Programming Windows®
Identity Foundation

Apply the principles—and patterns—for implementing claims-based identity in your .NET solutions

Take control of access and identity management with Windows
Identity Foundation (WIF)—the claims-based identity model in
Microsoft .NET. Led by an insider on the WIF engineering team,
you’ll learn practical, scenario-based approaches for implementing
WIF in your Web applications and services—while streamlining
development and IT overhead.

Discover how to:
• Implement authentication and authorization in ASP.NET—
  without low-level code
• Delve deeper—examining WS-Federation and WS-Trust protocols
  in action
• Configure WIF for fine-grained control over identity management
• Implement Single Sign-On, Single Sign-Out, advanced session
  management, and other patterns
• Tackle advanced scenarios—from managing delegation to flowing
  identity across multiple tiers
• Employ claims-based identity in Windows Communication
  Foundation
• Use WIF to help secure applications and services hosted in
  Windows Azure™
• Extend WIF to Microsoft Silverlight® and ASP.NET MVC

Get code samples on the Web
For system requirements, see the Introduction.

About the Author
Vittorio Bertocci is a Senior Architect
Evangelist in the Developer Platform Evangelism
division at Microsoft, and a key member of the
extended engineering team for WIF. He is an
expert on identity, Windows Azure, and .NET
development; a frequent speaker at Microsoft
PDC, Tech•Ed, and other industry events; and
a coauthor of A Guide to Claims-Based Identity
and Access Control.

Windows Internals
Part 1

Mark Russinovich
David A. Solomon
Alex Ionescu

DEVELOPER ROADMAP

Start Here!
• Beginner-level instruction
• Easy to follow explanations and examples
• Exercises to build your first projects

Step by Step
• For experienced developers learning a
  new topic
• Focus on fundamental techniques and tools
• Hands-on tutorial with practice files plus
  eBook

Developer Reference
• Professional developers; intermediate to
  advanced
• Extensively covers essential topics and
  troubleshooting
• Features extensive, adaptable code examples

Focused Topics
• For programmers who develop
  complex or advanced solutions
• Specialized topics; narrow focus; deep
  coverage
• Features extensive, adaptable code examples

See inside cover
To our parents, who guided and inspired us to follow our dreams
Contents at a Glance

Windows Internals, Sixth Edition, Part 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Concepts and Tools</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>System Architecture</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>System Mechanisms</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Management Mechanisms</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Processes, Threads, and Jobs</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Networking</td>
<td>591</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Windows Internals, Sixth Edition, Part 2 (available Fall 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>I/O System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Storage Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Memory Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Cache Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>File Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Startup and Shutdown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Crash Dump Analysis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Contents

Windows Internals, Sixth Edition, Part 1

Introduction .......................................................... xvii

Chapter 1  Concepts and Tools  ........................................ 1
Windows Operating System Versions ................................. 1
Foundation Concepts and Terms ..................................... 2
  Windows API .......................................................... 2
  Services, Functions, and Routines ................................. 4
  Processes, Threads, and Jobs ........................................ 5
  Virtual Memory ......................................................... 15
  Kernel Mode vs. User Mode ......................................... 17
  Terminal Services and Multiple Sessions ......................... 20
  Objects and Handles ................................................ 21
  Security .............................................................. 22
  Registry ............................................................. 23
  Unicode ............................................................. 24
Digging into Windows Internals ....................................... 24
  Performance Monitor ............................................... 25
  Kernel Debugging .................................................. 26
  Windows Software Development Kit ............................... 31
  Windows Driver Kit ................................................ 31
  Sysinternals Tools ................................................ 32
Conclusion .................................................................... 32

Chapter 2  System Architecture ........................................ 33
Requirements and Design Goals ...................................... 33
  Operating System Model ............................................ 34
Architecture Overview ................................................ 35
  Portability ............................................................ 37
  Symmetric Multiprocessing .......................................... 38
Contents

Scalability ................................................................. 40
Differences Between Client and Server Versions .............. 41
Checked Build ............................................................ 45

Key System Components ............................................... 46
  Environment Subsystems and Subsystem DLLs .................. 48
  Ntdll.dll .................................................................... 53
  Executive .................................................................. 54
  Kernel ..................................................................... 57
  Hardware Abstraction Layer ....................................... 60
  Device Drivers ........................................................... 63
  System Processes ....................................................... 68

Conclusion .................................................................. 78

Chapter 3 System Mechanisms ........................................ 79
  Trap Dispatching ........................................................ 79
  Interrupt Dispatching .................................................. 81
  Timer Processing ........................................................ 112
  Exception Dispatching ................................................ 123
  System Service Dispatching ....................................... 132

  Object Manager .......................................................... 140
    Executive Objects ...................................................... 143
    Object Structure ....................................................... 145

  Synchronization .......................................................... 176
    High-IRQL Synchronization ...................................... 178
    Low-IRQL Synchronization ....................................... 183

  System Worker Threads ............................................... 205
  Windows Global Flags ............................................... 207

  Advanced Local Procedure Call .................................... 209
    Connection Model ....................................................... 210
    Message Model ........................................................ 211
    Asynchronous Operation ......................................... 213

    Views, Regions, and Sections .................................. 214
    Attributes ............................................................... 215
    Blobs, Handles, and Resources ................................ 215
    Security .................................................................. 216
    Performance ............................................................. 217
    Debugging and Tracing .............................................. 218
Kernel Event Tracing .......................................................... 220
Wow64 ........................................................................... 224
  Wow64 Process Address Space Layout .......................... 224
System Calls ................................................................. 225
Exception Dispatching .................................................... 225
User APC Dispatching .................................................... 225
Console Support ............................................................. 225
User Callbacks ............................................................... 226
File System Redirection ................................................ 226
Registry Redirection ...................................................... 227
I/O Control Requests ..................................................... 227
16-Bit Installer Applications .......................................... 228
Printing ......................................................................... 228
Restrictions .................................................................... 228
User-Mode Debugging ................................................... 229
  Kernel Support ............................................................ 229
  Native Support ........................................................... 230
  Windows Subsystem Support ..................................... 232
Image Loader ................................................................. 232
  Early Process Initialization ....................................... 234
  DLL Name Resolution and Redirection ....................... 235
  Loaded Module Database ........................................... 238
  Import Parsing .......................................................... 242
  Post-Import Process Initialization ............................... 243
  SwitchBack ............................................................... 244
  API Sets .................................................................... 245
Hypervisor (Hyper-V) .................................................... 248
  Partitions .................................................................. 249
  Parent Partition ........................................................ 249
  Child Partitions ........................................................ 251
  Hardware Emulation and Support ............................... 254
Kernel Transaction Manager .......................................... 268
Hotpatch Support .......................................................... 270
Kernel Patch Protection .................................................. 272
Code Integrity ............................................................... 274
Conclusion ..................................................................... 276
Chapter 6  Security  487

Security Ratings .................................................. 487
   Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria .......... 487
   The Common Criteria ........................................ 489
Security System Components .................................. 490
Protecting Objects ................................................ 494
   Access Checks ................................................. 495
   Security Identifiers ........................................... 497
   Virtual Service Accounts .................................... 518
   Security Descriptors and Access Control ................ 522
The AuthZ API .................................................... 536
Account Rights and Privileges ................................ 538
   Account Rights .............................................. 540
   Privileges ..................................................... 540
   Super Privileges ............................................. 546
Access Tokens of Processes and Threads .................... 547
Security Auditing .................................................. 548
   Object Access Auditing .................................... 549
   Global Audit Policy ......................................... 552
   Advanced Audit Policy Settings ......................... 554
Logon ............................................................... 555
   Winlogon Initialization .................................... 556
   User Logon Steps ............................................ 558
   Assured Authentication ..................................... 562
   Biometric Framework for User Authentication .......... 563
User Account Control and Virtualization ..................... 566
   File System and Registry Virtualization ................ 566
   Elevation ....................................................... 573
Application Identification (AppID) ............................. 581
AppLocker .......................................................... 583
Software Restriction Policies ................................... 589
Conclusion ........................................................ 590
## Chapter 7 Networking

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Windows Networking Architecture</td>
<td>591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The OSI Reference Model</td>
<td>592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows Networking Components</td>
<td>594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networking APIs</td>
<td>597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows Sockets</td>
<td>597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winsock Kernel</td>
<td>603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remote Procedure Call</td>
<td>605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Web Access APIs</td>
<td>610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Named Pipes and Mailslots</td>
<td>612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NetBIOS</td>
<td>618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Networking APIs</td>
<td>620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Redirector Support</td>
<td>627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Provider Router</td>
<td>627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple UNC Provider</td>
<td>630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surrogate Providers</td>
<td>632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redirector</td>
<td>633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mini-Redirectors</td>
<td>634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Server Message Block and Sub-Redirectors</td>
<td>635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distributed File System Namespace</td>
<td>637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distributed File System Replication</td>
<td>638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offline Files</td>
<td>639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caching Modes</td>
<td>641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghosts</td>
<td>643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Security</td>
<td>643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cache Structure</td>
<td>643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BranchCache</td>
<td>645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caching Modes</td>
<td>647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BranchCache Optimized Application Retrieval:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMB Sequence</td>
<td>651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HTTP Sequence</td>
<td>653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name Resolution</td>
<td>655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domain Name System</td>
<td>655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peer Name Resolution Protocol</td>
<td>656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location and Topology</td>
<td>658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Location Awareness</td>
<td>658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Connectivity Status Indicator</td>
<td>659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Link-Layer Topology Discovery</td>
<td>662</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Protocol Drivers ................................................................. 663
  Windows Filtering Platform ............................................ 666
NDIS Drivers ....................................................................... 672
  Variations on the NDIS Miniport ......................................... 677
  Connection-Oriented NDIS ................................................ 677
  Remote NDIS ................................................................. 680
  QoS .............................................................................. 682
Binding .............................................................................. 684
Layered Network Services .................................................. 685
  Remote Access ............................................................. 685
  Active Directory ............................................................ 686
  Network Load Balancing .................................................. 688
  Network Access Protection .............................................. 689
  Direct Access ............................................................... 695
Conclusion ........................................................................ 696

Index ................................................................. 697

Windows Internals, Sixth Edition, Part 2 (available Fall 2012)

Introduction

Chapter 8  I/O System
  I/O System Components
  Device Drivers
  I/O Processing
  Kernel-Mode Driver Framework (KMDF)
  User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)
  The Plug and Play (PnP) Manager
  The Power Manager
  Conclusion

Chapter 9  Storage Management
  Storage Terminology
  Disk Drivers
  Volume Management
  BitLocker Drive Encryption
  Volume Shadow Copy Service
  Conclusion

xiv  Contents
Chapter 10 Memory Management
Introduction to the Memory Manager
Services the Memory Manager Provides
Kernel-Mode Heaps (System Memory Pools)
Heap Manager
Virtual Address Space Layouts
Address Translation
Page Fault Handling
Stacks
Virtual Address Descriptors
NUMA
Section Objects
Driver Verifier
Page Frame Number Database
Physical Memory Limits
Working Sets
Proactive Memory Management (SuperFetch)
Conclusion

Chapter 11 Cache Manager
Key Features of the Cache Manager
Cache Virtual Memory Management
Cache Size
Cache Data Structures
File System Interfaces
Fast I/O
Read Ahead and Write Behind
Conclusion

Chapter 12 File Systems
Windows File System Formats
File System Driver Architecture
Troubleshooting File System Problems
Common Log File System
NTFS Design Goals and Features
NTFS File System Driver
NTFS On-Disk Structure
NTFS Recovery Support
Encrypting File System Security
Conclusion

Chapter 13  Startup and Shutdown
Boot Process
Troubleshooting Boot and Startup Problems
Shutdown
Conclusion

Chapter 14  Crash Dump Analysis
Why Does Windows Crash?
The Blue Screen
Troubleshooting Crashes
Crash Dump Files
Windows Error Reporting
Online Crash Analysis
Basic Crash Dump Analysis
Using Crash Troubleshooting Tools
Advanced Crash Dump Analysis
Conclusion

What do you think of this book? We want to hear from you!
Microsoft is interested in hearing your feedback so we can continually improve our books and learning resources for you. To participate in a brief online survey, please visit: microsoft.com/learning/booksurvey
Introduction

*Windows Internals, Sixth Edition* is intended for advanced computer professionals (both developers and system administrators) who want to understand how the core components of the Microsoft Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 operating systems work internally. With this knowledge, developers can better comprehend the rationale behind design choices when building applications specific to the Windows platform. Such knowledge can also help developers debug complex problems. System administrators can benefit from this information as well, because understanding how the operating system works “under the covers” facilitates understanding the performance behavior of the system and makes troubleshooting system problems much easier when things go wrong. After reading this book, you should have a better understanding of how Windows works and why it behaves as it does.

Structure of the Book

For the first time, *Windows Internals* has been divided into two parts. Updating the book for each release of Windows takes considerable time so producing it in two parts allows us to publish the first part earlier.

This book, Part 1, begins with two chapters that define key concepts, introduce the tools used in the book, and describe the overall system architecture and components. The next two chapters present key underlying system and management mechanisms. Part 1 wraps up by covering three core components of the operating system: processes, threads, and jobs; security; and networking.

Part 2, which will be available separately in fall 2012, covers the remaining core subsystems: I/O, storage, memory management, the cache manager, and file systems. Part 2 concludes with a description of the startup and shutdown processes and a description of crash-dump analysis.
History of the Book

This is the sixth edition of a book that was originally called *Inside Windows NT* (Microsoft Press, 1992), written by Helen Custer (prior to the initial release of Microsoft Windows NT 3.1). *Inside Windows NT* was the first book ever published about Windows NT and provided key insights into the architecture and design of the system. *Inside Windows NT, Second Edition* (Microsoft Press, 1998) was written by David Solomon. It updated the original book to cover Windows NT 4.0 and had a greatly increased level of technical depth.

*Inside Windows 2000, Third Edition* (Microsoft Press, 2000) was authored by David Solomon and Mark Russinovich. It added many new topics, such as startup and shutdown, service internals, registry internals, file-system drivers, and networking. It also covered kernel changes in Windows 2000, such as the Windows Driver Model (WDM), Plug and Play, power management, Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), encryption, the job object, and Terminal Services. *Windows Internals, Fourth Edition* was the Windows XP and Windows Server 2003 update and added more content focused on helping IT professionals make use of their knowledge of Windows internals, such as using key tools from Windows Sysinternals (www.microsoft.com/technet/sysinternals) and analyzing crash dumps. *Windows Internals, Fifth Edition* was the update for Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008. New content included the image loader, user-mode debugging facility, and Hyper-V.

Sixth Edition Changes

This latest edition has been updated to cover the kernel changes made in Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2. Hands-on experiments have been updated to reflect changes in tools.

Hands-on Experiments

Even without access to the Windows source code, you can glean much about Windows internals from tools such as the kernel debugger and tools from Sysinternals and Winsider Seminars & Solutions. When a tool can be used to expose or demonstrate some aspect of the internal behavior of Windows, the steps for trying the tool yourself are listed in “EXPERIMENT” boxes. These appear throughout the book, and we encourage you to try these as you’re reading—seeing visible proof of how Windows works internally will make much more of an impression on you than just reading about it will.
Topics Not Covered

Windows is a large and complex operating system. This book doesn’t cover everything relevant to Windows internals but instead focuses on the base system components. For example, this book doesn’t describe COM+, the Windows distributed object-oriented programming infrastructure, or the Microsoft .NET Framework, the foundation of managed code applications.

Because this is an internals book and not a user, programming, or system administration book, it doesn’t describe how to use, program, or configure Windows.

A Warning and a Caveat

Because this book describes undocumented behavior of the internal architecture and the operation of the Windows operating system (such as internal kernel structures and functions), this content is subject to change between releases. (External interfaces, such as the Windows API, are not subject to incompatible changes.)

By “subject to change,” we don’t necessarily mean that details described in this book will change between releases, but you can’t count on them not changing. Any software that uses these undocumented interfaces might not work on future releases of Windows. Even worse, software that runs in kernel mode (such as device drivers) and uses these undocumented interfaces might experience a system crash when running on a newer release of Windows.

Acknowledgments

First, thanks to Jamie Hanrahan and Brian Catlin of Azius, LLC for joining us on this project—the book would not have been finished without their help. They did the bulk of the updates on the “Security” and “Networking” chapters and contributed to the update of the “Management Mechanisms” and “Processes and Threads” chapters. Azius provides Windows-internals and device-driver training. See www.azius.com for more information.

We want to recognize Alex Ionescu, who for this edition is a full coauthor. This is a reflection of Alex’s extensive work on the fifth edition, as well as his continuing work on this edition.
Thanks to Eric Traut and Jon DeVaan for continuing to allow David Solomon access to the Windows source code for his work on this book as well as continued development of his Windows Internals courses.

Three key reviewers were not acknowledged for their review and contributions to the fifth edition: Arun Kishan, Landy Wang, and Aaron Margosis—thanks again to them! And thanks again to Arun and Landy for their detailed review and helpful input for this edition.

This book wouldn't contain the depth of technical detail or the level of accuracy it has without the review, input, and support of key members of the Microsoft Windows development team. Therefore, we want to thank the following people, who provided technical review and input to the book:

- Greg Cottingham
- Joe Hamburg
- Jeff Lambert
- Pavel Lebedynskiy
- Joseph East
- Adi Oltean
- Alexey Pakhunov
- Valerie See

For the “Networking” chapter, a special thanks to Gianluigi Nusca and Tom Jolly, who really went beyond the call of duty: Gianluigi for his extraordinary help with the BranchCache material and the amount of suggestions (and many paragraphs of material he wrote), and Tom Jolly not only for his own review and suggestions (which were excellent), but for getting many other developers to assist with the review. Here are all those who reviewed and contributed to the “Networking” chapter:

- Roopesh Battepati
- Molly Brown
- Greg Cottingham
- Dotan Elharrar
- Eric Hanson
- Tom Jolly
Amos Ortal and Dotan Elharrar were extremely helpful on NAP, and Shiva Kumar Thangapandi helped extensively with EAP.

The detailed checking Christophe Nasarre, overall technical reviewer, performed contributed greatly to the technical accuracy and consistency in the book.

We would like to again thank Ilfak Guilfanov of Hex-Rays (www.hex-rays.com) for the IDA Pro Advanced and Hex-Rays licenses they granted to Alex Ionescu so that he could speed up his reverse engineering of the Windows kernel.

Finally, the authors would like to thank the great staff at Microsoft Press who have been behind turning this book into a reality. Devon Musgrave served double duty as acquisitions editor and developmental editor, while Carol Dillingham oversaw the title as its project editor. Editorial and production manager Steve Sagman, copy editor Roger LeBlanc, proofreader Audrey Marr, and indexer Christina Yeager also contributed to the quality of this book.

Last but not least, thanks to Ben Ryan, publisher of Microsoft Press, who continues to believe in the importance of providing this level of detail about Windows to their readers!
Errata & Book Support

We've made every effort to ensure the accuracy of this book. Any errors that have been reported since this book was published are listed on our Microsoft Press site at oreilly.com:

http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=245675

If you find an error that is not already listed, you can report it to us through the same page.

If you need additional support, email Microsoft Press Book Support at mspinput@microsoft.com.

Please note that product support for Microsoft software is not offered through the addresses above.

We Want to Hear from You

At Microsoft Press, your satisfaction is our top priority, and your feedback our most valuable asset. Please tell us what you think of this book at:

http://www.microsoft.com/learning/booksurvey

The survey is short, and we read every one of your comments and ideas. Thanks in advance for your input!

Stay in Touch

Let's keep the conversation going! We're on Twitter: http://twitter.com/MicrosoftPress.
CHAPTER 1

Concepts and Tools

In this chapter, we’ll introduce the key Microsoft Windows operating system concepts and terms we’ll be using throughout this book, such as the Windows API, processes, threads, virtual memory, kernel mode and user mode, objects, handles, security, and the registry. We’ll also introduce the tools that you can use to explore Windows internals, such as the kernel debugger, the Performance Monitor, and key tools from Windows Sysinternals (www.microsoft.com/technet/sysinternals). In addition, we’ll explain how you can use the Windows Driver Kit (WDK) and the Windows Software Development Kit (SDK) as resources for finding further information on Windows internals.

Be sure that you understand everything in this chapter—the remainder of the book is written assuming that you do.

Windows Operating System Versions

This book covers the most recent version of the Microsoft Windows client and server operating systems: Windows 7 (32-bit and 64-bit versions) and Windows Server 2008 R2 (64-bit version only). Unless specifically stated, the text applies to all versions. As background information, Table 1-1 lists the Windows product names, their internal version number, and their release date.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product Name</th>
<th>Internal Version Number</th>
<th>Release Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Windows NT 3.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>July 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows NT 3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>September 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows NT 3.51</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>May 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows NT 4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>July 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows 2000</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>December 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows XP</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>August 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows Server 2003</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>March 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows Vista</td>
<td>6.0 (Build 6000)</td>
<td>January 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows Server 2008</td>
<td>6.0 (Build 6001)</td>
<td>March 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows 7</td>
<td>6.1 (Build 7600)</td>
<td>October 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows Server 2008 R2</td>
<td>6.1 (Build 7600)</td>
<td>October 2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note The “7” in the “Windows 7” product name does not refer to the internal version number, but is rather a generational index. In fact, to minimize application compatibility issues, the version number for Windows 7 is actually 6.1, as shown in Table 1-1. This allows applications checking for the major version number to continue behaving on Windows 7 as they did on Windows Vista. In fact, Windows 7 and Server 2008 R2 have identical version/build numbers because they were built from the same Windows code base.

Foundation Concepts and Terms

In the course of this book, we’ll be referring to some structures and concepts that might be unfamiliar to some readers. In this section, we’ll define the terms we’ll be using throughout. You should become familiar with them before proceeding to subsequent chapters.

Windows API

The Windows application programming interface (API) is the user-mode system programming interface to the Windows operating system family. Prior to the introduction of 64-bit versions of Windows, the programming interface to the 32-bit versions of the Windows operating systems was called the Win32 API to distinguish it from the original 16-bit Windows API, which was the programming interface to the original 16-bit versions of Windows. In this book, the term Windows API refers to both the 32-bit and 64-bit programming interfaces to Windows.

Note The Windows API is described in the Windows Software Development Kit (SDK) documentation. (See the section “Windows Software Development Kit” later in this chapter.) This documentation is available for free viewing online at www.msdn.microsoft.com. It is also included with all subscription levels to the Microsoft Developer Network (MSDN), Microsoft’s support program for developers. For more information, see www.msdn.microsoft.com. An excellent description of how to program the Windows base API is in the book Windows via C/C++, Fifth Edition by Jeffrey Richter and Christophe Nasarre (Microsoft Press, 2007).

The Windows API consists of thousands of callable functions, which are divided into the following major categories:

- Base Services
- Component Services
- User Interface Services
This book focuses on the internals of the key base services, such as processes and threads, memory management, I/O, and security.

What About .NET?

The Microsoft .NET Framework consists of a library of classes called the Framework Class Library (FCL) and a Common Language Runtime (CLR) that provides a managed code execution environment with features such as just-in-time compilation, type verification, garbage collection, and code access security. By offering these features, the CLR provides a development environment that improves programmer productivity and reduces common programming errors. For an excellent description of the .NET Framework and its core architecture, see *CLR via C#*, Third Edition by Jeffrey Richter (Microsoft Press, 2010).

The CLR is implemented as a classic COM server whose code resides in a standard user-mode Windows DLL. In fact, all components of the .NET Framework are implemented as standard user-mode Windows DLLs layered over unmanaged Windows API functions. (None of the .NET Framework runs in kernel mode.) Figure 1-1 illustrates the relationship between these components:

![Figure 1-1 Relationship between .NET Framework components](image-url)
History of the Win32 API

Interestingly, Win32 wasn’t slated to be the original programming interface to what was then called Windows NT. Because the Windows NT project started as a replacement for OS/2 version 2, the primary programming interface was the 32-bit OS/2 Presentation Manager API. A year into the project, however, Microsoft Windows 3.0 hit the market and took off. As a result, Microsoft changed direction and made Windows NT the future replacement for the Windows family of products as opposed to the replacement for OS/2. It was at this juncture that the need to specify the Windows API arose—before this, in Windows 3.0, the API existed only as a 16-bit interface.

Although the Windows API would introduce many new functions that hadn’t been available on Windows 3.1, Microsoft decided to make the new API compatible with the 16-bit Windows API function names, semantics, and use of data types whenever possible to ease the burden of porting existing 16-bit Windows applications to Windows NT. This explains why many function names and interfaces might seem inconsistent: this was required to ensure that the then new Windows API was compatible with the old 16-bit Windows API.

Services, Functions, and Routines

Several terms in the Windows user and programming documentation have different meanings in different contexts. For example, the word service can refer to a callable routine in the operating system, a device driver, or a server process. The following list describes what certain terms mean in this book:

- **Windows API functions**  Documented, callable subroutines in the Windows API. Examples include CreateProcess, CreateFile, and GetMessage.

- **Native system services (or system calls)**  The undocumented, underlying services in the operating system that are callable from user mode. For example, NtCreateUserProcess is the internal system service the Windows CreateProcess function calls to create a new process. For a definition of system calls, see the section “System Service Dispatching” in Chapter 3, “System Mechanisms.”

- **Kernel support functions (or routines)**  Subroutines inside the Windows operating system that can be called only from kernel mode (defined later in this chapter). For example, ExAllocatePoolWithTag is the routine that device drivers call to allocate memory from the Windows system heaps (called pools).

- **Windows services**  Processes started by the Windows service control manager. For example, the Task Scheduler service runs in a user-mode process that supports the at command (which
is similar to the UNIX commands `at` or `cron`. (Note: although the registry defines Windows device drivers as “services,” they are not referred to as such in this book.)

**DLLs (dynamic-link libraries)** A set of callable subroutines linked together as a binary file that can be dynamically loaded by applications that use the subroutines. Examples include `Msvcrtd.dll` (the C run-time library) and `Kernel32.dll` (one of the Windows API subsystem libraries). Windows user-mode components and applications use DLLs extensively. The advantage DLLs provide over static libraries is that applications can share DLLs, and Windows ensures that there is only one in-memory copy of a DLL’s code among the applications that are referencing it. Note that nonexecutable .NET assemblies are compiled as DLLs but without any exported subroutines. Instead, the CLR parses compiled metadata to access the corresponding types and members.

### Processes, Threads, and Jobs

Although programs and processes appear similar on the surface, they are fundamentally different. A *program* is a static sequence of instructions, whereas a *process* is a container for a set of resources used when executing the instance of the program. At the highest level of abstraction, a Windows process comprises the following:

- A **private virtual address space**, which is a set of virtual memory addresses that the process can use
- An executable program, which defines initial code and data and is mapped into the process’ virtual address space
- A list of open handles to various system resources—such as semaphores, communication ports, and files—that are accessible to all threads in the process
- A security context called an **access token** that identifies the user, security groups, privileges, User Account Control (UAC) virtualization state, session, and limited user account state associated with the process
- A unique identifier called a **process ID** (internally part of an identifier called a **client ID**)
- At least one thread of execution (although an “empty” process is possible, it is not useful)

Each process also points to its parent or creator process. If the parent no longer exists, this information is not updated. Therefore, it is possible for a process to refer to a nonexistent parent. This is not a problem, because nothing relies on this information being kept current. In the case of ProcessExplorer, the start time of the parent process is taken into account to avoid attaching a child process based on a reused process ID. The following experiment illustrates this behavior.
EXPERIMENT: Viewing the Process Tree

One unique attribute about a process that most tools don’t display is the parent or creator process ID. You can retrieve this value with the Performance Monitor (or programmatically) by querying the Creating Process ID. The Tlist.exe tool (in the Debugging Tools for Windows) can show the process tree by using the /t switch. Here’s an example of output from \tlist /t:

C:\>tlist /t
System Process (0)
System (4)
  smss.exe (224)
  csrss.exe (384)
  csrss.exe (444)
    conhost.exe (3076) OleMainThreadWndName
  winlogon.exe (496)
  wininit.exe (504)
    services.exe (580)
      svchost.exe (696)
      svchost.exe (796)
      svchost.exe (912)
      svchost.exe (948)
      svchost.exe (988)
      svchost.exe (244)
        WUDFHost.exe (1008)
          dwm.exe (2912) DWM Notification Window
  btwdins.exe (268)
  svchost.exe (1104)
  svchost.exe (1192)
  svchost.exe (1368)
  svchost.exe (1400)
  spoolsv.exe (1560)
  svchost.exe (1860)
  svchost.exe (1936)
  svchost.exe (1124)
  svchost.exe (1440)
  svchost.exe (2276)
    taskhost.exe (2816) Task Host Window
  svchost.exe (892)
  lsass.exe (588)
  lsm.exe (596)
  explorer.exe (2968) Program Manager
    cmd.exe (1832) Administrator: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe - "c:\tlist.exe" /t
      tlist.exe (2448)

The list indents each process to show its parent/child relationship. Processes whose parents aren’t alive are left-justified (as is Explorer.exe in the preceding example) because even if a grandparent process exists, there’s no way to find that relationship. Windows maintains only the creator process ID, not a link back to the creator of the creator, and so forth.
To demonstrate the fact that Windows doesn’t keep track of more than just the parent process ID, follow these steps:

1. Open a Command Prompt window.
2. Type `title Parent` (to change the window title to Parent).
3. Type `start cmd` (which starts a second command prompt).
4. Type `title Child` in the second command prompt.
5. Bring up Task Manager.
6. Type `mspaint` (which runs Microsoft Paint) in the second command prompt.
7. Go back to the second command prompt and type `exit`. (Notice that Paint remains.)
8. Switch to Task Manager.
9. Click on the Applications tab.
10. Right-click on the Parent task, and select Go To Process.
11. Right-click on this cmd.exe process, and select End Process Tree.
12. Click End Process Tree in the Task Manager confirmation message box.

The first command prompt window will disappear, but you should still see the Paint window because it was the grandchild of the command prompt process you terminated; and because the intermediate process (the parent of Paint) was terminated, there was no link between the parent and the grandchild.

A number of tools for viewing (and modifying) processes and process information are available. The following experiments illustrate the various views of process information you can obtain with some of these tools. While many of these tools are included within Windows itself and within the Debugging Tools for Windows and the Windows SDK, others are stand-alone tools from Sysinternals. Many of these tools show overlapping subsets of the core process and thread information, sometimes identified by different names.

Probably the most widely used tool to examine process activity is Task Manager. (Because there is no such thing as a “task” in the Windows kernel, the name of this tool, Task Manager, is a bit odd.) The following experiment shows the difference between what Task Manager lists as applications and processes.
EXPERIMENT: Viewing Process Information with Task Manager

The built-in Windows Task Manager provides a quick list of the processes on the system. You can start Task Manager in one of four ways: (1) press Ctrl+Shift+Esc, (2) right-click on the taskbar and click Start Task Manager, (3) press Ctrl+Alt+Delete and click the Start Task Manager button, or (4) start the executable Taskmgr.exe. Once Task Manager has started, click on the Processes tab to see the list of processes. Notice that processes are identified by the name of the image of which they are an instance. Unlike some objects in Windows, processes can’t be given global names. To display additional details, choose Select Columns from the View menu and select additional columns to be added, as shown here:

Although the Task Manager Processes tab shows a list of processes, what the Applications tab displays isn’t as obvious. The Applications tab lists the top-level visible windows on all the desktops in the interactive window station you are connected to. (By default, there is only one interactive desktop—an application can create more by using the Windows CreateDesktop function, as is done by the Sysinternals Desktops tool.) The Status column indicates whether or not the thread that owns the window is in a window message wait state. “Running” means the thread is waiting for windowing input; “Not Responding” means the thread isn’t waiting for windowing input (for example, the thread might be running or waiting for I/O or some Windows synchronization object).
On the Applications tab, you can match a task to the process that owns the thread that owns the task window by right-clicking on the task name and choosing Go To Process as shown in the previous list experiment.

Process Explorer, from Sysinternals, shows more details about processes and threads than any other available tool, which is why you will see it used in a number of experiments throughout the book. The following are some of the unique things that Process Explorer shows or enables:

- Process security token (such as lists of groups and privileges and the virtualization state)
- Highlighting to show changes in the process and thread list
- List of services inside service-hosting processes, including the display name and description
- Processes that are part of a job and job details
- Processes hosting .NET applications and .NET-specific details (such as the list of AppDomains, loaded assemblies, and CLR performance counters)
- Start time for processes and threads
- Complete list of memory-mapped files (not just DLLs)
- Ability to suspend a process or a thread
- Ability to kill an individual thread
Easy identification of which processes were consuming the most CPU time over a period of time (The Performance Monitor can display process CPU utilization for a given set of processes, but it won’t automatically show processes created after the performance monitoring session has started—only a manual trace in binary output format can do that.)

Process Explorer also provides easy access to information in one place, such as:

- Process tree (with the ability to collapse parts of the tree)
- Open handles in a process (including unnamed handles)
- List of DLLs (and memory-mapped files) in a process
- Thread activity within a process
- User-mode and kernel-mode thread stacks (including the mapping of addresses to names using the Dbghelp.dll that comes with the Debugging Tools for Windows)
- More accurate CPU percentage using the thread cycle count (an even better representation of precise CPU activity, as explained in Chapter 5, “Processes and Threads”)
- Integrity level
- Memory manager details such as peak commit charge and kernel memory paged and nonpaged pool limits (other tools show only current size)

An introductory experiment using Process Explorer follows.

**EXPERIMENT: Viewing Process Details with Process Explorer**

Download the latest version of Process Explorer from Sysinternals and run it. The first time you run it, you will receive a message that symbols are not currently configured. If properly configured, Process Explorer can access symbol information to display the symbolic name of the thread start function and functions on a thread’s call stack (available by double-clicking on a process and clicking on the Threads tab). This is useful for identifying what threads are doing within a process. To access symbols, you must have the Debugging Tools for Windows installed (described later in this chapter). Then click on Options, choose Configure Symbols, and fill in the path to the Dbghelp.dll in the Debugging Tools folder and a valid symbol path. For example, on a 64-bit system this configuration is correct:
In the preceding example, the on-demand symbol server is being used to access symbols and a copy of the symbol files is being stored on the local machine in the c:\symbols folder. For more information on configuring the use of the symbol server, see http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/hardware/gg462988.aspx.

When Process Explorer starts, it shows by default the process tree view. It has an optional lower pane that can show open handles or mapped DLLs and memory-mapped files. (These are explored in Chapter 3, “System Mechanisms” in Part 1 and Chapter 10, “Memory Management” in Part 2.) It also shows tooltips for several kinds of hosting processes:

- The services inside a service-hosting process (Svchost.exe) if you hover your mouse over the name
- The COM object tasks inside a Taskeng.exe process (started by the Task Scheduler)
- The target of a Rundll32.exe process (used for things such as Control Panel items)
- The COM object being hosted inside a Dllhost.exe process
- Internet Explorer tab processes
- Console host processes

Here are a few steps to walk you through some basic capabilities of Process Explorer:

1. Notice that processes hosting services are highlighted by default in pink. Your own processes are highlighted in blue. (These colors can be configured.)
2. Hover your mouse pointer over the image name for processes, and notice the full path displayed by the tooltip. As noted earlier, certain types of processes have additional details in the tooltip.

3. Click on View, Select Columns from the Process Image tab, and add the image path.

4. Sort by clicking on the process column, and notice the tree view disappears. (You can either display tree view or sort by any of the columns shown.) Click again to sort from Z to A. Then click again, and the display returns to tree view.

5. Deselect View, Show Processes From All Users to show only your processes.

6. Go to Options, Difference Highlight Duration, and change the value to 5 seconds. Then launch a new process (anything), and notice the new process highlighted in green for 5 seconds. Exit this new process, and notice the process is highlighted in red for 5 seconds before disappearing from the display. This can be useful to see processes being created and exiting on your system.

7. Finally, double-click on a process and explore the various tabs available from the process properties display. (These will be referenced in various experiments throughout the book where the information being shown is being explained.)

A **thread** is the entity within a process that Windows schedules for execution. Without it, the process’ program can’t run. A thread includes the following essential components:

- The contents of a set of CPU registers representing the state of the processor.
- Two stacks—one for the thread to use while executing in kernel mode and one for executing in user mode.
- A private storage area called **thread-local storage** (TLS) for use by subsystems, run-time libraries, and DLLs.
- A unique identifier called a **thread ID** (part of an internal structure called a **client ID**—process IDs and thread IDs are generated out of the same namespace, so they never overlap).
- Threads sometimes have their own security context, or token, that is often used by multi-threaded server applications that impersonate the security context of the clients that they serve.

The volatile registers, stacks, and private storage area are called the thread’s **context**. Because this information is different for each machine architecture that Windows runs on, this structure, by necessity, is architecture-specific. The Windows **GetThreadContext** function provides access to this architecture-specific information (called the CONTEXT block).
The threads of a 32-bit application running on a 64-bit version of Windows will contain both 32-bit and 64-bit contexts, which Wow64 will use to switch the application from running in 32-bit to 64-bit mode when required. These threads will have two user stacks and two CONTEXT blocks, and the usual Windows API functions will return the 64-bit context instead. The Wow64GetThreadContext function, however, will return the 32-bit context. See Chapter 3 for more information on Wow64.

Fibers and User-Mode Scheduler Threads

Because switching execution from one thread to another involves the kernel scheduler, it can be an expensive operation, especially if two threads are often switching between each other. Windows implements two mechanisms for reducing this cost: fibers and user-mode scheduling (UMS).

Fibers allow an application to schedule its own “threads” of execution rather than rely on the priority-based scheduling mechanism built into Windows. Fibers are often called “light-weight” threads, and in terms of scheduling, they’re invisible to the kernel because they’re implemented in user mode in Kernel32.dll. To use fibers, a call is first made to the Windows ConvertThreadToFiber function. This function converts the thread to a running fiber. Afterward, the newly converted fiber can create additional fibers with the CreateFiber function. (Each fiber can have its own set of fibers.) Unlike a thread, however, a fiber doesn’t begin execution until it’s manually selected through a call to the SwitchToFiber function. The new fiber runs until it exits or until it calls SwitchToFiber, again selecting another fiber to run. For more information, see the Windows SDK documentation on fiber functions.

UMS threads, which are available only on 64-bit versions of Windows, provide the same basic advantages as fibers, without many of the disadvantages. UMS threads have their own kernel thread state and are therefore visible to the kernel, which allows multiple UMS threads to issue blocking system calls, share and contend on resources, and have per-thread state. However, as long as two or more UMS threads only need to perform work in user mode, they can periodically switch execution contexts (by yielding from one thread to another) without involving the scheduler: the context switch is done in user mode. From the kernel’s perspective, the same kernel thread is still running and nothing has changed. When a UMS thread performs an operation that requires entering the kernel (such as a system call), it switches to its dedicated kernel-mode thread (called a directed context switch). See Chapter 5 for more information on UMS.

Although threads have their own execution context, every thread within a process shares the process’ virtual address space (in addition to the rest of the resources belonging to the process), meaning that all the threads in a process have full read-write access to the process virtual address space. Threads cannot accidentally reference the address space of another process, however, unless the other process makes available part of its private address space as a shared memory section (called
a file mapping object in the Windows API) or unless one process has the right to open another process to use cross-process memory functions such as `ReadProcessMemory` and `WriteProcessMemory`.

In addition to a private address space and one or more threads, each process has a security context and a list of open handles to kernel objects such as files, shared memory sections, or one of the synchronization objects such as mutexes, events, or semaphores, as illustrated in Figure 1-2.

![Figure 1-2: A process and its resources](image)

Each process’ security context is stored in an object called an access token. The process access token contains the security identification and credentials for the process. By default, threads don’t have their own access token, but they can obtain one, thus allowing individual threads to impersonate the security context of another process—including processes on a remote Windows system—without affecting other threads in the process. (See Chapter 6, “Security,” for more details on process and thread security.)

The virtual address descriptors (VADs) are data structures that the memory manager uses to keep track of the virtual addresses the process is using. These data structures are described in more depth in Chapter 10 in Part 2.

Windows provides an extension to the process model called a job. A job object’s main function is to allow groups of processes to be managed and manipulated as a unit. A job object allows control of certain attributes and provides limits for the process or processes associated with the job. It also records basic accounting information for all processes associated with the job and for all processes that were associated with the job but have since terminated. In some ways, the job object compensates for the lack of a structured process tree in Windows—yet in many ways it is more powerful than a UNIX-style process tree.

You’ll find out much more about the internal structure of jobs, processes, and threads; the mechanics of process and thread creation; and the thread-scheduling algorithms in Chapter 5.
Virtual Memory

Windows implements a virtual memory system based on a flat (linear) address space that provides each process with the illusion of having its own large, private address space. Virtual memory provides a logical view of memory that might not correspond to its physical layout. At run time, the memory manager, with assistance from hardware, translates, or maps, the virtual addresses into physical addresses, where the data is actually stored. By controlling the protection and mapping, the operating system can ensure that individual processes don't bump into one another or overwrite operating system data. Figure 1-3 illustrates three virtually contiguous pages mapped to three discontiguous pages in physical memory.

![Virtual memory](image)

**FIGURE 1-3** Mapping virtual memory to physical memory

Because most systems have much less physical memory than the total virtual memory in use by the running processes, the memory manager transfers, or pages, some of the memory contents to disk. Paging data to disk frees physical memory so that it can be used for other processes or for the operating system itself. When a thread accesses a virtual address that has been paged to disk, the virtual memory manager loads the information back into memory from disk. Applications don’t have to be altered in any way to take advantage of paging because hardware support enables the memory manager to page without the knowledge or assistance of processes or threads.

The size of the virtual address space varies for each hardware platform. On 32-bit x86 systems, the total virtual address space has a theoretical maximum of 4 GB. By default, Windows allocates half this address space (the lower half of the 4-GB virtual address space, from 0x00000000 through 0x7FFFFFFF) to processes for their unique private storage and uses the other half (the upper half, addresses 0x80000000 through 0xFFFFFFFF) for its own protected operating system memory utilization. The mappings of the lower half change to reflect the virtual address space of the currently executing process, but the mappings of the upper half always consist of the operating system's virtual memory. Windows supports boot-time options (the `increaseuserva` qualifier in the Boot Configuration Database, described in Chapter 13, “Startup and Shutdown,” in Part 2) that give processes running specially marked programs (the large address space aware flag must be set in the header of the executable image) the ability to use up to 3 GB of private address space (leaving 1 GB for the
operating system). This option allows applications such as database servers to keep larger portions of a database in the process address space, thus reducing the need to map subset views of the database. Figure 1-4 shows the two typical virtual address space layouts supported by 32-bit Windows. (The increaseuserva option allows anywhere from 2 to 3 GB to be used by marked applications.)

![Figure 1-4: Typical address space layouts for 32-bit Windows](image)

Although 3 GB is better than 2 GB, it's still not enough virtual address space to map very large (multigigabyte) databases. To address this need on 32-bit systems, Windows provides a mechanism called Address Windowing Extension (AWE), which allows a 32-bit application to allocate up to 64 GB of physical memory and then map views, or windows, into its 2-GB virtual address space. Although using AWE puts the burden of managing mappings of virtual to physical memory on the programmer, it does address the need of being able to directly access more physical memory than can be mapped at any one time in a 32-bit process address space.

64-bit Windows provides a much larger address space for processes: 7152 GB on IA-64 systems and 8192 GB on x64 systems. Figure 1-5 shows a simplified view of the 64-bit system address space layouts. (For a detailed description, see Chapter 10 in Part 2.) Note that these sizes do not represent the architectural limits for these platforms. Sixty-four bits of address space is over 17 billion GB, but current 64-bit hardware limits this to smaller values. And Windows implementation limits in the current versions of 64-bit Windows further reduce this to 8192 GB (8 TB).

![Figure 1-5: Address space layouts for 64-bit Windows](image)

Details of the implementation of the memory manager, including how address translation works and how Windows manages physical memory, are described in Chapter 10 in Part 2.
Kernel Mode vs. User Mode

To protect user applications from accessing and/or modifying critical operating system data, Windows uses two processor access modes (even if the processor on which Windows is running supports more than two): user mode and kernel mode. User application code runs in user mode, whereas operating system code (such as system services and device drivers) runs in kernel mode. Kernel mode refers to a mode of execution in a processor that grants access to all system memory and all CPU instructions. By providing the operating system software with a higher privilege level than the application software has, the processor provides a necessary foundation for operating system designers to ensure that a misbehaving application can’t disrupt the stability of the system as a whole.

### Note
The architectures of the x86 and x64 processors define four privilege levels (or rings) to protect system code and data from being overwritten either inadvertently or maliciously by code of lesser privilege. Windows uses privilege level 0 (or ring 0) for kernel mode and privilege level 3 (or ring 3) for user mode. The reason Windows uses only two levels is that some hardware architectures that were supported in the past (such as Compaq Alpha and Silicon Graphics MIPS) implemented only two privilege levels.

Although each Windows process has its own private memory space, the kernel-mode operating system and device driver code share a single virtual address space. Each page in virtual memory is tagged to indicate what access mode the processor must be in to read and/or write the page. Pages in system space can be accessed only from kernel mode, whereas all pages in the user address space are accessible from user mode. Read-only pages (such as those that contain static data) are not writable from any mode. Additionally, on processors that support no-execute memory protection, Windows marks pages containing data as nonexecutable, thus preventing inadvertent or malicious code execution in data areas.

32-bit Windows doesn’t provide any protection to private read/write system memory being used by components running in kernel mode. In other words, once in kernel mode, operating system and device driver code has complete access to system space memory and can bypass Windows security to access objects. Because the bulk of the Windows operating system code runs in kernel mode, it is vital that components that run in kernel mode be carefully designed and tested to ensure that they don’t violate system security or cause system instability.

This lack of protection also emphasizes the need to take care when loading a third-party device driver, because once in kernel mode the software has complete access to all operating system data. This weakness was one of the reasons behind the driver-signing mechanism introduced in Windows, which warns (and, if configured as such, blocks) the user if an attempt is made to add an unsigned Plug and Play driver. (See Chapter 8, “I/O System,” in Part 2 for more information on driver signing.) Also, a mechanism called Driver Verifier helps device driver writers to find bugs (such as buffer overruns or memory leaks) that can cause security or reliability issues. Driver Verifier is explained in Chapter 10 in Part 2.

On 64-bit versions of Windows, the Kernel Mode Code Signing (KMCS) policy dictates that any 64-bit device drivers (not just Plug and Play) must be signed with a cryptographic key assigned by
one of the major code certification authorities. The user cannot explicitly force the installation of an unsigned driver, even as an administrator, but, as a one-time exception, this restriction can be disabled manually at boot time by pressing F8 and choosing the advanced boot option Disable Driver Signature Enforcement. This causes a watermark on the desktop wallpaper and certain digital rights management (DRM) features to be disabled.

As you’ll see in Chapter 2, “System Architecture,” user applications switch from user mode to kernel mode when they make a system service call. For example, a Windows ReadFile function eventually needs to call the internal Windows routine that actually handles reading data from a file. That routine, because it accesses internal system data structures, must run in kernel mode. The transition from user mode to kernel mode is accomplished by the use of a special processor instruction that causes the processor to switch to kernel mode and enter the system service dispatching code in the kernel which calls the appropriate internal function in Ntoskrnl.exe or Win32k.sys. Before returning control to the user thread, the processor mode is switched back to user mode. In this way, the operating system protects itself and its data from perusal and modification by user processes.

**Note** A transition from user mode to kernel mode (and back) does not affect thread scheduling per se—a mode transition is not a context switch. Further details on system service dispatching are included in Chapter 3.

Thus, it’s normal for a user thread to spend part of its time executing in user mode and part in kernel mode. In fact, because the bulk of the graphics and windowing system also runs in kernel mode, graphics-intensive applications spend more of their time in kernel mode than in user mode. An easy way to test this is to run a graphics-intensive application such as Microsoft Paint or Microsoft Chess Titans and watch the time split between user mode and kernel mode using one of the performance counters listed in Table 1-2. More advanced applications can use newer technologies such as Direct2D and compositing, which perform bulk computations in user mode and send only the raw surface data to the kernel, reducing the time spent transitioning between user and kernel modes.

**TABLE 1-2 Mode-Related Performance Counters**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Object: Counter</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Processor: % Privileged Time</td>
<td>Percentage of time that an individual CPU (or all CPUs) has run in kernel mode during a specified interval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processor: % User Time</td>
<td>Percentage of time that an individual CPU (or all CPUs) has run in user mode during a specified interval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process: % Privileged Time</td>
<td>Percentage of time that the threads in a process have run in kernel mode during a specified interval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process: % User Time</td>
<td>Percentage of time that the threads in a process have run in user mode during a specified interval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thread: % Privileged Time</td>
<td>Percentage of time that a thread has run in kernel mode during a specified interval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thread: % User Time</td>
<td>Percentage of time that a thread has run in user mode during a specified interval</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXPERIMENT: Kernel Mode vs. User Mode

You can use the Performance Monitor to see how much time your system spends executing in kernel mode vs. in user mode. Follow these steps:

1. Run the Performance Monitor by opening the Start menu and selecting All Programs /Administrative Tools/Performance Monitor. Select the Performance Monitor node under Performance/Monitoring Tools on the left-side tree.
2. Click the Add button (+) on the toolbar.
3. Expand the Processor counter section, click the % Privileged Time counter and, while holding down the Ctrl key, click the % User Time counter.
4. Click Add, and then click OK.
5. Open a command prompt, and do a directory scan of your C drive over the network by typing `dir \%computername%\c$ /s`.

6. When you’re finished, just close the tool.
You can also quickly see this by using Task Manager. Just click the Performance tab, and then select Show Kernel Times from the View menu. The CPU usage bar will show total CPU usage in green and kernel-mode time in red.

To see how the Performance Monitor itself uses kernel time and user time, run it again, but add the individual Process counters % User Time and % Privileged Time for every process in the system:

1. If it’s not already running, run the Performance Monitor again. (If it is already running, start with a blank display by right-clicking in the graph area and selecting Remove All Counters.)

2. Click the Add button (+) on the toolbar.

3. In the available counters area, expand the Process section.

4. Select the % Privileged Time and % User Time counters.

5. Select a few processes in the Instance box (such as mmc, csrss, and Idle).

6. Click Add, and then click OK.

7. Move the mouse rapidly back and forth.

8. Press Ctrl+H to turn on highlighting mode. This highlights the currently selected counter in black.

9. Scroll through the counters at the bottom of the display to identify the processes whose threads were running when you moved the mouse, and note whether they were running in user mode or kernel mode.

You should see the Performance Monitor process (by looking in the Instance column for the mmv process) kernel-mode and user-mode time go up when you move the mouse because it is executing application code in user-mode and calling Windows functions that run in kernel mode. You’ll also notice kernel-mode thread activity in a process named csrss when you move the mouse. This activity occurs because the Windows subsystem’s kernel-mode raw input thread, which handles keyboard and mouse input, is attached to this process. (See Chapter 2 for more information about system threads.) Finally, the process named Idle that you see spending nearly 100 percent of its time in kernel mode isn’t really a process—it’s a fake process used to account for idle CPU cycles. As you can observe from the mode in which the threads in the Idle process run, when Windows has nothing to do, it does it in kernel mode.

**Terminal Services and Multiple Sessions**

Terminal Services refers to the support in Windows for multiple interactive user sessions on a single system. With Windows Terminal Services, a remote user can establish a session on another machine, log in, and run applications on the server. The server transmits the graphical user interface to the
client (as well as other configurable resources such as audio and clipboard), and the client transmits the user’s input back to the server. (Similar to the X Window System, Windows permits running individual applications on a server system with the display remoted to the client instead of remoting the entire desktop.)

The first session is considered the services session, or session zero, and contains system service hosting processes (explained in further detail in Chapter 4, “Management Mechanisms”). The first login session at the physical console of the machine is session one, and additional sessions can be created through the use of the remote desktop connection program (Mstsc.exe) or through the use of fast user switching (described later).

Windows client editions permits a single remote user to connect to the machine, but if someone is logged in at the console, the workstation is locked (that is, someone can be using the system either locally or remotely, but not at the same time). Windows editions that include Windows Media Center allow one interactive session and up to four Windows Media Center Extender sessions.

Windows server systems support two simultaneous remote connections (to facilitate remote management—for example, use of management tools that require being logged in to the machine being managed) and more than two remote sessions if it’s appropriately licensed and configured as a terminal server.

All Windows client editions support multiple sessions created locally through a feature called fast user switching that can be used one at a time. When a user chooses to disconnect her session instead of log off (for example, by clicking Start and choosing Switch User from the Shutdown submenu or by holding down the Windows key and pressing L and then clicking the Switch User button), the current session (that is, the processes running in that session and all the sessionwide data structures that describe the session) remains active in the system and the system returns to the main logon screen. If a new user logs in, a new session is created.

For applications that want to be aware of running in a terminal server session, there are a set of Windows APIs for programmatically detecting that as well as for controlling various aspects of Terminal Services. (See the Windows SDK and the Remote Desktop Services API for details.)

Chapter 2 describes briefly how sessions are created and has some experiments showing how to view session information with various tools, including the kernel debugger. The “Object Manager” section in Chapter 3 describes how the system namespace for objects is instantiated on a per-session basis and how applications that need to be aware of other instances of themselves on the same system can accomplish that. Finally, Chapter 10 in Part 2 covers how the memory manager sets up and manages sessionwide data.

**Objects and Handles**

In the Windows operating system, a kernel object is a single, run-time instance of a statically defined object type. An object type comprises a system-defined data type, functions that operate on instances of the data type, and a set of object attributes. If you write Windows applications, you might encounter process, thread, file, and event objects, to name just a few examples. These objects are based on
lower-level objects that Windows creates and manages. In Windows, a process is an instance of the process object type, a file is an instance of the file object type, and so on.

An *object attribute* is a field of data in an object that partially defines the object’s state. An object of type *process*, for example, would have attributes that include the process ID, a base scheduling priority, and a pointer to an access token object. *Object methods*, the means for manipulating objects, usually read or change the object attributes. For example, the *open* method for a process would accept a process identifier as input and return a pointer to the object as output.

**Note** Although there is a parameter named *ObjectAttributes* that a caller supplies when creating an object using the kernel object manager APIs, that parameter shouldn’t be confused with the more general meaning of the term as used in this book.

The most fundamental difference between an object and an ordinary data structure is that the internal structure of an object is opaque. You must call an object service to get data out of an object or to put data into it. You can’t directly read or change data inside an object. This difference separates the underlying implementation of the object from code that merely uses it, a technique that allows object implementations to be changed easily over time.

Objects, through the help of a kernel component called the *object manager*, provide a convenient means for accomplishing the following four important operating system tasks:

- Providing human-readable names for system resources
- Sharing resources and data among processes
- Protecting resources from unauthorized access
- Reference tracking, which allows the system to know when an object is no longer in use so that it can be automatically deallocated

Not all data structures in the Windows operating system are objects. Only data that needs to be shared, protected, named, or made visible to user-mode programs (via system services) is placed in objects. Structures used by only one component of the operating system to implement internal functions are not objects. Objects and handles (references to an instance of an object) are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

**Security**

Windows was designed from the start to be secure and to meet the requirements of various formal government and industry security ratings, such as the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CCITSE) specification. Achieving a government-approved security rating allows an operating system to compete in that arena. Of course, many of these capabilities are advantageous features for any multiuser system.

The core security capabilities of Windows include discretionary (need-to-know) and mandatory integrity protection for all shareable system objects (such as files, directories, processes, threads, and
so forth), security auditing (for accountability of subjects, or users and the actions they initiate), user authentication at logon, and the prevention of one user from accessing uninitialized resources (such as free memory or disk space) that another user has deallocated.

Windows has three forms of access control over objects. The first form—discretionary access control—is the protection mechanism that most people think of when they think of operating system security. It’s the method by which owners of objects (such as files or printers) grant or deny access to others. When users log in, they are given a set of security credentials, or a security context. When they attempt to access objects, their security context is compared to the access control list on the object they are trying to access to determine whether they have permission to perform the requested operation.

Privileged access control is necessary for those times when discretionary access control isn’t enough. It’s a method of ensuring that someone can get to protected objects if the owner isn’t available. For example, if an employee leaves a company, the administrator needs a way to gain access to files that might have been accessible only to that employee. In that case, under Windows, the administrator can take ownership of the file so that he can manage its rights as necessary.

Finally, mandatory integrity control is required when an additional level of security control is required to protect objects that are being accessed from within the same user account. It’s used both to isolate Protected Mode Internet Explorer from a user’s configuration and to protect objects created by an elevated administrator account from access by a nonelevated administrator account. (See Chapter 6 for more information on User Account Control—UAC.)

Security pervades the interface of the Windows API. The Windows subsystem implements object-based security in the same way the operating system does; the Windows subsystem protects shared Windows objects from unauthorized access by placing Windows security descriptors on them. The first time an application tries to access a shared object, the Windows subsystem verifies the application’s right to do so. If the security check succeeds, the Windows subsystem allows the application to proceed.

For a comprehensive description of Windows security, see Chapter 6.

**Registry**

If you’ve worked at all with Windows operating systems, you’ve probably heard about or looked at the registry. You can’t talk much about Windows internals without referring to the registry because it’s the system database that contains the information required to boot and configure the system, systemwide software settings that control the operation of Windows, the security database, and per-user configuration settings (such as which screen saver to use).

In addition, the registry is a window into in-memory volatile data, such as the current hardware state of the system (what device drivers are loaded, the resources they are using, and so on) as well as the Windows performance counters. The performance counters, which aren’t actually “in” the registry, are accessed through the registry functions. See Chapter 4 for more on how performance counter information is accessed from the registry.
Although many Windows users and administrators will never need to look directly into the registry (because you can view or change most configuration settings with standard administrative utilities), it is still a useful source of Windows internals information because it contains many settings that affect system performance and behavior. (If you decide to directly change registry settings, you must exercise extreme caution; any changes might adversely affect system performance or, worse, cause the system to fail to boot successfully.) You’ll find references to individual registry keys throughout this book as they pertain to the component being described. Most registry keys referred to in this book are under the systemwide configuration, HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, which we’ll abbreviate throughout as HKLM.

For further information on the registry and its internal structure, see Chapter 4.

Unicode

Windows differs from most other operating systems in that most internal text strings are stored and processed as 16-bit-wide Unicode characters. Unicode is an international character set standard that defines unique 16-bit values for most of the world’s known character sets.

Because many applications deal with 8-bit (single-byte) ANSI character strings, many Windows functions that accept string parameters have two entry points: a Unicode (wide, 16-bit) version and an ANSI (narrow, 8-bit) version. If you call the narrow version of a Windows function, there is a slight performance impact as input string parameters are converted to Unicode before being processed by the system and output parameters are converted from Unicode to ANSI before being returned to the application. Thus, if you have an older service or piece of code that you need to run on Windows but this code is written using ANSI character text strings, Windows will convert the ANSI characters into Unicode for its own use. However, Windows never converts the data inside files—it’s up to the application to decide whether to store data as Unicode or as ANSI.

Regardless of language, all versions of Windows contain the same functions. Instead of having separate language versions, Windows has a single worldwide binary so that a single installation can support multiple languages (by adding various language packs). Applications can also take advantage of Windows functions that allow single worldwide application binaries that can support multiple languages.

For more information about Unicode, see www.unicode.org as well as the programming documentation in the MSDN Library.

Digging into Windows Internals

Although much of the information in this book is based on reading the Windows source code and talking to the developers, you don’t have to take everything on faith. Many details about the internals of Windows can be exposed and demonstrated by using a variety of available tools, such as those that come with Windows and the Windows debugging tools. These tool packages are briefly described later in this section.
To encourage your exploration of Windows internals, we’ve included “Experiment” sidebars throughout the book that describe steps you can take to examine a particular aspect of Windows internal behavior. (You already saw a few of these sections earlier in this chapter.) We encourage you to try these experiments so that you can see in action many of the internals topics described in this book.

Table 1-3 shows a list of the principal tools used in this book and where they come from.

### Table 1-3 Tools for Viewing Windows Internals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tool</th>
<th>Image Name</th>
<th>Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Startup Programs Viewer</td>
<td>AUTORUNS</td>
<td>Sysinternals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access Check</td>
<td>ACCESSCHK</td>
<td>Sysinternals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependency Walker</td>
<td>DEPENDS</td>
<td><a href="http://www.dependencywalker.com">www.dependencywalker.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Flags</td>
<td>GFLAGS</td>
<td>Debugging tools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handle Viewer</td>
<td>HANDLE</td>
<td>Sysinternals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kernel debuggers</td>
<td>WINDBG, KD</td>
<td>Debugging tools, Windows SDK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Object Viewer</td>
<td>WINOBJ</td>
<td>Sysinternals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance Monitor</td>
<td>PERFMON.MSC</td>
<td>Windows built-in tool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pool Monitor</td>
<td>POOLMON</td>
<td>Windows Driver Kit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process Explorer</td>
<td>PROCEXP</td>
<td>Sysinternals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process Monitor</td>
<td>PROCMON</td>
<td>Sysinternals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task (Process) List</td>
<td>TLIST</td>
<td>Debugging tools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Manager</td>
<td>TASKMGR</td>
<td>Windows built-in tool</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Performance Monitor**

We’ll refer to the Performance Monitor found in the Administrative Tools folder on the Start menu (or via Control Panel) throughout this book; specifically, we’ll focus on the Performance Monitor and Resource Monitor. The Performance Monitor has three functions: system monitoring, viewing performance counter logs, and setting alerts (by using data collector sets, which also contain performance counter logs and trace and configuration data). For simplicity, when we refer to the Performance Monitor, we are referring to the System Monitor function within the tool.

The Performance Monitor provides more information about how your system is operating than any other single utility. It includes hundreds of base and extensible counters for various objects. For each major topic described in this book, a table of the relevant Windows performance counters is included.

The Performance Monitor contains a brief description for each counter. To see the descriptions, select a counter in the Add Counters window and select the Show Description check box.
Although all the low-level system monitoring we'll do in this book can be done with the Performance Monitor, Windows also includes a Resource Monitor utility (accessible from the start menu or from the Task Manager Performance tab) that shows four primary system resources: CPU, Disk, Network, and Memory. In their basic states, these resources are displayed with the same level of information that you would find in Task Manager. However, they also provide sections that can be expanded for more information.

When expanded, the CPU tab displays information about per-process CPU usage, just like Task Manager. However, it adds a column for average CPU usage, which can give you a better idea of which processes are most active. The CPU tab also includes a separate display of services and their associated CPU usage and average. Each service hosting process is identified by the service group it is hosting. As with Process Explorer, selecting a process (by clicking its associated check box) will display a list of named handles opened by the process, as well as a list of modules (such as DLLs) that are loaded in the process address space. The Search Handles box can also be used to search for which processes have opened a handle to a given named resource.

The Memory section displays much of the same information that one can obtain with Task Manager, but it is organized for the entire system. A physical memory bar graph displays the current organization of physical memory into either hardware reserved, in use, modified, standby, and free memory. See Chapter 10 in Part 2 for the exact meaning of these terms.

The Disk section, on the other hand, displays per-file information for I/Os in a way that makes it easy to identify the most accessed, written to, or read from files on the system. These results can be further filtered down by process.

The Networking section displays the active network connections and which processes own them, as well as how much data is going through them. This information makes it possible to see background network activity that might be hard to detect otherwise. In addition, the TCP connections that are active on the system are shown, organized by process, with data such as the remote and local port and address, and packet latency. Finally, a list of listening ports is displayed by process, allowing an administrator to see which services (or applications) are currently waiting for connections on a given port. The protocol and firewall policy for each port and process is also shown.

Note that all of the Windows performance counters are accessible programmatically. The section “HKEY_PERFORMANCE_DATA” in Chapter 4 has a brief description of the components involved in retrieving performance counters through the Windows API.

**Kernel Debugging**

Kernel debugging means examining internal kernel data structures and/or stepping through functions in the kernel. It is a useful way to investigate Windows internals because you can display internal system information not available through any other tools and get a clearer idea of code flows within the kernel.
Before describing the various ways you can debug the kernel, let’s examine a set of files that you’ll need in order to perform any type of kernel debugging.

Symbols for Kernel Debugging
Symbol files contain the names of functions and variables and the layout and format of data structures. They are generated by the linker and used by debuggers to reference and display these names during a debug session. This information is not usually stored in the binary image because it is not needed to execute the code. This means that binaries are smaller and faster. However, this means that when debugging, you must make sure that the debugger can access the symbol files that are associated with the images you are referencing during a debugging session.

To use any of the kernel debugging tools to examine internal Windows kernel data structures (such as the process list, thread blocks, loaded driver list, memory usage information, and so on), you must have the correct symbol files for at least the kernel image, Ntoskrnl.exe. (The section “Architecture Overview” in Chapter 2 explains more about this file.) Symbol table files must match the version of the image they were taken from. For example, if you install a Windows Service Pack or hot fix that updates the kernel, you must obtain the matching, updated symbol files.

While it is possible to download and install symbols for various versions of Windows, updated symbols for hot fixes are not always available. The easiest solution to obtain the correct version of symbols for debugging is to use the Microsoft on-demand symbol server by using a special syntax for the symbol path that you specify in the debugger. For example, the following symbol path causes the debugging tools to load required symbols from the Internet symbol server and keep a local copy in the c:symbols folder:

srv*c:symbols*http://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols

For detailed instructions on how to use the symbol server, see the debugging tools help file or the Web page http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/hardware/gg462988.aspx.

Debugging Tools for Windows
The Debugging Tools for Windows package contains advanced debugging tools used in this book to explore Windows internals. The latest version is included as part of the Windows Software Development Kit (SDK). These tools can be used to debug user-mode processes as well as the kernel. (See the following sidebar.)

Note The Debugging Tools for Windows are updated frequently and released independently of Windows operating system versions, so check often for new versions.
User-Mode Debugging

The debugging tools can also be used to attach to a user-mode process and examine and/or change process memory. There are two options when attaching to a process:

- **Invasive**  Unless specified otherwise, when you attach to a running process, the DebugActiveProcess Windows function is used to establish a connection between the debugger and the debugee. This permits examining and/or changing process memory, setting breakpoints, and performing other debugging functions. Windows allows you to stop debugging without killing the target process, as long as the debugger is detached, not killed.

- **Noninvasive**  With this option, the debugger simply opens the process with the OpenProcess function. It does not attach to the process as a debugger. This allows you to examine and/or change memory in the target process, but you cannot set breakpoints.

You can also open user-mode process dump files with the debugging tools. User-mode dump files are explained in Chapter 3 in the section on exception dispatching.

There are two debuggers that can be used for kernel debugging: a command-line version (Kd.exe) and a graphical user interface (GUI) version (Windbg.exe). Both provide the same set of commands, so which one you choose is a matter of personal preference. You can perform three types of kernel debugging with these tools:

- Open a crash dump file created as a result of a Windows system crash. (See Chapter 14, “Crash Dump Analysis,” in Part 2 for more information on kernel crash dumps.)

- Connect to a live, running system and examine the system state (or set breakpoints if you’re debugging device driver code). This operation requires two computers—a target and a host. The target is the system being debugged, and the host is the system running the debugger. The target system can be connected to the host via a null modem cable, an IEEE 1394 cable, or a USB 2.0 debugging cable. The target system must be booted in debugging mode (either by pressing F8 during the boot process and selecting Debugging Mode or by configuring the system to boot in debugging mode using Bcdedit or Msconfig.exe). You can also connect through a named pipe, which is useful when debugging through a virtual machine product such as Hyper-V, Virtual PC, or VMWare, by exposing the guest operating system’s serial port as a named pipe device.

- Windows systems also allow you to connect to the local system and examine the system state. This is called *local kernel debugging*. To initiate local kernel debugging with WinDbg, open the File menu, choose Kernel Debug, click on the Local tab, and then click OK. The target system must be booted in debugging mode. An example output screen is shown in Figure 1-6. Some kernel debugger commands do not work when used in local kernel debugging mode (such as creating a memory dump with the .dump command—however, this can be done with LiveKd, described later in this section).
Once connected in kernel debugging mode, you can use one of the many debugger extension commands (commands that begin with “!”) to display the contents of internal data structures such as threads, processes, I/O request packets, and memory management information. Throughout this book, the relevant kernel debugger commands and output are included as they apply to each topic being discussed. An excellent companion reference is the Debugger.chm help file, contained in the WinDbg installation folder, which documents all the kernel debugger functionality and extensions. In addition, the dt (display type) command can format over 1000 kernel structures because the kernel symbol files for Windows contain type information that the debugger can use to format structures.

EXPERIMENT: Displaying Type Information for Kernel Structures

To display the list of kernel structures whose type information is included in the kernel symbols, type dt nt!_* in the kernel debugger. A sample partial output is shown here:

```
lkd> dt nt!_*
   nt!_LIST_ENTRY
   nt!_LIST_ENTRY
   nt!_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS
   nt!_IMAGE_FILE_HEADER
   nt!_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER
   nt!_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS
   nt!_LARGE_INTEGER
```

You can also use the dt command to search for specific structures by using its wildcard lookup capability. For example, if you were looking for the structure name for an interrupt object, type dt nt!_interrupt*:

```
lkd> dt nt!_interrupt*
   nt!_KINTERRUPT
   nt!_KINTERRUPT_MODE
   nt!_KINTERRUPT_POLARITY
   nt!_UNEXPECTED_INTERRUPT
```
Then you can use *dt* to format a specific structure as shown next:

```bash
lkd> dt nt!_kinterrupt
nt!_KINTERRUPT
+0x000 Type : Int2B
+0x002 Size : Int2B
+0x008 InterruptListEntry : _LIST_ENTRY
+0x018 ServiceRoutine : Ptr64 unsigned char
+0x020 MessageServiceRoutine : Ptr64 unsigned char
+0x028 MessageIndex : Uint4B
+0x030 ServiceContext : Ptr64 Void
+0x038 SpinLock : Uint8B
+0x040 TickCount : Uint4B
+0x048 ActualLock : Ptr64 Uint8B
+0x050 DispatchAddress : Ptr64 void
+0x058 Vector : Uint4B
+0x05c Irlq : Uint8B
+0x05e FloatingSave : UChar
+0x05f Connected : UChar
+0x060 Number : Uint4B
+0x064 ShareVector : UChar
+0x065 Pad : [3] Char
+0x068 Mode : _KINTERRUPT_MODE
+0x06c Polarity : _KINTERRUPT_POLARITY
+0x070 ServiceCount : Uint4B
+0x074 DispatchCount : Uint4B
+0x078 Rsvd1 : Uint8B
+0x080 TrapFrame : Ptr64 _KTRAP_FRAME
+0x088 Reserved : Ptr64 Void
+0x090 DispatchCode : [4] Uint4B
```

Note that *dt* does not show substructures (structures within structures) by default. To recurse through substructures, use the *–r* switch. For example, using this switch to display the kernel interrupt object shows the format of the _LIST_ENTRY structure stored at the *InterruptListEntry* field:

```bash
lkd> dt nt!_kinterrupt -r
nt!_KINTERRUPT
+0x000 Type : Int2B
+0x002 Size : Int2B
+0x008 InterruptListEntry : _LIST_ENTRY
  +0x000 Flink : Ptr64 _LIST_ENTRY
  +0x000 Flink : Ptr64 _LIST_ENTRY
  +0x008 Blink : Ptr64 _LIST_ENTRY
  +0x008 Blink : Ptr64 _LIST_ENTRY
  +0x008 Blink : Ptr64 _LIST_ENTRY
  +0x008 Blink : Ptr64 _LIST_ENTRY
```
The Debugging Tools for Windows help file also explains how to set up and use the kernel debuggers. Additional details on using the kernel debuggers that are aimed primarily at device driver writers can be found in the Windows Driver Kit documentation.

**LiveKd Tool**

LiveKd is a free tool from Sysinternals that allows you to use the standard Microsoft kernel debuggers just described to examine the running system without booting the system in debugging mode. This approach might be useful when kernel-level troubleshooting is required on a machine that wasn’t booted in debugging mode—certain issues might be hard to reproduce reliably, so a reboot with the `debug` option enabled might not readily exhibit the error.

You run LiveKd just as you would WinDbg or Kd. LiveKd passes any command-line options you specify to the debugger you select. By default, LiveKd runs the command-line kernel debugger (Kd). To have it run WinDbg, specify the `–w` switch. To see the help files for LiveKd switches, specify the `–?` switch.

LiveKd presents a simulated crash dump file to the debugger, so you can perform any operations in LiveKd that are supported on a crash dump. Because LiveKd is relying on physical memory to back the simulated dump, the kernel debugger might run into situations in which data structures are in the middle of being changed by the system and are inconsistent. Each time the debugger is launched, it starts with a fresh view of the system state. If you want to refresh the snapshot, quit the debugger (with the `q` command), and LiveKd will ask you whether you want to start it again. If the debugger enters a loop in printing output, press Ctrl+C to interrupt the output and quit. If it hangs, press Ctrl+Break, which will terminate the debugger process. LiveKd will then ask you whether you want to run the debugger again.

**Windows Software Development Kit**

The Windows Software Development Kit (SDK) is available as part of the MSDN subscription program or can be downloaded for free from msdn.microsoft.com. Besides the Debugging Tools, it contains the documentation, C header files, and libraries necessary to compile and link Windows applications. (Although Microsoft Visual C++ comes with a copy of these header files, the versions contained in the Windows SDK always match the latest version of the Windows operating systems, whereas the version that comes with Visual C++ might be an older version that was current when Visual C++ was released.) From an internals perspective, items of interest in the Windows SDK include the Windows API header files (`\Program Files\Microsoft SDKs\Windows\v7.0A\Include`). A few of these tools are also shipped as sample source code in both the Windows SDK and the MSDN Library.

**Windows Driver Kit**

The Windows Driver Kit (WDK) is also available through the MSDN subscription program, and just like the Windows SDK, it is available for free download. The Windows Driver Kit documentation is included in the MSDN Library.
Although the WDK is aimed at device driver developers, it is an abundant source of Windows internals information. For example, while Chapter 8 in Part 2 describes the I/O system architecture, driver model, and basic device driver data structures, it does not describe the individual kernel support functions in detail. The WDK documentation contains a comprehensive description of all the Windows kernel support functions and mechanisms used by device drivers in both a tutorial and reference form.

Besides including the documentation, the WDK contains header files (in particular, ntddk.h, ntifs.h, and wdm.h) that define key internal data structures and constants as well as interfaces to many internal system routines. These files are useful when exploring Windows internal data structures with the kernel debugger because although the general layout and content of these structures are shown in this book, detailed field-level descriptions (such as size and data types) are not. A number of these data structures (such as object dispatcher headers, wait blocks, events, mutants, semaphores, and so on) are, however, fully described in the WDK.

So if you want to dig into the I/O system and driver model beyond what is presented in this book, read the WDK documentation (especially the Kernel-Mode Driver Architecture Design Guide and Reference manuals). You might also find useful Programming the Microsoft Windows Driver Model, Second Edition by Walter Oney (Microsoft Press, 2002) and Developing Drivers with the Windows Driver Foundation by Penny Orwick and Guy Smith (Microsoft Press, 2007).

**Sysinternals Tools**

Many experiments in this book use freeware tools that you can download from Sysinternals. Mark Russinovich, coauthor of this book, wrote most of these tools. The most popular tools include Process Explorer and Process Monitor. Note that many of these utilities involve the installation and execution of kernel-mode device drivers and thus require (elevated) administrator privileges, though they can run with limited functionality and output in a standard (or nonelevated) user account.

Since the Sysinternals tools are updated frequently, it is best to make sure you have the latest version. To be notified of tool updates, you can follow the Sysinternals Site Blog (which has an RSS feed).

For a description of all the tools, a description of how to use them, and case studies of problems solved, see Windows Sysinternals Administrator’s Reference (Microsoft Press, 2011) by Mark Russinovich and Aaron Margosis.

For questions and discussions on the tools, use the Sysinternals Forums.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, you’ve been introduced to the key Windows technical concepts and terms that will be used throughout the book. You’ve also had a glimpse of the many useful tools available for digging into Windows internals. Now we’re ready to begin our exploration of the internal design of the system, beginning with an overall view of the system architecture and its key components.
CHAPTER 2

System Architecture

Now that we’ve covered the terms, concepts, and tools you need to be familiar with, we’re ready to start our exploration of the internal design goals and structure of the Microsoft Windows operating system. This chapter explains the overall architecture of the system—the key components, how they interact with each other, and the context in which they run. To provide a framework for understanding the internals of Windows, let’s first review the requirements and goals that shaped the original design and specification of the system.

Requirements and Design Goals

The following requirements drove the specification of Windows NT back in 1989:

■ Provide a true 32-bit, preemptive, reentrant, virtual memory operating system
■ Run on multiple hardware architectures and platforms
■ Run and scale well on symmetric multiprocessing systems
■ Be a great distributed computing platform, both as a network client and as a server
■ Run most existing 16-bit MS-DOS and Microsoft Windows 3.1 applications
■ Meet government requirements for POSIX 1003.1 compliance
■ Meet government and industry requirements for operating system security
■ Be easily adaptable to the global market by supporting Unicode

To guide the thousands of decisions that had to be made to create a system that met these requirements, the Windows NT design team adopted the following design goals at the beginning of the project:

■ **Extensibility** The code must be written to comfortably grow and change as market requirements change.
■ **Portability** The system must be able to run on multiple hardware architectures and must be able to move with relative ease to new ones as market demands dictate.
- **Reliability and robustness**  The system should protect itself from both internal malfunction and external tampering. Applications should not be able to harm the operating system or other applications.

- **Compatibility**  Although Windows NT should extend existing technology, its user interface and APIs should be compatible with older versions of Windows and with MS-DOS. It should also interoperate well with other systems, such as UNIX, OS/2, and NetWare.

- **Performance**  Within the constraints of the other design goals, the system should be as fast and responsive as possible on each hardware platform.

As we explore the details of the internal structure and operation of Windows, you’ll see how these original design goals and market requirements were woven successfully into the construction of the system. But before we start that exploration, let’s examine the overall design model for Windows and compare it with other modern operating systems.

### Operating System Model

In most multiuser operating systems, applications are separated from the operating system itself—the operating system kernel code runs in a privileged processor mode (referred to as *kernel mode* in this book), with access to system data and to the hardware; application code runs in a nonprivileged processor mode (called *user mode*), with a limited set of interfaces available, limited access to system data, and no direct access to hardware. When a user-mode program calls a system service, the processor executes a special instruction that switches the calling thread to kernel mode. When the system service completes, the operating system switches the thread context back to user mode and allows the caller to continue.

Windows is similar to most UNIX systems in that it’s a monolithic operating system in the sense that the bulk of the operating system and device driver code shares the same kernel-mode protected memory space. This means that any operating system component or device driver can potentially corrupt data being used by other operating system components. However, Windows does implement some kernel protection mechanisms, such as PatchGuard and Kernel Mode Code Signing (both described in Chapter 3, “System Mechanisms”), which help in the mitigation and prevention of issues related to the shared kernel-mode address space.

All these operating system components are, of course, fully protected from errant applications because applications don’t have direct access to the code and data of the privileged part of the operating system (although they can quickly call other kernel services). This protection is one of the reasons that Windows has the reputation for being both robust and stable as an application server and as a workstation platform, yet fast and nimble from the perspective of core operating system services, such as virtual memory management, file I/O, networking, and file and print sharing.
The kernel-mode components of Windows also embody basic object-oriented design principles. For example, in general they don’t reach into one another’s data structures to access information maintained by individual components. Instead, they use formal interfaces to pass parameters and access and/or modify data structures.

Despite its pervasive use of objects to represent shared system resources, Windows is not an object-oriented system in the strict sense. Most of the operating system code is written in C for portability. The C programming language doesn’t directly support object-oriented constructs such as dynamic binding of data types, polymorphic functions, or class inheritance. Therefore, the C-based implementation of objects in Windows borrows from, but doesn’t depend on, features of particular object-oriented languages.

Architecture Overview

With this brief overview of the design goals and packaging of Windows, let’s take a look at the key system components that make up its architecture. A simplified version of this architecture is shown in Figure 2-1. Keep in mind that this diagram is basic—it doesn’t show everything. (For example, the networking components and the various types of device driver layering are not shown.)

![Simplified Windows architecture](image)

In Figure 2-1, first notice the line dividing the user-mode and kernel-mode parts of the Windows operating system. The boxes above the line represent user-mode processes, and the components below the line are kernel-mode operating system services. As mentioned in Chapter 1, “Concepts and Tools,” user-mode threads execute in a protected process address space (although while they are executing in kernel mode, they have access to system space). Thus, system support processes, service processes, user applications, and environment subsystems each have their own private process address space.
The four basic types of user-mode processes are described as follows:

- **Fixed (or hardwired) system support processes**, such as the logon process and the Session Manager, that are not Windows services. (That is, they are not started by the service control manager. Chapter 4, “Management and Mechanisms,” describes services in detail.)

- **Service processes** that host Windows services, such as the Task Scheduler and Print Spooler services. Services generally have the requirement that they run independently of user logons. Many Windows server applications, such as Microsoft SQL Server and Microsoft Exchange Server, also include components that run as services.

- **User applications**, which can be one of the following types: Windows 32-bit or 64-bit, Windows 3.1 16-bit, MS-DOS 16-bit, or POSIX 32-bit or 64-bit. Note that 16-bit applications can be run only on 32-bit Windows.

- **Environment subsystem server processes**, which implement part of the support for the operating system environment, or personality, presented to the user and programmer. Windows NT originally shipped with three environment subsystems: Windows, POSIX, and OS/2. However, the POSIX and OS/2 subsystems last shipped with Windows 2000. The Ultimate and Enterprise editions of Windows client as well as all of the server versions include support for an enhanced POSIX subsystem called Subsystem for Unix-based Applications (SUA).

In Figure 2-1, notice the “Subsystem DLLs” box below the “Service processes” and “User applications” boxes. Under Windows, user applications don’t call the native Windows operating system services directly; rather, they go through one or more **subsystem dynamic-link libraries** (DLLs). The role of the subsystem DLLs is to translate a documented function into the appropriate internal (and generally undocumented) native system service calls. This translation might or might not involve sending a message to the environment subsystem process that is serving the user application.

The kernel-mode components of Windows include the following:

- **The Windows executive** contains the base operating system services, such as memory management, process and thread management, security, I/O, networking, and interprocess communication.

- **The Windows kernel** consists of low-level operating system functions, such as thread scheduling, interrupt and exception dispatching, and multiprocessor synchronization. It also provides a set of routines and basic objects that the rest of the executive uses to implement higher-level constructs.

- **Device drivers** include both hardware device drivers, which translate user I/O function calls into specific hardware device I/O requests, as well as nonhardware device drivers such as file system and network drivers.

- **The hardware abstraction layer** (HAL) is a layer of code that isolates the kernel, the device drivers, and the rest of the Windows executive from platform-specific hardware differences (such as differences between motherboards).
The *windowing and graphics system* implements the graphical user interface (GUI) functions (better known as the Windows USER and GDI functions), such as dealing with windows, user interface controls, and drawing.

Table 2-1 lists the file names of the core Windows operating system components. (You’ll need to know these file names because we’ll be referring to some system files by name.) Each of these components is covered in greater detail both later in this chapter and in the chapters that follow.

**TABLE 2-1 Core Windows System Files**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File Name</th>
<th>Components</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ntoskrnl.exe</td>
<td>Executive and kernel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ntkrnlpa.exe (32-bit systems only)</td>
<td>Executive and kernel, with support for Physical Address Extension (PAE), which allows 32-bit systems to address up to 64 GB of physical memory and to mark memory as nonexecutable (see the section “No Execute Page Prevention” in Chapter 10, “Memory Management,” in Part 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hal.dll</td>
<td>Hardware abstraction layer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Win32k.sys</td>
<td>Kernel-mode part of the Windows subsystem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ntdll.dll</td>
<td>Internal support functions and system service dispatch stubs to executive functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kernel32.dll, Advapi32.dll, User32.dll, Gdi32.dll</td>
<td>Core Windows subsystem DLLs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Before we dig into the details of these system components, though, let’s examine some basics about the Windows kernel design, starting with how Windows achieves portability across multiple hardware architectures.

**Portability**

Windows was designed to run on a variety of hardware architectures. The initial release of Windows NT supported the x86 and MIPS architectures. Support for the Digital Equipment Corporation (which was bought by Compaq, which later merged with Hewlett-Packard) Alpha AXP was added shortly thereafter. (Although Alpha AXP was a 64-bit processor, Windows NT ran in 32-bit mode. During the development of Windows 2000, a native 64-bit version was running on Alpha AXP, but this was never released.) Support for a fourth processor architecture, the Motorola PowerPC, was added in Windows NT 3.51. Because of changing market demands, however, support for the MIPS and PowerPC architectures was dropped before development began on Windows 2000. Later, Compaq withdrew support for the Alpha AXP architecture, resulting in Windows 2000 being supported only on the x86 architecture. Windows XP and Windows Server 2003 added support for three 64-bit processor families: the Intel Itanium IA-64 family, the AMD64 family, and the Intel 64-bit Extension Technology (EM64T) for x86 (which is compatible with the AMD64 architecture, although there are slight differences in instructions supported). The latter two processor families are called *64-bit extended systems* and in this book are referred to as x64. (How Windows runs 32-bit applications on 64-bit Windows is explained in Chapter 3.)
Windows achieves portability across hardware architectures and platforms in two primary ways:

- Windows has a layered design, with low-level portions of the system that are processor-architecture-specific or platform-specific isolated into separate modules so that upper layers of the system can be shielded from the differences between architectures and among hardware platforms. The two key components that provide operating system portability are the kernel (contained in Ntoskrnl.exe) and the hardware abstraction layer (or HAL, contained in Hal.dll). Both these components are described in more detail later in this chapter. Functions that are architecture-specific (such as thread context switching and trap dispatching) are implemented in the kernel. Functions that can differ among systems within the same architecture (for example, different motherboards) are implemented in the HAL. The only other component with a significant amount of architecture-specific code is the memory manager, but even that is a small amount compared to the system as a whole.

- The vast majority of Windows is written in C, with some portions in C++. Assembly language is used only for those parts of the operating system that need to communicate directly with system hardware (such as the interrupt trap handler) or that are extremely performance-sensitive (such as context switching). Assembly language code exists not only in the kernel and the HAL but also in a few other places within the core operating system (such as the routines that implement interlocked instructions as well as one module in the local procedure call facility), in the kernel-mode part of the Windows subsystem, and even in some user-mode libraries, such as the process startup code in Ntdll.dll (a system library explained later in this chapter).

### Symmetric Multiprocessing

*Multitasking* is the operating system technique for sharing a single processor among multiple threads of execution. When a computer has more than one processor, however, it can execute multiple threads simultaneously. Thus, whereas a multitasking operating system only appears to execute multiple threads at the same time, a multiprocessing operating system actually does it, executing one thread on each of its processors.

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, one of the key design goals for Windows was that it had to run well on multiprocessor computer systems. Windows is a *symmetric multiprocessing* (SMP) operating system. There is no master processor—the operating system as well as user threads can be scheduled to run on any processor. Also, all the processors share just one memory space. This model contrasts with *asymmetric multiprocessing* (ASMP), in which the operating system typically selects one processor to execute operating system kernel code while other processors run only user code. The differences in the two multiprocessing models are illustrated in Figure 2-2.

Windows also supports three modern types of multiprocessor systems: multicore, Hyper-Threading enabled, and NUMA (non-uniform memory architecture). These are briefly mentioned in the following paragraphs. (For a complete, detailed description of the scheduling support for these systems, see the thread scheduling section in Chapter 5, “Processes and Threads”.)
Hyper-Threading is a technology introduced by Intel that provides two logical processors for each physical core. Each logical processor has its own CPU state, but the execution engine and onboard cache are shared. This permits one logical CPU to make progress while the other logical CPU is stalled (such as after a cache miss or branch misprediction). The scheduling algorithms are enhanced to make optimal use of Hyper-Threading-enabled machines, such as by scheduling threads on an idle physical processor versus choosing an idle logical processor on a physical processor whose other logical processors are busy. For more details on thread scheduling, see Chapter 5.

In NUMA systems, processors are grouped in smaller units called nodes. Each node has its own processors and memory and is connected to the larger system through a cache-coherent interconnect bus. Windows on a NUMA system still runs as an SMP system, in that all processors have access to all memory—it’s just that node-local memory is faster to reference than memory attached to other nodes. The system attempts to improve performance by scheduling threads on processors that are in the same node as the memory being used. It attempts to satisfy memory-allocation requests from within the node, but it will allocate memory from other nodes if necessary.

Naturally, Windows also natively supports multicore systems—because these systems have real physical cores (simply on the same package), the original SMP code in Windows treats them as discrete processors, except for certain accounting and identification tasks (such as licensing, described shortly) that distinguish between cores on the same processor and cores on different sockets.
Windows was not originally designed with a specific processor number limit in mind, other than the licensing policies that differentiate the various Windows editions. However, for convenience and efficiency, Windows does keep track of processors (total number, idle, busy, and other such details) in a bitmask (sometimes called an affinity mask) that is the same number of bits as the native data type of the machine (32-bit or 64-bit), which allows the processor to manipulate bits directly within a register. Due to this fact, Windows systems were originally limited to the number of CPUs in a native word, because the affinity mask couldn’t arbitrarily be increased. To maintain compatibility, as well as support larger processor systems, Windows implements a higher-order construct called a processor group. The processor group is a set of processors that can all be defined by a single affinity bitmask, and the kernel as well as the applications can choose which group they refer to during affinity updates. Compatible applications can query the number of supported groups (currently limited to 4) and then enumerate the bitmask for each group. Meanwhile, legacy applications continue to function by seeing only their current group. More information on how exactly Windows assigns processors to groups (which is also related to NUMA) is detailed in Chapter 5.

As mentioned, the actual number of supported licensed processors depends on the edition of Windows being used. (See Table 2-2 later in this chapter.) This number is stored in the system license policy file (\Windows\ServiceProfiles\NetworkService\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\SoftwareProtectionPlatform\tokens.dat) as a policy value called “Kernel-RegisteredProcessors.” (Keep in mind that tampering with that data is a violation of the software license, and modifying licensing policies to allow the use of more processors involves more than just changing this value.)

Scalability

One of the key issues with multiprocessor systems is scalability. To run correctly on an SMP system, operating system code must adhere to strict guidelines and rules. Resource contention and other performance issues are more complicated in multiprocessing systems than in uniprocessor systems and must be accounted for in the system’s design. Windows incorporates several features that are crucial to its success as a multiprocessor operating system:

- The ability to run operating system code on any available processor and on multiple processors at the same time
- Multiple threads of execution within a single process, each of which can execute simultaneously on different processors
- Fine-grained synchronization within the kernel (such as spinlocks, queued spinlocks, and pushlocks, described in Chapter 3) as well as within device drivers and server processes, which allows more components to run concurrently on multiple processors
- Programming mechanisms such as I/O completion ports (described in Chapter 8, “I/O System,” in Part 2) that facilitate the efficient implementation of multithreaded server processes that can scale well on multiprocessor systems
The scalability of the Windows kernel has evolved over time. For example, Windows Server 2003 introduced per-CPU scheduling queues, which permit thread scheduling decisions to occur in parallel on multiple processors. Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 eliminated global locking on the scheduling database. This step-wise improvement of the granularity of locking has also occurred in other areas, such as the memory manager. Further details on multiprocessor synchronization can be found in Chapter 3.

**Differences Between Client and Server Versions**

Windows ships in both client and server retail packages. As of this writing, there are six client versions of Windows 7: Windows 7 Home Basic, Windows 7 Home Premium, Windows 7 Professional, Windows 7 Ultimate, Windows 7 Enterprise, and Windows 7 Starter.


Additionally, there are “N” versions of the client that do not include Windows Media Player. Finally, the Standard, Enterprise, and Datacenter editions of Windows Server 2008 R2 also include “with Hyper-V” editions, which include Hyper-V. (Hyper-V virtualization is discussed in Chapter 3.)

These versions differ by

- The number of processors supported (in terms of sockets, not cores or threads)
- The amount of physical memory supported (actually highest physical address usable for RAM—see Chapter 10 in Part 2 for more information on physical memory limits)
- The number of concurrent network connections supported (For example, a maximum of 10 concurrent connections are allowed to the file and print services in the client version.)
- Support for Media Center
- Support for Multi-Touch, Aero, and Desktop Compositing
- Support for features such as BitLocker, VHD Booting, App Locker, Windows XP Compatibility Mode, and more than 100 other configurable licensing policy values
- Layered services that come with Windows Server editions that don't come with the client editions (for example, directory services and clustering)

TABLE 2-2 Differences Between Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Sockets Supported (32-Bit Edition)</th>
<th>Physical Memory Supported (32-Bit Edition)</th>
<th>Number of Sockets Supported (64-Bit Edition)</th>
<th>Physical Memory Supported (Itanium Editions)</th>
<th>Physical Memory Supported (x64 Editions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Windows 7 Starter</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 GB</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>2 GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows 7 Home Basic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4 GB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>8 GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows 7 Home Premium</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4 GB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>16 GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows 7 Professional</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4 GB</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>192 GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows 7 Enterprise</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4 GB</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>192 GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows 7 Ultimate</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4 GB</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>192 GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows Server 2008 R2 Foundation</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>8 GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows Web Server 2008 R2</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>32 GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows Server 2008 R2 Standard</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>32 GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows HPC Server 2008 R2</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>128 GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows Server 2008 R2 Enterprise</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>2048 GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows Server 2008 R2 Datacenter</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>2048 GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows Server 2008 R2 for Itanium-Based Systems</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>2048 GB</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although there are several client and server retail packages of the Windows operating system, they share a common set of core system files, including the kernel image, Ntoskrnl.exe (and the PAE version, Ntkrnlpa.exe); the HAL libraries; the device drivers; and the base system utilities and DLLs. These files are identical for all editions of Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2.

With so many different editions of Windows and each having the same kernel image, how does the system know which edition is booted? By querying the registry values ProductType and ProductSuite under the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\ProductOptions key. ProductType is used to distinguish whether the system is a client system or a server system (of any flavor). These values are
loaded into the registry based on the licensing policy file described earlier. The valid values are listed in Table 2-3. This can be queried from the user-mode GetVersionEx function or from a device driver using the kernel-mode support function RtlGetVersion.

### TABLE 2-3 ProductType Registry Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Edition of Windows</th>
<th>Value of ProductType</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Windows client</td>
<td>WinNT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows server (domain controller)</td>
<td>LanmanNT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows server (server only)</td>
<td>ServerNT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A different registry value, ProductPolicy, contains a cached copy of the data inside the tokens.dat file, which differentiates between the editions of Windows and the features that they enable.

If user programs need to determine which edition of Windows is running, they can call the Windows VerifyVersionInfo function, documented in the Windows Software Development Kit (SDK). Device drivers can call the kernel-mode function RtlVerifyVersionInfo, documented in the WDK.

So if the core files are essentially the same for the client and server versions, how do the systems differ in operation? In short, server systems are optimized by default for system throughput as high-performance application servers, whereas the client version (although it has server capabilities) is optimized for response time for interactive desktop use. For example, based on the product type, several resource allocation decisions are made differently at system boot time, such as the size and number of operating system heaps (or pools), the number of internal system worker threads, and the size of the system data cache. Also, run-time policy decisions, such as the way the memory manager trades off system and process memory demands, differ between the server and client editions. Even some thread scheduling details have different default behavior in the two families (the default length of the time slice, or thread quantum—see Chapter 5 for details). Where there are significant operational differences in the two products, these are highlighted in the pertinent chapters throughout the rest of this book. Unless otherwise noted, everything in this book applies to both the client and server versions.

### EXPERIMENT: Determining Features Enabled by Licensing Policy

As mentioned earlier, Windows supports more than 100 different features that can be enabled through the software licensing mechanism. These policy settings determine the various differences not only between a client and server installation, but also between each edition (or SKU) of the operating system, such as BitLocker support (available on Windows server as well as the Ultimate and Enterprise editions of Windows client). You can use the SlPolicy tool available from Winsider Seminars & Solutions (www.winsiderss.com/tools/slpolicy.htm) to display these policy values on your machine.
Policy settings are organized by a facility, which represents the owner module for which the policy applies. You can display a list of all facilities on your system by running Slpolicy.exe with the –f switch:

C:\>SlPolicy.exe -f
SlPolicy v1.05 - Show Software Licensing Policies
Copyright (C) 2008-2011 Winsider Seminars & Solutions Inc.
www.winsiderss.com

Software Licensing Facilities:

Kernel
Licensing and Activation
Core
DWM
SMB
IIS

You can then add the name of any facility after the switch to display the policy value for that facility. For example, to look at the limitations on CPUs and available memory, use the Kernel facility. Here’s the expected output on a machine running Windows 7 Ultimate:

C:\>SlPolicy.exe -f Kernel

SlPolicy v1.05 - Show Software Licensing Policies
Copyright (C) 2008-2011 Winsider Seminars & Solutions Inc.
www.winsiderss.com

Kernel
------
Processor Limit: 2
Maximum Memory Allowed (x86): 4096
Maximum Memory Allowed (x64): 196608
Maximum Memory Allowed (IA64): 196608
Maximum Physical Page: 4096
Addition of Physical Memory Allowed: No
Addition of Physical Memory Allowed, if virtualized: Yes
Product Information: 1
Dynamic Partitioning Supported: No
Virtual Dynamic Partitioning Supported: No
Memory Mirroring Supported: No
Native VHD Boot Supported: Yes
Bad Memory List Persistence Supported: No
Number of MUI Languages Allowed: 1000
List of Allowed Languages: EMPTY
List of Disallowed Languages: EMPTY
MUI Language SKU: 
Expiration Date: 0
Checked Build

There is a special debug version of Windows called the checked build (available only with an MSDN Operating Systems subscription). It is a recompilation of the Windows source code with a compile-time flag defined called “DBG” (to cause compile-time, conditional debugging and tracing code to be included). Also, to make it easier to understand the machine code, the post-processing of the Windows binaries to optimize code layout for faster execution is not performed. (See the section “Debugging Performance-Optimized Code” in the Debugging Tools for Windows help file.)

The checked build is provided primarily to aid device driver developers because it performs more stringent error checking on kernel-mode functions called by device drivers or other system code. For example, if a driver (or some other piece of kernel-mode code) makes an invalid call to a system function that is checking parameters (such as acquiring a spinlock at the wrong interrupt level), the system will stop execution when the problem is detected rather than allow some data structure to be corrupted and the system to possibly crash at a later time.

EXPERIMENT: Determining If You Are Running the Checked Build

There is no built-in tool to display whether you are running the checked build or the retail build (called the free build). However, this information is available through the “Debug” property of the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Win32_OperatingSystem class. The following sample Microsoft Visual Basic script displays this property:

```vbs
strComputer = "."
Set objWMIService = GetObject("winmgmts:" & "{impersonationLevel=impersonate}!\" & strComputer & "\root\cimv2")
Set colOperatingSystems = objWMIService.ExecQuery("
"SELECT * FROM Win32_OperatingSystem"
"
"

For Each objOperatingSystem in colOperatingSystems
    WScript.Echo "Debug: " & objOperatingSystem.Debug
Next
```

To try this, type in the preceding script and save it as file. The following is the output from running the script:

```
C:\>cscript osversion.vbs
Microsoft (R) Windows Script Host Version 5.8
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

Caption: Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 Enterprise
Debug: False
Version: 6.1.7600
```

This system is not running the checked build, because the Debug flag shown here says False.

Much of the additional code in the checked-build binaries is a result of using the ASSERT and/or NT_ASSERT macros, which are defined in the WDK header file Wdm.h and documented in the WDK documentation. These macros test a condition (such as the validity of a data structure or parameter),
and if the expression evaluates to FALSE, the macros call the kernel-mode function \texttt{RtlAssert}, which calls \texttt{DbgPrintEx} to send the text of the debug message to a debug message buffer. If a kernel debugger is attached, this message is displayed automatically followed by a prompt asking the user what to do about the assertion failure (breakpoint, ignore, terminate process, or terminate thread). If the system wasn’t booted with the kernel debugger (using the \texttt{debug} option in the Boot Configuration Database—BCD) and no kernel debugger is currently attached, failure of an ASSERT test will bug-check the system. For a list of ASSERT checks made by some of the kernel support routines, see the section “Checked Build ASSERTs” in the WDK documentation.

The checked build is also useful for system administrators because of the additional detailed informational tracing that can be enabled for certain components. (For detailed instructions, see the Microsoft Knowledge Base Article number 314743, titled \texttt{HOWTO: Enable Verbose Debug Tracing in Various Drivers and Subsystems}.) This information output is sent to an internal debug message buffer using the \texttt{DbgPrintEx} function referred to earlier. To view the debug messages, you can either attach a kernel debugger to the target system (which requires booting the target system in debugging mode), use the \texttt{!dbgprint} command while performing local kernel debugging, or use the Dbgview.exe tool from Sysinternals (\url{www.microsoft.com/technet/sysinternals}).

You don’t have to install the entire checked build to take advantage of the debug version of the operating system. You can just copy the checked version of the kernel image (Ntoskrnl.exe) and the appropriate HAL (Hal.dll) to a normal retail installation. The advantage of this approach is that device drivers and other kernel code get the rigorous checking of the checked build without having to run the slower debug versions of all components in the system. For detailed instructions on how to do this, see the section “Installing Just the Checked Operating System and HAL” in the WDK documentation.

Finally, the checked build can also be useful for testing user-mode code only because the timing of the system is different. (This is because of the additional checking taking place within the kernel and the fact that the components are compiled without optimizations.) Often, multithreaded synchronization bugs are related to specific timing conditions. By running your tests on a system running the checked build (or at least the checked kernel and HAL), the fact that the timing of the whole system is different might cause latent timing bugs to surface that do not occur on a normal retail system.

**Key System Components**

Now that we’ve looked at the high-level architecture of Windows, let’s delve deeper into the internal structure and the role each key operating system component plays. Figure 2-3 is a more detailed and complete diagram of the core Windows system architecture and components than was shown earlier in the chapter (in Figure 2-1). Note that it still does not show all components (networking in particular, which is explained in Chapter 7, “Networking.”

The following sections elaborate on each major element of this diagram. Chapter 3 explains the primary control mechanisms the system uses (such as the object manager, interrupts, and so forth). Chapter 13, “Startup and Shutdown,” in Part 2 describes the process of starting and shutting down
Windows, and Chapter 4 details management mechanisms such as the registry, service processes, and Windows Management Instrumentation. Other chapters explore in even more detail the internal structure and operation of key areas such as processes and threads, memory management, security, the I/O manager, storage management, the cache manager, the Windows file system (NTFS), and networking.

**FIGURE 2-3** Windows architecture
Environment Subsystems and Subsystem DLLs

The role of an environment subsystem is to expose some subset of the base Windows executive system services to application programs. Each subsystem can provide access to different subsets of the native services in Windows. That means that some things can be done from an application built on one subsystem that can’t be done by an application built on another subsystem. For example, a Windows application can’t use the SUA fork function.

Each executable image (.exe) is bound to one and only one subsystem. When an image is run, the process creation code examines the subsystem type code in the image header so that it can notify the proper subsystem of the new process. This type code is specified with the /SUBSYSTEM qualifier of the link command in Microsoft Visual C++.

As mentioned earlier, user applications don’t call Windows system services directly. Instead, they go through one or more subsystem DLLs. These libraries export the documented interface that the programs linked to that subsystem can call. For example, the Windows subsystem DLLs (such as Kernel32.dll, Advapi32.dll, User32.dll, and Gdi32.dll) implement the Windows API functions. The SUA subsystem DLL (Psxdll.dll) implements the SUA API functions.

EXPERIMENT: Viewing the Image Subsystem Type

You can see the image subsystem type by using the Dependency Walker tool (Depends.exe) (available at www.dependencywalker.com). For example, notice the image types for two different Windows images, Notepad.exe (the simple text editor) and Cmd.exe (the Windows command prompt):

This shows that Notepad is a GUI program, while Cmd is a console, or character-based, program. And although this implies there are two different subsystems for GUI and character-based programs, there is just one Windows subsystem, and GUI programs can have consoles, just like console programs can display GUIs.
When an application calls a function in a subsystem DLL, one of three things can occur:

- The function is entirely implemented in user mode inside the subsystem DLL. In other words, no message is sent to the environment subsystem process, and no Windows executive system services are called. The function is performed in user mode, and the results are returned to the caller. Examples of such functions include GetCurrentProcess (which always returns –1, a value that is defined to refer to the current process in all process-related functions) and GetCurrentProcessId. (The process ID doesn’t change for a running process, so this ID is retrieved from a cached location, thus avoiding the need to call into the kernel.)

- The function requires one or more calls to the Windows executive. For example, the Windows ReadFile and WriteFile functions involve calling the underlying internal (and undocumented) Windows I/O system services NtReadFile and NtWriteFile, respectively.

- The function requires some work to be done in the environment subsystem process. (The environment subsystem processes, running in user mode, are responsible for maintaining the state of the client applications running under their control.) In this case, a client/server request is made to the environment subsystem via a message sent to the subsystem to perform some operation. The subsystem DLL then waits for a reply before returning to the caller.

Some functions can be a combination of the second and third items just listed, such as the Windows CreateProcess and CreateThread functions.

**Subsystem Startup**

Subsystems are started by the Session Manager (Smss.exe) process. The subsystem startup information is stored under the registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\SubSystems. Figure 2-4 shows the values under this key.

![Registry Editor showing Windows startup information](image)

**FIGURE 2-4** Registry Editor showing Windows startup information

The Required value lists the subsystems that load when the system boots. The value has two strings: Windows and Debug. The Windows value contains the file specification of the Windows subsystem, Csrss.exe, which stands for Client/Server Run-Time Subsystem. Debug is blank (because it’s used for internal testing) and therefore does nothing. The Optional value indicates that the
SUA subsystem will be started on demand. The registry value \textit{Kmode} contains the file name of the kernel-mode portion of the Windows subsystem, Win32k.sys (explained later in this chapter).

Let's take a closer look at each of the environment subsystems.

\textbf{Windows Subsystem}

Although Windows was designed to support multiple, independent environment subsystems, from a practical perspective, having each subsystem implement all the code to handle windowing and display I/O would result in a large amount of duplication of system functions that, ultimately, would negatively affect both system size and performance. Because Windows was the primary subsystem, the Windows designers decided to locate these basic functions there and have the other subsystems call on the Windows subsystem to perform display I/O. Thus, the SUA subsystem calls services in the Windows subsystem to perform display I/O.

As a result of this design decision, the Windows subsystem is a required component for any Windows system, even on server systems with no interactive users logged in. Because of this, the process is marked as a critical process (which means if for any reason it exits, the system crashes).

The Windows subsystem consists of the following major components:

- For each session, an instance of the environment subsystem process (Csrss.exe) loads three DLLs (Basesrv.dll, Winsrv.dll, and Csrsrv.dll) that contain support for the following:
  - Creating and deleting processes and threads
  - Portions of the support for 16-bit virtual DOS machine (VDM) processes (32-bit Windows only)
  - Side-by-Side (SxS)/Fusion and manifest support
  - Other miscellaneous functions—such as \textit{GetTempFile}, \textit{DefineDosDevice}, \textit{ExitWindowsEx}, and several natural language support functions

- A kernel-mode device driver (Win32k.sys) that contains the following:
  - The window manager, which controls window displays; manages screen output; collects input from keyboard, mouse, and other devices; and passes user messages to applications.
  - The Graphics Device Interface (GDI), which is a library of functions for graphics output devices. It includes functions for line, text, and figure drawing and for graphics manipulation.
  - Wrappers for DirectX support that is implemented in another kernel driver (Dxgkrnl.sys).

- The console host process (Conhost.exe), which provides support for console (character cell) applications.

- Subsystem DLLs (such as Kernel32.dll, Advapi32.dll, User32.dll, and Gdi32.dll) that translate documented Windows API functions into the appropriate and mostly undocumented kernel-mode system service calls in Ntoskrnl.exe and Win32k.sys.
Graphics device drivers for hardware-dependent graphics display drivers, printer drivers, and video miniport drivers.

**Note** As part of a refactoring effort in the Windows architecture called MinWin, the subsystem DLLs are now generally composed of specific libraries that implement API Sets, which are then linked together into the subsystem DLL and resolved using a special redirection scheme. More information on this refactoring is available in Chapter 5 in the “Image Loader” section.

Applications call the standard USER functions to create user interface controls, such as windows and buttons, on the display. The window manager communicates these requests to the GDI, which passes them to the graphics device drivers, where they are formatted for the display device. A display driver is paired with a video miniport driver to complete video display support.

The GDI provides a set of standard two-dimensional functions that let applications communicate with graphics devices without knowing anything about the devices. GDI functions mediate between applications and graphics devices such as display drivers and printer drivers. The GDI interprets application requests for graphic output and sends the requests to graphics display drivers. It also provides a standard interface for applications to use varying graphics output devices. This interface enables application code to be independent of the hardware devices and their drivers. The GDI tailors its messages to the capabilities of the device, often dividing the request into manageable parts. For example, some devices can understand directions to draw an ellipse; others require the GDI to interpret the command as a series of pixels placed at certain coordinates. For more information about the graphics and video driver architecture, see the “Design Guide” section of the “Display (Adapters and Monitors)” chapter in the Windows Driver Kit.

Because much of the subsystem—in particular, display I/O functionality—runs in kernel mode, only a few Windows functions result in sending a message to the Windows subsystem process: process and thread creation and termination, network drive letter mapping, and creation of temporary files. In general, a running Windows application won’t be causing many, if any, context switches to the Windows subsystem process.

**Console Window Host**

In the original Windows subsystem design, the subsystem process (Csrss.exe) was responsible for the managing of console windows and each console application (such as Cmd.exe, the command prompt) communicated with Csrss. Windows now uses a separate process, the console window host (Conhost.exe), for each console window on the system. (A single console window can be shared by multiple console applications, such as when you launch a command prompt from the command prompt. By default, the second command prompt shares the console window of the first.)
Whenever a console application registers itself with the Csrss instance running in the current session, Csrss creates a new instance of Conhost using the client process’ security token instead of Csrss’ System token. It then maps a shared memory section that is used to allow all Conhosts to share part of their memory with Csrss for efficient buffer handling (because these threads do not live within Csrss anymore) and creates a named Asynchronous Local Procedure Call (ALPC) port in the \RPC Control object directory. (For more information on ALPC, see Chapter 3.) The name of the port is of the format console-PID-lpc-handle, where PID is the process ID of the Conhost process. It then registers its PID with the kernel process structure associated with the user application, which can then query this information to open the newly created ALPC port. This process also creates a mapping of a shared section memory object between the command-line application and its Conhost so that the two can share data. Finally, a wait event is created in the session 0 BaseNamedObjects directory (named ConsoleEvent-PID) so that the command-line application and the Conhost can notify each other of new buffer data. The following figure shows a Conhost process with handles open to its ALPC port and event.

Because the Conhost is running with the user’s credentials (which also implies the user’s privilege level), as well as in a process associated with the console application itself, the User Interface Privilege Isolation (UIPI, described in Chapter 6, “Security”) security mechanism covers console processes. In addition, CPU-bound console applications can be identified with their supporting console host process (which a user can kill if needed). As a side effect, because Conhost processes now run outside the special enclave of the Csrss subsystem, console applications (whose windows are actually owned by Conhost) can be fully themed, load third-party DLLs, and run with full windowing capabilities.
Subsystem for Unix-based Applications

The Subsystem for UNIX-based Applications (SUA) enables compiling and running custom UNIX-based applications on a computer running Windows Server or the Enterprise or Ultimate editions of Windows client. SUA provides nearly 2000 UNIX functions and 300 UNIX-like tools and utilities. (See http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc771470.aspx for more information on SUA.) For more information on how Windows handles running SUA applications, see the section “Flow of CreateProcess” in Chapter 5.

Original POSIX Subsystem

POSIX, an acronym loosely defined as “a portable operating system interface based on UNIX,” refers to a collection of international standards for UNIX-style operating system interfaces. The POSIX standards encourage vendors implementing UNIX-style interfaces to make them compatible so that programmers can move their applications easily from one system to another.

Windows initially implemented only one of the many POSIX standards, POSIX.1, formally known as ISO/IEC 9945-1:1990 or IEEE POSIX standard 1003.1-1990. This standard was included primarily to meet U.S. government procurement requirements set in the mid-to-late 1980s that mandated POSIX.1 compliance as specified in Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 151-2, developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Windows NT 3.5, 3.51, and 4 were formally tested and certified according to FIPS 151-2.

Because POSIX.1 compliance was a mandatory goal for Windows, the operating system was designed to ensure that the required base system support was present to allow for the implementation of a POSIX.1 subsystem (such as the fork function, which is implemented in the Windows executive, and the support for hard file links in the Windows file system).

Ntdll.dll

Ntdll.dll is a special system support library primarily for the use of subsystem DLLs. It contains two types of functions:

- System service dispatch stubs to Windows executive system services
- Internal support functions used by subsystems, subsystem DLLs, and other native images

The first group of functions provides the interface to the Windows executive system services that can be called from user mode. There are more than 400 such functions, such as NtCreateFile, NtSetEvent, and so on. As noted earlier, most of the capabilities of these functions are accessible through the Windows API. (A number are not, however, and are for use only within the operating system.)
For each of these functions, Ntdll contains an entry point with the same name. The code inside the function contains the architecture-specific instruction that causes a transition into kernel mode to invoke the system service dispatcher (explained in more detail in Chapter 3), which, after verifying some parameters, calls the actual kernel-mode system service that contains the real code inside Ntoskrnl.exe.

Ntdll also contains many support functions, such as the image loader (functions that start with \textit{Ldr}), the heap manager, and Windows subsystem process communication functions (functions that start with \textit{Csr}). Ntdll also includes general run-time library routines (functions that start with \textit{Rtl}), support for user-mode debugging (functions that start with \textit{DbgUi}), and Event Tracing for Windows (functions starting in \textit{Etw}), and the user-mode asynchronous procedure call (APC) dispatcher and exception dispatcher. (APCs and exceptions are explained in Chapter 3.) Finally, you'll find a small subset of the C Run-Time (CRT) routines in Ntdll, limited to those routines that are part of the string and standard libraries (such as \textit{memcpy}, \textit{strcpy}, \textit{itoa}, and so on).

**Executive**

The Windows executive is the upper layer of Ntoskrnl.exe. (The kernel is the lower layer.) The executive includes the following types of functions:

- Functions that are exported and callable from user mode. These functions are called \textit{system services} and are exported via Ntdll. Most of the services are accessible through the Windows API or the APIs of another environment subsystem. A few services, however, aren’t available through any documented subsystem function. (Examples include ALPC and various query functions such as \textit{NtQueryInformationProcess}, specialized functions such as \textit{NtCreatePagingFile}, and so on.)

- Device driver functions that are called through the use of the \textit{DeviceIoControl} function. This provides a general interface from user mode to kernel mode to call functions in device drivers that are not associated with a read or write.

- Functions that can be called only from kernel mode that are exported and are documented in the WDK.

- Functions that are exported and callable from kernel mode but are not documented in the WDK (such as the functions called by the boot video driver, which start with \textit{Inbv}).

- Functions that are defined as global symbols but are not exported. These include internal support functions called within Ntoskrnl, such as those that start with \textit{Iop} (internal I/O manager support functions) or \textit{Mi} (internal memory management support functions).

- Functions that are internal to a module that are not defined as global symbols.

The executive contains the following major components, each of which is covered in detail in a subsequent chapter of this book:

- The \textit{configuration manager} (explained in Chapter 4) is responsible for implementing and managing the system registry.
The process manager (explained in Chapter 5) creates and terminates processes and threads. The underlying support for processes and threads is implemented in the Windows kernel; the executive adds additional semantics and functions to these lower-level objects.

The security reference monitor (or SRM, described in Chapter 6) enforces security policies on the local computer. It guards operating system resources, performing run-time object protection and auditing.

The I/O manager (explained in Chapter 8 in Part 2) implements device-independent I/O and is responsible for dispatching to the appropriate device drivers for further processing.

The Plug and Play (PnP) manager (explained in Chapter 8 in Part 2) determines which drivers are required to support a particular device and loads those drivers. It retrieves the hardware resource requirements for each device during enumeration. Based on the resource requirements of each device, the PnP manager assigns the appropriate hardware resources such as I/O ports, IRQs, DMA channels, and memory locations. It is also responsible for sending proper event notification for device changes (addition or removal of a device) on the system.

The power manager (explained in Chapter 8 in Part 2) coordinates power events and generates power management I/O notifications to device drivers. When the system is idle, the power manager can be configured to reduce power consumption by putting the CPU to sleep. Changes in power consumption by individual devices are handled by device drivers but are coordinated by the power manager.

The Windows Driver Model Windows Management Instrumentation routines (explained in Chapter 4) enable device drivers to publish performance and configuration information and receive commands from the user-mode WMI service. Consumers of WMI information can be on the local machine or remote across the network.

The cache manager (explained in Chapter 11, “Cache Manager,” in Part 2) improves the performance of file-based I/O by causing recently referenced disk data to reside in main memory for quick access (and by deferring disk writes by holding the updates in memory for a short time before sending them to the disk). As you’ll see, it does this by using the memory manager’s support for mapped files.

The memory manager (explained in Chapter 10 in Part 2) implements virtual memory, a memory management scheme that provides a large, private address space for each process that can exceed available physical memory. The memory manager also provides the underlying support for the cache manager.

The logical prefetcher and Superfetch (explained in Chapter 10 in Part 2) accelerate system and process startup by optimizing the loading of data referenced during the startup of the system or a process.
In addition, the executive contains four main groups of support functions that are used by the executive components just listed. About a third of these support functions are documented in the WDK because device drivers also use them. These are the four categories of support functions:

- **The object manager**, which creates, manages, and deletes Windows executive objects and abstract data types that are used to represent operating system resources such as processes, threads, and the various synchronization objects. The object manager is explained in Chapter 3.

- The **Advanced LPC facility** (ALPC, explained in Chapter 3) passes messages between a client process and a server process on the same computer. Among other things, ALPC is used as a local transport for *remote procedure call* (RPC), an industry-standard communication facility for client and server processes across a network.

- A broad set of common **run-time library** functions, such as string processing, arithmetic operations, data type conversion, and security structure processing.

- Executive support routines, such as system memory allocation (paged and nonpaged pool), interlocked memory access, as well as three special types of synchronization objects: resources, fast mutexes, and pushlocks.

The executive also contains a variety of other infrastructure routines, some of which we will mention only briefly throughout the book:

- The **kernel debugger** library, which allows debugging of the kernel from a debugger supporting KD, a portable protocol supported over a variety of transports (such as USB and IEEE 1394) and implemented by WinDbg and the Kd.exe utilities.

- The **user-mode debugging framework**, which is responsible for sending events to the user-mode debugging API and allowing breakpoints and stepping through code to work, as well as for changing contexts of running threads.

- The **kernel transaction manager**, which provides a common, two-phase commit mechanism to resource managers, such as the transactional registry (TxR) and transactional NTFS (TxF).

- The **hypervisor library**, part of the Hyper-V stack in Windows Server 2008, provides kernel support for the virtual machine environment and optimizes certain parts of the code when the system knows it’s running in a client partition (virtual environment).

- The **errata manager** provides workarounds for nonstandard or noncompliant hardware devices.

- The **Driver Verifier** implements optional integrity checks of kernel-mode drivers and code.

- **Event Tracing for Windows** provides helper routines for systemwide event tracing for kernel-mode and user-mode components.

- The **Windows diagnostic infrastructure** enables intelligent tracing of system activity based on diagnostic scenarios.
- The Windows hardware error architecture support routines provide a common framework for reporting hardware errors.
- The file-system runtime library provides common support routines for file system drivers.

Kernel

The kernel consists of a set of functions in Ntoskrnl.exe that provides fundamental mechanisms (such as thread scheduling and synchronization services) used by the executive components, as well as low-level hardware architecture–dependent support (such as interrupt and exception dispatching) that is different on each processor architecture. The kernel code is written primarily in C, with assembly code reserved for those tasks that require access to specialized processor instructions and registers not easily accessible from C.

Like the various executive support functions mentioned in the preceding section, a number of functions in the kernel are documented in the WDK (and can be found by searching for functions beginning with `Ke`) because they are needed to implement device drivers.

Kernel Objects

The kernel provides a low-level base of well-defined, predictable operating system primitives and mechanisms that allow higher-level components of the executive to do what they need to do. The kernel separates itself from the rest of the executive by implementing operating system mechanisms and avoiding policy making. It leaves nearly all policy decisions to the executive, with the exception of thread scheduling and dispatching, which the kernel implements.

Outside the kernel, the executive represents threads and other shareable resources as objects. These objects require some policy overhead, such as object handles to manipulate them, security checks to protect them, and resource quotas to be deducted when they are created. This overhead is eliminated in the kernel, which implements a set of simpler objects, called kernel objects, that help the kernel control central processing and support the creation of executive objects. Most executive-level objects encapsulate one or more kernel objects, incorporating their kernel-defined attributes.

One set of kernel objects, called control objects, establishes semantics for controlling various operating system functions. This set includes the APC object, the deferred procedure call (DPC) object, and several objects the I/O manager uses, such as the interrupt object.

Another set of kernel objects, known as dispatcher objects, incorporates synchronization capabilities that alter or affect thread scheduling. The dispatcher objects include the kernel thread, mutex (called mutant internally), event, kernel event pair, semaphore, timer, and waitable timer. The executive uses kernel functions to create instances of kernel objects, to manipulate them, and to construct the more complex objects it provides to user mode. Objects are explained in more detail in Chapter 3, and processes and threads are described in Chapter 5.
Kernel Processor Control Region and Control Block (KPCR and KPRCB)

The kernel uses a data structure called the *processor control region*, or KPCR, to store processor-specific data. The KPCR contains basic information such as the processor’s interrupt dispatch table (IDT), task-state segment (TSS), and global descriptor table (GDT). It also includes the interrupt controller state, which it shares with other modules, such as the ACPI driver and the HAL. To provide easy access to the KPCR, the kernel stores a pointer to it in the *fs* register on 32-bit Windows and in the *gs* register on an x64 Windows system. On IA64 systems, the KPCR is always located at 0xe0000000ffff0000.

The KPCR also contains an embedded data structure called the *kernel processor control block* (KPRCB). Unlike the KPCR, which is documented for third-party drivers and other internal Windows kernel components, the KPRCB is a private structure used only by the kernel code in Ntoskrnl.exe. It contains scheduling information such as the current, next, and idle threads scheduled for execution on the processor; the dispatcher database for the processor (which includes the ready queues for each priority level); the DPC queue; CPU vendor and identifier information (model, stepping, speed, feature bits); CPU and NUMA topology (node information, cores per package, logical processors per core, and so on); cache sizes; time accounting information (such as the DPC and interrupt time); and more. The KPRCB also contains all the statistics for the processor, such as I/O statistics, cache manager statistics (see Chapter 11, “Cache Manager,” in Part 2 for a description of these), DPC statistics, and memory manager statistics. (See Chapter 10 in Part 2 for more information.) Finally, the KPRCB is sometimes used to store cache-aligned, per-processor structures to optimize memory access, especially on NUMA systems. For example, the nonpaged and paged-pool system look-aside lists are stored in the KPRCB.

**EXPERIMENT: Viewing the KPCR and KPRCB**

You can view the contents of the KPCR and KPRCB by using the `!pcr` and `!prcb` kernel debugger commands. If you don’t include flags, the debugger will display information for CPU 0 by default; otherwise, you can specify a CPU by adding its number after the command (for example, `!pcr 2`). The following example shows what the output of the `!pcr` and `!prcb` commands looks like. If the system had pending DPCs, those would also be shown.

```
\kd> !pcr
KPCR for Processor 0 at 81d09800:
   Major 1 Minor 1
   NtTib.ExceptionList: 9b31ca3c
   NtTib.StackBase: 00000000
   NtTib.StackLimit: 00000000
   NtTib.SubSystemTib: 80150000
   NtTib.Version: 1c47209e
   NtTib.UserPointer: 00000001
   NtTib.SelfTib: 7ffde000
   SelfPcr: 81d09800
   Prcb: 81d09920
   Irql: 00000002
   IRR: 00000000
   IDR: ffffffff
```
InterruptMode: 00000000
   IDT: 82fb8400
   GDT: 82fb8000
   TSS: 80150000

   CurrentThread: 86d317e8
   NextThread: 00000000
   IdleThread: 81d0d640

   DpcQueue:

   lkd> !prcb
PRCB for Processor 0 at 81d09920:
   Current IRQL -- 0
   Threads-- Current 86d317e8 Next 00000000 Idle 81d0d640
   Number 0 SetMember 1
   Interrupt Count -- 294ccce0
   Times -- Dpc 0002a87f Interrupt 00010b87
         Kernel 026270a1 User 00140e5e

   You can use the dt command to directly dump the _KPCR and _KPRCB data structures because both debugger commands give you the address of the structure (shown in bold for clarity in the previous output). For example, if you wanted to determine the speed of the processor, you could look at the MHz field with the following command:

   lkd> dt nt!_KPRCB 81d09920 MHz

   +0x3c4 MHz : 0xbb4
   lkd> ? bb4
   Evaluate expression: 2996 = 00000bb4

   On this machine, the processor was running at about 3 GHz.

Hardware Support

The other major job of the kernel is to abstract or isolate the executive and device drivers from variations between the hardware architectures supported by Windows. This job includes handling variations in functions such as interrupt handling, exception dispatching, and multiprocessor synchronization.

   Even for these hardware-related functions, the design of the kernel attempts to maximize the amount of common code. The kernel supports a set of interfaces that are portable and semantically identical across architectures. Most of the code that implements these portable interfaces is also identical across architectures.

   Some of these interfaces are implemented differently on different architectures or are partially implemented with architecture-specific code. These architecturally independent interfaces can be called on any machine, and the semantics of the interface will be the same whether or not the code varies by architecture. Some kernel interfaces (such as spinlock routines, which are described
in Chapter 3) are actually implemented in the HAL (described in the next section) because their implementation can vary for systems within the same architecture family.

The kernel also contains a small amount of code with x86-specific interfaces needed to support old MS-DOS programs. These x86 interfaces aren’t portable in the sense that they can’t be called on a machine based on any other architecture; they won’t be present. This x86-specific code, for example, supports calls to manipulate global descriptor tables (GDTs) and local descriptor tables (LDTs), which are hardware features of the x86.

Other examples of architecture-specific code in the kernel include the interfaces to provide translation buffer and CPU cache support. This support requires different code for the different architectures because of the way caches are implemented.

Another example is context switching. Although at a high level the same algorithm is used for thread selection and context switching (the context of the previous thread is saved, the context of the new thread is loaded, and the new thread is started), there are architectural differences among the implementations on different processors. Because the context is described by the processor state (registers and so on), what is saved and loaded varies depending on the architecture.

**Hardware Abstraction Layer**

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, one of the crucial elements of the Windows design is its portability across a variety of hardware platforms. The hardware abstraction layer (HAL) is a key part of making this portability possible. The HAL is a loadable kernel-mode module (Hal.dll) that provides the low-level interface to the hardware platform on which Windows is running. It hides hardware-dependent details such as I/O interfaces, interrupt controllers, and multiprocessor communication mechanisms—any functions that are both architecture-specific and machine-dependent.

So rather than access hardware directly, Windows internal components as well as user-written device drivers maintain portability by calling the HAL routines when they need platform-dependent information. For this reason, the HAL routines are documented in the WDK. To find out more about the HAL and its use by device drivers, refer to the WDK.

Although several HALs are included (as shown in Table 2-4), Windows has the ability to detect at boot-up time which HAL should be used, eliminating the problem that existed on earlier versions of Windows when attempting to boot a Windows installation on a different kind of system.

**TABLE 2-4 List of x86 HALs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HAL File Name</th>
<th>Systems Supported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Halacpi.dll</td>
<td>Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI) PCs. Implies uniprocessor-only machine, without APIC support (the presence of either one would make the system use the HAL below instead).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halmacpi.dll</td>
<td>Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controller (APIC) PCs with an ACPI. The existence of an APIC implies SMP support.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note On x64 machines, there is only one HAL image, called Hal.dll. This results from all x64 machines having the same motherboard configuration, because the processors require ACPI and APIC support. Therefore, there is no need to support machines without ACPI or with a standard PIC.

EXPERIMENT: Determining Which HAL You’re Running

You can determine which version of the HAL you’re running by using WinDbg and opening a local kernel debugging session. Be sure you have the symbols loaded by entering .reload, and then typing lm vm hal. For example, the following output is from a system running the ACPI HAL:

```plaintext
lkd> lm vm hal
start end module name
fffff800'0181b000 fffff800'01864000 hal (deferred)
Loaded symbol image file: halmacpi.dll
Image path: halmacpi.dll
Image name: halmacpi.dll
Timestamp: Mon Jul 13 21:27:36 2009 (4A5BDF08)
CheckSum: 0004BD36
ImageSize: 00049000
FileVersion: 6.1.7600.16385
ProductVersion: 6.1.7600.16385
File flags: 0 (Mask 3F)
File OS: 40004 NT Win32
File type: 2.0 Dll
File date: 00000000.00000000
Translations: 0409.04b0
CompanyName: Microsoft Corporation
ProductName: Microsoft® Windows® Operating System
InternalName: halmacpi.dll
OriginalFilename: halmacpi.dll
FileVersion: 6.1.7600.16385
FileVersion: 6.1.7600.16385 (win7_rtm.090713-1255)
FileDescription: Hardware Abstraction Layer DLL
LegalCopyright: © Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
```

EXPERIMENT: Viewing NTOSKRNL and HAL Image Dependencies

You can view the relationship of the kernel and HAL images by examining their export and import tables using the Dependency Walker tool (Depends.exe). To examine an image in the Dependency Walker, select Open from the File menu to open the desired image file.
Here is a sample of output you can see by viewing the dependencies of Ntoskrnl using this tool:

Notice that Ntoskrnl is linked against the HAL, which is in turn linked against Ntoskrnl. (They both use functions in each other.) Ntoskrnl is also linked to the following binaries:

- Pshed.dll, the Platform-Specific Hardware Error Driver. PSHED provides an abstraction of the hardware error reporting facilities of the underlying platform by hiding the details of a platform’s error-handling mechanisms from the operating system and exposing a consistent interface to the Windows operating system.

- On 32-bit systems only, Bootvid.dll, the Boot Video Driver. Bootvid provides support for the VGA commands required to display boot text and the boot logo during startup. On x64 systems, this library is built into the kernel to avoid conflicts with Kernel Patch Protection (KPP). (See Chapter 3 for more information on KPP and PatchGuard.)

- Kdcom.dll, the Kernel Debugger Protocol (KD) Communications Library.

- Ci.dll, the code integrity library. (See Chapter 3 for more information on code integrity.)

- Clfs.sys, the common logging file system driver, used by, among other things, the Kernel Transaction Manager (KTM). (See Chapter 3 for more information on the KTM.)

For a detailed description of the information displayed by this tool, see the Dependency Walker help file (Depends.hlp).
Device Drivers

Although device drivers are explained in detail in Chapter 8 in Part 2, this section provides a brief overview of the types of drivers and explains how to list the drivers installed and loaded on your system.

Device drivers are loadable kernel-mode modules (typically ending in .sys) that interface between the I/O manager and the relevant hardware. They run in kernel mode in one of three contexts:

- In the context of the user thread that initiated an I/O function
- In the context of a kernel-mode system thread
- As a result of an interrupt (and therefore not in the context of any particular process or thread—whichever process or thread was current when the interrupt occurred)

As stated in the preceding section, device drivers in Windows don’t manipulate hardware directly, but rather they call functions in the HAL to interface with the hardware. Drivers are typically written in C (sometimes C++) and therefore, with proper use of HAL routines, can be source-code portable across the CPU architectures supported by Windows and binary portable within an architecture family.

There are several types of device drivers:

- **Hardware device drivers** manipulate hardware (using the HAL) to write output to or retrieve input from a physical device or network. There are many types of hardware device drivers, such as bus drivers, human interface drivers, mass storage drivers, and so on.

- **File system drivers** are Windows drivers that accept file-oriented I/O requests and translate them into I/O requests bound for a particular device.

- **File system filter drivers**, such as those that perform disk mirroring and encryption, intercept I/Os, and perform some added-value processing before passing the I/O to the next layer.

- **Network redirectors and servers** are file system drivers that transmit file system I/O requests to a machine on the network and receive such requests, respectively.

- **Protocol drivers** implement a networking protocol such as TCP/IP, NetBEUI, and IPX/SPX.

- **Kernel streaming filter drivers** are chained together to perform signal processing on data streams, such as recording or displaying audio and video.

Because installing a device driver is the only way to add user-written kernel-mode code to the system, some programmers have written device drivers simply as a way to access internal operating system functions or data structures that are not accessible from user mode (but that are documented and supported in the WDK). For example, many of the utilities from Sysinternals combine a Windows GUI application and a device driver that is used to gather internal system state and call kernel-mode-only accessible functions not available from the user-mode Windows API.
Windows Driver Model (WDM)

Windows 2000 added support for Plug and Play, Power Options, and an extension to the Windows NT driver model called the Windows Driver Model (WDM). Windows 2000 and later can run legacy Windows NT 4 drivers, but because these don’t support Plug and Play and Power Options, systems running these drivers will have reduced capabilities in these two areas.

From the WDM perspective, there are three kinds of drivers:

- A **bus driver** services a bus controller, adapter, bridge, or any device that has child devices. Bus drivers are required drivers, and Microsoft generally provides them; each type of bus (such as PCI, PCMCIA, and USB) on a system has one bus driver. Third parties can write bus drivers to provide support for new buses, such as VMEbus, Multibus, and Futurebus.

- A **function driver** is the main device driver and provides the operational interface for its device. It is a required driver unless the device is used raw (an implementation in which I/O is done by the bus driver and any bus filter drivers, such as SCSI PassThru). A function driver is by definition the driver that knows the most about a particular device, and it is usually the only driver that accesses device-specific registers.

- A **filter driver** is used to add functionality to a device (or existing driver) or to modify I/O requests or responses from other drivers (and is often used to fix hardware that provides incorrect information about its hardware resource requirements). Filter drivers are optional and can exist in any number, placed above or below a function driver and above a bus driver. Usually, system original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) or independent hardware vendors (IHVs) supply filter drivers.

In the WDM driver environment, no single driver controls all aspects of a device: a bus driver is concerned with reporting the devices on its bus to the PnP manager, while a function driver manipulates the device.

In most cases, lower-level filter drivers modify the behavior of device hardware. For example, if a device reports to its bus driver that it requires 4 I/O ports when it actually requires 16 I/O ports, a lower-level, device-specific function filter driver could intercept the list of hardware resources reported by the bus driver to the PnP manager and update the count of I/O ports.

Upper-level filter drivers usually provide added-value features for a device. For example, an upper-level device filter driver for a keyboard can enforce additional security checks.

Interrupt processing is explained in Chapter 3. Further details about the I/O manager, WDM, Plug and Play, and Power Options are included in Chapter 8 in Part 2.

Windows Driver Foundation

The Windows Driver Foundation (WDF) simplifies Windows driver development by providing two frameworks: the Kernel-Mode Driver Framework (KMDF) and the User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF). Developers can use KMDF to write drivers for Windows 2000 SP4 and later, while UMDF supports Windows XP and later.
KMDF provides a simple interface to WDM and hides its complexity from the driver writer without modifying the underlying bus/function/filter model. KMDF drivers respond to events that they can register and call into the KMDF library to perform work that isn’t specific to the hardware they are managing, such as generic power management or synchronization. (Previously, each driver had to implement this on its own.) In some cases, more than 200 lines of WDM code can be replaced by a single KMDF function call.

UMDF enables certain classes of drivers (mostly USB-based or other high-latency protocol buses)—such as those for video cameras, MP3 players, cell phones, PDAs, and printers—to be implemented as user-mode drivers. UMDF runs each user-mode driver in what is essentially a user-mode service, and it uses ALPC to communicate to a kernel-mode wrapper driver that provides actual access to hardware. If a UMDF driver crashes, the process dies and usually restarts, so the system doesn’t become unstable—the device simply becomes unavailable while the service hosting the driver restarts. Finally, UMDF drivers are written in C++ using COM-like classes and semantics, further lowering the bar for programmers to write device drivers.

**EXPERIMENT: Viewing the Installed Device Drivers**

You can list the installed drivers by running Msinfo32. (To launch this, click Start and then type Msinfo32 and then press Enter.) Under System Summary, expand Software Environment and open System Drivers. Here’s an example output of the list of installed drivers:

This window displays the list of device drivers defined in the registry, their type, and their state (Running or Stopped). Device drivers and Windows service processes are both defined in the same place: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. However, they are distinguished by a type code—for example, type 1 is a kernel-mode device driver. (For a complete list of the information stored in the registry for device drivers, see Table 4-7 in Chapter 4.)

Alternatively, you can list the currently loaded device drivers by selecting the System process in Process Explorer and opening the DLL view.
Peering into Undocumented Interfaces

Examining the names of the exported or global symbols in key system images (such as Ntoskrnl.exe, Hal.dll, or Ntdll.dll) can be enlightening—you can get an idea of the kinds of things Windows can do versus what happens to be documented and supported today. Of course, just because you know the names of these functions doesn’t mean that you can or should call them—the interfaces are undocumented and are subject to change. We suggest that you look at these functions purely to gain more insight into the kinds of internal functions Windows performs, not to bypass supported interfaces.

For example, looking at the list of functions in Ntdll.dll gives you the list of all the system services that Windows provides to user-mode subsystem DLLs versus the subset that each subsystem exposes. Although many of these functions map clearly to documented and supported Windows functions, several are not exposed via the Windows API. (See the article “Inside the Native API” from Sysinternals.)

Conversely, it’s also interesting to examine the imports of Windows subsystem DLLs (such as Kernel32.dll or Advapi32.dll) and which functions they call in Ntdll.

Another interesting image to dump is Ntoskrnl.exe—although many of the exported routines that kernel-mode device drivers use are documented in the Windows Driver Kit, quite a few are not. You might also find it interesting to take a look at the import table for Ntoskrnl and the HAL; this table shows the list of functions in the HAL that Ntoskrnl uses and vice versa.

Table 2-5 lists most of the commonly used function name prefixes for the executive components. Each of these major executive components also uses a variation of the prefix to denote internal functions—either the first letter of the prefix followed by an i (for internal) or the full prefix followed by a p (for private). For example, Ki represents internal kernel functions, and Psp refers to internal process support functions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prefix</th>
<th>Component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alpc</td>
<td>Advanced Local Inter-Process Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cc</td>
<td>Common Cache</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cm</td>
<td>Configuration manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dbgk</td>
<td>Debugging Framework for User-Mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Em</td>
<td>Errata Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etw</td>
<td>Event Tracing for Windows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex</td>
<td>Executive support routines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FsRtl</td>
<td>File system driver run-time library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefix</td>
<td>Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hvl</td>
<td>Hypervisor Library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Io</td>
<td>I/O manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kd</td>
<td>Kernel Debugger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ke</td>
<td>Kernel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lsa</td>
<td>Local Security Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mm</td>
<td>Memory manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nt</td>
<td>NT system services (most of which are exported as Windows functions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ob</td>
<td>Object manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pf</td>
<td>Prefetcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Po</td>
<td>Power manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pp</td>
<td>PnP manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ps</td>
<td>Process support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rtl</td>
<td>Run-time library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Se</td>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sm</td>
<td>Store Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tm</td>
<td>Transaction Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vf</td>
<td>Verifier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wdi</td>
<td>Windows Diagnostic Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whea</td>
<td>Windows Hardware Error Architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wmi</td>
<td>Windows Management Instrumentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zw</td>
<td>Mirror entry point for system services (beginning with Nt) that sets previous access mode to kernel, which eliminates parameter validation, because Nt system services validate parameters only if previous access mode is user</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

You can decipher the names of these exported functions more easily if you understand the naming convention for Windows system routines. The general format is

\[
<\text{Prefix}><\text{Operation}><\text{Object}>
\]

In this format, \textit{Prefix} is the internal component that exports the routine, \textit{Operation} tells what is being done to the object or resource, and \textit{Object} identifies what is being operated on.

For example, \textit{ExAllocatePoolWithTag} is the executive support routine to allocate from a paged or nonpaged pool. \textit{KeInitializeThread} is the routine that allocates and sets up a kernel thread object.
System Processes

The following system processes appear on every Windows system. (Two of these—Idle and System—are not full processes because they are not running a user-mode executable.)

- Idle process (contains one thread per CPU to account for idle CPU time)
- System process (contains the majority of the kernel-mode system threads)
- Session manager (Smss.exe)
- Local session manager (Lsm.exe)
- Windows subsystem (Csrss.exe)
- Session 0 initialization (Wininit.exe)
- Logon process (Winlogon.exe)
- Service control manager (Services.exe) and the child service processes it creates (such as the system-supplied generic service-host process, Svchost.exe)
- Local security authentication server (Lsass.exe)

To understand the relationship of these processes, it is helpful to view the process “tree”—that is, the parent/child relationship between processes. Seeing which process created each process helps to understand where each process comes from. Figure 2-5 is a screen snapshot of the process tree viewed after taking a Process Monitor boot trace. Using Process Monitor allows you to see processes that have since exited (indicated by the muted icon).

![Figure 2-5: Initial system process tree](image-url)
The next sections explain the key system processes shown in Figure 2-5. Although these sections briefly indicate the order of process startup, Chapter 13 in Part 2 contains a detailed description of the steps involved in booting and starting Windows.

**System Idle Process**

The first process listed in Figure 2-5 is the system idle process. As we’ll explain in Chapter 5, processes are identified by their image name. However, this process (as well as the process named System) isn’t running a real user-mode image (in that there is no “System Idle Process.exe” in the \Windows directory). In addition, the name shown for this process differs from utility to utility (because of implementation details). Table 2-6 lists several of the names given to the Idle process (process ID 0). The Idle process is explained in detail in Chapter 5.

**TABLE 2-6 Names for Process ID 0 in Various Utilities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Utility</th>
<th>Name for Process ID 0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Task Manager</td>
<td>System Idle Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process Status (Pstat.exe)</td>
<td>Idle Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process Explorer (Procexp.exe)</td>
<td>System Idle Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task List (Tasklist.exe)</td>
<td>System Idle Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tlist (Tlist.exe)</td>
<td>System Process</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now let's look at system threads and the purpose of each of the system processes that are running real images.

**System Process and System Threads**

The System process (process ID 4) is the home for a special kind of thread that runs only in kernel mode: a *kernel-mode system thread*. System threads have all the attributes and contexts of regular user-mode threads (such as a hardware context, priority, and so on) but are different in that they run only in kernel-mode executing code loaded in system space, whether that is in Ntoskrnl.exe or in any other loaded device driver. In addition, system threads don’t have a user process address space and hence must allocate any dynamic storage from operating system memory heaps, such as a paged or nonpaged pool.

System threads are created by the *PsCreateSystemThread* function (documented in the WDK), which can be called only from kernel mode. Windows, as well as various device drivers, create system threads during system initialization to perform operations that require thread context, such as issuing and waiting for I/Os or other objects or polling a device. For example, the memory manager uses system threads to implement such functions as writing dirty pages to the page file or mapped files, swapping processes in and out of memory, and so forth. The kernel creates a system thread called the *balance set manager* that wakes up once per second to possibly initiate various scheduling and memory management related events. The cache manager also uses system threads to implement
both read-ahead and write-behind I/Os. The file server device driver (Srv2.sys) uses system threads to respond to network I/O requests for file data on disk partitions shared to the network. Even the floppy driver has a system thread to poll the floppy device. (Polling is more efficient in this case because an interrupt-driven floppy driver consumes a large amount of system resources.) Further information on specific system threads is included in the chapters in which the component is described.

By default, system threads are owned by the System process, but a device driver can create a system thread in any process. For example, the Windows subsystem device driver (Win32k.sys) creates a system thread inside the Canonical Display Driver (Cdd.dll) part of the Windows subsystem process (Csrss.exe) so that it can easily access data in the user-mode address space of that process.

When you’re troubleshooting or going through a system analysis, it’s useful to be able to map the execution of individual system threads back to the driver or even to the subroutine that contains the code. For example, on a heavily loaded file server, the System process will likely be consuming considerable CPU time. But the knowledge that when the System process is running that “some system thread” is running isn’t enough to determine which device driver or operating system component is running.

So if threads in the System process are running, first determine which ones are running (for example, with the Performance Monitor tool). Once you find the thread (or threads) that is running, look up in which driver the system thread began execution (which at least tells you which driver likely created the thread) or examine the call stack (or at least the current address) of the thread in question, which would indicate where the thread is currently executing.

Both of these techniques are illustrated in the following experiment.

---

### EXPERIMENT: Mapping a System Thread to a Device Driver

In this experiment, we'll see how to map CPU activity in the System process to the responsible system thread (and the driver it falls in) generating the activity. This is important because when the System process is running, you must go to the thread granularity to really understand what’s going on. For this experiment, we will generate system thread activity by generating file server activity on your machine. (The file server driver, Srv2.sys, creates system threads to handle inbound requests for file I/O. See Chapter 7 for more information on this component.)

1. Open a command prompt.
2. Do a directory listing of your entire C drive using a network path to access your C drive. For example, if your computer name is COMPUTER1, type `dir \computer1\c$ /s` (The `/s` switch lists all subdirectories.)
3. Run Process Explorer, and double-click on the System process.
4. Click on the Threads tab.

5. Sort by the CSwitch Delta (context switch delta) column. You should see one or more threads in Srv2.sys running, such as the following:

If you see a system thread running and you are not sure what the driver is, click the Module button, which will bring up the file properties. Clicking the Module button while highlighting the thread in the Srv2.sys previously shown results in the following display.
Session Manager (Smss)

The session manager (%SystemRoot%\System32\Smss.exe) is the first user-mode process created in the system. The kernel-mode system thread that performs the final phase of the initialization of the executive and kernel creates this process.

When Smss starts, it checks whether it is the first instance (the master Smss) or an instance of itself that the master Smss launched to create a session. (If command-line arguments are present, it is the latter.) By creating multiple instances of itself during boot-up and Terminal Services session creation, Smss can create multiple sessions at the same time (at maximum, four concurrent sessions, plus one more for each extra CPU beyond one). This ability enhances logon performance on Terminal Server systems where multiple users connect at the same time. Once a session finishes initializing, the copy of Smss terminates. As a result, only the initial Smss.exe process remains active. (For a description of Terminal Services, see the section “Terminal Services and Multiple Sessions” in Chapter 1.)

The master Smss performs the following one-time initialization steps:

1. Marks the process and the initial thread as critical. (If a process or thread marked critical exits for any reason, Windows crashes. See Chapter 5 for more information.)

2. Increases the process base priority to 11.

3. If the system supports hot processor add, enables automatic processor affinity updates so that if new processors are added new sessions will take advantage of the new processors. (For more information about dynamic processor additions, see Chapter 5.)
4. Creates named pipes and mailslots used for communication between Smss, Csrss, and Lsm (described in upcoming paragraphs).

5. Creates ALPC port to receive commands.

6. Creates systemwide environment variables as defined in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment.

7. Creates symbolic links for devices defined in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\DOS Devices under the \Global?? directory in the Object Manager namespace.

8. Creates root \Sessions directory in the Object Manager namespace.

9. Runs the programs in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\BootExecute. (The default is Autochk.exe, which performs a check disk.)

10. Processes pending file renames as specified in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\PendingFileRenameOperations.

11. Initializes paging file(s).


13. Runs the programs in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\SetupExecute.

14. Opens known DLLs (HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\KnownDLLs) and maps them as permanent sections (mapped files).

15. Creates a thread to respond to session create requests.

16. Creates the Smss to initialize session 0 (noninteractive session).

17. Creates the Smss to initialize session 1 (interactive session).

Once these steps have been completed, Smss waits forever on the handle to the session 0 instance of Csrss.exe. Because Csrss is marked as a critical process (see Chapter 5), if Csrss exits, this wait will never complete because the system will crash.

A session startup instance of Smss does the following:

1. Calls NtSetSystemInformation with a request to set up kernel-mode session data structures. This in turn calls the internal memory manager function MmSessionCreate, which sets up the session virtual address space that will contain the session paged pool and the per-session data structures allocated by the kernel-mode part of the Windows subsystem (Win32k.sys) and other session-space device drivers. (See Chapter 10 in Part 2 for more details.)

2. Creates the subsystem process(es) for the session (by default, the Windows subsystem Csrss.exe).

3. Creates an instance of Winlogon (interactive sessions) or Wininit (for session 0). See the upcoming paragraphs for more information on these two processes.
Then this intermediate Smss process exits (leaving the subsystem processes and Winlogon or Wininit as parent-less processes).

**Windows Initialization Process (Wininit.exe)**

The Wininit.exe process performs the following system initialization functions:

- Marks itself critical so that if it exits prematurely and the system is booted in debugging mode, it will break into the debugger (if not, the system will crash).
- Initializes the user-mode scheduling infrastructure.
- Creates the %windir%\temp folder.
- Creates a window station (Winsta0) and two desktops (Winlogon and Default) for processes to run on in session 0.
- Creates Services.exe (Service Control Manager or SCM). See upcoming paragraphs for a brief description or Chapter 4 for more details.
- Starts Lsass.exe (Local Security Authentication Subsystem Server). See Chapter 6 for more information on Lsass.
- Starts Lsm.exe (Local Session Manager). See the upcoming “Local Session Manager (Lsm.exe),” section for a brief description.
- Waits forever for system shutdown.

**Service Control Manager (SCM)**

Recall from earlier in the chapter that “services” on Windows can refer either to a server process or to a device driver. This section deals with services that are user-mode processes. Services are like UNIX “daemon processes” or VMS “detached processes” in that they can be configured to start automatically at system boot time without requiring an interactive logon. They can also be started manually (such as by running the Services administrative tool or by calling the Windows StartService function). Typically, services do not interact with the logged-on user, although there are special conditions when this is possible. (See Chapter 4.)

The service control manager is a special system process running the image %SystemRoot%\System32\Services.exe that is responsible for starting, stopping, and interacting with service processes. Service programs are really just Windows images that call special Windows functions to interact with the service control manager to perform such actions as registering the service’s successful startup, responding to status requests, or pausing or shutting down the service. Services are defined in the registry under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services.

Keep in mind that services have three names: the process name you see running on the system, the internal name in the registry, and the display name shown in the Services administrative tool. (Not all services have a display name—if a service doesn’t have a display name, the internal name is shown.) With Windows, services can also have a description field that further details what the service does.
To map a service process to the services contained in that process, use the `tlist /s` or `tasklist /svc` command. Note that there isn't always one-to-one mapping between service processes and running services, however, because some services share a process with other services. In the registry, the type code indicates whether the service runs in its own process or shares a process with other services in the image.

A number of Windows components are implemented as services, such as the Print Spooler, Event Log, Task Scheduler, and various networking components. For more details on services, see Chapter 4.

**EXPERIMENT: Listing Installed Services**

To list the installed services, select Administrative Tools from Control Panel, and then select Services. You should see output like this:

To see the detailed properties about a service, right-click on a service and select Properties. For example, here are the properties for the Print Spooler service (highlighted in the previous screen shot):
Notice that the Path To Executable field identifies the program that contains this service. Remember that some services share a process with other services—mapping isn’t always one to one.

**EXPERIMENT: Viewing Service Details Inside Service Processes**

Process Explorer highlights processes hosting one service or more. (You can configure this by selecting the Configure Colors entry in the Options menu.) If you double-click on a service-hosting process, you will see a Services tab that lists the services inside the process, the name of the registry key that defines the service, the display name seen by the administrator, the description text for that service (if present), and for Svchost services, the path to the DLL that implements the service. For example, listing the services in a Svchost.exe process running under the System account looks like the following:

![Service Details](image)

**Local Session Manager (Lsm.exe)**

The Local Session Manager (Lsm.exe) manages the state of terminal server sessions on the local machine. It sends requests to Smsst through the ALPC port SmSsWinStationApiPort to start new sessions (for example, creating the Csrs and Winlogon processes) such as when a user selects Switch User from Explorer. Lsm also communicates with Winlogon and Csrs (using a local system RPC). It notifies Csrss of events such as connect, disconnect, terminate, and broadcast system message. It receives notification from Winlogon for the following events:

- Logon and logoff
Winlogon, LogonUI, and Userinit

The Windows logon process (%SystemRoot%\System32\Winlogon.exe) handles interactive user logons and logoffs. Winlogon is notified of a user logon request when the secure attention sequence (SAS) keystroke combination is entered. The default SAS on Windows is the combination Ctrl+Alt+Delete. The reason for the SAS is to protect users from password-capture programs that simulate the logon process, because this keyboard sequence cannot be intercepted by a user-mode application.

The identification and authentication aspects of the logon process are implemented through DLLs called credential providers. The standard Windows credential providers implement the default Windows authentication interfaces: password and smartcard. However, developers can provide their own credential providers to implement other identification and authentication mechanisms in place of the standard Windows user name/password method (such as one based on a voice print or a biometric device such as a fingerprint reader). Because Winlogon is a critical system process on which the system depends, credential providers and the UI to display the logon dialog box run inside a child process of Winlogon called LogonUI. When Winlogon detects the SAS, it launches this process, which initializes the credential providers. Once the user enters her credentials or dismisses the logon interface, the LogonUI process terminates.

In addition, Winlogon can load additional network provider DLLs that need to perform secondary authentication. This capability allows multiple network providers to gather identification and authentication information all at one time during normal logon.

Once the user name and password have been captured, they are sent to the local security authentication server process (%SystemRoot%\System32\Lsass.exe, described in Chapter 6) to be authenticated. LSASS calls the appropriate authentication package (implemented as a DLL) to perform the actual verification, such as checking whether a password matches what is stored in the Active Directory or the SAM (the part of the registry that contains the definition of the local users and groups).

Upon a successful authentication, LSASS calls a function in the security reference monitor (for example, NtCreateToken) to generate an access token object that contains the user’s security profile. If User Account Control (UAC) is used and the user logging on is a member of the administrators group or has administrator privileges, LSASS will create a second, restricted version of the token. This access token is then used by Winlogon to create the initial process(es) in the user’s session. The initial process(es) are stored in the registry value Userinit under the registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE \Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon. (The default is Userinit.exe, but there can be more than one image in the list.)
Userinit performs some initialization of the user environment (such as running the login script and applying group policies) and then looks in the registry at the *Shell* value (under the same Winlogon key referred to previously) and creates a process to run the system-defined shell (by default, Explorer.exe). Then Userinit exits. This is the reason Explorer.exe is shown with no parent—it's parent has exited, and as explained in Chapter 1, tlist left-justifies processes whose parent isn’t running. (Another way of looking at it is that Explorer is the grandchild of Winlogon.)

Winlogon is active not only during user logon and logoff but also whenever it intercepts the SAS from the keyboard. For example, when you press Ctrl+Alt+Delete while logged on, the Windows Security screen comes up, providing the options to log off, start the Task Manager, lock the workstation, shut down the system, and so forth. Winlogon and LogonUI are the processes that handle this interaction.

For a complete description of the steps involved in the logon process, see the section “Smss, Csrss, and Wininit” in Chapter 13 in Part 2. For more details on security authentication, see Chapter 6. For details on the callable functions that interface with LSASS (the functions that start with *Lsa*), see the documentation in the Windows SDK.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, we’ve taken a broad look at the overall system architecture of Windows. We’ve examined the key components of Windows and seen how they interrelate. In the next chapter, we’ll look in more detail at the core system mechanisms that these components are built on, such as the object manager and synchronization.
CHAPTER 3

System Mechanisms

The Windows operating system provides several base mechanisms that kernel-mode components such as the executive, the kernel, and device drivers use. This chapter explains the following system mechanisms and describes how they are used:

- Trap dispatching, including interrupts, deferred procedure calls (DPCs), asynchronous procedure calls (APCs), exception dispatching, and system service dispatching
- The executive object manager
- Synchronization, including spinlocks, kernel dispatcher objects, how waits are implemented, as well as user-mode-specific synchronization primitives that avoid trips to kernel mode (unlike typical dispatcher objects)
- System worker threads
- Miscellaneous mechanisms such as Windows global flags
- Advanced Local Procedure Calls (ALPCs)
- Kernel event tracing
- Wow64
- User-mode debugging
- The image loader
- Hypervisor (Hyper-V)
- Kernel Transaction Manager (KTM)
- Kernel Patch Protection (KPP)
- Code integrity

Trap Dispatching

Interrupts and exceptions are operating system conditions that divert the processor to code outside the normal flow of control. Either hardware or software can detect them. The term trap refers to a processor’s mechanism for capturing an executing thread when an exception or an interrupt occurs.
and transferring control to a fixed location in the operating system. In Windows, the processor transfers control to a *trap handler*, which is a function specific to a particular interrupt or exception. Figure 3-1 illustrates some of the conditions that activate trap handlers.

The kernel distinguishes between interrupts and exceptions in the following way. An *interrupt* is an asynchronous event (one that can occur at any time) that is unrelated to what the processor is executing. Interrupts are generated primarily by I/O devices, processor clocks, or timers, and they can be enabled (turned on) or disabled (turned off). An *exception*, in contrast, is a synchronous condition that usually results from the execution of a particular instruction. (Aborts, such as machine checks, is a type of processor exception that’s typically not associated with instruction execution.) Running a program a second time with the same data under the same conditions can reproduce exceptions. Examples of exceptions include memory-access violations, certain debugger instructions, and divide-by-zero errors. The kernel also regards system service calls as exceptions (although technically they’re system traps).

Either hardware or software can generate exceptions and interrupts. For example, a bus error exception is caused by a hardware problem, whereas a divide-by-zero exception is the result of a software bug. Likewise, an I/O device can generate an interrupt, or the kernel itself can issue a software interrupt (such as an APC or DPC, both of which are described later in this chapter).

When a hardware exception or interrupt is generated, the processor records enough machine state on the kernel stack of the thread that’s interrupted to return to that point in the control flow and continue execution as if nothing had happened. If the thread was executing in user mode, Windows
switches to the thread’s kernel-mode stack. Windows then creates a *trap frame* on the kernel stack of the interrupted thread into which it stores the execution state of the thread. The trap frame is a subset of a thread’s complete context, and you can view its definition by typing `dt nt!_ktrap_frame` in the kernel debugger. (Thread context is described in Chapter 5, “Processes and Threads.”) The kernel handles software interrupts either as part of hardware interrupt handling or synchronously when a thread invokes kernel functions related to the software interrupt.

In most cases, the kernel installs front-end, trap-handling functions that perform general trap-handling tasks before and after transferring control to other functions that field the trap. For example, if the condition was a device interrupt, a kernel hardware interrupt trap handler transfers control to the *interrupt service routine* (ISR) that the device driver provided for the interrupting device. If the condition was caused by a call to a system service, the general system service trap handler transfers control to the specified system service function in the executive. The kernel also installs trap handlers for traps that it doesn’t expect to see or doesn’t handle. These trap handlers typically execute the system function `KeBugCheckEx`, which halts the computer when the kernel detects problematic or incorrect behavior that, if left unchecked, could result in data corruption. (For more information on bug checks, see Chapter 14, “Crash Dump Analysis,” in Part 2.) The following sections describe interrupt, exception, and system service dispatching in greater detail.

**Interrupt Dispatching**

Hardware-generated interrupts typically originate from I/O devices that must notify the processor when they need service. Interrupt-driven devices allow the operating system to get the maximum use out of the processor by overlapping central processing with I/O operations. A thread starts an I/O transfer to or from a device and then can execute other useful work while the device completes the transfer. When the device is finished, it interrupts the processor for service. Pointing devices, printers, keyboards, disk drives, and network cards are generally interrupt driven.

System software can also generate interrupts. For example, the kernel can issue a software interrupt to initiate thread dispatching and to asynchronously break into the execution of a thread. The kernel can also disable interrupts so that the processor isn’t interrupted, but it does so only infrequently—at critical moments while it’s programming an interrupt controller or dispatching an exception, for example.

The kernel installs interrupt trap handlers to respond to device interrupts. Interrupt trap handlers transfer control either to an external routine (the ISR) that handles the interrupt or to an internal kernel routine that responds to the interrupt. Device drivers supply ISRs to service device interrupts, and the kernel provides interrupt-handling routines for other types of interrupts.

In the following subsections, you’ll find out how the hardware notifies the processor of device interrupts, the types of interrupts the kernel supports, the way device drivers interact with the kernel (as a part of interrupt processing), and the software interrupts the kernel recognizes (plus the kernel objects that are used to implement them).
Hardware Interrupt Processing

On the hardware platforms supported by Windows, external I/O interrupts come into one of the lines on an interrupt controller. The controller, in turn, interrupts the processor on a single line. Once the processor is interrupted, it queries the controller to get the interrupt request (IRQ). The interrupt controller translates the IRQ to an interrupt number, uses this number as an index into a structure called the interrupt dispatch table (IDT), and transfers control to the appropriate interrupt dispatch routine. At system boot time, Windows fills in the IDT with pointers to the kernel routines that handle each interrupt and exception.

Windows maps hardware IRQs to interrupt numbers in the IDT, and the system also uses the IDT to configure trap handlers for exceptions. For example, the x86 and x64 exception number for a page fault (an exception that occurs when a thread attempts to access a page of virtual memory that isn’t defined or present) is 0xe (14). Thus, entry 0xe in the IDT points to the system’s page-fault handler. Although the architectures supported by Windows allow up to 256 IDT entries, the number of IRQs a particular machine can support is determined by the design of the interrupt controller the machine uses.

EXPERIMENT: Viewing the IDT

You can view the contents of the IDT, including information on what trap handlers Windows has assigned to interrupts (including exceptions and IRQs), using the !idt kernel debugger command. The !idt command with no flags shows simplified output that includes only registered hardware interrupts (and, on 64-bit machines, the processor trap handlers).

The following example shows what the output of the !idt command looks like:

```
1kd> !idt

Dumping IDT:

00: fffff80001a7ec40 nt!KiDivideErrorFault
01: fffff80001a7ed40 nt!KiDebugTrapOrFault
02: fffff80001a7ef00 nt!KiNmiInterrupt Stack = 0xFFFFF80001865000
03: fffff80001a7f280 nt!KiBreakpointTrap
04: fffff80001a7f380 nt!KiOverflowTrap
05: fffff80001a7f480 nt!KiBoundFault
06: fffff80001a7f580 nt!KiInvalidOpcodeFault
07: fffff80001a7f7c0 nt!KiNpxNotAvailableFault
08: fffff80001a7f880 nt!KiDoubleFaultAbort Stack = 0xFFFFF80001863000
09: fffff80001a7f940 nt!KiNpxSegmentOverrunAbort
0a: fffff80001a7fac0 nt!KiInvalidTssFault
0b: fffff80001a7fc00 nt!KiStackFault
0c: fffff80001a7fd40 nt!KiGeneralProtectionFault
0d: fffff80001a7fe80 nt!KiPageFault
0e: fffff80001a80240 nt!KiFloatingErrorFault
10: fffff80001a803c0 nt!KiAlignmentFault
12: fffff80001a804c0 nt!KiMcheckAbort Stack = 0xFFFFF80001867000
```
On the system used to provide the output for this experiment, the keyboard device driver's (I8042prt.sys) keyboard ISR is at interrupt number 0x81. You can also see that interrupt 0xe corresponds to KiPageFault, as explained earlier.

Each processor has a separate IDT so that different processors can run different ISRs, if appropriate. For example, in a multiprocessor system, each processor receives the clock interrupt, but only one processor updates the system clock in response to this interrupt. All the processors, however, use the interrupt to measure thread quantum and to initiate rescheduling when a thread’s quantum ends.
Similarly, some system configurations might require that a particular processor handle certain device interrupts.

**x86 Interrupt Controllers**

Most x86 systems rely on either the i8259A Programmable Interrupt Controller (PIC) or a variant of the i82489 Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controller (APIC); today’s computers include an APIC. The PIC standard originates with the original IBM PC. The i8259A PIC works only with uniprocessor systems and has only eight interrupt lines. However, the IBM PC architecture defined the addition of a second PIC, called the *slave*, whose interrupts are multiplexed into one of the master PIC’s interrupt lines. This provides 15 total interrupts (seven on the master and eight on the slave, multiplexed through the master’s eighth interrupt line). APICs and Streamlined Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controllers (SAPICs, discussed shortly) work with multiprocessor systems and have 256 interrupt lines. Intel and other companies have defined the Multiprocessor Specification (MP Specification), a design standard for x86 multiprocessor systems that centers on the use of APIC. To provide compatibility with uniprocessor operating systems and boot code that starts a multiprocessor system in uniprocessor mode, APICs support a PIC compatibility mode with 15 interrupts and delivery of interrupts to only the primary processor. Figure 3-2 depicts the APIC architecture.

The APIC actually consists of several components: an I/O APIC that receives interrupts from devices, local APICs that receive interrupts from the I/O APIC on the bus and that interrupt the CPU they are associated with, and an i8259A-compatible interrupt controller that translates APIC input into PIC-equivalent signals. Because there can be multiple I/O APICs on the system, motherboards typically have a piece of core logic that sits between them and the processors. This logic is responsible for implementing interrupt routing algorithms that both balance the device interrupt load across processors and attempt to take advantage of locality, delivering device interrupts to the same processor that has just fielded a previous interrupt of the same type. Software programs can reprogram the I/O APICs with a fixed routing algorithm that bypasses this piece of chipset logic. Windows does this by programming the APICs in an “interrupt one processor in the following set” routing mode.

![x86 APIC architecture](image-url)
x64 Interrupt Controllers

Because the x64 architecture is compatible with x86 operating systems, x64 systems must provide the same interrupt controllers as the x86. A significant difference, however, is that the x64 versions of Windows will not run on systems that do not have an APIC because they use the APIC for interrupt control.

IA64 Interrupt Controllers

The IA64 architecture relies on the Streamlined Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controller (SAPIC), which is an evolution of the APIC. Even if load balancing and routing are present in the firmware, Windows does not take advantage of it; instead, it statically assigns interrupts to processors in a round-robin manner.

EXPERIMENT: Viewing the PIC and APIC

You can view the configuration of the PIC on a uniprocessor and the current local APIC on a multiprocessor by using the `!pic` and `!apic` kernel debugger commands, respectively. Here’s the output of the `!pic` command on a uniprocessor. (Note that the `!pic` command doesn’t work if your system is using an APIC HAL.)

```
lkd> !pic
----- IRQ Number ----- 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
Physically in service: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Physically requested: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
```

Here’s the output of the `!apic` command on a system running with an APIC HAL. Note that during local kernel debugging, this command shows the APIC associated with the current processor—in other words, whichever processor the debugger’s thread happens to be running on as you enter the command. When looking at a crash dump or remote system, you can use the ~(tilde) command followed by the processor number to switch the processor of whose local APIC you want to see.

```
lkd> !apic
Apic @ fffe0000  ID:0 (50014)  LogDesc:01000000  DestFmt:fffffffff TPR 20
TimeCnt: 0000000000clk  SpurVec:3f  FaultVec:e3  error:0
Ipi Cmd: 01000000'0000002f  Vec:2F  FixedDel  Ph:01000000  edg high
Timer.: 00000000'000300fd  Vec:FD  FixedDel  Dest=Self  edg high  m
Lint10.: 00000000'0001003f  Vec:3F  FixedDel  Dest=Self  edg high  m
Lint11.: 00000000'000004ff  Vec:FF  NMI  Dest=Self  edg high
TMR: 51-52, 62, A3, B1, B3
IRR:
ISR::
```

The various numbers following the Vec labels indicate the associated vector in the IDT with the given command. For example, in this output, interrupt number 0xFD is associated with the APIC Timer, and interrupt number 0xE3 handles APIC errors. Because this experiment was
run on the same machine as the earlier /idt experiment, you can notice that 0xFD is the HAL’s Profiling Interrupt (which uses a timer for profile intervals), and 0xe3 is the HAL’s Local APIC Error Handler, as expected.

The following output is for the /ioapic command, which displays the configuration of the I/O APICs, the interrupt controller components connected to devices:

```
lkd> /ioapic
IoApic @ FEC00000 ID:0 (51) Arb:A951
Inti00.: 0000a951'0000a951  Vec:51 LowestDl  Lg:0000a951 lvl low
```

Software Interrupt Request Levels (IRQLs)

Although interrupt controllers perform interrupt prioritization, Windows imposes its own interrupt priority scheme known as interrupt request levels (IRQLs). The kernel represents IRQLs internally as a number from 0 through 31 on x86 and from 0 to 15 on x64 and IA64, with higher numbers representing higher-priority interrupts. Although the kernel defines the standard set of IRQLs for software interrupts, the HAL maps hardware-interrupt numbers to the IRQLs. Figure 3-3 shows IRQLs defined for the x86 architecture, and Figure 3-4 shows IRQLs for the x64 and IA64 architectures.

![Interrupt Request Levels (IRQLs)](image)

**FIGURE 3-3** x86 interrupt request levels (IRQLs)

Interrupts are serviced in priority order, and a higher-priority interrupt preempts the servicing of a lower-priority interrupt. When a high-priority interrupt occurs, the processor saves the interrupted thread’s state and invokes the trap dispatchers associated with the interrupt. The trap dispatcher raises
the IRQL and calls the interrupt’s service routine. After the service routine executes, the interrupt dispatcher lowers the processor’s IRQL to where it was before the interrupt occurred and then loads the saved machine state. The interrupted thread resumes executing where it left off. When the kernel lowers the IRQL, lower-priority interrupts that were masked might materialize. If this happens, the kernel repeats the process to handle the new interrupts.

IRQL priority levels have a completely different meaning than thread-scheduling priorities (which are described in Chapter 5). A scheduling priority is an attribute of a thread, whereas an IRQL is an attribute of an interrupt source, such as a keyboard or a mouse. In addition, each processor has an IRQL setting that changes as operating system code executes.

Each processor’s IRQL setting determines which interrupts that processor can receive. IRQLs are also used to synchronize access to kernel-mode data structures. (You’ll find out more about synchronization later in this chapter.) As a kernel-mode thread runs, it raises or lowers the processor’s IRQL either directly by calling KeRaiseIrql and KeLowerIrql or, more commonly, indirectly via calls to functions that acquire kernel synchronization objects. As Figure 3-5 illustrates, interrupts from a source with an IRQL above the current level interrupt the processor, whereas interrupts from sources with IRQLs equal to or below the current level are masked until an executing thread lowers the IRQL.

Because accessing a PIC is a relatively slow operation, HALs that require accessing the I/O bus to change IRQLs, such as for PIC and 32-bit Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI) systems, implement a performance optimization, called lazy IRQL, that avoids PIC accesses. When the IRQL is raised, the HAL notes the new IRQL internally instead of changing the interrupt mask. If a lower-priority interrupt subsequently occurs, the HAL sets the interrupt mask to the settings appropriate for the first interrupt and does not quiesce the lower-priority interrupt until the IRQL is lowered (thus keeping the interrupt pending). Thus, if no lower-priority interrupts occur while the IRQL is raised, the HAL doesn’t need to modify the PIC.
A kernel-mode thread raises and lowers the IRQL of the processor on which it's running, depending on what it's trying to do. For example, when an interrupt occurs, the trap handler (or perhaps the processor) raises the processor's IRQL to the assigned IRQL of the interrupt source. This elevation masks all interrupts at and below that IRQL (on that processor only), which ensures that the processor servicing the interrupt isn't waylaid by an interrupt at the same level or a lower level. The masked interrupts are either handled by another processor or held back until the IRQL drops. Therefore, all components of the system, including the kernel and device drivers, attempt to keep the IRQL at *passive* level (sometimes called *low* level). They do this because device drivers can respond to hardware interrupts in a timelier manner if the IRQL isn't kept unnecessarily elevated for long periods.

**Note**  An exception to the rule that raising the IRQL blocks interrupts of that level and lower relates to APC-level interrupts. If a thread raises the IRQL to APC level and then is rescheduled because of a dispatch/DPC-level interrupt, the system might deliver an APC-level interrupt to the newly scheduled thread. Thus, APC level can be considered a thread-local rather than processor-wide IRQL.

**EXPERIMENT: Viewing the IRQL**

You can view a processor's saved IRQL with the `!irql` debugger command. The saved IRQL represents the IRQL at the time just before the break-in to the debugger, which raises the IRQL to a static, meaningless value:

```
kd> !irql
Debugger saved IRQL for processor 0x0 -- 0 (LOW_LEVEL)
```
Note that the IRQL value is saved in two locations. The first, which represents the current IRQL, is the processor control region (PCR), while its extension, the processor region control block (PRCB), contains the saved IRQL in the `DebuggerSaveIrql` field. The PCR and PRCB contain information about the state of each processor in the system, such as the current IRQL, a pointer to the hardware IDT, the currently running thread, and the next thread selected to run. The kernel and the HAL use this information to perform architecture-specific and machine-specific actions. Portions of the PCR and PRCB structures are defined publicly in the Windows Driver Kit (WDK) header file Ntddk.h.

You can view the contents of the current processor’s PCR with the kernel debugger by using the `!pcr` command. To view the PCR of a specific processor, add the processor’s number after the command, separated with a space:

```
1kd> !pcr 0
KPCR for Processor 0 at fffff80001bfad00:
   Major 1 Minor 1
   NtTib.ExceptionList: fffff80001853000
   NtTib.StackBase: fffff80001854080
   NtTib.StackLimit: 000000000026ea28
   NtTib.SubSystemTib: fffff80001bfad00
   NtTib.Version: 0000000001bfae80
   NtTib.UserPointer: fffff80001bfba4f0
   NtTib.SelfTib: 000007fffffdb00
   SelfPcr: 0000000000000000
   Prcb: fffff80001bfba4f0
   Irql: 0000000000000000
   IRR: 0000000000000000
   IDR: 0000000000000000
   InterruptMode: 0000000000000000
   IDT: 0000000000000000
   GDT: 0000000000000000
   TSS: 0000000000000000
   CurrentThread: fffff80001c08c40
   NextThread: 0000000000000000
   IdleThread: fffff80001c08c40
   DpcQueue:
```

Because changing a processor’s IRQL has such a significant effect on system operation, the change can be made only in kernel mode—user-mode threads can’t change the processor’s IRQL. This means that a processor’s IRQL is always at passive level when it’s executing user-mode code. Only when the processor is executing kernel-mode code can the IRQL be higher.

Each interrupt level has a specific purpose. For example, the kernel issues an *interprocessor interrupt* (IPI) to request that another processor perform an action, such as dispatching a particular thread for execution or updating its translation look-aside buffer (TLB) cache. The system clock generates an interrupt at regular intervals, and the kernel responds by updating the clock and measuring thread execution time. If a hardware platform supports two clocks, the kernel
adds another clock interrupt level to measure performance. The HAL provides a number of interrupt levels for use by interrupt-driven devices; the exact number varies with the processor and system configuration. The kernel uses software interrupts (described later in this chapter) to initiate thread scheduling and to asynchronously break into a thread’s execution.

Mapping Interrupts to IRQLs
IRQL levels aren’t the same as the interrupt requests (IRQs) defined by interrupt controllers—the architectures on which Windows runs don’t implement the concept of IRQLs in hardware. So how does Windows determine what IRQL to assign to an interrupt? The answer lies in the HAL. In Windows, a type of device driver called a bus driver determines the presence of devices on its bus (PCI, USB, and so on) and what interrupts can be assigned to a device. The bus driver reports this information to the Plug and Play manager, which decides, after taking into account the acceptable interrupt assignments for all other devices, which interrupt will be assigned to each device. Then it calls a Plug and Play interrupt arbiter, which maps interrupts to IRQLs. (The root arbiter is used on non-ACPI systems, while the ACPI HAL has its own arbiter on ACPI-compatible systems.)

The algorithm for assignment differs for the various HALs that Windows includes. On ACPI systems (including x86, x64, and IA64), the HAL computes the IRQL for a given interrupt by dividing the interrupt vector assigned to the IRQ by 16. As for selecting an interrupt vector for the IRQ, this depends on the type of interrupt controller present on the system. On today’s APIC systems, this number is generated in a round-robin fashion, so there is no computable way to figure out the IRQ based on the interrupt vector or the IRQL. However, an experiment later in this section shows how the debugger can query this information from the interrupt arbiter.

Predefined IRQLs
Let’s take a closer look at the use of the predefined IRQLs, starting from the highest level shown in Figure 3-4:

- The kernel uses high level only when it’s halting the system in KeBugCheckEx and masking out all interrupts.
- Power fail level originated in the original Windows NT design documents, which specified the behavior of system power failure code, but this IRQL has never been used.
- Interprocessor interrupt level is used to request another processor to perform an action, such as updating the processor’s TLB cache, system shutdown, or system crash.
- Clock level is used for the system’s clock, which the kernel uses to track the time of day as well as to measure and allot CPU time to threads.
- The system’s real-time clock (or another source, such as the local APIC timer) uses profile level when kernel profiling (a performance-measurement mechanism) is enabled. When kernel profiling is active, the kernel’s profiling trap handler records the address of the code
that was executing when the interrupt occurred. A table of address samples is constructed over time that tools can extract and analyze. You can obtain Kernrate, a kernel profiling tool that you can use to configure and view profiling-generated statistics, from the Windows Driver Kit (WDK). See the Kernrate experiment for more information on using this tool.

- The synchronization IRQL is internally used by the dispatcher and scheduler code to protect access to global thread scheduling and wait/synchronization code. It is typically defined as the highest level right after the device IRQLs.

- The device IRQLs are used to prioritize device interrupts. (See the previous section for how hardware interrupt levels are mapped to IRQLs.)

- The corrected machine check interrupt level is used to signal the operating system after a serious but corrected hardware condition or error that was reported by the CPU or firmware through the Machine Check Error (MCE) interface.

- DPC/dispatch-level and APC-level interrupts are software interrupts that the kernel and device drivers generate. (DPCs and APCs are explained in more detail later in this chapter.)

- The lowest IRQL, passive level, isn’t really an interrupt level at all; it’s the setting at which normal thread execution takes place and all interrupts are allowed to occur.

EXPERIMENT: Using Kernel Profiler (Kernrate) to Profile Execution

You can use the Kernel Profiler tool (Kernrate) to enable the system-profiling timer, collect samples of the code that is executing when the timer fires, and display a summary showing the frequency distribution across image files and functions. It can be used to track CPU usage consumed by individual processes and/or time spent in kernel mode independent of processes (for example, interrupt service routines). Kernel profiling is useful when you want to obtain a breakdown of where the system is spending time.

In its simplest form, Kernrate samples where time has been spent in each kernel module (for example, Ntoskrnl, drivers, and so on). For example, after installing the Windows Driver Kit, try performing the following steps:

1. Open a command prompt.

2. Type `cd C:\WinDDK\7600.16385.1\tools\other` (the path to your installation of the Windows 7/Server 2008R2 WDK).

3. Type `dir`. (You will see directories for each platform.)

4. Run the image that matches your platform (with no arguments or switches). For example, `i386\kernrate.exe` is the image for an x86 system.
5. While Kernrate is running, perform some other activity on the system. For example, run Windows Media Player and play some music, run a graphics-intensive game, or perform network activity such as doing a directory listing of a remote network share.

6. Press Ctrl+C to stop Kernrate. This causes Kernrate to display the statistics from the sampling period.

In the following sample output from Kernrate, Windows Media Player was running, playing a recorded movie from disk:

C:\WinDDK\7600.16385.1\tools\Other\i386>kernrate.exe

/=====================================
<         KERNRATE LOG           >
\=====================================

Date: 2011/03/09   Time: 16:44:24
Machine Name: TEST-LAPTOP
Number of Processors: 2
PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE: x86
PROCESSOR_LEVEL: 6
PROCESSOR_REVISION: 0f06
Physical Memory: 3310 MB
Pagefile Total: 7285 MB
Virtual Total: 2047 MB
PageFile1: \??\C:\pagefile.sys, 4100MB
OS Version: 6.1 Build 7601 Service-Pack: 1.0
WinDir: C:\Windows

Kernrate Executable Location: C:\WINDDK\7600.16385.1\TOOLS\OTHER\I386

Kernrate User-Specified Command Line:
kernrate.exe

Kernel Profile (PID = 0): Source= Time,
Using Kernrate Default Rate of 25000 events/hit
Starting to collect profile data

***> Press ctrl-c to finish collecting profile data
====> Finished Collecting Data, Starting to Process Results

-------------Overall Summary:-------------

P0     K 0:00:00.000 ( 0.0%)  U 0:00:00.234 ( 4.7%)  I 0:00:04.789 (95.3%)
DPC 0:00:00.000 ( 0.0%)  Interrupt 0:00:00.000 ( 0.0%)
     Interrupts= 9254, Interrupt Rate= 1842/sec.

P1     K 0:00:00.031 ( 0.6%)  U 0:00:00.140 ( 2.8%)  I 0:00:04.851 (96.6%)
DPC 0:00:00.000 ( 0.0%)  Interrupt 0:00:00.000 ( 0.0%)
     Interrupts= 7051, Interrupt Rate= 1404/sec.

TOTAL  K 0:00:00.031 ( 0.3%)  U 0:00:00.374 ( 3.7%)  I 0:00:09.640 (96.0%)
DPC 0:00:00.000 ( 0.0%)  Interrupt 0:00:00.000 ( 0.0%)
     Total Interrupts= 16305, Total Interrupt Rate= 3246/sec.
CHAPTER 3 System Mechanisms

Total Profile Time = 5023 msec

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BytesStart</th>
<th>BytesStop</th>
<th>BytesDiff.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Available Physical Memory</td>
<td>1716359168</td>
<td>1716195328</td>
<td>-163840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available Pagefile(s)</td>
<td>5973733376</td>
<td>5972783104</td>
<td>-950272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available Virtual</td>
<td>2122145792</td>
<td>2122145792</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available Extended Virtual</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committed Memory Bytes</td>
<td>1665404928</td>
<td>1666355200</td>
<td>950272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Paged Pool Usage Bytes</td>
<td>66211840</td>
<td>66211840</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paged Pool Usage Bytes</td>
<td>189083648</td>
<td>189087744</td>
<td>4096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paged Pool Available Bytes</td>
<td>150593536</td>
<td>150593536</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Avg. Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Context Switches</td>
<td>30152</td>
<td>6003/sec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System Calls</td>
<td>110807</td>
<td>22059/sec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page Faults</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>45/sec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/O Read Operations</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>145/sec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/O Write Operations</td>
<td>1038</td>
<td>207/sec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/O Other Operations</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>171/sec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/O Read Bytes</td>
<td>2013850</td>
<td>2759/ I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/O Write Bytes</td>
<td>28212</td>
<td>27/ I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/O Other Bytes</td>
<td>19902</td>
<td>23/ I/O</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results for Kernel Mode:

OutputResults: KernelModuleCount = 167
Percentage in the following table is based on the Total Hits for the Kernel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Module</th>
<th>Hits</th>
<th>msec</th>
<th>%Total</th>
<th>Events/Sec</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NTKRNLPA</td>
<td>3768</td>
<td>5036</td>
<td>98 %</td>
<td>18705321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVLDDMKM</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5036</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>59571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAL</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5036</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>59571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIN32K</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5037</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>49632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DXGKRNL</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5036</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>44678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NETW4V32</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5036</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>9928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLTLMGR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5036</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>4964</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The overall summary shows that the system spent 0.3 percent of the time in kernel mode, 3.7 percent in user mode, 96.0 percent idle, 0.0 percent at DPC level, and 0.0 percent at interrupt level. The module with the highest hit rate was Ntkrnlpa.exe, the kernel for machines with Physical Address Extension (PAE) or NX support. The module with the second highest hit rate was nvlddmkm.sys, the driver for the video card on the machine used for the test. This makes sense because the major activity going on in the system was Windows Media Player sending video I/O to the video driver.
If you have symbols available, you can zoom in on individual modules and see the time spent by function name. For example, profiling the system while rapidly dragging a window around the screen resulted in the following (partial) output:

```
C:\WinDDK\7600.16385.1\tools\Other\i386>kernrate.exe -z ntkrnlpa -z win32k

<   KERNRATE  LOG    >
\==================================
Date: 2011/03/09   Time: 16:49:56

Time   4191 hits, 25000 events per hit -------
Module                               Hits       msec  %Total  Events/Sec
NTKRNLPDA                             3623       5695    86 %    15904302
WIN32K                                 303        5696     7 %     1329880
INTELPPM                               141        5696     3 %      618855
HAL                                     61        5695     1 %      267778
CDD                                     30        5696     0 %      131671
NVLDSDKM                                13        5696     0 %       57057

----- Zoomed module WIN32K.SYS (Bucket size = 16 bytes, Rounding Down) --------
Module                               Hits       msec  %Total  Events/Sec
BltLnkReadPat                          34        5696    10 %      149227
memmove                                21        5696     6 %       92169
vSrcTranCopyS8D32                      17        5696     5 %       74613
memcpy                                  12        5696     3 %       52668
RGNOBJ::bMerge                          10        5696     3 %       43890
HANDLELOCK::vLockHandle                8         5696     2 %       35112

----- Zoomed module NTKRNLPDA.EXE (Bucket size = 16 bytes, Rounding Down) --------
Module                               Hits       msec  %Total  Events/Sec
KiIdleLoop                             3288       5695    87 %     14433713
READ_REGISTER_USHORT                   95        5695     2 %       417032
READ_REGISTER_ULONG                    93        5695     2 %       408232
RtlFillMemoryUlong                     31        5695     0 %       136084
KiFastCallEntry                        18        5695     0 %       79016

The module with the second hit rate was Win32k.sys, the windowing system driver. Also high on the list were the video driver and Cdd.dll, a global video driver used for the 3D-accelerated Aero desktop theme. These results make sense because the main activity in the system was drawing on the screen. Note that in the zoomed display for Win32k.sys, the functions with the highest hits are related to merging, copying, and moving bits, the main GDI operations for painting a window dragged on the screen.

One important restriction on code running at DPC/dispatch level or above is that it can’t wait for an object if doing so necessitates the scheduler to select another thread to execute, which is an illegal operation because the scheduler relies on DPC-level software interrupts to schedule threads. Another restriction is that only nonpaged memory can be accessed at IRQL DPC/dispatch level or higher.

This rule is actually a side effect of the first restriction because attempting to access memory that isn’t resident results in a page fault. When a page fault occurs, the memory manager initiates a disk I/O and then needs to wait for the file system driver to read the page in from disk.
This wait would, in turn, require the scheduler to perform a context switch (perhaps to the idle thread if no user thread is waiting to run), thus violating the rule that the scheduler can’t be invoked (because the IRQL is still DPC/dropatch level or higher at the time of the disk read). A further problem results in the fact that I/O completion typically occurs at APC_LEVEL, so even in cases where a wait wouldn’t be required, the I/O would never complete because the completion APC would not get a chance to run.

If either of these two restrictions is violated, the system crashes with an IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL or a DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL crash code. (See Chapter 14 in Part 2 for a thorough discussion of system crashes.) Violating these restrictions is a common bug in device drivers. The Windows Driver Verifier (explained in the section “Driver Verifier” in Chapter 10, “Memory Management,” in Part 2) has an option you can set to assist in finding this particular type of bug.

**Interrupt Objects**

The kernel provides a portable mechanism—a kernel control object called an *interrupt object*—that allows device drivers to register ISRs for their devices. An interrupt object contains all the information the kernel needs to associate a device ISR with a particular level of interrupt, including the address of the ISR, the IRQL at which the device interrupts, and the entry in the kernel’s interrupt dispatch table (IDT) with which the ISR should be associated. When an interrupt object is initialized, a few instructions of assembly language code, called the *dispatch code*, are copied from an interrupt-handling template, *KiInterruptTemplate*, and stored in the object. When an interrupt occurs, this code is executed.

This interrupt-object resident code calls the real interrupt dispatcher, which is typically either the kernel’s *KiInterruptDispatch* or *KiChainedDispatch* routine, passing it a pointer to the interrupt object. *KiInterruptDispatch* is the routine used for interrupt vectors for which only one interrupt object is registered, and *KiChainedDispatch* is for vectors shared among multiple interrupt objects. The interrupt object contains information that this second dispatcher routine needs to locate and properly call the ISR the device driver provides.

The interrupt object also stores the IRQL associated with the interrupt so that *KiInterruptDispatch* or *KiChainedDispatch* can raise the IRQL to the correct level before calling the ISR and then lower the IRQL after the ISR has returned. This two-step process is required because there’s no way to pass a pointer to the interrupt object (or any other argument for that matter) on the initial dispatch because the initial dispatch is done by hardware. On a multiprocessor system, the kernel allocates and initializes an interrupt object for each CPU, enabling the local APIC on that CPU to accept the particular interrupt.

On x64 Windows systems, the kernel optimizes interrupt dispatch by using specific routines that save processor cycles by omitting functionality that isn’t needed, such as *KiInterruptDispatchNoLock*, which is used for interrupts that do not have an associated kernel-managed spinlock (typically used by drivers that want to synchronize with their ISRs), and *KiInterruptDispatchNoEOI*, which is used for interrupts that have programmed the APIC in “Auto-End-of-Interrupt” (Auto-EOI) mode—because
the interrupt controller will send the EOI signal automatically, the kernel does not need to the extra code to do perform the EOI itself. Finally, for the performance/profiling interrupt specifically, the *KiInterruptDispatchLBControl* handler is used, which supports the *Last Branch Control* MSR available on modern CPUs. This register enables the kernel to track/save the branch instruction when tracing; during an interrupt, this information would be lost because it’s not stored in the normal thread register context, so special code must be added to preserve it. The HAL’s performance and profiling interrupts use this functionality, for example, while the other HAL interrupt routines take advantage of the “no-lock” dispatch code, because the HAL does not require the kernel to synchronize with its ISR.

Another kernel interrupt handler is *KiFloatingDispatch*, which is used for interrupts that require saving the floating-point state. Unlike kernel-mode code, which typically is not allowed to use floating-point (MMX, SSE, 3DNow!) operations because these registers won’t be saved across context switches, ISRs might need to use these registers (such as the video card ISR performing a quick drawing operation). When connecting an interrupt, drivers can set the *FloatingSave* argument to *TRUE*, requesting that the kernel use the floating-point dispatch routine, which will save the floating registers. (However, this greatly increases interrupt latency.) Note that this is supported only on 32-bit systems.

Figure 3-6 shows typical interrupt control flow for interrupts associated with interrupt objects.

![Diagram of interrupt control flow](image)
EXPERIMENT: Examining Interrupt Internals

Using the kernel debugger, you can view details of an interrupt object, including its IRQL, ISR address, and custom interrupt-dispatching code. First, execute the `!idt` command and locate the entry that includes a reference to `I8042KeyboardInterruptService`, the ISR routine for the PS2 keyboard device:

```
81:  ffffffff80045bae10 i8042prt!I8042KeyboardInterruptService  (KINTERRUPT ffffffff80045bad80)
```

To view the contents of the interrupt object associated with the interrupt, execute `dt nt!_kinterrupt` with the address following KINTERRUPT:

```
lkd> dt nt!_KINTERRUPT ffffffff80045bad80
+0x000 Type : 22
+0x002 Size : 160
+0x008 InterruptListEntry : _LIST_ENTRY [ 0x00000000'00000000 - 0x0 ]
+0x018 ServiceRoutine : 0xffffffff80'0356ca04 unsigned char
I8042prt!I8042KeyboardInterruptService+0
+0x020 MessageServiceRoutine : (null)
+0x028 MessageIndex : 0
+0x030 ServiceContext : 0xffffffff80'02c839f0
+0x038 SpinLock : 0
+0x040 TickCount : 0
+0x048 ActualLock : 0xffffffff80'02c83b50 -> 0
+0x050 DispatchAddress : 0xffffffff80'01a7db90 void nt!KiInterruptDispatch+0
+0x058 Vector : 0x81
+0x05c Irql : 0x8''
+0x05d SynchronizeIrql : 0x9''
+0x05e FloatingSave : 0''
+0x05f Connected : 0x1''
+0x060 Number : 0
+0x064 ShareVector : 0''
+0x065 Pad : [3] ''
+0x068 Mode : 1 ( Latched )
+0x06c Polarity : 0 ( InterruptPolarityUnknown )
+0x070 ServiceCount : 0
+0x074 DispatchCount : 0
+0x078 Rsvd1 : 0
+0x080 TrapFrame : 0xffffffff80'0185ab00 _KTRAP_FRAME
+0x088 Reserved : (null)
+0x090 DispatchCode : [4] 0x8d485550
```

In this example, the IRQL that Windows assigned to the interrupt is 8. Although there is no direct mapping between an interrupt vector and an IRQ, Windows does keep track of this translation when managing device resources through what are called arbiters. For each resource type, an arbiter maintains the relationship between virtual resource usage (such as an interrupt vector) and physical resources (such as an interrupt line). As such, you can query either the root...
IRQ arbiter (on systems without ACPI) or the ACPI IRQ arbiter and obtain this mapping. Use the \apciirqarb\ command to obtain information on the ACPI IRQ arbiter:

`lkd> !apciirqarb`

Processor 0 (0, 0):
Device Object: 0000000000000000
Current IDT Allocation:
... 0000000000000081 - 0000000000000081  D \ffffffa80029b4c20 (i8042prt)
A:0000000000000000 IRQ: 0
...

If you don’t have an ACPI system, you can use \arbiter\ 4 (4 tells the debugger to display only IRQ arbiters):

`lkd> !arbiter 4`

DEVNODE \ffffffa80027c6d90 (HTREE\ROOT\0)
Interrupt Arbiter "RootIRQ" at \ffffffa80001c82500
Allocated ranges:
0000000000000081 - 0000000000000081  Owner \ffffffa80029b4c20 (i8042prt)

In both cases, you will be given the owner of the vector, in the type of a device object. You can then use the \devobj\ command to get information on the i8042prt device in this example (which corresponds to the PS/2 driver):

`lkd> !devobj \ffffffa80029b4c20`
Device object (\ffffffa80029b4c20) is for:
  00000061 \Driver\ACPI DriverObject \ffffffa8002888e70
Current Irp 00000000 RefCount 1 Type 00000032 Flags 00003040
Dacl \ffffff9a100096a41 DevExt \ffffffa800299f740 DevObjExt \ffffffa80029b4d70 DevNode
\ffffffa80029b54b0
The device object is associated to a device node, which stores all the device's physical resources. You can now dump these resources with the \devnode\ command, and using the 6 flag to ask for resource information:

`lkd> !devnode \ffffffa80029b54b0 6`
DevNode 0x\ffffffa80029b54b0 for PDO 0x\ffffffa80029b4c20
Parent 0x\ffffffa80029b390  Sibling 0x\ffffffa80029b5230  Child 0000000000
InstancePath is "ACPI\PNP0303\4\17aa870d&0"
ServiceName is "i8042prt"
...
CmResourceList at 0x\ffffff8a00185bf40  Version 1.1  Interface 0xf  Bus #0
Entry 0 - Port (0x1) Device Exclusive (0x1)
  Flags (0x11) - PORT_MEMORY PORT_IO 16_BIT DECODE
  Range starts at 0x60 for 0x1 bytes
Entry 1 - Port (0x1) Device Exclusive (0x1)
  Flags (0x11) - PORT_MEMORY PORT_IO 16_BIT DECODE
  Range starts at 0x64 for 0x1 bytes
Entry 2 - Port (0x1) Device Exclusive (0x1)
  Flags (0x11) - PORT_MEMORY PORT_IO 16_BIT DECODE
  Range starts at 0x62 for 0x1 bytes
Entry 3 - Port (0x1) Device Exclusive (0x1)
Flags (0x11) - PORT_MEMORY PORT_IO 16_BIT_DECODE
Range starts at 0x66 for 0x1 bytes

Entry 4 - Interrupt (0x2) Device Exclusive (0x1)
Flags (0x01) - LATCHED
Level 0x1, Vector 0x1, Group 0, Affinity 0xffffffff

The device node tells you that this device has a resource list with 4 entries, one of which is an interrupt entry corresponding to IRQ 1. (The level and vector numbers represent the IRQ vector, not the interrupt vector.) IRQ 1 is the traditional PC/AT IRQ number associated with the PS/2 keyboard device, so this is the expected value. (A USB keyboard would have a different interrupt.)

On ACPI systems, you can obtain this information in a slightly easier way by reading the extended output of the !acpiirqarb command introduced earlier. As part of its output, it displays the IRQ to IDT mapping table:

Interrupt Controller (Inputs: 0x0-0x17 Dev: 0000000000000000):
  (00)Cur:IDT-a1 Ref-1 edg hi   Pos:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi
  (01)Cur:IDT-81 Ref-1 edg hi   Pos:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi
  (02)Cur:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi   Pos:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi
  (03)Cur:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi   Pos:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi
  (04)Cur:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi   Pos:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi
  (05)Cur:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi   Pos:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi
  (06)Cur:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi   Pos:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi
  (07)Cur:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi   Pos:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi
  (08)Cur:IDT-71 Ref-1 edg hi   Pos:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi
  (09)Cur:IDT-b1 Ref-1 lev hi   Pos:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi
  (0a)Cur:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi   Pos:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi
  (0b)Cur:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi   Pos:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi
  (0c)Cur:IDT-91 Ref-1 edg hi   Pos:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi
  (0d)Cur:IDT-61 Ref-1 edg hi   Pos:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi
  (0e)Cur:IDT-82 Ref-1 edg hi   Pos:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi
  (0f)Cur:IDT-72 Ref-1 edg hi   Pos:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi
  (10)Cur:IDT-51 Ref-3 lev low Pos:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi
  (11)Cur:IDT-b2 Ref-1 lev low Pos:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi
  (12)Cur:IDT-a2 Ref-5 lev low Pos:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi
  (13)Cur:IDT-92 Ref-1 lev low Pos:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi
  (14)Cur:IDT-62 Ref-2 lev low Pos:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi
  (15)Cur:IDT-a3 Ref-2 lev low Pos:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi
  (16)Cur:IDT-b3 Ref-1 lev low Pos:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi
  (17)Cur:IDT-52 Ref-1 lev low Pos:IDT-00 Ref-0 edg hi

As expected, IRQ 1 is associated with IDT entry 0x81. For more information on device objects, resources, and other related concepts, see Chapter 8, “I/O System,” in Part 2.

The ISR’s address for the interrupt object is stored in the ServiceRoutine field (which is what !idt displays in its output), and the interrupt code that actually executes when an interrupt occurs is stored in the DispatchCode array at the end of the interrupt object. The interrupt code stored there is programmed to build the trap frame on the stack and then call the function stored in the DispatchAddress field (KiInterruptDispatch in the example), passing it a pointer to the interrupt object.
Windows and Real-Time Processing

Deadline requirements, either hard or soft, characterize real-time environments. Hard real-time systems (for example, a nuclear power plant control system) have deadlines the system must meet to avoid catastrophic failures, such as loss of equipment or life. Soft real-time systems (for example, a car’s fuel-economy optimization system) have deadlines the system can miss, but timeliness is still a desirable trait. In real-time systems, computers have sensor input devices and control output devices. The designer of a real-time computer system must know worst-case delays between the time an input device generates an interrupt and the time the device’s driver can control the output device to respond. This worst-case analysis must take into account the delays the operating system introduces as well as the delays the application and device drivers impose.

Because Windows doesn’t enable controlled prioritization of device IRQs and user-level applications execute only when a processor’s IRQL is at passive level, Windows isn’t typically suitable as a real-time operating system. The system’s devices and device drivers—not Windows—ultimately determine the worst-case delay. This factor becomes a problem when the real-time system’s designer uses off-the-shelf hardware. The designer can have difficulty determining how long every off-the-shelf device’s ISR or DPC might take in the worst case. Even after testing, the designer can’t guarantee that a special case in a live system won’t cause the system to miss an important deadline. Furthermore, the sum of all the delays a system’s DPCs and ISRs can introduce usually far exceeds the tolerance of a time-sensitive system.

Although many types of embedded systems (for example, printers and automotive computers) have real-time requirements, Windows Embedded Standard 7 doesn’t have real-time characteristics. It is simply a version of Windows 7 that makes it possible to produce small-footprint versions of Windows 7 suitable for running on devices with limited resources. For example, a device that has no networking capability would omit all the Windows 7 components related to networking, including network management tools and adapter and protocol stack device drivers.

Still, there are third-party vendors that supply real-time kernels for Windows. The approach these vendors take is to embed their real-time kernel in a custom HAL and to have Windows run as a task in the real-time operating system. The task running Windows serves as the user interface to the system and has a lower priority than the tasks responsible for managing the device.

Associating an ISR with a particular level of interrupt is called connecting an interrupt object, and dissociating an ISR from an IDT entry is called disconnecting an interrupt object. These operations, accomplished by calling the kernel functions IoConnectInterruptEx and IoDisconnectInterruptEx, allow a device driver to “turn on” an ISR when the driver is loaded into the system and to “turn off” the ISR if the driver is unloaded.
Using the interrupt object to register an ISR prevents device drivers from fiddling directly with interrupt hardware (which differs among processor architectures) and from needing to know any details about the IDT. This kernel feature aids in creating portable device drivers because it eliminates the need to code in assembly language or to reflect processor differences in device drivers.

Interrupt objects provide other benefits as well. By using the interrupt object, the kernel can synchronize the execution of the ISR with other parts of a device driver that might share data with the ISR. (See Chapter 8 in Part 2 for more information about how device drivers respond to interrupts.)

Furthermore, interrupt objects allow the kernel to easily call more than one ISR for any interrupt level. If multiple device drivers create interrupt objects and connect them to the same IDT entry, the interrupt dispatcher calls each routine when an interrupt occurs at the specified interrupt line. This capability allows the kernel to easily support daisy-chain configurations, in which several devices share the same interrupt line. The chain breaks when one of the ISRs claims ownership for the interrupt by returning a status to the interrupt dispatcher.

If multiple devices sharing the same interrupt require service at the same time, devices not acknowledged by their ISRs will interrupt the system again once the interrupt dispatcher has lowered the IRQL. Chaining is permitted only if all the device drivers wanting to use the same interrupt indicate to the kernel that they can share the interrupt; if they can’t, the Plug and Play manager reorganizes their interrupt assignments to ensure that it honors the sharing requirements of each. If the interrupt vector is shared, the interrupt object invokes KiChainedDispatch, which will invoke the ISRs of each registered interrupt object in turn until one of them claims the interrupt or all have been executed. In the earlier sample !idt output (in the “EXPERIMENT: Viewing the IDT” section), vector 0xa2 is connected to several chained interrupt objects. On the system it was run on, it happens to correspond to an integrated 7-in-1 media card reader, which is a combination of Secure Digital (SD), Compact Flash (CF), MultiMedia Card (MMC) and other types of readers, each having their individual interrupt. Because it’s packaged as one device by the same vendor, it makes sense that its interrupts share the same vector.

### Line-Based vs. Message Signaled-Based Interrupts

Shared interrupts are often the cause of high interrupt latency and can also cause stability issues. They are typically undesirable and a side effect of the limited number of physical interrupt lines on a computer. For example, in the previous example of the 7-in-1 media card reader, a much better solution is for each device to have its own interrupt and for one driver to manage the different interrupts knowing which device they came from. However, consuming four IRQ lines for a single device quickly leads to IRQ line exhaustion. Additionally, PCI devices are each connected to only one IRQ line anyway, so the media card reader cannot use more than one IRQ in the first place.

Other problems with generating interrupts through an IRQ line is that incorrect management of the IRQ signal can lead to interrupt storms or other kinds of deadlocks on the machine, because the signal is driven “high” or “low” until the ISR acknowledges it. (Furthermore, the interrupt controller must typically receive an EOI signal as well.) If either
of these does not happen due to a bug, the system can end up in an interrupt state forever, further interrupts could be masked away, or both. Finally, line-based interrupts provide poor scalability in multiprocessor environments. In many cases, the hardware has the final decision as to which processor will be interrupted out of the possible set that the Plug and Play manager selected for this interrupt, and there is little device drivers can do.

A solution to all these problems is a new interrupt mechanism first introduced in the PCI 2.2 standard called message-signaled interrupts (MSI). Although it remains an optional component of the standard that is seldom found in client machines, an increasing number of servers and workstations implement MSI support, which is fully supported by all recent versions of Windows. In the MSI model, a device delivers a message to its driver by writing to a specific memory address. This action causes an interrupt, and Windows then calls the ISR with the message content (value) and the address where the message was delivered. A device can also deliver multiple messages (up to 32) to the memory address, delivering different payloads based on the event.

Because communication is based across a memory value, and because the content is delivered with the interrupt, the need for IRQ lines is removed (making the total system limit of MSIs equal to the number of interrupt vectors, not IRQ lines), as is the need for a driver ISR to query the device for data related to the interrupt, decreasing latency. Due to the large number of device interrupts available through this model, this effectively nullifies any benefit of sharing interrupts, decreasing latency further by directly delivering the interrupt data to the concerned ISR.

Finally, MSI-X, an extension to the MSI model, which is introduced in PCI 3.0, adds support for 32-bit messages (instead of 16-bit), a maximum of 2048 different messages (instead of just 32), and more importantly, the ability to use a different address (which can be dynamically determined) for each of the MSI payloads. Using a different address allows the MSI payload to be written to a different physical address range that belongs to a different processor, or a different set of target processors, effectively enabling nonuniform memory access (NUMA)-aware interrupt delivery by sending the interrupt to the processor that initiated the related device request. This improves latency and scalability by monitoring both load and closest NUMA node during interrupt completion.

**Interrupt Affinity and Priority**

On systems that both support ACPI and contain an APIC, Windows enables driver developers and administrators to somewhat control the processor affinity (selecting the processor or group of processors that receives the interrupt) and affinity policy (selecting how processors will be chosen and which processors in a group will be chosen). Furthermore, it enables a primitive
mechanism of interrupt prioritization based on IRQL selection. Affinity policy is defined according to Table 3-1, and it’s configurable through a registry value called InterruptPolicyValue in the Interrupt Management\Affinity Policy key under the device’s instance key in the registry. Because of this, it does not require any code to configure—an administrator can add this value to a given driver’s key to influence its behavior. Microsoft provides such a tool, called the Interrupt Affinity policy Tool, which can be downloaded from http://www.microsoft.com/whdc/system/sysperf/intpolicy.mspx.

**TABLE 3-1** IRQ Affinity Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IrqPolicyMachineDefault</td>
<td>The device does not require a particular affinity policy. Windows uses the default machine policy, which (for machines with less than eight logical processors) is to select any available processor on the machine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IrqPolicyAllCloseProcessors</td>
<td>On a NUMA machine, the Plug and Play manager assigns the interrupt to all the processors that are close to the device (on the same node). On non-NUMA machines, this is the same as IrqPolicyAllProcessorsInMachine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IrqPolicyOneCloseProcessor</td>
<td>On a NUMA machine, the Plug and Play manager assigns the interrupt to one processor that is close to the device (on the same node). On non-NUMA machines, the chosen processor will be any available on the system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IrqPolicyAllProcessorsInMachine</td>
<td>The interrupt is processed by any available processor on the machine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IrqPolicySpecifiedProcessors</td>
<td>The interrupt is processed only by one of the processors specified in the affinity mask under the AssignmentSetOverride registry value.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IrqPolicySpreadMessagesAcrossAllProcessors</td>
<td>Different message-signaled interrupts are distributed across an optimal set of eligible processors, keeping track of NUMA topology issues, if possible. This requires MSI-X support on the device and platform.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other than setting this affinity policy, another registry value can also be used to set the interrupt’s priority, based on the values in Table 3-2.

**TABLE 3-2** IRQ Priorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IrqPriorityUndefined</td>
<td>No particular priority is required by the device. It receives the default priority (IrqPriorityNormal).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IrqPriorityLow</td>
<td>The device can tolerate high latency and should receive a lower IRQL than usual.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IrqPriorityNormal</td>
<td>The device expects average latency. It receives the default IRQL associated with its interrupt vector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IrqPriorityHigh</td>
<td>The device requires as little latency as possible. It receives an elevated IRQL beyond its normal assignment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As discussed earlier, it is important to note that Windows is not a real-time operating system, and as such, these IRQ priorities are hints given to the system that control only the IRQL associated with the interrupt and provide no extra priority other than the Windows IRQL priority-scheme mechanism. Because the IRQ priority is also stored in the registry, administrators are free to set these values for drivers should there be a requirement of lower latency for a driver not taking advantage of this feature.

Software Interrupts
Although hardware generates most interrupts, the Windows kernel also generates software interrupts for a variety of tasks, including these:

- Initiating thread dispatching
- Non-time-critical interrupt processing
- Handling timer expiration
- Asynchronously executing a procedure in the context of a particular thread
- Supporting asynchronous I/O operations

These tasks are described in the following subsections.

**Dispatch or Deferred Procedure Call (DPC) Interrupts**  When a thread can no longer continue executing, perhaps because it has terminated or because it voluntarily enters a wait state, the kernel calls the dispatcher directly to effect an immediate context switch. Sometimes, however, the kernel detects that rescheduling should occur when it is deep within many layers of code. In this situation, the kernel requests dispatching but defers its occurrence until it completes its current activity. Using a DPC software interrupt is a convenient way to achieve this delay.

The kernel always raises the processor’s IRQL to DPC/dispatch level or above when it needs to synchronize access to shared kernel structures. This disables additional software interrupts and thread dispatching. When the kernel detects that dispatching should occur, it requests a DPC/dispatch-level interrupt; but because the IRQL is at or above that level, the processor holds the interrupt in check. When the kernel completes its current activity, it sees that it’s going to lower the IRQL below DPC/dispatch level and checks to see whether any dispatch interrupts are pending. If there are, the IRQL drops to DPC/dispatch level and the dispatch interrupts are processed. Activating the thread dispatcher by using a software interrupt is a way to defer dispatching until conditions are right. However, Windows uses software interrupts to defer other types of processing as well.
In addition to thread dispatching, the kernel also processes deferred procedure calls (DPCs) at this IRQL. A DPC is a function that performs a system task—a task that is less time-critical than the current one. The functions are called *deferred* because they might not execute immediately.

DPCs provide the operating system with the capability to generate an interrupt and execute a system function in kernel mode. The kernel uses DPCs to process timer expiration (and release threads waiting for the timers) and to reschedule the processor after a thread's quantum expires. Device drivers use DPCs to process interrupts. To provide timely service for hardware interrupts, Windows—with the cooperation of device drivers—attempts to keep the IRQL below device IRQL levels. One way that this goal is achieved is for device driver ISRs to perform the minimal work necessary to acknowledge their device, save volatile interrupt state, and defer data transfer or other less time-critical interrupt processing activity for execution in a DPC at DPC/dispatch IRQL. (See Chapter 8 in Part 2 for more information on DPCs and the I/O system.)

A DPC is represented by a *DPC object*, a kernel control object that is not visible to user-mode programs but is visible to device drivers and other system code. The most important piece of information the DPC object contains is the address of the system function that the kernel will call when it processes the DPC interrupt. DPC routines that are waiting to execute are stored in kernel-managed queues, one per processor, called *DPC queues*. To request a DPC, system code calls the kernel to initialize a DPC object and then places it in a DPC queue.

By default, the kernel places DPC objects at the end of the DPC queue of the processor on which the DPC was requested (typically the processor on which the ISR executed). A device driver can override this behavior, however, by specifying a DPC priority (low, medium, medium-high, or high, where medium is the default) and by targeting the DPC at a particular processor. A DPC aimed at a specific CPU is known as a *targeted DPC*. If the DPC has a high priority, the kernel inserts the DPC object at the front of the queue; otherwise, it is placed at the end of the queue for all other priorities.

When the processor’s IRQL is about to drop from an IRQL of DPC/dispatch level or higher to a lower IRQL (APC or passive level), the kernel processes DPCs. Windows ensures that the IRQL remains at DPC/dispatch level and pulls DPC objects off the current processor’s queue until the queue is empty (that is, the kernel “drains” the queue), calling each DPC function in turn. Only when the queue is empty will the kernel let the IRQL drop below DPC/dispatch level and let regular thread execution continue. DPC processing is depicted in Figure 3-7.

DPC priorities can affect system behavior another way. The kernel usually initiates DPC queue draining with a DPC/dispatch-level interrupt. The kernel generates such an interrupt only if the DPC is directed at the current processor (the one on which the ISR executes) and the DPC has a priority higher than low. If the DPC has a low priority, the kernel requests the interrupt only if the number of outstanding DPC requests for the processor rises above a threshold or if the number of DPCs requested on the processor within a time window is low.
The dispatcher executes each DPC routine in the DPC queue, emptying the queue as it proceeds. If required, the dispatcher also reschedules the processor.

After the DPC interrupt, control transfers to the (thread) dispatcher.

If a DPC is targeted at a CPU different from the one on which the ISR is running and the DPC’s priority is either high or medium-high, the kernel immediately signals the target CPU (by sending it a dispatch IPI) to drain its DPC queue, but only as long as the target processor is idle. If the priority is medium or low, the number of DPCs queued on the target processor must exceed a threshold for the kernel to trigger a DPC/dispatch interrupt. The system idle thread also drains the DPC queue for the processor it runs on. Although DPC targeting and priority levels are flexible, device drivers rarely need to change the default behavior of their DPC objects. Table 3-3 summarizes the situations that initiate DPC queue draining. Medium-high and high appear and are, in fact, equal priorities when looking at the generation rules. The difference comes from their insertion in the list, with high interrupts being at the head and medium-high interrupts at the tail.

### TABLE 3-3 DPC Interrupt Generation Rules

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DPC Priority</th>
<th>DPC Targeted at ISR’s Processor</th>
<th>DPC Targeted at Another Processor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>DPC queue length exceeds maximum DPC queue length, or DPC request rate is less than minimum DPC request rate</td>
<td>DPC queue length exceeds maximum DPC queue length, or system is idle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Always</td>
<td>DPC queue length exceeds maximum DPC queue length, or system is idle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Always</td>
<td>Target processor is idle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Always</td>
<td>Target processor is idle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Because user-mode threads execute at low IRQL, the chances are good that a DPC will interrupt the execution of an ordinary user’s thread. DPC routines execute without regard to what thread is running, meaning that when a DPC routine runs, it can’t assume what process address space is currently mapped. DPC routines can call kernel functions, but they can’t call system services, generate page faults, or create or wait for dispatcher objects (explained later in this chapter). They can, however, access nonpaged system memory addresses, because system address space is always mapped regardless of what the current process is.

DPCs are provided primarily for device drivers, but the kernel uses them too. The kernel most frequently uses a DPC to handle quantum expiration. At every tick of the system clock, an interrupt occurs at clock IRQL. The clock interrupt handler (running at clock IRQL) updates the system time and then decrements a counter that tracks how long the current thread has run. When the counter reaches 0, the thread’s time quantum has expired and the kernel might need to reschedule the processor, a lower-priority task that should be done at DPC/dispatch IRQL. The clock interrupt handler queues a DPC to initiate thread dispatching and then finishes its work and lowers the processor’s IRQL. Because the DPC interrupt has a lower priority than do device interrupts, any pending device interrupts that surface before the clock interrupt completes are handled before the DPC interrupt occurs.

Because DPCs execute regardless of whichever thread is currently running on the system (much like interrupts), they are a primary cause for perceived system unresponsiveness of client systems or workstation workloads because even the highest-priority thread will be interrupted by a pending DPC. Some DPCs run long enough that users might perceive video or sound lagging, and even abnormal mouse or keyboard latencies, so for the benefit of drivers with long-running DPCs, Windows supports threaded DPCs.

Threaded DPCs, as their name implies, function by executing the DPC routine at passive level on a real-time priority (priority 31) thread. This allows the DPC to preempt most user-mode threads (because most application threads don’t run at real-time priority ranges), but it allows other interrupts, nonthreaded DPCs, APCs, and higher-priority threads to preempt the routine.

The threaded DPC mechanism is enabled by default, but you can disable it by adding a DWORD value HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\kernel\ThreadDpcEnable and setting it to 0. Because threaded DPCs can be disabled, driver developers who make use of threaded DPCs must write their routines following the same rules as for nonthreaded DPC routines and cannot access paged memory, perform dispatcher waits, or make assumptions about the IRQL level at which they are executing. In addition, they must not use the KeAcquire/ReleaseSpinLockAtDpcLevel APIs because the functions assume the CPU is at dispatch level. Instead, threaded DPCs must use KeAcquire/ReleaseSpinLockForDpc, which performs the appropriate action after checking the current IRQL.
EXPERIMENT: Monitoring Interrupt and DPC Activity

You can use Process Explorer to monitor interrupt and DPC activity by opening the System Information dialog and switching to the CPU tab, where it lists the number of interrupts and DPCs executed each time Process Explorer refreshes the display (1 second by default):

You can also trace the execution of specific interrupt service routines and deferred procedure calls with the built-in event tracing support (described later in this chapter):

1. Start capturing events by opening an elevated command prompt, navigating to the Microsoft Windows Performance Toolkit directory (typically in c:\Program Files) and typing the following command (make sure no other program is capturing events, such as Process Explorer or Process Monitor, or this will fail with an error):

   \texttt{xperf \(-\text{on PROC\_THREAD+LOADER+DPC+INTERRUPT}\)}

2. Stop capturing events by typing the following:

   \texttt{xperf \(-\text{d dpcisr.etl}\)}}
3. Generate reports for the event capture by typing this:

```bash
xperf dpcisr.etl
tracerpt \kernel.etl -report dpcisr.html -f html
```

This will generate a web page called dpcisr.html.

4. Open report.html, and expand the DPC/ISR subsection. Expand the DPC/ISR Breakdown area, and you will see summaries of the time spent in ISRs and DPCs by each driver. For example:

![DPC/ISR Breakdown](image)

Running an `ln` command in the kernel debugger on the address of each event record shows the name of the function that executed the DPC or ISR:

```
1kd> ln 0x806321C7
(806321c7)  ndis!ndisInterruptDpc
```

```
1kd> ln 0x820AED3F
(820aed3f)  nt!IopTimerDispatch
```

```
1kd> ln 0x82051312
(82051312)  nt!PpmPerfIdleDpc
```

The first is a DPC queued by a network card NDIS miniport driver. The second is a DPC for a generic I/O timer expiration. The third address is the address of a DPC for an idle performance operation.
Other than using it to get an HTML report, you can use the Xperf Viewer to show a detailed overview of all DPC and ISR events by right-clicking on the DPC and/or ISR CPU Usage graphs in the main Xperf window and choosing Summary Table. You will be able to see a per-driver view of each DPC and ISR in detail, along with its duration and count, just as shown in the following graphic:

### Asynchronous Procedure Call Interrupts

Asynchronous procedure calls (APCs) provide a way for user programs and system code to execute in the context of a particular user thread (and hence a particular process address space). Because APCs are queued to execute in the context of a particular thread and run at an IRQL less than DPC/dispatch level, they don’t operate under the same restrictions as a DPC. An APC routine can acquire resources (objects), wait for object handles, incur page faults, and call system services.

APCs are described by a kernel control object, called an **APC object**. APCs waiting to execute reside in a kernel-managed **APC queue**. Unlike the DPC queue, which is systemwide, the APC queue is thread-specific—each thread has its own APC queue. When asked to queue an APC, the kernel inserts it into the queue belonging to the thread that will execute the APC routine. The kernel, in turn, requests a software interrupt at APC level, and when the thread eventually begins running, it executes the APC.

There are two kinds of APCs: kernel mode and user mode. Kernel-mode APCs don’t require permission from a target thread to run in that thread’s context, while user-mode APCs do. Kernel-mode APCs interrupt a thread and execute a procedure without the thread’s intervention or consent. There are also two types of kernel-mode APCs: normal and special. Special APCs execute at APC level and allow the APC routine to modify some of the APC parameters. Normal APCs execute at passive level and receive the modified parameters from the special APC routine (or the original parameters if they weren’t modified).
Both normal and special APCs can be disabled by raising the IRQL to APC level or by calling `KeEnterGuardedRegion`. `KeEnterGuardedRegion` disables APC delivery by setting the `SpecialApcDisable` field in the calling thread’s KTHREAD structure (described further in Chapter 5). A thread can disable normal APCs only by calling `KeEnterCriticalRegion`, which sets the `KernelApcDisable` field in the thread’s KTHREAD structure. Table 3-4 summarizes the APC insertion and delivery behavior for each type of APC.

The executive uses kernel-mode APCs to perform operating system work that must be completed within the address space (in the context) of a particular thread. It can use special kernel-mode APCs to direct a thread to stop executing an interruptible system service, for example, or to record the results of an asynchronous I/O operation in a thread’s address space. Environment subsystems use special kernel-mode APCs to make a thread suspend or terminate itself or to get or set its user-mode execution context. The Subsystem for UNIX Applications uses kernel-mode APCs to emulate the delivery of UNIX signals to Subsystem for UNIX Application processes.

Another important use of kernel-mode APCs is related to thread suspension and termination. Because these operations can be initiated from arbitrary threads and directed to other arbitrary threads, the kernel uses an APC to query the thread context as well as to terminate the thread. Device drivers often block APCs or enter a critical or guarded region to prevent these operations from occurring while they are holding a lock; otherwise, the lock might never be released, and the system would hang.

**TABLE 3-4 APC Insertion and Delivery**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APC Type</th>
<th>Insertion Behavior</th>
<th>Delivery Behavior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special (kernel)</td>
<td>Inserted at the tail of the kernel-mode APC list</td>
<td>Delivered at APC level as soon as IRQL drops and the thread is not in a guarded region. It is given pointers to arguments specified when inserting the APC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal (kernel)</td>
<td>Inserted right after the last special APC (at the head of all other normal APCs)</td>
<td>Delivered at PASSIVE_LEVEL after the associated special APC was executed. It is given arguments returned by the associated special APC (which can be the original arguments used during insertion or new ones).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal (user)</td>
<td>Inserted at the tail of the user-mode APC list</td>
<td>Delivered at PASSIVE_LEVEL as soon as IRQL drops, the thread is not in a critical (or guarded) region, and the thread is in an alerted state. It is given arguments returned by the associated special APC (which can be the original arguments used during insertion or new ones).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal (user)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thread Exit</td>
<td>Inserted at the head of the user-mode APC list</td>
<td>Delivered at PASSIVE_LEVEL on return to user mode, if the thread is doing an alerted user-mode wait. It is given arguments returned by the thread-termination special APC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PsExitSpecialApc</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Device drivers also use kernel-mode APCs. For example, if an I/O operation is initiated and a thread goes into a wait state, another thread in another process can be scheduled to run. When the device finishes transferring data, the I/O system must somehow get back into the context of the thread that initiated the I/O so that it can copy the results of the I/O operation to the buffer in the address space of the process containing that thread. The I/O system uses a special kernel-mode APC to perform this action, unless the application used the `SetFileIoOverlappedRange` API or I/O completion
ports—in which case, the buffer will either be global in memory or copied only after the thread pulls a completion item from the port. (The use of APCs in the I/O system is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8 in Part 2.)

Several Windows APIs—such as ReadFileEx, WriteFileEx, and QueueUserAPC—use user-mode APCs. For example, the ReadFileEx and WriteFileEx functions allow the caller to specify a completion routine to be called when the I/O operation finishes. The I/O completion is implemented by queuing an APC to the thread that issued the I/O. However, the callback to the completion routine doesn’t necessarily take place when the APC is queued because user-mode APCs are delivered to a thread only when it’s in an alertable wait state. A thread can enter a wait state either by waiting for an object handle and specifying that its wait is alertable (with the Windows WaitForMultipleObjectsEx function) or by testing directly whether it has a pending APC (using SleepEx). In both cases, if a user-mode APC is pending, the kernel interrupts (alerts) the thread, transfers control to the APC routine, and resumes the thread’s execution when the APC routine completes. Unlike kernel-mode APCs, which can execute at APC level, user-mode APCs execute at passive level.

APC delivery can reorder the wait queues—the lists of which threads are waiting for what, and in what order they are waiting. (Wait resolution is described in the section “Low-IRQL Synchronization,” later in this chapter.) If the thread is in a wait state when an APC is delivered, after the APC routine completes, the wait is reissued or re-executed. If the wait still isn’t resolved, the thread returns to the wait state, but now it will be at the end of the list of objects it’s waiting for. For example, because APCs are used to suspend a thread from execution, if the thread is waiting for any objects, its wait is removed until the thread is resumed, after which that thread will be at the end of the list of threads waiting to access the objects it was waiting for. A thread performing an alertable kernel-mode wait will also be woken up during thread termination, allowing such a thread to check whether it woke up as a result of termination or for a different reason.

Timer Processing

The system’s clock interval timer is probably the most important device on a Windows machine, as evidenced by its high IRQL value (CLOCK_LEVEL) and due to the critical nature of the work it is responsible for. Without this interrupt, Windows would lose track of time, causing erroneous results in calculations of uptime and clock time—and worse, causing timers not to expire anymore and threads never to lose their quantum anymore. Windows would also not be a preemptive operating system, and unless the current running thread yielded the CPU, critical background tasks and scheduling could never occur on a given processor.

Windows programs the system clock to fire at the most appropriate interval for the machine, and subsequently allows drivers, applications, and administrators to modify the clock interval for their needs. Typically, the system clock is maintained either by the PIT (Programmable Interrupt Timer) chip that is present on all computers since the PC/AT, or the RTC (Real Time Clock). The PIT works on a crystal that is tuned at one-third the NTSC color carrier frequency (because it was originally used for TV-Out on the first CGA video cards), and the HAL uses various achievable multiples to reach millisecond-unit intervals, starting at 1 ms all the way up to 15 ms. The RTC, on the other hand, runs at 32.768 KHz, which, by being a power of two, is easily configured to run at various intervals that
are also powers of two. On today’s machines, the APIC Multiprocessor HAL configures the RTC to fire every 15.6 milliseconds, which corresponds to about 64 times a second.

Some types of Windows applications require very fast response times, such as multimedia applications. In fact, some multimedia tasks require rates as low as 1 ms. For this reason, Windows implements APIs and mechanisms that enable lowering the interval of the system’s clock interrupt, which results in more clock interrupts (at least on processor 0). Note that this increases the resolution of all timers in the system, potentially causing other timers to expire more frequently.

Windows tries its best to restore the clock timer back to its original value whenever it can. Each time a process requests a clock interval change, Windows increases an internal reference count and associates it with the process. Similarly, drivers (which can also change the clock rate) get added to the global reference count. When all drivers have restored the clock and all processes that modified the clock either have exited or restored it, Windows restores the clock to its default value (or, barring that, to the next highest value that’s been required by a process or driver).

**EXPERIMENT: Identifying High-Frequency Timers**

Due to the problems that high-frequency timers can cause, Windows uses Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) to trace all processes and drivers that request a change in the system’s clock interval, displaying the time of the occurrence and the requested interval. The current interval is also shown. This data is of great use to both developers and system administrators in identifying the causes of poor battery performance on otherwise healthy systems, and to decrease overall power consumption on large systems as well. To obtain it, simply run `powercfg /energy` and you should obtain an HTML file called `energy-report.html` similar to the one shown here:
Scroll down to the section on Platform Timer Resolution, and you will be shown all the applications that have modified the timer resolution and are still active, along with the call stacks that caused this call. Timer resolutions are shown in hundreds of nanoseconds, so a period of 20,000 corresponds to 2 ms. In the sample shown, two applications—namely, Microsoft PowerPoint and the UltraVNC remote desktop server—each requested a higher resolution.

You can also use the debugger to obtain this information. For each process, the EPROCESS structure contains a number of fields, shown next, that help identify changes in timer resolution:

+0x4a8 TimerResolutionLink : _LIST_ENTRY [ 0xfffffa80'05218fd8 - 0xfffffa80'059cd508 ]
+0x4b8 RequestedTimerResolution : 0
+0x4bc ActiveThreadsHighWatermark : 0x1d
+0x4c0 SmallestTimerResolution : 0x2710
+0x4c8 TimerResolutionStackRecord : 0xfffff8a0'0476ecd0 _PO_DIAG_STACK_RECORD

Note that the debugger shows you an additional piece of information: the smallest timer resolution that was ever requested by a given process. In this example, the process shown corresponds to PowerPoint 2010, which typically requests a lower timer resolution during slide shows, but not during slide editing mode. The EPROCESS fields of PowerPoint, shown in the preceding code, prove this, and the stack could be parsed by dumping the PO_DIAG_STACK_RECORD structure.

Finally, the TimerResolutionLink field connects all processes that have made changes to timer resolution, through the ExpTimerResolutionListHead doubly linked list. Parsing this list with the !list debugger command can reveal all processes on the system that have, or had, made changes to the timer resolution, when the powercfg command is unavailable or information on past processes is required:

```
lkd> !list "-e -x \"dt nt!_EPROCESS @$extret-@@(#FIELD_OFFSET(nt!_EPROCESS, TimerResolutionLink)) ImageFileName SmallestTimerResolution RequestedTimerResolution\" nt!ExpTimerResolutionListHead"
```

```
dt nt!_EPROCESS @$extret-@@(#FIELD_OFFSET(nt!_EPROCESS, TimerResolutionLink)) ImageFileName SmallestTimerResolution RequestedTimerResolution
  +0x2e0 ImageFileName            : [15]  "audiodg.exe"
  +0x4b8 RequestedTimerResolution : 0
  +0x4c0 SmallestTimerResolution  : 0x2710
```

```
dt nt!_EPROCESS @$extret-@@(#FIELD_OFFSET(nt!_EPROCESS, TimerResolutionLink)) ImageFileName SmallestTimerResolution RequestedTimerResolution
  +0x2e0 ImageFileName            : [15]  "chrome.exe"
  +0x4b8 RequestedTimerResolution : 0
  +0x4c0 SmallestTimerResolution  : 0x2710
```

```
dt nt!_EPROCESS @$extret-@@(#FIELD_OFFSET(nt!_EPROCESS, TimerResolutionLink)) ImageFileName SmallestTimerResolution RequestedTimerResolution
  +0x2e0 ImageFileName            : [15]  "chrome.exe"
  +0x4b8 RequestedTimerResolution : 0
  +0x4c0 SmallestTimerResolution  : 0x2710
```
Timer Expiration

As we said, one of the main tasks of the ISR associated with the interrupt that the RTC or PIT will generate is to keep track of system time, which is mainly done by the KeUpdateSystemTime routine. Its second job is to keep track of logical run time, such as process/thread execution times and the system tick time, which is the underlying number used by APIs such as GetTickCount that developers use to time operations in their applications. This part of the work is performed by KeUpdateRunTime. Before doing any of that work, however, KeUpdateRunTime checks whether any timers have expired.

Windows timers can be either absolute timers, which implies a distinct expiration time in the future, or relative timers, which contain a negative expiration value used as a positive offset from the current time during timer insertion. Internally, all timers are converted to an absolute expiration time, although the system keeps track of whether or not this is the “true” absolute time or a converted relative time. This difference is important in certain scenarios, such as Daylight Savings Time (or even manual clock changes). An absolute timer would still fire at “8PM” if the user moved the clock from 1PM to 7PM, but a relative timer—say, one set to expire “in two hours”—would not feel the effect of the clock change because two hours haven’t really elapsed. During system time-change events such as these, the kernel reprograms the absolute time associated with relative timers to match the new settings.

Because the clock fires at known interval multiples, the bottom bits of the current system time will be at one of 64 known positions (on an APIC HAL). Windows uses that fact to organize all driver and application timers into linked lists based on an array where each entry corresponds to a possible multiple of the system time. This table, called the timer table, is located in the PRCB, which enables

each processor to perform its own independent timer expiration without needing to acquire a global lock, as shown in Figure 3-8. Later, you will see what determines which logical processor’s timer table a timer is inserted on. Because each processor has its own timer table, each processor also does its own timer expiration work. As each processor gets initialized, the table is filled with absolute timers with an infinite expiration time, to avoid any incoherent state. Each multiple of the system time that a timer can be associated with is called the *hand*, and it’s stored in the timer object’s dispatcher header. Therefore, to determine if a clock has expired, it is only necessary to check if there are any timers on the linked list associated with the current hand.

![Diagram of timer lists](image)

**FIGURE 3-8** Example of per-processor timer lists

Although updating counters and checking a linked list are fast operations, going through every timer and expiring it is a potentially costly operation—keep in mind that all this work is currently being performed at CLOCK_LEVEL, an exceptionally elevated IRQL. Similarly to how a driver ISR queues a DPC to defer work, the clock ISR requests a DPC software interrupt, setting a flag in the PRCB so that the DPC draining mechanism knows timers need expiration. Likewise, when updating process/thread runtime, if the clock ISR determines that a thread has expired its quantum, it also queues a DPC software interrupt and sets a different PRCB flag. These flags are per-PRCB because each processor normally does its own processing of run-time updates, because each processor is running a different thread and has different tasks associated with it. Table 3-5 displays the various fields used in timer expiration and processing.

Once the IRQL eventually drops down back to DISPATCH_LEVEL, as part of DPC processing, these two flags will be picked up.
TABLE 3-5  Timer Processing KPRCB Fields

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPRCB Field</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ReadySummary</td>
<td>Bitmask (32 bits)</td>
<td>Bitmask of priority levels that have one or more ready threads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DeferredReadyListHead</td>
<td>Singly linked list</td>
<td>Single list head for the deferred ready queue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DispatcherReadyListHead</td>
<td>Array of 32 list entries</td>
<td>List heads for the 32 ready queues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter 5 covers the actions related to thread scheduling and quantum expiration. Here we will take a look at the timer expiration work. Because the timers are linked together by hand, the expiration code (executed by the DPC associated with the PRCB in the TimerExpiryDpc field) parses this list from head to tail. (At insertion time, the timers nearest to the clock interval multiple will be first, followed by timers closer and closer to the next interval, but still within this hand.) There are two primary tasks to expiring a timer:

- The timer is treated as a dispatcher synchronization object (threads are waiting on the timer as part of a timeout or directly as part of a wait). The wait-testing and wait-satisfaction algorithms will be run on the timer. This work is described in a later section on synchronization in this chapter. This is how user-mode applications, and some drivers, make use of timers.

- The timer is treated as a control object associated with a DPC callback routine that executes when the timer expires. This method is reserved only for drivers and enables very low latency response to timer expiration. (The wait/dispatcher method requires all the extra logic of wait signaling.) Additionally, because timer expiration itself executes at DISPATCH_LEVEL, where DPCs also run, it is perfectly suited as a timer callback.

As each processor wakes up to handle the clock interval timer to perform system-time and run-time processing, it therefore also processes timer expirations after a slightly latency/delay in which the IRQL drops from CLOCK_LEVEL to DISPATCH_LEVEL. Figure 3-9 shows this behavior on two processors—the solid arrows indicate the clock interrupt firing, while the dotted arrows indicate any timer expiration processing that might occur if the processor had associated timers.

![FIGURE 3-9 Timer expiration](image-url)
Processor Selection

A critical determination that must be made when a timer is inserted is to pick the appropriate table to use—in other words, the most optimal processor choice. If the timer has no DPC associated with it, the kernel scans all processors in the current processor’s group that have not been parked. (For more information on Core Parking, see Chapter 5.) If the current processor is parked, it picks the next processor in the group; otherwise, the current processor is used. On the other hand, if the timer does have an associated DPC, the insertion code simply looks at the target processor associated with the DPC and selects that processor’s timer table.

In the case where the driver developer did not specify a target processor for the DPC, the kernel must make the choice. Because driver developers typically expect the DPC to execute on the same processor as the one the driver code was running on at insertion time, the kernel typically chooses CPU 0, since CPU 0 is the timekeeping processor that will always be active to pick up clock interrupts (more on this later). However, on server systems, the kernel picks a processor, just as it normally does when there is no DPC, by using the same checks just described.

This behavior is intended to improve performance and scalability on server systems that make use of Hyper-V, although it can improve performance on any heavily loaded system. As system timers pile up—because most drivers do not affinitize their DPCs—CPU 0 becomes more and more congested with the execution of timer expiration code, which increases latency and can even cause heavy delays or missed DPCs. Additionally, the timer expiration can start competing with the DPC timer typically associated with driver interrupt processing, such as network packet code, causing systemwide slowdowns. This process is exacerbated in a Hyper-V scenario, where CPU 0 must process the timers and DPCs associated with potentially numerous virtual machines, each with their own timers and associated devices.

By spreading the timers across processors, as shown in Figure 3-10, each processor’s timer-expiration load is fully distributed among unparked logical processors. The timer object stores its associated processor number in the dispatcher header on 32-bit systems and in the object itself on 64-bit systems.

Note This behavior is controlled by the kernel variable KiDistributeTimers, which is initialized based on a registry key whose value is different between a server and client installation. By modifying, or creating, the value DistributeTimers under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\kernel, this behavior can be configured differently from its SKU-based default.
EXPERIMENT: Listing System Timers

You can use the kernel debugger to dump all the current registered timers on the system, as well as information on the DPC associated with each timer (if any). See the following output for a sample:

```
[kd]> !timer
Dump system timers


List Timer    Interrupt Low/High     Fire Time              DPC/thread
PROCESSOR 0 (nt!_KTIMER_TABLE fffff80001bf080)
  5 fffffa8003099810   627684ac 000003df [4/5/2010 18:58:10.756] NDIS!ndisMTimerObjectDpc (DPC @ fffffa8003099850)
  13 fffffa8003027278   272dde78 000004cf [4/6/2010 23:34:30.510] NDIS!ndisMWakeUpDpcX (DPC @ fffffa80030272b8)
      fffffa8003029278   272e0588 000004cf [4/6/2010 23:34:30.511] NDIS!ndisMWakeUpDpcX (DPC @ fffffa80030292b8)
      fffffa8006096b60
  19 fffff80001c85c40   64f9aab5 000003df [4/5/2010 18:58:14.971] nti!CmpLazyFlushDpcRoutine (DPC @ fffff80001c85c00)
  31 fffffa8002c43660 P dc527b9b 000003e8 [4/5/2010 20:06:00.673] intelppmlongCapTraceDpc (DPC @ fffff8002c436a0)
  40 fffff80001c86f60   62ca1080 000003df [4/5/2010 18:58:11.304] nt!CcScanDpc (DPC @ fffff80001c86f20)
      ...
      fffffa8004599b60   fe2fc6ce 000003e0 [4/5/2010 19:09:41.514] netbt!TimerExpiry (DPC @ fffffa8004599b20)
```

FIGURE 3-10 Timer queuing behaviors
In this example, there are multiple driver-associated timers, due to expire shortly, associated with the Ndis.sys and Afd.sys drivers (both related to networking), as well as audio, Bluetooth, and ATA/IDE drivers. There are also background housekeeping timers due to expire, such as those related to power management, ETW, registry flushing, and Users Account Control (UAC) virtualization. Additionally, there are a dozen or so timers that don’t have any DPC associated with them—this likely indicates user-mode or kernel-mode timers that are used for wait...
dispatching. You can use `!thread` on the thread pointers to verify this. Finally, three interesting timers that are always present on a Windows system are the timer that checks for Daylight Savings Time time-zone changes, the timer that checks for the arrival of the upcoming year, and the timer that checks for entry into the next century. One can easily locate them based on their typically distant expiration time, unless this experiment is performed on the eve of one of these events.

**Intelligent Timer Tick Distribution**

Figure 3-11, which shows processors handling the clock ISR and expiring timers, reveals that processor 1 wakes up a number of times (the solid arrows) even when there are no associated expiring timers (the dotted arrows). Although that behavior is required as long as processor 1 is running (to update the thread/process run times and scheduling state), what if processor 1 is idle (and has no expiring timers). Does it still need to handle the clock interrupt? Because the only other work required that was referenced earlier is to update the overall system time/clock ticks, it’s sufficient to designate merely one processor as the time-keeping processor (in this case, processor 0) and allow other processors to remain in their sleep state; if they wake, any time-related adjustments can be performed by resynchronizing with processor 0.

Windows does, in fact, make this realization (internally called *intelligent timer tick distribution*), and Figure 3-11 shows the processor states under the scenario where processor 1 is sleeping (unlike earlier, when we assumed it was running code). As you can see, processor 1 wakes up only 5 times to handle its expiring timers, creating a much larger gap (sleeping period). The kernel uses a variable `KiPendingTimer`, which contains an array of affinity mask structures that indicate which logical processors need to receive a clock interval for the given timer hand (clock-tick interval). It can then appropriately program the interrupt controller, as well as determine to which processors it will send an IPI to initiate timer processing.

**FIGURE 3-11** Intelligent timer tick distribution applied to processor 1
Leaving as large a gap as possible is important due to the way power management works in processors: as the processor detects that the work load is going lower and lower, it decreases its power consumption (P states), until it finally reaches an idle state. The processor then has the ability to selectively turn off parts of itself and enter deeper and deeper idle/sleep states, such as turning off caches. However, if the processor has to wake again, it will consume energy and take time to power up; for this reason, processor designers will risk entering these lower idle/sleep states (C states) only if the time spent in a given state outweighs the time and energy it takes to enter and exit the state. Obviously, it makes no sense to spend 10 ms to enter a sleep state that will last only 1 ms. By preventing clock interrupts from waking sleeping processors unless needed (due to timers), they can enter deeper C-states and stay there longer.

**Timer Coalescing**

Although minimizing clock interrupts to sleeping processors during periods of no timer expiration gives a big boost to longer C-state intervals, with a timer granularity of 15 ms, many timers likely will be queued at any given hand and expiring often, even if just on processor 0. Reducing the amount of software timer-expiration work would both help to decrease latency (by requiring less work at DISPATCH_LEVEL) as well as allow other processors to stay in their sleep states even longer (because we’ve established that the processors wake up only to handle expiring timers, fewer timer expirations result in longer sleep times). In truth, it is not just the amount of expiring timers that really affects sleep state (it does affect latency), but the periodicity of these timer expirations—six timers all expiring at the same hand is a better option than six timers expiring at six different hands. Therefore, to fully optimize idle-time duration, the kernel needs to employ a coalescing mechanism to combine separate timer hands into an individual hand with multiple expirations.

Timer coalescing works on the assumption that most drivers and user-mode applications do not particularly care about the exact firing period of their timers (except in the case of multimedia applications, for example). This “don’t care” region actually grows as the original timer period grows—an application waking up every 30 seconds probably doesn’t mind waking up every 31 or 29 seconds instead, while a driver polling every second could probably poll every second plus or minus 50 ms without too many problems. The important guarantee most periodic timers depend on is that their firing period remains constant within a certain range—for example, when a timer has been changed to fire every second plus 50 ms, it continues to fire within that range forever, not sometimes at every two seconds and other times at half a second. Even so, not all timers are ready to be coalesced into coarser granularities, so Windows enables this mechanism only for timers that have marked themselves as coalescable, either through the KeSetCoalescableTimer kernel API or through its user-mode counterpart, SetWaitableTimerEx.

With these APIs, driver and application developers are free to provide the kernel with the maximum tolerance (or tolerably delay) that their timer will endure, which is defined as the maximum amount of time past the requested period at which the timer will still function correctly. (In the previous example, the 1-second timer had a tolerance of 50 milliseconds.) The recommended minimum tolerance is 32 ms, which corresponds to about twice the 15.6-ms clock tick—any smaller value wouldn’t really result in any coalescing, because the expiring timer could not be moved even from one clock tick to the next. Regardless of the tolerance that is specified, Windows aligns the timer to one of four preferred coalescing intervals: 1 second, 250 ms, 100 ms, or 50 ms.
When a tolerable delay is set for a periodic timer, Windows uses a process called *shifting*, which causes the timer to drift between periods until it gets aligned to the most optimal multiple of the period interval within the preferred coalescing interval associated with the specified tolerance (which is then encoded in the dispatcher header). For absolute timers, the list of preferred coalescing intervals is scanned, and a preferred expiration time is generated based on the closest acceptable coalescing interval to the maximum tolerance the caller specified. This behavior means that absolute timers are always pushed out as far as possible past their real expiration point, which spreads out timers as far as possible and creates longer sleep times on the processors.

Now with timer coalescing, refer back to Figure 3-11 and assume all the timers specified tolerances and are thus coalescable. In one scenario, Windows could decide to coalesce the timers as shown in Figure 3-12. Notice that now, processor 1 receives a total of only three clock interrupts, significantly increasing the periods of idle sleep, thus achieving a lower C-state. Furthermore, there is less work to do for some of the clock interrupts on processor 0, possibly removing the latency of requiring a drop to DISPATCH_LEVEL at each clock interrupt.

![Timer Coalescing Diagram](image)

### Figure 3-12 Timer coalescing

**Exception Dispatching**

In contrast to interrupts, which can occur at any time, exceptions are conditions that result directly from the execution of the program that is running. Windows uses a facility known as *structured exception handling*, which allows applications to gain control when exceptions occur. The application can then fix the condition and return to the place the exception occurred, unwind the stack (thus terminating execution of the subroutine that raised the exception), or declare back to the system that the exception isn’t recognized and the system should continue searching for an exception handler that might process the exception. This section assumes you’re familiar with the basic concepts behind Windows structured exception handling—if you’re not, you should read the overview in the Windows API reference documentation in the Windows SDK or Chapters 23 through 25 in Jeffrey Richter and Christophe Nasarre’s book *Windows via C/C++* (Microsoft Press, 2007) before proceeding. Keep in mind that although exception handling is made accessible through language extensions (for example, the `__try` construct in Microsoft Visual C++), it is a system mechanism and hence isn’t language specific.
On the x86 and x64 processors, all exceptions have predefined interrupt numbers that directly correspond to the entry in the IDT that points to the trap handler for a particular exception. Table 3-6 shows x86-defined exceptions and their assigned interrupt numbers. Because the first entries of the IDT are used for exceptions, hardware interrupts are assigned entries later in the table, as mentioned earlier.

All exceptions, except those simple enough to be resolved by the trap handler, are serviced by a kernel module called the exception dispatcher. The exception dispatcher’s job is to find an exception handler that can dispose of the exception. Examples of architecture-independent exceptions that the kernel defines include memory-access violations, integer divide-by-zero, integer overflow, floating-point exceptions, and debugger breakpoints. For a complete list of architecture-independent exceptions, consult the Windows SDK reference documentation.

TABLE 3-6 x86 Exceptions and Their Interrupt Numbers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interrupt Number</th>
<th>Exception</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Divide Error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Debug (Single Step)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Non-Maskable Interrupt (NMI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Breakpoint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Overflow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Bounds Check</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Invalid Opcode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>NPX Not Available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Double Fault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>NPX Segment Overrun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Invalid Task State Segment (TSS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Segment Not Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Stack Fault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>General Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Page Fault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Intel Reserved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Floating Point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Alignment Check</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Machine Check</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>SIMD Floating Point</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The kernel traps and handles some of these exceptions transparently to user programs. For example, encountering a breakpoint while executing a program being debugged generates an exception, which the kernel handles by calling the debugger. The kernel handles certain other exceptions by returning an unsuccessful status code to the caller.
A few exceptions are allowed to filter back, untouched, to user mode. For example, certain types of memory-access violations or an arithmetic overflow generate an exception that the operating system doesn’t handle. 32-bit applications can establish frame-based exception handlers to deal with these exceptions. The term frame-based refers to an exception handler’s association with a particular procedure activation. When a procedure is invoked, a stack frame representing that activation of the procedure is pushed onto the stack. A stack frame can have one or more exception handlers associated with it, each of which protects a particular block of code in the source program. When an exception occurs, the kernel searches for an exception handler associated with the current stack frame. If none exists, the kernel searches for an exception handler associated with the previous stack frame, and so on, until it finds a frame-based exception handler. If no exception handler is found, the kernel calls its own default exception handlers.

For 64-bit applications, structured exception handling does not use frame-based handlers. Instead, a table of handlers for each function is built into the image during compilation. The kernel looks for handlers associated with each function and generally follows the same algorithm we described for 32-bit code.

Structured exception handling is heavily used within the kernel itself so that it can safely verify whether pointers from user mode can be safely accessed for read or write access. Drivers can make use of this same technique when dealing with pointers sent during I/O control codes (IOCTLS).

Another mechanism of exception handling is called vectored exception handling. This method can be used only by user-mode applications. You can find more information about it in the Windows SDK or the MSDN Library.

When an exception occurs, whether it is explicitly raised by software or implicitly raised by hardware, a chain of events begins in the kernel. The CPU hardware transfers control to the kernel trap handler, which creates a trap frame (as it does when an interrupt occurs). The trap frame allows the system to resume where it left off if the exception is resolved. The trap handler also creates an exception record that contains the reason for the exception and other pertinent information.

If the exception occurred in kernel mode, the exception dispatcher simply calls a routine to locate a frame-based exception handler that will handle the exception. Because unhandled kernel-mode exceptions are considered fatal operating system errors, you can assume that the dispatcher always finds an exception handler. Some traps, however, do not lead into an exception handler because the kernel always assumes such errors to be fatal—these are errors that could have been caused only by severe bugs in the internal kernel code or by major inconsistencies in driver code (that could have occurred only through deliberate, low-level system modifications that drivers should not be responsible for). Such fatal errors will result in a bug check with the UNEXPECTED_KERNEL_MODE_TRAP code.

If the exception occurred in user mode, the exception dispatcher does something more elaborate. As you’ll see in Chapter 5, the Windows subsystem has a debugger port (this is actually a debugger object, which will be discussed later) and an exception port to receive notification of user-mode exceptions in Windows processes. (In this case, by “port” we mean an LPC port object, which will be discussed later in this chapter.) The kernel uses these ports in its default exception handling, as illustrated in Figure 3-13.
Debugger breakpoints are common sources of exceptions. Therefore, the first action the exception dispatcher takes is to see whether the process that incurred the exception has an associated debugger process. If it does, the exception dispatcher sends a debugger object message to the debug object associated with the process (which internally the system refers to as a “port” for compatibility with programs that might rely on behavior in Windows 2000, which used an LPC port instead of a debug object).

If the process has no debugger process attached or if the debugger doesn’t handle the exception, the exception dispatcher switches into user mode, copies the trap frame to the user stack formatted as a CONTEXT data structure (documented in the Windows SDK), and calls a routine to find a structured or vectored exception handler. If none is found or if none handles the exception, the exception dispatcher switches back into kernel mode and calls the debugger again to allow the user to do more debugging. (This is called the second-chance notification.)

If the debugger isn’t running and no user-mode exception handlers are found, the kernel sends a message to the exception port associated with the thread’s process. This exception port, if one exists, was registered by the environment subsystem that controls this thread. The exception port gives the environment subsystem, which presumably is listening at the port, the opportunity to translate the exception into an environment-specific signal or exception. For example, when Subsystem for UNIX Applications gets a message from the kernel that one of its threads generated an exception, Subsystem for UNIX Applications sends a UNIX-style signal to the thread that caused the exception. However, if the kernel progresses this far in processing the exception and the subsystem doesn’t
handle the exception, the kernel sends a message to a systemwide error port that Csrss (Client/Server Run-Time Subsystem) uses for Windows Error Reporting (WER)—which will be discussed shortly—and executes a default exception handler that simply terminates the process whose thread caused the exception.

Unhandled Exceptions

All Windows threads have an exception handler that processes unhandled exceptions. This exception handler is declared in the internal Windows start-of-thread function. The start-of-thread function runs when a user creates a process or any additional threads. It calls the environment-supplied thread start routine specified in the initial thread context structure, which in turn calls the user-supplied thread start routine specified in the CreateThread call.

**EXPERIMENT: Viewing the Real User Start Address for Windows Threads**

The fact that each Windows thread begins execution in a system-supplied function (and not the user-supplied function) explains why the start address for thread 0 is the same for every Windows process in the system (and why the start addresses for secondary threads are also the same). To see the user-supplied function address, use Process Explorer or the kernel debugger.

Because most threads in Windows processes start at one of the system-supplied wrapper functions, Process Explorer, when displaying the start address of threads in a process, skips the initial call frame that represents the wrapper function and instead shows the second frame on the stack. For example, notice the thread start address of a process running Notepad.exe:
Process Explorer does display the complete call hierarchy when it displays the call stack. Notice the following results when the Stack button is clicked:

![Stack for thread 8510](image)

Line 18 in the preceding screen shot is the first frame on the stack—the start of the internal thread wrapper. The second frame (line 17) is the environment subsystem's thread wrapper—in this case, kernel32, because you are dealing with a Windows subsystem application. The third frame (line 16) is the main entry point into Notepad.exe.

The generic code for the internal thread start functions is shown here:

```c
VOID RtlUserThreadStart(VOID)
{
    LPVOID lpStartAddr = (R/E)AX; // Located in the initial thread context structure
    LPVOID lpvThreadParam = (R/E)BX; // Located in the initial thread context structure
    LPVOID lpWin32StartAddr;
    lpWin32StartAddr = Kernel32ThreadInitThunkFunction ? Kernel32ThreadInitThunkFunction : lpStartAddr;
    __try
    {
        DWORD dwThreadExitCode = lpWin32StartAddr(lpvThreadParam);
        RtlExitUserThread(dwThreadExitCode);
    }
    __except(RtlpGetExceptionFilter(GetExceptionInformation()))
    {
        NtTerminateProcess(NtCurrentProcess(), GetExceptionCode());
    }
}
```
VOID Win32StartOfProcess(
    LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE lpStartAddr,
    LPVOID lpvThreadParam)
{
    lpStartAddr(lpvThreadParam);
}

Notice that the Windows unhandled exception filter is called if the thread has an exception that it
doesn’t handle. The purpose of this function is to provide the system-defined behavior for what to do
when an exception is not handled, which is to launch the WerFault.exe process. However, in a default
configuration the Windows Error Reporting service, described next, will handle the exception and this
unhandled exception filter never executes.

WerFault.exe checks the contents of the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT
\CurrentVersion\AeDebug registry key and makes sure that the process isn’t on the exclusion list.
There are two important values in the key: Auto and Debugger. Auto tells the unhandled exception
filter whether to automatically run the debugger or ask the user what to do. Installing development
tools, such as Microsoft Visual Studio, changes this value to 0 if it is already set. (If the value was not
set, 0 is the default option.) The Debugger value is a string that points to the path of the debug-
ger executable to run in the case of an unhandled exception, and WerFault passes the process ID of
the crashing process and an event name to signal when the debugger has started as command-line
arguments when it starts the debugger.

**Windows Error Reporting**

Windows Error Reporting (WER) is a sophisticated mechanism that automates the submission of both
user-mode process crashes as well as kernel-mode system crashes. (For a description of how this
applies to system crashes, see Chapter 14 in Part 2.)

Windows Error Reporting can be configured by going to Control Panel, choosing Action Center,
Change Action Center settings, and then Problem Reporting Settings.

When an unhandled exception is caught by the unhandled exception filter (described in the
previous section), it builds context information (such as the current value of the registers and stack)
and opens an ALPC port connection to the WER service. This service begins to analyze the crashed
program's state and performs the appropriate actions to notify the user. As described previously, in
most cases this means launching the WerFault.exe program, which executes with the current user’s
credentials and, unless the system is configured not to, displays a message box informing the user
of the crash. On systems where a debugger is installed, an additional option to debug the process is
shown, as you can see in Figure 3-14. When you click the Debug button, the debugger (registered in
the Debugger string value described earlier in the AeDebug key) will be launched so that it can attach
to the crashing process.
On default configured systems, an error report (a minidump and an XML file with various details, such as the DLL version numbers loaded in the process) is sent to Microsoft’s online crash analysis server. Eventually, as the service is notified of a solution for a problem, it will display a tooltip to the user informing her of steps that should be taken to solve the problem. An entry will also be displayed in the Action Center. Furthermore, the Reliability Monitor will also show all instances of application and system crashes.

**Note** WER will actively (visually) inform the user of a crashed application only if the application has at least one visible/interactive window; otherwise, the crash will be logged, but the user will have to manually visit the Action Center to view it. This behavior attempts to avoid user confusion by not displaying a WER dialog box about an invisible crashed process the user might not be aware of, such as a background service.

In environments where systems are not connected to the Internet or where the administrator wants to control which error reports are submitted to Microsoft, the destination for the error report can be configured to be an internal file server. Microsoft System Center Desktop Error Monitoring understands the directory structure created by Windows Error Reporting and provides the administrator with the option to take selective error reports and submit them to Microsoft.

If all the operations we’ve described had to occur within the crashing thread's context—that is, as part of the unhandled exception filter that was initially set up—these complex steps would sometimes become impossible for a badly damaged thread to perform, and the unhandled exception filter itself would crash. This “silent process death” would be impossible to log, making it hard to debug and also resulting in invisible crashes in cases where no user was present on the machine. To avoid such issues, Windows’ WER mechanism performs this work externally from the crashed thread if the unhandled exception filter itself crashes, which allows any kind of process or thread crash to be logged and for the user to be notified.

WER contains many customizable settings that can be configured by the user through the Group Policy editor or by manually making changes to the registry. Table 3-7 lists the WER registry
configuration options, their use, and possible values. These values are located under the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting subkey for computer configuration and in the equivalent path under HKEY_CURRENT_USER for per-user configuration.

**TABLE 3-7** WER Registry Settings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Setting</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ConfigureArchive</td>
<td>Contents of archived data</td>
<td>1 for parameters, 2 for all data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consent\DefaultConsent</td>
<td>What kind of data should require consent</td>
<td>1 for any data, 2 for parameters only, 3 for parameters and safe data, 4 for all data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consent\DefaultOverrideBehavior</td>
<td>Whether the DefaultConsent overrides WER plug-in consent values</td>
<td>1 to enable override</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consent\PluginName</td>
<td>Consent value for a specific WER plug-in</td>
<td>Same as DefaultConsent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CorporateWERDirectory</td>
<td>Directory for a corporate WER store</td>
<td>String containing the path</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CorporateWERPortNumber</td>
<td>Port to use for a corporate WER store</td>
<td>Port number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CorporateWERServer</td>
<td>Name to use for a corporate WER store</td>
<td>String containing the name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CorporateWERUseAuthentication</td>
<td>Use Windows Integrated Authentication for corporate WER store</td>
<td>1 to enable built-in authentication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CorporateWERUseSSL</td>
<td>Use Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) for corporate WER store</td>
<td>1 to enable SSL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DebugApplications</td>
<td>List of applications that require the user to choose between Debug and Continue</td>
<td>1 to require the user to choose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DisableArchive</td>
<td>Whether the archive is enabled</td>
<td>1 to disable archive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disabled</td>
<td>Whether WER is disabled</td>
<td>1 to disable WER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DisableQueue</td>
<td>Determines whether reports are to be queued</td>
<td>1 to disable queue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DontShowUI</td>
<td>Disables or enables the WER UI</td>
<td>1 to disable UI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DontSendAdditionalData</td>
<td>Prevents additional crash data from being sent</td>
<td>1 not to send</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ExcludedApplications\AppName</td>
<td>List of applications excluded from WER</td>
<td>String containing the application list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ForceQueue</td>
<td>Whether reports should be sent to the user queue</td>
<td>1 to send reports to the queue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LocalDumps\DumpFolder</td>
<td>Path at which to store the dump files</td>
<td>String containing the path</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LocalDumps\DumpCount</td>
<td>Maximum number of dump files in the path</td>
<td>Count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LocalDumps\DumpType</td>
<td>Type of dump to generate during a crash</td>
<td>0 for a custom dump, 1 for a minidump, 2 for a full dump</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LocalDumps\CustomDumpFlags</td>
<td>For custom dumps, specifies custom options</td>
<td>Values defined in MINIDUMP_TYPE (see Chapter 13, “Startup and Shutdown,” in Part 2 for more information)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting</td>
<td>Meaning</td>
<td>Values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LoggingDisabled</td>
<td>Enables or disables logging</td>
<td>1 to disable logging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MaxArchiveCount</td>
<td>Maximum size of the archive (in files)</td>
<td>Value between 1–5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MaxQueueCount</td>
<td>Maximum size of the queue</td>
<td>Value between 1–500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QueuePesterInterval</td>
<td>Days between requests to have the user check for solutions</td>
<td>Number of days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note** The values listed under *LocalDumps* can also be configured per application by adding the application name in the subkey path between *LocalDumps* and the relevant value. However, they cannot be configured per user; they exist only in the HKLM path.

As discussed, the WER service uses an ALPC port for communicating with crashed processes. This mechanism uses a systemwide error port that the WER service registers through *NtSetInformationProcess* (which uses *DbgkRegisterErrorPort*). As a result, all Windows processes now have an error port that is actually an ALPC port object registered by the WER service. The kernel, which is first notified of an exception, uses this port to send a message to the WER service, which then analyzes the crashing process. This means that even in severe cases of thread state damage, WER will still be able to receive notifications and launch WerFault.exe to display a user interface instead of having to do this work within the crashing thread itself. Additionally, WER will be able to generate a crash dump for the process, and a message will be written to the Event Log. This solves all the problems of silent process death: users are notified, debugging can occur, and service administrators can see the crash event.

**System Service Dispatching**

As Figure 3-1 illustrated, the kernel’s trap handlers dispatch interrupts, exceptions, and system service calls. In the preceding sections, you saw how interrupt and exception handling work; in this section, you’ll learn about system services. A system service dispatch is triggered as a result of executing an instruction assigned to system service dispatching. The instruction that Windows uses for system service dispatching depends on the processor on which it’s executing.

**System Service Dispatching**

On x86 processors prior to the Pentium II, Windows uses the *int 0x2e* instruction (46 decimal), which results in a trap. Windows fills in entry 46 in the IDT to point to the system service dispatcher. (Refer to Table 3-3.) The trap causes the executing thread to transition into kernel mode and enter the system service dispatcher. A numeric argument passed in the EAX processor register indicates the system service number being requested. The EDX register points to the list of parameters the caller passes to the system service. To return to user mode, the system service dispatcher uses the *iret* (interrupt return instruction).
On x86 Pentium II processors and higher, Windows uses the `sysenter` instruction, which Intel defined specifically for fast system service dispatches. To support the instruction, Windows stores at boot time the address of the kernel’s system service dispatcher routine in a *machine-specific register* (MSR) associated with the instruction. The execution of the instruction causes the change to kernel mode and execution of the system service dispatcher. The system service number is passed in the EAX processor register, and the EDX register points to the list of caller arguments. To return to user mode, the system service dispatcher usually executes the `sysexit` instruction. (In some cases, like when the single-step flag is enabled on the processor, the system service dispatcher uses the `iret` instead because `sysexit` does not allow returning to user-mode with a different EFLAGS register, which is needed if `sysenter` was executed while the *trap flag* was set as a result of a user-mode debugger tracing or stepping over a system call.)

**Note** Because certain older applications might have been hardcoded to use the `int 0x2e` instruction to manually perform a system call (an unsupported operation), 32-bit Windows keeps this mechanism usable even on systems that support the `sysenter` instruction by still having the handler registered.

On the x64 architecture, Windows uses the `syscall` instruction, passing the system call number in the EAX register, the first four parameters in registers, and any parameters beyond those four on the stack.

On the IA64 architecture, Windows uses the `epc` (Enter Privileged Mode) instruction. The first eight system call arguments are passed in registers, and the rest are passed on the stack.

**EXPERIMENT: Locating the System Service Dispatcher**

As mentioned, 32-bit system calls occur through an interrupt, which means that the handler needs to be registered in the IDT or through a special `sysenter` instruction that uses an MSR to store the handler address at boot time. On certain 32-bit AMD systems, Windows uses the `syscall` instruction instead, which is similar to the 64-bit `syscall` instruction. Here’s how you can locate the appropriate routine for either method:

1. To see the handler on 32-bit systems for the interrupt 2E version of the system call dispatcher, type `!idt 2e` in the kernel debugger.

   ```
   lkd> !idt 2e
   Dumping IDT:

   2e:  8208c8ee nt!KiSystemService
   ```

2. To see the handler for the `sysenter` version, use the `rdmsr` debugger command to read from the MSR register 0x176, which stores the handler:

   ```
   lkd> rdmsr 176
   msr[176] = 00000000'8208c9c0
   ```
If you have a 64-bit machine, you can look at the 64-bit service call dispatcher by repeating this step, but using the 0xC0000082 MSR instead, which is used by the syscall version for 64-bit code. You will see it corresponds to nt!KiSystemCall64:

```
1kd> rdmsr c0000082
msr[c0000082] = fffff800'01a71ec0
1kd> ln fffff800'01a71ec0
(fffff800'01a71ec0)   nt!KiSystemCall64
```

3. You can disassemble the KiSystemService or KiSystemCall64 routine with the u command. On a 32-bit system, you’ll eventually notice the following instructions:

```
nt!KiSystemService+0x7b:
8208c969 897d04          mov     dword ptr [ebp+4],edi
8208c96c fb              sti
8208c96d e9dd000000      jmp     nt!KiFastCallEntry+0x8f (8208ca4f)
```

Because the actual system call dispatching operations are common regardless of the mechanism used to reach the handler, the older interrupt-based handler simply calls into the middle of the newer sysenter-based handler to perform the same generic tasks. The only parts of the handlers that are different are related to the generation of the trap frame and the setup of certain registers.

At boot time, 32-bit Windows detects the type of processor on which it’s executing and sets up the appropriate system call code to use by storing a pointer to the correct code in the SharedUserData structure. The system service code for NtReadFile in user mode looks like this:

```
0:000> u ntdll!NtReadFile
ntdll!ZwReadFile:
77020b074 b802010000      mov     eax,102h
77020b079 ba0003fe7f      mov     edx,offset SharedUserData!SystemCallStub (7ffe0300)
77020b07e ff12            call    dword ptr [edx]
77020b080 c22400         ret     24h
77020b083 90             nop
```

The system service number is 0x102 (258 in decimal), and the call instruction executes the system service dispatch code set up by the kernel, whose pointer is at address 0x7ffe0300. (This corresponds to the SystemCallStub member of the KUSER_SHARED_DATA structure, which starts at 0x7ffe0000.) Because the following output was taken from an Intel Core 2 Duo, it contains a pointer to sysenter:

```
0:000> dd SharedUserData!SystemCallStub l 1
7ffe0300  77020f30
0:000> u 77020f30
ntdll!KiFastSystemCall:
77020f30 8bd4            mov     edx,esp
77020f32 0f34            sysenter
```
Because 64-bit systems have only one mechanism for performing system calls, the system service entry points in Ntdll.dll use the syscall instruction directly, as shown here:

```
ntdll!NtReadFile:
00000000'77f9fc60 4c8bd1           mov    r10,rcx
00000000'77f9fc63 b810200000       mov    eax,0x102
00000000'77f9fc68 0f05               syscall
00000000'77f9fc6a c3               ret
```

Kernel-Mode System Service Dispatching

As Figure 3-15 illustrates, the kernel uses the system call number to locate the system service information in the system service dispatch table. On 32-bit systems, this table is similar to the interrupt dispatch table described earlier in the chapter except that each entry contains a pointer to a system service rather than to an interrupt-handling routine. On 64-bit systems, the table is implemented slightly differently—instead of containing pointers to the system service, it contains offsets relative to the table itself. This addressing mechanism is more suited to the x64 application binary interface (ABI) and instruction-encoding format.

**Note** System service numbers can change between service packs—Microsoft occasionally adds or removes system services, and the system service numbers are generated automatically as part of a kernel compile.

![System service exceptions](image)

The system service dispatcher, KiSystemService, copies the caller's arguments from the thread's user-mode stack to its kernel-mode stack (so that the user can't change the arguments as the kernel is accessing them) and then executes the system service. The kernel knows how many stack bytes require copying by using a second table, called the argument table, which is a byte array (instead of a pointer array like the dispatch table), each entry describing the number of bytes to copy. On 64-bit systems, Windows actually encodes this information within the service table itself through a process called system call table compaction. If the arguments passed to a system service point to buffers in
user space, these buffers must be probed for accessibility before kernel-mode code can copy data to
or from them. This probing is performed only if the previous mode of the thread is set to user mode.
The previous mode is a value (kernel or user) that the kernel saves in the thread whenever it executes
a trap handler and identifies the privilege level of the incoming exception, trap, or system call. As an
optimization, if a system call comes from a driver or the kernel itself, the probing and capturing of
parameters is skipped, and all parameters are assumed to be pointing to valid kernel-mode buffers
(also, access to kernel-mode data is allowed).

Because kernel-mode code can also make system calls, let’s look at the way these are done.
Because the code for each system call is in kernel mode and the caller is already in kernel mode, you
can see that there shouldn’t be a need for an interrupt or sysenter operation: the CPU is already at the
right privilege level, and drivers, as well as the kernel, should only be able to directly call the func-
tion required. In the executive’s case, this is actually what happens: the kernel has access to all its own
routines and can simply call them just like standard routines. Externally, however, drivers can access
these system calls only if they have been exported just like other standard kernel-mode APIs. In fact,
quite a few of the system calls are exported. Drivers, however, are not supposed to access system calls
this way. Instead, drivers must use the Zw versions of these calls—that is, instead of NtCreateFile, they
must use ZwCreateFile. These Zw versions must also be manually exported by the kernel, and only a
handful are, but they are fully documented and supported.

The Zw versions are officially available only for drivers because of the previous mode concept
discussed earlier. Because this value is updated only each time the kernel builds a trap frame, its value
won’t actually change across a simple API call—no trap frame is being generated. By calling a func-
tion such as NtCreateFile directly, the kernel preserves the previous mode value that indicates that it
is user mode, detects that the address passed is a kernel-mode address, and fails the call, correctly
asserting that user-mode applications should not pass kernel-mode pointers. However, this is not
actually what happens, so how can the kernel be aware of the correct previous mode? The answer lies
in the Zw calls.

These exported APIs are not actually simple aliases or wrappers around the Nt versions. Instead,
they are “trampolines” to the appropriate Nt system call, which use the same system call-dispatching
mechanism. Instead of generating an interrupt or a sysenter, which would be slow and/or unsupport-
ed, they build a fake interrupt stack (the stack that the CPU would generate after an interrupt) and call
the KiSystemService routine directly, essentially emulating the CPU interrupt. The handler executes the
same operations as if this call came from user mode, except it detects the actual privilege level this
call came from and set the previous mode to kernel. Now NtCreateFile sees that the call came from
the kernel and does not fail anymore. Here’s what the kernel-mode trampolines look like on both
32-bit and 64-bit systems. The system call number is highlighted in bold.

\ldd u nt!ZwReadFile
nt!ZwReadFile:
8207f118 b802010000 mov eax,102h
8207f11d 8d542404 lea edx,[esp+4]
8207f121 9c pushfd
8207f122 6a08 push 8
8207f124 e8c5d70000 call nt!KiSystemService (8208c8ee)
8207f129 c22400 ret 24h
As you'll see in Chapter 5, Windows has two system service tables, and third-party drivers cannot extend the tables or insert new ones to add their own service calls. On 32-bit and IA64 versions of Windows, the system service dispatcher locates the tables via a pointer in the thread kernel structure, and on x64 versions it finds them via their global addresses. The system service dispatcher determines which table contains the requested service by interpreting a 2-bit field in the 32-bit system service number as a table index. The low 12 bits of the system service number serve as the index into the table specified by the table index. The fields are shown in Figure 3-16.

![Figure 3-16 System service number to system service translation](image)

**Service Descriptor Tables**

A primary default array table, `KeServiceDescriptorTable`, defines the core executive system services implemented in Ntoskrnl.exe. The other table array, `KeServiceDescriptorTableShadow`, includes the Windows USER and GDI services implemented in the kernel-mode part of the Windows subsystem, Win32k.sys. On 32-bit and IA64 versions of Windows, the first time a Windows thread calls a Windows USER or GDI service, the address of the thread's system service table is changed to point to a table that includes the Windows USER and GDI services. The `KeAddSystemServiceTable` function allows Win32k.sys to add a system service table.
The system service dispatch instructions for Windows executive services exist in the system library Ntdll.dll. Subsystem DLLs call functions in Ntdll to implement their documented functions. The exception is Windows USER and GDI functions, for which the system service dispatch instructions are implemented in User32.dll and Gdi32.dll—Ntdll.dll is not involved. These two cases are shown in Figure 3-17.

As shown in Figure 3-17, the Windows WriteFile function in Kernel32.dll imports and calls the WriteFile function in API-MS-Win-Core-File-L1-1-0.dll, one of the MinWin redirection DLLs (see the next section for more information on API redirection), which in turn calls the WriteFile function in KernelBase.dll, where the actual implementation lies. After some subsystem-specific parameter checks, it then calls the NtWriteFile function in Ntdll.dll, which in turn executes the appropriate instruction to cause a system service trap, passing the system service number representing NtWriteFile. The system service dispatcher (function KiSystemService in Ntoskrnl.exe) then calls the real NtWriteFile to process the I/O request. For Windows USER and GDI functions, the system service dispatch calls functions in the loadable kernel-mode part of the Windows subsystem, Win32k.sys.

---

**FIGURE 3-17** System service dispatching
EXPERIMENT: Mapping System Call Numbers to Functions and Arguments

You can duplicate the same lookup performed by the kernel when dealing with a system call ID to figure out which function is responsible for handling it and how many arguments it takes.

1. The KeServiceDescriptorTable and KeServiceDescriptorTableShadow tables both point to the same array of pointers (or offsets, on 64-bit) for kernel system calls, called KiServiceTable, and the same array of stack bytes, called KiArgumentTable. On a 32-bit system, you can use the kernel debugger command dds to dump the data along with symbolic information. The debugger attempts to match each pointer with a symbol. Here’s a partial output:

   lkd> dds KiServiceTable
   820807d0  821be2e5 nt!NtAcceptConnectPort
   820807d4  820659a6 nt!NtAccessCheck
   820807d8  8224a953 nt!NtAccessCheckAndAuditAlarm
   820807dc  820659dd nt!NtAccessCheckByType
   820807e0  8224a992 nt!NtAccessCheckByTypeAndAuditAlarm
   820807e4  82065a18 nt!NtAccessCheckByTypeResultList
   820807e8  8224a9db nt!NtAccessCheckByTypeResultListAndAuditAlarm
   820807ec  8224aa24 nt!NtAccessCheckByTypeResultListAndAuditAlarmByHandle
   820807e0  822892af nt!NtAddAtom

2. As described earlier, 64-bit Windows organizes the system call table differently and uses relative pointers (an offset) to system calls instead of the absolute addresses used by 32-bit Windows. The base of the pointer is the KiServiceTable itself, so you’ll have to dump the data in its raw format with the dq command. Here’s an example of output from a 64-bit system:

   lkd> dq nt!KiServiceTable
   ffffffff800'01a73b00  02f6f000'04106900 031a0105'fff72d00

3. Instead of dumping the entire table, you can also look up a specific number. On 32-bit Windows, because each system call number is an index into the table and because each element is 4 bytes, you can use the following calculation: Handler = KiServiceTable + Number * 4. Let’s use the number 0x102, obtained during our description of the NtReadFile stub code in Ntdll.dll.

   lkd> ln poi(KiServiceTable + 102 * 4)
   (82193023)   nt!NtReadFile

   On 64-bit Windows, each offset can be mapped to each function with the ln command, by shifting right by 4 bits (used as described earlier) and adding the remaining value to the base of KiServiceTable itself, as shown here:

   lkd> ln @@c++(((int*)@@(nt!KiServiceTable))[3] >> 4) + nt!KiServiceTable
   (fffffff800'01d9cb10)   nt!NtReadFile | (fffffff800'01d9d24c)   nt!NtOpenFile

   Exact matches:
   nt!NtReadFile = <no type information>
4. Because drivers, including kernel-mode rootkits, are able to patch this table on 32-bit versions of Windows, which is something the operating system does not support, you can use dds to dump the entire table and look for any values outside the range of valid kernel addresses (dds will also make this clear by not being able to look up a symbol for the function). On 64-bit Windows, Kernel Patch Protection monitors the system service tables and crashes the system when it detects modifications.

**EXPERIMENT: Viewing System Service Activity**

You can monitor system service activity by watching the System Calls/Sec performance counter in the System object. Run the Performance Monitor, click on Performance Monitor under Monitoring Tools, and click the Add button to add a counter to the chart. Select the System object, select the System Calls/Sec counter, and then click the Add button to add the counter to the chart.

---

**Object Manager**

As mentioned in Chapter 2, “System Architecture,” Windows implements an object model to provide consistent and secure access to the various internal services implemented in the executive. This section describes the Windows object manager, the executive component responsible for creating, deleting, protecting, and tracking objects. The object manager centralizes resource control operations that otherwise would be scattered throughout the operating system. It was designed to meet the goals listed on the next page.

**EXPERIMENT: Exploring the Object Manager**

Throughout this section, you’ll find experiments that show you how to peer into the object manager database. These experiments use the following tools, which you should become familiar with if you aren’t already:

- **WinObj** (available from Sysinternals) displays the internal object manager’s namespace and information about objects (such as the reference count, the number of open handles, security descriptors, and so forth).

- **Process Explorer and Handle** from Sysinternals, as well as **Resource Monitor** (introduced in Chapter 1) display the open handles for a process.

- **The Openfiles /query command** displays the open file handles for a process, but it requires a global flag to be set in order to operate.

- **The kernel debugger !handle command** displays the open handles for a process.
WinObj provides a way to traverse the namespace that the object manager maintains. (As we’ll explain later, not all objects have names.) Run WinObj, and examine the layout, shown next.

As noted previously, the Windows `Openfiles /query` command requires that a Windows global flag called maintain objects list be enabled. (See the “Windows Global Flags” section later in this chapter for more details about global flags.) If you type `Openfiles /Local`, it will tell you whether the flag is enabled. You can enable it with the `Openfiles /Local ON` command. In either case, you must reboot the system for the setting to take effect. Process Explorer, Handle, and Resource Monitor do not require object tracking to be turned on because they query all system handles and create a per-process object list.

The object manager was designed to meet the following goals:

- Provide a common, uniform mechanism for using system resources
- Isolate object protection to one location in the operating system to ensure uniform and consistent object access policy
- Provide a mechanism to charge processes for their use of objects so that limits can be placed on the usage of system resources
- Establish an object-naming scheme that can readily incorporate existing objects, such as the devices, files, and directories of a file system, or other independent collections of objects
- Support the requirements of various operating system environments, such as the ability of a process to inherit resources from a parent process (needed by Windows and Subsystem for...
UNIX Applications) and the ability to create case-sensitive file names (needed by Subsystem for UNIX Applications)

- Establish uniform rules for object retention (that is, for keeping an object available until all processes have finished using it)
- Provide the ability to isolate objects for a specific session to allow for both local and global objects in the namespace

Internally, Windows has three kinds of objects: executive objects, kernel objects, and GDI/User objects. Executive objects are objects implemented by various components of the executive (such as the process manager, memory manager, I/O subsystem, and so on). Kernel objects are a more primitive set of objects implemented by the Windows kernel. These objects are not visible to user-mode code but are created and used only within the executive. Kernel objects provide fundamental capabilities, such as synchronization, on which executive objects are built. Thus, many executive objects contain (encapsulate) one or more kernel objects, as shown in Figure 3-18.

![Diagram of executive objects containing kernel objects](image)

**FIGURE 3-18** Executive objects that contain kernel objects

Note GDI/User objects, on the other hand, belong to the Windows subsystem (Win32k.sys) and do not interact with the kernel. For this reason, they are outside the scope of this book, but you can get more information on them from the Windows SDK.

Details about the structure of kernel objects and how they are used to implement synchronization are given later in this chapter. The remainder of this section focuses on how the object manager works and on the structure of executive objects, handles, and handle tables and just briefly describes how objects are involved in implementing Windows security access checking; Chapter 6 thoroughly covers that topic.
Executive Objects

Each Windows environment subsystem projects to its applications a different image of the operating system. The executive objects and object services are primitives that the environment subsystems use to construct their own versions of objects and other resources.

Executive objects are typically created either by an environment subsystem on behalf of a user application or by various components of the operating system as part of their normal operation. For example, to create a file, a Windows application calls the Windows CreateFileW function, implemented in the Windows subsystem DLL Kernelbase.dll. After some validation and initialization, CreateFileW in turn calls the native Windows service NtCreateFile to create an executive file object.

The set of objects an environment subsystem supplies to its applications might be larger or smaller than the set the executive provides. The Windows subsystem uses executive objects to export its own set of objects, many of which correspond directly to executive objects. For example, the Windows mutexes and semaphores are directly based on executive objects (which, in turn, are based on corresponding kernel objects). In addition, the Windows subsystem supplies named pipes and mailslots, resources that are based on executive file objects. Some subsystems, such as Subsystem for UNIX Applications, don’t support objects as objects at all. Subsystem for UNIX Applications uses executive objects and services as the basis for presenting UNIX-style processes, pipes, and other resources to its applications.

Table 3-8 lists the primary objects the executive provides and briefly describes what they represent. You can find further details on executive objects in the chapters that describe the related executive components (or in the case of executive objects directly exported to Windows, in the Windows API reference documentation). You can see the full list of object types by running Winobj with elevated rights and navigating to the ObjectTypes directory.

**Note** The executive implements a total of 4242 object types. Many of these objects are for use only by the executive component that defines them and are not directly accessible by Windows APIs. Examples of these objects include Driver, Device, and EventPair.

| **TABLE 3-8 Executive Objects Exposed to the Windows API** |
|-----------------|-----------------|
| **Object Type** | **Represents** |
| Process         | The virtual address space and control information necessary for the execution of a set of thread objects. |
| Thread          | An executable entity within a process. |
| Job             | A collection of processes manageable as a single entity through the job. |
| Section         | A region of shared memory (known as a file-mapping object in Windows). |
| File            | An instance of an opened file or an I/O device. |
| Token           | The security profile (security ID, user rights, and so on) of a process or a thread. |
| Event           | An object with a persistent state (signaled or not signaled) that can be used for synchronization or notification. |
**Object Type** | **Represents**
---|---
Semaphore | A counter that provides a resource gate by allowing some maximum number of threads to access the resources protected by the semaphore.
Mutex | A synchronization mechanism used to serialize access to a resource.
Timer | A mechanism to notify a thread when a fixed period of time elapses.
IoCompletion | A method for threads to enqueue and dequeue notifications of the completion of I/O operations (known as an I/O completion port in the Windows API).
Key | A mechanism to refer to data in the registry. Although keys appear in the object manager namespace, they are managed by the configuration manager, in a way similar to that in which file objects are managed by file system drivers. Zero or more key values are associated with a key object; key values contain data about the key.
Directory | A virtual directory in the object manager’s namespace responsible for containing other objects or object directories.
TpWorkerFactory | A collection of threads assigned to perform a specific set of tasks. The kernel can manage the number of work items that will be performed on the queue, how many threads should be responsible for the work, and dynamic creation and termination of worker threads, respecting certain limits the caller can set. Windows exposes the worker factory object through thread pools.
TmRm (Resource Manager), TmTx (Transaction), TmTm (Transaction Manager), TmEn (Enlistment) | Objects used by the Kernel Transaction Manager (KTM) for various transactions and/or enlistments as part of a resource manager or transaction manager. Objects can be created through the CreateTransactionManager, CreateResourceManager, CreateTransaction, and CreateEnlistment APIs.
WindowStation | An object that contains a clipboard, a set of global atoms, and a group of Desktop objects.
Desktop | An object contained within a window station. A desktop has a logical display surface and contains windows, menus, and hooks.
PowerRequest | An object associated with a thread that executes, among other things, a call to SetThreadExecutionState to request a given power change, such as blocking sleeps (due to a movie being played, for example).
EtwConsumer | Represents a connected ETW real-time consumer that has registered with the StartTrace API (and can call ProcessTrace to receive the events on the object queue).
EtwRegistration | Represents the registration object associated with a user-mode (or kernel-mode) ETW provider that registered with the EventRegister API.

**Note** Because Windows NT was originally supposed to support the OS/2 operating system, the mutex had to be compatible with the existing design of OS/2 mutual-exclusion objects, a design that required that a thread be able to abandon the object, leaving it inaccessible. Because this behavior was considered unusual for such an object, another kernel object—the *mutant*—was created. Eventually, OS/2 support was dropped, and the object became used by the Windows 32 subsystem under the name *mutex* (but it is still called *mutant* internally).
Object Structure

As shown in Figure 3-19, each object has an object header and an object body. The object manager controls the object headers, and the owning executive components control the object bodies of the object types they create. Each object header also contains an index to a special object, called the type object, that contains information common to each instance of the object. Additionally, up to five optional subheaders exist: the name information header, the quota information header, the process information header, the handle information header, and the creator information header.

![Object Structure Diagram]

FIGURE 3-19 Structure of an object

Object Headers and Bodies

The object manager uses the data stored in an object's header to manage objects without regard to their type. Table 3-9 briefly describes the object header fields, and Table 3-10 describes the fields found in the optional object subheaders.
### TABLE 3-9 Object Header Fields

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Handle count</td>
<td>Maintains a count of the number of currently opened handles to the object.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pointer count</td>
<td>Maintains a count of the number of references to the object (including one reference for each handle). Kernel-mode components can reference an object by pointer without using a handle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security descriptor</td>
<td>Determines who can use the object and what they can do with it. Note that unnamed objects, by definition, cannot have security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Object type index</td>
<td>Contains the index to a type object that contains attributes common to objects of this type. The table that stores all the type objects is <code>ObTypeIndexTable</code>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subheader mask</td>
<td>Bitmask describing which of the optional subheader structures described in Table 3-10 are present, except for the creator information subheader, which, if present, always precedes the object. The bitmask is converted to a negative offset by using the <code>ObpInfoMaskToOffset</code> table, with each subheader being associated with a 1-byte index that places it relative to the other subheaders present.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flags</td>
<td>Characteristics and object attributes for the object. See Table 3-12 for a list of all the object flags.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lock</td>
<td>Per-object lock used when modifying fields belonging to this object header or any of its subheaders.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the object header, which contains information that applies to any kind of object, the subheaders contain optional information regarding specific aspects of the object. Note that these structures are located at a variable offset from the start of the object header, the value of which depends on the number of subheaders associated with the main object header (except, as mentioned earlier, for creator information). For each subheader that is present, the `InfoMask` field is updated to reflect its existence. When the object manager checks for a given subheader, it checks if the corresponding bit is set in the `InfoMask` and then uses the remaining bits to select the correct offset into the `ObpInfoMaskToOffset` table, where it finds the offset of the subheader from the start of the object header.

These offsets exist for all possible combinations of subheader presence, but because the subheaders, if present, are always allocated in a fixed, constant order, a given header will have only as many possible locations as the maximum number of subheaders that precede it. For example, because the name information subheader is always allocated first, it has only one possible offset. On the other hand, the handle information subheader (which is allocated third) has three possible locations, because it might or might not have been allocated after the quota subheader, itself having possibly been allocated after the name information. Table 3-10 describes all the optional object subheaders and their location. In the case of creator information, a value in the object header flags determines whether the subheader is present. (See Table 3-12 for information about these flags.)

### TABLE 3-10 Optional Object Subheaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Bit</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Creator information</td>
<td>Links the object into a list for all the objects of the same type, and records the process that created the object, along with a back trace.</td>
<td>0 (0x1)</td>
<td>Object header - <code>ObpInfoMaskToOffset[0]</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name information</td>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>Bit</td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name information</td>
<td>Contains the object name, responsible for making an object visible to other processes for sharing, and a pointer to the object directory, which provides the hierarchical structure in which the object names are stored.</td>
<td>1 (0x2)</td>
<td>Object header - ObpInfoMaskToOffset[InfoMask &amp; 0x3]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Handle information | Contains a database of entries (or just a single entry) for a process that has an open handle to the object (along with a per-process handle count). | 2 (0x4) | Object header - ObpInfoMaskToOffset[InfoMask & 0x7] |

| Quota information | Lists the resource charges levied against a process when it opens a handle to the object. | 3 (0x8) | Object header - ObpInfoMaskToOffset[InfoMask & 0xF] |

| Process information | Contains a pointer to the owning process if this is an exclusive object. More information on exclusive objects follows later in the chapter. | 4 (0x10) | Object header - ObpInfoMaskToOffset[InfoMask & 0x1F] |

Each of these subheaders is optional and is present only under certain conditions, either during system boot up or at object creation time. Table 3-11 describes each of these conditions.

**TABLE 3-11** Conditions Required for Presence of Object Subheaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name information</td>
<td>The object must have been created with a name.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota information</td>
<td>The object must not have been created by the initial (or idle) system process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process information</td>
<td>The object must have been created with the exclusive object flag. (See Table 3-12 for information about object flags.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handle information</td>
<td>The object type must have enabled the maintain handle count flag. File objects, ALPC objects, WindowStation objects, and Desktop objects have this flag set in their object type structure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creator information</td>
<td>The object type must have enabled the maintain type list flag. Driver objects have this flag set if the Driver Verifier is enabled. However, enabling the maintain object type list global flag (discussed earlier) will enable this for all objects, and Type objects always have the flag set.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, a number of attributes and/or flags determine the behavior of the object during creation time or during certain operations. These flags are received by the object manager whenever any new object is being created, in a structure called the object attributes. This structure defines the object name, the root object directory where it should be inserted, the security descriptor for the object, and the object attribute flags. Table 3-12 lists the various flags that can be associated with an object.

**Note** When an object is being created through an API in the Windows subsystem (such as CreateEvent or CreateFile), the caller does not specify any object attributes—the subsystem DLL performs the work behind the scenes. For this reason, all named objects created through Win32 go in the BaseNamedObjects directory, either the global or per-session instance, because this is the root object directory that Kernelbase.dll specifies as part of the object attributes structure. More information on BaseNamedObjects and how it relates to the per-session namespace will follow later in this chapter.
### TABLE 3-12 Object Flags

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attributes Flag</th>
<th>Header Flag</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OBJ_INHERIT</td>
<td>OBJ_FLAG_INHERIT</td>
<td>Determines whether the handle to the object will be inherited by child processes, and whether a process can use DuplicateHandle to make a copy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBJ_PERMANENT</td>
<td>OBJ_FLAG_PERMANENT_OBJECT</td>
<td>Defines object retention behavior related to reference counts, described later.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBJ_EXCLUSIVE</td>
<td>OBJ_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE_OBJECT</td>
<td>Specifies that the object can be used only by the process that created it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE</td>
<td>OBJ_FLAG_CASE_INSENSITIVE</td>
<td>Specifies that lookups for this object in the namespace should be case insensitive. It can be overridden by the case insensitive flag in the object type.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBJ_OPENIF</td>
<td>OBJ_FLAG_OPENIF</td>
<td>Specifies that a create operation for this object name should result in an open, if the object exists, instead of a failure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBJ_OPENLINK</td>
<td>OBJ_FLAG_OPENLINK</td>
<td>Specifies that the object manager should open a handle to the symbolic link, not the target.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBJ_KERNEL_HANDLE</td>
<td>OBJ_FLAG_KERNEL_HANDLE</td>
<td>Specifies that the handle to this object should be a kernel handle (more on this later).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBJ_FORCE_ACCESS_CHECK</td>
<td>OBJ_FLAG_FORCE_ACCESS_CHECK</td>
<td>Specifies that even if the object is being opened from kernel mode, full access checks should be performed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBJ_KERNEL_EXCLUSIVE</td>
<td>OBJ_FLAG_KERNEL_EXCLUSIVE_ACCESS</td>
<td>Disables any user-mode process from opening a handle to the object; used to protect the /Device/PhysicalMemory section object.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OF_DEFAULT_SECURITY_QUOTA</td>
<td>OF_FLAG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_QUOTA</td>
<td>Specifies that the object’s security descriptor is using the default 2-KB quota.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OB_FLAG_SINGLE_HANDLE_ENTRY</td>
<td>OBJ_FLAG_SINGLE_HANDLE_ENTRY</td>
<td>Specifies that the handle information subheader contains only a single entry and not a database.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OB_FLAG_NEW_OBJECT</td>
<td>OB_FLAG_NEW_OBJECT</td>
<td>Specifies that the object has been created but not yet inserted into the object namespace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OB_FLAG_DELETED_INLINE</td>
<td>OB_FLAG_DELETEDINLINE</td>
<td>Specifies that the object is being deleted through the deferred deletion worker thread.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to an object header, each object has an object body whose format and contents are unique to its object type; all objects of the same type share the same object body format. By creating an object type and supplying services for it, an executive component can control the manipulation of data in all object bodies of that type. Because the object header has a static and well-known size, the object manager can easily look up the object header for an object simply by subtracting the size of the header from the pointer of the object. As explained earlier, to access the subheaders, the object manager subtracts yet another well-known value from the pointer of the object header.
Because of the standardized object header and subheader structures, the object manager is able to provide a small set of generic services that can operate on the attributes stored in any object header and can be used on objects of any type (although some generic services don’t make sense for certain objects). These generic services, some of which the Windows subsystem makes available to Windows applications, are listed in Table 3-13.

Although these generic object services are supported for all object types, each object has its own create, open, and query services. For example, the I/O system implements a create file service for its file objects, and the process manager implements a create process service for its process objects.

Although a single create object service could have been implemented, such a routine would have been quite complicated, because the set of parameters required to initialize a file object, for example, differs markedly from that required to initialize a process object. Also, the object manager would have incurred additional processing overhead each time a thread called an object service to determine the type of object the handle referred to and to call the appropriate version of the service.

**TABLE 3-13 Generic Object Services**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Close</td>
<td>Closes a handle to an object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duplicate</td>
<td>Shares an object by duplicating a handle and giving it to another process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make permanent/temporary</td>
<td>Changes the retention of an object (described later)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Query object</td>
<td>Gets information about an object’s standard attributes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Query security</td>
<td>Gets an object’s security descriptor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set security</td>
<td>Changes the protection on an object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wait for a single object</td>
<td>Synchronizes a thread’s execution with one object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal an object and wait for another</td>
<td>Signals an object (such as an event), and synchronizes a thread’s execution with another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wait for multiple objects</td>
<td>Synchronizes a thread’s execution with multiple objects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Type Objects**

Object headers contain data that is common to all objects but that can take on different values for each instance of an object. For example, each object has a unique name and can have a unique security descriptor. However, objects also contain some data that remains constant for all objects of a particular type. For example, you can select from a set of access rights specific to a type of object when you open a handle to objects of that type. The executive supplies terminate and suspend access (among others) for thread objects and read, write, append, and delete access (among others) for file objects. Another example of an object-type-specific attribute is synchronization, which is described shortly.

To conserve memory, the object manager stores these static, object-type-specific attributes once when creating a new object type. It uses an object of its own, a type object, to record this data. As Figure 3-20 illustrates, if the object-tracking debug flag (described in the “Windows Global Flags”
section later in this chapter) is set, a type object also links together all objects of the same type (in this case, the process type), allowing the object manager to find and enumerate them, if necessary. This functionality takes advantage of the creator information subheader discussed previously.

EXPERIMENT: Viewing Object Headers and Type Objects

You can look at the process object type data structure in the kernel debugger by first identifying a process object with the `lkd> !process` command:

```
1kd> !process 0 0
**** NT ACTIVE PROCESS DUMP ****
PROCESS ffffffff800279cae0
    SessionId: none  Cid: 0004    Peb: 00000000  ParentCid: 0000
    DirBase: 00187000  ObjectTable: ffffffff8a0000001920  HandleCount: 541.
    Image: System
```

Then execute the `lkd> !object` command with the process object address as the argument:

```
1kd> !object ffffffff800279cae0
Object: ffffffff800279cae0  Type: (fffffff8002755b60) Process
    ObjectHeader: ffffffff800279cab0 (new version)
    HandleCount: 3  PointerCount: 172 3172
```

Notice that on 32-bit Windows, the object header starts 0x18 (24 decimal) bytes prior to the start of the object body, and on 64-bit Windows, it starts 0x30 (48 decimal) bytes prior—the size of the object header itself. You can view the object header with this command:

```
1kd> dt nt!_OBJECT_HEADER ffffffff800279cab0
+0x000 PointerCount     : 172
+0x008 HandleCount      : 33
+0x008 NextToFree       : 0x000000000x00000000'00000003
+0x010 Lock             : _EX_PUSH_LOCK
```
Now look at the object type data structure by obtaining its address from the `ObTypeIndexTable` table for the entry associated with the `TypeIndex` field of the object header data structure:

```
lkd> ?? ((nt!OBJECT_TYPE**)@@((nt!ObTypeIndexTable))[((nt!OBJECT_HEADER*)0xfffffa800279cab0)->TypeIndex])
```

```
struct _OBJECT_TYPE * 0xfffffa80'02755b60
  +0x000 TypeList : _LIST_ENTRY [ 0xfffffa80'02755b60 - 0xfffffa80'02755b60 ]
  +0x010 Name : _UNICODE_STRING "Process"
  +0x020 DefaultObject : (null)
  +0x028 Index : 0x70x7 '
  +0x02c TotalNumberOfObjects : 0x380x38
  +0x030 TotalNumberOfHandles : 0x1320x132
  +0x034 HighWaterNumberOfObjects : 0x3d
  +0x038 HighWaterNumberOfHandles : 0x13c
  +0x040 TypeInfo : _OBJECT_TYPE_INITIALIZER
  +0x0b0 TypeLock : _EX_PUSH_LOCK
  +0x0b8 Key : 0x636f7250
  +0x0c0 CallbackList : _LIST_ENTRY [ 0xfffffa80'02755c20 - 0xfffffa80'02755c20 ]
```

The output shows that the object type structure includes the name of the object type, tracks the total number of active objects of that type, and tracks the peak number of handles and objects of that type. The `CallbackList` also keeps track of any object manager filtering callbacks that are associated with this object type. The `TypeInfo` field stores the pointer to the data structure that stores attributes common to all objects of the object type as well as pointers to the object type’s methods:

```
lkd> ?? ((nt!OBJECT_TYPE*)0xfffffa8002755b60)->TypeInfo)
```

```
+0x000 Length : 0x70
+0x002 ObjectFlags : 0x4a 'J'
+0x002 CaseInsensitive : 0y0
+0x002 UnnamedObjectsOnly : 0y1
+0x002 UseDefaultObject : 0y0
+0x002 SecurityRequired : 0y1
+0x002 MaintainHandleCount : 0y0
+0x002 MaintainTypeList : 0y0
+0x002 SupportsObjectCallbacks : 0y1
+0x004 ObjectTypeCode : 0
+0x008 InvalidAttributes : 0xb0
+0x00c GenericMapping : _GENERIC_MAPPING
+0x01c AccessMask : 0x1ffffff
+0x020 RetainAccess : 0x101000
+0x024 PoolType : 0 ( NonPagedPool )
+0x028 DefaultPagedPoolCharge : 0x1000
```
Type objects can’t be manipulated from user mode because the object manager supplies no services for them. However, some of the attributes they define are visible through certain native services and through Windows API routines. The information stored in the type initializers is described in Table 3-14.

**TABLE 3-14** Type Initializer Fields

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type name</td>
<td>The name for objects of this type (“process,” “event,” “port,” and so on).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pool type</td>
<td>Indicates whether objects of this type should be allocated from paged or nonpaged memory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Default quota charges</td>
<td>Default paged and nonpaged pool values to charge to process quotas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid access mask</td>
<td>The types of access a thread can request when opening a handle to an object of this type (“read,” “write,” “terminate,” “suspend,” and so on).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generic access rights mapping</td>
<td>A mapping between the four generic access rights (read, write, execute, and all) to the type-specific access rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flags</td>
<td>Indicate whether objects must never have names (such as process objects), whether their names are case-sensitive, whether they require a security descriptor, whether they support object-filtering callbacks, and whether a handle database (handle information subheader) and/or a type-list linkage (creator information subheader) should be maintained. The <em>use default object</em> flag also defines the behavior for the <em>default object</em> field shown later in this table.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Object type code</td>
<td>Used to describe the type of object this is (versus comparing with a well-known name value). File objects set this to 1, synchronization objects set this to 2, and thread objects set this to 4. This field is also used by ALPC to store handle attribute information associated with a message.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid attributes</td>
<td>Specifies object attribute flags (shown earlier in Table 3-12) that are invalid for this object type.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Default object</td>
<td>Specifies the internal object manager event that should be used during waits for this object, if the object type creator requested one. Note that certain objects, such as File objects and ALPC port objects already contain their own embedded dispatcher object; in this case, this field is an offset into the object body. For example, the event inside the <em>FILE_OBJECT</em> structure is embedded in a field called <em>Event</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methods</td>
<td>One or more routines that the object manager calls automatically at certain points in an object’s lifetime.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Synchronization, one of the attributes visible to Windows applications, refers to a thread’s ability to synchronize its execution by waiting for an object to change from one state to another. A thread can synchronize with executive job, process, thread, file, event, semaphore, mutex, and timer objects. Other executive objects don’t support synchronization. An object’s ability to support synchronization is based on three possibilities:

- The executive object is a wrapper for a dispatcher object and contains a dispatcher header, a kernel structure that is covered in the section “Low-IRQL Synchronization” later in this chapter.
- The creator of the object type requested a default object, and the object manager provided one.
- The executive object has an embedded dispatcher object, such as an event somewhere inside the object body, and the object’s owner supplied its offset to the object manager when registering the object type (described in Table 3-14).

Object Methods
The last attribute in Table 3-14, methods, comprises a set of internal routines that are similar to C++ constructors and destructors—that is, routines that are automatically called when an object is created or destroyed. The object manager extends this idea by calling an object method in other situations as well, such as when someone opens or closes a handle to an object or when someone attempts to change the protection on an object. Some object types specify methods whereas others don’t, depending on how the object type is to be used.

When an executive component creates a new object type, it can register one or more methods with the object manager. Thereafter, the object manager calls the methods at well-defined points in the lifetime of objects of that type, usually when an object is created, deleted, or modified in some way. The methods that the object manager supports are listed in Table 3-15.

The reason for these object methods is to address the fact that, as you’ve seen, certain object operations are generic (close, duplicate, security, and so on). Fully generalizing these generic routines would have required the designers of the object manager to anticipate all object types. However, the routines to create an object type are exported by the kernel, enabling external kernel components to create their own object types. Although this functionality is not documented for driver developers, it is internally used by Win32k.sys to define WindowStation and Desktop objects. Through object-method extensibility, Win32k.sys defines its routines for handling operations such as create and query.

One exception to this rule is the security routine, which does, unless otherwise instructed, default to SeDefaultObjectMethod. This routine does not need to know the internal structure of the object because it deals only with the security descriptor for the object, and you’ve seen that the pointer to the security descriptor is stored in the generic object header, not inside the object body. However, if an object does require its own additional security checks, it can define a custom security routine. The other reason for having a generic security method is to avoid complexity, because most objects rely on the security reference monitor to manage their security.
### TABLE 3-15 Object Methods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>When Method Is Called</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Open</td>
<td>When an object handle is opened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close</td>
<td>When an object handle is closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delete</td>
<td>Before the object manager deletes an object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Query name</td>
<td>When a thread requests the name of an object, such as a file, that exists in a secondary object namespace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parse</td>
<td>When the object manager is searching for an object name that exists in a secondary object namespace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dump</td>
<td>Not used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okay to close</td>
<td>When the object manager is instructed to close a handle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>When a process reads or changes the protection of an object, such as a file, that exists in a secondary object namespace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The object manager calls the open method whenever it creates a handle to an object, which it does when an object is created or opened. The WindowStation and Desktop objects provide an open method; for example, the WindowStation object type requires an open method so that Win32k.sys can share a piece of memory with the process that serves as a desktop-related memory pool.

An example of the use of a close method occurs in the I/O system. The I/O manager registers a close method for the file object type, and the object manager calls the close method each time it closes a file object handle. This close method checks whether the process that is closing the file handle owns any outstanding locks on the file and, if so, removes them. Checking for file locks isn’t something the object manager itself can or should do.

The object manager calls a delete method, if one is registered, before it deletes a temporary object from memory. The memory manager, for example, registers a delete method for the section object type that frees the physical pages being used by the section. It also verifies that any internal data structures the memory manager has allocated for a section are deleted before the section object is deleted. Once again, the object manager can’t do this work because it knows nothing about the internal workings of the memory manager. Delete methods for other types of objects perform similar functions.

The parse method (and similarly, the query name method) allows the object manager to relinquish control of finding an object to a secondary object manager if it finds an object that exists outside the object manager namespace. When the object manager looks up an object name, it suspends its search when it encounters an object in the path that has an associated parse method. The object manager calls the parse method, passing to it the remainder of the object name it is looking for. There are two namespaces in Windows in addition to the object manager’s: the registry namespace, which the configuration manager implements, and the file system namespace, which the I/O manager implements with the aid of file system drivers. (See Chapter 4, “Management Mechanisms,” for more information on the configuration manager and Chapter 8 in Part 2 for more details about the I/O manager and file system drivers.)
For example, when a process opens a handle to the object named \Device\HarddiskVolume1\docs \resume.doc, the object manager traverses its name tree until it reaches the device object named HarddiskVolume1. It sees that a parse method is associated with this object, and it calls the method, passing to it the rest of the object name it was searching for—in this case, the string docs\resume.doc. The parse method for device objects is an I/O routine because the I/O manager defines the device object type and registers a parse method for it. The I/O manager’s parse routine takes the name string and passes it to the appropriate file system, which finds the file on the disk and opens it.

The security method, which the I/O system also uses, is similar to the parse method. It is called whenever a thread tries to query or change the security information protecting a file. This information is different for files than for other objects because security information is stored in the file itself rather than in memory. The I/O system, therefore, must be called to find the security information and read or change it.

Finally, the okay-to-close method is used as an additional layer of protection around the malicious—or incorrect—closing of handles being used for system purposes. For example, each process has a handle to the Desktop object or objects on which its thread or threads have windows visible. Under the standard security model, it is possible for those threads to close their handles to their desktops because the process has full control of its own objects. In this scenario, the threads end up without a desktop associated with them—a violation of the windowing model. Win32k.sys registers an okay-to-close routine for the Desktop and WindowStation objects to prevent this behavior.

**Object Handles and the Process Handle Table**

When a process creates or opens an object by name, it receives a *handle* that represents its access to the object. Referring to an object by its handle is faster than using its name because the object manager can skip the name lookup and find the object directly. Processes can also acquire handles to objects by inheriting handles at process creation time (if the creator specifies the inherit handle flag on the CreateProcess call and the handle was marked as inheritable, either at the time it was created or afterward by using the Windows SetHandleInformation function) or by receiving a duplicated handle from another process. (See the Windows DuplicateHandle function.)

All user-mode processes must own a handle to an object before their threads can use the object. Using handles to manipulate system resources isn’t a new idea. C and Pascal (an older programming language similar to Delphi) run-time libraries, for example, return handles to opened files. Handles serve as indirect pointers to system resources; this indirection keeps application programs from fiddling directly with system data structures.

Object handles provide additional benefits. First, except for what they refer to, there is no difference between a file handle, an event handle, and a process handle. This similarity provides a consistent interface to reference objects, regardless of their type. Second, the object manager has the exclusive right to create handles and to locate an object that a handle refers to. This means that the object manager can scrutinize every user-mode action that affects an object to see whether the security profile of the caller allows the operation requested on the object in question.
Note Executive components and device drivers can access objects directly because they are running in kernel mode and therefore have access to the object structures in system memory. However, they must declare their usage of the object by incrementing the reference count so that the object won’t be de-allocated while it’s still being used. (See the section “Object Retention” later in this chapter for more details.) To successfully make use of this object, however, device drivers need to know the internal structure definition of the object, and this is not provided for most objects. Instead, device drivers are encouraged to use the appropriate kernel APIs to modify or read information from the object. For example, although device drivers can get a pointer to the Process object (EPROCESS), the structure is opaque, and $Ps^*$ APIs must be used. For other objects, the type itself is opaque (such as most executive objects that wrap a dispatcher object—for example, events or mutexes). For these objects, drivers must use the same system calls that user-mode applications end up calling (such as $ZwCreateEvent$) and use handles instead of object pointers.

EXPERIMENT: Viewing Open Handles

Run Process Explorer, and make sure the lower pane is enabled and configured to show open handles. (Click on View, Lower Pane View, and then Handles). Then open a command prompt and view the handle table for the new Cmd.exe process. You should see an open file handle to the current directory. For example, assuming the current directory is C:\Users\Administrator, Process Explorer shows the following:

Now pause Process Explorer by pressing the space bar or clicking on View, Update Speed and choosing Pause. Then change the current directory with the $cd$ command and press F5 to refresh the display. You will see in Process Explorer that the handle to the previous current directory is closed and a new handle is opened to the new current directory. The previous handle is highlighted in red and the new handle is highlighted in green.
Process Explorer’s differences-highlighting feature makes it easy to see changes in the handle table. For example, if a process is leaking handles, viewing the handle table with Process Explorer can quickly show what handle or handles are being opened but not closed. (Typically, you see a long list of handles to the same object.) This information can help the programmer find the handle leak.

Resource Monitor also shows open handles to named handles for the processes you select by checking the boxes next to their names. Here are the command prompt’s open handles:

You can also display the open handle table by using the command-line Handle tool from Sysinternals. For example, note the following partial output of Handle when examining the file object handles located in the handle table for a Cmd.exe process before and after changing the directory. By default, Handle filters out nonfile handles unless the –a switch is used, which displays all the handles in the process, similar to Process Explorer.

C:\>handle -p cmd.exe

Handle v3.46
Copyright (C) 1997-2011 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

------------------------------------------------------------------

cmd.exe pid: 5124 Alex-Laptop\Alex Ionescu
  3C: File (R-D) C:\Windows\System32\en-US\KernelBase.dll.mui
  44: File (RW-) C:\

C:\>cd windows

C:\Windows>handle -p cmd.exe

Handle v3.46
Copyright (C) 1997-2011 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

------------------------------------------------------------------

cmd.exe pid: 5124 Alex-Laptop\Alex Ionescu
  3C: File (R-D) C:\Windows\System32\en-US\KernelBase.dll.mui
  40: File (RW-) C:\Windows
An object handle is an index into a process-specific handle table, pointed to by the executive process (EPROCESS) block (described in Chapter 5). The first handle index is 4, the second 8, and so on. A process’ handle table contains pointers to all the objects that the process has opened a handle to. Handle tables are implemented as a three-level scheme, similar to the way that the x86 memory management unit implements virtual-to-physical address translation, giving a maximum of more than 16,000,000 handles per process. (See Chapter 10 in Part 2 for details about memory management in x86 systems.)

**Note** With a three-table scheme, the top-level table can contain a page full of pointers to mid-level tables, allowing for well over half a billion handles. However, to maintain compatibility with Windows 2000’s handle scheme and inherent limitation of 16,777,216 handles, the top-level table only contains up to a maximum of 32 pointers to the mid-level tables, capping newer versions of Windows at the same limit.

Only the lowest-level handle table is allocated on process creation—the other levels are created as needed. The subhandle table consists of as many entries as will fit in a page minus one entry that is used for handle auditing. For example, for x86 systems a page is 4096 bytes, divided by the size of a handle table entry (8 bytes), which is 512, minus 1, which is a total of 511 entries in the lowest-level handle table. The mid-level handle table contains a full page of pointers to subhandle tables, so the number of subhandle tables depends on the size of the page and the size of a pointer for the platform. Figure 3-21 describes the handle table layout on Windows.

**FIGURE 3-21** Windows process handle table architecture
EXPERIMENT: Creating the Maximum Number of Handles

The test program Testlimit from Sysinternals has an option to open handles to an object until it cannot open any more handles. You can use this to see how many handles can be created in a single process on your system. Because handle tables are allocated from paged pool, you might run out of paged pool before you hit the maximum number of handles that can be created in a single process. To see how many handles you can create on your system, follow these steps:


2. Run Process Explorer, click View and then System Information, and then click on the Memory tab. Notice the current and maximum size of paged pool. (To display the maximum pool size values, Process Explorer must be configured properly to access the symbols for the kernel image, Ntoskrnl.exe.) Leave this system information display running so that you can see pool utilization when you run the Testlimit program.

3. Open a command prompt.

4. Run the Testlimit program with the \(-h\) switch (do this by typing `testlimit –h`). When Testlimit fails to open a new handle, it displays the total number of handles it was able to create. If the number is less than approximately 16 million, you are probably running out of paged pool before hitting the theoretical per-process handle limit.

5. Close the Command Prompt window; doing this kills the Testlimit process, thus closing all the open handles.

As shown in Figure 3-22, on x86 systems, each handle entry consists of a structure with two 32-bit members: a pointer to the object (with flags), and the granted access mask. On 64-bit systems, a handle table entry is 12 bytes long: a 64-bit pointer to the object header and a 32-bit access mask. (Access masks are described in Chapter 6, “Security.”)

![FIGURE 3-22 Structure of a handle table entry](image)
The first flag is a lock bit, indicating whether the entry is currently in use. The second flag is the inheritance designation—that is, it indicates whether processes created by this process will get a copy of this handle in their handle tables. As already noted, handle inheritance can be specified on handle creation or later with the `SetHandleInformation` function. The third flag indicates whether closing the object should generate an audit message. (This flag isn’t exposed to Windows—the object manager uses it internally.) Finally, the protect-from-close bit, stored in an unused portion of the access mask, indicates whether the caller is allowed to close this handle. (This flag can be set with the `NtSetInformationObject` system call.)

System components and device drivers often need to open handles to objects that user-mode applications shouldn’t have access to. This is done by creating handles in the kernel handle table (referenced internally with the name `ObpKernelHandleTable`). The handles in this table are accessible only from kernel mode and in any process context. This means that a kernel-mode function can reference the handle in any process context with no performance impact. The object manager recognizes references to handles from the kernel handle table when the high bit of the handle is set—that is, when references to kernel-handle-table handles have values greater than 0x80000000. The kernel handle table also serves as the handle table for the System process, and all handles created by the System process (such as code running in system threads) are automatically marked as kernel handles because they live in the kernel handle table by definition.

EXPERIMENT: Viewing the Handle Table with the Kernel Debugger

The `!handle` command in the kernel debugger takes three arguments:

```
!handle <handle index> <flags> <processid>
```

The handle index identifies the handle entry in the handle table. (Zero means “display all handles.”) The first handle is index 4, the second 8, and so on. For example, typing `!handle 4` will show the first handle for the current process.

The flags you can specify are a bitmask, where bit 0 means “display only the information in the handle entry,” bit 1 means “display free handles (not just used handles),” and bit 2 means “display information about the object that the handle refers to.” The following command displays full details about the handle table for process ID 0x62C:

```
lkd> !handle 0 7 62c
```

```
processor number 0, process 000000000000062c
Searching for Process with Cid == 62c
PROCESS ffffffa80052a7060
  SessionId: 1  Cid: 062c  Peb: 7fffffffdb000  ParentCid: 0558
  DirBase: 7e401000  ObjectTable: fffff8a00381fc80  HandleCount: 111.
  Image: windbg.exe

Handle table at fffff8a0038fa000 with 113 Entries in use
0000: free handle, Entry address fffff8a0038fa000, Next Entry 0000000000000000
0004: Object: fffff8a005022b70  GrantedAccess: 00000003 Entry: fffff8a00381fc80
Object: fffff8a005022b70  Type: (fffffa8002778f30) Directory
  ObjectHeader: fffff8a005022b40 (new version)
HandleCount: 25  PointerCount: 63
```
EXPERIMENT: Searching for Open Files with the Kernel Debugger

Although you can use Process Explorer, Handle, and the OpenFiles.exe utility to search for open file handles, these tools are not available when looking at a crash dump or analyzing a system remotely. You can instead use the `!devhandles` command to search for handles opened to files on a specific volume. (See Chapter 8 in Part 2 for more information on devices, files, and volumes.)

1. First you need to pick the drive letter you are interested in and obtain the pointer to its `Device object`. You can use the `!object` command as shown here:

   ```
   1: kd> !object \Global??\C:
   Object: fffff8a00016ea40  Type: (fffffa8000c38bb0) SymbolicLink
   ObjectHeader: fffff8a00016ea10 (new version)
   HandleCount: 0  PointerCount: 1
   Directory Object: fffff8a000008060  Name: C: 
   Target String is '\Device\HarddiskVolume1'
   Drive Letter Index is 3 (C:)
   ```

2. Next use the `!object` command to get the `Device` object of the target volume name:

   ```
   1: kd> !object \Device\HarddiskVolume1
   Object: fffffa8001bd3cd0  Type: (fffffa8000ca0750) Device
   ```

3. Now you can use the pointer of the `Device` object with the `!devhandles` command. Each object shown points to a file:

   ```
   !devhandles fffffa8001bd3cd0
   Checking handle table for process 0xfffffa8000c819e0
   Kernel handle table at fffff8a000001830 with 434 entries in use
   ```

   ```
   PROCESS fffffa8000c819e0
   SessionId: none  Cid: 0004    Peb: 00000000  ParentCid: 0000
   DirBase: 00187000  ObjectTable: fffff8a000001830  HandleCount: 434.
   Image: System
   ```

   ```
   0048: Object: fffffa8001d4f2a0  GrantedAccess: 0013008b Entry: fffff8a000003120
   Object: fffffa8001d4f2a0  Type: (fffffa8000ca0360) File
   ObjectHeader: fffffa8001d4f270 (new version)
   HandleCount: 1  PointerCount: 19
   Directory Object: 00000000  Name: \Windows\System32\LogFiles\WMI\RtBackup\EtwRTEventLog-Application.etl {HarddiskVolume1}
   ```
Reserve Objects

Because objects represent anything from events to files to interprocess messages, the ability for applications and kernel code to create objects is essential to the normal and desired runtime behavior of any piece of Windows code. If an object allocation fails, this usually causes anywhere from loss of functionality (the process cannot open a file) to data loss or crashes (the process cannot allocate a synchronization object). Worse, in certain situations, the reporting of errors that led to object creation failure might themselves require new objects to be allocated. Windows implements two special reserve objects to deal with such situations: the User APC reserve object and the I/O Completion packet reserve object. Note that the reserve-object mechanism itself is fully extensible, and future versions of Windows might add other reserve object types—from a broad view, the reserve object is a mechanism enabling any kernel-mode data structure to be wrapped as an object (with an associated handle, name, and security) for later use.

As was discussed in the APC section earlier in this chapter, APCs are used for operations such as suspension, termination, and I/O completion, as well as communication between user-mode applications that want to provide asynchronous callbacks. When a user-mode application requests a User APC to be targeted to another thread, it uses the QueueUserApc API in Kernelbase.dll, which calls the NtQueueUserApcThread system call. In the kernel, this system call attempts to allocate a piece of paged pool in which to store the KAPC control object structure associated with an APC. In low-memory situations, this operation fails, preventing the delivery of the APC, which, depending on what the APC was used for, could cause loss of data or functionality.

To prevent this, the user-mode application, can, on startup, use the NtAllocateReserveObject system call to request the kernel to pre-allocate the KAPC structure. Then the application uses a different system call, NtQueueUserApcThreadEx, that contains an extra parameter that is used to store the handle to the reserve object. Instead of allocating a new structure, the kernel attempts to acquire the reserve object (by setting its InUse bit to true) and use it until the KAPC object is not needed anymore, at which point the reserve object is released back to the system. Currently, to prevent mismanagement of system resources by third-party developers, the reserve object API is available only internally through system calls for operating system components. For example, the RPC library uses reserved APC objects to guarantee asynchronous callbacks will still be able to return in low-memory situations.

A similar scenario can occur when applications need failure-free delivery of an I/O completion port message, or packet. Typically, packets are sent with the PostQueuedCompletionStatus API in Kernelbase.dll, which calls the NtSetIoCompletion API. Similarly to the user APC, the kernel must allocate an I/O manager structure to contain the completion-packet information, and if this allocation fails, the packet cannot be created. With reserve objects, the application can use the NtAllocateReserveObject API on startup to have the kernel pre-allocate the I/O completion packet, and the NtSetIoCompletionEx system call can be used to supply a handle to this reserve object, guaranteeing a success path. Just like User APC reserve objects, this functionality is reserved for
system components and is used both by the RPC library and the Windows Peer-To-Peer BranchCache service (see Chapter 7, “Networking,” for more information on networking) to guarantee completion of asynchronous I/O operations.

**Object Security**

When you open a file, you must specify whether you intend to read or to write. If you try to write to a file that is opened for read access, you get an error. Likewise, in the executive, when a process creates an object or opens a handle to an existing object, the process must specify a set of *desired access rights*—that is, what it wants to do with the object. It can request either a set of standard access rights (such as read, write, and execute) that apply to all object types or specific access rights that vary depending on the object type. For example, the process can request delete access or append access to a file object. Similarly, it might require the ability to suspend or terminate a thread object.

When a process opens a handle to an object, the object manager calls the *security reference monitor*, the kernel-mode portion of the security system, sending it the process’ set of desired access rights. The security reference monitor checks whether the object’s security descriptor permits the type of access the process is requesting. If it does, the reference monitor returns a set of *granted access rights* that the process is allowed, and the object manager stores them in the object handle it creates. How the security system determines who gets access to which objects is explored in Chapter 6.

Thereafter, whenever the process’ threads use the handle through a service call, the object manager can quickly check whether the set of granted access rights stored in the handle corresponds to the usage implied by the object service the threads have called. For example, if the caller asked for read access to a section object but then calls a service to write to it, the service fails.

---

**EXPERIMENT: Looking at Object Security**

You can look at the various permissions on an object by using either Process Explorer, WinObj, or AccessCheck, which are all tools from Sysinternals. Let’s look at different ways you can display the access control list (ACL) for an object:

- You can use WinObj to navigate to any object on the system, including object directories, right-click on the object, and select Properties. For example, select the BaseNamedObjects directory, select Properties, and click on the Security tab. You should see a dialog box similar to the one shown next.

  By examining the settings in the dialog box, you can see that the Everyone group doesn’t have *delete* access to the directory, for example, but the SYSTEM account does (because this is where session 0 services with SYSTEM privileges will store their objects).
Instead of using WinObj, you can view the handle table of a process using Process Explorer, as shown in the experiment “Viewing Open Handles” earlier in the chapter. Look at the handle table for the Explorer.exe process. You should notice a Directory object handle to the \Sessions\n\BaseNamedObjects directory. (We’ll describe the per-session namespace shortly.) You can double-click on the object handle and then click on the Security tab and see a similar dialog box (with more users and rights granted). Process Explorer cannot decode the specific object directory access rights, so all you’ll see are generic rights.

Finally, you can use AccessCheck to query the security information of any object by using the –o switch as shown in the following output. Note that using AccessCheck will also show you the integrity level of the object. (See Chapter 6 for more information on integrity levels and the security reference monitor.)

```
C:\Windows>accesschk -o \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects

Accesschk v5.02 - Reports effective permissions for securable objects
Copyright (C) 2006-2011 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

\sessions\2\BaseNamedObjects
Type: Directory
RW NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
RW NTDEV\markruss
RW NTDEV\S-1-5-5-0-5491067-markruss
RW BUILTIN\Administrators
R Everyone
NT AUTHORITY\RESTRICTED
```
Windows also supports Ex (Extended) versions of the APIs—\textit{CreateEventEx}, \textit{CreateMutexEx}, \textit{CreateSemaphoreEx}—that add another argument for specifying the access mask. This makes it possible for applications to properly use discretionary access control lists (DACLs) to secure their objects without breaking their ability to use the create object APIs to open a handle to them. You might be wondering why a client application would not simply use \textit{OpenEvent}, which does support a desired access argument. Using the open object APIs leads to an inherent race condition when dealing with a failure in the open call—that is, when the client application has attempted to open the event before it has been created. In most applications of this kind, the open API is followed by a create API in the failure case. Unfortunately, there is no guaranteed way to make this create operation \textit{atomic}—in other words, to occur only once. Indeed, it would be possible for multiple threads and/or processes to have executed the create API concurrently and all attempt to create the event at the same time. This race condition and the extra complexity required to try and handle it makes using the open object APIs an inappropriate solution to the problem, which is why the Ex APIs should be used instead.

\section*{Object Retention}

There are two types of objects: temporary and permanent. Most objects are temporary—that is, they remain while they are in use and are freed when they are no longer needed. Permanent objects remain until they are explicitly freed. Because most objects are temporary, the rest of this section describes how the object manager implements \textit{object retention}—that is, retaining temporary objects only as long as they are in use and then deleting them. Because all user-mode processes that access an object must first open a handle to it, the object manager can easily track how many of these processes, and even which ones, are using an object. Tracking these handles represents one part of implementing retention. The object manager implements object retention in two phases. The first phase is called \textit{name retention}, and it is controlled by the number of open handles to an object that exist. Every time a process opens a handle to an object, the object manager increments the open handle counter in the object’s header. As processes finish using the object and close their handles to it, the object manager decrements the open handle counter. When the counter drops to 0, the object manager deletes the object’s name from its global namespace. This deletion prevents processes from opening a handle to the object.

The second phase of object retention is to stop retaining the objects themselves (that is, to delete them) when they are no longer in use. Because operating system code usually accesses objects by using pointers instead of handles, the object manager must also record how many object pointers it has dispensed to operating system processes. It increments a \textit{reference count} for an object each time it gives out a pointer to the object; when kernel-mode components finish using the pointer, they call the object manager to decrement the object’s reference count. The system also increments the reference count when it increments the handle count, and likewise decrements the reference count when the handle count decrements, because a handle is also a reference to the object that must be tracked.

Figure 3-23 illustrates two event objects that are in use. Process A has the first event open. Process B has both events open. In addition, the first event is being referenced by some kernel-mode structure; thus, the reference count is 3. So even if Processes A and B closed their handles to the first event object, it would continue to exist because its reference count is 1. However, when Process B closes its handle to the second event object, the object would be deallocated.
So even after an object’s open handle counter reaches 0, the object’s reference count might remain positive, indicating that the operating system is still using the object. Ultimately, when the reference count drops to 0, the object manager deletes the object from memory. This deletion has to respect certain rules and also requires cooperation from the caller in certain cases. For example, because objects can be present both in paged or nonpaged pool memory (depending on the settings located in their object type), if a dereference occurs at an IRQL level of dispatch or higher and this dereference causes the pointer count to drop to 0, the system would crash if it attempted to immediately free the memory of a paged-pool object. (Recall that such access is illegal because the page fault will never be serviced.) In this scenario, the object manager performs a deferred delete operation, queuing the operation on a worker thread running at passive level (IRQL 0). We’ll describe more about system worker threads later in this chapter.

Another scenario that requires deferred deletion is when dealing with Kernel Transaction Manager (KTM) objects. In some scenarios, certain drivers might hold a lock related to this object, and attempting to delete the object will result in the system attempting to acquire this lock. However, the driver might never get the chance to release its lock, causing a deadlock. When dealing with KTM objects, driver developers must use ObDereferenceObjectDeferDelete to force deferred deletion regardless of IRQL level. Finally, the I/O manager also uses this mechanism as an optimization so that certain I/Os can complete more quickly, instead of waiting for the object manager to delete the object.

**FIGURE 3-23** Handles and reference counts
Because of the way object retention works, an application can ensure that an object and its name remain in memory simply by keeping a handle open to the object. Programmers who write applications that contain two or more cooperating processes need not be concerned that one process might delete an object before the other process has finished using it. In addition, closing an application’s object handles won’t cause an object to be deleted if the operating system is still using it. For example, one process might create a second process to execute a program in the background; it then immediately closes its handle to the process. Because the operating system needs the second process to run the program, it maintains a reference to its process object. Only when the background program finishes executing does the object manager decrement the second process’ reference count and then delete it.

Because object leaks can be dangerous to the system by leaking kernel pool memory and eventually causing systemwide memory starvation—and can also break applications in subtle ways—Windows includes a number of debugging mechanisms that can be enabled to monitor, analyze, and debug issues with handles and objects. Additionally, Debugging Tools for Windows come with two extensions that tap into these mechanisms and provide easy graphical analysis. Table 3-16 describes them.

**TABLE 3-16** Debugging Mechanisms for Object Handles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Enabled By</th>
<th>Kernel Debugger Extension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Handle Tracing Database</td>
<td>Kernel Stack Trace systemwide and/or per-process with the User Stack Trace option checked with Gflags.exe.</td>
<td>!htrace &lt;handle value&gt; &lt;process ID&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Object Reference Tracing</td>
<td>Per-process-name(s), or per-object-type-pool-tag(s), with Gflags.exe, under Object Reference Tracing.</td>
<td>!obtrace &lt;object pointer&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Object Reference Tagging</td>
<td>Drivers must call appropriate API.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Enabling the handle-tracing database is useful when attempting to understand the use of each handle within an application or the system context. The !htrace debugger extension can display the stack trace captured at the time a specified handle was opened. After you discover a handle leak, the stack trace can pinpoint the code that is creating the handle, and it can be analyzed for a missing call to a function such as CloseHandle.

The object-reference-tracing !obtrace extension monitors even more by showing the stack trace for each new handle created as well as each time a handle is referenced by the kernel (and also each time it is opened, duplicated, or inherited) and dereferenced. By analyzing these patterns, misuse of an object at the system level can be more easily debugged. Additionally, these reference traces provide a way to understand the behavior of the system when dealing with certain objects. Tracing processes, for example, display references from all the drivers on the system that have registered call-back notifications (such as Process Monitor) and help detect rogue or buggy third-party drivers that might be referencing handles in kernel mode but never dereferencing them.
When enabling object-reference tracing for a specific object type, you can obtain the name of its pool tag by looking at the key member of the OBJECT_TYPE structure when using the `dt` command. Each object type on the system has a global variable that references this structure—for example, `PsProcessType`. Alternatively, you can use the `!object` command, which displays the pointer to this structure.

Unlike the previous two mechanisms, object-reference tagging is not a debugging feature that must be enabled with global flags or the debugger, but rather a set of APIs that should be used by device-driver developers to reference and dereference objects, including `ObReferenceObjectWithTag` and `ObDereferenceObjectWithTag`. Similar to pool tagging (see Chapter 10 in Part 2 for more information on pool tagging), these APIs allow developers to supply a four-character tag identifying each reference/dereference pair. When using the `!obtrace` extension just described, the tag for each reference or dereference operation is also shown, which avoids solely using the call stack as a mechanism to identify where leaks or under-references might occur, especially if a given call is performed thousands of times by the driver.

**Resource Accounting**

Resource accounting, like object retention, is closely related to the use of object handles. A positive open handle count indicates that some process is using that resource. It also indicates that some process is being charged for the memory the object occupies. When an object’s handle count and reference count drop to 0, the process that was using the object should no longer be charged for it.

Many operating systems use a quota system to limit processes’ access to system resources. However, the types of quotas imposed on processes are sometimes diverse and complicated, and the code to track the quotas is spread throughout the operating system. For example, in some operating systems, an I/O component might record and limit the number of files a process can open, whereas a memory component might impose a limit on the amount of memory a process’ threads can allocate. A process component might limit users to some maximum number of new processes they can create or a maximum number of threads within a process. Each of these limits is tracked and enforced in different parts of the operating system.

In contrast, the Windows object manager provides a central facility for resource accounting. Each object header contains an attribute called `quota charges` that records how much the object manager subtracts from a process’ allotted paged and/or nonpaged pool quota when a thread in the process opens a handle to the object.

Each process on Windows points to a quota structure that records the limits and current values for nonpaged-pool, paged-pool, and page-file usage. These quotas default to 0 (no limit) but can be specified by modifying registry values. (You need to add/edit `NonPagedPoolQuota`, `PagedPoolQuota`, and `PagingFileQuota` under `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management`.) Note that all the processes in an interactive session share the same quota block (and there’s no documented way to create processes with their own quota blocks).
Object Names

An important consideration in creating a multitude of objects is the need to devise a successful system for keeping track of them. The object manager requires the following information to help you do so:

- A way to distinguish one object from another
- A method for finding and retrieving a particular object

The first requirement is served by allowing names to be assigned to objects. This is an extension of what most operating systems provide—the ability to name selected resources, files, pipes, or a block of shared memory, for example. The executive, in contrast, allows any resource represented by an object to have a name. The second requirement, finding and retrieving an object, is also satisfied by object names. If the object manager stores objects by name, it can find an object by looking up its name.

Object names also satisfy a third requirement, which is to allow processes to share objects. The executive's object namespace is a global one, visible to all processes in the system. One process can create an object and place its name in the global namespace, and a second process can open a handle to the object by specifying the object's name. If an object isn't meant to be shared in this way, its creator doesn't need to give it a name.

To increase efficiency, the object manager doesn't look up an object's name each time someone uses the object. Instead, it looks up a name under only two circumstances. The first is when a process creates a named object: the object manager looks up the name to verify that it doesn't already exist before storing the new name in the global namespace. The second is when a process opens a handle to a named object: the object manager looks up the name, finds the object, and then returns an object handle to the caller; thereafter, the caller uses the handle to refer to the object. When looking up a name, the object manager allows the caller to select either a case-sensitive or case-insensitive search, a feature that supports Subsystem for UNIX Applications and other environments that use case-sensitive file names.

Object Directories

The object directory object is the object manager’s means for supporting this hierarchical naming structure. This object is analogous to a file system directory and contains the names of other objects, possibly even other object directories. The object directory object maintains enough information to translate these object names into pointers to the objects themselves. The object manager uses the pointers to construct the object handles that it returns to user-mode callers. Both kernel-mode code (including executive components and device drivers) and user-mode code (such as subsystems) can create object directories in which to store objects. For example, the I/O manager creates an object directory named \Device, which contains the names of objects representing I/O devices.

Where the names of objects are stored depends on the object type. Table 3-17 lists the standard object directories found on all Windows systems and what types of objects have their names stored there. Of the directories listed, only \BaseNamedObjects and \Global?? are visible to
standard Windows applications. (See the “Session Namespace” section later in this chapter for more information.)

**TABLE 3-17 Standard Object Directories**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Directory</th>
<th>Types of Object Names Stored</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>\ArcName</td>
<td>Symbolic links mapping ARC-style paths to NT-style paths.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\BaseNamedObjects</td>
<td>Global mutexes, events, semaphores, waitable timers, jobs, ALPC ports, symbolic links, and section objects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\Callback</td>
<td>Callback objects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\Device</td>
<td>Device objects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\Driver</td>
<td>Driver objects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\FileSystem</td>
<td>File-system driver objects and file-system-recognizer device objects. The Filter Manager also creates its own device objects under the Filters subkey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\GLOBAL??</td>
<td>MS-DOS device names. (The \Sessions\0\DosDevices&lt;LUID&gt;\Global directories are symbolic links to this directory.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\KernelObjects</td>
<td>Contains event objects that signal low resource conditions, memory errors, the completion of certain operating system tasks, as well as objects representing Sessions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\KnownDlls</td>
<td>Section names and path for known DLLs (DLLs mapped by the system at startup time).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\KnownDlls32</td>
<td>On a 64-bit Windows installation, \KnownDlls contains the native 64-bit binaries, so this directory is used instead to store Wow64 32-bit versions of those DLLs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\Nls</td>
<td>Section names for mapped national language support tables.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\ObjectTypes</td>
<td>Names of types of objects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\PSXSS</td>
<td>If Subsystem for UNIX Applications is enabled (through installation of the SUA component), this contains ALPC ports used by Subsystem for UNIX Applications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\RPC Control</td>
<td>ALPC ports used by remote procedure calls (RPCs), and events used by Conhost.exe as part of the console isolation mechanism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\Security</td>
<td>ALPC ports and events used by names of objects specific to the security subsystem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\Sessions</td>
<td>Per-session namespace directory. (See the next subsection.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\UMDFCommunicationPorts</td>
<td>ALPC ports used by the User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\Windows</td>
<td>Windows subsystem ALPC ports, shared section, and window stations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because the base kernel objects such as mutexes, events, semaphores, waitable timers, and sections have their names stored in a single object directory, no two of these objects can have the same name, even if they are of a different type. This restriction emphasizes the need to choose names carefully so that they don’t collide with other names. For example, you could prefix names with a GUID and/or combine the name with the user’s security identifier (SID).

Object names are global to a single computer (or to all processors on a multiprocessor computer), but they’re not visible across a network. However, the object manager’s parse method makes it possible to access named objects that exist on other computers. For example, the I/O manager, which supplies file-object services, extends the functions of the object manager to remote files. When asked
to open a remote file object, the object manager calls a parse method, which allows the I/O manager to intercept the request and deliver it to a network redirector, a driver that accesses files across the network. Server code on the remote Windows system calls the object manager and the I/O manager on that system to find the file object and return the information back across the network.

One security consideration to keep in mind when dealing with named objects is the possibility of object name squatting. Although object names in different sessions are protected from each other, there’s no standard protection inside the current session namespace that can be set with the standard Windows API. This makes it possible for an unprivileged application running in the same session as a privileged application to access its objects, as described earlier in the object security subsection. Unfortunately, even if the object creator used a proper DACL to secure the object, this doesn’t help against the squatting attack, in which the unprivileged application creates the object before the privileged application, thus denying access to the legitimate application.

Windows exposes the concept of a private namespace to alleviate this issue. It allows user-mode applications to create object directories through the CreatePrivateNamespace API and associate these directories with boundary descriptors, which are special data structures protecting the directories. These descriptors contain SIDs describing which security principals are allowed access to the object directory. In this manner, a privileged application can be sure that unprivileged applications will not be able to conduct a denial-of-service attack against its objects. (This doesn’t stop a privileged application from doing the same, however, but this point is moot.) Additionally, a boundary descriptor can also contain an integrity level, protecting objects possibly belonging to the same user account as the application, based on the integrity level of the process. (See Chapter 6 for more information on integrity levels.)

**EXPERIMENT: Looking at the Base Named Objects**

You can see the list of base objects that have names with the WinObj tool from Sysinternals. Run Winobj.exe., and click on \BaseNamedObjects, as shown here:
The named objects are shown on the right. The icons indicate the object type:

- Mutexes are indicated with a lock sign.
- Sections (Windows file-mapping objects) are shown as memory chips.
- Events are shown as exclamation points.
- Semaphores are indicated with an icon that resembles a traffic signal.
- Symbolic links have icons that are curved arrows.
- Folders indicate object directories.
- Gears indicate other objects, such as ALPC ports.

**EXPERIMENT: Tampering with Single Instancing**

Applications such as Windows Media Player and those in Microsoft Office are common examples of single-instancing enforcement through named objects. Notice that when launching the Wmplayer.exe executable, Windows Media Player appears only once—every other launch simply results in the window coming back into focus. You can tamper with the handle list by using Process Explorer to turn the computer into a media mixer! Here’s how:

1. **Launch Windows Media Player and Process Explorer to view the handle table (by clicking View, Lower Pane View, and then Handles).** You should see a handle whose name column contains CheckForOtherInstanceMutex.

![Process Explorer](image)

2. **Right-click on the handle, and select Close Handle.** Confirm the action when asked.

3. **Now run Windows Media Player again.** Notice that this time a second process is created.
4. Go ahead and play a different song in each instance. You can also use the Sound Mixer in the system tray (click on the Volume icon) to select which of the two processes will have greater volume, effectively creating a mixing environment.

Instead of closing a handle to a named object, an application could have run on its own before Windows Media Player and created an object with the same name. In this scenario, Windows Media Player would never run, fooled into believing it was already running on the system.

Symbolic Links  In certain file systems (on NTFS and some UNIX systems, for example), a symbolic link lets a user create a file name or a directory name that, when used, is translated by the operating system into a different file or directory name. Using a symbolic link is a simple method for allowing users to indirectly share a file or the contents of a directory, creating a cross-link between different directories in the ordinarily hierarchical directory structure.

The object manager implements an object called a **symbolic link object**, which performs a similar function for object names in its object namespace. A symbolic link can occur anywhere within an object name string. When a caller refers to a symbolic link object’s name, the object manager traverses its object namespace until it reaches the symbolic link object. It looks inside the symbolic link and finds a string that it substitutes for the symbolic link name. It then restarts its name lookup.

One place in which the executive uses symbolic link objects is in translating MS-DOS-style device names into Windows internal device names. In Windows, a user refers to hard disk drives using the names C:, D:, and so on and serial ports as COM1, COM2, and so on. The Windows subsystem makes these symbolic link objects protected, global data by placing them in the object manager namespace under the \Global?? directory.

Session Namespace

Services have access to the **global** namespace, a namespace that serves as the first instance of the namespace. Additional sessions are given a session-private view of the namespace known as a **local** namespace. The parts of the namespace that are localized for each session include \DosDevices, \Windows, and \BaseNamedObjects. Making separate copies of the same parts of the namespace is known as **instancing** the namespace. Instancing \DosDevices makes it possible for each user to have different network drive letters and Windows objects such as serial ports. On Windows, the global \DosDevices directory is named \Global?? and is the directory to which \DosDevices points, and local \DosDevices directories are identified by the logon session ID.

The \Windows directory is where Win32k.sys inserts the interactive window station created by Winlogon, \WinSta0. A Terminal Services environment can support multiple interactive users, but each user needs an individual version of WinSta0 to preserve the illusion that he is accessing the predefined interactive window station in Windows. Finally, applications and the system create shared objects in \BaseNamedObjects, including events, mutexes, and memory sections. If two users are running an application that creates a named object, each user session must have a private version of the
object so that the two instances of the application don’t interfere with one another by accessing the same object.

The object manager implements a local namespace by creating the private versions of the three directories mentioned under a directory associated with the user’s session under \Sessions\n (where n is the session identifier). When a Windows application in remote session two creates a named event, for example, the object manager transparently redirects the object’s name from \BaseNamedObjects to \Sessions\2\BaseNamedObjects.

All object-manager functions related to namespace management are aware of the instanced directories and participate in providing the illusion that all sessions use the same namespace. Windows subsystem DLLs prefix names passed by Windows applications that reference objects in \DosDevices with \?? (for example, C:\Windows becomes \??\C:\Windows). When the object manager sees the special \?? prefix, the steps it takes depends on the version of Windows, but it always relies on a field named DeviceMap in the executive process object (EPROCESS, which is described further in Chapter 5) that points to a data structure shared by other processes in the same session.

The DosDevicesDirectory field of the DeviceMap structure points at the object manager directory that represents the process’ local \DosDevices. When the object manager sees a reference to \??, it locates the process’ local \DosDevices by using the DosDevicesDirectory field of the DeviceMap. If the object manager doesn’t find the object in that directory, it checks the DeviceMap field of the directory object. If it’s valid, it looks for the object in the directory pointed to by the GlobalDosDevicesDirectory field of the DeviceMap structure, which is always \Global??.

Under certain circumstances, applications that are session–aware need to access objects in the global session even if the application is running in another session. The application might want to do this to synchronize with instances of itself running in other remote sessions or with the console session (that is, session 0). For these cases, the object manager provides the special override “\Global” that an application can prefix to any object name to access the global namespace. For example, an application in session two opening an object named \Global\ApplicationInitialized is directed to \BaseNamedObjects\ApplicationInitialized instead of \Sessions\2\BaseNamedObjects \ApplicationInitialized.

An application that wants to access an object in the global \DosDevices directory does not need to use the \Global prefix as long as the object doesn’t exist in its local \DosDevices directory. This is because the object manager automatically looks in the global directory for the object if it doesn’t find it in the local directory. However, an application can force checking the global directory by using \GLOBALROOT.

Session directories are isolated from each other, and administrative privileges are required to create a global object (except for section objects). A special privilege named create global object is verified before allowing such operations.
EXPERIMENT: Viewing Namespace Instancing

You can see the separation between the session 0 namespace and other session namespaces as soon as you log in. The reason you can is that the first console user is logged in to session 1 (while services run in session 0). Run Winobj.exe, and click on the \Sessions directory. You’ll see a subdirectory with a numeric name for each active session. If you open one of these directories, you’ll see subdirectories named \DosDevices, \Windows, and \BaseNamedObjects, which are the local namespace subdirectories of the session. The following screen shot shows a local namespace:

![Local Namespace Screen Shot](image)

Next run Process Explorer and select a process in your session (such as Explorer.exe), and then view the handle table (by clicking View, Lower Pane View, and then Handles). You should see a handle to \Windows\WindowStations\WinSta0 underneath \Sessions\n, where n is the session ID.

![Process Explorer Screen Shot](image)
Object Filtering

Windows includes a filtering model in the object manager, similar to the file system minifilter model described in Chapter 8 in Part 2. One of the primary benefits of this filtering model is the ability to use the altitude concept that these existing filtering technologies use, which means that multiple drivers can filter object-manager events at appropriate locations in the filtering stack. Additionally, drivers are permitted to intercept calls such as NtOpenThread and NtOpenProcess and even to modify the access masks being requested from the process manager. This allows protection against certain operations on an open handle—however, an open operation cannot be entirely blocked because doing so would too closely resemble a malicious operation (processes that could never be managed).

Furthermore, drivers are able to take advantage of both pre and post callbacks, allowing them to prepare for a certain operation before it occurs, as well as to react or finalize information after the operation has occurred. These callbacks can be specified for each operation (currently, only open, create, and duplicate are supported) and be specific for each object type (currently, only process and thread objects are supported). For each callback, drivers can specify their own internal context value, which can be returned across all calls to the driver or across a pre/post pair. These callbacks can be registered with the ObRegisterCallbacks API and unregistered with the ObUnregisterCallbacks API—it is the responsibility of the driver to ensure deregistration happens.

Use of the APIs is restricted to images that have certain characteristics:

- The image must be signed, even on 32-bit computers, according to the same rules set forth in the Kernel Mode Code Signing (KMCS) policy. (Code integrity will be discussed later in this chapter.) The image must be compiled with the /integritycheck linker flag, which sets the IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_FORCE_INTEGRITY value in the PE header. This instructs the memory manager to check the signature of the image regardless of any other defaults that might not normally result in a check.

- The image must be signed with a catalog containing cryptographic per-page hashes of the executable code. This allows the system to detect changes to the image after it has been loaded in memory.

Before executing a callback, the object manager calls the MmVerifyCallbackFunction on the target function pointer, which in turn locates the loader data table entry associated with the module owning this address, and verifies whether or not the LDRP_IMAGE_INTEGRITY_FORCED flag is set. (See the “Loaded Module Database” section in this chapter for more information.)

Synchronization

The concept of mutual exclusion is a crucial one in operating systems development. It refers to the guarantee that one, and only one, thread can access a particular resource at a time. Mutual exclusion is necessary when a resource doesn’t lend itself to shared access or when sharing would result in an unpredictable outcome. For example, if two threads copy a file to a printer port at the same time, their output could be interspersed. Similarly, if one thread reads a memory location while another one writes to it, the first thread will receive unpredictable data. In general, writable resources can’t
be shared without restrictions, whereas resources that aren’t subject to modification can be shared. Figure 3-24 illustrates what happens when two threads running on different processors both write data to a circular queue.

![Diagram of thread execution](image)

**FIGURE 3-24** Incorrect sharing of memory

Because the second thread obtained the value of the queue tail pointer before the first thread finished updating it, the second thread inserted its data into the same location that the first thread used, overwriting data and leaving one queue location empty. Even though Figure 3-24 illustrates what could happen on a multiprocessor system, the same error could occur on a single-processor system if the operating system performed a context switch to the second thread before the first thread updated the queue tail pointer.

Sections of code that access a nonshareable resource are called critical sections. To ensure correct code, only one thread at a time can execute in a critical section. While one thread is writing to a file, updating a database, or modifying a shared variable, no other thread can be allowed to access the same resource. The pseudocode shown in Figure 3-24 is a critical section that incorrectly accesses a shared data structure without mutual exclusion.

The issue of mutual exclusion, although important for all operating systems, is especially important (and intricate) for a tightly coupled, symmetric multiprocessing (SMP) operating system such as Windows, in which the same system code runs simultaneously on more than one processor, sharing certain data structures stored in global memory. In Windows, it is the kernel’s job to provide mechanisms that system code can use to prevent two threads from modifying the same structure at the same time. The kernel provides mutual-exclusion primitives that it and the rest of the executive use to synchronize their access to global data structures.

Because the scheduler synchronizes access to its data structures at DPC/dispatch level IRQL, the kernel and executive cannot rely on synchronization mechanisms that would result in a page fault or reschedule operation to synchronize access to data structures when the IRQL is DPC/dispatch level or higher (levels known as an elevated or high IRQL). In the following sections, you’ll find out how the kernel and executive use mutual exclusion to protect their global data structures when the IRQL is...
high and what mutual-exclusion and synchronization mechanisms the kernel and executive use when the IRQL is low (below DPC/dispatch level).

**High-IRQL Synchronization**

At various stages during its execution, the kernel must guarantee that one, and only one, processor at a time is executing within a critical section. Kernel critical sections are the code segments that modify a global data structure such as the kernel’s dispatcher database or its DPC queue. The operating system can’t function correctly unless the kernel can guarantee that threads access these data structures in a mutually exclusive manner.

The biggest area of concern is interrupts. For example, the kernel might be updating a global data structure when an interrupt occurs whose interrupt-handling routine also modifies the structure. Simple single-processor operating systems sometimes prevent such a scenario by disabling all interrupts each time they access global data, but the Windows kernel has a more sophisticated solution. Before using a global resource, the kernel temporarily masks the interrupts whose interrupt handlers also use the resource. It does so by raising the processor’s IRQL to the highest level used by any potential interrupt source that accesses the global data. For example, an interrupt at DPC/dispatch level causes the dispatcher, which uses the dispatcher database, to run. Therefore, any other part of the kernel that uses the dispatcher database raises the IRQL to DPC/dispatch level, masking DPC/dispatch-level interrupts before using the dispatcher database.

This strategy is fine for a single-processor system, but it’s inadequate for a multiprocessor configuration. Raising the IRQL on one processor doesn’t prevent an interrupt from occurring on another processor. The kernel also needs to guarantee mutually exclusive access across several processors.

**Interlocked Operations**

The simplest form of synchronization mechanisms rely on hardware support for multiprocessor-safe manipulation of integer values and for performing comparisons. They include functions such as `InterlockedIncrement`, `InterlockedDecrement`, `InterlockedExchange`, and `InterlockedCompareExchange`. The `InterlockedDecrement` function, for example, uses the x86 `lock` instruction prefix (for example, `lock xadd`) to lock the multiprocessor bus during the subtraction operation so that another processor that’s also modifying the memory location being decremented won’t be able to modify it between the decrementing processor’s read of the original value and its write of the decremented value. This form of basic synchronization is used by the kernel and drivers. In today’s Microsoft compiler suite, these functions are called intrinsic because the code for them is generated in an inline assembler, directly during the compilation phase, instead of going through a function call. (It’s likely that pushing the parameters onto the stack, calling the function, copying the parameters into registers, and then popping the parameters off the stack and returning to the caller would be a more expensive operation than the actual work the function is supposed to do in the first place.)
Spinlocks

The mechanism the kernel uses to achieve multiprocessor mutual exclusion is called a spinlock. A spinlock is a locking primitive associated with a global data structure such as the DPC queue shown in Figure 3-25.

![Diagram of spinlock usage]

**FIGURE 3-25 Using a spinlock**

Before entering either critical section shown in Figure 3-25, the kernel must acquire the spinlock associated with the protected DPC queue. If the spinlock isn’t free, the kernel keeps trying to acquire the lock until it succeeds. The spinlock gets its name from the fact that the kernel (and thus, the processor) waits, “spinning,” until it gets the lock.

Spinlocks, like the data structures they protect, reside in nonpaged memory mapped into the system address space. The code to acquire and release a spinlock is written in assembly language for speed and to exploit whatever locking mechanism the underlying processor architecture provides. On many architectures, spinlocks are implemented with a hardware-supported test-and-set operation, which tests the value of a lock variable and acquires the lock in one atomic instruction. Testing and acquiring the lock in one instruction prevents a second thread from grabbing the lock between the time the first thread tests the variable and the time it acquires the lock. Additionally, the lock instruction mentioned earlier can also be used on the test-and-set operation, resulting in the combined lock bts assembly operation, which also locks the multiprocessor bus; otherwise, it would be possible for more than one processor to atomically perform the operation. (Without the lock, the operation is guaranteed to be atomic only on the current processor.)

All kernel-mode spinlocks in Windows have an associated IRQL that is always DPC/dispatch level or higher. Thus, when a thread is trying to acquire a spinlock, all other activity at the spinlock’s IRQL or lower ceases on that processor. Because thread dispatching happens at DPC/dispatch level, a thread that holds a spinlock is never preempted because the IRQL masks the dispatching mechanisms. This masking allows code executing in a critical section protected by a spinlock to continue executing so
that it will release the lock quickly. The kernel uses spinlocks with great care, minimizing the num-
ber of instructions it executes while it holds a spinlock. Any processor that attempts to acquire the
spinlock will essentially be busy, waiting indefinitely, consuming power (a busy wait results in 100%
CPU usage) and performing no actual work.

On x86 and x64 processors, a special pause assembly instruction can be inserted in busy wait
loops. This instruction offers a hint to the processor that the loop instructions it is processing are part
of a spinlock (or a similar construct) acquisition loop. The instruction provides three benefits:

- It significantly reduces power usage by delaying the core ever so slightly instead of
  continuously looping.

- On HyperThreaded cores, it allows the CPU to realize that the “work” being done by the
  spinning logical core is not terribly important and awards more CPU time to the second logical
  core instead.

- Because a busy wait loop results in a storm of read requests coming to the bus from the
  waiting thread (which might be generated out of order), the CPU attempts to correct for viola-
tions of memory order as soon as it detects a write (that is, when the owning thread releases
  the lock). Thus, as soon as the spinlock is released, the CPU reorders any pending memory
  read operations to ensure proper ordering. This reordering results in a large penalty in system
  performance and can be avoided with the pause instruction.

The kernel makes spinlocks available to other parts of the executive through a set of kernel
functions, including KeAcquireSpinLock and KeReleaseSpinLock. Device drivers, for example, require
spinlocks to guarantee that device registers and other global data structures are accessed by only
one part of a device driver (and from only one processor) at a time. Spinlocks are not for use by
user programs—user programs should use the objects described in the next section. Device drivers
also need to protect access to their own data structures from interrupts associated with themselves.
Because the spinlock APIs typically raise the IRQL only to DPC/dispatch level, this isn’t enough to
protect against interrupts. For this reason, the kernel also exports the KeAcquireInterruptSpinLock
and KeReleaseInterruptSpinLock APIs that take as a parameter the KINTERRUPT object discussed at
the beginning of this chapter. The system looks inside the interrupt object for the associated DIRQL
with the interrupt and raises the IRQL to the appropriate level to ensure correct access to structures
shared with the ISR. Devices can use the KeSynchronizeExecution API to synchronize an entire function
with an ISR, instead of just a critical section. In all cases, the code protected by an interrupt spinlock
must execute extremely quickly—any delay causes higher-than-normal interrupt latency and will have
significant negative performance effects.

Kernel spinlocks carry with them restrictions for code that uses them. Because spinlocks always
have an IRQL of DPC/dispatch level or higher, as explained earlier, code holding a spinlock will crash
the system if it attempts to make the scheduler perform a dispatch operation or if it causes a page
fault.
Queued Spinlocks

To increase the scalability of spinlocks, a special type of spinlock, called a *queued spinlock*, is used in most circumstances instead of a standard spinlock. A queued spinlock works like this: When a processor wants to acquire a queued spinlock that is currently held, it places its identifier in a queue associated with the spinlock. When the processor that’s holding the spinlock releases it, it hands the lock over to the first processor identified in the queue. In the meantime, a processor waiting for a busy spinlock checks the status not of the spinlock itself but of a per-processor flag that the processor ahead of it in the queue sets to indicate that the waiting processor’s turn has arrived.

The fact that queued spinlocks result in spinning on per-processor flags rather than global spinlocks has two effects. The first is that the multiprocessor’s bus isn’t as heavily trafficked by interprocessor synchronization. The second is that instead of a random processor in a waiting group acquiring a spinlock, the queued spinlock enforces first-in, first-out (FIFO) ordering to the lock. FIFO ordering means more consistent performance across processors accessing the same locks.

Windows defines a number of global queued spinlocks by storing pointers to them in an array contained in each processor’s *processor region control block* (PRCB). A global spinlock can be acquired by calling `KeAcquireQueuedSpinLock` with the index into the PRCB array at which the pointer to the spinlock is stored. The number of global spinlocks has grown in each release of the operating system, and the table of index definitions for them is published in the WDK header file Wdm.h. Note, however, that acquiring one of these queued spinlocks from a device driver is an unsupported and heavily frowned-upon operation. These locks are reserved for the kernel’s own internal use.

---

**EXPERIMENT: Viewing Global Queued Spinlocks**

You can view the state of the global queued spinlocks (the ones pointed to by the queued spinlock array in each processor’s PCR) by using the `!qlocks` kernel debugger command. In the following example, the page frame number (PFN) database queued spinlock is held by processor 1, and the other queued spinlocks are not acquired. (The PFN database is described in Chapter 10 in Part 2.)

```
lkd> !qlocks
Key: O = Owner, 1-n = Wait order, blank = not owned/waiting, C = Corrupt

```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Processor Number</th>
<th>Lock Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KE</td>
<td>Unused Spare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MM</td>
<td>Expansion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MM</td>
<td>Unused Spare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MM</td>
<td>System Space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Vacb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Master</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---
Instack Queued Spinlocks

Device drivers can use dynamically allocated queued spinlocks with the
KeAcquireInStackQueuedSpinLock and KeReleaseInStackQueuedSpinLock functions. Several
components—including the cache manager, executive pool manager, and NTFS—take advantage
of these types of locks instead of using global queued spinlocks.

KeAcquireInStackQueuedSpinLock takes a pointer to a spinlock data structure and a spinlock queue
handle. The spinlock handle is actually a data structure in which the kernel stores information about
the lock’s status, including the lock’s ownership and the queue of processors that might be waiting for
the lock to become available. For this reason, the handle shouldn’t be a global variable. It is usually a
stack variable, guaranteeing locality to the caller thread and is responsible for the InStack part of the
spinlock and API name.

Executive Interlocked Operations

The kernel supplies a number of simple synchronization functions constructed on spinlocks for
more advanced operations, such as adding and removing entries from singly and doubly linked lists. Examples include ExInterlockedPopEntryList and ExInterlockedPushEntryList for singly linked lists,
and ExInterlockedInsertHeadList and ExInterlockedRemoveHeadList for doubly linked lists. All these
functions require a standard spinlock as a parameter and are used throughout the kernel and device
drivers.

Instead of relying on the standard APIs to acquire and release the spinlock parameter, these
functions place the code required inline and also use a different ordering scheme. Whereas the Ke
spinlock APIs first test and set the bit to see whether the lock is released and then atomically do a
locked test-and-set operation to actually make the acquisition, these routines disable interrupts on
the processor and immediately attempt an atomic test-and-set. If the initial attempt fails, interrupts
are enabled again, and the standard busy waiting algorithm continues until the test-and-set operation
returns 0—in which case, the whole function is restarted again. Because of these subtle differences, a
spinlock used for the executive interlocked functions must not be used with the standard kernel APIs
discussed previously. Naturally, noninterlocked list operations must not be mixed with interlocked
operations.

Note Certain executive interlocked operations silently ignore the spinlock when possible.
For example, the ExInterlockedIncrementLong or ExInterlockedCompareExchange APIs actu-
ally use the same lock prefix used by the standard interlocked functions and the intrinsic
functions. These functions were useful on older systems (or non-x86 systems) where the
lock operation was not suitable or available. For this reason, these calls are now deprecated
in favor of the intrinsic functions.
Low-IRQL Synchronization

Executive software outside the kernel also needs to synchronize access to global data structures in a multiprocessor environment. For example, the memory manager has only one page frame database, which it accesses as a global data structure, and device drivers need to ensure that they can gain exclusive access to their devices. By calling kernel functions, the executive can create a spinlock, acquire it, and release it.

Spinlocks only partially fill the executive’s needs for synchronization mechanisms, however. Because waiting for a spinlock literally stalls a processor, spinlocks can be used only under the following strictly limited circumstances:

- The protected resource must be accessed quickly and without complicated interactions with other code.
- The critical section code can’t be paged out of memory, can’t make references to pageable data, can’t call external procedures (including system services), and can’t generate interrupts or exceptions.

These restrictions are confining and can’t be met under all circumstances. Furthermore, the executive needs to perform other types of synchronization in addition to mutual exclusion, and it must also provide synchronization mechanisms to user mode.

There are several additional synchronization mechanisms for use when spinlocks are not suitable:

- Kernel dispatcher objects
- Fast mutexes and guarded mutexes
- Pushlocks
- Executive resources

Additionally, user-mode code, which also executes at low IRQL, must be able to have its own locking primitives. Windows supports various user-mode-specific primitives:

- Condition variables (CondVars)
- Slim Reader-Writer Locks (SRW Locks)
- Run-once initialization (InitOnce)
- Critical sections

We’ll take a look at the user-mode primitives and their underlying kernel-mode support later; for now, we’ll focus on kernel-mode objects. Table 3-18 serves as a reference that compares and contrasts the capabilities of these mechanisms and their interaction with kernel-mode APC delivery.
TABLE 3-18 Kernel Synchronization Mechanisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Exposed for Use by Device Drivers</th>
<th>Disables Normal Kernel-Mode APCs</th>
<th>Disables Special Kernel-Mode APCs</th>
<th>Supports Recursive Acquisition</th>
<th>Supports Shared and Exclusive Acquisition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kernel dispatcher mutexes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kernel dispatcher semaphores or events</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast mutexes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guarded mutexes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pushlocks</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive resources</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kernel Dispatcher Objects

The kernel furnishes additional synchronization mechanisms to the executive in the form of kernel objects, known collectively as dispatcher objects. The Windows API-visible synchronization objects acquire their synchronization capabilities from these kernel dispatcher objects. Each Windows API-visible object that supports synchronization encapsulates at least one kernel dispatcher object. The executive’s synchronization semantics are visible to Windows programmers through the `WaitForSingleObject` and `WaitForMultipleObjects` functions, which the Windows subsystem implements by calling analogous system services that the object manager supplies. A thread in a Windows application can synchronize with a variety of objects, including a Windows process, thread, event, semaphore, mutex, waitable timer, I/O completion port, ALPC port, registry key, or file object. In fact, almost all objects exposed by the kernel can be waited on. Some of these are proper dispatcher objects, while others are larger objects that have a dispatcher object within them (such as ports, keys, or files). Table 3-19 shows the proper dispatcher objects, so any other object that the Windows API allows waiting on probably internally contains one of those primitives.

One other type of executive synchronization object worth noting is called an executive resource. Executive resources provide exclusive access (like a mutex) as well as shared read access (multiple readers sharing read-only access to a structure). However, they’re available only to kernel-mode code and thus are not accessible from the Windows API. The remaining subsections describe the implementation details of waiting for dispatcher objects.

Waiting for Dispatcher Objects

A thread can synchronize with a dispatcher object by waiting for the object’s handle. Doing so causes the kernel to put the thread in a wait state.

At any given moment, a synchronization object is in one of two states: signaled state or nonsignaled state. A thread can’t resume its execution until its wait is satisfied, a condition that occurs
when the dispatcher object whose handle the thread is waiting for also undergoes a state change, from the nonsignaled state to the signaled state (when another thread sets an event object, for example). To synchronize with an object, a thread calls one of the wait system services that the object manager supplies, passing a handle to the object it wants to synchronize with. The thread can wait for one or several objects and can also specify that its wait should be canceled if it hasn’t ended within a certain amount of time. Whenever the kernel sets an object to the signaled state, one of the kernel’s signal routines checks to see whether any threads are waiting for the object and not also waiting for other objects to become signaled. If there are, the kernel releases one or more of the threads from their waiting state so that they can continue executing.

The following example of setting an event illustrates how synchronization interacts with thread dispatching:

- A user-mode thread waits for an event object’s handle.
- The kernel changes the thread’s scheduling state to waiting and then adds the thread to a list of threads waiting for the event.
- Another thread sets the event.
- The kernel marches down the list of threads waiting for the event. If a thread’s conditions for waiting are satisfied (see the following note), the kernel takes the thread out of the waiting state. If it is a variable-priority thread, the kernel might also boost its execution priority. (For details on thread scheduling, see Chapter 5.)

**Note** Some threads might be waiting for more than one object, so they continue waiting, unless they specified a `WaitAny` wait, which will wake them up as soon as one object (instead of all) is signaled.

**What Signals an Object?**

The signaled state is defined differently for different objects. A thread object is in the nonsignaled state during its lifetime and is set to the signaled state by the kernel when the thread terminates. Similarly, the kernel sets a process object to the signaled state when the process’ last thread terminates. In contrast, the timer object, like an alarm, is set to “go off” at a certain time. When its time expires, the kernel sets the timer object to the signaled state.

When choosing a synchronization mechanism, a program must take into account the rules governing the behavior of different synchronization objects. Whether a thread’s wait ends when an object is set to the signaled state varies with the type of object the thread is waiting for, as Table 3-19 illustrates.
TABLE 3-19 Definitions of the Signaled State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Object Type</th>
<th>Set to Signaled State When</th>
<th>Effect on Waiting Threads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Process</td>
<td>Last thread terminates</td>
<td>All are released.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thread</td>
<td>Thread terminates</td>
<td>All are released.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event (notification type)</td>
<td>Thread sets the event</td>
<td>All are released.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event (synchronization type)</td>
<td>Thread sets the event</td>
<td>One thread is released and might receive a boost; the event object is reset.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gate (locking type)</td>
<td>Thread signals the gate</td>
<td>First waiting thread is released and receives a boost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gate (signaling type)</td>
<td>Thread signals the type</td>
<td>First waiting thread is released.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keyed event</td>
<td>Thread sets event with a key</td>
<td>Thread that’s waiting for the key and which is of the same process as the signaler is released.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semaphore</td>
<td>Semaphore count drops by 1</td>
<td>One thread is released.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timer (notification type)</td>
<td>Set time arrives, or time interval expires</td>
<td>All are released.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timer (synchronization type)</td>
<td>Set time arrives, or time interval expires</td>
<td>One thread is released.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutex</td>
<td>Thread releases the mutex</td>
<td>One thread is released and takes ownership of the mutex.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queue</td>
<td>Item is placed on queue</td>
<td>One thread is released.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When an object is set to the signaled state, waiting threads are generally released from their wait states immediately. Some of the kernel dispatcher objects and the system events that induce their state changes are shown in Figure 3-26.

For example, a notification event object (called a manual reset event in the Windows API) is used to announce the occurrence of some event. When the event object is set to the signaled state, all threads waiting for the event are released. The exception is any thread that is waiting for more than one object at a time; such a thread might be required to continue waiting until additional objects reach the signaled state.

In contrast to an event object, a mutex object has ownership associated with it (unless it was acquired during a DPC). It is used to gain mutually exclusive access to a resource, and only one thread at a time can hold the mutex. When the mutex object becomes free, the kernel sets it to the signaled state and then selects one waiting thread to execute, while also inheriting any priority boost that had been applied. (See Chapter 5 for more information on priority boosting.) The thread selected by the kernel acquires the mutex object, and all other threads continue waiting.

A mutex object can also be abandoned: this occurs when the thread currently owning it becomes terminated. When a thread terminate, the kernel enumerates all mutexes owned by the thread and sets them to the abandoned state, which, in terms of signaling logic, is treated as a signaled state in that ownership of the mutex is transferred to a waiting thread.
FIGURE 3-26 Selected kernel dispatcher objects
This brief discussion wasn’t meant to enumerate all the reasons and applications for using the various executive objects but rather to list their basic functionality and synchronization behavior. For information on how to put these objects to use in Windows programs, see the Windows reference documentation on synchronization objects or Jeffrey Richter and Christophe Nasarre’s book *Windows via C/C++*.

**Data Structures**

Three data structures are key to tracking who is waiting, how they are waiting, what they are waiting for, and which state the entire wait operation is at. These three structures are the **dispatcher header**, the **wait block**, and the **wait status register**. The former two structures are publicly defined in the WDK include file Wdm.h, while the latter is not documented.

The dispatcher header is a packed structure because it needs to hold lots of information in a fixed-size structure. (See the upcoming “EXPERIMENT: Looking at Wait Queues” section to see the definition of the dispatcher header data structure.) One of the main tricks is to define mutually exclusive flags at the same memory location (offset) in the structure. By using the *Type* field, the kernel knows which of these fields actually applies. For example, a mutex can be abandoned, but a timer can be absolute or relative. Similarly, a timer can be inserted into the timer list, but the *Debug Active* field makes sense only for processes. On the other hand, the dispatcher header does contain information generic for any dispatcher object: the object type, signaled state, and a list of the threads waiting for that object.

The wait block represents a thread waiting for an object. Each thread that is in a wait state has a list of the wait blocks that represent the objects the thread is waiting for. Each dispatcher object has a list of the wait blocks that represent which threads are waiting for the object. This list is kept so that when a dispatcher object is signaled, the kernel can quickly determine who is waiting for that object. Finally, because the balance-set-manager thread running on each CPU (see Chapter 5 for more information about the balance set manager) needs to analyze the time that each thread has been waiting for (in order to decide whether or not to page out the kernel stack), each PRCB has a list of waiting threads.

The wait block has a pointer to the object being waited for, a pointer to the thread waiting for the object, and a pointer to the next wait block (if the thread is waiting for more than one object). It also records the type of wait (any or all) as well as the position of that entry in the array of handles passed by the thread on the *WaitForMultipleObjects* call (position 0 if the thread was waiting for only one object). The wait type is very important during wait satisfaction, because it determines whether or not all the wait blocks belonging to the thread waiting on the signaled object should be processed: for a *wait any*, the dispatcher does not care what the state of the other objects is because at least one (the current one) of the objects is now signaled. On the other hand, for a *wait all*, the dispatcher can wake the thread only if *all* the other objects are also in a signaled state, which requires traversing the wait blocks and associated objects.

The wait block also contains a volatile *wait block state*, which defines the current state of this wait block in the transactional wait operation it is currently being engaged in. The different states, their meaning, and their effects in the wait logic code, are explained in Table 3-20.
### TABLE 3-20 Wait Block States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WaitBlockActive (2)</td>
<td>This wait block is actively linked to an object as part of a thread that is in a wait state.</td>
<td>During wait satisfaction, this wait block will be unlinked from the wait block list.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WaitBlockInactive (3)</td>
<td>The thread wait associated with this wait block has been satisfied (or the timeout has already expired while setting it up).</td>
<td>During wait satisfaction, this wait block will not be unlinked from the wait block list because the wait satisfaction must have already unlinked during its active state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WaitBlockBypassStart (0)</td>
<td>A signal is being delivered to the thread while the wait has not yet been committed.</td>
<td>During wait satisfaction (which would be immediate, before the thread enters the true wait state), the waiting thread must synchronize with the signaler because there is a risk that the wait object might be on the stack—marking the wait block as inactive would cause the waiter to unwind the stack while the signaler might still be accessing it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WaitBlockBypassComplete (1)</td>
<td>The thread wait associated with this wait block has now been properly synchronized (the wait satisfaction has completed), and the bypass scenario is now completed.</td>
<td>The wait block is now essentially treated the same as an inactive wait block (ignored).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because the overall state of the thread (or any of the objects it is being required to start waiting on) can change while wait operations are still being set up (because there is nothing blocking another thread executing on a different logical processor from attempting to signal one of the objects, or possibly alerting the thread, or even sending it an APC), the kernel dispatcher needs to keep track of two additional pieces of data for each waiting thread: the current fine-grained wait state of the thread, as well as any pending state changes that could modify the result of the attempted wait operation.

When a thread is instructed to wait for a given object (such as due to a *WaitForSingleObject* call), it first attempts to enter the in-progress wait state (*WaitInProgress*) by beginning the wait. This operation succeeds if there are no pending alerts to the thread at the moment (based on the alertability of the wait and the current processor mode of the wait, which determine whether or not the alert can preempt the wait). If there is an alert, the wait is not even entered at all, and the caller receives the appropriate status code; otherwise, the thread now enters the *WaitInProgress* state, at which point the main thread state is set to *Waiting*, and the wait reason and wait time are recorded, with any timeout specified also being registered.

Once the wait is in progress, the thread can initialize the wait blocks as needed (and mark them as *WaitBlockActive* in the process) and then proceed to lock all the objects that are part of this wait. Because each object has its own lock, it is important that the kernel be able to maintain a consistent locking ordering scheme when multiple processors might be analyzing a wait chain consisting of many objects (caused by a *WaitForMultipleObjects* call). The kernel uses a technique known as *address ordering* to achieve this: because each object has a distinct and static kernel-mode address, the objects can be ordered in monotonically increasing address order, guaranteeing that locks are always acquired and released in the same order by all callers. This means that the caller-supplied array of objects will be duplicated and sorted accordingly.
The next step is to check for immediate satisfaction of the wait, such as when a thread is being told to wait on a mutex that has already been released or an event that is already signaled. In such cases, the wait is immediately satisfied, which involves unlinking the associated wait blocks (however, in this case, no wait blocks have yet been inserted) and performing a wait exit (processing any pending scheduler operations marked in the wait status register). If this shortcut fails, the kernel next attempts to check whether the timeout specified for the wait (if any) has actually already expired. In this case, the wait is not “satisfied” but merely “timed out,” which results in slightly faster processing of the exit code, albeit with the same result.

If none of these shortcuts were effective, the wait block is inserted into the thread's wait list, and the thread now attempts to commit its wait. (Meanwhile, the object lock or locks have been released, allowing other processors to modify the state of any of the objects that the thread is now supposed to attempt waiting on.) Assuming a noncontended scenario, where other processors are not interested in this thread or its wait objects, the wait switches into the committed state as long as there are no pending changes marked by the wait status register. The commit operation links the waiting thread in the PRCB list, activates an extra wait queue thread if needed, and inserts the timer associated with the wait timeout, if any. Because potentially quite a lot of cycles have elapsed by this point, it is again possible that the timeout has already elapsed. In this scenario, inserting the timer will cause immediate signaling of the thread, and thus a wait satisfaction on the timer, and the overall timeout of the wait. Otherwise, in the much more common scenario, the CPU now context switches away to the next thread that is ready for execution. (See Chapter 5 for more information on scheduling.)

In highly contended code paths on multiprocessor machines, it is possible and likely that the thread attempting to commit its wait has experienced a change while its wait was still in progress. One possible scenario is that one of the objects it was waiting on has just been signaled. As touched upon earlier, this causes the associated wait block to enter the WaitBlockBypassStart state, and the thread’s wait status register now shows the WaitAborted wait state. Another possible scenario is for an alert or APC to have been issued to the waiting thread, which does not set the WaitAborted state but enables one of the corresponding bits in the wait status register. Because APCs can break waits (depending on the type of APC, wait mode, and alertability), the APC is delivered and the wait is aborted. Other operations that will modify the wait status register without generating a full abort cycle include modifications to the thread’s priority or affinity, which will be processed when exiting the wait due to failure to commit, as with the previous cases mentioned.

Figure 3-27 shows the relationship of dispatcher objects to wait blocks to threads to PRCB. In this example, CPU 0 has two waiting (committed) threads: thread 1 is waiting for object B, and thread 2 is waiting for objects A and B. If object A is signaled, the kernel sees that because thread 2 is also waiting for another object, thread 2 can’t be readied for execution. On the other hand, if object B is signaled, the kernel can ready thread 1 for execution right away because it isn’t waiting for any other objects. (Alternatively, if thread 1 was also waiting for other objects but its wait type was a WaitAny, the kernel could still wake it up.)
FIGURE 3-27 Wait data structures

**EXPERIMENT: Looking at Wait Queues**

You can see the list of objects a thread is waiting for with the kernel debugger’s `!thread` command. For example, the following excerpt from the output of a `!process` command shows that the thread is waiting for an event object:

```
kd> !process
§
THREAD fffffa8005292060 Cid 062c062c.0660 Teb: 000007ffffffde000 Win32Thread: fffff900c01c68f0 WAIT: (WrUserRequest) UserMode Non-Alertable
fffffa80047b8240  SynchronizationEvent
```
You can use the `dt` command to interpret the dispatcher header of the object like this:

```
lkd> dt nt!_DISPATCHER_HEADER fffffffa80047b8240
   +0x000 Type : 0x1 ''
   +0x001 TimerControlFlags : 0 ''
   +0x001 Absolute : 0y0
   +0x001 Coalescable : 0y0
   +0x001 KeepShifting : 0y0
   +0x001 EncodedTolerableDelay : 0y00000 (0)
   +0x001 Abandoned : 0 ''
   +0x001 Signalling : 0 ''
   +0x002 ThreadControlFlags : 0x6 ''
   +0x002 CpuThrottled : 0y0
   +0x002 CycleProfiling : 0y1
   +0x002 CounterProfiling : 0y1
   +0x002 Reserved : 0y0000 (0)
   +0x002 Hand : 0x6 ''
   +0x002 Size : 0x6
   +0x003 TimerMiscFlags : 0 ''
   +0x003 Index : 0y000000 (0)
   +0x003 Inserted : 0y0
   +0x003 Expired : 0y0
   +0x003 DebugActive : 0 ''
   +0x003 ActiveDR7 : 0y0
   +0x003 Instrumented : 0y0
   +0x003 Reserved2 : 0y0000
   +0x003 UmsScheduled : 0y0
   +0x003 UmsPrimary : 0y0
   +0x003 DpcActive : 0 ''
   +0x000 Lock : 393217
   +0x004 SignalState : 0
   +0x008 WaitListHead : _LIST_ENTRY [ 0xfffffa80047b8248 - 0xfffffa80047b8248 ]
```

You should ignore any values that do not correspond to the given object type, because they might be either incorrectly decoded by the debugger (because the wrong type or field is being used) or simply contain stale or invalid data from a previous allocation value. There is no defined correlation you can see between which fields apply to which object, other than by looking at the Windows kernel source code or the WDK header files’ comments. For convenience, Table 3-21 lists the dispatcher header flags and the objects to which they apply.

### Table 3-21: Usage and Meaning of the Dispatcher Header Flags

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flag</th>
<th>Applies To</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absolute</td>
<td>Timers</td>
<td>The expiration time is absolute, not relative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalescable</td>
<td>Periodic Timers</td>
<td>Indicates whether coalescing should be used for this timer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KeepShifting</td>
<td>Coalescable Timers</td>
<td>Indicates whether or not the kernel dispatcher should continue attempting to shift the timer’s expiration time. When alignment is reached with the machine’s periodic interval, this eventually becomes FALSE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EncodedTolerableDelay</td>
<td>Coalescable Timers</td>
<td>The maximum amount of tolerance (shifted as a power of two) that the timer can support when running outside of its expected periodicity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flag</td>
<td>Applies To</td>
<td>Meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abandoned</td>
<td>Mutexes</td>
<td>The thread holding the mutex was terminated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signaling</td>
<td>Gates</td>
<td>A priority boost should be applied to the woken thread when the gate is signaled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CpuThrottled</td>
<td>Threads</td>
<td>CPU throttling has been enabled for this thread, such as when running under DFSS mode (Distributed Fair-Share Scheduler).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CycleProfiling</td>
<td>Threads</td>
<td>CPU cycle profiling has been enabled for this thread.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CounterProfiling</td>
<td>Threads</td>
<td>Hardware CPU performance counter monitoring/profiling has been enabled for this thread.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>All objects</td>
<td>Size of the object divided by 4, to fit in a single byte.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand</td>
<td>Timers</td>
<td>Index into the timer handle table.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td>Timers</td>
<td>Index into the timer expiration table.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inserted</td>
<td>Timers</td>
<td>Set if the timer was inserted into the timer handle table.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expired</td>
<td>Timers</td>
<td>Set if the timer has already expired.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DebugActive</td>
<td>Processes</td>
<td>Specifies whether the process is being debugged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ActiveDR7</td>
<td>Thread</td>
<td>Hardware breakpoints are being used, so DR7 is active and should be sanitized during context operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrumented</td>
<td>Thread</td>
<td>Specifies whether the thread has a user-mode instrumentation callback (supported only on Windows for x64 processors).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UmsScheduled</td>
<td>Thread</td>
<td>This thread is a UMS Worker (scheduled) thread.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UmsPrimary</td>
<td>Thread</td>
<td>This thread is a UMS Scheduler (primary) thread.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DpcActive</td>
<td>Mutexes</td>
<td>The mutex was acquired during a DPC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lock</td>
<td>All objects</td>
<td>Used for locking an object during wait operations which need to modify its state or linkage; actually corresponds to bit 7 (0x80) of the Type field.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Apart from these flags, the Type field contains the identifier for the object. This identifier corresponds to a number in the KOBJECTS enumeration, which you can dump with the debugger:

```
\lkd> dt nt\_KOBJECTS
  EventNotificationObject = 0
  EventSynchronizationObject = 1
  MutantObject = 2
  ProcessObject = 3
  QueueObject = 4
  SemaphoreObject = 5
  ThreadObject = 6
  GateObject = 7
  TimerNotificationObject = 8
  TimerSynchronizationObject = 9
  Spare2Object = 10
```
When the wait list head pointers are identical, there are either zero threads or one thread waiting on this object. Dumping a wait block for an object that is part of a multiple wait from a thread, or that multiple threads are waiting on, can yield the following:

dt nt!_KWAIT_BLOCK 0xfffffa80'053cf628
+0x000 WaitListEntry  : _LIST_ENTRY [ 0xfffffa80'02efe568 - 0xfffffa80'02803468 ]
+0x010 Thread        : 0xfffffa80'053cf520 _KTHREAD
+0x018 Object        : 0xfffffa80'02803460
+0x020 NextWaitBlock : 0xfffffa80'053cf628 _KWAIT_BLOCK
+0x028 WaitKey       : 0
+0x02a WaitType      : 0x1 ''
+0x02b BlockState    : 0x2 ''
+0x02c SpareLong     : 8

If the wait list has more than one entry, you can execute the same command on the second pointer value in the WaitListEntry field of each wait block (by executing !thread on the thread pointer in the wait block) to traverse the list and see what other threads are waiting for the object. This would indicate more than one thread waiting on this object. On the other hand, when dealing with an object that’s part of a collection of objects being waited on by a single thread, you have to parse the NextWaitBlock field instead.

**Keyed Events**

A synchronization object called a *keyed event* bears special mention because of the role it plays in user-mode-exclusive synchronization primitives. Keyed events were originally implemented to help processes deal with low-memory situations when using critical sections, which are user-mode synchronization objects that we’ll see more about shortly. A keyed event, which is not documented, allows a thread to specify a "key" for which it waits, where the thread wakes when another thread of the same process signals the event with the same key.

If there is contention, *EnterCriticalSection* dynamically allocates an event object, and the thread wanting to acquire the critical section waits for the thread that owns the critical section to signal it in *LeaveCriticalSection*. Unfortunately, this introduces a new problem. Without keyed events, the system could be critically out of memory and critical-section acquisition could fail because the system
was unable to allocate the event object required. The low-memory condition itself might have been caused by the application trying to acquire the critical section, so the system would deadlock in this situation. Low memory isn’t the only scenario that could cause this to fail: a less likely scenario is handle exhaustion. If the process reaches its 16-million-handle limit, the new handle for the event object could fail.

The failure caused by low-memory conditions typically are an exception from the code responsible for acquiring the critical section. Unfortunately, the result is also a damaged critical section, which makes the situation hard to debug and makes the object useless for a reacquisition attempt. Attempting a LeaveCriticalSection results in another event-object allocation attempt, further generating exceptions and corrupting the structure.

Allocating a global standard event object would not fix the issue because standard event primitives can be used only for a single object. Each critical section in the process still requires its own event object, so the same problem would resurface. The implementation of keyed events allows multiple critical sections (waiters) to use the same global (per-process) keyed event handle. This allows the critical section functions to operate properly even when memory is temporarily low.

When a thread signals a keyed event or performs a wait on it, it uses a unique identifier called a key, which identifies the instance of the keyed event (an association of the keyed event to a single critical section). When the owner thread releases the keyed event by signaling it, only a single thread waiting on the key is woken up (the same behavior as synchronization events, in contrast to notification events). Additionally, only the waiters in the current process are awakened, so the key is even isolated across processes, meaning that there is actually only a single keyed event object for the entire system. When a critical section uses the keyed event, EnterCriticalSection sets the key as the address of the critical section and performs a wait.

When EnterCriticalSection calls NtWaitForKeyedEvent to perform a wait on the keyed event, it can now give a NULL handle as parameter for the keyed event, telling the kernel that it was unable to create a keyed event. The kernel recognizes this behavior and uses a global keyed event named ExpCritSecOutOfMemoryEvent. The primary benefit is that processes don’t need to waste a handle for a named keyed event anymore because the kernel keeps track of the object and its references.

However, keyed events are more than just fallback objects for low-memory conditions. When multiple waiters are waiting on the same key and need to be woken up, the key is actually signaled multiple times, which requires the object to keep a list of all the waiters so that it can perform a “wake” operation on each of them. (Recall that the result of signaling a keyed event is the same as that of signaling a synchronization event.) However, a thread can signal a keyed event without any threads on the waiter list. In this scenario, the signaling thread instead waits on the event itself. Without this fallback, a signaling thread could signal the keyed event during the time that the user-mode code saw the keyed event as unsignaled and attempt a wait. The wait might have come after the signaling thread signaled the keyed event, resulting in a missed pulse, so the waiting thread would deadlock. By forcing the signaling thread to wait in this scenario, it actually signals the keyed event only when someone is looking (waiting).
Note When the keyed-event wait code itself needs to perform a wait, it uses a built-in semaphore located in the kernel-mode thread object (ETHREAD) called KeyedWaitSemaphore. (This semaphore actually shares its location with the ALPC wait semaphore.) See Chapter 5 for more information on thread objects.

Keyed events, however, do not replace standard event objects in the critical section implementation. The initial reason, during the Windows XP timeframe, was that keyed events do not offer scalable performance in heavy-usage scenarios. Recall that all the algorithms described were meant to be used only in critical, low-memory scenarios, when performance and scalability aren’t all that important. To replace the standard event object would place strain on keyed events that they weren’t implemented to handle. The primary performance bottleneck was that keyed events maintained the list of waiters described in a doubly linked list. This kind of list has poor traversal speed, meaning the time required to loop through the list. In this case, this time depended on the number of waiter threads. Because the object is global, dozens of threads could be on the list, requiring long traversal times every single time a key was set or waited on.

Note The head of the list is kept in the keyed event object, while the threads are actually linked through the KeyedWaitChain field (which is actually shared with the thread’s exit time, stored as a LARGE_INTEGER, the same size as a doubly linked list) in the kernel-mode thread object (ETHREAD). See Chapter 5 for more information on this object.

Windows improves keyed-event performance by using a hash table instead of a linked list to hold the waiter threads. This optimization allows Windows to include three new lightweight user-mode synchronization primitives (to be discussed shortly) that all depend on the keyed event. Critical sections, however, still continue to use event objects, primarily for application compatibility and debugging, because the event object and internals are well known and documented, while keyed events are opaque and not exposed to the Win32 API.

Fast Mutexes and Guarded Mutexes

Fast mutexes, which are also known as executive mutexes, usually offer better performance than mutex objects because, although they are built on dispatcher event objects, they perform a wait through the dispatcher only if the fast mutex is contended—unlike a standard mutex, which always attempts the acquisition through the dispatcher. This gives the fast mutex especially good performance in a multiprocessor environment. Fast mutexes are used widely in device drivers.

However, fast mutexes are suitable only when normal kernel-mode APC (described earlier in this chapter) delivery can be disabled. The executive defines two functions for acquiring them: ExAcquireFastMutex and ExAcquireFastMutexUnsafe. The former function blocks all APC delivery by raising the IRQL of the processor to APC level. The latter expects to be called with normal kernel-mode APC delivery disabled, which can be done by raising the IRQL to APC level. ExTryToAcquireFastMutex performs similarly to the first, but it does not actually wait if the fast mutex
is already held, returning FALSE instead. Another limitation of fast mutexes is that they can't be
acquired recursively, like mutex objects can.

Guarded mutexes are essentially the same as fast mutexes (although they use a different
synchronization object, the KGATE, internally). They are acquired with the KeAcquireGuardedMutex
and KeAcquireGuardedMutexUnsafe functions, but instead of disabling APCs by raising the IRQL to
APC level, they disable all kernel-mode APC delivery by calling KeEnterGuardedRegion. Similarly to
fast mutexes, a KeTryToAcquireGuardedMutex method also exists. Recall that a guarded region, un-
like a critical region, disables both special and normal kernel-mode APCs, which allows the guarded
mutex to avoid raising the IRQL.

Three differences make guarded mutexes faster than fast mutexes:

- By avoiding raising the IRQL, the kernel can avoid talking to the local APIC of every processor
  on the bus, which is a significant operation on large SMP systems. On uniprocessor systems,
  this isn't a problem because of lazy IRQL evaluation, but lowering the IRQL might still require
  accessing the PIC.

- The gate primitive is an optimized version of the event. By not having both synchronization
  and notification versions and by being the exclusive object that a thread can wait on, the code
  for acquiring and releasing a gate is heavily optimized. Gates even have their own dispatcher
  lock instead of acquiring the entire dispatcher database.

- In the noncontended case, the acquisition and release of a guarded mutex works on a
  single bit, with an atomic bit test-and-reset operation instead of the more complex integer
  operations fast mutexes perform.

**Note** The code for a fast mutex is also optimized to account for almost all these
optimizations—it uses the same atomic lock operation, and the event object is actually a
gate object (although by dumping the type in the kernel debugger, you would still see an
event object structure; this is actually a compatibility lie). However, fast mutexes still raise
the IRQL instead of using guarded regions.

Because the flag responsible for special kernel APC delivery disabling (and the guarded-region
functionality) was not added until Windows Server 2003, many drivers do not take advantage of
guarded mutexes. Doing so would raise compatibility issues with earlier versions of Windows, which
require a recompiled driver making use only of fast mutexes. Internally, however, the Windows kernel
has replaced almost all uses of fast mutexes with guarded mutexes because the two have identical
semantics and can be easily interchanged.

Another problem related to the guarded mutex was the kernel function KeAreApcsDisabled. Prior
to Windows Server 2003, this function indicated whether normal APCs were disabled by checking
whether the code was running inside a critical section. In Windows Server 2003, this function was
changed to indicate whether the code was in a critical, or guarded, region, changing the functionality
to also return TRUE if special kernel APCs are also disabled.
Because there are certain operations that drivers should not perform when special kernel APCs are disabled, it makes sense to call `KeGetCurrentIrql` to check whether the IRQL is APC level or not, which is the only way special kernel APCs could have been disabled. However, because the memory manager makes use of guarded mutexes instead, this check fails because guarded mutexes do not raise IRQL. Drivers should instead call `KeAreAllApcsDisabled` for this purpose. This function checks whether special kernel APCs are disabled and/or whether the IRQL is APC level—the sure-fire way to detect both guarded mutexes and fast mutexes.

**Executive Resources**

Executive resources are a synchronization mechanism that supports shared and exclusive access; like fast mutexes, they require that normal kernel-mode APC delivery be disabled before they are acquired. They are also built on dispatcher objects that are used only when there is contention. Executive resources are used throughout the system, especially in file-system drivers, because such drivers tend to have long-lasting wait periods in which I/O should still be allowed to some extent (such as reads).

Threads waiting to acquire an executive resource for shared access wait for a semaphore associated with the resource, and threads waiting to acquire an executive resource for exclusive access wait for an event. A semaphore with unlimited count is used for shared waiters because they can all be woken and granted access to the resource when an exclusive holder releases the resource simply by signaling the semaphore. When a thread waits for exclusive access of a resource that is currently owned, it waits on a synchronization event object because only one of the waiters will wake when the event is signaled. In the earlier section on synchronization events, it was mentioned that some event unwait operations can actually cause a priority boost: this scenario occurs when executive resources are used, which is one reason why they also track ownership like mutexes do. (See Chapter 5 for more information on the executive resource priority boost.)

Because of the flexibility that shared and exclusive access offer, there are a number of functions for acquiring resources: `ExAcquireResourceSharedLite`, `ExAcquireResourceExclusiveLite`, `ExAcquireSharedStarveExclusive`, `ExAcquireShareWaitForExclusive`. These functions are documented in the WDK.

---

**EXPERIMENT: Listing Acquired Executive Resources**

The kernel debugger `!locks` command searches paged pool for executive resource objects and dumps their state. By default, the command lists only executive resources that are currently owned, but the `–d` option lists all executive resources. Here is partial output of the command:

```
lkd> !locks
**** DUMP OF ALL RESOURCE OBJECTS ****
KD: Scanning for held locks.

Resource @ 0x89929320   Exclusively owned
   Contention Count = 3911396
   Threads: 8952d030-01<*> 
```
KD: Scanning for held locks...........................................

Resource @ 0x89da1a68    Shared 1 owning threads
    Threads: 8a4cb533-01<*>  ***  Actual Thread 8a4cb530

    Note that the contention count, which is extracted from the resource structure, records the
    number of times threads have tried to acquire the resource and had to wait because it was
    already owned.

    You can examine the details of a specific resource object, including the thread that owns the
    resource and any threads that are waiting for the resource, by specifying the –v switch and the
    address of the resource:

    !locks -v 0x89929320

    Resource @ 0x89929320    Exclusively owned
        Contention Count = 3913573
        Threads: 8952d030-01<*>  

        THREAD 8952d030  Cid 0acc.050c  Teb: 7ffdf000  Win32Thread: fe82c4c0  RUNNING on
        processor 0
            Not impersonating
            DeviceMap         9aa0bd8
            Owning Process    89e1ead8    Image:     windbg.exe
            Wait Start TickCount 24620588   Ticks: 12 (0:00:00:00.187)
            Context Switch Count 772193
            UserTime           00:00:02.293
            KernelTime         00:00:09.828
            Win32 Start Address windbg (0x006e63b8)
            Win32 Start Address windbg (0x006e63b8)
            Stack Init a7eba000 Current a7eb9c10 Base a7eba000 Limit a7eb7000 Call 0
            Priority 10  BasePriority 8  PriorityDecrement 0  IoPriority 2  PagePriority 5
    Unable to get context for thread running on processor 1, HRESULT 0x80004001
    1 total locks, 1 locks currently held

Pushlocks

Pushlocks are another optimized synchronization mechanism built on gate objects; like guarded
mutexes, they wait for a gate object only when there’s contention on the lock. They offer advan-
tages over the guarded mutex in that they can be acquired in shared or exclusive mode. However,
their main advantage is their size: a resource object is 56 bytes, but a pushlock is pointer-size.
Unfortunately, they are not documented in the WDK and are therefore reserved for use by the
operating system (although the APIs are exported, so internal drivers do use them).

    There are two types of pushlocks: normal and cache-aware. Normal pushlocks require only the
    size of a pointer in storage (4 bytes on 32-bit systems, and 8 bytes on 64-bit systems). When a thread
    acquires a normal pushlock, the pushlock code marks the pushlock as owned if it is not currently
    owned. If the pushlock is owned exclusively or the thread wants to acquire the thread exclusively
    and the pushlock is owned on a shared basis, the thread allocates a wait block on the thread’s stack,
    initializes a gate object in the wait block, and adds the wait block to the wait list associated with
the pushlock. When a thread releases a pushlock, the thread wakes a waiter, if any are present, by signaling the event in the waiter's wait block.

Because a pushlock is only pointer-sized, it actually contains a variety of bits to describe its state. The meaning of those bits changes as the pushlock changes from being contended to noncontended. In its initial state, the pushlock contains the following structure:

- One lock bit, set to 1 if the lock is acquired
- One waiting bit, set to 1 if the lock is contended and someone is waiting on it
- One waking bit, set to 1 if the lock is being granted to a thread and the waiter's list needs to be optimized
- One multiple shared bit, set to 1 if the pushlock is shared and currently acquired by more than one thread
- 28 (on 32-bit Windows) or 60 (on 64-bit Windows) share count bits, containing the number of threads that have acquired the pushlock

As discussed previously, when a thread acquires a pushlock exclusively while the pushlock is already acquired by either multiple readers or a writer, the kernel allocates a pushlock wait block. The structure of the pushlock value itself changes. The share count bits now become the pointer to the wait block. Because this wait block is allocated on the stack and the header files contain a special alignment directive to force it to be 16-byte aligned, the bottom 4 bits of any pushlock wait-block structure will be all zeros. Therefore, those bits are ignored for the purposes of pointer dereferencing; instead, the 4 bits shown earlier are combined with the pointer value. Because this alignment removes the share count bits, the share count is now stored in the wait block instead.

A cache-aware pushlock adds layers to the normal (basic) pushlock by allocating a pushlock for each processor in the system and associating it with the cache-aware pushlock. When a thread wants to acquire a cache-aware pushlock for shared access, it simply acquires the pushlock allocated for its current processor in shared mode; to acquire a cache-aware pushlock exclusively, the thread acquires the pushlock for each processor in exclusive mode.

Other than a much smaller memory footprint, one of the large advantages that pushlocks have over executive resources is that in the noncontended case they do not require lengthy accounting and integer operations to perform acquisition or release. By being as small as a pointer, the kernel can use atomic CPU instructions to perform these tasks. \textit{(lock cmpxchg} is used, which atomically compares and exchanges the old lock with a new lock.) If the atomic compare and exchange fails, the lock contains values the caller did not expect (callers usually expect the lock to be unused or acquired as shared), and a call is then made to the more complex contended version. To improve performance even further, the kernel exposes the pushlock functionality as inline functions, meaning that no function calls are ever generated during noncontended acquisition—the assembly code is directly inserted in each function. This increases code size slightly, but it avoids the slowness of a function call. Finally, pushlocks use several algorithmic tricks to avoid lock convoys (a situation that can occur when multiple threads of the same priority are all waiting on a lock and little actual work gets done), and
Areas in which pushlocks are used include the object manager, where they protect global object-manager data structures and object security descriptors, and the memory manager, where their cache-aware counterpart is used to protect Address Windowing Extension (AWE) data structures.

### Chapter 3: System Mechanisms

### Critical Sections

Critical sections are one of the main synchronization primitives that Windows provides to user-mode applications on top of the kernel-based synchronization primitives. Critical sections and the other user-mode primitives you’ll see later have one major advantage over their kernel counterparts, which is saving a round-trip to kernel mode in cases in which the lock is noncontended (which is typically 99 percent of the time or more). Contended cases still require calling the kernel, however, because it is the only piece of the system that is able to perform the complex waking and dispatching logic required to make these objects work.

Critical sections are able to remain in user mode by using a local bit to provide the main exclusive locking logic, much like a spinlock. If the bit is 0, the critical section can be acquired, and the owner sets the bit to 1. This operation doesn’t require calling the kernel but uses the interlocked CPU operations discussed earlier. Releasing the critical section behaves similarly, with bit state changing from 1 to 0 with an interlocked operation. On the other hand, as you can probably guess, when the bit is already 1 and another caller attempts to acquire the critical section, the kernel must be called to put the thread in a wait state. Finally, because critical sections are not kernel objects, they have certain limitations. The primary one is that you cannot obtain a kernel handle to a critical section; as such, no security, naming, or other object manager functionality can be applied to a critical section. Two processes cannot use the same critical section to coordinate their operations, nor can duplication or inheritance be used.

### User-Mode Resources

User-mode resources also provide more fine-grained locking mechanisms than kernel primitives. A resource can be acquired for shared mode or for exclusive mode, allowing it to function as a multiple-reader (shared), single-writer (exclusive) lock for data structures such as databases. When a resource is acquired in shared mode and other threads attempt to acquire the same resource, no trip to the
kernel is required because none of the threads will be waiting. Only when a thread attempts to acquire the resource for exclusive access, or the resource is already locked by an exclusive owner, will this be required.

To make use of the same dispatching and synchronization mechanism you saw in the kernel, resources actually make use of existing kernel primitives. A resource data structure (RTL_RESOURCE) contains handles to a kernel mutex as well as a kernel semaphore object. When the resource is acquired exclusively by more than one thread, the resource uses the mutex because it permits only one owner. When the resource is acquired in shared mode by more than one thread, the resource uses a semaphore because it allows multiple owner counts. This level of detail is typically hidden from the programmer, and these internal objects should never be used directly.

Resources were originally implemented to support the SAM (or Security Account Manager, which is discussed in Chapter 6) and not exposed through the Windows API for standard applications. Slim Reader-Writer Locks (SRW Locks), described next, were implemented in Windows Vista to expose a similar locking primitive through a documented API, although some system components still use the resource mechanism.

**Condition Variables**

Condition variables provide a Windows native implementation for synchronizing a set of threads that are waiting on a specific result to a conditional test. Although this operation was possible with other user-mode synchronization methods, there was no atomic mechanism to check the result of the conditional test and to begin waiting on a change in the result. This required that additional synchronization be used around such pieces of code.

A user-mode thread initializes a condition variable by calling `InitializeConditionVariable` to set up the initial state. When it wants to initiate a wait on the variable, it can call `SleepConditionVariableCS`, which uses a critical section (that the thread must have initialized) to wait for changes to the variable. The setting thread must use `WakeConditionVariable` (or `WakeAllConditionVariable`) after it has modified the variable. (There is no automatic detection mechanism.) This call releases the critical section of either one or all waiting threads, depending on which function was used.

Before condition variables, it was common to use either a notification event or a synchronization event (recall that these are referred to as auto-reset or manual-reset in the Windows API) to signal the change to a variable, such as the state of a worker queue. Waiting for a change required a critical section to be acquired and then released, followed by a wait on an event. After the wait, the critical section had to be re-acquired. During this series of acquisitions and releases, the thread might have switched contexts, causing problems if one of the threads called `PulseEvent` (a similar problem to the one that keyed events solve by forcing a wait for the signaling thread if there is no waiter). With condition variables, acquisition of the critical section can be maintained by the application while `SleepConditionVariableCS` is called and can be released only after the actual work is done. This makes writing work-queue code (and similar implementations) much simpler and predictable.

Internally, condition variables can be thought of as a port of the existing pushlock algorithms present in kernel mode, with the additional complexity of acquiring and releasing critical sections.
in the \textit{SleepConditionVariableCS} API. Condition variables are pointer-size (just like pushlocks), avoid using the dispatcher (which requires a ring transition to kernel mode in this scenario, making the advantage even more noticeable), automatically optimize the wait list during wait operations, and protect against lock convoys. Additionally, condition variables make full use of keyed events instead of the regular event object that developers would have used on their own, which makes even contended cases more optimized.

\textbf{Slim Reader-Writer Locks}

Although condition variables are a synchronization mechanism, they are not fully primitive locking objects. As you’ve seen, they still depend on the critical section lock, whose acquisition and release uses standard dispatcher event objects, so trips through kernel mode can still happen and callers still require the initialization of the large critical section object. If condition variables share a lot of similarities with pushlocks, Slim Reader-Writer Locks (SRW Locks) are nearly identical. They are also pointer-size, use atomic operations for acquisition and release, rearrange their waiter lists, protect against lock convoys, and can be acquired both in shared and exclusive mode. Some differences from pushlocks, however, include the fact that SRW Locks cannot be “upgraded” or converted from shared to exclusive or vice versa. Additionally, they cannot be recursively acquired. Finally, SRW Locks are exclusive to user-mode code, while pushlocks are exclusive to kernel-mode code, and the two cannot be shared or exposed from one layer to the other.

Not only can SRW Locks entirely replace critical sections in application code, but they also offer multiple-reader, single-writer functionality. SRW Locks must first be initialized with \textit{InitializeSRWLock}, after which they can be acquired or released in either exclusive or shared mode with the appropriate APIs: \textit{AcquireSRWLockExclusive}, \textit{ReleaseSRWLockExclusive}, \textit{AcquireSRWLockShared}, and \textit{ReleaseSRWLockShared}.

\textbf{Note} Unlike most other Windows APIs, the SRW locking functions do not return with a value—instead they generate exceptions if the lock could not be acquired. This makes it obvious that an acquisition has failed so that code that assumes success will terminate instead of potentially proceeding to corrupt user data.

The Windows SRW Locks do not prefer readers or writers, meaning that the performance for either case should be the same. This makes them great replacements for critical sections, which are writer-only or exclusive synchronization mechanisms, and they provide an optimized alternative to resources. If SRW Locks were optimized for readers, they would be poor exclusive-only locks, but this isn’t the case. As a result, the design of the condition variable mechanism introduced earlier also allows for the use of SRW Locks instead of critical sections, through the \textit{SleepConditionVariableSRW} API. Finally, SRW Locks also use keyed events instead of standard event objects, so the combination of condition variables and SRW Locks results in scalable, pointer-size synchronization mechanisms with very few trips to kernel mode—except in contended cases, which are optimized to take less time and memory to wake and set because of the use of keyed events.
Run Once Initialization

The ability to guarantee the atomic execution of a piece of code responsible for performing some sort of initialization task—such as allocating memory, initializing certain variables, or even creating objects on demand—is a typical problem in multithreaded programming. In a piece of code that can be called simultaneously by multiple threads (a good example is the DllMain routine, which initializes a DLL), there are several ways of attempting to ensure the correct, atomic, and unique execution of initialization tasks.

In this scenario, Windows implements init once, or one-time initialization (also called run once initialization internally). This mechanism allows for both synchronous (meaning that the other threads must wait for initialization to complete) execution of a certain piece of code, as well as asynchronous (meaning that the other threads can attempt to do their own initialization and race) execution. We’ll look at the logic behind asynchronous execution after explaining the synchronous mechanism.

In the synchronous case, the developer writes the piece of code that would normally execute after double-checking the global variable in a dedicated function. Any information that this routine needs can be passed through the parameter variable that the init-once routine accepts. Any output information is returned through the context variable. (The status of the initialization itself is returned as a Boolean.) All the developer has to do to ensure proper execution is call InitOnceExecuteOnce with the parameter, context, and run-once function pointer after initializing an INIT_ONCE object with InitOnceInitialize API. The system will take care of the rest.

For applications that want to use the asynchronous model instead, the threads call InitOnceBeginInitialize and receive a BOOLEAN pending status and the context described earlier. If the pending status is FALSE, initialization has already taken place, and the thread uses the context value for the result. (It’s also possible for the function itself to return FALSE, meaning that initialization failed.) However, if the pending status comes back as TRUE, the thread should race to be the first to create the object. The code that follows performs whatever initialization tasks are required, such as creating objects or allocating memory. When this work is done, the thread calls InitOnceComplete with the result of the work as the context and receives a BOOLEAN status. If the status is TRUE, the thread won the race, and the object that it created or allocated is the one that will be the global object. The thread can now save this object or return it to a caller, depending on the usage.

In the more complex scenario when the status is FALSE, this means that the thread lost the race. The thread must undo all the work it did, such as deleting objects or freeing memory, and then call InitOnceBeginInitialize again. However, instead of requesting to start a race as it did initially, it uses the INIT_ONCE_CHECK_ONLY flag, knowing that it has lost, and requests the winner’s context instead (for example, the objects or memory that were created or allocated by the winner). This returns another status, which can be TRUE, meaning that the context is valid and should be used or returned to the caller, or FALSE, meaning that initialization failed and nobody has actually been able to perform the work (such as in the case of a low-memory condition, perhaps).

In both cases, the mechanism for run-once initialization is similar to the mechanism for condition variables and SRW Locks. The init once structure is pointer-size, and inline assembly versions of the
SRW acquisition/release code are used for the noncontended case, while keyed events are used when contention has occurred (which happens when the mechanism is used in synchronous mode) and the other threads must wait for initialization. In the asynchronous case, the locks are used in shared mode, so multiple threads can perform initialization at the same time.

**System Worker Threads**

During system initialization, Windows creates several threads in the System process, called *system worker threads*, which exist solely to perform work on behalf of other threads. In many cases, threads executing at DPC/dispatch level need to execute functions that can be performed only at a lower IRQL. For example, a DPC routine, which executes in an arbitrary thread context (because DPC execution can usurp any thread in the system) at DPC/dispatch level IRQL, might need to access paged pool or wait for a dispatcher object used to synchronize execution with an application thread. Because a DPC routine can’t lower the IRQL, it must pass such processing to a thread that executes at an IRQL below DPC/dispatch level.

Some device drivers and executive components create their own threads dedicated to processing work at passive level; however, most use system worker threads instead, which avoids the unnecessary scheduling and memory overhead associated with having additional threads in the system. An executive component requests a system worker thread’s services by calling the executive functions `ExQueueWorkItem` or `IoQueueWorkItem`. Device drivers should use only the latter (because this associates the work item with a Device object, allowing for greater accountability and the handling of scenarios in which a driver unloads while its work item is active). These functions place a *work item* on a queue dispatcher object where the threads look for work. (Queue dispatcher objects are described in more detail in the section “I/O Completion Ports” in Chapter 8 in Part 2.)

The `IoQueueWorkItemEx`, `IoSizeofWorkItem`, `IoInitializeWorkItem`, and `IoUninitializeWorkItem` APIs act similarly, but they create an association with a driver’s Driver object or one of its Device objects.

Work items include a pointer to a routine and a parameter that the thread passes to the routine when it processes the work item. The device driver or executive component that requires passive-level execution implements the routine. For example, a DPC routine that must wait for a dispatcher object can initialize a work item that points to the routine in the driver that waits for the dispatcher object, and perhaps points to a pointer to the object. At some stage, a system worker thread will remove the work item from its queue and execute the driver’s routine. When the driver’s routine finishes, the system worker thread checks to see whether there are more work items to process. If there aren’t any more, the system worker thread blocks until a work item is placed on the queue. The DPC routine might or might not have finished executing when the system worker thread processes its work item.

There are three types of system worker threads:

- *Delayed worker threads* execute at priority 12, process work items that aren’t considered time-critical, and can have their stack paged out to a paging file while they wait for work
items. The object manager uses a delayed work item to perform deferred object deletion, which deletes kernel objects after they have been scheduled for freeing.

- **Critical worker threads** execute at priority 13, process time-critical work items, and on Windows Server systems have their stacks present in physical memory at all times.

- A single hypercritical worker thread executes at priority 15 and also keeps its stack in memory. The process manager uses the hypercritical work item to execute the thread “reaper” function that frees terminated threads.

The number of delayed and critical worker threads created by the executive’s `ExpWorkerInitialization` function, which is called early in the boot process, depends on the amount of memory present on the system and whether the system is a server. Table 3-22 shows the initial number of threads created on default configurations. You can specify that `ExpInitializeWorker` create up to 16 additional delayed and 16 additional critical worker threads with the `AdditionalDelayedWorkerThreads` and `AdditionalCriticalWorkerThreads` values under the registry key `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Executive`.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work Queue Type</th>
<th>Default Number of Threads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Delayed</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypercritical</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The executive tries to match the number of critical worker threads with changing workloads as the system executes. Once every second, the executive function `ExpWorkerThreadBalanceManager` determines whether it should create a new critical worker thread. The critical worker threads that are created by `ExpWorkerThreadBalanceManager` are called **dynamic worker threads**, and all the following conditions must be satisfied before such a thread is created:

- Work items exist in the critical work queue.

- The number of inactive critical worker threads (ones that are either blocked waiting for work items or that have blocked on dispatcher objects while executing a work routine) must be less than the number of processors on the system.

- There are fewer than 16 dynamic worker threads.

Dynamic worker threads exit after 10 minutes of inactivity. Thus, when the workload dictates, the executive can create up to 16 dynamic worker threads.
EXPERIMENT: Listing System Worker Threads

You can use the `!exqueue` kernel debugger command to see a listing of system worker threads classified by their type:

```
1kd> !exqueue
Dumping ExWorkerQueue: 820FDE40

**** Critical WorkQueue (current = 0 maximum = 2 )
THREAD 86116db8 Cid 0004.001c Teb: 00000000 Win32Thread: 00000000 WAIT
THREAD 8613b020 Cid 0004.0020 Teb: 00000000 Win32Thread: 00000000 WAIT
THREAD 8613bd78 Cid 0004.0024 Teb: 00000000 Win32Thread: 00000000 WAIT
THREAD 8613bad0 Cid 0004.0028 Teb: 00000000 Win32Thread: 00000000 WAIT
THREAD 8613b828 Cid 0004.002c Teb: 00000000 Win32Thread: 00000000 WAIT

**** Delayed WorkQueue (current = 0 maximum = 2 )
THREAD 8613b580 Cid 0004.0030 Teb: 00000000 Win32Thread: 00000000 WAIT
THREAD 8613b2d8 Cid 0004.0034 Teb: 00000000 Win32Thread: 00000000 WAIT
THREAD 8613c020 Cid 0004.0038 Teb: 00000000 Win32Thread: 00000000 WAIT
THREAD 8613cd78 Cid 0004.003c Teb: 00000000 Win32Thread: 00000000 WAIT
THREAD 8613cad0 Cid 0004.0040 Teb: 00000000 Win32Thread: 00000000 WAIT
THREAD 8613c828 Cid 0004.0044 Teb: 00000000 Win32Thread: 00000000 WAIT
THREAD 8613c580 Cid 0004.0048 Teb: 00000000 Win32Thread: 00000000 WAIT

**** HyperCritical WorkQueue (current = 0 maximum = 2 )
THREAD 8613c2d8 Cid 0004.004c Teb: 00000000 Win32Thread: 00000000 WAIT
```

Windows Global Flags

Windows has a set of flags stored in a systemwide global variable named `NtGlobalFlag` that enable various internal debugging, tracing, and validation support in the operating system. The system variable `NtGlobalFlag` is initialized from the registry key `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager` in the value `GlobalFlag` at system boot time. By default, this registry value is 0, so it's likely that on your systems, you're not using any global flags. In addition, each image has a set of global flags that also turn on internal tracing and validation code (although the bit layout of these flags is entirely different from the systemwide global flags).

Fortunately, the debugging tools contains a utility named Gflags.exe you can use to view and change the system global flags (either in the registry or in the running system) as well as image global flags. Gflags has both a command-line and a GUI interface. To see the command-line flags, type `gflags /?`. If you run the utility without any switches, the dialog box shown in Figure 3-28 is displayed.
You can configure a variable’s settings in the registry on the System Registry page or the current value of a variable in system memory on the Kernel Flags page.

The Image File page requires you to fill in the file name of an executable image. Use this option to change a set of global flags that apply to an individual image (rather than to the whole system). In Figure 3-29, notice that the flags are different from the operating system ones shown in Figure 3-28.
EXPERIMENT: Viewing and Setting NtGlobalFlag

You can use the !gflag kernel debugger command to view and set the state of the NtGlobalFlag kernel variable. The !gflag command lists all the flags that are enabled. You can use !gflag -? to get the entire list of supported global flags.

Advanced Local Procedure Call

All modern operating systems require a mechanism for securely transferring data between one or more processes in user mode, as well as between a service in the kernel and clients in user mode. Typically, UNIX mechanisms such as mailslots, files, named pipes, and sockets are used for portability, while other developers use window messages for graphical applications. Windows implements an internal IPC mechanism called Advanced Local Procedure Call, or ALPC, which is a high-speed, scalable, and secured facility for message passing arbitrary-size messages. Although it is internal, and thus not available for third-party developers, ALPC is widely used in various parts of Windows:

- Windows applications that use remote procedure call (RPC), a documented API, indirectly use ALPC when they specify local-RPC over the ncalrpc transport, a form of RPC used to communicate between processes on the same system. Kernel-mode RPC, used by the network stack, also uses ALPC.

- Whenever a Windows process and/or thread starts, as well as during any Windows subsystem operation (such as all console I/O), ALPC is used to communicate with the subsystem process (CSRSS). All subsystems communicate with the session manager (SMSS) over ALPC.

- Winlogon uses ALPC to communicate with the local security authentication process, LSASS.

- The security reference monitor (an executive component explained in Chapter 6) uses ALPC to communicate with the LSASS process.

- The user-mode power manager and power monitor communicate with the kernel-mode power manager over ALPC, such as whenever the LCD brightness is changed.

- Windows Error Reporting uses ALPC to receive context information from crashing processes.

- The User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF) enables user-mode drivers to communicate using ALPC.

Note ALPC is the replacement for an older IPC mechanism initially shipped with the very first kernel design of Windows NT, called LPC, which is why certain variables, fields, and functions might still refer to “LPC” today. Keep in mind that LPC is now emulated on top of ALPC for compatibility and has been removed from the kernel (legacy system calls still exist, which get wrapped into ALPC calls).
Connection Model

Typically, ALPCs are used between a server process and one or more client processes of that server. An ALPC connection can be established between two or more user-mode processes or between a kernel-mode component and one or more user-mode processes. ALPC exports a single executive object called the port object to maintain the state needed for communication. Although this is just one object, there are actually several kinds of ALPC ports that it can represent:

- **Server connection port** A named port that is a server connection request point. Clients can connect to the server by connecting to this port.

- **Server communication port** An unnamed port a server uses to communicate with a particular client. The server has one such port per active client.

- **Client communication port** An unnamed port a particular client thread uses to communicate with a particular server.

- **Unconnected communication port** An unnamed port a client can use to communicate locally with itself.

ALPC follows a connection and communication model that’s somewhat reminiscent of BSD socket programming. A server first creates a server connection port (\texttt{NtAlpcCreatePort}), while a client attempts to connect to it (\texttt{NtAlpcConnectPort}). If the server was in a listening state, it receives a connection request message and can choose to accept it (\texttt{NtAlpcAcceptPort}). In doing so, both the client and server communication ports are created, and each respective endpoint process receives a handle to its communication port. Messages are then sent across this handle (\texttt{NtAlpcSendWaitReceiveMessage}), typically in a dedicated thread, so that the server can continue listening for connection requests on the original connection port (unless this server expects only one client).

The server also has the ability to deny the connection, either for security reasons or simply due to protocol or versioning issues. Because clients can send a custom payload with a connection request, this is usually used by various services to ensure that the correct client, or only one client, is talking to the server. If any anomalies are found, the server can reject the connection, and, optionally, return a payload containing information on why the client was rejected (allowing the client to take corrective action, if possible, or for debugging purposes).

Once a connection is made, a connection information structure (actually, a blob, as will be described shortly) stores the linkage between all the different ports, as shown in Figure 3-30.
Message Model

Using ALPC, a client and thread using blocking messages each take turns performing a loop around the NtAlpcSendWaitReplyPort system call, in which one side sends a request and waits for a reply while the other side does the opposite. However, because ALPC supports asynchronous messages, it's possible for either side not to block and choose instead to perform some other runtime task and check for messages later (some of these methods will be described shortly). ALPC supports the following three methods of exchanging payloads sent with a message:

- A message can be sent to another process through the standard double-buffering mechanism, in which the kernel maintains a copy of the message (copying it from the source process), switches to the target process, and copies the data from the kernel's buffer. For compatibility, if legacy LPC is being used, only messages up to 256 bytes can be sent this way, while ALPC has the ability to allocate an extension buffer for messages up to ~64KB.

- A message can be stored in an ALPC section object from which the client and server processes map views. (See Chapter 10 in Part 2 for more information on section mappings.)
A message can be stored in a message zone, which is an Memory Descriptor List (MDL) that backs the physical pages containing the data and that is mapped into the kernel's address space.

An important side effect of the ability to send asynchronous messages is that a message can be canceled—for example, when a request takes too long or the user has indicated that she wants to cancel the operation it implements. ALPC supports this with the NtAlpcCancelMessage system call.

An ALPC message can be on one of four different queues implemented by the ALPC port object:

- **Main queue**  A message has been sent, and the client is processing it.
- **Pending queue**  A message has been sent and the caller is waiting for a reply, but the reply has not yet been sent.
- **Large message queue**  A message has been sent, but the caller’s buffer was too small to receive it. The caller gets another chance to allocate a larger buffer and request the message payload again.
- **Canceled queue**  A message that was sent to the port, but has since been canceled.

Note that a fifth queue, called the wait queue, does not link messages together; instead, it links all the threads waiting on a message.

**EXPERIMENT: Viewing Subsystem ALPC Port Objects**

You can see named ALPC port objects with the WinObj tool from Sysinternals. Run Winobj.exe, and select the root directory. A gear icon identifies the port objects, as shown here:
You should see the ALPC ports used by the power manager, the security manager, and other internal Windows services. If you want to see the ALPC port objects used by RPC, you can select the \RPC Control directory. One of the primary users of ALPC, outside of Local RPC, is the Windows subsystem, which uses ALPC to communicate with the Windows subsystem DLLs that are present in all Windows processes. (Subsystem for UNIX Applications uses a similar mechanism.) Because CSRSS loads once for each session, you will find its ALPC port objects under the appropriate \Sessions\X\Windows directory, such as shown here:

Asynchronous Operation

The synchronous model of ALPC is tied to the original LPC architecture in the early NT design, and is similar to other blocking IPC mechanisms, such as Mach ports. Although it is simple to design, a blocking IPC algorithm includes many possibilities for deadlock, and working around those scenarios creates complex code that requires support for a more flexible asynchronous (nonblocking) model. As such, ALPC was primarily designed to support asynchronous operation as well, which is a requirement for scalable RPC and other uses, such as support for pending I/O in user-mode drivers. A basic feature of ALPC, which wasn’t originally present in LPC, is that blocking calls can have a timeout parameter. This allows legacy applications to avoid certain deadlock scenarios.

However, ALPC is optimized for asynchronous messages and provides three different models for asynchronous notifications. The first doesn’t actually notify the client or server, but simply copies the data payload. Under this model, it’s up to the implementor to choose a reliable synchronization method. For example, the client and the server can share a notification event object, or the client can poll for data arrival. The data structure used by this model is the ALPC completion list (not to be confused with the Windows I/O completion port). The ALPC completion list is an efficient, nonblocking
data structure that enables atomic passing of data between clients, and its internals are described further in the “Performance” section.

The next notification model is a waiting model that uses the Windows completion-port mechanism (on top of the ALPC completion list). This enables a thread to retrieve multiple payloads at once, control the maximum number of concurrent requests, and take advantage of native completion-port functionality. The user-mode thread pool (described later in this chapter) implementation provides internal APIs that processes use to manage ALPC messages within the same infrastructure as worker threads, which are implemented using this model. The RPC system in Windows, when using Local RPC (over ncalrpc), also makes use of this functionality to provide efficient message delivery by taking advantage of this kernel support.

Finally, because drivers can also use asynchronous ALPC, but do not typically support completion ports at such a high-level, ALPC also provides a mechanism for a more basic, kernel-based notification using executive callback objects. A driver can register its own callback and context with NtSetInformationAlpcPort, after which it will get called whenever a message is received. The user-mode, power-manager interfaces in the kernel employ this mechanism for asynchronous LCD backlight operation on laptops, for example.

**Views, Regions, and Sections**

Instead of sending message buffers between their two respective processes, a server and client can choose a more efficient data-passing mechanism that is at the core of Windows' memory manager: the section object. (More information is available in Chapter 10 in Part 2.) This allows a piece of memory to be allocated as shared, and for both client and server to have a consistent, and equal, view of this memory. In this scenario, as much data as can fit can be transferred, and data is merely copied into one address range and immediately available in the other. Unfortunately, shared-memory communication, such as LPC traditionally provided, has its share of drawbacks, especially when considering security ramifications. For one, because both client and server must have access to the shared memory, an unprivileged client can use this to corrupt the server’s shared memory, and even build executable payloads for potential exploits. Additionally, because the client knows the location of the server’s data, it can use this information to bypass ASLR protections. (See Chapter 8 in Part 2 for more information.)

ALPC provides its own security on top of what’s provided by section objects. With ALPC, a specific ALPC section object must be created with the appropriate NtAlpcCreatePortSection API, which will create the correct references to the port, as well as allow for automatic section garbage collection. (A manual API also exists for deletion.) As the owner of the ALPC section object begins using the section, the allocated chunks are created as ALPC regions, which represent a range of used addresses within the section and add an extra reference to the message. Finally, within a range of shared memory, the clients obtain views to this memory, which represents the local mapping within their address space.

Regions also support a couple of security options. First of all, regions can be mapped either using a secure mode or an unsecure mode. In the secure mode, only two views (mappings) are allowed to the region. This is typically used when a server wants to share data privately with a single client.
process. Additionally, only one region for a given range of shared memory can be opened from within the context of a given port. Finally, regions can also be marked with write-access protection, which enables only one process context (the server) to have write access to the view (by using MmSecureVirtualMemoryAgainstWrites). Other clients, meanwhile, will have read-only access only. These settings mitigate many privilege-escalation attacks that could happen due to attacks on shared memory, and they make ALPC more resilient than typical IPC mechanisms.

Attributes
ALPC provides more than simple message passing: it also enables specific contextual information to be added to each message and have the kernel track the validity, lifetime, and implementation of that information. Users of ALPC have the ability to assign their own custom context information as well. Whether it’s system-managed or user-managed, ALPC calls this data attributes. There are three of these that the kernel manages:

- The security attribute, which holds key information to allow impersonation of clients, as well as advanced ALPC security functionality (which is described later)
- The data view attribute, responsible for managing the different views associated with the regions of an ALPC section
- The handle attribute, which contains information about which handles to associate with the message (which is described in more detail later in the “Security” section).

Normally, these attributes are initially passed in by the server or client when the message is sent and converted into the kernel’s own internal ALPC representation. If the ALPC user requests this data back, it is exposed back securely. By implementing this kind of model and combining it with its own internal handle table, described next, ALPC can keep critical data opaque between clients and servers, while still maintaining the true pointers in kernel mode.

Finally, a fourth attribute is supported, called the context attribute. This attribute supports the traditional, LPC-style, user-specific context pointer that could be associated with a given message, and it is still supported for scenarios where custom data needs to be associated with a client/server pair.

To define attributes correctly, a variety of APIs are available for internal ALPC consumers, such as AlpcInitializeMessageAttribute and AlpcGetMessageAttribute.

Blobs, Handles, and Resources
Although the ALPC library exposes only one Object Manager object type (the port), it internally must manage a number of data structures that allow it to perform the tasks required by its mechanisms. For example, ALPC needs to allocate and track the messages associated with each port, as well as the message attributes, which it must track for the duration of their lifetime. Instead of using the Object Manager’s routines for data management, ALPC implements its own lightweight objects called blobs. Just like objects, blobs can automatically be allocated and garbage collected, reference tracked, and
locked through synchronization. Additionally, blobs can have custom allocation and deallocation callbacks, which let their owners control extra information that might need to be tracked for each blob. Finally, ALPC also uses the executive’s handle table implementation (used for objects and PIDs/TIDs) to have an ALPC-specific handle table, which allows ALPC to generate private handles for blobs, instead of using pointers.

In the ALPC model, messages are blobs, for example, and their constructor generates a message ID, which is itself a handle into ALPC’s handle table. Other ALPC blobs include the following:

- The connection blob, which stores the client and server communication ports, as well as the server connection port and ALPC handle table.

- The security blob, which stores the security data necessary to allow impersonation of a client. It stores the security attribute.

- The section, region, and view blobs, which describe ALPC’s shared-memory model. The view blob is ultimately responsible for storing the data view attribute.

- The reserve blob, which implements support for ALPC Reserve Objects. (See the “Reserve Objects” section in this chapter.)

- The handle data blob, which contains the information that enables ALPC’s handle attribute support.

Because blobs are allocated from pageable memory, they must carefully be tracked to ensure their deletion at the appropriate time. For certain kinds of blobs, this is easy: for example, when an ALPC message is freed, the blob used to contain it is also deleted. However, certain blobs can represent numerous attributes attached to a single ALPC message, and the kernel must manage their lifetime appropriately. For example, because a message can have multiple views associated with it (when many clients have access to the same shared memory), the views must be tracked with the messages that reference them. ALPC implements this functionality by using a concept of resources. Each message is associated with a resource list, and whenever a blob associated with a message (that isn’t a simple pointer) is allocated, it is also added as a resource of the message. In turn, the ALPC library provides functionality for looking up, flushing, and deleting associated resources. Security blobs, reserve blobs, and view blobs are all stored as resources.

Security
ALPC implements several security mechanisms, full security boundaries, and mitigations to prevent attacks in case of generic IPC parsing bugs. At a base level, ALPC port objects are managed by the same object manager interfaces that manage object security, preventing nonprivileged applications from obtaining handles to server ports with ACLs. On top of that, ALPC provides a SID-based trust model, inherited from the original LPC design. This model enables clients to validate the server they are connecting to by relying on more than just the port name. With a secured port, the client
process submits to the kernel the SID of the server process it expects on the side of the endpoint. At connection time, the kernel validates that the client is indeed connecting to the expected server, mitigating namespace squatting attacks where an untrusted server creates a port to spoof a server.

ALPC also allows both clients and servers to atomically and uniquely identify the thread and process responsible for each message. It also supports the full Windows impersonation model through the `NtAlpcImpersonateClientThread` API. Other APIs give an ALPC server the ability to query the SIDs associated with all connected clients and to query the LUID (locally unique identifier) of the client’s security token (which is further described in Chapter 6).

**Performance**

ALPC uses several strategies to enhance performance, primarily through its support of completion lists, which were briefly described earlier. At the kernel level, a completion list is essentially a user MDL that’s been probed and locked and then mapped to an address. (For more information on Memory Descriptor Lists, see Chapter 10 in Part 2.) Because it’s associated with an MDL (which tracks physical pages), when a client sends a message to a server, the payload copy can happen directly at the physical level, instead of requiring the kernel to double-buffer the message, as is common in other IPC mechanisms.

The completion list itself is implemented as a 64-bit queue of completed entries, and both user-mode and kernel-mode consumers can use an interlocked compare-exchange operation to insert and remove entries from the queue. Furthermore, to simplify allocations, once an MDL has been initialized, a bitmap is used to identify available areas of memory that can be used to hold new messages that are still being queued. The bitmap algorithm also uses native lock instructions on the processor to provide atomic allocation and de-allocation of areas of physical memory that can be used by completion lists.

Another ALPC performance optimization is the use of *message zones*. A message zone is simply a pre-allocated kernel buffer (also backed by an MDL) in which a message can be stored until a server or client retrieves it. A message zone associates a system address with the message, allowing it to be made visible in any process address space. More importantly, in the case of asynchronous operation, it does not require the complex setup of delayed payloads because no matter when the consumer finally retrieves the message data, the message zone will still be valid. Both completion lists and message zones can be set up with `NtAlpcSetInformationPort`.

A final optimization worth mentioning is that instead of copying data as soon as it is sent, the kernel sets up the payload for a delayed copy, capturing only the needed information, but without any copying. The message data is copied only when the receiver requests the message. Obviously, if a message zone or shared memory is being used, there’s no advantage to this method, but in asynchronous, kernel-buffer message passing, this can be used to optimize cancellations and high-traffic scenarios.
Debugging and Tracing

On checked builds of the kernel, ALPC messages can be logged. All ALPC attributes, blobs, message zones, and dispatch transactions can be individually logged, and undocumented !alpc commands in WinDbg can dump the logs. On retail systems, IT administrators and troubleshooters can enable the ALPC Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) logger to monitor ALPC messages. ETW events do not include payload data, but they do contain connection, disconnection, and send/receive and wait/unblock information. Finally, even on retail systems, certain !alpc commands obtain information on ALPC ports and messages.

EXPERIMENT: Dumping a Connection Port

In this experiment, you’ll use the CSRSS API port for Windows processes running in Session 1, which is the typical interactive session for the console user. Whenever a Windows application launches, it connects to CSRSS’s API port in the appropriate session.

1. Start by obtaining a pointer to the connection port with the !object command:

   0: kd> !object \Sessions\1\Windows\ApiPort
   Object: fffffa8004dc2090  Type: (fffffa80027a2ed0) ALPC Port
   ObjectHeader: fffffa8004dc2060 (new version)
   HandleCount: 1  PointerCount: 50
   Directory Object: fffff8a001a5fb30  Name: ApiPort

2. Now dump information on the port object itself with !alpc /p. This will confirm, for example, that CSRSS is the owner:

   0: kd> !alpc /p fffffa8004dc2090
   Port @ fffffa8004dc2090
   Type                      : ALPC_CONNECTION_PORT
   CommunicationInfo         : fffff8a001a22560
   ConnectionPort           : fffffa8004dc2090
   ClientCommunicationPort  : 0000000000000000
   ServerCommunicationPort  : 0000000000000000
   OwnerProcess              : fffffa800502db30 (csrss.exe)
   SequenceNo                : 0x000003C9 (969)
   CompletionPort            : 0000000000000000
   CompletionList            : 0000000000000000
   MessageZone               : 0000000000000000
   ConnectionPending         : No
   ConnectionRefused         : No
   Disconnected              : No
   Closed                    : No
   FlushOnClose              : Yes
   ReturnExtendedInfo        : No
   Waitable                  : No
   Security                  : Static
   Wow64CompletionList       : No
Main queue is empty.
Large message queue is empty.
Pending queue is empty.
Canceled queue is empty.

3. You can see what clients are connected to the port, which will include all Windows processes running in the session, with the undocumented `!alpc /lpc` command. You will also see the server and client communication ports associated with each connection and any pending messages on any of the queues:

```
0: kd> !alpc /lpc ffffffa8004dc2090
```

Port @fffffa8004dc2090 has 14 connections

```
SRV:ffefffa8004809c50 (m:0, p:0, l:0) <-> CLI:ffefffa8004809e60 (m:0, p:0, l:0),
Process=fffffa8004ffcb30 ('winlogon.exe')
SRV:ffefffa80054dfb30 (m:0, p:0, l:0) <-> CLI:ffefffa80054dfe60 (m:0, p:0, l:0),
Process=fffffa80054de060 ('dwm.exe')
SRV:ffefffa8005394dd0 (m:0, p:0, l:0) <-> CLI:ffefffa8005396900 (m:0, p:0, l:0),
Process=fffffa80054ed060 ('explorer.exe')
SRV:ffefffa80045a8070 (m:0, p:0, l:0) <-> CLI:ffefffa80045af070 (m:0, p:0, l:0),
Process=fffffa80045b1340 ('logonnlp.exe')
SRV:ffefffa8005197940 (m:0, p:0, l:0) <-> CLI:ffefffa800519a900 (m:0, p:0, l:0),
Process=fffffa8005da060 ('TSVNCache.exe')
SRV:ffefffa800470b070 (m:0, p:0, l:0) <-> CLI:ffefffa800470f330 (m:0, p:0, l:0),
Process=fffffa8004710360 ('vmware-tray.exe')
SRV:ffefffa800545d7670 (m:0, p:0, l:0) <-> CLI:ffefffa80054b16f0 (m:0, p:0, l:0),
Process=fffffa80056b8b30 ('WINWORD.EXE')
SRV:ffefffa80050e0e60 (m:0, p:0, l:0) <-> CLI:ffefffa80056fee60 (m:0, p:0, l:0),
Process=fffffa800478f060 ('Winobj.exe')
SRV:ffefffa800482e670 (m:0, p:0, l:0) <-> CLI:ffefffa80047b7680 (m:0, p:0, l:0),
Process=fffffa80056aab30 ('cmd.exe')
SRV:ffefffa8005166e60 (m:0, p:0, l:0) <-> CLI:ffefffa80051481e0 (m:0, p:0, l:0),
Process=fffffa8002823b30 ('conhost.exe')
SRV:ffefffa80054a2070 (m:0, p:0, l:0) <-> CLI:ffefffa800566e210 (m:0, p:0, l:0),
Process=fffffa8005669e0 ('livedk.exe')
SRV:ffefffa80056aa390 (m:0, p:0, l:0) <-> CLI:ffefffa80055a6c00 (m:0, p:0, l:0),
Process=fffffa80051b28b0 ('livedkd64.exe')
SRV:ffefffa8005551d90 (m:0, p:0, l:0) <-> CLI:ffefffa80055bfc60 (m:0, p:0, l:0),
Process=fffffa8002a69b30 ('kd.exe')
```

4. Note that if you have other sessions, you can repeat this experiment on those sessions also (as well as with session 0, the system session). You will eventually get a list of all the Windows processes on your machine. If you are using Subsystem for UNIX Applications, you can also use this technique on the \PSXSS\ApiPort object.
Kernel Event Tracing

Various components of the Windows kernel and several core device drivers are instrumented to record trace data of their operations for use in system troubleshooting. They rely on a common infrastructure in the kernel that provides trace data to the user-mode Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) facility. An application that uses ETW falls into one or more of three categories:

- **Controller** A controller starts and stops logging sessions and manages buffer pools. Example controllers include Reliability and Performance Monitor (see the “EXPERIMENT: Tracing TCP/IP Activity with the Kernel Logger” section, later in this section) and XPerf from the Windows Performance Toolkit (see the “EXPERIMENT: Monitoring Interrupt and DPC Activity” section, earlier in this chapter).

- **Provider** A provider defines GUIDs (globally unique identifiers) for the event classes it can produce traces for and registers them with ETW. The provider accepts commands from a controller for starting and stopping traces of the event classes for which it’s responsible.

- **Consumer** A consumer selects one or more trace sessions for which it wants to read trace data. Consumers can receive the events in buffers in real time or in log files.

Windows includes dozens of user-mode providers, for everything from Active Directory to the Service Control Manager to Explorer. ETW also defines a logging session with the name NT Kernel Logger (also known as the kernel logger) for use by the kernel and core drivers. The providers for the NT Kernel Logger are implemented by ETW code in Ntoskrnl.exe and the core drivers.

When a controller in user mode enables the kernel logger, the ETW library (which is implemented in \Windows\System32\Ntdll.dll) calls the NtTraceControl system function, telling the ETW code in the kernel which event classes the controller wants to start tracing. If file logging is configured (as opposed to in-memory logging to a buffer), the kernel creates a system thread in the system process that creates a log file. When the kernel receives trace events from the enabled trace sources, it records them to a buffer. If it was started, the file logging thread wakes up once per second to dump the contents of the buffers to the log file.

Trace records generated by the kernel logger have a standard ETW trace event header, which records time stamp, process, and thread IDs, as well as information on what class of event the record corresponds to. Event classes can provide additional data specific to their events. For example, disk event class trace records indicate the operation type (read or write), disk number at which the operation is directed, and sector offset and length of the operation.

Some of the trace classes that can be enabled for the kernel logger and the component that generates each class include the following:

- **Disk I/O** Disk class driver
- **File I/O** File system drivers
- **File I/O Completion**  File system drivers
- **Hardware Configuration**  Plug and Play manager (See Chapter 9 in Part 2 for information on the Plug and Play manager.)
- **Image Load/Unload**  The system image loader in the kernel
- **Page Faults**  Memory manager (See Chapter 10 in Part 2 for more information on page faults.)
- **Hard Page Faults**  Memory manager
- **Process Create/Delete**  Process manager (See Chapter 5 for more information on the process manager.)
- **Thread Create/Delete**  Process manager
- **Registry Activity**  Configuration manager (See “The Registry” section in Chapter 4 for more information on the configuration manager.)
- **Network TCP/IP**  TCP/IP driver
- **Process Counters**  Process manager
- **Context Switches**  Kernel dispatcher
- **Deferred Procedure Calls**  Kernel dispatcher
- **Interrupts**  Kernel dispatcher
- **System Calls**  Kernel dispatcher
- **Sample Based Profiling**  Kernel dispatcher and HAL
- **Driver Delays**  I/O manager
- **Split I/O**  I/O manager
- **Power Events**  Power manager
- **ALPC**  Advanced local procedure call
- **Scheduler and Synchronization**  Kernel dispatcher (See Chapter 5 for more information about thread scheduling)

You can find more information on ETW and the kernel logger, including sample code for controllers and consumers, in the Windows SDK.
EXPERIMENT: Tracing TCP/IP Activity with the Kernel Logger

To enable the kernel logger and have it generate a log file of TCP/IP activity, follow these steps:

1. Run the Performance Monitor, and click on Data Collector Sets, User Defined.
2. Right-click on User Defined, choose New, and select Data Collector Set.
3. When prompted, enter a name for the data collector set (for example, `experiment`), and choose Create Manually (Advanced) before clicking Next.
4. In the dialog box that opens, select Create Data Logs, check Event Trace Data, and then click Next. In the Providers area, click Add, and locate Windows Kernel Trace. In the Properties list, select Keywords(Any), and then click Edit.

5. From this list, select only Net for Network TCP/IP, and then click OK.
6. Click Next to select a location where the files are saved. By default, this location is C:\Perflogs\<User>\experiment\, if this is how you named the data collector set. Click Next, and in the Run As edit box, enter the Administrator account name and set the password to match it. Click Finish. You should now see a window similar to the one shown here:

![Performance Monitor Window](image)

7. Right-click on “experiment” (or whatever name you gave your data collector set), and then click Start. Now generate some network activity by opening a browser and visiting a web site.

8. Right-click on the data collector set node again, and then click Stop.

9. Open a command prompt, and change to the C:\Perflogs\experiment\00001 directory (or the directory into which you specified that the trace log file be stored).

10. Run `tracerpt`, and pass it the name of the trace log file:

    `tracerpt DataCollector01.etl -o dumpfile.csv -of CSV`

11. Open dumpfile.csv in Microsoft Excel or in a text editor. You should see TCP and/or UDP trace records like the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tcplp</th>
<th>SendIPV4</th>
<th>0xFFFFF00</th>
<th>1.28663E+17</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>1388</th>
<th>157.54.86.28</th>
<th>172.31.234.35</th>
<th>80</th>
<th>49414</th>
<th>646659</th>
<th>646661</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Udplp</td>
<td>RecvIPV4</td>
<td>0xFFFFF00</td>
<td>1.28663E+17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>172.31.239.255</td>
<td>172.31.233.110</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0x0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udplp</td>
<td>RecvIPV4</td>
<td>0xFFFFF00</td>
<td>1.28663E+17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>172.31.239.255</td>
<td>172.31.234.162</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0x0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tcplp</td>
<td>RecvIPV4</td>
<td>0xFFFFF00</td>
<td>1.28663E+17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1425</td>
<td>157.54.86.28</td>
<td>172.31.234.35</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>49414</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0x0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tcplp</td>
<td>RecvIPV4</td>
<td>0xFFFFF00</td>
<td>1.28663E+17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1380</td>
<td>157.54.86.28</td>
<td>172.31.234.35</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>49414</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0x0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tcplp</td>
<td>RecvIPV4</td>
<td>0xFFFFF00</td>
<td>1.28663E+17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>157.54.86.28</td>
<td>172.31.234.35</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>49414</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0x0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tcplp</td>
<td>RecvIPV4</td>
<td>0xFFFFF00</td>
<td>1.28663E+17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1415</td>
<td>157.54.86.28</td>
<td>172.31.234.35</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>49414</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0x0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tcplp</td>
<td>RecvIPV4</td>
<td>0xFFFFF00</td>
<td>1.28663E+17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>157.54.86.28</td>
<td>172.31.234.35</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>49414</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0x0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Wow64

Wow64 (Win32 emulation on 64-bit Windows) refers to the software that permits the execution of 32-bit x86 applications on 64-bit Windows. It is implemented as a set of user-mode DLLs, with some support from the kernel for creating 32-bit versions of what would normally only be 64-bit data structures, such as the process environment block (PEB) and thread environment block (TEB). Changing Wow64 contexts through `Get/SetThreadContext` is also implemented by the kernel. Here are the user-mode DLLs responsible for Wow64:

- **Wow64.dll** Manages process and thread creation, and hooks exception-dispatching and base system calls exported by Ntoskrnl.exe. It also implements file-system redirection and registry redirection.

- **Wow64Cpu.dll** Manages the 32-bit CPU context of each running thread inside Wow64, and provides processor architecture-specific support for switching CPU mode from 32-bit to 64-bit and vice versa.

- **Wow64Win.dll** Intercepts the GUI system calls exported by Win32k.sys.

- **IA32Exec.bin and Wowia32x.dll on IA64 systems** Contain the IA-32 software emulator and its interface library. Because Itanium processors cannot natively execute x86 32-bit instructions in an efficient manner (performance is worse than 30 percent), software emulation (through binary translation) is required through the use of these two additional components.

The relationship of these DLLs is shown in Figure 3-31.

![Wow64 architecture](image)

**FIGURE 3-31** Wow64 architecture

**Wow64 Process Address Space Layout**

Wow64 processes can run with 2 GB or 4 GB of virtual space. If the image header has the large-address-aware flag set, the memory manager reserves the user-mode address space above the 4-GB boundary through the end of the user-mode boundary. If the image is not marked as large
address space aware, the memory manager reserves the user-mode address space above 2 GB. (For more information on large-address-space support, see the section “x86 User Address Space Layouts” in Chapter 10 in Part 2.)

System Calls
Wow64 hooks all the code paths where 32-bit code would transition to the native 64-bit system or when the native system needs to call into 32-bit user-mode code. During process creation, the process manager maps into the process address space the native 64-bit Ntdll.dll, as well as the 32-bit Ntdll.dll for Wow64 processes. When the loader initialization is called, it calls the Wow64 initialization code inside Wow64.dll. Wow64 then sets up the startup context required by the 32-bit Ntdll, switches the CPU mode to 32-bits, and starts executing the 32-bit loader. From this point onward, execution continues as if the process is running on a native 32-bit system.

Special 32-bit versions of Ntdll.dll, User32.dll, and Gdi32.dll are located in the \Windows\Syswow64 folder (as well as certain other DLLs that perform interprocess communication, such as Rpcrt4.dll). These call into Wow64 rather than issuing the native 32-bit system call instruction. Wow64 transitions to native 64-bit mode, captures the parameters associated with the system call (converting 32-bit pointers to 64-bit pointers), and issues the corresponding native 64-bit system call. When the native system call returns, Wow64 converts any output parameters if necessary from 64-bit to 32-bit formats before returning to 32-bit mode.

Exception Dispatching
Wow64 hooks exception dispatching through Ntdll’s KiUserExceptionDispatcher. Whenever the 64-bit kernel is about to dispatch an exception to a Wow64 process, Wow64 captures the native exception and context record in user mode and then prepares a 32-bit exception and context record and dispatches it the same way the native 32-bit kernel would.

User APC Dispatching
Wow64 also hooks user-mode APC delivery through Ntdll’s KiUserApcDispatcher. Whenever the 64-bit kernel is about to dispatch a user-mode APC to a Wow64 process, it maps the 32-bit APC address to a higher range of 64-bit address space. The 64-bit Ntdll then captures the native APC and context record in user mode and maps it back to a 32-bit address. It then prepares a 32-bit user-mode APC and context record and dispatches it the same way the native 32-bit kernel would.

Console Support
Because console support is implemented in user mode by Csrss.exe, of which only a single native binary exists, 32-bit applications would be unable to perform console I/O while on 64-bit Windows. Similarly to how a special rpcrt4.dll exits to thunk 32-bit to 64-bit RPCs, the 32-bit Kernel.dll for Wow64 contains special code to call into Wow, for thunking parameters during interaction with Csrss and Conhost.exe.
User Callbacks
Wow64 intercepts all callbacks from the kernel into user mode. Wow64 treats such calls as system calls; however, the data conversion is done in the reverse order: input parameters are converted from 64 bits to 32 bits, and output parameters are converted when the callback returns from 32 bits to 64 bits.

File System Redirection
To maintain application compatibility and to reduce the effort of porting applications from Win32 to 64-bit Windows, system directory names were kept the same. Therefore, the \Windows\System32 folder contains native 64-bit images. Wow64, as it hooks all the system calls, translates all the path-related APIs and replaces the path name of the \Windows\System32 folder with \Windows\Syswow64. Wow64 also redirects \Windows\LastGood to \Windows\LastGood\syswow64 and \Windows\Regedit.exe to \Windows\syswow64\Regedit.exe. Through the use of system environment variables, the %PROGRAMFILES% variable is also set to \Program Files (x86) for 32-bit applications, while it is set to \Program Files folder for 64-bit applications. CommonProgramFiles and CommonProgramFiles (x86) also exist, which always point to the 32-bit location, while ProgramW6432 and CommonProgramW6432 point to the 64-bit locations unconditionally.

Note Because certain 32-bit applications might indeed be aware and able to deal with 64-bit images, a virtual directory, \Windows\Sysnative, allows any I/Os originating from a 32-bit application to this directory to be exempted from file redirection. This directory doesn't actually exist—it is a virtual path that allows access to the real System32 directory, even from an application running under Wow64.

There are a few subdirectories of \Windows\System32 that, for compatibility reasons, are exempted from being redirected such that access attempts to them made by 32-bit applications actually access the real one. These directories include the following:

- %windir%\system32\drivers\etc
- %windir%\system32\spool
- %windir%\system32\catroot and %windir%\system32\catroot2
- %windir%\system32\logfiles
- %windir%\system32\driverstore

Finally, Wow64 provides a mechanism to control the file system redirection built into Wow64 on a per-thread basis through the Wow64DisableWow64FsRedirection and Wow64RevertWow64FsRedirection functions. This mechanism can have issues with delay-loaded DLLs, opening files through the common file dialog and even internationalization—because once redirection is disabled, the system no longer uses it during internal loading either, and certain 64-bit-only files would then fail to be found. Using the c:\windows\sysnative path or some of the other consistent paths introduced earlier is usually a safer methodology for developers to use.
Registry Redirection

Applications and components store their configuration data in the registry. Components usually write their configuration data in the registry when they are registered during installation. If the same component is installed and registered both as a 32-bit binary and a 64-bit binary, the last component registered will override the registration of the previous component because they both write to the same location in the registry.

To help solve this problem transparently without introducing any code changes to 32-bit components, the registry is split into two portions: Native and Wow64. By default, 32-bit components access the 32-bit view and 64-bit components access the 64-bit view. This provides a safe execution environment for 32-bit and 64-bit components and separates the 32-bit application state from the 64-bit one if it exists.

To implement this, Wow64 intercepts all the system calls that open registry keys and retranslates the key path to point it to the Wow64 view of the registry. Wow64 splits the registry at these points:

- HKLM\SOFTWARE
- HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT

However, note that many of the subkeys are actually shared between 32-bit and 64-bit apps—that is, not the entire hive is split.

Under each of these keys, Wow64 creates a key called Wow6432Node. Under this key is stored 32-bit configuration information. All other portions of the registry are shared between 32-bit and 64-bit applications (for example, HKLM\SYSTEM).

As an extra help, if a 32-bit application writes a REG_SZ or REG_EXPAND_SZ value that starts with the data “%ProgramFiles%” or “%commonprogramfiles%” to the registry, Wow64 modifies the actual values to “%ProgramFiles(x86)%” and “%commonprogramfiles(x86)%” to match the file system redirection and layout explained earlier. The 32-bit application must write exactly these strings using this case—any other data will be ignored and written normally. Finally, any key containing “system32” is replaced with “syswow64” in all cases, regardless of flags and case sensitivity, unless KEY_WOW64_64KEY is used and the key is on the list of “reflected keys”, which is available on MSDN.

For applications that need to explicitly specify a registry key for a certain view, the following flags on the RegOpenKeyEx, RegCreateKeyEx, RegOpenKeyTransacted, RegCreateKeyTransacted, and RegDeleteKeyEx functions permit this:

- KEY_WOW64_64KEY—Explicitly opens a 64-bit key from either a 32-bit or 64-bit application, and disables the REG_SZ or REG_EXPAND_SZ interception explained earlier
- KEY_WOW64_32KEY—Explicitly opens a 32-bit key from either a 32-bit or 64-bit application

I/O Control Requests

Besides normal read and write operations, applications can communicate with some device drivers through device I/O control functions using the Windows DeviceIoControl API. The application might specify an input and/or output buffer along with the call. If the buffer contains pointer-dependent...
data and the process sending the control request is a Wow64 process, the view of the input and/or output structure is different between the 32-bit application and the 64-bit driver, because pointers are 4 bytes for 32-bit applications and 8 bytes for 64-bit applications. In this case, the kernel driver is expected to convert the associated pointer-dependent structures. Drivers can call the IoIs32bitProcess function to detect whether or not an I/O request originated from a Wow64 process. Look for “Supporting 32-Bit I/O in Your 64-Bit Driver” on MSDN for more details.

16-Bit Installer Applications
Wow64 doesn’t support running 16-bit applications. However, because many application installers are 16-bit programs, Wow64 has special case code to make references to certain well-known 16-bit installers work. These installers include the following:

- Microsoft ACME Setup version: 1.2, 2.6, 3.0, and 3.1
- InstallShield version 5.x (where x is any minor version number)

Whenever a 16-bit process is about to be created using the CreateProcess() API, Ntvdm64.dll is loaded and control is transferred to it to inspect whether the 16-bit executable is one of the supported installers. If it is, another CreateProcess is issued to launch a 32-bit version of the installer with the same command-line arguments.

Printing
32-bit printer drivers cannot be used on 64-bit Windows. Print drivers must be ported to native 64-bit versions. However, because printer drivers run in the user-mode address space of the requesting process and only native 64-bit printer drivers are supported on 64-bit Windows, a special mechanism is needed to support printing from 32-bit processes. This is done by redirecting all printing functions to Splwow64.exe, the Wow64 RPC print server. Because Splwow64 is a 64-bit process, it can load 64-bit printer drivers.

Restrictions
Wow64 does not support the execution of 16-bit applications (this is supported on 32-bit versions of Windows) or the loading of 32-bit kernel-mode device drivers (they must be ported to native 64-bits). Wow64 processes can load only 32-bit DLLs and can’t load native 64-bit DLLs. Likewise, native 64-bit processes can’t load 32-bit DLLs. The one exception is the ability to load resource or data-only DLLs cross-architecture, which is allowed because those DLLs contain only data, not code.

In addition to the above, due to page size differences, Wow64 on IA64 systems does not support the ReadFileScatter, WriteFileGather, GetWriteWatch, AVX registers, XSAVE, and AWE functions. Also, hardware acceleration through DirectX is not available. (Software emulation is provided for Wow64 processes.)
User-Mode Debugging

Support for user-mode debugging is split into three different modules. The first one is located in the executive itself and has the prefix *Dbgk*, which stands for *Debugging Framework*. It provides the necessary internal functions for registering and listening for debug events, managing the debug object, and packaging the information for consumption by its user-mode counterpart. The user-mode component that talks directly to *Dbgk* is located in the native system library, Ntdll.dll, under a set of APIs that begin with the prefix *DbgUi*. These APIs are responsible for wrapping the underlying debug object implementation (which is opaque), and they allow all subsystem applications to use debugging by wrapping their own APIs around the *DbgUi* implementation. Finally, the third component in user-mode debugging belongs to the subsystem DLLs. It is the exposed, documented API (located in KernelBase.dll for the Windows subsystem) that each subsystem supports for performing debugging of other applications.

Kernel Support

The kernel supports user-mode debugging through an object mentioned earlier, the *debug object*. It provides a series of system calls, most of which map directly to the Windows debugging API, typically accessed through the *DbgUi* layer first. The debug object itself is a simple construct, composed of a series of flags that determine state, an event to notify any waiters that debugger events are present, a doubly linked list of debug events waiting to be processed, and a fast mutex used for locking the object. This is all the information that the kernel requires for successfully receiving and sending debugger events, and each debugged process has a *debug port* member in its structure pointing to this debug object.

Once a process has an associated debug port, the events described in Table 3-23 can cause a debug event to be inserted into the list of events.

**TABLE 3-23** Kernel-Mode Debugging Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Identifier</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Triggered By</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>DbgKmExceptionApi</em></td>
<td>An exception has occurred.</td>
<td><em>KiDispatchException</em> during an exception that occurred in user mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>DbgKmCreateThreadApi</em></td>
<td>A new thread has been created.</td>
<td>Startup of a user-mode thread</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>DbgKmCreateProcessApi</em></td>
<td>A new process has been created.</td>
<td>Startup of a user-mode thread that is the first thread in the process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>DbgKmExitThreadApi</em></td>
<td>A thread has exited.</td>
<td>Death of a user-mode thread</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>DbgKmExitProcessApi</em></td>
<td>A process has exited.</td>
<td>Death of a user-mode thread that was the last thread in the process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>DbgKmLoadDllApi</em></td>
<td>A DLL was loaded.</td>
<td><em>NtMapViewOfSection</em> when the section is an image file (could be an EXE as well)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>DbgKmUnloadDllApi</em></td>
<td>A DLL was unloaded.</td>
<td><em>NtUnmapViewOfSection</em> when the section is an image file (could be an EXE as well)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>DbgKmErrorReportApi</em></td>
<td>An exception needs to be forwarded to Windows Error Reporting (WER).</td>
<td><em>KiDispatchException</em> during an exception that occurred in user mode, after the debugger was unable to handle it</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Apart from the causes mentioned in the table, there are a couple of special triggering cases outside the regular scenarios that occur at the time a debugger object first becomes associated with a process. The first create process and create thread messages will be manually sent when the debugger is attached, first for the process itself and its main thread and followed by create thread messages for all the other threads in the process. Finally, load dll events for the executable being debugged (Ntdll.dll) and then all the current DLLs loaded in the debugged process will be sent.

Once a debugger object has been associated with a process, all the threads in the process are suspended. At this point, it is the debugger’s responsibility to start requesting that debug events be sent through. Debuggers request that debug events be sent back to user mode by performing a wait on the debug object. This call loops the list of debug events. As each request is removed from the list, its contents are converted from the internal dbgk structure to the native structure that the next layer up understands. As you’ll see, this structure is different from the Win32 structure as well, and another layer of conversion has to occur. Even after all pending debug messages have been processed by the debugger, the kernel does not automatically resume the process. It is the debugger’s responsibility to call the ContinueDebugEvent function to resume execution.

Apart from some more complex handling of certain multithreading issues, the basic model for the framework is a simple matter of producers—code in the kernel that generates the debug events in the previous table—and consumers—the debugger waiting on these events and acknowledging their receipt.

**Native Support**

Although the basic protocol for user-mode debugging is quite simple, it’s not directly usable by Windows applications—instead, it’s wrapped by the DbgUi functions in Ntdll.dll. This abstraction is required to allow native applications, as well as different subsystems, to use these routines (because code inside Ntdll.dll has no dependencies). The functions that this component provides are mostly analogous to the Windows API functions and related system calls. Internally, the code also provides the functionality required to create a debug object associated with the thread. The handle to a debug object that is created is never exposed. It is saved instead in the thread environment block (TEB) of the debugger thread that performs the attachment. (For more information on the TEB, see Chapter 5.) This value is saved in DbgSsReserved[1].

When a debugger attaches to a process, it expects the process to be broken into—that is, an int 3 (breakpoint) operation should have happened, generated by a thread injected into the process. If this didn’t happen, the debugger would never actually be able to take control of the process and would merely see debug events flying by. Ntdll.dll is responsible for creating and injecting that thread into the target process.

Finally, Ntdll.dll also provides APIs to convert the native structure for debug events into the structure that the Windows API understands.
EXPERIMENT: Viewing Debugger Objects

Although you’ve been using WinDbg to do kernel-mode debugging, you can also use it to debug user-mode programs. Go ahead and try starting Notepad.exe with the debugger attached using these steps:

1. Run WinDbg, and then click File, Open Executable.
2. Navigate to the \Windows\System32\ directory, and choose Notepad.exe.
3. You’re not going to do any debugging, so simply ignore whatever might come up. You can type `g` in the command window to instruct WinDbg to continue executing Notepad.

Now run Process Explorer, and be sure the lower pane is enabled and configured to show open handles. (Click on View, Lower Pane View, and then Handles.) You also want to look at unnamed handles, so click on View, Show Unnamed Handles And Mappings.

Next, click on the Windbg.exe process and look at its handle table. You should see an open, unnamed handle to a debug object. (You can organize the table by Type to find this entry more readily.) You should see something like the following:

You can try right-clicking on the handle and closing it. Notepad should disappear, and the following message should appear in WinDbg:

```
ERROR: WaitForEvent failed, NTSTATUS 0xC0000354
This usually indicates that the debuggee has been killed out from underneath the debugger.
You can use .tlist to see if the debuggee still exists.
WaitForEvent failed
```

In fact, if you look at the description for the NTSTATUS code given, you will find the text: “An attempt to do an operation on a debug port failed because the port is in the process of being deleted,” which is exactly what you’ve done by closing the handle.
As you can see, the native *DbgUi* interface doesn’t do much work to support the framework except for this abstraction. The most complicated task it does is the conversion between native and Win32 debugger structures. This involves several additional changes to the structures.

**Windows Subsystem Support**

The final component responsible for allowing debuggers such as Microsoft Visual Studio or WinDbg to debug user-mode applications is in Kernel32.dll. It provides the documented Windows APIs. Apart from this trivial conversion of one function name to another, there is one important management job that this side of the debugging infrastructure is responsible for: managing the duplicated file and thread handles.

Recall that each time a *load DLL* event is sent, a handle to the image file is duplicated by the kernel and handed off in the event structure, as is the case with the handle to the process executable during the *create process* event. During each *wait* call, Kernel32.dll checks whether this is an event that results in new duplicated process and/or thread handles from the kernel (the two *create* events). If so, it allocates a structure in which it stores the process ID, thread ID, and the thread and/or process handle associated with the event. This structure is linked into the first *DbgSsReserved* array index in the TEB, where we mentioned the debug object handle is stored. Likewise, Kernel32.dll also checks for *exit* events. When it detects such an event, it “marks” the handles in the data structure.

Once the debugger is finished using the handles and performs the *continue* call, Kernel32.dll parses these structures, looks for any handles whose threads have exited, and closes the handles for the debugger. Otherwise, those threads and processes would actually never exit, because there would always be open handles to them as long as the debugger was running.

**Image Loader**

When a process is started on the system, the kernel creates a *process object* to represent it (see Chapter 5 for more information on processes) and performs various kernel-related initialization tasks. However, these tasks do not result in the execution of the application, merely in the preparation of its context and environment. In fact, unlike drivers, which are kernel-mode code, applications execute in user mode. So most of the actual initialization work is done outside the kernel. This work is performed by the *image loader*, also internally referred to as *Ldr*.

The image loader lives in the user-mode system DLL *Ntdll.dll* and not in the kernel library. Therefore, it behaves just like standard code that is part of a DLL, and it is subject to the same restrictions in terms of memory access and security rights. What makes this code special is the guaranty that it will always be present in the running process (Ntdll.dll is always loaded) and that it is the first piece of code to run in user mode as part of a new application. (When the system builds the initial context, the program counter, or instruction pointer, is set to an initialization function inside Ntdll.dll. See Chapter 5 for more information.)
Because the loader runs before the actual application code, it is usually invisible to users and developers. Additionally, although the loader’s initialization tasks are hidden, a program typically does interact with its interfaces during the run time of a program—for example, whenever loading or un-loading a DLL or querying the base address of one. Some of the main tasks the loader is responsible for include these:

- Initializing the user-mode state for the application, such as creating the initial heap and setting up the thread-local storage (TLS) and fiber-local storage (FLS) slots
- Parsing the import table (IAT) of the application to look for all DLLs that it requires (and then recursively parsing the IAT of each DLL), followed by parsing the export table of the DLLs to make sure the function is actually present (Special forwarder entries can also redirect an export to yet another DLL.)
- Loading and unloading DLLs at run time, as well as on demand, and maintaining a list of all loaded modules (the module database)
- Allowing for run-time patching (called hotpatching) support, explained later in the chapter
- Handling manifest files
- Reading the application compatibility database for any shims, and loading the shim engine DLL if required
- Enabling support for API sets and API redirection, a core part of the MinWin refactoring effort
- Enabling dynamic runtime compatibility mitigations through the SwitchBranch mechanism

As you can see, most of these tasks are critical to enabling an application to actually run its code; without them, everything from calling external functions to using the heap would immediately fail. After the process has been created, the loader calls a special native API to continue execution based on a context frame located on the stack. This context frame, built by the kernel, contains the actual entry point of the application. Therefore, because the loader doesn’t use a standard call or jump into the running application, you’ll never see the loader initialization functions as part of the call tree in a stack trace for a thread.

**EXPERIMENT: Watching the Image Loader**

In this experiment, you’ll use global flags to enable a debugging feature called loader snaps. This allows you to see debug output from the image loader while debugging application startup.

1. From the directory where you’ve installed WinDbg, launch the Gflags.exe application, and then click on the Image File tab.

2. In the Image field, type Notepad.exe, and then press the Tab key. This should enable the check boxes. Select the Show Loader Snaps option, and then click OK to dismiss the dialog box.
3. Now follow the steps in the “EXPERIMENT: Viewing Debugger Objects” section to start debugging the Notepad.exe application.

4. You should now see a couple of screens of debug information similar to that shown here:

```
0924:0248 @ 116983652 - LdrpInitializeProcess - INFO: Initializing process 0x924
0924:0248 @ 116983652 - LdrpInitializeProcess - INFO: Beginning execution of notepad.exe (C:\Windows\notepad.exe)
0924:0248 @ 116983652 - LdrpLoadDll - INFO: Loading DLL "kernel32.dll" from path "C:\Windows;C:\Windows\system32;C:\Windows;...
0924:0248 @ 116983652 - LdrpMapDll - INFO: Mapped DLL "kernel32.dll" at address 76BD000
0924:0248 @ 116983652 - LdrGetProcedureAddressEx - INFO: Locating procedure "BaseThreadInitThunk" by name
0924:0248 @ 116983652 - LdrpRunInitializeRoutines - INFO: Calling init routine 76C14592 for DLL "C:\Windows\system32\kernel32.dll"
0924:0248 @ 116983652 - LdrGetProcedureAddressEx - INFO: Locating procedure "BaseQueryModuleData" by name
```

5. Eventually, the debugger breaks somewhere inside the loader code, at a special place where the image loader checks whether a debugger is attached and fires a breakpoint. If you press the G key to continue execution, you will see more messages from the loader, and Notepad will appear.

6. Try interacting with Notepad and see how certain operations invoke the loader. A good experiment is to open the Save/Open dialog. That demonstrates that the loader not only runs at startup, but continuously responds to thread requests that can cause delayed loads of other modules (which can then be unloaded after use).

---

**Early Process Initialization**

Because the loader is present in Ntdll.dll, which is a native DLL that’s not associated with any particular subsystem, all processes are subject to the same loader behavior (with some minor differences). In Chapter 5, we’ll look in detail at the steps that lead to the creation of a process in kernel mode, as well as some of the work performed by the Windows function `CreateProcess`. Here, however, we’ll cover the work that takes place in user mode, independent of any subsystem, as soon as the first user-mode instruction starts execution. When a process starts, the loader performs the following steps:

1. Build the image path name for the application, and query the Image File Execution Options key for the application, as well as the DEP and SEH validation linker settings.

2. Look inside the executable’s header to see whether it is a .NET application (specified by the presence of a .NET-specific image directory).

3. Initialize the National Language Support (NLS for internationalization) tables for the process.

4. Initialize the Wow64 engine if the image is 32-bit and is running on 64-bit Windows.
5. Load any configuration options specified in the executable’s header. These options, which a developer can define when compiling the application, control the behavior of the executable.

6. Set the affinity mask if one was specified in the executable header.

7. Initialize FLS and TLS.

8. Initialize the heap manager for the process, and create the first process heap.

9. Allocate an SxS (Side-by-Side Assembly)/Fusion activation context for the process. This allows the system to use the appropriate DLL version file, instead of defaulting to the DLL that shipped with the operating system. (See Chapter 5 for more information.)

10. Open the \KnownDlls object directory, and build the known DLL path. For a Wow64 process, \KnownDlls32 is used instead.

11. Determine the process’ current directory and default load path (used when loading images and opening files).

12. Build the first loader data table entries for the application executable and Ntdll.dll, and insert them into the module database.

At this point, the image loader is ready to start parsing the import table of the executable belonging to the application and start loading any DLLs that were dynamically linked during the compilation of the application. Because each imported DLL can also have its own import table, this operation will continue recursively until all DLLs have been satisfied and all functions to be imported have been found. As each DLL is loaded, the loader will keep state information for it and build the module database.

**DLL Name Resolution and Redirection**

Name resolution is the process by which the system converts the name of a PE-format binary to a physical file in situations where the caller has not specified or cannot specify a unique file identity. Because the locations of various directories (the application directory, the system directory, and so on) cannot be hardcoded at link time, this includes the resolution of all binary dependencies as well as LoadLibrary operations in which the caller does not specify a full path.

When resolving binary dependencies, the basic Windows application model locates files in a search path—a list of locations that is searched sequentially for a file with a matching base name—although various system components override the search path mechanism in order to extend the default application model. The notion of a search path is a holdover from the era of the command line, when an application’s current directory was a meaningful notion; this is somewhat anachronistic for modern GUI applications.

However, the placement of the current directory in this ordering allowed load operations on system binaries to be overridden by placing malicious binaries with the same base name in the application’s current directory. To prevent security risks associated with this behavior, a feature known as safe DLL search mode was added to the path search computation and, starting with Windows XP SP2,
is enabled by default for all processes. Under safe search mode, the current directory is moved behind the three system directories, resulting in the following path ordering:

1. The directory from which the application was launched
2. The native Windows system directory (for example, C:\Windows\System32)
3. The 16-bit Windows system directory (for example, C:\Windows\System)
4. The Windows directory (for example, C:\Windows)
5. The current directory at application launch time
6. Any directories specified by the %PATH% environment variable

The DLL search path is recomputed for each subsequent DLL load operation. The algorithm used to compute the search path is the same as the one used to compute the default search path, but the application can change specific path elements by editing the %PATH% variable using the SetEnvironmentVariable API, changing the current directory using the SetCurrentDirectory API, or using the SetDllDirectory API to specify a DLL directory for the process. When a DLL directory is specified, the directory replaces the current directory in the search path and the loader ignores the safe DLL search mode setting for the process.

Callers can also modify the DLL search path for specific load operations by supplying the LOAD_WITH_ALTERED_SEARCH_PATH flag to the LoadLibraryEx API. When this flag is supplied and the DLL name supplied to the API specifies a full path string, the path containing the DLL file is used in place of the application directory when computing the search path for the operation.

**DLL Name Redirection**

Before attempting to resolve a DLL name string to a file, the loader attempts to apply DLL name redirection rules. These redirection rules are used to extend or override portions of the DLL namespace—which normally corresponds to the Win32 file system namespace—to extend the Windows application model. In order of application, they are

- **MinWin API Set Redirection** The API set mechanism is designed to allow the Windows team to change the binary that exports a given system API in a manner that is transparent to applications.

- **.LOCAL Redirection** The .LOCAL redirection mechanism allows applications to redirect all loads of a specific DLL base name, regardless of whether a full path is specified, to a local copy of the DLL in the application directory—either by creating a copy of the DLL with the same base name followed by .local (for example, MyLibrary.dll.local) or by creating a file folder with the name .local under the application directory and placing a copy of the local DLL in the folder (for example, C:\Program Files\My App\.LOCAL\MyLibrary.dll). DLLs redirected by the .LOCAL mechanism are handled identically to those redirected by SxS. (See the next bullet point.) The loader honors .LOCAL redirection of DLLs only when the executable does not have an associated manifest, either embedded or external.
- **Fusion (SxS) Redirection** Fusion (also referred to as *side-by-side, or SxS*) is an extension to the Windows application model that allows components to express more detailed binary dependency information (usually versioning information) by embedding binary resources known as *manifests*. The Fusion mechanism was first used so that applications could load the correct version of the Windows common controls package (*comctl32.dll*) after that binary was split into different versions that could be installed alongside one another; other binaries have since been versioned in the same fashion. As of Visual Studio 2005, applications built with the Microsoft linker will use Fusion to locate the appropriate version of the C runtime libraries.

The Fusion runtime tool reads embedded dependency information from a binary’s resource section using the Windows resource loader, and it packages the dependency information into lookup structures known as *activation contexts*. The system creates default activation contexts at the system and process level at boot and process startup time, respectively; in addition, each thread has an associated activation context stack, with the activation context structure at the top of the stack considered active. The per-thread activation context stack is managed both explicitly, via the `ActivateActCtx` and `DeactivateActCtx` APIs, and implicitly by the system at certain points, such as when the DLL main routine of a binary with embedded dependency information is called. When a Fusion DLL name redirection lookup occurs, the system searches for redirection information in the activation context at the head of the thread’s activation context stack, followed by the process and system activation contexts; if redirection information is present, the file identity specified by the activation context is used for the load operation.

- **Known DLL Redirection** Known DLLs is a mechanism that maps specific DLL base names to files in the system directory, preventing the DLL from being replaced with an alternate version in a different location.

One edge case in the DLL path search algorithm is the DLL versioning check performed on 64-bit and WOW64 applications. If a DLL with a matching base name is located but is subsequently determined to have been compiled for the wrong machine architecture—for example, a 64-bit image in a 32-bit application—the loader ignores the error and resumes the path search operation, starting with the path element after the one used to locate the incorrect file. This behavior is designed to allow applications to specify both 64-bit and 32-bit entries in the global `%PATH%` environment variable.

---

**EXPERIMENT: Observing DLL Load Search Order**

You can use Sysinternals Process Monitor to watch how the loader searches for DLLs. When the loader attempts to resolve a DLL dependency, you will see it perform `CreateFile` calls to probe each location in the search sequence until either it finds the specified DLL or the load fails.

Here’s the capture of the loader’s search when an executable named `Myapp.exe` has a static dependency on a library named `Mylibrary.dll`. The executable is stored in `C:\Myapp`, but the current working directory was `C:\` when the executable was launched. For the sake of demonstration, the executable does not include a manifest (by default, Visual Studio has one) so that the loader will check inside the `C:\Myapp\Myapp.exe.local` subdirectory that was created for the
experiment. To reduce noise, the Process Monitor filter includes the myapp.exe process and any paths that contain the string “mylibrary.dll”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process Name</th>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Path</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>myapp.exe</td>
<td>CreateFile</td>
<td>C:\myapp\myapp.exe.local\mylibrary.dll</td>
<td>NAME NOT FOUND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>myapp.exe</td>
<td>CreateFile</td>
<td>C:\myapp\mylibrary.dll</td>
<td>NAME NOT FOUND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>myapp.exe</td>
<td>CreateFile</td>
<td>C:\myapp\mylibrary.dll</td>
<td>NAME NOT FOUND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>myapp.exe</td>
<td>CreateFile</td>
<td>C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mylibrary.dll</td>
<td>NAME NOT FOUND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>myapp.exe</td>
<td>CreateFile</td>
<td>C:\Windows\system\mylibrary.dll</td>
<td>NAME NOT FOUND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>myapp.exe</td>
<td>CreateFile</td>
<td>C:\myapp\mylibrary.dll</td>
<td>NAME NOT FOUND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>myapp.exe</td>
<td>CreateFile</td>
<td>C:\myapp\vplib.dll</td>
<td>SUCCESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>myapp.exe</td>
<td>CloseFile</td>
<td>C:\vplib.dll</td>
<td>SUCCESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>myapp.exe</td>
<td>CloseFile</td>
<td>C:\vplib.dll</td>
<td>SUCCESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>myapp.exe</td>
<td>CloseFile</td>
<td>C:\vplib.dll</td>
<td>SUCCESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>myapp.exe</td>
<td>CreateFile</td>
<td>C:\vplib.dll</td>
<td>SUCCESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>myapp.exe</td>
<td>CreateFile</td>
<td>C:\vplib.dll</td>
<td>SUCCESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>myapp.exe</td>
<td>CloseFile</td>
<td>C:\vplib.dll</td>
<td>SUCCESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>myapp.exe</td>
<td>Load Image</td>
<td>C:\vplib.dll</td>
<td>SUCCESS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note how the search order matches that described. First, the loader checks the .LOCAL subdirectory, then the directory where the executable resides, then C:\Windows\System32 directory (because this is a 32-bit executable, that redirects to C:\Windows\SysWOW64), then the 16-bit Windows directory, then C:\Windows, and finally, the current directory at the time the executable was launched. The Load Image event confirms that the loader successfully resolved the import.

Loaded Module Database

The loader maintains a list of all modules (DLLs as well as the primary executable) that have been loaded by a process. This information is stored in a per-process structure called the process environment block, or PEB (see Chapter 5 for a full description of the PEB)—namely, in a substructure identified by Ldr and called PEB_LDR_DATA. In the structure, the loader maintains three doubly-linked lists, all containing the same information but ordered differently (either by load order, memory location, or initialization order). These lists contain structures called loader data table entries (LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY) that store information about each module. Table 3-24 lists the various pieces of information the loader maintains in an entry.

**TABLE 3-24** Fields in a Loader Data Table Entry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BaseDllName</td>
<td>Name of the module itself, without the full path</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ContextInformation</td>
<td>Used by SwitchBranch (described later) to store the current Windows context GUID associated with this module</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DllBase</td>
<td>Holds the base address at which the module was loaded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EntryPoint</td>
<td>Contains the initial routine of the module (such as DllMain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EntryPointActivationContext</td>
<td>Contains the SxS/Fusion activation context when calling initializers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flags</td>
<td>Loader state flags for this module (See Table 3-25 for a description of the flags.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Field | Meaning
--- | ---
ForwarderLinks | Linked list of modules that were loaded as a result of export table forwarders from the module
FullDllName | Fully qualified path name of the module
HashLinks | Linked list used during process startup and shutdown for quicker lookups
List Entry Links | Links this entry into each of the three ordered lists part of the loader database
LoadCount | Reference count for the module (that is, how many times it has been loaded)
LoadTime | Stores the system time value when this module was being loaded
OriginalBase | Stores the original base address (set by the linker) of this module, enabling faster processing of relocated import entries
PatchInformation | Information that’s relevant during a hotpatch operation on this module
ServiceTagLinks | Linked list of services (see Chapter 4 for more information) referencing this module
SizeOfImage | Size of the module in memory
StaticLinks | Linked list of modules loaded as a result of static references from this one
TimeDateStamp | Time stamp written by the linker when the module was linked, which the loader obtains from the module’s image PE header
TlsIndex | Thread local storage slot associated with this module

One way to look at a process’ loader database is to use WinDbg and its formatted output of the PEB. The next experiment shows you how to do this and how to look at the LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY structures on your own.

#### EXPERIMENT: Dumping the Loaded Modules Database

Before starting the experiment, perform the same steps as in the previous two experiments to launch Notepad.exe with WinDbg as the debugger. When you get to the first prompt (where you’ve been instructed to type `g` until now), follow these instructions:

1. You can look at the PEB of the current process with the `!peb` command. For now, you’re interested only in the `Ldr` data that will be displayed. (See Chapter 5 for details about other information stored in the PEB.)

```
0: kd> !peb
PEB at 000007ffffffda000
    InheritedAddressSpace: No
    ReadImageFileExecOptions: No
    BeingDebugged: No
    ImageBaseAddress: 00000000ff590000
    Ldr 0000000076e72640
    Ldr.Initialized: Yes
    Ldr.InInitializationOrderModuleList: 0000000000212880 . 0000000004731c20
    Ldr.InLoadOrderModuleList: 0000000000212770 . 0000000004731c00
```
2. The address shown on the Ldr line is a pointer to the PEB_LDR_DATA structure described earlier. Notice that WinDbg shows you the address of the three lists and dumps the initialization order list for you, displaying the full path, time stamp, and base address of each module.

3. You can also analyze each module entry on its own by going through the module list and then dumping the data at each address, formatted as a LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY structure. Instead of doing this for each entry, however, WinDbg can do most of the work by using the `!list` extension and the following syntax:

```
!list -t ntdll!_LIST_ENTRY.Flink -x "dt ntdll!_LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY @$extret"
```

Note that the last number is variable: it depends on whatever is shown on your machine under `Ldr.InLoadOrderModuleList`.

4. You should then see the entries for each module:

```
0:001> !list -t ntdll!_LIST_ENTRY.Flink -x "dt ntdll!_LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY @$extret" 001c1cf8
+0x000 InLoadOrderLinks : _LIST_ENTRY [ 0x1c1d68 - 0x76fd4ccc ]
+0x008 InMemoryOrderLinks : _LIST_ENTRY [ 0x1c1d70 - 0x76fd4cd4 ]
+0x010 InInitializationOrderLinks : _LIST_ENTRY [ 0x0 - 0x0 ]
+0x018 DllBase          : 0x00d80000
+0x01c EntryPoint       : 0x00d831ed
+0x020 SizeOfImage      : 0x28000
+0x024 FullDllName      : _UNICODE_STRING "C:\Windows\notepad.exe"
+0x02c BaseDllName      : _UNICODE_STRING "notepad.exe"
+0x034 Flags            : 0x4010
```

Although this section covers the user-mode loader in Ntdll.dll, note that the kernel also employs its own loader for drivers and dependent DLLs, with a similar loader entry structure. Likewise, the kernel-mode loader has its own database of such entries, which is directly accessible through the `PsActiveModuleList` global data variable. To dump the kernel's loaded module database, you can use a similar `!list` command as shown in the preceding experiment by replacing the pointer at the end of the command with “nt!PsActiveModuleList”.

Looking at the list in this raw format gives you some extra insight into the loader's `internals`, such as the `flags` field, which contains state information that `!peb` on its own would not show you. See Table 3-25 for their meaning. Because both the kernel and user-mode loaders use this structure, some flags apply only to kernel-mode drivers, while others apply only to user-mode applications (such as .NET state).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flag</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LDRP_STATIC_LINK (0x2)</td>
<td>This module is referenced by an import table and is required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDRP_IMAGE_DLL (0x4)</td>
<td>The module is an image DLL (and not a data DLL or executable).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDRP_IMAGE_INTEGRITY_FORCED (0x20)</td>
<td>The module was linked with /FORCEINTEGRITY (contains IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_FORCE_INTEGRITY in its PE header).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDRP_LOAD_IN_PROGRESS (0x1000)</td>
<td>This module is currently being loaded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDRP_UNLOAD_IN_PROGRESS (0x2000)</td>
<td>This module is currently being unloaded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDRP_ENTRY_PROCESSED (0x4000)</td>
<td>The loader has finished processing this module.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDRP_ENTRY_INSERTED (0x8000)</td>
<td>The loader has finished inserting this entry into the loaded module database.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDRP_FAILED_BUILTIN_LOAD (0x20000)</td>
<td>Indicates this boot driver failed to load.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDRP_DONT_CALL_FOR_THREADS (0x40000)</td>
<td>Do not send DLL_THREAD_ATTACH/DETACH notifications to this DLL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDRP_PROCESS_ATTACH_CALLED (0x80000)</td>
<td>This DLL has been sent the DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH notification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDRP_DEBUG_SYMBOLS_LOADED (0x100000)</td>
<td>The debug symbols for this module have been loaded by the kernel or user debugger.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDRP_IMAGE_NOT_AT_BASE (0x200000)</td>
<td>This image was relocated from its original base address.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDRP_COR_IMAGE (0x400000)</td>
<td>This module is a .NET application.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDRP_COR_OWNS_UNMAP (0x800000)</td>
<td>This module should be unmapped by the .NET runtime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDRP_SYSTEM(mapped) (0x100000)</td>
<td>This module is mapped into kernel address space with System PTEs (versus being in the initial boot loader’s memory).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDRP_IMAGE_VERIFYING (0x2000000)</td>
<td>This module is currently being verified by Driver Verifier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDRP_DRIVER_DEPENDENT_DLL (0x4000000)</td>
<td>This module is a DLL that is in a driver’s import table.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDRP_ENTRY_NATIVE (0x8000000)</td>
<td>This module was compiled for Windows 2000 or later. It’s used by Driver Verifier as an indication that a driver might be suspect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDRP_REDIRECTED (0x10000000)</td>
<td>The manifest file specified a redirected file for this DLL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDRP_NON_PAGED_DEBUG_INFO (0x20000000)</td>
<td>The debug information for this module is in non-paged memory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDRP_MM_LOADED (0x40000000)</td>
<td>This module was loaded by the kernel loader through MmLoadSystemImage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDRP_COMPAT_DATABASE_PROCESSED (0x80000000)</td>
<td>The shim engine has processed this DLL.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Import Parsing

Now that we’ve explained the way the loader keeps track of all the modules loaded for a process, you can continue analyzing the startup initialization tasks performed by the loader. During this step, the loader will do the following:

1. Load each DLL referenced in the import table of the process’ executable image.

2. Check whether the DLL has already been loaded by checking the module database. If it doesn’t find it in the list, the loader opens the DLL and maps it into memory.

3. During the mapping operation, the loader first looks at the various paths where it should attempt to find this DLL, as well as whether this DLL is a “known DLL,” meaning that the system has already loaded it at startup and provided a global memory mapped file for accessing it. Certain deviations from the standard lookup algorithm can also occur, either through the use of a .local file (which forces the loader to use DLLs in the local path) or through a manifest file, which can specify a redirected DLL to use to guarantee a specific version.

4. After the DLL has been found on disk and mapped, the loader checks whether the kernel has loaded it somewhere else—this is called relocation. If the loader detects relocation, it parses the relocation information in the DLL and performs the operations required. If no relocation information is present, DLL loading fails.

5. The loader then creates a loader data table entry for this DLL and inserts it into the database.

6. After a DLL has been mapped, the process is repeated for this DLL to parse its import table and all its dependencies.

7. After each DLL is loaded, the loader parses the IAT to look for specific functions that are being imported. Usually this is done by name, but it can also be done by ordinal (an index number). For each name, the loader parses the export table of the imported DLL and tries to locate a match. If no match is found, the operation is aborted.

8. The import table of an image can also be bound. This means that at link time, the developers already assigned static addresses pointing to imported functions in external DLLs. This removes the need to do the lookup for each name, but it assumes that the DLLs the application will use will always be located at the same address. Because Windows uses address space randomization (see Chapter 10 in Part 2 for more information on Address Space Load Randomization, or ASLR), this is usually not the case for system applications and libraries.

9. The export table of an imported DLL can use a forwarder entry, meaning that the actual function is implemented in another DLL. This must essentially be treated like an import or dependency, so after parsing the export table, each DLL referenced by a forwarder is also loaded and the loader goes back to step 1.

After all imported DLLs (and their own dependencies, or imports) have been loaded, all the required imported functions have been looked up and found, and all forwarders also have been loaded and processed, the step is complete: all dependencies that were defined at compile time by
the application and its various DLLs have now been fulfilled. During execution, delayed dependencies (called delay load), as well as run-time operations (such as calling LoadLibrary) can call into the loader and essentially repeat the same tasks. Note, however, that a failure in these steps will result in an error launching the application if they are done during process startup. For example, attempting to run an application that requires a function that isn’t present in the current version of the operating system can result in a message similar to the one in Figure 3-32.

FIGURE 3-32 Dialog box shown when a required (imported) function is not present in a DLL

Post-Import Process Initialization

After the required dependencies have been loaded, several initialization tasks must be performed to fully finalize launching the application. In this phase, the loader will do the following:

1. Check if the application is a .NET application, and redirect execution to the .NET runtime entry point instead, assuming the image has been validated by the framework.

2. Check if the application itself requires relocation, and process the relocation entries for the application. If the application cannot be relocated, or does not have relocation information, the loading will fail.

3. Check if the application makes use of TLS, and look in the application executable for the TLS entries it needs to allocate and configure.

4. If this is a Windows application, the Windows subsystem thread-initialization thunk code is located after loading kernel32.dll, and the Authz/AppLocker enforcement is enabled. (See Chapter 6 for more information on Software Restriction Policies.) If Kernel32.dll is not found, the system is presumably assumed to be running in MinWin and only Kernelbase.dll is loaded.

5. Any static imports are now loaded.

6. At this point, the initial debugger breakpoint will be hit when using a debugger such as WinDbg. This is where you had to type \texttt{g} to continue execution in the earlier experiments.

7. Make sure that the application will be able to run properly if the system is a multiprocessor system.

8. Set up the default data execution prevention (DEP) options, including for exception-chain validation, also called “software” DEP. (See Chapter 10 in Part 2 for more information on DEP.)
9. Check whether this application requires any application compatibility work, and load the shim engine if required.

10. Detect if this application is protected by SecuROM, SafeDisc, and other kinds of wrapper or protection utilities that could have issues with DEP (and reconfigure DEP settings in those cases).

11. Run the initializers for all the loaded modules.

12. Run the post-initialization Shim Engine callback if the module is being shimmed for application compatibility.

13. Run the associated subsystem DLL post-process initialization routine registered in the PEB. For Windows applications, this does Terminal Services–specific checks, for example.

Running the initializers is the last main step in the loader’s work. This is the step that calls the DllMain routine for each DLL (allowing each DLL to perform its own initialization work, which might even include loading new DLLs at run time) as well as processes the TLS initializers of each DLL. This is one of the last steps in which loading an application can fail. If all the loaded DLLs do not return a successful return code after finishing their DllMain routines, the loader aborts starting the application. As a very last step, the loader calls the TLS initializer of the actual application.

**SwitchBack**

As each new version of Windows fixes bugs such as race conditions and incorrect parameter validation checks in existing API functions, an application-compatibility risk is created for each change, no matter how minor. Windows makes use of a technology called SwitchBack, implemented in the loader, which enables software developers to embed a GUID specific to the Windows version they are targeting in their executable’s associated manifest. For example, if a developer wants to take advantage of improvements added in Windows 7 to a given API, she would include the Windows 7 GUID in her manifest, while if a developer has a legacy application that depends on Windows Vista–specific behavior, she would put the Windows Vista GUID in the manifest instead. SwitchBack parses this information and correlates it with embedded information in SwitchBack-compatible DLLs (in the .sb_data image section) to decide which version of an affected API should be called by the module. Because SwitchBack works at the loaded-module level, it enables a process to have both legacy and current DLLs concurrently calling the same API, yet observing different results.

Windows currently defines two GUIDs that represent either Windows Vista or Windows 7 compatibility settings:

- \{e2011457-1546-43c5-a5fe-008deee3d3f0\} for Windows Vista
- \{35138b9a-5d96-4fbd-8e2d-a2440225f93a\} for Windows 7

These GUIDs must be present in the application’s manifest file under the SupportedOS ID present in a compatibility attribute entry. (If the application manifest does not contain a GUID, Windows
Vista is chosen as the default compatibility mode. Running under the Windows 7 context affects the following components:

- RPC components use the Windows thread pool instead of a private implementation.
- DirectDraw Lock cannot be acquired on the primary buffer.
- Blitting on the desktop is not allowed without a clipping window.
- A race condition in `GetOverlappedResult` is fixed.

Whenever a Windows API is affected by changes that might break compatibility, the function's entry code calls the `SbSwitchProcedure` to invoke the SwitchBack logic. It passes along a pointer to the SwitchBack Module Table, which contains information about the SwitchBack mechanisms employed in the module. The table also contains a pointer to an array of entries for each SwitchBack point. This table contains a description of each branch-point that identifies it with a symbolic name and a comprehensive description, along with an associated mitigation tag. Typically, there will be two branch-points in a module, one for Windows Vista behavior, and one for Windows 7 behavior. For each branch-point, the required SwitchBack context is given—it is this context that determines which of the two (or more) branches is taken at runtime. Finally, each of these descriptors contains a function pointer to the actual code that each branch should execute. If the application is running with the Windows 7 GUID, this will be part of its SwitchBack context, and the `SbSelectProcedure` API, upon parsing the module table, will perform a match operation. It finds the module entry descriptor for the context and proceeds to call the function pointer included in the descriptor.

SwitchBack uses ETW to trace the selection of given SwitchBack contexts and branch-points and feeds the data into the Windows AIT (Application Impact Telemetry) logger. This data can be periodically collected by Microsoft to determine the extent to which each compatibility entry is being used, identify the applications using it (a full stack trace is provided in the log), and notify third-party vendors.

As mentioned, the compatibility level of the application is stored in its manifest. At load time, the loader parses the manifest file, creates a context data structure, and caches it in the `pContextData` member of the process environment block. (For more information on the PEB, see Chapter 5.) This context data contains the associated compatibility GUIDs that this process is executing under and determines which version of the branch-points in the called APIs that employ SwitchBack will be executed.

**API Sets**

While SwitchBack uses API redirection for specific application-compatibility scenarios, there is a much more pervasive redirection mechanism used in Windows for all applications, called *API Sets*. Its purpose is to enable fine-grained categorization of Windows APIs into sub-DLLs instead of having large multipurpose DLLs that span nearly thousands of APIs that might not be needed on all types of Windows systems today and in the future. This technology, developed mainly to support the refactoring of the bottom-most layers of the Windows architecture to separate it from higher layers, goes
hand in hand with the breakdown of Kernel32.dll and Advapi32.dll (among others) into multiple, virtual DLL files.

For example, the following graphic shows that Kernel32.dll, which is a core Windows library, imports from many other DLLs, beginning with API-MS-WIN. Each of these DLLs contain a small subset of the APIs that Kernel32 normally provides, but together they make up the entire API surface exposed by Kernel32.dll. The CORE-STRING library, for instance, provides only the Windows base string functions.

In splitting functions across discrete files, two objectives are achieved: first, doing this allows future applications to link only with the API libraries that provide the functionality that they need, and second, if Microsoft were to create a version of Windows that did not support, for example, Localization (say a non-user-facing, English-only embedded system), it would be possible to simply remove the sub-DLL and modify the API Set schema. This would result in a smaller Kernel32 binary, and any applications that ran without requiring localization would still run.

With this technology, a “base” Windows system called “MinWin” is defined (and, at the source level, built), with a minimum set of services that includes the kernel, core drivers (including file systems, basic system processes such as CSRSS and the Service Control Manager, and a handful of Windows services). Windows Embedded, with its Platform Builder, provides what might seem to be a similar technology, as system builders are able to remove select “Windows components,” such as the shell, or the network stack. However, removing components from Windows leaves dangling dependencies—code paths that, if exercised, would fail because they depend on the removed components. MinWin’s dependencies, on the other hand, are entirely self-contained.
When the process manager initializes, it calls the *PspInitializeApiSetMap* function, which is responsible for creating a section object (using a standard section object) of the API Set redirection table, which is stored in %SystemRoot%\System32\ApiSetSchema.dll. The DLL contains no executable code, but it has a section called .apiset that contains API Set mapping data that maps virtual API Set DLLs to logical DLLs that implement the APIs. Whenever a new process starts, the process manager maps the section object into the process’ address space and sets the *ApiSetMap* field in the process’ PEB to point to the base address where the section object was mapped.

In turn, the loader’s *LdrpApplyFileNameRedirection* function, which is normally responsible for the .local and SxS/Fusion manifest redirection that was mentioned earlier, also checks for API Set redirection data whenever a new import library that has a name starting with “API-“ loads (either dynamically or statically). The API Set table is organized by library with each entry describing in which logical DLL the function can be found, and that DLL is what gets loaded. Although the schema data is a binary format, you can dump its strings with the Sysinternals Strings tool to see which DLLs are currently defined:

```
C:\Windows\System32>strings apisetSchema.dll
...  
MS-Win-Core-Console-L1-1-0
kernel32.dll\MS-Win-Core-DateTime-L1-1-0
MS-Win-Core-Debug-L1-1-0
kernelbase.dll\MS-Win-Core-DelayLoad-L1-1-0
MS-Win-Core-ErrorHandling-L1-1-0
MS-Win-Core-Fibers-L1-1-0
MS-Win-Core-File-L1-1-0
MS-Win-Core-Heap-L1-1-0
MS-Win-Core-Interlocked-L1-1-0
MS-Win-Core-IO-L1-1-0
MS-Win-Core-LibraryLoader-L1-1-0
MS-Win-Core-Localization-L1-1-0
MS-Win-Core-LocalRegistry-L1-1-0
MS-Win-Core-Memory-L1-1-0
MS-Win-Core-Misc-L1-1-0
MS-Win-Core-NamedPipe-L1-1-0
MS-Win-Core-ProcessEnvironment-L1-1-0
MS-Win-Core-ProcessThreads-L1-1-0
MS-Win-Core-Profile-L1-1-0
MS-Win-Core-RtlSupport-L1-1-0
ntdll.dll
MS-Win-Core-String-L1-1-0
```
Hypervisor (Hyper-V)

One of the key technologies in the software industry—used by system administrators, developers, and testers alike—is called virtualization, and it refers to the ability to run multiple operating systems simultaneously on the same physical machine. One operating system, in which the virtualization software is executing, is called the host, while the other operating systems are running as guests inside the virtualization software. The usage scenarios for this model cover everything from being able to test an application on different platforms to having fully virtual servers all actually running as part of the same machine and managed through one central point.

Until recently, all the virtualization was done by the software itself, sometimes assisted by hardware-level virtualization technology (called host-based virtualization). Thanks to hardware virtualization, the CPU can do most of the notifications required for trapping instructions and virtualizing access to memory. These notifications, as well as the various configuration steps required for allowing guest operating systems to run concurrently, must be handled by a piece of infrastructure compatible with the CPU’s virtualization support. Instead of relying on a piece of separate software running inside a host operating system to perform these tasks, a thin piece of low-level system software, which uses strictly hardware-assisted virtualization support, can be used—a hypervisor. Figure 3-33 shows a simple architectural overview of these two kinds of systems.

With Hyper-V, Windows server computers can install support for hypervisor-based virtualization as a server role (as long as an edition with Hyper-V support is licensed). Because the hypervisor is part of the operating system, managing the guests inside it, as well as interacting with them, is fully integrated in the operating system through standard management mechanisms such as WMI and services. (See Chapter 4 for more information on these topics.)

Finally, apart from having a hypervisor that allows running other guests managed by a Windows Server host, both client and server editions of Windows also ship with enlightenments, which are special optimizations in the kernel and possibly device drivers that detect that the code is being run as a guest under a hypervisor and perform certain tasks differently, or more efficiently, considering this environment. We will look at some of these improvements later; for now, we’ll take a look at the basic architecture of the Windows virtualization stack, shown in Figure 3-34.
Partitions

One of the key architectural components behind the Windows hypervisor is the concept of a partition. A partition essentially references an instance of an operating system installation, which can refer either to what’s traditionally called the host or to the guest. Under the Windows hypervisor model, these two terms are not used; instead, we talk of either a parent partition or a child partition, respectively. Consequently, at a minimum, a Hyper-V system will have a parent partition, which is recommended to contain a Windows Server Core installation, as well as the virtualization stack and its associated components. Although this installation type is recommended because it allows minimizing patches and reducing the security surface area, resulting in increased availability of the server, a full installation is also supported. Each operating system running within the virtualized environment represents a child partition, which might contain certain additional tools that optimize access to the hardware or allow management of the operating system.

Parent Partition

One of the main goals behind the design of the Windows hypervisor was to have it as small and modular as possible, much like a microkernel, instead of providing a full, monolithic module. This means that most of the virtualization work is actually done by a separate virtualization stack and that there are also no hypervisor drivers. In lieu of these, the hypervisor uses the existing Windows driver architecture and talks to actual Windows device drivers. This architecture results in several components that provide and manage this behavior, which are collectively called the hypervisor stack.
Logically, it is the parent partition that is responsible for providing the hypervisor, as well as the entire hypervisor stack. Because these are Microsoft components, only a Windows machine can be a root partition, naturally. A parent partition should have almost no resource usage for itself because its role is to run other operating systems. The main components that the parent partition provides are shown in Figure 3-35.

**FIGURE 3-35** Components of a parent partition

### Parent Partition Operating System

The Windows installation (typically the minimal footprint server installation, called Windows Server Core, to minimize resource usage) is responsible for providing the hypervisor and the device drivers for the hardware on the system (which the hypervisor will need to access), as well as for running the hypervisor stack. It is also the management point for all the child partitions.

### Virtual Machine Manager Service and Worker Processes

The virtual machine management service (%SystemRoot%\System32\Vmms.exe) is responsible for providing the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) interface to the hypervisor, which allows managing the child partitions through a Microsoft Management Console (MMC) plug-in. It is also responsible for communicating requests to applications that need to communicate to the hypervisor or to child partitions. It controls settings such as which devices are visible to child partitions, how the memory and processor allocation for each partition is defined, and more.

The virtual machine worker processes (VMWPs), on the other hand, perform various virtualization work that a typical monolithic hypervisor would perform (similar to the work of a software-based virtualization solution). This means managing the state machine for a given child partition (to allow support for features such as snapshots and state transitions), responding to various notifications coming in from the hypervisor, performing the emulation of certain devices exposed to child partitions, and collaborating with the VM service and configuration component.
On a system with child partitions performing lots of I/O or privileged operations, you would expect most of the CPU usage to be visible in the parent partition: you can identify them by the name Vmwp.exe (one for each child partition). The worker process also includes components responsible for remote management of the virtualization stack, as well as an RDP component that allows using the remote desktop client to connect to any child partition and remotely view its user interface and interact with it.

**Virtualization Service Providers**

Virtualization service providers (VSPs) are responsible for the high-speed emulation of certain devices visible to child partitions (the exact difference between VSP-emulated devices and user-mode–process-emulated devices will be explained later), and unlike the VM service and processes, VSPs can also run in kernel mode as drivers. More detail on VSPs will follow in the section that describes device architecture in the virtualization stack.

**VM Infrastructure Driver and Hypervisor API Library**

Because the hypervisor cannot be directly accessed by user-mode applications, such as the VM service that is responsible for management, the virtualization stack must actually talk to a driver in kernel mode that is responsible for relaying the requests to the hypervisor. This is the job of the VM infrastructure driver (VID). The VID also provides support for certain low-memory memory devices, such as MMIO and ROM emulation.

A library located in kernel mode provides the actual interface to the hypervisor (called *hypercalls*). Messages can also come from child partitions (which will perform their own hypercalls), because there is only one hypervisor for the whole system and it can listen to messages coming from any partition. You can find this functionality in the Winhv.sys device driver.

**Hypervisor**

At the bottom of the architecture is the hypervisor itself, which registers itself with the processor at system boot-up time and provides its services for the stack to use (through the use of the hypercall interface). This early initialization is performed by the hvboot.sys driver, which is configured to start early on during a system boot. Because Intel and AMD processors have slightly differing implementations of hardware-assisted virtualization, there are actually two different hypervisors—the correct one is selected at boot-up time by querying the processor through CPUID instructions. On Intel systems, the Hvix64.exe binary is loaded, while on AMD systems, the Hvax64.exe image is used.

**Child Partitions**

The child partition, as discussed earlier, is an instance of any operating system running parallel to the parent partition. (Because you can save or pause the state of any child, it might not necessarily be running, but there will be a worker process for it.) Unlike the parent partition, which has full access to the APIC, I/O ports, and physical memory, child partitions are limited for security and management reasons to their own view of address space (the Guest Virtual Address Space, or GVA, which is...
managed by the hypervisor) and have no direct access to hardware. In terms of hypervisor access, it is also limited mainly to notifications and state changes. For example, a child partition doesn’t have control over other partitions (and can’t create new ones).

Child partitions have many fewer virtualization components than a parent partition because they are not responsible for running the virtualization stack—only for communicating with it. Also, these components can also be considered optional because they enhance performance of the environment but are not critical to its use. Figure 3-36 shows the components present in a typical Windows child partition.

![Components in a child partition](image)

**FIGURE 3-36** Components in a child partition

**EXPERIMENT: Examining Child Partitions from the Parent with LiveKd**

With Sysinternals LiveKd, you can examine a Windows XP or higher virtual machine from the parent partition without having to boot the child operating system in debugging mode. First, specify the `-hvl` option to LiveKd, which has it list the IDs and names of active child partitions:

```
C:\>livekd -hvl
LiveKd v5.0 - Execute kd/windbg on a live system
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com
Copyright (C) 2000-2010 Mark Russinovich and Ken Johnson

Partition GUID           Name
C5F6520B-CB6C-48CE-84EC-148C282C3A74   Win7x64
```

Then run LiveKd with the `-hv` switch and specify the ID or name of the child partition that you want to examine. Just as for debugging the local system with Livekd, the contents of the virtual machine’s memory can change as you execute LiveKd commands, resulting in LiveKd
seeing inconsistencies caused by data reflecting different points in time. If you want LiveKd to see a consistent view, you can specify the `-p` option to have the child partition paused while LiveKd is running. All commands that work on a local system also work when you use LiveKd to explore a virtual machine. Here's the partial output of the `!vm` kernel debugger command, which lists various memory-related statistics, when executed on a Hyper-V child partition:

```
C:\>livekd -hv win7x64
LiveKd v5.0 - Execute kd/windbg on a live system
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com
Copyright (C) 2000-2010 Mark Russinovich and Ken Johnson
Launching C:\\program files\\Debugging Tools for Windows (x64)\\kd.exe:
Microsoft (R) Windows Debugger Version 6.13.0002.895 AMD64
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

Loading Dump File [C:\Windows\livekd.dmp]
Kernel Complete Dump File: Full address space is available
Comment: 'LiveKD live system view (hypervisor partition)'
Symbol search path is: sryc:\Symbols\http://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols
Executable search path is:
Windows 7 Kernel Version 7600 MP (2 procs) Free x64
Product: Winnt, suite: TerminalServer SingleUserTS
Built by: 7600.16617.amd64fre.win7_gdr.100618-1621
Machine Name:
Kernel base = Oxffffff800 02a06000 PsLoadedModulessList = Oxffffff800.02c43e50
Debug session time: Sat Feb 12 19:34:57.897 17420 (UTC - 7:00)
System Uptime: 3 days 7:14:55.312
Loading Kernel Symbols
.................................................................
Loading User Symbols
Loading unloaded module list
G: kd> !vm

*** Virtual Memory Usage ***
Physical Memory: 513422 (2053688 Kb)
Page File: ????C:\pagefile.sys
Current: 1048576 Kb Free Space: 792480 Kb
Minimum: 1048576 Kb Maximum: 4194304 Kb
Available Pages: 101260 (405040 Kb)
Free Pages: 107196 (668784 Kb)
Locked IO Pages: 0 (0 Kb)
Free System PTEs: 33533587 (134134348 Kb)
Modified Pages: 898 (3592 Kb)
```

Virtualization Service Clients

Virtualization service clients (VSCs) are the child partition analogues of VSPs. Like VSPs, VSCs are used for device emulation, which is a topic of later discussion.

Enlightenments

Enlightenments are one of the key performance optimizations that Windows virtualization takes advantage of. They are direct modifications to the standard Windows kernel code that can detect that this operating system is running in a child partition and perform work differently. Usually, these optimizations are highly hardware-specific and result in a hypercall to notify the hypervisor. An example
is notifying the hypervisor of a long busy-wait spin loop. The hypervisor can keep some state stale in this scenario instead of keeping track of the state at every single loop instruction. Entering and exiting an interrupt state can also be coordinated with the hypervisor, as well as access to the APIC, which can be enlightened to avoid trapping the real access and then virtualizing it.

Another example has to do with memory management, specifically TLB flushing and changing address space. (See Chapter 9 for more information on these concepts.) Usually, the operating system executes a CPU instruction to flush this information, which affects the entire processor. However, because a child partition could be sharing a CPU with many other child partitions, such an operation would also flush this information for those operating systems, resulting in noticeable performance degradation. If Windows is running under a hypervisor, it instead issues a hypercall to have the hypervisor flush only the specific information belonging to the child partition.

**Hardware Emulation and Support**

A virtualization solution must also provide optimized access to devices. Unfortunately, most devices aren’t made to accept multiple requests coming in from different operating systems. The hypervisor steps in by providing the same level of synchronization where possible and by emulating certain devices when real access to hardware cannot be permitted. In addition to devices, memory and processors must also be virtualized. Table 3-26 describes the three types of hardware that the hypervisor must manage.

**TABLE 3-26 Virtualized Hardware**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Managed By</th>
<th>Usage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Processor</td>
<td>Hypervisor built-in scheduler and related microkernel components</td>
<td>Manage usage of hardware’s processing power, share multiple processors across multiple child partitions, manage and switch processor states (such as registers).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memory</td>
<td>Hypervisor built-in memory manager and related microkernel components</td>
<td>Manage hardware’s RAM usage and availability. Protect memory from child partitions and parent partition. Provide a contiguous view of physical memory starting at address 0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devices</td>
<td>VM worker processes—hypervisor responsible only for interception and notification</td>
<td>Provide hardware multiplexing so that multiple child partitions can access the same device on the physical machine. Optimize access to physical devices to be as fast as possible.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Instead of exposing actual hardware to child partitions, the hypervisor exposes virtual devices (called VDevs). VDevs are packaged as COM components that run inside a VM worker process, and they are the central manageable object behind the device. (Usually, VDevs expose a WMI interface.) The Windows virtualization stack provides support for two kinds of virtual devices: *emulated devices* and *synthetic devices* (also called *enlightened I/O*). The former provide support for various devices that the operating systems on the child partition would expect to find, while the latter requires specific support from the guest operating system. On the other hand, synthetic devices provide a significant performance benefit by reducing CPU overhead.
Emulated Devices

Emulated devices work by presenting the child partition with a set of I/O ports, memory ranges, and interrupts that are being controlled and monitored by the hypervisor. When access to these resources is detected, the VM worker process eventually gets notified through the virtualization stack (shown earlier in Figure 3-34). The process then emulates whatever action is expected from the device and completes the request, going back through the hypervisor and then to the child partition. From this topological view alone, one can see that there is a definite loss in performance, without even considering that the software emulation of a hardware device is usually slow.

The need for emulated devices comes from the fact that the hypervisor needs to support nonhypervisor-aware operating systems, as well as the early installation steps of even Windows itself. During the boot process, the installer can’t simply load all the child partition’s required components (such as VSCs) to use synthetic devices, so a Windows installation will always use emulated devices (which is why installation will seem very slow, but once installed the operating system will run quite close to native speed). Emulated devices are also used for hardware that doesn’t require high-speed emulation and for which software emulation might even be faster. This includes items such as COM (serial) ports, parallel ports, or the motherboard itself.

Note Hyper-V emulates an Intel i440BX motherboard, an S3 Trio video card, and an Intel 21140 NIC.

Synthetic Devices

Although emulated devices work adequately for 10-Mbit network connections, low-resolution VGA displays, and 16-bit sound cards, the operating systems and hardware that child partitions usually require in today’s usage scenarios require a lot more processing power, such as support for 1000-Mbit GbE connections; full-color, high-resolution 3D support; and high-speed access to storage devices. To support this kind of virtualized hardware access at an acceptable CPU usage level and virtualized throughput, the virtualization stack uses a variety of components to optimize device I/Os to their fullest (similar to kernel enlightenments). Three components are part of this support, and they all belong to what’s presented to the user as integration components or ICs:

- Virtualization service providers (VSPs)
- Virtualization service clients/consumers (VSCs)
- VMBus

Figure 3-37 shows a diagram of how an enlightened, or synthetic storage I/O, is handled by the virtualization stack.
As shown in Figure 3-37, VSPs run in the parent partition, where they are associated with a specific device that they are responsible for *enlightening*. (We’ll use that as a term instead of *emulating* when referring to synthetic devices.) VSCs reside in the child partition and are also associated with a specific device. Note, however, that the term *provider* can refer to multiple components spread across the device stack. For example, a VSP can be any of the following:

- A user-mode service
- A user-mode COM component
- A kernel-mode driver

In all three cases, the VSP will be associated with the actual virtual device inside the VM worker process. VSCs, on the other hand, are almost always designed to be drivers sitting at the lowest level of the device stack (see Chapter 8 in Part 2 for more information on device stacks) and intercept I/Os to a device and redirect them through a more optimized path. The main optimization that is performed by this model is to avoid actual hardware access and use VMBus instead. Under this model, the hypervisor is unaware of the I/O, and the VSP redirects it directly to the parent partition’s kernel.
storage stack, avoiding a trip to user mode as well. Other VSPs can perform work directly on the device, by talking to the actual hardware and bypassing any driver that might have been loaded on the parent partition. Another option is to have a user-mode VSP, which can make sense when dealing with lower-bandwidth devices.

As described earlier, VMBus is the name of the bus transport used to optimize device access by implementing a communications protocol using hypervisor services. VMBus is a bus driver present on both the parent partition and the child partitions responsible for the Plug and Play enumeration of synthetic devices in a child. It also contains the optimized cross-partition messaging protocol that uses a transport method that is appropriate for the data size. One of these methods is to provide a shared ring buffer between each partition—essentially an area of memory on which a certain amount of data is loaded on one side and unloaded on the other side. No memory needs to be allocated or freed because the buffer is continuously reused and simply rotated. Eventually, it might become full with requests, which would mean that newer I/Os would overwrite older I/Os. In this uncommon scenario, VMBus simply delays newer requests until older ones complete. The other messaging transport is direct child memory mapping to the parent address space for large enough transfers.

Virtual Processors

Just as the hypervisor doesn’t allow direct access to hardware (or to memory, as you’ll see later), child partitions don’t really see the actual processors on the machine but have a virtualized view of CPUs as well. On the root machine, the administrator and the operating system deal with logical processors, which are the actual processors on which threads can run (for example, a dual quad-core machine has eight logical processors), and assign these processors to various child partitions. For example, one child partition could be scheduled on logical processors 1, 2, 3, and 4, while the second child partition is scheduled on processors 5, 6, 7, and 8. These operations are all made possible through the use of virtual processors, or VPs.

Because processors can be shared across multiple child partitions, the hypervisor includes its own scheduler that distributes the workload of the various partitions across each processor. Additionally, the hypervisor maintains the register state for each virtual processor and to an appropriate “processor switch” when the same logical processor is being used by another child partition. The parent partition has the ability to access all these contexts and modify them as required, an essential part of the virtualization stack that must respond to certain instructions and perform actions.

The hypervisor is also directly responsible for virtualizing processor APICs and providing a simpler, less-featured virtual APIC, including support for the timer that’s found on most APICs (however, at a slower rate). Because not all operating systems support APICs, the hypervisor also allows for the injection of interrupts through a hypercall, which permits the virtualization stack to emulate a standard i8059 PIC.

Finally, because Windows supports dynamic processor addition, an administrator can add new processors to a child partition at run time to increase the responsiveness of the guest operating systems if it’s under heavy load.
Memory Virtualization

The final piece of hardware that must be abstracted away from child partitions is memory, not only for the normal behavior of the guest operating systems, but also for security and stability. Improperly managing the child partitions’ access to memory could result in privacy disclosures and data corruption, as well as possible malicious attacks by “escaping” the child partition and attacking the parent (which would then allow attacks on the other child partitions). Apart from this aspect, there is also the matter of the guest operating system’s view of physical address space. Almost all operating systems expect memory to begin at address 0 and be somewhat contiguous, so simply assigning chunks of physical memory to each child partition wouldn’t work even if enough memory was available on the system.

To solve this problem, the hypervisor implements an address space called the guest physical address space (GPA space). The GPA starts at address 0, which satisfies the needs of operating systems inside child partitions. However, the GPA is not a simple mapping to a chunk of physical memory because of the second problem (the lack of contiguous memory). As such, GPAs can point to any location in the machine’s physical memory (which is called the system physical address space, or SPA space), and there must be a translation system to go from one address type to another. This translation system is maintained by the hypervisor and is nearly identical to the way virtual memory is mapped to physical memory on x86 and x64 processors. (See Chapter 10 in Part 2 for more information on the memory manager and address translation.)

As for actual virtual addresses in the child partition (which are called guest virtual address space—GVA space), these continue to be managed by the operating system without any change in behavior. What the operating system believes are real physical addresses in its own page tables are actually SPAs. Figure 3-38 shows an overview of the mapping between each level.

![Figure 3-38 Guest virtual and physical address translation](image)

This means that when a guest operating system boots up and creates the page tables to map virtual to physical memory, the hypervisor intercepts SPAs and keeps its own copy of the page tables. Conceptually, whenever a piece of code accesses a virtual address inside a guest operating system, the hypervisor does the initial page table translation to go from the guest virtual address to the GPA and then maps that GPA to the respective SPA. In reality, this operation is optimized through the use of shadow page tables (SPTs), which the hypervisor maintains to have direct GVA-to-SPA translations and simply loads when appropriate so that the guest accesses the SPA directly.
Second-Level Address Translation and Tagged TLB

Because the translation from GVA to GPA to SPA is expensive (because it must be done in software), CPU manufacturers have worked to curtail this inefficiency by making the processor natively aware of the address translation requirements of a virtual machine—in other words, an advanced processor could understand that the memory access is occurring from a hosted virtual machine and perform the GVA-to-SPA lookup on its own, without requiring assistance from the hypervisor. This lookup technology is called Second-Level Address Translation (SLAT) because it covers both the target-to-host translation (second level) and the host VA–to–host PA translation (first level). For marketing purposes, however, Intel has called this support VT Extended/Nested Page Table (NPT) technology, while AMD calls it AMD-V Rapid Virtualization Indexing (RVI).

The latest version of the Hyper-V stack takes full advantage of this processor support, reducing the complexity of its code and minimizing the number of context switches required to handle page faults in hosted partitions. Additionally, SLAT enables Hyper-V to throw out its shadow page tables and relevant mappings, which allows an additional reduction of memory overhead as well. These changes increase the scalability of Hyper-V on such systems, notably leading to an increase in the maximum number of virtual machines that a single host (Hyper-V server) can serve, or run concurrently. According to tests performed by Microsoft, support for SLAT increases the maximum number of supported sessions between 1.6 and 2.5 times. Furthermore, the processor overhead drops from about 10 percent to 2 percent, and each virtual machine consumes one less megabyte of physical RAM on the host.

In addition, both Intel and AMD introduced a functionality that was typically found only on RISC processors such as ARM, MIPS, or PPC, which is the ability of the processor to differentiate between the processes associated with each cached virtual-to-physical translation entry in the translation look-aside buffer (TLB). On CISC processors such as the x86 and x64, the TLB was built as a systemwide resource—each time the operating system switched the currently executing process, the TLB had to be flushed to invalidate any cached entries that might’ve belonged to the previous executing process. If the processor, instead, could be told that the process has changed, the TLB would avoid a flush and the processor would simply not use the cached entries that did not correspond to this process. New entries would be created, eventually overriding other processes’ older entries. This type of smarter TLB is called a tagged TLB, because each cache entry is tagged with a per-process identifier.

Flushing the TLB is even worse when dealing with Hyper-V systems because a different process can actually correspond to a completely different VM. In other words, each time the hypervisor and operating system scheduled another VM for execution, the host’s TLB had to be flushed, flushing away all the cached translations the previous VM had performed, slowing down memory access, and causing significant latency. When running on a processor that implements a tagged TLB, the Hyper-V can simply notify the processor that a new process/VM is running and that the entries of other VM should not be used. AMD processors with RVI support tagged TLBs through an Address Space Identifier, or ASID, while recent Intel Nehalem-EX processors implement a tagged TLB by using a Virtual Processor Identifier (VPID).
Dynamic Memory

A feature called Dynamic Memory enables systems administrators to make a virtual machine’s physical memory allocation variable based on the memory demands of the active virtual machines, in much the same way that the Windows memory manager adjusts the physical memory assigned to each process based on their memory demands. The capability means that administrators do not have to precisely gauge the size of a virtual machine required for optimal performance and that the system’s physical memory is more effectively used by the virtual machines that need it.

Dynamic Memory’s architecture consists of several components, shown in Figure 3-39.

The principle components of the architecture are as follows:

- The Dynamic Memory balancer, which is implemented in the virtual machine management service. The balancer is responsible for assigning physical memory to child partitions.

- The Dynamic Memory VSP (DM VSP), which runs in the VMWPs of child partitions that have dynamic memory enabled.

- The Dynamic Memory VSC (DM VSC, %SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Dmvsc.sys), installed as an enlightenment driver running in the child partitions.
To configure a VM for dynamic memory, an administrator chooses Dynamic in the VM’s memory settings as shown in Figure 3-40.

![Dynamic memory configuration dialog](image)

**FIGURE 3-40** Dynamic memory configuration dialog

The associated settings include the amount of memory that will be assigned to the VM when it starts (Startup RAM), the maximum amount that it can be assigned (Maximum RAM), the percentage of the VM’s memory that should be available for immediate use by the operating system if its memory demand increases, and finally, the weight of the VM with respect to other VMs. In addition to serving as weighting for the distribution of physical memory among virtual machines that have dynamic memory enabled, the hypervisor also uses it as a guide for the startup order of virtual machines configured to start when the system boots. Finally, the available memory percentage is a reference to memory within the VM that the VM’s operating system has not assigned to a process, device drivers, or itself, and that can be assigned without incurring a page fault. Chapter 10 in Part 2 describes available memory in more detail.

When the DM VSC starts in a child partition that has dynamic memory enabled in its memory configuration, it first checks to see if the operating system supports dynamic memory capabilities. It performs this check by simply calling the memory manager’s hot-add memory function, specifying a block of child physical memory already assigned to the virtual machine. If the memory manager supports hot add, it returns an error indicating that the address range is already in use, and if it doesn’t, it reports that the function is not supported. If dynamic
memory is supported, the DM VSC establishes a connection to the DM VSP via VMBus. Because the system’s memory usage fluctuates during the boot process, after all autostart Windows services have finished initializing, the VSC begins reporting memory statistics once per second that indicate the current system commit level in the virtual machine. (See Chapter 10 in Part 2 for more information on system commit.)

The DM VSP in the parent partition calculates a memory pressure value for its corresponding VM using the following calculation based on the VM’s memory report:

\[
\text{Memory Pressure} = \frac{\text{Committed Memory}}{\text{Physical Memory}}
\]

*Physical Memory* refers to the amount of memory currently assigned to the VM’s partition. It also keeps a running exponential average pressure that represents the previous 20 seconds of pressure reports, adjusting the average pressure only when the current pressure deviates from the average by at least a standard deviation.

A component called the *balancer* executes in the VMMS service. Once per second, it analyzes the memory pressures reported by the DM VSPs, considers VM policy configuration, and determines if and how much memory should be redistributed. If a global Hyper-V setting called *NUMA spanning* is enabled, the balancer uses two balancing engines: one engine is the global balancer, and it is responsible for assigning new VMs to NUMA nodes. It does so based on the memory usage and VM pressures of the nodes at the time of the assignment. Each NUMA node has its own local balancer that manages the distribution of the node’s memory across the VMs assigned to the node. If the NUMA spanning option is off, the global balancer has no role other than to invoke the only local balancer for the system.

The benefit of assigning VMs to NUMA nodes is that VMs will be guaranteed the fastest memory accesses possible. The tradeoff, however, is that it might not be possible to start or add memory to a VM in the case where the sum of unassigned memory is sufficient but no one node has enough available memory to accommodate the amount of memory requested.

A local balancer increases or decreases a global target memory pressure to use all available memory under its management or to use it until a minimum pressure level is reached that indicates all VMs have ample memory. The balancer then loops over the VMs, determining how much memory to add or remove from each VM to reach the target pressure. During the calculations, the balancer reserves a minimum amount of memory for the host. The host’s reservation is a base amount of approximately 400 MB plus 30 MB for each 1 GB of RAM on the system. Factors that can affect the amount of memory reserved include whether or not the system is using SLAT or software paging, and whether multimedia redirection is enabled. Every five minutes, the balancer also removes memory from VMs that have so much memory that their pressure is essentially zero.

Note that if the child partition’s operating system is running a 32-bit version of Windows, the dynamic memory engine will not assign the partition more than 4 GB of memory.

Once it has calculated the amounts of memory to add and remove from VMs, it asks each WP to perform the desired operation. If the operation is to remove memory, the WP signals
the child DM VSC over VMBUS of the amount to remove and the DM VSC balloons its memory usage by allocating physical memory from the system using the \texttt{MmAllocatePagesForMdlEx} function. It retrieves the allocated GPAs and sends that back to the WP, which passes them to the Hyper-V memory manager. The Hyper-V memory manager then converts the GPAs to SPAs and adds the memory to its free memory pool.

If it’s a memory add operation, the WP asks the Hyper-V memory manager first if the VM has any physical memory assigned to it but currently allocated by the VSC’s balloon. If it does, the WP retrieves the GPAs for an amount that should be \textit{unbalanced} and asks the VSC to free those pages, making them available again for use by the VM’s operating system. If the amount that can be released by unballooning falls short of the amount of physical memory the balancer wants to give the VM, it asks the Hyper-V memory manager to give the remaining amount from its free memory pool to the child partition via Windows support for hot-add memory and reports the GPAs it added to the WP, which in turn relays them to the child’s DM VSC.

\section*{EXPERIMENT: Watching Dynamic Memory}

You can watch the behavior of Dynamic Memory by configuring Dynamic Memory for a VM running a 64-bit Dynamic Memory–compatible operating system, such as Windows 7 or Windows Server 2008 R2. Hyper-V exposes several Dynamic Memory–related performance counters under Hyper-V Dynamic Memory Balancer and Dynamic Memory VM. Counters include the amount of memory assigned to a guest, the guest operating system–visible memory (the amount of memory it thinks it has), its current and average memory pressure, and the amount of memory added and removed over time:
After freshly booting the virtual machine, add the Guest Visible Physical Memory and Physical Memory counters. Set the scale to three times the current Guest Visible Physical Memory value, which will be at least as large as the Physical Memory value. Then run the Sysinternals Testlimit tool in the virtual machine with the following commandline:

testlimit -m 1000 -c 1

Assuming you have enough available physical memory on the system, this causes Testlimit to allocate about 1 GB of virtual memory, raising the memory pressure in the virtual machine. After a few seconds, you will see the guest visible and actual physical memory assigned to the virtual machine jump to the same value. Roughly 30 seconds later, you'll see another jump when the balancer decides that the additional memory is not enough to completely relieve the memory pressure in the virtual machine and, because there's more memory available on the host, gives the virtual machine some more.

If you terminate Testlimit, the memory levels remain constant for several minutes if there's no memory demands from the host or other virtual machines, but eventually the balancer will respond to the lack of memory pressure in the virtual machine by trimming memory. Note that
the Guest Visible Physical Memory counter remains unchanged, but the Physical Memory counter drops back to a level near what it was before Testlimit executed:

![Graph showing memory counter changes]

Intercepts

We’ve talked about the various ways in which access to hardware, processors, and memory is virtualized by the hypervisor and sometimes handed off to a VM worker process, but we haven’t yet talked about the mechanism that allows this to happen—intercepts. Intercepts are configurable hooks that a parent partition can install and configure in order to respond to. These can include the following items:

- I/O intercepts, useful for device emulation
- MSR intercepts, useful for APIC emulation and profiling
- Access to GPAs, useful for device emulation, monitoring, and profiling (Additionally, the intercept can be fine-tuned to a specific access, such as read, write, or execute.)
- Exception intercepts such as page faults, useful for maintaining machine state and memory emulation (for example, maintaining copy-on-write)
Once the hypervisor detects an event for which an intercept has been registered, it sends an intercept message through the virtualization stack and puts the VP in a suspended state. The virtualization stack (usually the worker process) must then handle the event and resume the VP (typically with a modified register state that reflects the work performed to handle the intercept).

Live Migration

To support scenarios such as planned hardware upgrades and resource load balancing across servers, Hyper-V includes support for migrating virtual machines between nodes of a Windows Failover Cluster with minimal downtime. The key to Live Migration’s efficiency is that the bulk of the transfer of the virtual machine’s memory from the source to the target occurs while the virtual machine continues to run on the source node; only when the memory transfer is complete does the virtual machine suspend and resume operating on the target node. This small window when final virtual machine state migrates is typically less than the default TCP timeout value, preserving open connections from clients using services of the virtual machine and making the migration transparent from their perspective. Figure 3-41 shows the Live Migration process.

![Live Migration Diagram](image)

**FIGURE 3-41** Live migration transfer steps

The Live Migration process proceeds in a number of steps, shown in Figure 3-41:

1. **Migration Setup** The VMMS of the hosting (source) node of the virtual machine opens a TCP connection with the destination host. It transfers the virtual machine’s configuration information, which includes virtual hardware specifications such as the number of processors and amount of RAM, to the destination. VMMS on the destination (target) node instantiates a paused virtual machine matching the configuration. The VMMS on the source notifies the virtual machine’s worker process that the live migration is ready to proceed and hands it the TCP connection. Likewise, the target VMMS hands its end of the connection to the target worker process.

2. **Memory Transfer** The memory transfer phase consists of several subphases:
   
   a. The source VMWP creates a bitmap with one bit representing each page of the virtual machine’s guest physical memory. It sets every bit to indicate that the page is *dirty*, which means that the page’s current contents have not yet been sent to the target.
b. The source VMWP registers a memory-change notification callback with the hypervisor that sets the corresponding bit in the bitmap for each page of the virtual machine that changes.

c. The source VMWP proceeds to walk through the dirty-page bitmap in 16-KB blocks, clearing the dirty bits in the dirty-page bitmap for the pages in the block, reading each dirty page’s contents via a hypervisor call, and sending the contents to the target. The target VMWP invokes the hypervisor to inject the memory contents into the target virtual machine’s guest physical memory.

d. When it’s finished iterating over the dirty-page bitmap, the source VMWP checks to see if any pages have been dirtied during the iteration. If not, it moves to the next phase of the migration, but if any pages have been dirtied, it repeats the iteration. If it’s iterated five times, the virtual machine is dirtying memory faster than the worker process can send modifications, so it proceeds to the next phase of the migration.

5. State Transfer  The source VMWP suspends the virtual machine and makes a final iteration through the dirty-page bitmap to send over any pages that were dirtied since the last pass. Because the virtual machine is suspended during the transfer, no more pages will be dirtied. Then the source worker process sends the virtual machine’s state, including the contents of the virtual processor registers. Finally, it notifies VMMS that the migration is complete, waits for acknowledgement, and then sends a message to the target transferring ownership of the virtual machine. As the last migration step, the target worker process moves the virtual machine to the running state.

6. Another aspect of Live Migration is the transfer of ownership of the virtual machine’s files, including its VHDs. Traditional Windows Clustering is a shared-nothing model, where each LUN of the cluster’s storage system is owned by one node at a time. The LUN’s owning node has sole access to the LUN and any files stored on it. This model can lead to management complexity because each virtual machine must be stored on a separate LUN and therefore a separate volume, causing an explosion of volumes in a cluster hosting many virtual machines. It poses an even more significant challenge for Live Migration because LUN ownership transfer is an expensive operation, consisting of the source node flushing any modified file data to the LUN, the source node unmounting the volumes formatted on the LUN, ownership transfer from the source node to target node, and the target node mounting the volumes. Depending on the number of volumes on the LUN and the amount of dirty data that needs to be written back, the entire sequence can take tens of seconds, which would prevent Live Migration from meeting its goal of perceived nearly-instantaneous migrations.

7. To address the limitations of the traditional clustering model and make Live Migration possible, Live Migration leverages a storage feature called Clustered Shared Volumes (CSV). With CSV, one node owns the namespace of the volumes on a LUN while others can have exclusive ownership of individual files. Exclusive ownership permits the node hosting the virtual machine to directly access the on-disk storage of the VHD file, bypassing the network file system accesses normally required to interact with a LUN owned by another node. Only when a node wants to create or delete files, change the size of files (for example, to extend the size of a
dynamic or differencing VHD), or change other file metadata such as timestamps does it need to send a request via the SMB2 protocol to the owning node if it’s not the owner.

8. The hybrid sharing model of CSV enables LUN ownership to remain unchanged during Live Migration and enables only ownership of individual migrating virtual machine’s file to change, avoiding the unmounts and mount operations. Also, only dirty data specific to the virtual machine files must be written before the migration, something that can typically happen concurrently with the memory migration. Figure 3-42 depicts the storage ownership changes during a Live Migration. CSV’s implementation is described in the “File System Filter Drivers” section of Chapter 12, “File Systems,” in Part 2.

![Figure 3-42 Clustered Shared Volumes in Live Migration](image)

**Kernel Transaction Manager**

One of the more tedious aspects of software development is handling error conditions. This is especially true if, in the course of performing a high-level operation, an application has completed one or more subtasks that result in changes to the file system or registry. For example, an application’s software updating service might make several registry updates, replace one of the application’s executables, and then be denied access when it attempts to update a second executable. If the service doesn’t want to leave the application in the resulting inconsistent state, it must track all the changes it makes and be prepared to undo them. Testing the error-recovery code is difficult, and consequently often skipped, so errors in the recovery code can negate the effort.

Applications can, with very little effort, gain automatic error-recovery capabilities by using a kernel mechanism called the **Kernel Transaction Manager** (KTM), which provides the facilities required to perform such transactions and enables services such as the **distributed transaction coordinator** (DTC)
in user mode to take advantage of them. Any developer who uses the appropriate APIs can take advantage of these services as well.

KTM does more than solve large-scale issues like the one presented. Even on single-user home computers, installing a service patch or performing a system restore are large operations that involve both files and registry keys. Unplug an older Windows computer during such an operation, and the chances for a successful boot are slim. Even though the NT File System (NTFS) has always had a log file permitting the file system to guarantee atomic operations (see Chapter 12 in Part 2 for more information on NTFS), this only means that whichever file was being written to during the process will get fully written or fully deleted—it does not guarantee the entire update or restore operation. Likewise, the registry has had numerous improvements over the years to deal with corruption (see Chapter 4 for more information on the registry), but the fixes apply only at the key/value level.

As the heart of transaction support, KTM allows transactional resource managers such as NTFS and the registry to coordinate their updates for a specific set of changes made by an application. NTFS uses an extension to support transactions, called TxF. The registry uses a similar extension, called TxR. These kernel-mode resource managers work with KTM to coordinate the transaction state, just as user-mode resource managers use DTC to coordinate transaction state across multiple user-mode resource managers. Third parties can also use KTM to implement their own resource managers.

TxF and TxR both define a new set of file system and registry APIs that are similar to existing ones, except that they include a transaction parameter. If an application wants to create a file within a transaction, it first uses KTM to create the transaction, and then it passes the resulting transaction handle to the new file creation API. Although we’ll look at the registry and NTFS implementations of KTM later, these are not its only possible uses. In fact, it provides four system objects that allow a variety of operations to be supported. These are listed in Table 3-27.

**TABLE 3-27 KTM Objects**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Object</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Usage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transaction</td>
<td>Collection of data operations to be performed. Provides <strong>atomic</strong>, <strong>consistent</strong>, <strong>isolated</strong>, and <strong>durable</strong> operations.</td>
<td>Can be associated with the registry and file I/O to make those operations part of the same larger operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlistment</td>
<td>Association between a resource manager and a transaction.</td>
<td>Register with a transaction to receive notifications on it. The enlistment can specify which notifications should be generated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource Manager (RM)</td>
<td>Container for the transactions and the data on which they operate.</td>
<td>Provides an interface for clients to read and write the data, typically on a database.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transaction Manager (TM)</td>
<td>Container of all transactions that are part of the associated resource managers. As an instance of a log, it knows about all transaction states but not their data.</td>
<td>Provides an infrastructure through which clients and resource managers can communicate, and provides and coordinates recovery operations after a crash. Clients use the TM for transactions; RMs use the TM for enlistments.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXPERIMENT: Listing Transaction Managers

Windows ships with a built-in tool called Ktmutil.exe that allows you to see ongoing transactions as well as registered transaction managers on the system (and force the outcome of ongoing transactions). In this experiment, you’ll use it to display the transaction managers typically seen on a Windows machine.

Start an elevated command prompt and type:

Ktmutil.exe tm list

Here’s an example of output on a typical Windows system:

C:\Windows\system32>ktmutil tm list
TmGuid                                 TmLogPath
-------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------
{fef0dc5f-0392-11de-979f-002219dd8c25} \Device\HarddiskVolume2$Extend$RmMetadata$TxfLog$TxfLog::KtmLog
{fef0dc63-0392-11de-979f-002219dd8c25} \Device\HarddiskVolume1$Extend$RmMetadata$TxfLog$TxfLog::KtmLog
{5e68e4aa-129e-11e0-8635-806e6f6e6963} \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\ServiceProfiles\NetworkService\ntuser.dat{5e68e4ac-129e-11e0-8635-806e6f6e6963}.TM
{5e68e4ae-129e-11e0-8635-005056c00008} \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\ServiceProfiles\LocalService\ntuser.dat{5e68e4ac-129e-11e0-8635-005056c00008}.TM
{51ce23c9-0d6c-11e0-8af8-806e6f6e6963} \SystemRoot\System32\Config\TxR\{51ce23c7-0d6c-11e0-8af8-806e6f6e6963}.TM
{51ce23ee-0d6c-11e0-8af8-005056c00008} \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\markruss\ntuser.dat{51ce23ec-0d6c-11e0-8af8-005056c00008}.TM
{51ce23f2-0d6c-11e0-8af8-005056c00008} \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\markruss\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat{51ce23f0-0d6c-11e0-8af8-005056c00008}.TM

Hotpatch Support

Rebooting a machine to apply the latest patches can mean significant downtime for a server, which is why Windows supports a run-time method of patching, called a hot patch (or simply hotpatch), in contrast to a cold patch, which requires a reboot. Hotpatching doesn’t simply allow files to be overwritten during execution; instead, it includes a complex series of operations that can be requested (and combined). These operations are listed in Table 3-28.

TABLE 3-28 Hotpatch Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Usage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rename Image</td>
<td>Replacing a DLL that is on the disk and currently used by other applications, or replacing a driver that is on the disk and is currently loaded by the kernel</td>
<td>When an entire library in user mode needs to be replaced, the kernel can detect which processes and services are referencing it, unload them, and then update the DLL and restart the programs and services (which is done through the restart manager). When a driver needs to be replaced, the kernel can unload the driver (the driver requires an unload routine), update it, and then reload it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation</td>
<td>Meaning</td>
<td>Usage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Object Swap</td>
<td>Atomically renaming an object in the object directory namespace</td>
<td>When a file (typically a known DLL) needs to be renamed atomically but not affect any process that might be using it (so that the process can start using the new file immediately, using the old handle, without requiring an application restart).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patch Function Code</td>
<td>Replacing the code of one or more functions inside an image file with another version</td>
<td>If a DLL or driver can’t be replaced or renamed during run time, functions in the image can be directly patched. A hotpatch DLL that contains the newer code is jumped to whenever an older function is called.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refresh System DLL</td>
<td>Reload the memory mapped section object for Ntdll.dll</td>
<td>The system native library, Ntdll.dll, is loaded only once during boot-up and then simply duplicated into the address space of every new process. If it has been hotpatched, the system must refresh this section to load the newer version.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although hotpatches use internal kernel mechanisms, their actual implementation is no different from cold patches. The patch is delivered through Windows Update, typically as an executable file containing a program called Update.exe that performs the extraction of the patch and the update process. For hotpatches, however, an additional hotpatch file, containing the .hp extension, will be present. This file contains a special PE header called .HOT1. This header contains a data structure describing the various patch descriptors present inside the file. Each of these descriptors identifies the offset in the original file that needs to be patched, a validation mechanism (which can include a simple comparison of the old data, a checksum, or a hash), and the new data to be patched. The kernel parses the descriptors and applies the appropriate modifications. In the case of a protected process (see Chapter 5 for more information on processes) and other digitally signed images, the hotpatch must also be digitally signed in order to prevent fake patches from being applied to sensitive files or processes.

**Note** Because the hotpatch file also includes the original data, the hotpatching mechanism can also be used to uninstall a patch at run time.

Compile-time hotpatching support works by adding 7 additional bytes to the beginning of each function—4 are considered part of the end of the previous function, and 2 are part of the function prolog—that is, the function's beginning. Here's an example of a function that was built with hotpatching information:

```
1kd> u nt!NtCreateFile - 5
t!FsRtlTeardownPerFileContexts+0x169:
 82227ea5 90    nop
 82227ea6 90    nop
 82227ea7 90    nop
 82227ea8 90    nop
 82227ea9 90    nop
nt!NtCreateFile:
 82227eaa 8bff  mov    edi,edi
```
Notice that the five \textit{nop} instructions don’t actually do anything, while the \textit{mov edi, edi} at the beginning of the \textit{NtCreateFile} function are also essentially meaningless—no actual state-changing operation takes place. Because 7 bytes are available, the \textit{NtCreateFile} prologue can be transformed into a \textit{short jump} to the buffer of five instructions available, which are then converted to a \textit{near jump} instruction to the patched routine. Here’s \textit{NtCreateFile} after having been hotpatched:

\texttt{lk\textasciitilde u nt!NtCreateFile \textasciitilde 5}
\texttt{nt!FsRtlTeardownPerFileContexts\textasciitilde 0x169:}
\texttt{82227ea5 e93d020010 \textbf{jmp} nt\_patch\_NtCreateFile (922280e7)}
\texttt{nt\_NtCreateFile:}
\texttt{82227eaa ebfc \textbf{jmp} nt!FsRtlTeardownPerFileContexts\textasciitilde 0x169 (82227ea5)}

This method allows only the addition of 2 bytes to each function by jumping into the previous function’s alignment padding that it would most likely have at its end anyway.

There are some limitations to the hotpatching functionality:

- Patches that third-party applications such as security software might block or that might be incompatible with the operation of third-party applications
- Patches that modify a file’s export table or import table
- Patches that change data structures, fix infinite loops, or contain inline assembly code

\section*{Kernel Patch Protection}

Some 32-bit device drivers modify the behavior of Windows in unsupported ways. For example, they patch the system call table to intercept system calls or patch the kernel image in memory to add functionality to specific internal functions. Shortly after the release of 64-bit Windows for x64 and before a rich third-party ecosystem had developed, Microsoft saw an opportunity to preserve the stability of 64-bit Windows. To prevent these kinds of changes, x64 Windows implements Kernel Patch Protection (KPP), also referred to as PatchGuard. KPP’s job on the system is similar to what its name implies—it attempts to deter common techniques for patching the system, or hooking it. Table 3-29 lists which components or structures are protected and for what purpose.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Component} & \textbf{Legitimate Usage} & \textbf{Potential Malicious Usage} \\
\hline
\texttt{Ntoskrnl.exe, Hal.dll, Ci.dll, Kdcom.dll, Pshed.dll, CIfs.sys, Ndis.sys, Tcpipe.sys} & Kernel, HAL, and their dependencies. Lower layer of network stack. & Patching code in the kernel and/or HAL to subvert normal operation and behavior. Patching Ndis.sys to silently add back doors on open ports. \\
\hline
\texttt{Global Descriptor Table (GDT)} & CPU hardware protection for the implementation of ring privilege levels (Ring 0 vs. Ring 3). & Ability to set up a \textit{callgate}, a CPU mechanism through which user (Ring 3) code could perform operations with kernel privileges (Ring 0). \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Components Protected by KPP}
\end{table}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Legitimate Usage</th>
<th>Potential Malicious Usage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT)</td>
<td>Table read by the CPU to deliver interrupt vectors to the correct handling routine.</td>
<td>Malicious drivers could intercept file I/Os directly at the interrupt level, or hook page faults to hide contents of memory. Rootkits could hook the INT2E handler to hook all system calls from a single point.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System Service Descriptor Table (SSDT)</td>
<td>Table containing the array of pointers for each system call handler.</td>
<td>Rootkits could modify the output or input of calls from user mode and hide processes, files, or registry keys.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processor Machine State Registers (MSRs)</td>
<td>LSTAR MSR is used to set the handler of the SYSENTER and/or SYSCALL instructions used for system calls.</td>
<td>LSTAR could be overwritten by a malicious driver to provide a single hook for all system calls performed on the system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KdpStub, KiDebugRoutine, KdpTrap function pointers</td>
<td>Used for run-time configuration of where exceptions should be delivered, based on whether a kernel debugger is remotely connected to the machine.</td>
<td>Value of the pointers could be overwritten by a malicious rootkit to take control of the system at predetermined times and perform invisible background tasks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PsInvertedFunctionTable</td>
<td>Cache of exception directories used on x64, allowing quick mapping between code where an exception happened and its handler.</td>
<td>Could be used to take control of the system during the exception handling of unrelated system code, including KPP’s own exception code responsible for detecting modifications in the first place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kernel stacks</td>
<td>Store function arguments, the call stack (where a function should return), and variables.</td>
<td>A driver could allocate memory on the side, set it as a kernel stack for a thread, and then manipulate its contents to redirect calls and parameters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Object types</td>
<td>Definitions for the various objects (such as processes and files) that the system supports through the object manager.</td>
<td>Could be used as part of a technique called DKOM (Direct Kernel Object Modification) to modify system behavior—for example, by hooking the object callbacks that each object type has registered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Code related to bug-checking the system during a KPP violation, executing the DPCs and timers associated with KPP, and more.</td>
<td>By modifying certain parts of the system used by KPP, malicious drivers could attempt to silence, ignore, or otherwise cripple KPP.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note** Because certain 64-bit Intel processors implement a slightly different feature set of the x64 architecture, the kernel needs to perform run-time code patching to work around the lack of a `prefetch` instruction. KPP can deter kernel patching even on these processors, by exempting those specific patches from detection. Additionally, because of hypervisor (Hyper-V) enlightenments (more information on the hypervisor is provided earlier in this chapter), certain functions in the kernel are patched at boot time, such as the `swap context` routine. These patches are also allowed by very explicit checks to make sure they are known patches to the hypervisor-enlightened versions.
When KPP detects a change in any of the structures mentioned (as well as some other internal consistency checks), it crashes the system with code 0x109—CRITICAL_STRUCTURE_CORRUPTION.

For third-party developers who used techniques that KPP deters, the following supported techniques can be used:

- File system minifilters (see Chapter 8 in Part 2 for more information on these) to hook all file operations, including loading image files and DLLs, that can be intercepted to purge malicious code on-the-fly or block reading of known bad executables.

- Registry filter notifications (see Chapter 4 for more information on these notifications) to hook all registry operations. Security software can block modification of critical parts of the registry, as well as heuristically determine malicious software by registry access patterns or known bad registry keys.

- Process notifications (see Chapter 5 for more information on these notifications). Security software can monitor the execution and termination of all processes and threads on the system, as well as DLLs being loaded or unloaded. With the enhanced notifications added for antivirus and other security vendors, they also have the ability to block process launch.

- Object manager filtering (explained in the object manager section earlier). Security software can remove certain access rights being granted to processes and/or threads to defend their own utilities against certain operations.

There is no way to disable KPP once it’s enabled. Because device driver developers might need to make changes to a running system as part of debugging, KPP does not enable if the system boots in debugging mode with an active kernel-debugging connection.

**Code Integrity**

Code integrity is a Windows mechanism that authenticates the integrity and source of executable images (such as applications, DLLs, or drivers) by validating a digital certificate contained within the image’s resources. This mechanism works in conjunction with system policies, defining how signing should be enforced. One of these policies is the **Kernel Mode Code Signing** (KMCS) policy, which requires that kernel-mode code be signed with a valid Authenticode certificate rooted by one of several recognized code signing authorities, such as Verisign or Thawte.

To address backward-compatibility concerns, the KMCS policy is only fully enforced on 64-bit machines, because those drivers have to be recompiled recently in order to run on that Windows architecture. This, in turn, implies that a company or individual is still responsible for maintaining the driver and is able to sign it. On 32-bit machines, however, many older devices ship with outdated drivers, possibly from out-of-business companies, so signing those drivers would sometimes be
unfeasible. Figure 3-43 shows the warning displayed on 64-bit Windows machines that attempt to load an unsigned driver.

**Note** Windows also has a second driver-signing policy, which is part of the Plug and Play manager. This policy is applied solely to Plug and Play drivers, and unlike the kernel-mode code-signing policy, it can be configured to allow unsigned Plug and Play drivers (but not on 64-bit systems, where the KMCS policy takes precedence). See Chapter 8 in Part 2 for more information on the Plug and Play manager.

![Program Compatibility Assistant](image)

**FIGURE 3-43** Warning when attempting to install an unsigned 64-bit driver

Even on 32-bit Windows, code integrity writes an event to the Code Integrity event log when it loads an unsigned driver.

**Note** Protected Media Path applications can also query the kernel for its integrity state, which includes information on whether or not unsigned 32-bit drivers are loaded on the system. In such scenarios, they are allowed to disable protected, high-definition media playback as a method to ensure the security and reliability of the encrypted stream.

The code-integrity mechanism doesn’t stop at driver load time, however. Stronger measures also exist to authenticate per-page image contents for executable pages. This requires using a special flag while signing the driver binary and will generate a catalog with the cryptographic hash of every executable page on which the driver will reside. (Pages are a unit of protection on the CPU; for more information, see Chapter 10 in Part 2.) This method allows for detection of modification of an existing driver, which might happen either at run time by another driver or through a page file or hibernation...
file attack (in which the contents of memory are edited on the disk and then reloaded into memory). Generating such per-page hashes is also a requirement for the new filtering model, as well as Protected Media Path components.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we examined the key base system mechanisms on which the Windows executive is built. In the next chapter, we’ll look at three important mechanisms involved with the management infrastructure of Windows: the registry, services, and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).
This chapter describes four fundamental mechanisms in the Microsoft Windows operating system that are critical to its management and configuration:

- The registry
- Services
- Unified Background Process Manager
- Windows Management Instrumentation
- Windows Diagnostics Infrastructure

The Registry

The registry plays a key role in the configuration and control of Windows systems. It is the repository for both systemwide and per-user settings. Although most people think of the registry as static data stored on the hard disk, as you’ll see in this section, the registry is also a window into various in-memory structures maintained by the Windows executive and kernel.

We'll start by providing you with an overview of the registry structure, a discussion of the data types it supports, and a brief tour of the key information Windows maintains in the registry. Then we’ll look inside the internals of the configuration manager, the executive component responsible for implementing the registry database. Among the topics we’ll cover are the internal on-disk structure of the registry, how Windows retrieves configuration information when an application requests it, and what measures are employed to protect this critical system database.

Viewing and Changing the Registry

In general, you should never have to edit the registry directly: application and system settings stored in the registry that might require manual changes should have a corresponding user interface to control their modification. However, as you’ve already seen a number of times in this book, some advanced and debug settings have no editing user interface. Therefore, both graphical user interface (GUI) and command-line tools are included with Windows to enable you to view and modify the registry.
Windows comes with one main GUI tool for editing the registry—Regedit.exe—and a number of command-line registry tools. Reg.exe, for instance, has the ability to import, export, back up, and restore keys, as well as to compare, modify, and delete keys and values. It can also set or query flags used in UAC virtualization. Regini.exe, on the other hand, allows you to import registry data based on text files that contain ASCII or Unicode configuration data.

The Windows Driver Kit (WDK) also supplies a redistributable component, Offreg.dll, which hosts the Offline Registry Library. This library allows loading registry hive files in their binary format and applying operations on the files themselves, bypassing the usual logical loading and mapping that Windows requires for registry operations. Its use is primarily to assist in offline registry access, such as for purposes of integrity checking and validation. It can also provide performance benefits if the underlying data is not meant to be visible by the system, because the access is done through local file I/O instead of registry system calls.

**Registry Usage**
There are four principal times at which configuration data is read:

- During the initial boot process, the boot loader reads configuration data and the list of boot device drivers to load into memory before initializing the kernel. Because the Boot Configuration Database (BCD) is really stored in a registry hive, one could argue that registry access happens even earlier, when the Boot Manager displays the list of operating systems.

- During the kernel boot process, the kernel reads settings that specify which device drivers to load and how various system elements—such as the memory manager and process manager—configure themselves and tune system behavior.

- During logon, Explorer and other Windows components read per-user preferences from the registry, including network drive-letter mappings, desktop wallpaper, screen saver, menu behavior, icon placement, and perhaps most importantly, which startup programs to launch and which files were most recently accessed.

- During their startup, applications read systemwide settings, such as a list of optionally installed components and licensing data, as well as per-user settings that might include menu and toolbar placement and a list of most-recently accessed documents.

However, the registry can be read at other times as well, such as in response to a modification of a registry value or key. Although the registry provides asynchronous callbacks that are the preferred way to receive change notifications, some applications constantly monitor their configuration settings in the registry through polling and automatically take updated settings into account. In general, however, on an idle system there should be no registry activity and such applications violate best practices. (Process Monitor, from Sysinternals, is a great tool for tracking down such activity and the application or applications at fault.)
The registry is commonly modified in the following cases:

- Although not a modification, the registry's initial structure and many default settings are defined by a prototype version of the registry that ships on the Windows setup media that is copied onto a new installation.

- Application setup utilities create default application settings and settings that reflect installation configuration choices.

- During the installation of a device driver, the Plug and Play system creates settings in the registry that tell the I/O manager how to start the driver and creates other settings that configure the driver's operation. (See Chapter 8, “I/O System,” in Part 2 for more information on how device drivers are installed.)

- When you change application or system settings through user interfaces, the changes are often stored in the registry.

### Registry Data Types

The registry is a database whose structure is similar to that of a disk volume. The registry contains keys, which are similar to a disk’s directories, and values, which are comparable to files on a disk. A key is a container that can consist of other keys (subkeys) or values. Values, on the other hand, store data. Top-level keys are root keys. Throughout this section, we’ll use the words subkey and key interchangeably.

Both keys and values borrow their naming convention from the file system. Thus, you can uniquely identify a value with the name mark, which is stored in a key called trade, with the name trade\mark. One exception to this naming scheme is each key’s unnamed value. Regedit displays the unnamed value as (Default).

Values store different kinds of data and can be one of the 12 types listed in Table 4-1. The majority of registry values are REG_DWORD, REG_BINARY, or REG_SZ. Values of type REG_DWORD can store numbers or Booleans (on/off values); REG_BINARY values can store numbers larger than 32 bits or raw data such as encrypted passwords; REG_SZ values store strings (Unicode, of course) that can represent elements such as names, file names, paths, and types.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REG_NONE</td>
<td>No value type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REG_SZ</td>
<td>Fixed-length Unicode string</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REG_EXPAND_SZ</td>
<td>Variable-length Unicode string that can have embedded environment variables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REG_BINARY</td>
<td>Arbitrary-length binary data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value Type</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REG_DWORD</td>
<td>32-bit number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REG_DWORD_BIG_ENDIAN</td>
<td>32-bit number, with high byte first</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REG_LINK</td>
<td>Unicode symbolic link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REG_MULTI_SZ</td>
<td>Array of Unicode NULL-terminated strings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REG_RESOURCE_LIST</td>
<td>Hardware resource description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REG_FULL_RESOURCE_DESCRIPTOR</td>
<td>Hardware resource description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REG_RESOURCE_REQUIREMENTS_LIST</td>
<td>Resource requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REG_QWORD</td>
<td>64-bit number</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The REG_LINK type is particularly interesting because it lets a key transparently point to another key. When you traverse the registry through a link, the path searching continues at the target of the link. For example, if `\Root1\Link` has a REG_LINK value of `\Root2\RegKey` and RegKey contains the value RegValue, two paths identify RegValue: `\Root1\Link\RegValue` and `\Root2\RegKey\RegValue`. As explained in the next section, Windows prominently uses registry links: three of the six registry root keys are links to subkeys within the three nonlink root keys.

**Registry Logical Structure**

You can chart the organization of the registry via the data stored within it. There are six root keys (and you can’t add new root keys or delete existing ones) that store information, as shown in Table 4-2.

**TABLE 4-2 The Six Root Keys**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Root Key</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HKEY_CURRENT_USER</td>
<td>Stores data associated with the currently logged-on user</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKEY_USERS</td>
<td>Stores information about all the accounts on the machine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT</td>
<td>Stores file association and Component Object Model (COM) object registration information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE</td>
<td>Stores system-related information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKEY_PERFORMANCE_DATA</td>
<td>Stores performance information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG</td>
<td>Stores some information about the current hardware profile</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Why do root-key names begin with an H? Because the root-key names represent Windows handles (H) to keys (KEY). As mentioned in Chapter 1, “Concepts and Tools,” HKLM is an abbreviation used for HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE. Table 4-3 lists all the root keys and their abbreviations. The following sections explain in detail the contents and purpose of each of these six root keys.
### TABLE 4-3 Registry Root Keys

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Root Key</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Link</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HKEY_CURRENT_USER</td>
<td>HKCU</td>
<td>Points to the user profile of the currently logged-on user</td>
<td>Subkey under HKEY_USERS corresponding to currently logged-on user</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKEY_USERS</td>
<td>HKU</td>
<td>Contains subkeys for all loaded user profiles</td>
<td>Not a link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT</td>
<td>HKCR</td>
<td>Contains file association and COM registration information</td>
<td>Not a direct link; rather, a merged view of HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes and HKU&lt;SID&gt;\SOFTWARE\Classes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE</td>
<td>HKLM</td>
<td>Global settings for the machine</td>
<td>Not a link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG</td>
<td>HKCC</td>
<td>Current hardware profile</td>
<td>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Hardware Profiles\Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKEY_PERFORMANCE_DATA</td>
<td>HKPD</td>
<td>Performance counters</td>
<td>Not a link</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### HKEY_CURRENT_USER

The HKCU root key contains data regarding the preferences and software configuration of the locally logged-on user. It points to the currently logged-on user's user profile, located on the hard disk at \Users\<username>Ntuser.dat. (See the section “Registry Internals” later in this chapter to find out how root keys are mapped to files on the hard disk.) Whenever a user profile is loaded (such as at logon time or when a service process runs under the context of a specific user name), HKCU is created to map to the user's key under HKEY_USERS. Table 4-4 lists some of the subkeys under HKCU.

### TABLE 4-4 HKEY_CURRENT_USER Subkeys

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subkey</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AppEvents</td>
<td>Sound/event associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Console</td>
<td>Command window settings (for example, width, height, and colors)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Panel</td>
<td>Screen saver, desktop scheme, keyboard, and mouse settings, as well as accessibility and regional settings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Environment variable definitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUDC</td>
<td>Information on end-user defined characters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identities</td>
<td>Windows Mail account information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keyboard Layout</td>
<td>Keyboard layout setting (for example, U.S. or U.K.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network</td>
<td>Network drive mappings and settings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printers</td>
<td>Printer connection settings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Software</td>
<td>User-specific software preferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volatile Environment</td>
<td>Volatile environment variable definitions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
HKEY_USERS

HKU contains a subkey for each loaded user profile and user class registration database on the system. It also contains a subkey named HKU\.DEFAULT that is linked to the profile for the system (which is used by processes running under the local system account and is described in more detail in the section “Services” later in this chapter). This is the profile used by Winlogon, for example, so that changes to the desktop background settings in that profile will be implemented on the logon screen. When a user logs on to a system for the first time and her account does not depend on a roaming domain profile (that is, the user’s profile is obtained from a central network location at the direction of a domain controller), the system creates a profile for her account that’s based on the profile stored in %SystemDrive%\Users\Default.

The location under which the system stores profiles is defined by the registry value HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\ProfileList\ProfilesDirectory, which is by default set to %SystemDrive%\Users. The ProfileList key also stores the list of profiles present on a system. Information for each profile resides under a subkey that has a name reflecting the security identifier (SID) of the account to which the profile corresponds. (See Chapter 6, “Security,” for more information on SIDs.) Data stored in a profile’s key includes the time of the last load of the profile in the ProfileLoadTimeLow value, the binary representation of the account SID in the Sid value, and the path to the profile’s on-disk hive (which is described later in this chapter in the “Hives” section) in the ProfileImagePath directory. Windows shows the list of profiles stored on a system in the User Profiles management dialog box, shown in Figure 4-1, which you access by clicking Settings in the User Profiles section of the Advanced tab in the Advanced System Settings of the System Control Panel applet.

![Figure 4-1](image)

**FIGURE 4-1** The User Profiles management dialog box
EXPERIMENT: Watching Profile Loading and Unloading

You can see a profile load into the registry and then unload by using the Runas command to launch a process in an account that’s not currently logged on to the machine. While the new process is running, run Regedit and note the loaded profile key under HKEY_USERS. After terminating the process, perform a refresh in Regedit by pressing the F5 key and the profile should no longer be present.

HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT

HKCR consists of three types of information: file extension associations, COM class registrations, and the virtualized registry root for User Account Control (UAC). (See Chapter 6 for more information on UAC.) A key exists for every registered file name extension. Most keys contain a REG_SZ value that points to another key in HKCR containing the association information for the class of files that extension represents.

For example, HKCR\.xls would point to information on Microsoft Office Excel files in a key such as HKCU\.xls\Excel.Sheet.8. Other keys contain configuration details for COM objects registered on the system. The UAC virtualized registry is located in the VirtualStore key, which is not related to the other kinds of data stored in HKCR.

The data under HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT comes from two sources:

- The per-user class registration data in HKCU\SOFTWARE\Classes (mapped to the file on hard disk \Users\<username>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Usrclass.dat)
- Systemwide class registration data in HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes

The reason that there is a separation of per-user registration data from systemwide registration data is so that roaming profiles can contain these customizations. It also closes a security hole: a non-privileged user cannot change or delete keys in the systemwide version HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT, and thus cannot affect the operation of applications on the system. Nonprivileged users and applications can read systemwide data and can add new keys and values to systemwide data (which are mirrored in their per-user data), but they can modify existing keys and values in their private data only.

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE

HKLM is the root key that contains all the systemwide configuration subkeys: BCD00000000, COMPONENTS (loaded dynamically as needed), HARDWARE, SAM, SECURITY, SOFTWARE, and SYSTEM.

The HKLM\BCD00000000 subkey contains the Boot Configuration Database (BCD) information loaded as a registry hive. This database replaces the Boot.ini file that was used before Windows Vista and adds greater flexibility and isolation of per-installation boot configuration data. (For more information on the BCD, see Chapter 13, “Startup and Shutdown,” in Part 2.)
Each entry in the BCD, such as a Windows installation or the command-line settings for the installation, is stored in the Objects subkey, either as an object referenced by a GUID (in the case of a boot entry) or as a numeric subkey called an element. Most of these raw elements are documented in the BCD reference in the MSDN Library and define various command-line settings or boot parameters. The value associated with each element subkey corresponds to the value for its respective command-line flag or boot parameter.

The BCDEdit command-line utility allows you to modify the BCD using symbolic names for the elements and objects. It also provides extensive help for all the boot options available; unfortunately, it works only locally. Because the registry can be opened remotely as well as imported from a hive file, you can modify or read the BCD of a remote computer by using the Registry Editor. The following experiment shows you how to enable kernel debugging by using the Registry Editor.

**EXPERIMENT: Offline or Remote BCD Editing**

In this experiment, you enable debugging through editing the BCD inside the registry. For the purposes of this example, you edit the local copy of the BCD, but the point of this technique is that it can be used on any machine’s BCD hive. Follow these steps to add the /DEBUG command-line flag:

1. Open the Registry Editor, and then navigate to the HKLM\BCD00000000 key. Expand every subkey so that the numerical identifiers of each Elements key are fully visible.
2. Identify the boot entry for your Windows installation by locating the Description with a Type value of 0x10200003, and then check ID 0x12000004 in the Elements tree. In the Element value of that subkey, you should find the name of your version of Windows, such as Windows 7. If you have more than one Windows installation on your machine, you may need to check the 0x22000002 Element, which contains the path, such as \Windows.

3. Now that you’ve found the correct GUID for your Windows installation, create a new subkey under the Elements subkey for that GUID and name it 0x260000a0. If this subkey already exists, simply navigate to it.

4. If you had to create the subkey, now create a binary value called Element inside it.

5. Edit the value and set it to 01. This will enable kernel-mode debugging. Here’s what these changes should look like:

   ![Registry Editor screenshot]

   **Note** The 0x12000004 ID corresponds to BcdLibraryString_ApplicationPath, while the 0x22000002 ID corresponds to BcdOSLoaderString_SystemRoot. Finally, the ID you added, 0x260000a0, corresponds to BcdOSLoaderBoolean_KernelDebuggerEnabled. These values are documented in the BCD reference in the MSDN Library.

The HKLM\COMPONENTS subkey contains information pertinent to the Component Based Servicing (CBS) stack. This stack contains various files and resources that are part of a Windows installation image (used by the Automated Installation Kit or the OEM Preinstallation Kit) or an active installation. The CBS APIs that exist for servicing purposes use the information located in this key to
identify installed components and their configuration information. This information is used whenever components are installed, updated, or removed either individually (called units) or in groups (called packages). To optimize system resources, because this key can get quite large, it is only dynamically loaded and unloaded as needed if the CBS stack is servicing a request.

The HKLM\HARDWARE subkey maintains descriptions of the system’s legacy hardware and some hardware device-to-driver mappings. On a modern system, only a few peripherals—such as keyboard, mouse, and ACPI BIOS data—are likely to be found here. The Device Manager tool (which is available by running System from Control Panel and then clicking Device Manager) lets you view registry hardware information that it obtains by simply reading values out of the HARDWARE key (although it primarily uses the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum tree).

HKLM\SAM holds local account and group information, such as user passwords, group definitions, and domain associations. Windows Server systems that are operating as domain controllers store domain accounts and groups in Active Directory, a database that stores domainwide settings and information. (Active Directory isn’t described in this book.) By default, the security descriptor on the SAM key is configured so that even the administrator account doesn’t have access. HKLM\SECURITY stores systemwide security policies and user-rights assignments. HKLM\SAM is linked into the SECURITY subkey under HKLM\SECURITY\SAM. By default, you can’t view the contents of HKLM\SECURITY or HKLM\SAM\SAM because the security settings of those keys allow access only by the System account. (System accounts are discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.) You can change the security descriptor to allow read access to administrators, or you can use PsExec to run Regedit in the local system account if you want to peer inside. However, that glimpse won’t be very revealing because the data is undocumented and the passwords are encrypted with one-way mapping—that is, you can’t determine a password from its encrypted form.

HKLM\SOFTWARE is where Windows stores systemwide configuration information not needed to boot the system. Also, third-party applications store their systemwide settings here, such as paths to application files and directories and licensing and expiration date information.

HKLM\SYSTEM contains the systemwide configuration information needed to boot the system, such as which device drivers to load and which services to start. Because this information is critical to starting the system, Windows also maintains a copy of part of this information, called the last known good control set, under this key. The maintenance of a copy allows an administrator to select a previously working control set in the case that configuration changes made to the current control set prevent the system from booting. For details on when Windows declares the current control set “good,” see the section “Accepting the Boot and Last Known Good” later in this chapter.

**HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG**

HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG is just a link to the current hardware profile, stored under HKLM\SYSTEM \CurrentControlSet\Hardware Profiles\Current. Hardware profiles are no longer supported in Windows, but the key still exists to support legacy applications that might be depending on its presence.
HKEY_PERFORMANCE_DATA

The registry is the mechanism used to access performance counter values on Windows, whether those are from operating system components or server applications. One of the side benefits of providing access to the performance counters via the registry is that remote performance monitoring works “for free” because the registry is easily accessible remotely through the normal registry APIs.

You can access the registry performance counter information directly by opening a special key named HKEY_PERFORMANCE_DATA and querying values beneath it. You won’t find this key by looking in the Registry Editor; this key is available only programmatically through the Windows registry functions, such as RegQueryValueEx. Performance information isn’t actually stored in the registry; the registry functions use this key to locate the information from performance data providers.

You can also access performance counter information by using the Performance Data Helper (PDH) functions available through the Performance Data Helper API (Pdh.dll). Figure 4-2 shows the components involved in accessing performance counter information.

FIGURE 4-2 Registry performance counter architecture

Transactional Registry (TxR)

Thanks to the Kernel Transaction Manager (KTM; for more information see the section about the KTM in Chapter 3, “System Mechanisms”), developers have access to a straightforward API that allows them to implement robust error-recovery capabilities when performing registry operations, which can be linked with nonregistry operations, such as file or database operations.

Three APIs support transactional modification of the registry: RegCreateKeyTransacted, RegOpenKeyTransacted, and RegDeleteKeyTransacted. These new routines take the same parameters.
as their nontransacted analogs, except that a new transaction handle parameter is added. A developer supplies this handle after calling the KTM function `CreateTransaction`.

After a transacted create or open operation, all subsequent registry operations—such as creating, deleting, or modifying values inside the key—will also be transacted. However, operations on the subkeys of a transacted key will not be automatically transacted, which is why the third API, `RegDeleteKeyTransacted` exists. It allows the transacted deletion of subkeys, which `RegDeleteKeyEx` would not normally do.

Data for these transacted operations is written to log files using the common logging file system (CLFS) services, similar to other KTM operations. Until the transaction itself is committed or rolled back (both of which might happen programmatically or as a result of a power failure or system crash, depending on the state of the transaction), the keys, values, and other registry modifications performed with the transaction handle will not be visible to external applications through the nontransacted APIs. Also, transactions are isolated from each other; modifications made inside one transaction will not be visible from inside other transactions or outside the transaction until the transaction is committed.

**Note** A nontransactional writer will abort a transaction in case of conflict—for example, if a value was created inside a transaction and later, while the transaction is still active, a nontransactional writer tries to create a value under the same key. The nontransactional operation will succeed, and all operations in the conflicting transaction will be aborted.

The isolation level (the “I” in ACID) implemented by TxR resource managers is read-commit, which means that changes become available to other readers (transacted or not) immediately after being committed. This mechanism is important for people who are familiar with transactions in databases, where the isolation level is predictable-reads (or cursor-stability, as it is called in database literature). With a predictable-reads isolation level, after you read a value inside a transaction, subsequent reads will give you back the same data. Read-commit does not make this guarantee. One of the consequences is that registry transactions can’t be used for “atomic” increment/decrement operations on a registry value.

To make permanent changes to the registry, the application that has been using the transaction handle must call the KTM function `CommitTransaction`. (If the application decides to undo the changes, such as during a failure path, it can call the `RollbackTransaction` API.) The changes will then be visible through the regular registry APIs as well.

**Note** If a transaction handle created with `CreateTransaction` is closed before the transaction is committed (and there are no other handles open to that transaction), the system will roll back that transaction.
Apart from using the CLFS support provided by the KTM, TxR also stores its own internal log files in the `%SystemRoot%\System32\Config\Txr` folder on the system volume; these files have a `.regtrans-ms` extension and are hidden by default. Even if there are no third-party applications installed, your system likely will contain files in this directory because Windows Update and Component Based Servicing make use of TxR to atomically write data to the registry to avoid system failure or inconsistent component data in the case of an incomplete update. In fact, if you take a look at some of the transaction files, you should be able to see the key names on which the transaction was being performed.

There is a global registry resource manager (RM) that services all the hives that are mounted at boot time. For every hive that is mounted explicitly, an RM is created. For applications that use registry transactions, the creation of an RM is transparent because KTM ensures that all RMs taking part in the same transaction are coordinated in the two-phase commit/abort protocol. For the global registry RM, the CLFS log files are stored, as mentioned earlier, inside `System32\Config\Txr`. For other hives, they are stored alongside the hive (in the same directory). They are hidden and follow the same naming convention, ending in `.regtrans-ms`. The log file names are prefixed with the name of the hive to which they correspond.

**Monitoring Registry Activity**

Because the system and applications depend so heavily on configuration settings to guide their behavior, system and application failures can result from changing registry data or security. When the system or an application fails to read settings that it assumes it will always be able to access, it might not function properly, display error messages that hide the root cause, or even crash. It’s virtually impossible to know what registry keys or values are misconfigured without understanding how the system or the application that’s failing is accessing the registry. In such situations, the Process Monitor utility from Windows Sysinternals ([http://technet.microsoft.com/sysinternals](http://technet.microsoft.com/sysinternals)) might provide the answer.

Process Monitor lets you monitor registry activity as it occurs. For each registry access, Process Monitor shows you the process that performed the access; the time, type, and result of the access; and the stack of the thread at the moment of the access. This information is useful for seeing how applications and the system rely on the registry, discovering where applications and the system store configuration settings, and troubleshooting problems related to applications having missing registry keys or values. Process Monitor includes advanced filtering and highlighting so that you can zoom in on activity related to specific keys or values or to the activity of particular processes.

**Process Monitor Internals**

Process Monitor relies on a device driver that it extracts from its executable image at run time and then starts. Its first execution requires that the account running it have the Load Driver privilege as well as the Debug privilege; subsequent executions in the same boot session require only the Debug privilege because, once loaded, the driver remains resident.
EXPERIMENT: Viewing Registry Activity on an Idle System

Because the registry implements the `RegNotifyChangeKey` function that applications can use to request notification of registry changes without polling for them, when you launch Process Monitor on a system that’s idle you should not see repetitive accesses to the same registry keys or values. Any such activity identifies a poorly written application that unnecessarily negatively affects a system’s overall performance.

Run Process Monitor, and after several seconds examine the output log to see whether you can spot polling behavior. Right-click on an output line associated with polling, and then choose Process Properties from the context menu to view details about the process performing the activity.

EXPERIMENT: Using Process Monitor to Locate Application Registry Settings

In some troubleshooting scenarios, you might need to determine where in the registry the system or an application stores particular settings. This experiment has you use Process Monitor to discover the location of Notepad’s settings. Notepad, like most Windows applications, saves user preferences—such as word-wrap mode, font and font size, and window position—across executions. By having Process Monitor watching when Notepad reads or writes its settings, you can identify the registry key in which the settings are stored. Here are the steps for doing this:

1. Have Notepad save a setting you can easily search for in a Process Monitor trace. You can do this by running Notepad, setting the font to Times New Roman, and then exiting Notepad.

2. Run Process Monitor. Open the filter dialog box and the Process Name filter, and type `notepad.exe` as the string to match. This step specifies that Process Monitor will log only activity by the `notepad.exe` process.

3. Run Notepad again, and after it has launched stop Process Monitor’s event capture by toggling Capture Events on the Process Monitor File menu.

4. Scroll to the top line of the resultant log and select it.

5. Press Ctrl+F to open a Find dialog box, and search for `times new`. Process Monitor should highlight a line like the one shown in the following screen that represents Notepad reading the font value from the registry. Other operations in the immediate vicinity should relate to other Notepad settings.
6. Finally, right-click the highlighted line and click Jump To. Process Monitor will execute Regedit (if it’s not already running) and cause it to navigate to and select the Notepad-referenced registry value.

**Process Monitor Troubleshooting Techniques**

Two basic Process Monitor troubleshooting techniques are effective for discovering the cause of registry-related application or system problems:

- Look at the last thing in the Process Monitor trace that the application did before it failed. This action might point to the problem.
- Compare a Process Monitor trace of the failing application with a trace from a working system.

To follow the first approach, run Process Monitor and then run the application. At the point the failure occurs, go back to Process Monitor and stop the logging (by pressing Ctrl+E). Then go to the end of the log and find the last operations performed by the application before it failed (or crashed, hung, or whatever). Starting with the last line, work your way backward, examining the files, registry keys, or both that were referenced—often this will help pinpoint the problem.

Use the second approach when the application fails on one system but works on another. Capture a Process Monitor trace of the application on the working and failing systems, and save the output to a log file. Then open the good and bad log files with Microsoft Excel (accepting the defaults in the Import wizard), and delete the first three columns. (If you don’t delete the first three columns, the comparison will show every line as different because the first three columns contain information that is different from run to run, such as the time and the process ID.) Finally, compare the resulting log files. (You can do this by using WinDiff, which is included in the Windows SDK).

Entries in a Process Monitor trace that have values of NAME NOT FOUND or ACCESS DENIED in the Result column are ones you should investigate. NAME NOT FOUND is reported when an application attempts to read from a registry key or value that doesn’t exist. In many cases, a missing key or
value is innocuous because a process that fails to read a setting from the registry simply falls back on default values. In some cases, however, applications expect to find values for which there is no default and will fail if they are missing.

Access-denied errors are a common source of registry-related application failures and occur when an application doesn’t have permission to access a key the way that it wants. Applications that do not validate registry operation results or perform proper error recovery will fail.

A common result string that might appear suspicious is BUFFER OVERFLOW. It does not indicate a buffer-overflow exploit in the application that receives it. Instead, it’s used by the configuration manager to inform an application that the buffer it specified to store a registry value is too small to hold the value. Application developers often take advantage of this behavior to determine how large a buffer to allocate to store a value. They first perform a registry query with a zero-length buffer that returns a buffer-overflow error and the length of the data it attempted to read. The application then allocates a buffer of the indicated size and rereads the value. You should therefore see operations that return BUFFER OVERFLOW repeat with a successful result.

In one example of Process Monitor being used to troubleshoot a real problem, it saved a user from doing a complete reinstall of his Windows system. The symptom was that Internet Explorer would hang on startup if the user did not first manually dial the Internet connection. This Internet connection was set as the default connection for the system, so starting Internet Explorer should have caused an automatic dial-up to the Internet (because Internet Explorer was set to display a default home page upon startup).

An examination of a Process Monitor log of Internet Explorer startup activity, going backward from the point in the log where Internet Explorer hung, showed a query to a key under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\RAS Phonebook. The user reported that he had previously uninstalled the dialer program associated with the key and manually created the dial-up connection. Because the dial-up connection name did not match that of the uninstalled dialer program, it appeared that the key had not been deleted by the dialer’s uninstall program and that it was causing Internet Explorer to hang. After the key was deleted, Internet Explorer functioned as expected.

Logging Activity in Unprivileged Accounts or During Logon/Logoff
A common application-failure scenario is that an application works when run in an account that has Administrative group membership but not when run in the account of an unprivileged user. As described earlier, executing Process Monitor requires security privileges that are not normally assigned to standard user accounts, but you can capture a trace of applications executing in the logon session of an unprivileged user by using the Runas command to execute Process Monitor in an administrative account.

If a registry problem relates to account logon or logoff, you’ll also have to take special steps to be able to use Process Monitor to capture a trace of those phases of a logon session. Applications that are run in the local system account are not terminated when a user logs off, and you can take advantage of that fact to have Process Monitor run through a logoff and subsequent logon. You can
launch Process Monitor in the local system account either by using the At command that’s built into Windows and specifying the /interactive flag, or by using the Sysinternals PsExec utility, like this:

```
psexec –i 0 –s –d c:\procmon.exe
```

The `–i 0` switch directs PsExec to have Process Monitor’s window appear on the session 0 interactive window station’s default desktop, the `–s` switch has PsExec run Process Monitor in the local system account, and the `–d` switch has PsExec launch Process Monitor and exit without waiting for Process Monitor to terminate. When you execute this command, the instance of Process Monitor that executes will survive logoff and reappear on the desktop when you log back on, having captured the registry activity of both actions.

Another way to monitor registry activity during the logon, logoff, boot, or shutdown process is to use the Process Monitor log boot feature, which you can enable by selecting Log Boot on the Options menu. The next time you boot the system, the Process Monitor device driver logs registry activity from early in the boot to `%SystemRoot%\Procmon.pml`. It will continue logging to that file until disk space runs out, the system shuts down, or you run Process Monitor. A log file storing a registry trace of startup, logon, logoff, and shutdown on a Windows system will typically be between 50 and 150 MB in size.

**Registry Internals**

In this section, you’ll find out how the configuration manager—the executive subsystem that implements the registry—organizes the registry’s on-disk files. We’ll examine how the configuration manager manages the registry as applications and other operating system components read and change registry keys and values. We’ll also discuss the mechanisms by which the configuration manager tries to ensure that the registry is always in a recoverable state, even if the system crashes while the registry is being modified.

**Hives**

On disk, the registry isn’t simply one large file but rather a set of discrete files called hives. Each hive contains a registry tree, which has a key that serves as the root or starting point of the tree. Subkeys and their values reside beneath the root. You might think that the root keys displayed by the Registry Editor correlate to the root keys in the hives, but such is not the case. Table 4-5 lists registry hives and their on-disk file names. The path names of all hives except for user profiles are coded into the configuration manager. As the configuration manager loads hives, including system profiles, it notes each hive’s path in the values under the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Hivelist subkey, removing the path if the hive is unloaded. It creates the root keys, linking these hives together to build the registry structure you’re familiar with and that the Registry Editor displays.

You’ll notice that some of the hives listed in Table 4-5 are volatile and don’t have associated files. The system creates and manages these hives entirely in memory; the hives are therefore temporary. The system creates volatile hives every time it boots. An example of a volatile hive is the HKLM\HARDWARE hive, which stores information about physical devices and the devices’ assigned
resources. Resource assignment and hardware detection occur every time the system boots, so not storing this data on disk is logical.

**TABLE 4-5** On-Disk Files Corresponding to Paths in the Registry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hive Registry Path</th>
<th>Hive File Path</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\BCD00000000</td>
<td>\Boot\BCD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\COMPONENTS</td>
<td>%SystemRoot%\System32\Config\Components</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM</td>
<td>%SystemRoot%\System32\Config\System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SAM</td>
<td>%SystemRoot%\System32\Config\Sam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SECURITY</td>
<td>%SystemRoot%\System32\Config\Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE</td>
<td>%SystemRoot%\System32\Config\Software</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\HARDWARE</td>
<td>Volatile hive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKEY_USERS&lt;SID of local service account&gt;</td>
<td>%SystemRoot%\ServiceProfiles\LocalService\Ntuser.dat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKEY_USERS&lt;SID of network service account&gt;</td>
<td>%SystemRoot%\ServiceProfiles\NetworkService\NtUser.dat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKEY_USERS&lt;SID of username&gt;</td>
<td>\Users&lt;username&gt;\Ntuser.dat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKEY_USERS&lt;SID of username&gt;_Classes</td>
<td>\Users&lt;username&gt;\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Usrclass.dat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKEY_USERS.DEFAULT</td>
<td>%SystemRoot%\System32\Config\Default</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EXPERIMENT: Manually Loading and Unloading Hives**

Regedit has the ability to load hives that you can access through its File menu. This capability can be useful in troubleshooting scenarios where you want to view or edit a hive from an un-bootable system or a backup medium. In this experiment, you’ll use Regedit to load a version of the HKLM\SYSTEM hive that Windows Setup creates during the install process.

1. Hives can be loaded only underneath HKLM or HKU, so open Regedit, select HKLM, and choose Load Hive from the Regedit File menu.

2. Navigate to the %SystemRoot%\System32\Config\RegBack directory in the Load Hive dialog box, select System and open it. When prompted, type Test as the name of the key under which it will load.

3. Open the newly created HKLM\Test key, and explore the contents of the hive.

4. Open HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Hivelist, and locate the entry \Registry\Machine\Test, which demonstrates how the configuration manager lists loaded hives in the Hivelist key.

5. Select HKLM\Test, and then choose Unload Hive from the Regedit File menu to unload the hive.
Hive Size Limits

In some cases, hive sizes are limited. For example, Windows places a limit on the size of the HKLM\SYSTEM hive. It does so because Winload reads the entire HKLM\SYSTEM hive into physical memory near the start of the boot process when virtual memory paging is not enabled. Winload also loads Ntoskrnl and boot device drivers into physical memory, so it must constrain the amount of physical memory assigned to HKLM\SYSTEM. (See Chapter 13 in Part 2 for more information on the role Winload plays during the startup process.) On 32-bit systems, Winload allows the hive to be as large as 400 MB or one-half the amount of physical memory on the system, whichever is lower. On x64 systems, the lower bound is 1.5 GB. On Itanium systems, it is 32 MB.

Registry Symbolic Links

A special type of key known as a registry symbolic link makes it possible for the configuration manager to link keys to organize the registry. A symbolic link is a key that redirects the configuration manager to another key. Thus, the key HKLM\SAM is a symbolic link to the key at the root of the SAM hive. Symbolic links are created by specifying the REG_CREATE_LINK parameter to RegCreateKey or RegCreateKeyEx. Internally, the configuration manager will create a REG_LINK value called SymbolicLinkValue, which will contain the path to the target key. Because this value is a REG_LINK instead of a REG_SZ, it will not be visible with Regedit—it is, however, part of the on-disk registry hive.

EXPERIMENT: Looking at Hive Handles

The configuration manager opens hives by using the kernel handle table (described in Chapter 3) so that it can access hives from any process context. Using the kernel handle table is an efficient alternative to approaches that involve using drivers or executive components to access from the System process only handles that must be protected from user processes. You can use Process Explorer to see the hive handles, which will be displayed as being opened in the System process. Select the System process, and then select Handles from the Lower Pane View menu entry on the View menu. Sort by handle type, and scroll until you see the hive files, as shown in the following screen.
Hive Structure

The configuration manager logically divides a hive into allocation units called blocks in much the same way that a file system divides a disk into clusters. By definition, the registry block size is 4096 bytes (4 KB). When new data expands a hive, the hive always expands in block-granular increments. The first block of a hive is the base block.

The base block includes global information about the hive, including a signature—regf—that identifies the file as a hive, updated sequence numbers, a time stamp that shows the last time a write operation was initiated on the hive, information on registry repair or recovery performed by Winload, the hive format version number, a checksum, and the hive file’s internal file name (for example, \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\CONFIG\SAM). We’ll clarify the significance of the updated sequence numbers and time stamp when we describe how data is written to a hive file.

The hive format version number specifies the data format within the hive. The configuration manager uses hive format version 1.3 (which improved searching by caching the first four characters of the name inside the cell index structure for quick lookups) for all hives except for System and Software for roaming profile compatibility with Windows 2000. For System and Software hives, it uses version 1.5 because of the later format’s optimizations for large values (values larger than 1 MB are supported) and searching (instead of caching the first four characters of a name, a hash of the entire name is used to reduce collisions).

Windows organizes the registry data that a hive stores in containers called cells. A cell can hold a key, a value, a security descriptor, a list of subkeys, or a list of key values. A 4-byte character tag at the beginning of a cell’s data describes the data’s type as a signature. Table 4-6 describes each cell data type in detail. A cell’s header is a field that specifies the cell’s size as the 1’s complement (not present in the CM_ structures). When a cell joins a hive and the hive must expand to contain the cell, the system creates an allocation unit called a bin.

A bin is the size of the new cell rounded up to the next block or page boundary, whichever is higher. The system considers any space between the end of the cell and the end of the bin to be free space that it can allocate to other cells. Bins also have headers that contain a signature, hbin, and a field that records the offset into the hive file of the bin and the bin’s size.

TABLE 4-6 Cell Data Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Type</th>
<th>Structure Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key cell</td>
<td>CM_KEY_NODE</td>
<td>A cell that contains a registry key, also called a key node. A key cell contains a signature (kn for a key, kl for a link node), the time stamp of the most recent update to the key, the cell index of the key’s parent key cell, the cell index of the subkey-list cell that identifies the key’s subkeys, a cell index for the key’s security descriptor cell, a cell index for a string key that specifies the class name of the key, and the name of the key (for example, CurrentControlSet). It also saves cached information such as the number of subkeys under the key, as well as the size of the largest key, value name, value data, and class name of the subkeys under this key.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Data Type | Structure Type | Description
--- | --- | ---
Value cell | CM_KEY_VALUE | A cell that contains information about a key’s value. This cell includes a signature (kv), the value’s type (for example, REG_DWORD or REG_BINARY), and the value’s name (for example, Boot-Execute). A value cell also contains the cell index of the cell that contains the value’s data.
Subkey-list cell | CM_KEY_INDEX | A cell composed of a list of cell indexes for key cells that are all subkeys of a common parent key.
Value-list cell | CM_KEY_INDEX | A cell composed of a list of cell indexes for value cells that are all values of a common parent key.
Security-descriptor cell | CM_KEY_SECURITY | A cell that contains a security descriptor. Security-descriptor cells include a signature (ks) at the head of the cell and a reference count that records the number of key nodes that share the security descriptor. Multiple key cells can share security-descriptor cells.

By using bins, instead of cells, to track active parts of the registry, Windows minimizes some management chores. For example, the system usually allocates and deallocates bins less frequently than it does cells, which lets the configuration manager manage memory more efficiently. When the configuration manager reads a registry hive into memory, it reads the whole hive, including empty bins, but it can choose to discard them later. When the system adds and deletes cells in a hive, the hive can contain empty bins interspersed with active bins. This situation is similar to disk fragmentation, which occurs when the system creates and deletes files on the disk. When a bin becomes empty, the configuration manager joins to the empty bin any adjacent empty bins to form as large a contiguous empty bin as possible. The configuration manager also joins adjacent deleted cells to form larger free cells. (The configuration manager shrinks a hive only when bins at the end of the hive become free. You can compact the registry by backing it up and restoring it using the Windows `RegSaveKey` and `RegReplaceKey` functions, which are used by the Windows Backup utility.)

The links that create the structure of a hive are called cell indexes. A cell index is the offset of a cell into the hive file minus the size of the base block. Thus, a cell index is like a pointer from one cell to another cell that the configuration manager interprets relative to the start of a hive. For example, as you saw in Table 4-6, a cell that describes a key contains a field specifying the cell index of its parent key; a cell index for a subkey specifies the cell that describes the subkeys that are subordinate to the specified subkey. A subkey-list cell contains a list of cell indexes that refer to the subkey’s key cells. Therefore, if you want to locate, for example, the key cell of subkey A, whose parent is key B, you must first locate the cell containing key B’s subkey list using the subkey-list cell index in key B’s cell. Then you locate each of key B’s subkey cells by using the list of cell indexes in the subkey-list cell. For each subkey cell, you check to see whether the subkey’s name, which a key cell stores, matches the one you want to locate, in this case, subkey A.

The distinction between cells, bins, and blocks can be confusing, so let’s look at an example of a simple registry hive layout to help clarify the differences. The sample registry hive file in Figure 4-3 contains a base block and two bins. The first bin is empty, and the second bin contains several cells. Logically, the hive has only two keys: the root key Root, and a subkey of Root, Sub Key. Root has two
values, Val 1 and Val 2. A subkey-list cell locates the root key’s subkey, and a value-list cell locates the root key’s values. The free spaces in the second bin are empty cells. Figure 4-3 doesn’t show the security cells for the two keys, which would be present in a hive.

To optimize searches for both values and subkeys, the configuration manager sorts subkey-list cells alphabetically. The configuration manager can then perform a binary search when it looks for a subkey within a list of subkeys. The configuration manager examines the subkey in the middle of the list, and if the name of the subkey the configuration manager is looking for is alphabetically before the name of the middle subkey, the configuration manager knows that the subkey is in the first half of the subkey list; otherwise, the subkey is in the second half of the subkey list. This splitting process continues until the configuration manager locates the subkey or finds no match. Value-list cells aren’t sorted, however, so new values are always added to the end of the list.

Cell Maps
If hives never grew, the configuration manager could perform all its registry management on the in-memory version of a hive as if the hive were a file. Given a cell index, the configuration manager could calculate the location in memory of a cell simply by adding the cell index, which is a hive file offset, to the base of the in-memory hive image. Early in the system boot, this process is exactly what Winload does with the SYSTEM hive: Winload reads the entire SYSTEM hive into memory as a read-only hive and adds the cell indexes to the base of the in-memory hive image to locate cells. Unfortunately, hives grow as they take on new keys and values, which means the system must allocate paged pool memory to store the new bins that contain added keys and values. Thus, the paged pool that keeps the registry data in memory isn’t necessarily contiguous.

EXPERIMENT: Viewing Hive Paged Pool Usage
There are no administrative-level tools that show you the amount of paged pool that registry hives, including user profiles, are consuming on Windows. However, the !reg dumppool kernel debugger command shows you not only how many pages of the paged pool each loaded hive consumes but also how many of the pages store volatile and nonvolatile data. The command
prints the total hive memory usage at the end of the output. (The command shows only the last 32 characters of a hive’s name.)

kd> lreg dumppool

dumping hive at e20d66a8 (a\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat)
  Stable Length = 1000
  1/1 pages present
  Volatile Length = 0

dumping hive at e215ee88 (settings\Administrator\ntuser.dat)
  Stable Length = f2000
  242/242 pages present
  Volatile Length = 2000
  2/2 pages present

dumping hive at e13fa188 (\SystemRoot\System32\Config\SAM)
  Stable Length = 5000
  5/5 pages present
  Volatile Length = 0
...

To deal with noncontiguous memory addresses referencing hive data in memory, the configuration manager adopts a strategy similar to what the Windows memory manager uses to map virtual memory addresses to physical memory addresses. The configuration manager employs a two-level scheme, which Figure 4-4 illustrates, that takes as input a cell index (that is, a hive file offset) and returns as output both the address in memory of the block the cell index resides in and the address in memory of the block the cell resides in. Remember that a bin can contain one or more blocks and that hives grow in bins, so Windows always represents a bin with a contiguous region of memory. Therefore, all blocks within a bin occur within the same cache manager view.

![Cell index diagram](image)

**FIGURE 4-4** Structure of a cell index
To implement the mapping, the configuration manager divides a cell index logically into fields, in the same way that the memory manager divides a virtual address into fields. Windows interprets a cell index’s first field as an index into a hive’s cell map directory. The cell map directory contains 1024 entries, each of which refers to a cell map table that contains 512 map entries. An entry in this cell map table is specified by the second field in the cell index. That entry locates the bin and block memory addresses of the cell. Not all bins are necessarily mapped into memory, and if a cell lookup yields an address of 0, the configuration manager maps the bin into memory, unmapping another on the mapping LRU list it maintains, if necessary.

In the final step of the translation process, the configuration manager interprets the last field of the cell index as an offset into the identified block to precisely locate a cell in memory. When a hive initializes, the configuration manager dynamically creates the mapping tables, designating a map entry for each block in the hive, and it adds and deletes tables from the cell directory as the changing size of the hive requires.

The Registry Namespace and Operation

The configuration manager defines a key object type to integrate the registry’s namespace with the kernel's general namespace. The configuration manager inserts a key object named Registry into the root of the Windows namespace, which serves as the entry point to the registry. Regedit shows key names in the form HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet, but the Windows subsystem translates such names into their object namespace form (for example, \Registry\Machine\System \CurrentControlSet). When the Windows object manager parses this name, it encounters the key object by the name of Registry first and hands the rest of the name to the configuration manager. The configuration manager takes over the name parsing, looking through its internal hive tree to find the desired key or value. Before we describe the flow of control for a typical registry operation, we need to discuss key objects and key control blocks. Whenever an application opens or creates a registry key, the object manager gives a handle with which to reference the key to the application. The handle corresponds to a key object that the configuration manager allocates with the help of the object manager. By using the object manager's object support, the configuration manager takes advantage of the security and reference-counting functionality that the object manager provides.

For each open registry key, the configuration manager also allocates a key control block. A key control block stores the name of the key, includes the cell index of the key node that the control block refers to, and contains a flag that notes whether the configuration manager needs to delete the key cell that the key control block refers to when the last handle for the key closes. Windows places all key control blocks into a hash table to enable quick searches for existing key control blocks by name. A key object points to its corresponding key control block, so if two applications open the same registry key, each will receive a key object, and both key objects will point to a common key control block.

When an application opens an existing registry key, the flow of control starts with the application specifying the name of the key in a registry API that invokes the object manager’s name-parsing routine. The object manager, upon encountering the configuration manager’s registry key object in the namespace, hands the path name to the configuration manager. The configuration manager performs a lookup on the key control block hash table. If the related key control block is found there, there's no
need for any further work; otherwise, the lookup provides the configuration manager with the closest key control block to the searched key, and the lookup continues by using the in-memory hive data structures to search through keys and subkeys to find the specified key. If the configuration manager finds the key cell, the configuration manager searches the key control block tree to determine whether the key is open (by the same application or another one). The search routine is optimized to always start from the closest ancestor with a key control block already opened. For example, if an application opens `\Registry\Machine\Key1\Subkey2`, and `\Registry\Machine` is already opened, the parse routine uses the key control block of `\Registry\Machine` as a starting point. If the key is open, the configuration manager increments the existing key control block’s reference count. If the key isn’t open, the configuration manager allocates a new key control block and inserts it into the tree. Then the configuration manager allocates a key object, points the key object at the key control block, and returns control to the object manager, which returns a handle to the application.

When an application creates a new registry key, the configuration manager first finds the key cell for the new key’s parent. The configuration manager then searches the list of free cells for the hive in which the new key will reside to determine whether cells exist that are large enough to hold the new key cell. If there aren’t any free cells large enough, the configuration manager allocates a new bin and uses it for the cell, placing any space at the end of the bin on the free cell list. The new key cell fills with pertinent information—including the key’s name—and the configuration manager adds the key cell to the subkey list of the parent key’s subkey-list cell. Finally, the system stores the cell index of the parent cell in the new subkey’s key cell.

The configuration manager uses a key control block’s reference count to determine when to delete the key control block. When all the handles that refer to a key in a key control block close, the reference count becomes 0, which denotes that the key control block is no longer necessary. If an application that calls an API to delete the key sets the delete flag, the configuration manager can delete the associated key from the key’s hive because it knows that no application is keeping the key open.

**EXPERIMENT: Viewing Key Control Blocks**

You can use the kernel debugger to list all the key control blocks allocated on a system with the command `!reg openkeys` command. Alternatively, if you want to view the key control block for a particular open key, use `!reg findkcb`:

```
kd> !reg findkcb \registry\machine\software\microsoft

Found KCB = e1034d40 :: \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT

You can then examine a reported key control block with the `!reg kcb` command:
```
kd> !reg kcb e1034d40

```
Key                         : \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT
RefCount                    : 1f
Flags                       : CompressedName, Stable
ExtFlags                    :
Parent                      : 0xe1997368
KeyHive                     : 0xe1c8a768
```
The Flags field indicates that the name is stored in compressed form, and the SubKeyCount field shows that the key has 137 subkeys.

Stable Storage

To make sure that a nonvolatile registry hive (one with an on-disk file) is always in a recoverable state, the configuration manager uses log hives. Each nonvolatile hive has an associated log hive, which is a hidden file with the same base name as the hive and a logN extension. To ensure forward progress, the configuration manager uses a dual-logging scheme. There are potentially two log files: .log1 and .log2. If, for any reason, .log1 was written but a failure occurred while writing dirty data to the primary log file, the next time a flush happens, a switch to .log2 will occur with the cumulative dirty data. If that fails as well, the cumulative dirty data (the data in .log1 and the data that was dirtied in between) is saved in .log2. As a consequence, .log1 will be used again next time around, until a successful write operation is done to the primary log file. If no failure occurs, only .log1 is used.

For example, if you look in your %SystemRoot%\System32\Config directory (and you have the Show Hidden Files And Folders folder option selected), you’ll see System.log1, Sam.log1, and other .log1 and .log2 files. When a hive initializes, the configuration manager allocates a bit array in which each bit represents a 512-byte portion, or sector, of the hive. This array is called the dirty sector array because an on bit in the array means that the system has modified the corresponding sector in the hive in memory and must write the sector back to the hive file. (An off bit means that the corresponding sector is up to date with the in-memory hive’s contents.)

When the creation of a new key or value or the modification of an existing key or value takes place, the configuration manager notes the sectors of the hive that change in the hive’s dirty sector array. Then the configuration manager schedules a lazy write operation, or a hive sync. The hive lazy writer system thread wakes up five seconds after the request to synchronize the hive and writes dirty hive sectors for all hives from memory to the hive files on disk. Thus, the system flushes, at the same time, all the registry modifications that take place between the time a hive sync is requested and the time the hive sync occurs. When a hive sync takes place, the next hive sync will occur no sooner than five seconds later.
Note The RegFlushKey API's name implies that the function flushes only modified data for a specified key to disk, but it actually triggers a full registry flush, which has a major performance impact on the system. For that reason and the fact that the registry automatically makes sure that modified data is in stable storage within seconds, application programmers should avoid using it.

If the lazy writer simply wrote all a hive's dirty sectors to the hive file and the system crashed in mid-operation, the hive file would be in an inconsistent (corrupted) and unrecoverable state. To prevent such an occurrence, the lazy writer first dumps the hive's dirty sector array and all the dirty sectors to the hive's log file, increasing the log file's size if necessary. The lazy writer then updates a sequence number in the hive's base block and writes the dirty sectors to the hive. When the lazy writer is finished, it updates a second sequence number in the base block. Thus, if the system crashes during the write operations to the hive, at the next reboot the configuration manager will notice that the two sequence numbers in the hive's base block don't match. The configuration manager can update the hive with the dirty sectors in the hive's log file to roll the hive forward. The hive is then up to date and consistent.

The Windows Boot Loader also contains some code related to registry reliability. For example, it can parse the System.log file before the kernel is loaded and do repairs to fix consistency. Additionally, in certain cases of hive corruption (such as if a base block, bin, or cell contains data that fails consistency checks), the configuration manager can reinitialize corrupted data structures, possibly deleting subkeys in the process, and continue normal operation. If it has to resort to a self-healing operation, it pops up a system error dialog box notifying the user.

Registry Filtering
The configuration manager in the Windows kernel implements a powerful model of registry filtering, which allows for monitoring of registry activity by tools such as Process Monitor. When a driver uses the callback mechanism, it registers a callback function with the configuration manager. The configuration manager executes the driver's callback function before and after the execution of registry system services so that the driver has full visibility and control over registry accesses. Antivirus products that scan registry data for viruses or prevent unauthorized processes from modifying the registry are other users of the callback mechanism.

Registry callbacks are also associated with the concept of altitudes. Altitudes are a way for different vendors to register a “height” on the registry filtering stack so that the order in which the system calls each callback routine can be deterministic and correct. This avoids a scenario in which an antivirus product would be scanning encrypted keys before an encryption product would run its own callback to decrypt them. With the Windows registry callback model, both types of tools are assigned a base altitude corresponding to the type of filtering they are doing—in this case, encryption versus scanning. Secondly, companies that create these types of tools must register with Microsoft so that within their own group, they will not collide with similar or competing products.
The filtering model also includes the ability to either completely take over the processing of the registry operation (bypassing the configuration manager and preventing it from handling the request) or redirect the operation to a different operation (such as Wow64’s registry redirection). Additionally, it is also possible to modify the output parameters as well as the return value of a registry operation.

Finally, drivers can assign and tag per-key or per-operation driver-defined information for their own purposes. A driver can create and assign this context data during a create or open operation, which the configuration manager will remember and return during each subsequent operation on the key.

Registry Optimizations

The configuration manager makes a few noteworthy performance optimizations. First, virtually every registry key has a security descriptor that protects access to the key. Storing a unique security-descriptor copy for every key in a hive would be highly inefficient, however, because the same security settings often apply to entire subtrees of the registry. When the system applies security to a key, the configuration manager checks a pool of the unique security descriptors used within the same hive as the key to which new security is being applied, and it shares any existing descriptor for the key, ensuring that there is at most one copy of every unique security descriptor in a hive.

The configuration manager also optimizes the way it stores key and value names in a hive. Although the registry is fully Unicode-capable and specifies all names using the Unicode convention, if a name contains only ASCII characters, the configuration manager stores the name in ASCII form in the hive. When the configuration manager reads the name (such as when performing name lookups), it converts the name into Unicode form in memory. Storing the name in ASCII form can significantly reduce the size of a hive.

To minimize memory usage, key control blocks don’t store full key registry path names. Instead, they reference only a key’s name. For example, a key control block that refers to \Registry\System\Control would refer to the name Control rather than to the full path. A further memory optimization is that the configuration manager uses key name control blocks to store key names, and all key control blocks for keys with the same name share the same key name control block. To optimize performance, the configuration manager stores the key control block names in a hash table for quick lookups.

To provide fast access to key control blocks, the configuration manager stores frequently accessed key control blocks in the cache table, which is configured as a hash table. When the configuration manager needs to look up a key control block, it first checks the cache table. Finally, the configuration manager has another cache, the delayed close table, that stores key control blocks that applications close so that an application can quickly reopen a key it has recently closed. To optimize lookups, these cache tables are stored for each hive. The configuration manager removes the oldest key control blocks from the delayed close table as it adds the most recently closed blocks to the table.
Almost every operating system has a mechanism to start processes at system startup time that provide services not tied to an interactive user. In Windows, such processes are called services or Windows services, because they rely on the Windows API to interact with the system. Services are similar to UNIX daemon processes and often implement the server side of client/server applications. An example of a Windows service might be a web server, because it must be running regardless of whether anyone is logged on to the computer and it must start running when the system starts so that an administrator doesn’t have to remember, or even be present, to start it.

Windows services consist of three components: a service application, a service control program (SCP), and the service control manager (SCM). First, we’ll describe service applications, service accounts, and the operations of the SCM. Then we’ll explain how auto-start services are started during the system boot. We’ll also cover the steps the SCM takes when a service fails during its startup and the way the SCM shuts down services.

Service Applications

Service applications, such as web servers, consist of at least one executable that runs as a Windows service. A user wanting to start, stop, or configure a service uses an SCP. Although Windows supplies built-in SCPs that provide general start, stop, pause, and continue functionality, some service applications include their own SCP that allows administrators to specify configuration settings particular to the service they manage.

Service applications are simply Windows executables (GUI or console) with additional code to receive commands from the SCM as well as to communicate the application’s status back to the SCM. Because most services don’t have a user interface, they are built as console programs.

When you install an application that includes a service, the application’s setup program must register the service with the system. To register the service, the setup program calls the Windows `CreateService` function, a services-related function implemented in Advapi32.dll (%SystemRoot%\System32\Advapi32.dll). Advapi32, the “Advanced API” DLL, implements all the client-side SCM APIs.

When a setup program registers a service by calling `CreateService`, a message is sent to the SCM on the machine where the service will reside. The SCM then creates a registry key for the service under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. The Services key is the nonvolatile representation of the SCM’s database. The individual keys for each service define the path of the executable image that contains the service as well as parameters and configuration options.

After creating a service, an installation or management application can start the service via the `StartService` function. Because some service-based applications also must initialize during the boot process to function, it’s not unusual for a setup program to register a service as an auto-start service, ask the user to reboot the system to complete an installation, and let the SCM start the service as the system boots.
When a program calls `CreateService`, it must specify a number of parameters describing the service’s characteristics. The characteristics include the service’s type (whether it’s a service that runs in its own process rather than a service that shares a process with other services), the location of the service’s executable image file, an optional display name, an optional account name and password used to start the service in a particular account’s security context, a start type that indicates whether the service starts automatically when the system boots or manually under the direction of an SCP, an error code that indicates how the system should react if the service detects an error when starting, and, if the service starts automatically, optional information that specifies when the service starts relative to other services.

The SCM stores each characteristic as a value in the service’s registry key. Figure 4-5 shows an example of a service registry key.

Table 4-7 lists all the service characteristics, many of which also apply to device drivers. (Not every characteristic applies to every type of service or device driver.) If a service needs to store configuration information that is private to the service, the convention is to create a subkey named Parameters under its service key and then store the configuration information in values under that subkey. The service then can retrieve the values by using standard registry functions.

![Registry Editor](image)

**FIGURE 4-5** Example of a service registry key

Note The SCM does not access a service’s Parameters subkey until the service is deleted, at which time the SCM deletes the service’s entire key, including subkeys like Parameters.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Value Setting</strong></th>
<th><strong>Value Name</strong></th>
<th><strong>Value Setting Description</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Start</strong></td>
<td>SERVICE_BOOT_START (0)</td>
<td>Winload preloads the driver so that it is in memory during the boot. These drivers are initialized just prior to SERVICE_SYSTEM_START drivers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SERVICE_SYSTEM_START (1)</td>
<td>The driver loads and initializes during kernel initialization after SERVICE_BOOT_START drivers have initialized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SERVICE_AUTO_START (2)</td>
<td>The SCM starts the driver or service after the SCM process, Services.exe, starts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SERVICE_DEMAND_START (3)</td>
<td>The SCM starts the driver or service on demand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SERVICE_DISABLED (4)</td>
<td>The driver or service doesn’t load or initialize.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ErrorControl</strong></td>
<td>SERVICE_ERROR_IGNORE (0)</td>
<td>Any error the driver or service returns is ignored, and no warning is logged or displayed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SERVICE_ERROR_NORMAL (1)</td>
<td>If the driver or service reports an error, an event log message is written.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SERVICE_ERROR_SEVERE (2)</td>
<td>If the driver or service returns an error and last known good isn’t being used, reboot into last known good; otherwise, continue the boot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SERVICE_ERROR_CRITICAL (3)</td>
<td>If the driver or service returns an error and last known good isn’t being used, reboot into last known good; otherwise, stop the boot with a blue screen crash.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type</strong></td>
<td>SERVICE_KERNEL_DRIVER (1)</td>
<td>Device driver.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SERVICE_FILE_SYSTEM_DRIVER (2)</td>
<td>Kernel-mode file system driver.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SERVICE_ADAPTER (4)</td>
<td>Obsolete.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SERVICE_RECOGNIZER_DRIVER (8)</td>
<td>File system recognizer driver.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SERVICE_WIN32_OWNING_PROCESS (16)</td>
<td>The service runs in a process that hosts only one service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SERVICE_WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS (32)</td>
<td>The service runs in a process that hosts multiple services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SERVICE_INTERACTIVE_PROCESS (256)</td>
<td>The service is allowed to display windows on the console and receive user input, but only on the console session (0) to prevent interacting with user/console applications on other sessions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group</strong></td>
<td>Group name</td>
<td>The driver or service initializes when its group is initialized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tag</strong></td>
<td>Tag number</td>
<td>The specified location in a group initialization order. This parameter doesn’t apply to services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ImagePath</strong></td>
<td>Path to the service or driver executable file</td>
<td>If ImagePath isn’t specified, the I/O manager looks for drivers in %SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers. Required for Windows services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value Setting</td>
<td>Value Name</td>
<td>Value Setting Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DependOnGroup</td>
<td>Group name</td>
<td>The driver or service won’t load unless a driver or service from the specified group loads.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DependOnService</td>
<td>Service name</td>
<td>The service won’t load until after the specified service loads. This parameter doesn’t apply to device drivers other than those with a start type of SERVICE_AUTO_START or SERVICE_DEMAND_START.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ObjectName</td>
<td>Usually LocalSystem, but it can be an account name, such as .\Administrator</td>
<td>Specifies the account in which the service will run. If ObjectName isn’t specified, LocalSystem is the account used. This parameter doesn’t apply to device drivers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DisplayName</td>
<td>Name of the service</td>
<td>The service application shows services by this name. If no name is specified, the name of the service’s registry key becomes its name.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Description of service</td>
<td>Up to 32767-byte description of the service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FailureActions</td>
<td>Description of actions the SCM should take when the service process exits unexpectedly</td>
<td>Failure actions include restarting the service process, rebooting the system, and running a specified program. This value doesn’t apply to drivers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FailureCommand</td>
<td>Program command line</td>
<td>The SCM reads this value only if FailureActions specifies that a program should execute upon service failure. This value doesn’t apply to drivers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DelayedAutoStart</td>
<td>0 or 1 (TRUE or FALSE)</td>
<td>Tells the SCM to start this service after a certain delay has passed since the SCM was started. This reduces the number of services starting simultaneously during startup.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PreshutdownTimeout</td>
<td>Timeout in milliseconds</td>
<td>This value allows services to override the default preshutdown notification timeout of 180 seconds. After this timeout, the SCM will perform shutdown actions on the service if it has not yet responded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ServiceSidType</td>
<td>SERVICE_SID_TYPE_NONE (0)</td>
<td>Backward-compatibility setting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SERVICE_SID_TYPE_UNRESTRICTED (1)</td>
<td>The SCM will add the service SID as a group owner to the service process’ token when it is created.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SERVICE_SID_TYPE_RESTRICTED (3)</td>
<td>Same as above, but the SCM will also add the service SID to the restricted SID list of the service process, along with the world, logon, and write-restricted SIDs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RequiredPrivileges</td>
<td>List of privileges</td>
<td>This value contains the list of privileges that the service requires to function. The SCM will compute their union when creating the token for the shared process related to this service, if any.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Security descriptor</td>
<td>This value contains the optional security descriptor that defines who has what access to the service object created internally by the SCM. If this value is omitted, the SCM applies a default security descriptor.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notice that Type values include three that apply to device drivers: device driver, file system driver, and file system recognizer. These are used by Windows device drivers, which also store their parameters as registry data in the Services registry key. The SCM is responsible for starting drivers with a Start value of SERVICE_AUTO_START or SERVICE_DEMAND_START, so it’s natural for the SCM database to include drivers. Services use the other types, SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS and SERVICE_WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS, which are mutually exclusive. An executable that hosts more than one service specifies the SERVICE_WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS type.

An advantage to having a process run more than one service is that the system resources that would otherwise be required to run them in distinct processes are saved. A potential disadvantage is that if one of the services of a collection running in the same process causes an error that terminates the process, all the services of that process terminate. Also, another limitation is that all the services must run under the same account (however, if a service takes advantage of service security hardening mechanisms, it can limit some of its exposure to malicious attacks).

When the SCM starts a service process, the process must immediately invoke the StartServiceCtrlDispatcher function. StartServiceCtrlDispatcher accepts a list of entry points into services, one entry point for each service in the process. Each entry point is identified by the name of the service the entry point corresponds to. After making a named-pipe communications connection to the SCM, StartServiceCtrlDispatcher waits for commands to come through the pipe from the SCM. The SCM sends a service-start command each time it starts a service the process owns. For each start command it receives, the StartServiceCtrlDispatcher function creates a thread, called a service thread, to invoke the starting service’s entry point and implement the command loop for the service. StartServiceCtrlDispatcher waits indefinitely for commands from the SCM and returns control to the process’ main function only when all the process’ services have stopped, allowing the service process to clean up resources before exiting.

A service entry point’s first action is to call the RegisterServiceCtrlHandler function. This function receives and stores a pointer to a function, called the control handler, which the service implements to handle various commands it receives from the SCM. RegisterServiceCtrlHandler doesn’t communicate with the SCM, but it stores the function in local process memory for the StartServiceCtrlDispatcher function. The service entry point continues initializing the service, which can include allocating memory, creating communications end points, and reading private configuration data from the registry. As explained earlier, a convention most services follow is to store their parameters under a subkey of their service registry key, named Parameters.

While the entry point is initializing the service, it must periodically send status messages, using the SetServiceStatus function, to the SCM indicating how the service’s startup is progressing. After the entry point finishes initialization, a service thread usually sits in a loop waiting for requests from client applications. For example, a Web server would initialize a TCP listen socket and wait for inbound HTTP connection requests.

A service process’ main thread, which executes in the StartServiceCtrlDispatcher function, receives SCM commands directed at services in the process and invokes the target service’s control han-
Service control handler function (stored by `RegisterServiceCtrlHandler`). SCM commands include stop, pause, resume, interrogate, and shutdown or application-defined commands. Figure 4-6 shows the internal organization of a service process. Pictured are the two threads that make up a process hosting one service: the main thread and the service thread.

1. `StartServiceCtrlDispatcher` launches service thread.
2. Service thread registers control handler.
3. `StartServiceCtrlDispatcher` calls handlers in response to SCM commands.
4. Service thread processes client requests.

**FIGURE 4-6** Inside a service process

**Service Accounts**

The security context of a service is an important consideration for service developers as well as for system administrators because it dictates what resources the process can access. Unless a service installation program or administrator specifies otherwise, most services run in the security context of the local system account (displayed sometimes as SYSTEM and other times as LocalSystem). Two other built-in accounts are the network service and local service accounts. These accounts have fewer capabilities than the local system account from a security standpoint, and any built-in Windows service that does not require the power of the local system account runs in the appropriate alternate service account. The following subsections describe the special characteristics of these accounts.

**The Local System Account**

The local system account is the same account in which core Windows user-mode operating system components run, including the Session Manager (`%SystemRoot%\System32\Smss.exe`), the Windows subsystem process (`Csrss.exe`), the Local Security Authority process (`%SystemRoot%\System32\Lsass.exe`), and the Logon process (`%SystemRoot%\System32\Winlogon.exe`). For more information on these latter two processes, see Chapter 6.
From a security perspective, the local system account is extremely powerful—more powerful than any local or domain account when it comes to security ability on a local system. This account has the following characteristics:

- It is a member of the local administrators group. Table 4-8 shows the groups to which the local system account belongs. (See Chapter 6 for information on how group membership is used in object access checks.)

- It has the right to enable virtually every privilege (even privileges not normally granted to the local administrator account, such as creating security tokens). See Table 4-9 for the list of privileges assigned to the local system account. (Chapter 6 describes the use of each privilege.)

- Most files and registry keys grant full access to the local system account. (Even if they don't grant full access, a process running under the local system account can exercise the take-ownership privilege to gain access.)

- Processes running under the local system account run with the default user profile (HKU\DEFAULT). Therefore, they can't access configuration information stored in the user profiles of other accounts.

- When a system is a member of a Windows domain, the local system account includes the machine security identifier (SID) for the computer on which a service process is running. Therefore, a service running in the local system account will be automatically authenticated on other machines in the same forest by using its computer account. (A forest is a grouping of domains.)

- Unless the machine account is specifically granted access to resources (such as network shares, named pipes, and so on), a process can access network resources that allow null sessions—that is, connections that require no credentials. You can specify the shares and pipes on a particular computer that permit null sessions in the NullSessionPipes and NullSessionShares registry values under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\lanmanserver\parameters.

### Table 4-8 Service Account Group Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local System</th>
<th>Network Service</th>
<th>Local Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Everyone</td>
<td>Everyone</td>
<td>Everyone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authenticated Users</td>
<td>Authenticated Users</td>
<td>Authenticated Users</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>Users</td>
<td>Users</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Network Service</td>
<td>Network Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>Service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Network Service Account

The network service account is intended for use by services that want to authenticate to other machines on the network using the computer account, as does the local system account, but do not have the need for membership in the Administrators group or the use of many of the privileges assigned to the local system account. Because the network service account does not belong to the Administrators group, services running in the network service account by default have access to far fewer registry keys and file system folders and files than the services running in the local system account. Further, the assignment of few privileges limits the scope of a compromised network service process. For example, a process running in the network service account cannot load a device driver or open arbitrary processes.

Another difference between the network service and local system accounts is that processes running in the network service account use the network service account’s profile. The registry component of the network service profile loads under HKU\S-1-5-20, and the files and directories that make up the component reside in %SystemRoot%\ServiceProfiles\NetworkService.

A service that runs in the network service account is the DNS client, which is responsible for resolving DNS names and for locating domain controllers.

The Local Service Account

The local service account is virtually identical to the network service account with the important difference that it can access only network resources that allow anonymous access. Table 4-9 shows that the network service account has the same privileges as the local service account, and Table 4-8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local System</th>
<th>Network Service</th>
<th>Local Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege</td>
<td>SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege</td>
<td>SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeAuditPrivilege</td>
<td>SeAuditPrivilege</td>
<td>SeAuditPrivilege</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeBackupPrivilege</td>
<td>SeBackupPrivilege</td>
<td>SeBackupPrivilege</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeChangeNotifyPrivilege</td>
<td>SeChangeNotifyPrivilege</td>
<td>SeChangeNotifyPrivilege</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeCreateGlobalPrivilege</td>
<td>SeCreateGlobalPrivilege</td>
<td>SeCreateGlobalPrivilege</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeCreatePagefilePrivilege</td>
<td>SeCreatePagefilePrivilege</td>
<td>SeCreatePagefilePrivilege</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeCreatePermanentPrivilege</td>
<td>SeCreatePermanentPrivilege</td>
<td>SeCreatePermanentPrivilege</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeCreateTokenPrivilege</td>
<td>SeCreateTokenPrivilege</td>
<td>SeCreateTokenPrivilege</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeDebugPrivilege</td>
<td>SeDebugPrivilege</td>
<td>SeDebugPrivilege</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeImpersonatePrivilege</td>
<td>SeImpersonatePrivilege</td>
<td>SeImpersonatePrivilege</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeIncreaseBasePriorityPrivilege</td>
<td>SeIncreaseBasePriorityPrivilege</td>
<td>SeIncreaseBasePriorityPrivilege</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege</td>
<td>SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege</td>
<td>SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeLoadDriverPrivilege</td>
<td>SeLoadDriverPrivilege</td>
<td>SeLoadDriverPrivilege</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeLockMemoryPrivilege</td>
<td>SeLockMemoryPrivilege</td>
<td>SeLockMemoryPrivilege</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeManageVolumePrivilege</td>
<td>SeManageVolumePrivilege</td>
<td>SeManageVolumePrivilege</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeProfileSingleProcessPrivilege</td>
<td>SeProfileSingleProcessPrivilege</td>
<td>SeProfileSingleProcessPrivilege</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeRestorePrivilege</td>
<td>SeRestorePrivilege</td>
<td>SeRestorePrivilege</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeSecurityPrivilege</td>
<td>SeSecurityPrivilege</td>
<td>SeSecurityPrivilege</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeShutdownPrivilege</td>
<td>SeShutdownPrivilege</td>
<td>SeShutdownPrivilege</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege</td>
<td>SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege</td>
<td>SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeSystemTimePrivilege</td>
<td>SeSystemTimePrivilege</td>
<td>SeSystemTimePrivilege</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege</td>
<td>SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege</td>
<td>SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeTcbPrivilege</td>
<td>SeTcbPrivilege</td>
<td>SeTcbPrivilege</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeUndockPrivilege (client only)</td>
<td>SeUndockPrivilege (client only)</td>
<td>SeUndockPrivilege (client only)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Privileges assigned to the Everyone, Authenticated Users, and Users groups

The Network Service Account

The network service account is intended for use by services that want to authenticate to other machines on the network using the computer account, as does the local system account, but do not have the need for membership in the Administrators group or the use of many of the privileges assigned to the local system account. Because the network service account does not belong to the Administrators group, services running in the network service account by default have access to far fewer registry keys and file system folders and files than the services running in the local system account. Further, the assignment of few privileges limits the scope of a compromised network service process. For example, a process running in the network service account cannot load a device driver or open arbitrary processes.

Another difference between the network service and local system accounts is that processes running in the network service account use the network service account’s profile. The registry component of the network service profile loads under HKU\S-1-5-20, and the files and directories that make up the component reside in %SystemRoot%\ServiceProfiles\NetworkService.

A service that runs in the network service account is the DNS client, which is responsible for resolving DNS names and for locating domain controllers.

The Local Service Account

The local service account is virtually identical to the network service account with the important difference that it can access only network resources that allow anonymous access. Table 4-9 shows that the network service account has the same privileges as the local service account, and Table 4-8
shows that it belongs to the same groups with the exception that it belongs to the Network Service group instead of the Local Service group. The profile used by processes running in the local service loads into HKU\S-1-5-19 and is stored in %SystemRoot%\ServiceProfiles\LocalService.

Examples of services that run in the local service account include the Remote Registry Service, which allows remote access to the local system’s registry, and the LmHosts service, which performs NetBIOS name resolution.

Running Services in Alternate Accounts

Because of the restrictions just outlined, some services need to run with the security credentials of a user account. You can configure a service to run in an alternate account when the service is created or by specifying an account and password that the service should run under with the Windows Services MMC snap-in. In the Services snap-in, right-click on a service and select Properties, click on the Log On tab, and select the This Account option, as shown in Figure 4-7.

Running with Least Privilege

Services typically are subject to an all-or-nothing model, meaning that all privileges available to the account the service process is running under are available to a service running in the process that might require only a subset of those privileges. To better conform to the principle of least privilege, in which Windows assigns services only the privileges they require, developers can specify the privileges their service requires, and the SCM creates a security token that contains only those privileges.
Note The privileges a service specifies must be a subset of those that are available to the service account in which it runs.

Service developers use the ChangeServiceConfig2 API to indicate the list of privileges they desire. The API saves that information in the registry under the Parameters key for the service. When the service starts, the SCM reads the key and adds those privileges to the token of the process in which the service is running.

If there is a RequiredPrivileges value and the service is a stand-alone service (running as a dedicated process), the SCM creates a token containing only the privileges that the service needs. For services running as part of a multiservice service process (as are most services that are part of Windows) and specifying required privileges, the SCM computes the union of those privileges and combines them for the service-hosting process’ token. In other words, only the privileges not specified by any of the services that are part of that service group will be removed. In the case in which the registry value does not exist, the SCM has no choice but to assume that the service is either incompatible with least privileges or requires all privileges in order to function. In this case, the full token is created, containing all privileges, and no additional security is offered by this model. To strip almost all privileges, services can specify only the Change Notify privilege.

EXPERIMENT: Viewing Privileges Required by Services

You can look at the privileges a service requires with the Service Control utility, Sc.exe, and the qprivs option. Additionally, Process Explorer can show you information about the security token of any service process on the system, so you can compare the information returned by Sc.exe with the privileges part of the token. The following steps show you how to do this for some of the best locked-down services on the system.

1. Use Sc.exe to take a look at the required privileges specified by Dhcp by typing the following into a command prompt:

   `sc qprivs dhcp`

   You should see two privileges being requested: the SeCreateGlobalPrivilege and the SeChangeNotifyPrivilege.

2. Run Process Explorer, and take a look at the process list.

   You should see a couple of Svchost.exe processes that are hosting the services on your machine. Process Explorer highlights these in pink.

3. Now locate the service hosting process in which the Dhcp service is running. It should be running alongside other services that are part of the LocalServiceNetworkRestricted service group, such as the Audiosrv service and Eventlog service. You can do this by hovering the mouse over each Svchost process and reading the tooltip, which contains the names of the services running inside the service host.
4. Once you’ve found the process, double-click to open the Properties dialog box and select the Security tab.

![Properties dialog box](image)

Note that although the service is running as part of the local service account, the list of privileges Windows assigned to it is much shorter than the list available to the local service account shown in Table 4-9.

Because for a service-hosting process the privileges part of the token is the union of the privileges requested by all the services running inside it, this must mean that services such as Audiosrv and Eventlog have not requested privileges other than the ones shown by Process Explorer. You can verify this by running the Sc.exe tool on those other services as well.

**Service Isolation**

Although restricting the privileges that a service has access to helps lessen the ability of a compromised service process to compromise other processes, it does nothing to isolate the service from resources that the account in which it is running has access to under normal conditions. As mentioned earlier, the local system account has complete access to critical system files, registry keys,
and other securable objects on the system because the access control lists (ACLs) grant permissions to that account.

At times, access to some of these resources is indeed critical to a service’s operation, while other objects should be secured from the service. Previously, to avoid running in the local system account to obtain access to required resources, a service would be run under a standard user account and ACLs would be added on the system objects, which greatly increased the risk of malicious code attacking the system. Another solution was to create dedicated service accounts and set specific ACLs for each account (associated to a service), but this approach easily became an administrative hassle.

Windows now combines these two approaches into a much more manageable solution: it allows services to run in a nonprivileged account but still have access to specific privileged resources without lowering the security of those objects. In a manner similar to the second pre–Windows Vista solution, the ACLs on an object can now set permissions directly for a service, but not by requiring a dedicated account. Instead, the SCM generates a service SID to represent a service, and this SID can be used to set permissions on resources such as registry keys and files. Service SIDs are implemented in the group SIDs part of the token for any process hosting a service. They are generated by the SCM during system startup for each service that has requested one via the ChangeServiceConfig2 API. In the case of service-hosting processes (a process that contains more than one service), the process’ token will contain the service SIDs of all services that are part of the service group associated with the process, including services that are not started because there is no way to add new SIDs after a token has been created.

The usefulness of having a SID for each service extends beyond the mere ability to add ACL entries and permissions for various objects on the system as a way to have fine-grained control over their access. Our discussion initially covered the case in which certain objects on the system, accessible by a given account, must be protected from a service running within that same account. As we’ve described to this point, service SIDs prevent that problem only by requiring that Deny entries associated with the service SID be placed on every object that needs to be secured, a clearly unmanageable approach.

To avoid requiring Deny access control entries (ACEs) as a way to prevent services from having access to resources that the user account in which they run does have access, there are two types of service SIDs: the restricted service SID (SERVICE_SID_TYPE_RESTRICTED) and the unrestricted service SID (SERVICE_SID_TYPE_UNRESTRICTED), the latter being the default and the case we’ve looked at until now.

Unrestricted service SIDs are created as enabled-by-default, group owner SIDs, and the process token is also given a new ACE providing full permission to the service logon SID, which allows the service to continue communicating with the SCM. (A primary use of this would be to enable or disable service SIDs inside the process during service startup or shutdown.)

A restricted service SID, on the other hand, turns the service-hosting process’ token into a write-restricted token (see Chapter 6 for more information on tokens), which means that only objects granting explicit write access to the service SID will be writable by the service, regardless of the account it’s running as. Because of this, all services running inside that process (part of the same
service group) must have the restricted SID type; otherwise, services with the restricted SID type will fail to start. Once the token becomes write-restricted, three more SIDs are added for compatibility reasons:

- The world SID is added to allow write access to objects that are normally accessible by anyone anyway, most importantly certain DLLs in the load path.

- The service logon SID is added to allow the service to communicate with the SCM.

- The write-restricted SID is added to allow objects to explicitly allow any write-restricted service write access to them. For example, Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) uses this SID on its objects to allow any write-restricted service to generate events.

Figure 4-8 shows an example of a service-hosting process containing services that have been marked as having restricted service SIDs. For example, the Base Filtering Engine (BFE), which is responsible for applying Windows Firewall filtering rules, is part of this service because these rules are stored in registry keys that must be protected from malicious write access should a service be compromised. (This could allow a service exploit to disable the outgoing traffic firewall rules, enabling bidirectional communication with an attacker, for example.)

![Image of service property with restricted SIDs]

**FIGURE 4-8** Service with restricted service SIDs
By blocking write access to objects that would otherwise be writable by the service (through inheriting the permissions of the account it is running as), restricted service SIDs solve the other side of the problem we initially presented because users do not need to do anything to prevent a service running in a privileged account from having write access to critical system files, registry keys, or other objects, limiting the attack exposure of any such service that might have been compromised.

Windows also allows for firewall rules that reference service SIDs linked to one of the three behaviors described in Table 4-10.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Restrictions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Network access blocked</td>
<td>The shell hardware detection service (ShellHWDetection).</td>
<td>All network communications are blocked (both incoming and outgoing).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network access statically port-restricted</td>
<td>The RPC service (Rpcss) operates on port 135 (TCP and UDP).</td>
<td>Network communications are restricted to specific TCP or UDP ports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network access dynamically port-restricted</td>
<td>The DNS service (Dns) listens on variable ports (UDP).</td>
<td>Network communications are restricted to configurable TCP or UDP ports.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Interactive Services and Session 0 Isolation**

One restriction for services running under the local system, local service, and network service accounts that has always been present in Windows is that these services could not display (without using a special flag on the *MessageBox* function, discussed in a moment) dialog boxes or windows on the interactive user’s desktop. This limitation wasn’t the direct result of running under these accounts but rather a consequence of the way the Windows subsystem assigns service processes to window stations. This restriction is further enhanced by the use of sessions, in a model called Session Zero Isolation, a result of which is that services cannot directly interact with a user’s desktop.

The Windows subsystem associates every Windows process with a window station. A window station contains desktops, and desktops contain windows. Only one window station can be visible on a console and receive user mouse and keyboard input. In a Terminal Services environment, one window station per session is visible, but services all run as part of the console session. Windows names the visible window station WinSta0, and all interactive processes access WinSta0.

Unless otherwise directed, the Windows subsystem associates services running in the local system account with a nonvisible window station named Service-0x0-3e7$ that all noninteractive services share. The number in the name, 3e7, represents the logon session identifier that the Local Security Authority process (LSASS) assigns to the logon session the SCM uses for noninteractive services running in the local system account.

Services configured to run under a user account (that is, not the local system account) are run in a different nonvisible window station named with the LSASS logon identifier assigned for the service’s logon session. Figure 4-9 shows a sample display from the Sysinternals WinObj tool, viewing the object manager directory in which Windows places window station objects. Visible are the interactive window station (WinSta0) and the noninteractive system service window station (Service-0x0-3e7$).
Regardless of whether services are running in a user account, the local system account, or the local or network service accounts, services that aren’t running on the visible window station can’t receive input from a user or display windows on the console. In fact, if a service were to pop up a normal dialog box on the window station, the service would appear hung because no user would be able to see the dialog box, which of course would prevent the user from providing keyboard or mouse input to dismiss it and allow the service to continue executing.

**Note** In the past, it was possible to use the special MB_SERVICE_NOTIFICATION or MB_DEFAULT_DESKTOP_ONLY flags with the MessageBox API to display messages on the interactive window station even if the service was marked as noninteractive. Because of session isolation, any service using this flag will receive an immediate IDOK return value, and the message box will never be displayed.

In rare cases, a service can have a valid reason to interact with the user via dialog boxes or windows. To configure a service with the right to interact with the user, the SERVICE_INTERACTIVE_PROCESS modifier must be present in the service’s registry key’s Type parameter. (Note that services configured to run under a user account can’t be marked as interactive.) When the SCM starts a service marked as interactive, it launches the service’s process in the local system account’s security context but connects the service with WinSta0 instead of the noninteractive service window station.

Were user processes to run in the same session as services, this connection to WinSta0 would allow the service to display dialog boxes and windows on the console and enable those windows to respond to user input because they would share the window station with the interactive services. However, only processes owned by the system and Windows services run in session 0; all other logon sessions, including those of console users, run in different sessions. Any window displayed by processes in session 0 is therefore not visible to the user.
This additional boundary helps prevent shatter attacks, whereby a less privileged application sends window messages to a window visible on the same window station to exploit a bug in a more privileged process that owns the window, which permits it to execute code in the more privileged process.

To remain compatible with services that depend on user input, Windows includes a service that notifies users when a service has displayed a window. The Interactive Services Detection (UI0Detect) service looks for visible windows on the main desktop of the WinSta0 window station of session 0 and displays a notification dialog box on the console user’s desktop, allowing the user to switch to session 0 and view the service’s UI. (This is akin to connecting to a local Terminal Services session or switching users.)

**Note** The Interactive Services Detection mechanism is purely for application compatibility, and developers are strongly recommended to move away from interactive services and use a secondary, nonprivileged helper application to communicate visually with the user. Local RPC or COM can be used between this helper application and the service for configuration purposes after UI input has been received.

The dialog box, an example of which is shown in Figure 4-10, includes the process name, the time when the UI message was displayed, and the title of the window being displayed. Once the user connects to session 0, a similar dialog box provides a portal back to the user’s session. In the figure, the service displaying a window is Microsoft Paint, which was explicitly started by the Sysinternals PsExec utility with options that caused PsExec to run Paint in session 0. You can try this yourself with the following command:

```
psexec -s -i 0 -d mspaint.exe
```

This tells PsExec to run Microsoft Paint as a system process (–s) running on session 0 (–i 0), and to return immediately instead of waiting for the process to finish (–d).
If you click View The Message, you can switch to the console for session 0 (and switch back again with a similar window on the console).

The Service Control Manager

The SCM’s executable file is %SystemRoot%\System32\Services.exe, and like most service processes, it runs as a Windows console program. The Wininit process starts the SCM early during the system boot. (Refer to Chapter 13 in Part 2 for details on the boot process.) The SCM’s startup function, SvcCtrlMain, orchestrates the launching of services that are configured for automatic startup.

SvcCtrlMain first creates a synchronization event named SvcctrlStartEvent_A3752DX that it initializes as nonsignaled. Only after the SCM completes steps necessary to prepare it to receive commands from SCPs does the SCM set the event to a signaled state. The function that an SCP uses to establish a dialog with the SCM is OpenSCManager. OpenSCManager prevents an SCP from trying to contact the SCM before the SCM has initialized by waiting for SvcctrlStartEvent_A3752DX to become signaled.

Next, SvcCtrlMain gets down to business and calls ScGenerateServiceDB, the function that builds the SCM’s internal service database. ScGenerateServiceDB reads and stores the contents of HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\ServiceGroupOrder\List, a REG_MULTI_SZ value that lists the names and order of the defined service groups. A service’s registry key contains an optional Group value if that service or device driver needs to control its startup ordering with respect to services from other groups. For example, the Windows networking stack is built from the bottom up, so networking services must specify Group values that place them later in the startup sequence than networking device drivers. The SCM internally creates a group list that preserves the ordering of the groups it reads from the registry. Groups include (but are not limited to) NDIS, TDI, Primary Disk, Keyboard Port, and Keyboard Class. Add-on and third-party applications can even define their own groups and add them to the list. Microsoft Transaction Server, for example, adds a group named MS Transactions.

ScGenerateServiceDB then scans the contents of HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services, creating an entry in the service database for each key it encounters. A database entry includes all the service-related parameters defined for a service as well as fields that track the service’s status. The SCM adds entries for device drivers as well as for services because the SCM starts services and drivers marked as auto-start and detects startup failures for drivers marked boot-start and system-start. It also provides a means for applications to query the status of drivers. The I/O manager loads drivers marked boot-start and system-start before any user-mode processes execute, and therefore any drivers having these start types load before the SCM starts.

ScGenerateServiceDB reads a service’s Group value to determine its membership in a group and associates this value with the group’s entry in the group list created earlier. The function also reads and records in the database the service’s group and service dependencies by querying its DependOnGroup and DependOnService registry values. Figure 4-11 shows how the SCM organizes the service entry and group order lists. Notice that the service list is alphabetically sorted. The reason this list is sorted alphabetically is that the SCM creates the list from the Services registry key, and Windows stores registry keys alphabetically.
During service startup, the SCM calls on LSASS (for example, to log on a service in a non-local system account), so the SCM waits for LSASS to signal the LSA_RPC_SERVER_ACTIVE synchronization event, which it does when it finishes initializing. Wininit also starts the LSASS process, so the initialization of LSASS is concurrent with that of the SCM, and the order in which LSASS and the SCM complete initialization can vary. Then SvcCtrlMain calls ScGetBootAndSystemDriverState to scan the service database looking for boot-start and system-start device driver entries.

ScGetBootAndSystemDriverState determines whether or not a driver successfully started by looking up its name in the object manager namespace directory named \Driver. When a device driver successfully loads, the I/O manager inserts the driver's object in the namespace under this directory, so if its name isn't present, it hasn't loaded. Figure 4-12 shows WinObj displaying the contents of the Driver directory. SvcCtrlMain notes the names of drivers that haven't started and that are part of the current profile in a list named ScFailedDrivers.

Before starting the auto-start services, the SCM performs a few more steps. It creates its remote procedure call (RPC) named pipe, which is named \Pipe\Ntsvcs, and then RPC launches a thread to listen on the pipe for incoming messages from SCPs. The SCM then signals its initialization-complete event, SvcCtrlStartEvent_A3752DX. Registering a console application shutdown event handler and registering with the Windows subsystem process via RegisterServiceProcess prepares the SCM for system shutdown.
Network Drive Letters

In addition to its role as an interface to services, the SCM has another totally unrelated responsibility: it notifies GUI applications in a system whenever the system creates or deletes a network drive-letter connection. The SCM waits for the Multiple Provider Router (MPR) to signal a named event, \BaseNamedObjects\ScNetDrvMsg, which MPR signals whenever an application assigns a drive letter to a remote network share or deletes a remote-share drive-letter assignment. (See Chapter 7, “Networking,” for more information on MPR.) When MPR signals the event, the SCM calls the GetDriveType Windows function to query the list of connected network drive letters. If the list changes across the event signal, the SCM sends a Windows broadcast message of type WM_DEVICECHANGE. The SCM uses either DBT_DEVICEREMOVECOMPLETE or DBT_DEVICEARRIVAL as the message’s subtype. This message is primarily intended for Windows Explorer so that it can update any open Computer windows to show the presence or absence of a network drive letter.

Service Startup

SvcCtrlMain invokes the SCM function ScAutoStartServices to start all services that have a Start value designating auto-start (except delayed auto-start services). ScAutoStartServices also starts auto-start device drivers. To avoid confusion, you should assume that the term services means services and drivers unless indicated otherwise. The algorithm in ScAutoStartServices for starting services in the correct order proceeds in phases, whereby a phase corresponds to a group and phases proceed in the sequence defined by the group ordering stored in the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\ServiceGroupOrder\List registry value. The List value, shown in Figure 4-13, includes the names of
groups in the order that the SCM should start them. Thus, assigning a service to a group has no effect other than to fine-tune its startup with respect to other services belonging to different groups.

When a phase starts, `ScAutoStartServices` marks all the service entries belonging to the phase’s group for startup. Then `ScAutoStartServices` loops through the marked services seeing whether it can start each one. Part of this check includes seeing whether the service is marked as delayed auto-start, which causes the SCM to start it at a later stage. (Delayed auto-start services must also be ungrouped.) Another part of the check it makes consists of determining whether the service has a dependency on another group, as specified by the existence of the `DependOnGroup` value in the service’s registry key. If a dependency exists, the group on which the service is dependent must have already initialized, and at least one service of that group must have successfully started. If the service depends on a group that starts later than the service’s group in the group startup sequence, the SCM notes a “circular dependency” error for the service. If `ScAutoStartServices` is considering a Windows service or an auto-start device driver, it next checks to see whether the service depends on one or more other services, and if so, if those services have already started. Service dependencies are indicated with the `DependOnService` registry value in a service’s registry key. If a service depends on other services that belong to groups that come later in the `ServiceGroupOrder\List`, the SCM also generates a “circular dependency” error and doesn’t start the service. If the service depends on any services from the same group that haven’t yet started, the service is skipped.

When the dependencies of a service have been satisfied, `ScAutoStartServices` makes a final check to see whether the service is part of the current boot configuration before starting the service. When the system is booted in safe mode, the SCM ensures that the service is either identified by name or by group in the appropriate safe boot registry key. There are two safe boot keys, Minimal and Network, under `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot`, and the one that the SCM checks depends on what safe mode the user booted. If the user chose Safe Mode or Safe Mode With Command Prompt at the special boot menu (which you can access by pressing F8 early in the boot process), the SCM references the Minimal key; if the user chose Safe Mode With Networking, the SCM refers to Network. The existence of a string value named Option under the SafeBoot key indicates not only that the system booted in safe mode but also the type of safe mode the user selected. For more information about safe boots, see the section “Safe Mode” in Chapter 13 in Part 2.
Once the SCM decides to start a service, it calls *ScStartService*, which takes different steps for services than for device drivers. When *ScStartService* starts a Windows service, it first determines the name of the file that runs the service’s process by reading the ImagePath value from the service’s registry key. It then examines the service’s Type value, and if that value is **SERVICE_WINDOWS_SHARE_PROCESS** (0x20), the SCM ensures that the process the service runs in, if already started, is logged on using the same account as specified for the service being started. (This is to ensure that the service is not configured with the wrong account, such as a LocalService account, but with an image path pointing to a running Svchost, such as netsvcs, which runs as LocalSystem.) A service’s **ObjectName** registry value stores the user account in which the service should run. A service with no **ObjectName** or an **ObjectName** of LocalSystem runs in the local system account.

The SCM verifies that the service’s process hasn’t already been started in a different account by checking to see whether the service’s ImagePath value has an entry in an internal SCM database called the image database. If the image database doesn’t have an entry for the ImagePath value, the SCM creates one. When the SCM creates a new entry, it stores the logon account name used for the service and the data from the service’s ImagePath value. The SCM requires services to have an ImagePath value. If a service doesn’t have an ImagePath value, the SCM reports an error stating that it couldn’t find the service’s path and isn’t able to start the service. If the SCM locates an existing image database entry with matching ImagePath data, the SCM ensures that the user account information for the service it’s starting is the same as the information stored in the database entry—a process can be logged on as only one account, so the SCM reports an error when a service specifies a different account name than another service that has already started in the same process.

The SCM calls *ScLogonAndStartImage* to log on a service if the service’s configuration specifies and to start the service’s process. The SCM logs on services that don’t run in the System account by calling the LSASS function *LogonUserEx*. *LogonUserEx* normally requires a password, but the SCM indicates to LSASS that the password is stored as a service’s LSASS “secret” under the key **HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\Secrets** in the registry. (Keep in mind that the contents of SECURITY aren’t typically visible because its default security settings permit access only from the System account.) When the SCM calls *LogonUserEx*, it specifies a service logon as the logon type, so LSASS looks up the password in the Secrets subkey that has a name in the form _SC_<service name>.

The SCM directs LSASS to store a logon password as a secret using the *LsaStorePrivateData* function when an SCP configures a service’s logon information. When a logon is successful, *LogonUserEx* returns a handle to an access token to the caller. Windows uses access tokens to represent a user’s security context, and the SCM later associates the access token with the process that implements the service.

After a successful logon, the SCM loads the account’s profile information, if it’s not already loaded, by calling the UserEnv DLL’s (%SystemRoot%\System32\Userenv.dll) *LoadUserProfile* function. The value **HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\ProfileList\<user profile key>\ProfileImagePath** contains the location on disk of a registry hive that *LoadUserProfile* loads into the registry, making the information in the hive the HKEY_CURRENT_USER key for the service.
An interactive service must open the WinSta0 window station, but before ScLogonAndStartImage allows an interactive service to access WinSta0 it checks to see whether the value HKLM\SYSTEM \CurrentControlSet\Control\Windows\NoInteractiveServices is set. Administrators set this value to prevent services marked as interactive from displaying windows on the console. This option is desirable in unattended server environments in which no user is present to respond to the Session 0 UI Discovery notification from interactive services.

As its next step, ScLogonAndStartImage proceeds to launch the service’s process, if the process hasn’t already been started (for another service, for example). The SCM starts the process in a suspended state with the CreateProcessAsUser Windows function. The SCM next creates a named pipe through which it communicates with the service process, and it assigns the pipe the name \Pipe\Net\NtControlPipeX, where X is a number that increments each time the SCM creates a pipe. The SCM resumes the service process via the ResumeThread function and waits for the service to connect to its SCM pipe. If it exists, the registry value HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control \ServicesPipeTimeout determines the length of time that the SCM waits for a service to call StartServiceCtrlDispatcher and connect before it gives up, terminates the process, and concludes that the service failed to start. If ServicesPipeTimeout doesn’t exist, the SCM uses a default timeout of 30 seconds. The SCM uses the same timeout value for all its service communications.

When a service connects to the SCM through the pipe, the SCM sends the service a start command. If the service fails to respond positively to the start command within the timeout period, the SCM gives up and moves on to start the next service. When a service doesn’t respond to a start request, the SCM doesn’t terminate the process, as it does when a service doesn’t call StartServiceCtrlDispatcher within the timeout; instead, it notes an error in the system Event Log that indicates the service failed to start in a timely manner.

If the service the SCM starts with a call to ScStartService has a Type registry value of SERVICE_KERNEL_DRIVER or SERVICE_FILE_SYSTEM_DRIVER, the service is really a device driver, so ScStartService calls ScLoadDeviceDriver to load the driver. ScLoadDeviceDriver enables the load driver security privilege for the SCM process and then invokes the kernel service NtLoadDriver, passing in the data in the ImagePath value of the driver’s registry key. Unlike services, drivers don’t need to specify an ImagePath value, and if the value is absent, the SCM builds an image path by appending the driver’s name to the string %SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\.

ScAutoStartServices continues looping through the services belonging to a group until all the services have either started or generated dependency errors. This looping is the SCM’s way of automatically ordering services within a group according to their DependOnService dependencies. The SCM will start the services that other services depend on in earlier loops, skipping the dependent services until subsequent loops. Note that the SCM ignores Tag values for Windows services, which you might come across in subkeys under the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services key; the I/O manager honors Tag values to order device driver startup within a group for boot-start and system-start drivers. Once the SCM completes phases for all the groups listed in the ServiceGroupOrder\List value, it performs a phase for services belonging to groups not listed in the value and then executes a final phase for services without a group.
After handling auto-start services, the SCM calls `ScInitDelayStart`, which queues a delayed work item associated with a worker thread responsible for processing all the services that `ScAutoStartServices` skipped because they were marked delayed auto-start. This worker thread will execute after the delay. The default delay is 120 seconds, but it can be overridden by creating an `AutoStartDelay` value in `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control`. The SCM performs the same actions as those used during startup of nondelayed auto-start services.

### Delayed Auto-Start Services

Delayed auto-start services enable Windows to cope with the growing number of services that are being started when a user logs on, bogging down the boot-up process and increasing the time before a user is able to get responsiveness from the desktop. The design of auto-start services was primarily intended for services required early in the boot process because other services depend on them, a good example being the RPC service, on which all other services depend. The other use was to allow unattended startup of a service, such as the Windows Update service. Because many auto-start services fall in this second category, marking them as delayed auto-start allows critical services to start faster and for the user’s desktop to be ready sooner when a user logs on immediately after booting. Additionally, these services run in background mode, which lowers their thread, I/O, and memory priority. Configuring a service for delayed auto-start requires calling the `ChangeServiceConfig2` API. You can check the state of the flag for a service by using the `qc bits` option of `sc.exe` instead.

**Note** If a nondelayed auto-start service has a delayed auto-start service as one of its dependencies, the delayed auto-start flag will be ignored and the service will be started immediately in order to satisfy the dependency.

When it’s finished starting all auto-start services and drivers, as well as setting up the delayed auto-start work item, the SCM signals the event `\BaseNamedObjects\SC_AutoStartComplete`. This event is used by the Windows Setup program to gauge startup progress during installation.

### Startup Errors

If a driver or a service reports an error in response to the SCM’s startup command, the `ErrorControl` value of the service’s registry key determines how the SCM reacts. If the `ErrorControl` value is `SERVICE_ERROR_IGNORE (0)` or the `ErrorControl` value isn’t specified, the SCM simply ignores the error and continues processing service startups. If the `ErrorControl` value is `SERVICE_ERROR_NORMAL (1)`, the SCM writes an event to the system Event Log that says, “The `<service name>` service failed to start due to the following error:”. The SCM includes the textual representation of the Windows error code that the service returned to the SCM as the reason for the startup failure in the Event Log record. Figure 4-14 shows the Event Log entry that reports a service startup error.
If a service with an ErrorControl value of SERVICE_ERROR_SEVERE (2) or SERVICE_ERROR_CRITICAL (3) reports a startup error, the SCM logs a record to the Event Log and then calls the internal function ScRevertToLastKnownGood. This function switches the system’s registry configuration to a version, named last known good, with which the system last booted successfully. Then it restarts the system using the NtShutdownSystem system service, which is implemented in the executive. If the system is already booting with the last known good configuration, the system just reboots.

Accepting the Boot and Last Known Good

Besides starting services, the system charges the SCM with determining when the system’s registry configuration, HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet, should be saved as the last known good control set. The CurrentControlSet key contains the Services key as a subkey, so CurrentControlSet includes the registry representation of the SCM database. It also contains the Control key, which stores many kernel-mode and user-mode subsystem configuration settings. By default, a successful boot consists of a successful startup of auto-start services and a successful user logon. A boot fails if the system halts because a device driver crashes the system during the boot or if an auto-start service with an ErrorControl value of SERVICE_ERROR_SEVERE or SERVICE_ERROR_CRITICAL reports a startup error.

The SCM obviously knows when it has completed a successful startup of the auto-start services, but Winlogon (%SystemRoot%\System32\Winlogon.exe) must notify it when there is a successful logon. Winlogon invokes the NotifyBootConfigStatus function when a user logs on, and
**NotifyBootConfigStatus** sends a message to the SCM. Following the successful start of the auto-start services or the receipt of the message from **NotifyBootConfigStatus** (whichever comes last), the SCM calls the system function **NtInitializeRegistry** to save the current registry startup configuration.

Third-party software developers can supersede Winlogon’s definition of a successful logon with their own definition. For example, a system running Microsoft SQL Server might not consider a boot successful until after SQL Server is able to accept and process transactions. Developers impose their definition of a successful boot by writing a boot-verification program and installing the program by pointing to its location on disk with the value stored in the registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\BootVerificationProgram. In addition, a boot-verification program’s installation must disable Winlogon’s call to **NotifyBootConfigStatus** by setting HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\ReportBootOk to 0. When a boot-verification program is installed, the SCM launches it after finishing auto-start services and waits for the program’s call to **NotifyBootConfigStatus** before saving the last known good control set.

Windows maintains several copies of CurrentControlSet, and CurrentControlSet is really a symbolic registry link that points to one of the copies. The control sets have names in the form HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSetnnn, where nnn is a number such as 001 or 002. The HKLM\SYSTEM\Select key contains values that identify the role of each control set. For example, if CurrentControlSet points to ControlSet001, the Current value under Select has a value of 1. The LastKnownGood value under Select contains the number of the last known good control set, which is the control set last used to boot successfully. Another value that might be on your system under the Select key is Failed, which points to the last control set for which the boot was deemed unsuccessful and aborted in favor of an attempt at booting with the last known good control set. Figure 4-15 displays a system’s control sets and Select values.

**NtInitializeRegistry** takes the contents of the last known good control set and synchronizes it with that of the CurrentControlSet key’s tree. If this was the system’s first successful boot, the last known good won’t exist and the system will create a new control set for it. If the last known good tree exists, the system simply updates it with differences between it and CurrentControlSet.

Last known good is helpful in situations in which a change to CurrentControlSet, such as the modification of a system performance-tuning value under HKLM\SYSTEM\Control or the addition of a service or device driver, causes the subsequent boot to fail. Users can press F8 early in the boot process to bring up a menu that lets them direct the boot to use the last known good control set, rolling the system’s registry configuration back to the way it was the last time the system booted successfully. Chapter 13 in Part 2 describes in more detail the use of last known good and other recovery mechanisms for troubleshooting system startup problems.
Service Failures

A service can have optional FailureActions and FailureCommand values in its registry key that the SCM records during the service’s startup. The SCM registers with the system so that the system signals the SCM when a service process exits. When a service process terminates unexpectedly, the SCM determines which services ran in the process and takes the recovery steps specified by their failure-related registry values. Additionally, services are not only limited to requesting failure actions during crashes or unexpected service termination, since other problems, such as a memory leak, could also result in service failure.

If a service enters the SERVICE_STOPPED state and the error code returned to the SCM is not ERROR_SUCCESS, the SCM will check whether the service has the FailureActionsOnNonCrashFailures flag set and perform the same recovery as if the service had crashed. To use this functionality, the service must be configured via the ChangeServiceConfig2 API or the system administrator can use the Sc.exe utility with the Failureflag parameter to set FailureActionsOnNonCrashFailures to 1. The default value being 0, the SCM will continue to honor the same behavior as on earlier versions of Windows for all other services.

Actions that a service can configure for the SCM include restarting the service, running a program, and rebooting the computer. Furthermore, a service can specify the failure actions that take place the first time the service process fails, the second time, and subsequent times, and it can indicate a delay period that the SCM waits before restarting the service if the service asks to be restarted. The service failure action of the IIS Admin Service results in the SCM running the IISReset application, which performs cleanup work and then restarts the service. You can easily manage the recovery actions for a service using the Recovery tab of the service’s Properties dialog box in the Services MMC snap-in, as shown in Figure 4-16.
Service Shutdown

When Winlogon calls the Windows ExitWindowsEx function, ExitWindowsEx sends a message to Csrss, the Windows subsystem process, to invoke Csrss’s shutdown routine. Csrss loops through the active processes and notifies them that the system is shutting down. For every system process except the SCM, Csrss waits up to the number of seconds specified by HKU\DEFAULT\Control Panel\Desktop\WaitToKillAppTimeout (which defaults to 20 seconds) for the process to exit before moving on to the next process. When Csrss encounters the SCM process, it also notifies it that the system is shutting down but employs a timeout specific to the SCM. Csrss recognizes the SCM using the process ID Csrss saved when the SCM registered with Csrss using the RegisterServicesProcess function during system initialization. The SCM’s timeout differs from that of other processes because Csrss knows that the SCM communicates with services that need to perform cleanup when they shut down, so an administrator might need to tune only the SCM’s timeout. The SCM’s timeout value resides in the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WaitToKillServiceTimeout registry value, and it defaults to 12 seconds.

The SCM’s shutdown handler is responsible for sending shutdown notifications to all the services that requested shutdown notification when they initialized with the SCM. The SCM function ScShutdownAllServices loops through the SCM services database searching for services desiring shutdown notification and sends each one a shutdown command. For each service to which it sends a shutdown command, the SCM records the value of the service’s wait hint, a value that a service also specifies when it registers with the SCM. The SCM keeps track of the largest wait hint it receives. After sending the shutdown messages, the SCM waits either until one of the services it notified of shutdown exits or until the time specified by the largest wait hint passes.
If the wait hint expires without a service exiting, the SCM determines whether one or more of the services it was waiting on to exit have sent a message to the SCM telling the SCM that the service is progressing in its shutdown process. If at least one service made progress, the SCM waits again for the duration of the wait hint. The SCM continues executing this wait loop until either all the services have exited or none of the services upon which it’s waiting has notified it of progress within the wait hint timeout period.

While the SCM is busy telling services to shut down and waiting for them to exit, Csrss waits for the SCM to exit. If Csrss’s wait ends without the SCM having exited (the WaitToKillServiceTimeout time expired), Csrss kills the SCM and continues the shutdown process. Thus, services that fail to shut down in a timely manner are killed. This logic lets the system shut down in the face of services that never complete a shutdown as a result of flawed design, but it also means that services that require more than 20 seconds will not complete their shutdown operations.

Additionally, because the shutdown order is not deterministic, services that might depend on other services to shut down first (called shutdown dependencies) have no way to report this to the SCM and might never have the chance to clean up either.

To address these needs, Windows implements preshutdown notifications and shutdown ordering to combat the problems caused by these two scenarios. Preshutdown notifications are sent, using the same mechanism as shutdown notifications, to services that have requested preshutdown notification via the `SetServiceStatus` API, and the SCM will wait for them to be acknowledged.

The idea behind these notifications is to flag services that might take a long time to clean up (such as database server services) and give them more time to complete their work. The SCM will send a progress query request and wait three minutes for a service to respond to this notification. If the service does not respond within this time, it will be killed during the shutdown procedure; otherwise, it can keep running as long as it needs, as long as it continues to respond to the SCM.

Services that participate in the preshutdown can also specify a shutdown order with respect to other preshutdown services. Services that depend on other services to shut down first (for example, the Group Policy service needs to wait for Windows Update to finish) can specify their shutdown dependencies in the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\PreshutdownOrder registry value.

**Shared Service Processes**

Running every service in its own process instead of having services share a process whenever possible wastes system resources. However, sharing processes means that if any of the services in the process has a bug that causes the process to exit, all the services in that process terminate.

Of the Windows built-in services, some run in their own process and some share a process with other services. For example, the LSASS process contains security-related services—such as the Security Accounts Manager (SamSs) service, the Net Logon (Netlogon) service, and the Crypto Next Generation (CNG) Key Isolation (KeyIso) service.

There is also a generic process named Service Host (SvcHost–%SystemRoot%\System32\Svchost.exe) to contain multiple services. Multiple instances of SvcHost can be running in different processes.
Services that run in SvcHost processes include Telephony (TapiSrv), Remote Procedure Call (RpcSs), and Remote Access Connection Manager (RasMan). Windows implements services that run in SvcHost as DLLs and includes an ImagePath definition of the form “%SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe –k netsvcs” in the service’s registry key. The service’s registry key must also have a registry value named ServiceDll under a Parameters subkey that points to the service’s DLL file.

All services that share a common SvcHost process specify the same parameter (“–k netsvcs” in the example in the preceding paragraph) so that they have a single entry in the SCM’s image database. When the SCM encounters the first service that has a SvcHost ImagePath with a particular parameter during service startup, it creates a new image database entry and launches a SvcHost process with the parameter. The new SvcHost process takes the parameter and looks for a value having the same name as the parameter under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\svchost. SvcHost reads the contents of the value, interpreting it as a list of service names, and notifies the SCM that it’s hosting those services when SvcHost registers with the SCM.

When the SCM encounters a SvcHost service (by checking the service type value) during service startup with an ImagePath matching an entry it already has in the image database, it doesn’t launch a second process but instead just sends a start command for the service to the SvcHost it already started for that ImagePath value. The existing SvcHost process reads the ServiceDll parameter in the service’s registry key and loads the DLL into its process to start the service.

Table 4-11 lists all the default service groupings on Windows and some of the services that are registered for each of them.

**TABLE 4-11** Major Service Groupings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service Group</th>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LocalService</td>
<td>Network Store Interface, Windows Diagnostic Host, Windows Time, COM+ Event System, HTTP Auto-Proxy Service, Software Protection Platform UI Notification, Thread Order Service, LLDT Discovery, SSL, FDP Host, WebClient</td>
<td>Services that run in the local service account and make use of the network on various ports or have no network usage at all (and hence no restrictions).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation</td>
<td>UPnP and SSDP, Smart Card, TPM, Font Cache, Function Discovery, AppID, qWAVE, Windows Connect Now, Media Center Extender, Adaptive Brightness</td>
<td>Services that run in the local service account and make use of the network on a fixed set of ports. Services run with a write-restricted token.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LocalServiceNetworkRestricted</td>
<td>DHCP, Event Logger, Windows Audio, NetBIOS, Security Center, Parental Controls, HomeGroup Provider</td>
<td>Services that run in the local service account and make use of the network on a fixed set of ports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LocalServiceNoNetwork</td>
<td>Diagnostic Policy Engine, Base Filtering Engine, Performance Logging and Alerts, Windows Firewall, WWAN AutoConfig</td>
<td>Services that run in the local service account but make no use of the network at all. Services run with a write-restricted token.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Group</td>
<td>Services</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LocalSystemNetworkRestricted</td>
<td>DWM, WDI System Host, Network Connections, Distributed Link Tracking, Windows Audio Endpoint, Wired/WLAN AutoConfig, Pnp-X, HID Access, User-Mode Driver Framework Service, Superfetch, Portable Device Enumerator, HomeGroup Listener, Tablet Input, Program Compatibility, Offline Files</td>
<td>Services that run in the local system account and make use of the network on a fixed set of ports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NetworkService</td>
<td>Cryptographic Services, DHCP Client, Terminal Services, WorkStation, Network Access Protection, NLA, DNS Client, Telephony, Windows Event Collector, WinRM</td>
<td>Services that run in the network service account and make use of the network on various ports (or have no enforced network restrictions).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NetworkServiceAndNoImpersonation</td>
<td>KTM for DTC</td>
<td>Services that run in the network service account and make use of the network on a fixed set of ports. Services run with a write-restricted token.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted</td>
<td>IPSec Policy Agent</td>
<td>Services that run in the network service account and make use of the network on a fixed set of ports.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EXPERIMENT: Viewing Services Running Inside Processes**

The Process Explorer utility shows detailed information about the services running within processes. Run Process Explorer, and view the Services tab in the Process Properties dialog box for the following processes: Services.exe, Lsass.exe, and Svchost.exe. Several instances of Svchost will be running on your system, and you can see the account in which each is running by adding the Username column to the Process Explorer display or by looking at the Username field on the Image tab of a process’ Process Properties dialog box. The following screen shows the list of services running within a Svchost executing in the local service account:
The information displayed includes the service’s name, display name, and description, if it has one, which Process Explorer shows beneath the service list when you select a service. Additionally, the path of the DLL containing the service is shown. This information is useful for mapping thread start addresses (shown on the Threads tab) to their respective services, which can help in cases of service-related problems such as troubleshooting high CPU usage.

You can also use the tlist.exe tool from the Debugging Tools for Windows or Tasklist, which ships with Windows, to view the list of services running within processes from a command prompt. The syntax to see services with Tlist is:

tlist /s

The syntax for tasklist is:

tasklist /svc

Note that these utilities do not show service display names or descriptions, only service names.

Service Tags
One of the disadvantages of using service-hosting processes is that accounting for CPU time and usage, as well as for the usage of resources, by a specific service is much harder because each service is sharing the memory address space, handle table, and per-process CPU accounting numbers with the other services that are part of the same service group. Although there is always a thread inside the service-hosting process that belongs to a certain service, this association might not always be easy to make. For example, the service might be using worker threads to perform its operation, or perhaps the start address and stack of the thread do not reveal the service’s DLL name, making it hard to figure out what kind of work a thread might exactly be doing and to which service it might belong.

Windows implements a service attribute called the service tag, which the SCM generates by calling ScGenerateServiceTag when a service is created or when the service database is generated during system boot. The attribute is simply an index identifying the service. The service tag is stored in the SubProcessTag field of the thread environment block (TEB) of each thread (see Chapter 5, “Processes and Threads,” for more information on the TEB) and is propagated across all threads that a main service thread creates (except threads created indirectly by thread-pool APIs).

Although the service tag is kept internal to the SCM, several Windows utilities, like Netstat.exe (a utility you can use for displaying which programs have opened which ports on the network), use undocumented APIs to query service tags and map them to service names. Because the TCP/IP stack saves the service tag of the threads that create TCP/IP end points, when you run Netstat with the –b parameter, Netstat can report the service name for end points created by services. Another tool you can use to look at service tags is ScTagQuery from Winsider Seminars & Solutions Inc. (www.winsiderss.com/tools/sctagquery/sctagquery.htm). It can query the SCM for the mappings of every service tag and display them either systemwide or per-process. It can also show you to which services all the threads inside a service-hosting process belong. (This is conditional on those threads
having a proper service tag associated with them.) This way, if you have a runaway service consuming lots of CPU time, you can identify the culprit service in case the thread start address or stack does not have an obvious service DLL associated with it.

Unified Background Process Manager

Various Windows components have traditionally been in charge of managing hosted or background tasks as the operating system has increased in complexity in features, from the Service Control Manager described earlier to the Task Scheduler, the DCOM Server Launcher, and the WMI Provider—all of which are also responsible for the execution of out-of-process, hosted code. Today, Windows implements a Unified Background Process Manager (UBPM), which handles (at least, for now) two of these mechanisms—the SCM and Task Scheduler—providing the ability for these components to access UBPM functionality.

UBPM is implemented in Services.exe, in the same location as the SCM, but as a separate library providing its own interface over RPC (similarly to how the Plug and Play Manager also runs in Services.exe but is a separate component). It provides access to that interface through a public export DLL, Ubpm.dll, which is exposed to third-party service developers through new Trigger APIs that have been added to the SCM. The SCM then loads a custom SCM Extension DLL (Scext.dll), which calls into Ubpm.dll. This layer of indirection is needed for MinWin support, where Scext.dll is not loaded and the SCM provides only minimal functionality. Figure 4-17 describes this architecture.

![Diagram of Unified Background Process Manager architecture](image-url)
Initialization

UBPM is initialized by the SCM when its Ubpmlnitialize export is called by ScExtInitializeTerminateUbpml in the SCM Extension DLL. As such, it is implemented as a DLL running within the context of the SCM, not as its own separate process.

UBPM first begins initialization by setting up its internal utility library. By leveraging many of the improvements in newer versions of Windows, UBPM uses a thread pool to process the many incoming events we will later see, which allows it to scale from having a single worker thread to having up to 1000 (based on a maximum processing of 10,000 consumers).

Next, UBPM initializes its internal tracing support, which can be configured in the HKLM\Software \Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Tracing\UBPM\Regular key using the Flags value. This is useful for debugging and monitoring the behavior of the UBPM using the WPP tracing mechanism described in the Windows Driver Kit.

Following that, the event manager is set up, which will be used by later components of UBPM to report internal event states. The event manager registers a TASKSCHED GUID on which ETW events can be consumed, and it logs its state to a TaskScheduler.log file.

The next step, critical to UBPM, is to initialize its own real-time ETW consumer, which is the central mechanism used by UBPM to perform its job, as almost all the data it receives comes over as ETW events. UBPM starts an ETW real-time session in secure mode, meaning that it will be the only process capable of receiving its events, and it names its session UBPM. It also enables the first built-in provider (owned by the kernel) in order to receive notifications related to time changes.

It then associates an event callback—UbpmpEventCallback—with incoming events and creates a consumer thread, UbpmpConsumeEvents, that waits for the SCM’s event used to signify that auto-start events have completed (which was named previously). Once this happens, the consumer thread calls ProcessTrace, which calls into ETW and blocks the thread until the ETW trace is completed (normally, only once UBPM exists). The event callback, on the other hand, consumes each ETW event as it arrives and processes it according to the algorithm we’ll see in the next section.

ETW automatically replays any events that were missed before ProcessTrace was called, which means that kernel events during the boot will all be incoming at once and processed appropriately. UBPM also waits on the SCM’s auto-start event, which makes sure that when these events do come in, there will at least have been a couple of services that registered for them; otherwise, starting the trace too early will result in events with no registered consumers, which will cause them to be lost.

Finally, UBPM sets up a local RPC interface to TaskHost—the second component of UBPM, which we’ll describe later—and it also sets up its own local RPC interface, which exposes the APIs that allows services to use UBPM functionality (such as registering trigger providers, generating triggers and notifications, and so forth). These APIs are implemented in the Ubpmd.dll library and use RPC to communicate to the RPC interface in the UBPM code of Services.exe.

When UBPM exits, the opposite actions in the reverse order are performed to reset the system to its previous state.
UBPM API

UBPM enables the following mechanisms to be used by having services use the UBPM API:

- Registering and unregistering a trigger provider, as well as opening and closing a handle to one
- Generating a notification or a trigger
- Setting and querying the configuration of a trigger provider
- Sending a control command to a trigger provider

Provider Registration

Providers are registered through the SCM Extension DLL, which uses the ScExtRegisterProvider function that is used by ScExtGenerateNotification. This opens a handle to UBPM and calls the UbpmRegisterTriggerProvider API. When a service registers a provider, it must define a unique name and GUID for the provider, as well as the necessary flags to define the provider (for example, by using the ETW provider flag). Additionally, providers can also have a friendly name as well as a description. Once registration is completed, the provider is inserted into UBPM’s provider list, the total count of providers is incremented, and, if this is an ETW provider that’s not being started with the disabled flag, the provider’s GUID is enabled in the real-time ETW trace that UBPM activated upon initialization. A provider block is created containing all the provider’s information that was captured from the registration.

Now that a provider is registered, the open and close API can be used to increment the reference count to the provider and return its provider block. Furthermore, if the provider was not registered in a disabled state, and this is the first reference to it, its GUID is enabled in the real-time ETW trace.

Similarly, unregistering a provider will disable its GUID and unlink it from the provider list, and as soon as all references are closed, the provider block will be deleted.

EXPERIMENT: Viewing UBPM Trigger Providers

You can use the Performance Monitor to see UBPM actively monitoring all the ETW providers that have registered with it. Follow these instructions to do so:

1. Open the Performance Monitor by clicking on the Start button, and then choosing Run.
2. Type perfmon, and click OK.
3. When Performance Monitor launches, expand Data Collector Sets on the left sidebar by clicking the arrow.
4. Choose Event Trace Sessions from the list, and then double click on the UBPM entry.
The following screen shot displays the UBPM trigger providers on the author’s machine. You should see a similar display.

As you can see from the large list, dozens of providers are registered, each of them capable of generating individual events. For example, the BfeTriggerProvider handles Firewall events. In a later experiment, you will see a consumer of such an event.

**Consumer Registration**

Service consumer registration is initially exposed by the `ScExtRegisterTriggerConsumer` callback that the SCM Extension DLL provides. Its job is to receive all the SCM-formatted trigger information (which service developers provide according to the MSDN API documentation, “Service Trigger Events” available on MSDN) and convert that information into the raw data structures that UBPM internally uses. Once all the processing is finished, the SCM Extension DLL packages the trigger and associates it with two actions: UBPM Start Service and UBPM Stop Service.

The Scheduled Tasks service, which also leverages UBPM, provides similar functionality through an internal UBPM Singleton Class, which calls into Ubpm.dll. It allows its internal RegisterTask API to also register for trigger consumption, and it does similar processing of its input data, with the difference being that it uses the UBPM Start EXE action. Next, to actually perform the registration, both open a handle to UBPM, check if the consumer is already registered (changes to existing consumers are not allowed), and finally register the provider through the `UbpmRegisterTriggerConsumer` API.
Trigger consumer registration is done by `UbpmTriggerProviderRegister`, which validates the request, adds the provider’s GUID into the list of providers, and toggles it to enable the ETW trace to now receive events about this provider as well.

**EXPERIMENT: Viewing Which Services React to Which Triggers**

Certain Windows services are already preconfigured to consume the appropriate triggers to prevent them from staying resident even when they’re not needed, such as the Windows Time Service, the Tablet Input Service, and the Computer Browser service. The `sc` command lets you query information about a service’s triggers with the `qtriggerinfo` option.

1. Open a command prompt.

2. Type the following to see the triggers for the Windows Time Service:
   ```
   sc qtriggerinfo w32time
   [SC] QueryServiceConfig2 SUCCESS
   SERVICE_NAME: w32time
   START SERVICE
   DOMAIN JOINED STATUS         : 1ce20aba-9851-4421-9430-1ddeb766e809
   [DOMAIN JOINED]
   STOP SERVICE
   DOMAIN JOINED STATUS         : ddaf516e-58c2-4866-9574-c3b615d42ea1
   [NOT DOMAIN JOINED]
   ```

3. Now look at the Tablet Input Service:
   ```
   sc qtriggerinfo tabletinputservice
   [SC] QueryServiceConfig2 SUCCESS
   SERVICE_NAME: tabletinputservice
   START SERVICE
   DEVICE INTERFACE ARRIVAL     : 4d1e55b2-f16f-11cf-88cb-001111000030
   [INTERFACE CLASS GUID]
   DATA                       : HID_DEVICE_UP:000D_U:0001
   DATA                       : HID_DEVICE_UP:000D_U:0002
   DATA                       : HID_DEVICE_UP:000D_U:0003
   DATA                       : HID_DEVICE_UP:000D_U:0004
   ```

4. Finally, here is the Computer Browser Service:
   ```
   sc qtriggerinfo browser
   [SC] QueryServiceConfig2 SUCCESS
   SERVICE_NAME: browser
   START SERVICE
   FIREWALL PORT EVENT          : b7569e07-8421-4ee0-ad10-86915afdad09
   ```
| PORT OPEN |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| DATA            | : 139;TCP;System; |
| DATA            | : 137;UDP;System; |
| DATA            | : 138;UDP;System; |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STOP SERVICE FIREWALL PORT EVENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>: a144ed38-8e12-4de4-9d96-e64740b1a524</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| PORT CLOSE |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| DATA            | : 139;TCP;System; |
| DATA            | : 137;UDP;System; |
| DATA            | : 138;UDP;System; |

In these three cases, note how the Windows Time Service is waiting for domain join/exit in order to decide whether or not it should run, while the Tablet Input Service is waiting for a device with the HID Class ID matching Tablet Device. Finally, the Computer Browser Service will run only if the firewall policy allows access on ports 137, 138, and 139, which are SMB network ports that the browser needs.

### Task Host

TaskHost receives commands from UBPM living in the SCM. At initialization time, it opens the local RPC interface that was created by UBPM during its initialization and loops forever, waiting for commands to come through the channel. Four commands are currently supported, which are sent over the TaskHostSendResponseReceiveCommand RPC API:

- Stopping the host
- Starting a task
- Stopping a task
- Terminating a task

Additionally, hosted tasks are supplied with a TaskHostReportTaskStatus RPC API, which enables them to notify UBPM of their current execution state whenever they call UbpmReportTaskStatus.

All task-based commands are actually internally implemented by a generic COM Task library, and they essentially result in the creation and destruction of COM components.

### Service Control Programs

Service control programs are standard Windows applications that use SCM service management functions, including CreateService, OpenService, StartService, ControlService, QueryServiceStatus, and DeleteService. To use the SCM functions, an SCP must first open a communications channel to the SCM by calling the OpenSCManager function. At the time of the open call, the SCP must specify what types of actions it wants to perform. For example, if an SCP simply wants to enumerate and display the services present in the SCM’s database, it requests enumerate-service access in its call to OpenSCManager. During its initialization, the SCM creates an internal object that represents the SCM.
database and uses the Windows security functions to protect the object with a security descriptor that specifies what accounts can open the object with what access permissions. For example, the security descriptor indicates that the Authenticated Users group can open the SCM object with enumerate-service access. However, only administrators can open the object with the access required to create or delete a service.

As it does for the SCM database, the SCM implements security for services themselves. When an SCP creates a service by using the CreateService function, it specifies a security descriptor that the SCM associates internally with the service’s entry in the service database. The SCM stores the security descriptor in the service’s registry key as the Security value, and it reads that value when it scans the registry’s Services key during initialization so that the security settings persist across reboots. In the same way that an SCP must specify what types of access it wants to the SCM database in its call to OpenSCManager, an SCP must tell the SCM what access it wants to a service in a call to OpenService. Accesses that an SCP can request include the ability to query a service’s status and to configure, stop, and start a service.

The SCP you’re probably most familiar with is the Services MMC snap-in that’s included in Windows, which resides in %SystemRoot%\System32\Filemgmt.dll. Windows also includes Sc.exe (Service Controller tool), a command-line service control program that we’ve mentioned multiple times.

SCPs sometimes layer service policy on top of what the SCM implements. A good example is the timeout that the Services MMC snap-in implements when a service is started manually. The snap-in presents a progress bar that represents the progress of a service’s startup. Services indirectly interact with SCPs by setting their configuration status to reflect their progress as they respond to SCM commands such as the start command. SCPs query the status with the QueryServiceStatus function. They can tell when a service actively updates the status versus when a service appears to be hung, and the SCM can take appropriate actions in notifying a user about what the service is doing.

**Windows Management Instrumentation**

Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is an implementation of Web-Based Enterprise Management (WBEM), a standard that the Distributed Management Task Force (DMTF—an industry consortium) defines. The WBEM standard encompasses the design of an extensible enterprise data-collection and data-management facility that has the flexibility and extensibility required to manage local and remote systems that comprise arbitrary components.

**WMI Architecture**

WMI consists of four main components, as shown in Figure 4-18: management applications, WMI infrastructure, providers, and managed objects. Management applications are Windows applications that access and display or process data about managed objects. A simple example of a management application is a performance tool replacement that relies on WMI rather than the Performance API to obtain performance information. A more complex example is an enterprise-management tool that
lets administrators perform automated inventories of the software and hardware configuration of every computer in their enterprise.

Developers typically must target management applications to collect data from and manage specific objects. An object might represent one component, such as a network adapter device, or a collection of components, such as a computer. (The computer object might contain the network adapter object.) Providers need to define and export the representation of the objects that management applications are interested in. For example, the vendor of a network adapter might want to add adapter-specific properties to the network adapter WMI support that Windows includes, querying and setting the adapter’s state and behavior as the management applications direct. In some cases (for example, for device drivers), Microsoft supplies a provider that has its own API to help developers leverage the provider’s implementation for their own managed objects with minimal coding effort.

The WMI infrastructure, the heart of which is the Common Information Model (CIM) Object Manager (CIMOM), is the glue that binds management applications and providers. (CIM is described later in this chapter.) The infrastructure also serves as the object-class store and, in many cases, as the storage manager for persistent object properties. WMI implements the store, or repository, as an on-disk database named the CIMOM Object Repository. As part of its infrastructure, WMI supports several APIs through which management applications access object data and providers supply data and class definitions.
Windows programs and scripts (such as Windows PowerShell) use the WMI COM API, the primary management API, to directly interact with WMI. Other APIs layer on top of the COM API and include an Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) adapter for the Microsoft Access database application. A database developer uses the WMI ODBC adapter to embed references to object data in the developer’s database. Then the developer can easily generate reports with database queries that contain WMI-based data. WMI ActiveX controls support another layered API. Web developers use the ActiveX controls to construct web-based interfaces to WMI data. Another management API is the WMI scripting API, for use in script-based applications and Microsoft Visual Basic programs. WMI scripting support exists for all Microsoft programming language technologies.

As they are for management applications, WMI COM interfaces constitute the primary API for providers. However, unlike management applications, which are COM clients, providers are COM or Distributed COM (DCOM) servers (that is, the providers implement COM objects that WMI interacts with). Possible embodiments of a WMI provider include DLLs that load into WMI’s manager process or stand-alone Windows applications or Windows services. Microsoft includes a number of built-in providers that present data from well-known sources, such as the Performance API, the registry, the Event Manager, Active Directory, SNMP, and modern device drivers. The WMI SDK lets developers develop third-party WMI providers.

**Providers**

At the core of WBEM is the DMTF-designed CIM specification. The CIM specifies how management systems represent, from a systems management perspective, anything from a computer to an application or device on a computer. Provider developers use the CIM to represent the components that make up the parts of an application for which the developers want to enable management. Developers use the Managed Object Format (MOF) language to implement a CIM representation.

In addition to defining classes that represent objects, a provider must interface WMI to the objects. WMI classifies providers according to the interface features the providers supply. Table 4-12 lists WMI provider classifications. Note that a provider can implement one or more features; therefore, a provider can be, for example, both a class and an event provider. To clarify the feature definitions in Table 4-12, let’s look at a provider that implements several of those features. The Event Log provider supports several objects, including an Event Log Computer, an Event Log Record, and an Event Log File. The Event Log is an Instance provider because it can define multiple instances for several of its classes. One class for which the Event Log provider defines multiple instances is the Event Log File class (Win32_NTEventlogFile); the Event Log provider defines an instance of this class for each of the system’s event logs (that is, System Event Log, Application Event Log, and Security Event Log).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class</td>
<td>Can supply, modify, delete, and enumerate a provider-specific class. It can also support query processing. Active Directory is a rare example of a service that is a class provider.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instance</td>
<td>Can supply, modify, delete, and enumerate instances of system and provider-specific classes. An instance represents a managed object. It can also support query processing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classification</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property</td>
<td>Can supply and modify individual object property values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method</td>
<td>Supplies methods for a provider-specific class.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Generates event notifications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event consumer</td>
<td>Maps a physical consumer to a logical consumer to support event notification.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Event Log provider defines the instance data and lets management applications enumerate the records. To let management applications use WMI to back up and restore the Event Log files, the Event Log provider implements backup and restore methods for Event Log File objects. Doing so makes the Event Log provider a Method provider. Finally, a management application can register to receive notification whenever a new record writes to one of the Event Logs. Thus, the Event Log provider serves as an Event provider when it uses WMI event notification to tell WMI that Event Log records have arrived.

The Common Information Model and the Managed Object Format Language

The CIM follows in the steps of object-oriented languages such as C++ and C#, in which a modeler designs representations as classes. Working with classes lets developers use the powerful modeling techniques of inheritance and composition. Subclasses can inherit the attributes of a parent class, and they can add their own characteristics and override the characteristics they inherit from the parent class. A class that inherits properties from another class derives from that class. Classes also compose: a developer can build a class that includes other classes.

The DMTF provides multiple classes as part of the WBEM standard. These classes are CIM’s basic language and represent objects that apply to all areas of management. The classes are part of the CIM core model. An example of a core class is CIM_ManagedSystemElement. This class contains a few basic properties that identify physical components such as hardware devices and logical components such as processes and files. The properties include a caption, description, installation date, and status. Thus, the CIM_LogicalElement and CIM_PhysicalElement classes inherit the attributes of the CIM_ManagedSystemElement class. These two classes are also part of the CIM core model. The WBEM standard calls these classes abstract classes because they exist solely as classes that other classes inherit (that is, no object instances of an abstract class exist). You can therefore think of abstract classes as templates that define properties for use in other classes.

A second category of classes represents objects that are specific to management areas but independent of a particular implementation. These classes constitute the common model and are considered an extension of the core model. An example of a common-model class is the CIM_FileSystem class, which inherits the attributes of CIM_LogicalElement. Because virtually every operating system—including Windows, Linux, and other varieties of UNIX—rely on file-system-based structured storage, the CIM_FileSystem class is an appropriate constituent of the common model.

The final class category, the extended model, comprises technology-specific additions to the common model. Windows defines a large set of these classes to represent objects specific to the
Windows environment. Because all operating systems store data in files, the CIM common model includes the CIM_LogicalFile class. The CIM_DataFile class inherits the CIM_LogicalFile class, and Windows adds the Win32_PageFile and Win32_ShortcutFile file classes for those Windows file types.

The Event Log provider makes extensive use of inheritance. Figure 4-19 shows a view of the WMI CIM Studio, a class browser that ships with the WMI Administrative Tools that you can obtain from the Microsoft download center at the Microsoft website. You can see where the Event Log provider relies on inheritance in the provider’s Win32_NTEventLogFile class, which derives from CIM_DataFile. Event Log files are data files that have additional Event Log–specific attributes such as a log file name (LogFileName) and a count of the number of records that the file contains (NumberOfRecords). The tree that the class browser shows reveals that Win32_NTEventLogFile is based on several levels of inheritance, in which CIM_DataFile derives from CIM_LogicalFile, which derives from CIM_LogicalElement, and CIM_LogicalElement derives from CIM_ManagedSystemElement.

![WMI CIM Studio](image_url)
As stated earlier, WMI provider developers write their classes in the MOF language. The following output shows the definition of the Event Log provider’s Win32_NTEventlogFile, which is selected in Figure 4-19. Notice the correlation between the properties that the right panel in Figure 4-19 lists and those properties’ definitions in the MOF file that follows. CIM Studio uses yellow arrows to tag the properties that a class inherits. Thus, you don’t see those properties specified in Win32_NTEventLogFile’s definition.

dynamic: ToInstance, provider("MS_NT_EVENTLOG_PROVIDER"), Locale(1033), UUID("{8502C57B-5FBB-11D2-AAC1-006008C78BC7}")

class Win32_NTEventLogFile : CIM_DataFile
{
    [read] string LogfileName;
    [read, write] uint32 MaxFileSize;
    [read] uint32 NumberOfRecords;
    [read, volatile, ValueMap{"0", "1..365", "4294967295"}] string OverWritePolicy;
    [read, write, Units("Days"), Range("0-365 | 4294967295"')] uint32 OverwriteOutDated;
    [read] string Sources[];
    [implemented, Privileges{"SeSecurityPrivilege", "SeBackupPrivilege"}] uint32 ClearEventlog([in] string ArchiveFileName);
    [implemented, Privileges{"SeSecurityPrivilege", "SeBackupPrivilege"}] uint32 BackupEventlog([in] string ArchiveFileName);
};

One term worth reviewing is dynamic, which is a descriptive designator for the Win32_NTEventLogFile class that the MOF file in the preceding output shows. “Dynamic” means that the WMI infrastructure asks the WMI provider for the values of properties associated with an object of that class whenever a management application queries the object’s properties. A static class is one in the WMI repository; the WMI infrastructure refers to the repository to obtain the values instead of asking a provider for the values. Because updating the repository is a relatively expensive operation, dynamic providers are more efficient for objects that have properties that change frequently.

**EXPERIMENT: Viewing the MOF Definitions of WMI Classes**

You can view the MOF definition for any WMI class by using the WbemTest tool that comes with Windows. In this experiment, we’ll look at the MOF definition for the Win32_NTEventLogFile class:

1. Run Wbemtest from the Start menu’s Run dialog box.
2. Click the Connect button, change the Namespace to root\cimv2, and connect.
3. Click the Enum Classes button, select the Recursive option button, and then click OK.
4. Find Win32_NTEventLogFile in the list of classes, and then double-click it to see its class properties.
5. Click the Show MOF button to open a window that displays the MOF text.
After constructing classes in MOF, WMI developers can supply the class definitions to WMI in several ways. WDM driver developers compile a MOF file into a binary MOF (BMF) file—a more compact binary representation than a MOF file—and can choose to dynamically give the BMF files to the WDM infrastructure or to statically include it in their binary. Another way is for the provider to compile the MOF and use WMI COM APIs to give the definitions to the WMI infrastructure. Finally, a provider can use the MOF Compiler (Mofcomp.exe) tool to give the WMI infrastructure a class-compiled representation directly.

The WMI Namespace
Classes define the properties of objects, and objects are class instances on a system. WMI uses a namespace that contains several subnamespaces that WMI arranges hierarchically to organize objects. A management application must connect to a namespace before the application can access objects within the namespace.

WMI names the namespace root directory root. All WMI installations have four predefined namespaces that reside beneath root: CIMV2, Default, Security, and WMI. Some of these namespaces have other namespaces within them. For example, CIMV2 includes the Applications and ms_409 namespaces as subnamespaces. Providers sometimes define their own namespaces; you can see the WMI namespace (which the Windows device driver WMI provider defines) beneath root in Windows.

EXPERIMENT: Viewing WMI Namespaces
You can see what namespaces are defined on a system with WMI CIM Studio. WMI CIM Studio presents a connection dialog box when you run it that includes a namespace browsing button to the right of the namespace edit box. Opening the browser and selecting a namespace has WMI CIM Studio connect to that namespace. Windows defines over a dozen namespaces beneath root, some of which are visible here:
Unlike a file system namespace, which comprises a hierarchy of directories and files, a WMI namespace is only one level deep. Instead of using names as a file system does, WMI uses object properties that it defines as keys to identify the objects. Management applications specify class names with key names to locate specific objects within a namespace. Thus, each instance of a class must be uniquely identifiable by its key values. For example, the Event Log provider uses the Win32_NTLogEvent class to represent records in an Event Log. This class has two keys: Logfile, a string; and RecordNumber, an unsigned integer. A management application that queries WMI for instances of Event Log records obtains them from the provider key pairs that identify records. The application refers to a record using the syntax that you see in this sample object path name:

```
\\DARYL\root\CIMV2:Win32_NTLogEvent.Logfile="Application",
    RecordNumber="1"
```

The first component in the name (\\DARYL) identifies the computer on which the object is located, and the second component (\root\CIMV2) is the namespace in which the object resides. The class name follows the colon, and key names and their associated values follow the period. A comma separates the key values.

WMI provides interfaces that let applications enumerate all the objects in a particular class or to make queries that return instances of a class that match a query criterion.

### Class Association

Many object types are related to one another in some way. For example, a computer object has a processor, software, an operating system, active processes, and so on. WMI lets providers construct an association class to represent a logical connection between two different classes. Association classes associate one class with another, so the classes have only two properties: a class name and the Ref modifier. The following output shows an association in which the Event Log provider’s MOF file associates the Win32_NTLogEvent class with the Win32_ComputerSystem class. Given an object, a management application can query associated objects. In this way, a provider defines a hierarchy of objects.

```
[dynamic: ToInstance, provider("MS_NT_EVENTLOG_PROVIDER"): ToInstance, EnumPrivileges{"SecurityPrivilege"}:
    ToSubClass, Locale(1033): ToInstance, UUID("{8502C57F-5FBB-11D2-AAC1-006008C78BC7}"): ToInstance, Association: DisableOverride ToSubClass]
class Win32_NTLogEventComputer
{
    [key, read: ToSubClass] Win32_ComputerSystem ref Computer;
    [key, read: ToSubClass] Win32_NTLogEvent ref Record;
};
```
Figure 4-20 shows the WMI Object Browser (another tool that the WMI Administrative Tools includes) displaying the contents of the CIMV2 namespace. Windows system components typically place their objects within the CIMV2 namespace. The Object Browser first locates the Win32_ComputerSystem object instance ALEX-LAPTOP, which is the object that represents the computer. Then the Object Browser obtains the objects associated with Win32_ComputerSystem and displays them beneath ALEX-LAPTOP. The Object Browser user interface displays association objects with a double-arrow folder icon. The associated class type's objects display beneath the folder.

You can see in the Object Browser that the Event Log provider’s association class Win32_NTLogEventComputer is beneath ALEX-LAPTOP and that numerous instances of the Win32_NTLogEvent class exist. Refer to the preceding output to verify that the MOF file defines the Win32_NTLogEventComputer class to associate the Win32_ComputerSystem class with the Win32_NTLogEvent class. Selecting an instance of Win32_NTLogEvent in the Object Browser reveals that class' properties under the Properties tab in the right pane. Microsoft intended the Object Browser to help WMI developers examine their objects, but a management application would perform the same operations and display properties or collected information more intelligibly.

![WMI Object Browser](image)

**FIGURE 4-20** WMI Object Browser
EXPERIMENT: Using WMI Scripts to Manage Systems

A powerful aspect of WMI is its support for scripting languages. Microsoft has generated hundreds of scripts that perform common administrative tasks for managing user accounts, files, the registry, processes, and hardware devices. The Microsoft TechNet Scripting Center website serves as the central location for Microsoft scripts. Using a script from the scripting center is as easy as copying its text from your Internet browser, storing it in a file with a .vbs extension, and running it with the command cscript script.vbs, where script is the name you gave the script. Cscript is the command-line interface to Windows Script Host (WSH).

Here’s a sample TechNet script that registers to receive events when Win32_Process object instances are created, which occurs whenever a process starts, and prints a line with the name of the process that the object represents:

```vbs
strComputer = "."
Set objWMIService = GetObject("winmgmts:" & ":\" & strComputer & ";\root\cimv2")
Set colMonitoredProcesses = objWMIService.ExecNotificationQuery("select * from __instancecreationevent within 1 where TargetInstance isa 'Win32_Process'")
i = 0
Do While i = 0
    Set objLatestProcess = colMonitoredProcesses.NextEvent
    Wscript.Echo objLatestProcess.TargetInstance.Name
Loop
```

The line that invokes `ExecNotificationQuery` does so with a parameter that includes a “select” statement, which highlights WMI’s support for a read-only subset of the ANSI standard Structured Query Language (SQL), known as WQL, to provide a flexible way for WMI consumers to specify the information they want to extract from WMI providers. Running the sample script with Cscript and then starting Notepad results in the following output:

```
C:\>cscript monproc.vbs
Microsoft (R) Windows Script Host Version 5.7
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
```

WMI Implementation

The WMI service runs in a shared Svchost process that executes in the local system account. It loads providers into the Wmiprvse.exe provider-hosting process, which launches as a child of the RPC service process. WMI executes Wmiprvse in the local system, local service, or network service account, depending on the value of the HostingModel property of the WMI Win32Provider object instance that represents the provider implementation. A Wmiprvse process exits after the provider is removed from the cache, one minute following the last provider request it receives.
EXPERIMENT: Viewing Wmiprvse Creation

You can see Wmiprvse being created by running Process Explorer and executing Wmic. A Wmiprvse process will appear beneath the Svchost process that hosts the RPC service. If Process Explorer job highlighting is enabled, it will appear with the job highlight color because, to prevent a runaway provider from consuming all virtual memory resources on a system, Wmiprvse executes in a job object that limits the number of child processes it can create and the amount of virtual memory each process and all the processes of the job can allocate. (See Chapter 5 for more information on job objects.)

Most WMI components reside by default in %SystemRoot%\System32 and %SystemRoot%\System32\Wbem, including Windows MOF files, built-in provider DLLs, and management application WMI DLLs. Look in the %SystemRoot%\System32\Wbem directory, and you’ll find Ntevt.mof, the Event Log provider MOF file. You’ll also find Ntevt.dll, the Event Log provider’s DLL, which the WMI service uses.

Directories beneath %SystemRoot%\System32\Wbem store the repository, log files, and third-party MOF files. WMI implements the repository—named the CIMOM object repository—using a proprietary version of the Microsoft JET database engine. The database file, by default, resides in %SystemRoot%\System32\Wbem\Repository.

WMI honors numerous registry settings that the service’s HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WBEM\CIMOM registry key stores, such as thresholds and maximum values for certain parameters.

Device drivers use special interfaces to provide data to and accept commands—called the WMI System Control commands—from WMI. These interfaces are part of the WDM, which is explained in Chapter 8, “I/O System,” in Part 2. Because the interfaces are cross-platform, they fall under the \root \WMI namespace.
WMIC
Windows also includes Wmic.exe, a utility that allows you to interact with WMI from a WMI-aware command-line shell. All WMI objects and their properties, including their methods, are accessible through the shell, which makes WMIC an advanced systems management console.

WMI Security
WMI implements security at the namespace level. If a management application successfully connects to a namespace, the application can view and access the properties of all the objects in that namespace. An administrator can use the WMI Control application to control which users can access a namespace. Internally, this security model is implemented by using ACLs and Security Descriptors, part of the standard Windows security model that implements Access Checks. (See Chapter 6 for more information on access checks.)

To start the WMI Control application, from the Start menu, select Control Panel. From there, select System And Maintenance, Administrative Tools, Computer Management. Next, open the Services And Applications branch. Right-click WMI Control, and select Properties to launch the WMI Control Properties dialog box, which Figure 4-21 shows. To configure security for namespaces, click on the Security tab, select the namespace, and click Security. The other tabs in the WMI Control Properties dialog box let you modify the performance and backup settings that the registry stores.

![WMI Control Properties](image)

**FIGURE 4-21** WMI security properties
Windows Diagnostic Infrastructure

The Windows Diagnostic Infrastructure (WDI) helps to detect, diagnose, and resolve common problem scenarios with minimal user intervention. Windows components implement triggers that cause WDI to launch scenario-specific troubleshooting modules to detect the occurrence of a problem scenario. A trigger can indicate that the system is approaching or has reached a problematic state. Once a troubleshooting module has identified a root cause, it can invoke a problem resolver to address it. A resolution might be as simple as changing a registry setting or interacting with the user to perform recovery steps or configuration changes. Ultimately, WDI’s main role is to provide a unified framework for Windows components to perform the tasks involved in automated problem detection, diagnosis, and resolution.

WDI Instrumentation

Windows or application components must add instrumentation to notify WDI when a problem scenario is occurring. Components can wait for the results of diagnosis synchronously or can continue operating and let diagnosis proceed asynchronously. WDI implements two different types of instrumentation APIs to support these models:

- Event-based diagnosis, which can be used for minimally invasive diagnostics instrumentation, can be added to a component without requiring any changes to its implementation. WDI supports two kinds of event-based diagnosis: simple scenarios and start-stop scenarios. In a simple scenario, a single point in code is responsible for the failure and an event is raised to trigger diagnostics. In a start-stop scenario, an entire code path is deemed risky and is instrumented for diagnosis. One event is raised at the beginning of the scenario to a real-time Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) session named the DiagLog. At the same time, a kernel facility called the Scenario Event Mapper (SEM) enables a collection of additional ETW traces to the WDI context loggers. A second event is raised to signal the end of the diagnostic scenario, at which time the SEM disables the verbose tracing. This “just-in-time tracing” mechanism keeps the performance overhead of detailed tracing low while maintaining enough contextual information for WDI to find the root cause without a reproduction of the problem, if a failure should occur.

- On-demand diagnosis, which allows applications to request diagnoses on their own, interact with the diagnostic, receive notifications when the diagnostic has completed, and modify its behavior based on the results of the diagnosis. On-demand instrumentation is particularly useful when diagnosis needs to be performed in a privileged security context. WDI facilitates the transfer of context across trust and process boundaries and also supports impersonation of the caller when necessary.

Diagnostic Policy Service

The Diagnostic Policy Service (DPS, %SystemRoot%\System32\Dps.dll) implements most of the WDI scenario back end. DPS is a multithreaded service (running in a Svchost) that accepts on-demand scenario requests and also monitors and watches for diagnostic events delivered via DiagLog.
(See Figure 4-22, which shows the relationship of DPS to the other key WDI components.) In response to these requests, DPS launches the appropriate troubleshooting module, which encodes domain-specific knowledge, such as how to find the root cause of a network problem. In addition, DPS makes all the contextual information related to the scenario available to the modules in the form of captured traces. Troubleshooting modules perform an automated analysis of the data and can request DPS to launch a secondary module called a resolver, which is responsible for fixing the problem, silently if possible.

**FIGURE 4-22** Windows Diagnostic Infrastructure architecture

DPS controls and enforces Group Policy settings for diagnostic scenarios. You can use the Group Policy Editor (%SystemRoot%\System32\Gpedit.msc) to configure the settings for the diagnostics and automatic recovery options. You can access these settings from Computer Configuration, Administrative Templates, System, Troubleshooting And Diagnostics, shown in Figure 4-23.

**FIGURE 4-23** Configuring Diagnostic Policy Service settings
Diagnostic Functionality

Windows implements several built-in diagnostic scenarios and utilities. Some examples include:

- Disk diagnostics, which include the presence of Self-Monitoring Analysis and Reporting Technology (SMART) code inside the storage class driver (%SystemRoot%\System32\DriverClassspnp.sys) to monitor disk health. WDI notifies and guides the user through data back-up after an impending disk failure is detected. In addition, Windows monitors application crashes caused by disk corruptions in critical system files. The diagnostic uses the Windows File Protection mechanism to automatically restore such damaged system files from a backup cache when possible. For more information on Windows storage management, see Chapter 9, “Storage Management,” in Part 2.

- Network diagnostics and troubleshooting extends WDI to handle different classes of networking-related problems, such as file sharing, Internet access, wireless networks, third-party firewalls, and general network connectivity. For more information on networking, see Chapter 7, “Networking.”

- Resource exhaustion prevention, which includes Windows memory leak diagnosis and Windows resource exhaustion detection and resolution. These diagnostics can detect when the commit limit is approaching its maximum and alert the user of the situation, including the top memory and resource consumers. The user can then choose to terminate these applications to attempt to free some resources. For more information on the commit limit and virtual memory, see Chapter 10, “Memory Management,” in Part 2.

- Windows memory diagnostic tool, which can be manually executed by the user from the Boot Manager on startup or automatically recommended by Windows Error Reporting (WER) after a system crash that was analyzed as potentially the result of faulty RAM. For more information on the boot process, see Chapter 13 in Part 2.

- Windows startup repair tool, which attempts to automatically fix certain classes of errors commonly responsible for users being unable to boot the system, such as incorrect BCD settings, damaged disk structures such as the MBR or boot sector, and faulty drivers. When system boot is unsuccessful, the Boot Manager automatically launches the startup repair tool, if it is installed, which also includes manual recovery options and access to a command prompt. For more information on the startup repair tool, see Chapter 13 in Part 2.

- Windows performance diagnostics, which include Windows boot performance diagnostics, Windows shutdown performance diagnostics, Windows standby/resume performance diagnostics, and Windows system responsiveness performance diagnostics. Based on certain timing thresholds and the internal behavioral expectations of these mechanisms, Windows can detect problems caused by slow performance and log them to the Event Log, which in turn is used by WDI to provide resolutions and walkthroughs for the user to attempt to fix the problem.
Program Compatibility Assistant (PCA), which enables legacy applications to execute on newer Windows versions despite compatibility problems. PCA detects application installation failures caused by a mismatch during version checks and run-time failures caused by deprecated binaries and User Account Control (UAC) settings. PCA attempts to recover from these failures by applying the appropriate compatibility setting for the application, which takes effect during the next run. In addition, PCA maintains a database of programs with known compatibility issues and informs the users about potential problems at program startup.

Conclusion

So far, we've examined the overall structure of Windows, the core system mechanisms on which the structure is built, and core management mechanisms. With this foundation laid, we're ready to explore the individual executive components in more detail, starting with processes and threads.
In this chapter, we’ll explain the data structures and algorithms that deal with processes, threads, and jobs in the Microsoft Windows operating system. The first section focuses on the internal structures that make up a process. The second section outlines the steps involved in creating a process (and its initial thread). The internals of threads and thread scheduling are then described. The chapter concludes with a description of jobs.

Because processes and threads touch so many components in Windows, a number of terms and data structures (such as working sets, objects and handles, system memory heaps, and so on) are referred to in this chapter but are explained in detail elsewhere in the book. To fully understand this chapter, you need to be familiar with the terms and concepts explained in Chapter 1, “Concepts and Tools,” and Chapter 2, “System Architecture,” such as the difference between a process and a thread, the Windows virtual address space layout, and the difference between user mode and kernel mode.

Process Internals

This section describes the key Windows process data structures maintained by various parts of the system and describes different ways and tools to examine this data.

Data Structures

Each Windows process is represented by an executive process (EPROCESS) structure. Besides containing many attributes relating to a process, an EPROCESS contains and points to a number of other related data structures. For example, each process has one or more threads, each represented by an executive thread (ETHREAD) structure. (Thread data structures are explained in the section “Thread Internals” later in this chapter.)

The EPROCESS and most of its related data structures exist in system address space. One exception is the process environment block (PEB), which exists in the process address space (because it contains information accessed by user-mode code). Additionally, some of the process data structures used in memory management, such as the working set list, are valid only within the context of the current process, because they are stored in process-specific system space. (See Chapter 10, “Memory Management,” in Part 2 for more information on process address space.)

For each process that is executing a Win32 program, the Win32 subsystem process (Csrss) maintains a parallel structure called the CSR_PROCESS. Finally, the kernel-mode part of the Win32
subsystem (Win32k.sys) maintains a per-process data structure, W32PROCESS. The W32PROCESS structure is created the first time a thread calls a Windows USER or GDI function that is implemented in kernel mode.

With the exception of the idle process, every EPROCESS structure is encapsulated as a process object by the executive object manager (described in Chapter 3, “System Mechanisms”). Because processes are not named objects, they are not visible in the WinObj tool. You can, however, see the Type object called “Process” in the \ObjectTypes directory. A handle to a process provides, through use of the process-related APIs, access to some of the data in the EPROCESS structure and also in some of its associated structures.

Figure 5-1 is a simplified diagram of the process and thread data structures. Each data structure shown in the figure is described in detail in this chapter.

![Diagram](image)

**FIGURE 5-1** Data structures associated with processes and threads

Many other drivers and system components, by registering process creation notifications, can choose to create their own data structures to track information they store on a per-process basis. When one discusses the overhead of a process, the size of such data structures must often be taken into consideration, although it is nearly impossible to obtain an accurate number.

First let’s focus on the process object. (The thread object is covered in the section “Thread Internals” later in the chapter.) Figure 5-2 shows the key fields in an EPROCESS structure.
**FIGURE 5-2** Important fields of the executive process structure and its embedded kernel process structure
Similar to the way that the kernel’s APIs and components are divided into isolated and layered modules with their own naming conventions, the data structures for a process follow a similar design. As shown in Figure 5-2, the first member of the executive process structure is called \textit{Pcb}, for \textit{process control block}. It is a structure of type KPROCESS, for \textit{kernel process}. Although routines in the executive store information in the EPROCESS, the dispatcher, scheduler, and interrupt/time accounting code—being part of the operating system kernel—use the KPROCESS instead. This allows a layer of abstraction to exist between the executive’s high-level functionality and its underlying low-level implementation of certain functions, and it helps prevent unwanted dependencies between the layers.

**EXPERIMENT: Displaying the Format of an EPROCESS Structure and Its Fields**

For a list of the fields that make up an EPROCESS structure and their offsets in hexadecimal, type \texttt{dt nt!_eprocess} in the kernel debugger. (See Chapter 1 for more information on the kernel debugger and how to perform kernel debugging on the local system.) The output (truncated for the sake of space) on a 32-bit system looks like this:

```
lkd> dt nt!_eprocess
    +0x000 Pcb              : _KPROCESS
    +0x080 ProcessLock      : _EX_PUSH_LOCK
    +0x088 CreateTime       : _LARGE_INTEGER
    +0x090 ExitTime         : _LARGE_INTEGER
    +0x098 RundownProtect   : _EX_RUNDOWN_REF
    +0x09c UniqueProcessId  : Ptr32 Void
    ...
    +0x0dc ObjectTable      : Ptr32 _HANDLE_TABLE
    +0x0e0 Token            : _EX_FAST_REF
    ...
    +0x108 Win32Process     : Ptr32 Void
    +0x10c Job              : Ptr32 _EJOB
    ...
    +0x2a8 TimerResolutionLink : _LIST_ENTRY
    +0x2b0 RequestedTimerResolution : Uint4B
    +0x2b4 ActiveThreadsHighWatermark : Uint4B
    +0x2b8 SmallestTimerResolution : Uint4B
    +0x2bc TimerResolutionStackRecord : Ptr32 _PO_DIAG_STACK_RECORD
```

The first member of this structure (\textit{Pcb}) is an imbedded structure of type KPROCESS. This is where scheduling and time-accounting data is stored. You can display the format of the kernel process structure in the same way as the EPROCESS:

```
lkd> dt _kprocess
nt!_KPROCESS
    +0x000 Header           : _DISPATCHER_HEADER
    +0x010 ProfileListHead  : _LIST_ENTRY
    +0x018 DirectoryTableBase : Uint4B
    ...
    +0x074 StackCount       : _KSTACK_COUNT
    +0x078 ProcessListEntry : _LIST_ENTRY
    +0x080 CycleTime        : Uint8B
```
The `dt` command also enables you to view the specific contents of one field or multiple fields by typing their names following the structure name—such as `dt nt!_eprocess UniqueProcessId`, which displays the process ID field. In the case of a field that represents a structure—such as the `Pcb` field of EPROCESS, which contains the KPROCESS substructure—adding a period after the field name will cause the debugger to display the substructure.

For example, an alternative way to see the KPROCESS is to type `dt nt!_eprocess Pcb`. You can continue to recurse this way by adding more field names (within KPROCESS) and so on. Finally, to recurse through all the substructures, the `-r` switch of the `dt` command allows you to do just that. Adding a number after the switch controls the depth of recursion the command will follow.

The `dt` command used as shown earlier shows the format of the selected structure, not the contents of any particular instance of that structure type. To show an instance of an actual process, you can specify the address of an EPROCESS structure as an argument to the `dt` command. You can get the addresses of almost all of the EPROCESS structures in the system by using the `!process 0 0` command (the exception being the system idle process). Because the KPROCESS is the first thing in the EPROCESS, the address of an EPROCESS will also work as the address of a KPROCESS with `dt _kprocess`.

Processes and threads are such integral parts of Windows that it’s impossible to talk about them without referring to many other parts of the system. To keep the length of this chapter manageable, however, those related subjects (such as memory management, security, objects, and handles) are covered elsewhere.

**EXPERIMENT: Using the Kernel Debugger !process Command**

The kernel debugger `!process` command displays a subset of the information in a process object and its associated structures. This output is arranged in two parts for each process. First you see the information about the process, as shown here. (When you don’t specify a process address or ID, `!process` lists information for the process owning the thread currently running on CPU 0, which will be WinDbg itself on a single-processor system.)

```
lkd> !process
PROCESS 85857160  SessionId: 1  Cid: 0bcc  Peb: 7ffd9000  ParentCid: 090c
  DirBase: b45b0820  ObjectTable: b94ffda0  HandleCount: 99.
  Image: windbg.exe
  VadRoot 85a1c8e8 Vads 97 Clone 0 Private 5919. Modified 153. Locked 1.
  DeviceMap 9d32ee50
  Token 9d32ee50
  ...  ebaa1938
```
After the basic process output comes a list of the threads in the process. That output is explained in the “Experiment: Using the Kernel Debugger \texttt{!thread} Command” section later in the chapter.

Other commands that display process information include \texttt{!handle}, which dumps the process handle table (which is described in more detail in the section “Object Handles and the Process Handle Table” in Chapter 3). Process and thread security structures are described in Chapter 6, “Security.”

Note that the output gives you the address of the PEB, which you can use with the \texttt{!peb} command shown in the next experiment to see the PEB of an arbitrary process. However, because the PEB is in the user-mode address space, it is valid only within the context of its own process. To look at the PEB of another process, you must first switch WinDbg to that process. You can do this with the \texttt{.process} command, followed by the EPROCESS pointer.

The PEB lives in the user-mode address space of the process it describes. It contains information needed by the image loader, the heap manager, and other Windows components that need to access it from user mode. The EPROCESS and KPROCESS structures are accessible only from kernel mode. The important fields of the PEB are illustrated in Figure 5-3 and are explained in more detail later in this chapter.
EXPERIMENT: Examining the PEB

You can dump the PEB structure with the `!peb` command in the kernel debugger, which displays the PEB of the process that owns the currently running thread on CPU 0. By using the information in the previous experiment, you can also use the PEB pointer as an argument to the command.

```
lkd> !peb 7ffd9000
PEB at 7ffd9000
   InheritedAddressSpace: No
   ReadImageFileExecOptions: No
   BeingDebugged: No
   ImageBaseAddress: 002a0000
   Ldr      77895d00
   ...
   WindowTitle: 'C:\Users\Alex Ionescu\Desktop\WinDbg.lnk'
   ImageFile: 'C:\Program Files\Debugging Tools for Windows\windbg.exe'
   CommandLine: '"C:\Program Files\Debugging Tools for Windows\windbg.exe"'
   DllPath: 'C:\Program Files\Debugging Tools for Windows;C:\Windows\system32;C:\Windows\system;C:\Windows
   Environment: 001850a8
       ALLUSERSPROFILE=C:\ProgramData
       APPDATA=C:\Users\Alex Ionescu\AppData\Roaming
   ...
```

The CSR_PROCESS structure contains information about processes that is specific to the Windows subsystem (Csrss). As such, only Windows applications have a CSR_PROCESS structure associated with them (for example, Smss does not). Additionally, because each session has its own instance of the Windows subsystem, the CSR_PROCESS structures are maintained by the Csrss process within each individual session. The basic structure of the CSR_PROCESS is illustrated in Figure 5-4 and is explained in more detail later in this chapter.
EXPERIMENT: Examining the CSR_PROCESS

You can dump the CSR_PROCESS structure with the `!dp` command in the user-mode debugger while attached to the Csrss process of the session you want to inspect. Use the File, Attach To A Process option to get a list of processes, and select the Csrss process for the correct session. (You can see the session of the process by expanding the tree item for it.) Make sure to select the Noninvasive check box to avoid freezing your system.

The `!dp` command takes as input the PID of the process whose CSR_PROCESS structure should be dumped. Alternatively, the structure pointer can be given directly as an argument. Because `!dp` already performs a `dt` command internally, there is no need to use `dt` on your own.

```
0:000> !dp v 0x1c0aa8-8
PCSR_PROCESS @ 001c0aa0:
  +0x000 ClientId : _CLIENT_ID
  +0x008 ListLink : _LIST_ENTRY [ 0x1d8618 - 0x1b1b10 ]
  +0x010 ThreadList : _LIST_ENTRY [ 0x1c0b80 - 0x1c7638 ]
  +0x018 NtSession : 0x001c0bb8 _CSR_NT_SESSION
  +0x054 Luid : _LUID
  +0x05c ServerDllPerProcessData : [1] (null)
Threads:
  Thread 001c0b78, Process 001c0aa0, ClientId 198.19c, Flags 0, Ref Count 1
  Thread 001c0e78, Process 001c0aa0, ClientId 198.1cc, Flags 0, Ref Count 1
...```
The W32PROCESS structure is the final system data structure associated with processes that we'll look at. It contains all the information that the Windows graphics and window management code in the kernel (Win32k) needs to maintain state information about GUI processes (which were defined earlier as processes that have done at least one USER/GDI system call). The basic structure of the W32PROCESS is illustrated in Figure 5-5 and is explained in more detail later in this chapter.

**FIGURE 5-5** Fields of the Win32k Process structure

---

**EXPERIMENT: Examining the W32PROCESS**

There is no command provided by the debugger extensions to dump the W32PROCESS structure, but it is present in the symbols of the Win32k driver. As such, by using the `dt` command with the appropriate symbol name `win32k!_W32PROCESS`, it is possible to dump the fields as long as the pointer is known. Because the `/process` command does not actually output this pointer (even though it is stored in the EPROCESS object), the field must be inspected manually with `dt nt!_EPROCESS Win32Process` followed by an EPROCESS pointer.

In the following example, the W32PROCESS structure for the shell, Explorer.exe, is shown:

```
1kd> dt win32k!_W32PROCESS 0xff991490
+0x000 Process          : 0x84a2b030 _EPROCESS
+0x004 RefCount         : 1
...                      :
+0x020 W32Pid           : 0x590
+0x024 GDIHandleCount    : 383
+0x028 GDIHandleCountPeak: 0x239
+0x02c UserHandleCount   : 228
+0x030 UserHandleCountPeak: 0x16c
...                      :
+0x088 hSecureGdiSharedHandleTable : 0x84a24159
+0x08c DxProcess        : 0xa2c93980
```

The `DxProcess` field is a pointer to yet another per-process data structure—in this case, maintained by the DirectX Video Card Port Driver—but its description is beyond the scope of this book.
Protected Processes

In the Windows security model, any process running with a token containing the debug privilege (such as an administrator’s account) can request any access right that it desires to any other process running on the machine—for example, it can read and write arbitrary process memory, inject code, suspend and resume threads, and query information on other processes. Tools such as Process Explorer and Task Manager need and request these access rights to provide their functionality to users.

This logical behavior (which helps ensure that administrators will always have full control of the running code on the system) clashes with the system behavior for digital rights management requirements imposed by the media industry on computer operating systems that need to support playback of advanced, high-quality digital content such as Blu-ray and HD-DVD media. To support reliable and protected playback of such content, Windows uses protected processes. These processes exist alongside normal Windows processes, but they add significant constraints to the access rights that other processes on the system (even when running with administrative privileges) can request.

Protected processes can be created by any application; however, the operating system will allow a process to be protected only if the image file has been digitally signed with a special Windows Media Certificate. The Protected Media Path (PMP) in Windows makes use of protected processes to provide protection for high-value media, and developers of applications such as DVD players can make use of protected processes by using the Media Foundation API.

The Audio Device Graph process (Audiodg.exe) is a protected process because protected music content can be decoded through it. Similarly, the Windows Error Reporting (or WER, discussed in Chapter 3) client process (Werfault.exe) can also run protected because it needs to have access to protected processes in case one of them crashes. Finally, the System process itself is protected because some of the decryption information is generated by the Ksecdd.sys driver and stored in its user-mode memory. The System process is also protected to protect the integrity of all kernel handles (because the System process’ handle table contains all the kernel handles on the system).

At the kernel level, support for protected processes is twofold: first, the bulk of process creation occurs in kernel mode to avoid injection attacks. (The flow for both protected and standard process creation is described in detail in the next section.) Second, protected processes have a special bit set in their EPROCESS structure that modifies the behavior of security-related routines in the process manager to deny certain access rights that would normally be granted to administrators. In fact, the only access rights that are granted for protected processes are PROCESS_QUERY_SET_LIMITED_INFORMATION, PROCESS_TERMINATE, and PROCESS_SUSPEND_RESUME. Certain access rights are also disabled for threads running inside protected processes; we will look at those access rights later in this chapter in the section “Thread Internals.”
Because Process Explorer uses standard user-mode Windows APIs to query information on process internals, it is unable to perform certain operations on such processes. On the other hand, a tool like WinDbg in kernel-debugging mode, which uses kernel-mode infrastructure to obtain this information, will be able to display complete information. See the experiment in the “Thread Internals” section on how Process Explorer behaves when confronted with a protected process such as Audiodg.exe.

**Note** As mentioned in Chapter 1, to perform local kernel debugging, you must boot in debugging mode (enabled by using `bcdedit /debug on` or by using the Msconfig advanced boot options). This protects against debugger-based attacks on protected processes and the Protected Media Path (PMP). When booted in debugging mode, high-definition content playback will not work.

Limiting these access rights reliably allows the kernel to sandbox a protected process from user-mode access. On the other hand, because a protected process is indicated by a flag in the EPROCESS structure, an administrator can still load a kernel-mode driver that disables this bit. However, this would be a violation of the PMP model and considered malicious, and such a driver would likely eventually be blocked from loading on a 64-bit system because the kernel-mode, code-signing policy prohibits the digital signing of malicious code. Even on 32-bit systems, the driver has to be recognized by PMP policy or else the playback will be halted. This policy is implemented by Microsoft and not by any kernel detection. This block would require manual action from Microsoft to identify the signature as malicious and update the kernel.

**Flow of `CreateProcess`**

So far, this chapter has shown the various data structures involved in process state manipulation and management, and how various tools and debugger commands can inspect this information. In this section, we’ll see how and when those data structures are created and filled out, as well as the overall creation and termination behaviors behind processes.

A Windows subsystem process is created when an application calls (or eventually ends up in) one of the process-creation functions, such as `CreateProcess`, `CreateProcessAsUser`, `CreateProcessWithTokenW`, or `CreateProcessWithLogonW`. Creating a Windows process consists of several stages carried out in three parts of the operating system: the Windows client-side library Kernel32.dll (in the case of the `CreateProcessAsUser`, `CreateProcessWithTokenW`, and `CreateProcessWithLogonW` routines, part of the work is first done in Advapi32.dll), the Windows executive, and the Windows subsystem process (Csrss).
Because of the multiple-environment subsystem architecture of Windows, creating an executive process object (which other subsystems can use) is separated from the work involved in creating a Windows subsystem process. So, although the following description of the flow of the Windows CreateProcess function is complicated, keep in mind that part of the work is specific to the semantics added by the Windows subsystem as opposed to the core work needed to create an executive process object.

The following list summarizes the main stages of creating a process with the Windows CreateProcess function. The operations performed in each stage are described in detail in the subsequent sections. Some of these operations might be performed by CreateProcess itself (or other helper routines in user mode), while others will be performed by NtCreateUserProcess or one of its helper routines in kernel mode. In our detailed analysis to follow, we will differentiate between the two at each step required.

![Note](image)

Note Many steps of CreateProcess are related to the setup of the process virtual address space and therefore refer to many memory management terms and structures that are defined in Chapter 10 in Part 2.

1. Validate parameters; convert Windows subsystem flags and options to their native counterparts; parse, validate, and convert the attribute list to its native counterpart.

2. Open the image file (.exe) to be executed inside the process.

3. Create the Windows executive process object.

4. Create the initial thread (stack, context, and Windows executive thread object).


6. Start execution of the initial thread (unless the CREATE_SUSPENDED flag was specified).

7. In the context of the new process and thread, complete the initialization of the address space (such as load required DLLs) and begin execution of the program.

Figure 5-6 shows an overview of the stages Windows follows to create a process.
Stage 1: Converting and Validating Parameters and Flags

Before opening the executable image to run, `CreateProcess` performs the following steps.

In `CreateProcess`, the priority class for the new process is specified as independent bits in the `CreationFlags` parameter. Thus, you can specify more than one priority class for a single `CreateProcess` call. Windows resolves the question of which priority class to assign to the process by choosing the lowest-priority class set.

If no priority class is specified for the new process, the priority class defaults to Normal unless the priority class of the process that created it is Idle or Below Normal, in which case the priority class of the new process will have the same priority as the creating class.
If a Real-time priority class is specified for the new process and the process’ caller doesn’t have the Increase Scheduling Priority privilege, the High priority class is used instead. In other words, CreateProcess doesn’t fail just because the caller has insufficient privileges to create the process in the Real-time priority class; the new process just won’t have as high a priority as Real-time.

All windows are associated with desktops, the graphical representation of a workspace. If no desktop is specified in CreateProcess, the process is associated with the caller’s current desktop.

If the process is part of a job object, but the creation flags requested a separate virtual DOS machine (VDM), the flag is ignored.

If the caller is sending a handle to a monitor as an output handle instead of a console handle, standard handle flags are ignored.

If the creation flags specify that the process will be debugged, Kernel32 initiates a connection to the native debugging code in Ntdll.dll by calling DbgUiConnectToDbg and gets a handle to the debug object from the current thread’s environment block (TEB).

Kernel32.dll sets the default hard error mode if the creation flags specified one.

The user-specified attribute list is converted from Windows subsystem format to native format and internal attributes are added to it. The possible attributes that can be added to the attribute list are listed in Table 5-1, including their documented Windows API counterparts, if any.

---

**Note**  The attribute list passed on a CreateProcess call permits passing back to the caller information beyond a simple status code, such as the TEB address of the initial thread or information on the image section. This is necessary for protected processes because the parent cannot query this information after the child is created.

---

**TABLE 5-1  Process Attributes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Native Attribute</th>
<th>Equivalent Windows Attribute</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PS_CP_PARENT_PROCESS</td>
<td>PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS. Also used when elevating</td>
<td>Input</td>
<td>Handle to the parent process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS_CP_DEBUG_OBJECT</td>
<td>N/A – used when using DEBUG_PROCESS as a flag</td>
<td>Input</td>
<td>Debug object if process is being started debugged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS_CP_PRIMARY_TOKEN</td>
<td>N/A – used when using CreateProcessAsUser/WithToken</td>
<td>Input</td>
<td>Process token if CreateProcessAsUser was used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS_CP_CLIENT_ID</td>
<td>N/A – returned by Win32 API as a parameter</td>
<td>Output</td>
<td>Returns the TID and PID of the initial thread and the process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS_CP_TEB_ADDRESS</td>
<td>N/A – internally used and not exposed</td>
<td>Output</td>
<td>Returns the address of the TEB for the initial thread.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS_CP_FILENAME</td>
<td>N/A – used as a parameter in CreateProcess API.</td>
<td>Input</td>
<td>Name of the process that should be created.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Once these steps are completed, CreateProcess performs the initial call to NtCreateUserProcess to attempt creation of the process. Because Kernel32.dll has no idea at this point whether the application image name is a real Windows application or a POSIX, 16-bit, or DOS application, the call might fail—at which point, CreateProcess looks at the error reason and attempts to correct the situation.

Stage 2: Opening the Image to Be Executed

As illustrated in Figure 5-7, the first stage in NtCreateUserProcess is to find the appropriate Windows image that will run the executable file specified by the caller and to create a section object to later map it into the address space of the new process. If the call failed for any reason, it returns to CreateProcess with a failure state (see Table 5-2) that causes CreateProcess to attempt execution again.

If the executable file specified is a Windows .exe, NtCreateUserProcess tries to open the file and create a section object for it. The object isn't mapped into memory yet, but it is opened. Just because
a section object has been successfully created doesn’t mean that the file is a valid Windows image, however; it could be a DLL or a POSIX executable. If the file is a POSIX executable, the image to be run changes to Posix.exe, and CreateProcess restarts from the beginning of Stage 1. If the file is a DLL, CreateProcess fails.

Now that NtCreateUserProcess has found a valid Windows executable image, as part of the process creation code described in Stage 3 it looks in the registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options to see whether a subkey with the file name and extension of the executable image (but without the directory and path information—for example, Image.exe) exists there. If it does, PspAllocateProcess looks for a value named Debugger for that key. If this value is present, the image to be run becomes the string in that value and CreateProcess restarts at Stage 1.

Tip You can take advantage of this process creation behavior and debug the startup code of Windows services processes before they start rather than attach the debugger after starting a service, which doesn’t allow you to debug the startup code.

On the other hand, if the image is not a Windows .exe (for example, if it’s an MS-DOS, a Win16, or a POSIX application), CreateProcess goes through a series of steps to find a Windows support image to run it. This process is necessary because non-Windows applications aren’t run directly—Windows instead uses one of a few special support images that, in turn, are responsible for actually running the non-Windows program. For example, if you attempt to run a POSIX application, CreateProcess identifies it as such and changes the image to be run to the Windows executable file Posix.exe. If you attempt to run an MS-DOS or a Win16 executable, the image to be run becomes the Windows executable Ntvdm.exe. In short, you can’t directly create a process that is not a Windows process. If Windows can’t find a way to resolve the activated image as a Windows process (as shown in Table 5-2), CreateProcess fails.

Run Cmd.exe Run Ntvdm.exe Use .exe directly

Run Posix.exe Run Ntvdm.exe

What kind of application is it?

MS-DOS .bat or .cmd
Win16
Windows
POSIX
MS-DOS .exe, .com, or .pif

FIGURE 5-7 Choosing a Windows image to activate
### TABLE 5-2 Decision Tree for Stage 1 of CreateProcess

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If the Image . . .</th>
<th>Create State Code</th>
<th>This Image Will Run . . .</th>
<th>. . . and This Will Happen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is a POSIX executable file</td>
<td>PsCreateSuccess</td>
<td>Posix.exe</td>
<td>CreateProcess restarts Stage 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is an MS-DOS application with an .exe, .com, or .pif extension</td>
<td>PsCreateFailOnSectionCreate</td>
<td>Ntvdm.exe</td>
<td>CreateProcess restarts Stage 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is a Win16 application</td>
<td>PsCreateFailOnSectionCreate</td>
<td>Ntvdm.exe</td>
<td>CreateProcess restarts Stage 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is a Win64 application on a 32-bit system (or a PPC, MIPS, or Alpha Binary)</td>
<td>PsCreateFailMachineMismatch</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>CreateProcess will fail.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has a Debugger key with another image name</td>
<td>PsCreateFailExeName</td>
<td>Name specified in the Debugger key</td>
<td>CreateProcess restarts Stage 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is an invalid or damaged Windows EXE</td>
<td>PsCreateFailExeFormat</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>CreateProcess will fail.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannot be opened</td>
<td>PsCreateFailOnFileOpen</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>CreateProcess will fail.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is a command procedure (application with a .bat or .cmd extension)</td>
<td>PsCreateFailOnSectionCreate</td>
<td>Cmd.exe</td>
<td>CreateProcess restarts Stage 1.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Specifically, the decision tree that CreateProcess goes through to run an image is as follows:

- If the image is an MS-DOS application with an .exe, .com, or .pif extension, a message is sent to the Windows subsystem to check whether an MS-DOS support process (Ntvdm.exe, specified in the registry value HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WOW\cmdline) has already been created for this session. If a support process has been created, it is used to run the MS-DOS application. (The Windows subsystem sends the message to the VDM [Virtual DOS Machine] process to run the new image.) Then CreateProcess returns. If a support process hasn’t been created, the image to be run changes to Ntvdm.exe and CreateProcess restarts at Stage 1.

- If the file to run has a .bat or .cmd extension, the image to be run becomes Cmd.exe, the Windows command prompt, and CreateProcess restarts at Stage 1. (The name of the batch file is passed as the first parameter to Cmd.exe.)

- If the image is a Win16 (Windows 3.1) executable, CreateProcess must decide whether a new VDM process must be created to run it or whether it should use the default session-wide shared VDM process (which might not yet have been created). The CreateProcess flags CREATE_SEPARATE_WOW_VDM and CREATE_SHARED_WOW_VDM control this decision. If these flags aren’t specified, the registry value HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WOW\DefaultSeparateVDM dictates the default behavior. If the application is to be run in a separate VDM, the image to be run changes to ntvdm.exe followed by some configuration parameters and the 16-bit process’ name and CreateProcess restarts at Stage 1. Otherwise, the Windows subsystem sends a message to see whether the shared VDM process exists and can be used. (If the VDM process is running on a different desktop or isn’t running under the same desktop.)
security as the caller, it can’t be used and a new VDM process must be created.) If a shared VDM process can be used, the Windows subsystem sends a message to it to run the new image and CreateProcess returns. If the VDM process hasn’t yet been created (or if it exists but can’t be used), the image to be run changes to the VDM support image and CreateProcess restarts at Stage 1.

Stage 3: Creating the Windows Executive Process Object (PspAllocateProcess)

At this point, NtCreateUserProcess has opened a valid Windows executable file and created a section object to map it into the new process address space. Next it creates a Windows executive process object to run the image by calling the internal system function PspAllocateProcess. Creating the executive process object (which is done by the creating thread) involves the following substages:

- Setting up the EPROCESS object
- Creating the initial process address space
- Initializing the kernel process structure(KPROCESS)
- Setting up the PEB
- Concluding the setup of the process address space (which includes initializing the working set list and virtual address space descriptors and mapping the image into address space)

**Note** The only time there won’t be a parent process is during system initialization. After that point, a parent process is always required to provide a security context for the new process.

Stage 3A: Setting Up the EPROCESS Object

This substage involves the following steps:

1. Inherit the affinity of the parent process, unless it was explicitly set during process creation (through the attribute list).
2. Choose the ideal node that was specified in the attribute list, if any.
3. Inherit the I/O and page priority from the parent process. If there is no parent process, the default page priority (5) and I/O priority (Normal) are used.
4. Set the new process’ exit status to STATUS_PENDING.
5. Choose the hard error processing mode selected by the attribute list; otherwise, inherit the parent’s processing mode if none was given. If no parent exists, use the default processing mode which is to display all errors.
6. Store the parent process’ process ID in the *InheritedFromUniqueProcessId* field in the new process object.

7. Query the Image File Execution Options key to check if the process should be mapped with large pages. Also, query the key to check if NTDLL has been listed as a DLL that should be mapped with large pages within this process.

8. Query the Image File Execution Options key for a specific NUMA node assignment associated with the process. The assignment can be either based on inheritance (in which the NUMA node will be propagated from the parent) or an explicit NUMA assignment, as long as this assignment does not override the initial NUMA node specified in the attribute list.

9. Disable stack randomization if ASLR was disabled on the executable containing the process.

10. Attempt to acquire all the privileges required for creating the process. Choosing the Real-time process priority class, assigning a token to the new process, mapping the process with large pages, and creating the process within a new session are all operations that require the appropriate privilege.

11. Create the process’ primary access token (a duplicate of its parent’s primary token). New processes inherit the security profile of their parents. If the *CreateProcessAsUser* function is being used to specify a different access token for the new process, the token is then changed appropriately. This change might happen only if the parent token’s integrity level dominates the integrity level of the access token, and if the access token is a true child or sibling of the parent token. Note that if the parent has the *SeAssignPrimaryToken* privilege, this will bypass these checks.

12. The session ID of the new process token is now checked to determine if this is a cross-session create—in which case, the parent process temporarily attaches to the target session to correctly process quotas and address space creation.

13. Set the new process’ quota block to the address of its parent process’ quota block, and increment the reference count for the parent’s quota block. If the process was created through *CreateProcessAsUser*, this step won’t occur. Instead, the default quota is created, or a quota matching the user’s profile is selected.

14. The process minimum and maximum working set sizes are set to the values of *PspMinimumWorkingSet* and *PspMaximumWorkingSet*, respectively. These values can be overridden if performance options were specified in the *PerfOptions* key part of Image File Execution Options—in which case, the maximum working set is taken from there. Note that the default working set limits are soft limits and are essentially hints, while the *PerfOptions* working set maximum is a hard limit (that is, the working set will not be allowed to grow past that number).

15. Initialize the address space of the process. (See Stage 3B.) Then detach from the target session if it was different.
16. The group affinity for the process is now chosen if group-affinity inheritance was not used. The default group affinity either will inherit from the parent, if NUMA node propagation was set earlier (the group owning the NUMA node will be used) or be assigned round-robin based on the PspProcessGroupAssignment seed. If the system is in forced group-awareness mode and group 0 was chosen by the selection algorithm, group 1 is chosen instead, as long as it exists.

17. Initialize the KPROCESS part of the process object. (See Stage 3C.)

18. The token for the process is now set.

19. The process’ priority class is set to normal, unless the parent was using idle or the Below Normal process priority class—in which case, the parent’s priority is inherited. If a process priority class was set manually through the attribute lists, it is now set.

20. The process handle table is initialized. If the inherit handles flag is set for the parent process, any inheritable handles are copied from the parent’s object handle table into the new process. (For more information about object handle tables, see Chapter 3.) A process attribute can also be used to specify only a subset of handles, which is useful when you are using CreateProcessAsUser to restrict which objects should be inherited by the child process.

21. If performance options were specified through the PerfOptions key, these are now applied. The PerfOptions key includes overrides for the working set limit, I/O priority, page priority, and CPU priority class of the process.

22. The final process priority class and the default quantum for its threads are computed and set.

23. The second stage of address space setup is completed, including the initialization of the PEB (Stage 3D/3E).

24. Mitigation options for No-Execute support are now set.

25. The process PID and creation time is set, although the PID is not yet inserted in the PID handle table, nor is the process inserted in the process lists (that is the job of the insertion stage).

Stage 3B: Creating the Initial Process Address Space

The initial process address space consists of the following pages:

- Page directory (and it’s possible there’ll be more than one for systems with page tables more than two levels, such as x86 systems in PAE mode or 64-bit systems)
- Hyperspace page
- VAD bitmap page
- Working set list
To create these three pages, the following steps are taken:

1. Page table entries are created in the appropriate page tables to map the initial pages.
2. The number of pages is deducted from the kernel variable `MmTotalCommittedPages` and added to `MmProcessCommit`.
3. The systemwide default process minimum working set size (`PsMinimumWorkingSet`) is deducted from `MmResidentAvailablePages`.
4. The page table pages for the global system space (that is, other than the process-specific pages we just described, and except session-specific memory).

**Stage 3C: Creating the Kernel Process Structure**

The next stage of `PspAllocateProcess` is the initialization of the KPROCESS structure (the `Pcb` member of the EPROCESS). This work is performed by `KeInitializeProcess`, which initializes the following:

- The doubly-linked list which connects all threads part of the process (initially empty).
- The initial value (or reset value) of the process default quantum (which is described in more detail in the “Thread Scheduling” section later in the chapter), which is hard-coded to 6 until it is initialized later (by `PspComputeQuantumAndPriority`).

*Note* The default initial quantum differs between Windows client and server systems. For more information on thread quantums, turn to their discussion in the section “Thread Scheduling.”

- The process’ base priority is set based on what was computed in Stage 3A.
- The default processor affinity for the threads in the process is set, as is the group affinity. The group affinity was calculated earlier in Stage 3A or inherited from the parent.
- The process swapping state is set to resident.
- The thread seed is based on the ideal processor that the kernel has chosen for this process (which is based on the previously created process’ ideal processor, effectively randomizing this in a round-robin manner). Creating a new process will update the seed in `KeNodeBlock` (the initial NUMA node block) so that the next new process will get a different ideal processor seed.

**Stage 3D: Concluding the Setup of the Process Address Space**

Setting up the address space for a new process is somewhat complicated, so let’s look at what’s involved one step at a time. To get the most out of this section, you should have some familiarity with the internals of the Windows memory manager, which are described in Chapter 10 in Part 2.
1. The virtual memory manager sets the value of the process’ last trim time to the current time. The working set manager (which runs in the context of the balance set manager system thread) uses this value to determine when to initiate working set trimming.

2. The memory manager initializes the process’ working set list—page faults can now be taken.

3. The section (created when the image file was opened) is now mapped into the new process’ address space, and the process section base address is set to the base address of the image.

4. Ntdll.dll is mapped into the process; if this is a Wow64 process, the 32-bit Ntdll.dll is also mapped.

5. A new session, if requested, is now created for the process. This special step is mostly implemented for the benefit of the Session Manager (SMSS) when initializing a new session.

6. The standard handles are duplicated, and the new values are written in the process parameters structure.

7. Any memory reservations listed in the attribute list are now processed. Additionally, two flags allow the bulk reservation of the first 1 or 16 MB of the address space. These flags are used internally for mapping real-mode vectors and ROM code, for example (which must be in the low ranges of virtual address space, where normally the heap or other process structures could be located).

8. The user process parameters are written into the process, copied, and fixed up (meaning converted from absolute form to a relative form so that a single memory block is needed).

9. The affinity information is written into the PEB.

10. The MinWin API redirection set is mapped into the process.

---

**Note** POSIX processes clone the address space of their parents, so they don’t have to go through these steps to create a new address space. In the case of POSIX applications, the new process’ section base address is set to that of its parent process and the parent’s PEB is cloned for the new process.

---

**Stage 3E: Setting Up the PEB**

NtCreateUserProcess calls MmCreatePeb, which first maps the systemwide national language support (NLS) tables into the process’ address space. It next calls MiCreatePebOrTeb to allocate a page for the PEB and then initializes a number of fields, most of them based on internal variables that were configured through the registry, such as MmHeap* values, MmCriticalSectionTimeout, and MmMinimumStackCommitInBytes. Some of these fields can be overridden by settings in the linked executable image, such as the Windows version in the PE header or the affinity mask in the load configuration directory of the PE header.
If the image header characteristics IMAGE_FILE_UP_SYSTEM_ONLY flag is set (indicating that the image can run only on a uniprocessor system), a single CPU (MmRotatingUniprocessorNumber) is chosen for all the threads in this new process to run on. The selection process is performed by simply cycling through the available processors—each time this type of image is run, the next processor is used. In this way, these types of images are spread evenly across the processors.

Stage 3F: Completing the Setup of the Executive Process Object (PspInsertProcess)

Before the handle to the new process can be returned, a few final setup steps must be completed, which are performed by PspInsertProcess and its helper functions:

1. If systemwide auditing of processes is enabled (either as a result of local policy settings or group policy settings from a domain controller), the process’ creation is written to the Security event log.

2. If the parent process was contained in a job, the job is recovered from the job level set of the parent and then bound to the session of the newly created process. Finally, the new process is added to the job.

3. PspInsertProcess inserts the new process object at the end of the Windows list of active processes (PsActiveProcessHead).

4. The process debug port of the parent process is copied to the new child process, unless the NoDebugInherit flag is set (which can be requested when creating the process). If a debug port was specified, it is attached to the new process at this time.

5. Because job objects can now specify restrictions on which group or groups the threads within the processes part of a job can run on, PspInsertProcess must make sure that the group affinity associated with the process would not violate the group affinity associated with the job. An interesting secondary issue to consider is if the job’s permissions grant access to modify the process’ affinity permissions, because a lesser-privileged job object might interfere with the affinity requirements of a more privileged process.

6. Finally, PspInsertProcess creates a handle for the new process by calling ObOpenObjectByPointer, and then returns this handle to the caller. Note that no process creation callback is sent until the first thread within the process is created, and the code always sends process callbacks before sending object-managed based callbacks.

Stage 4: Creating the Initial Thread and Its Stack and Context

At this point, the Windows executive process object is completely set up. It still has no thread, however, so it can’t do anything yet. It’s now time to start that work. Normally, the PspCreateThread routine is responsible for all aspects of thread creation and is called by NtCreateThread when a new thread is being created. However, because the initial thread is created internally by the kernel without user-mode input, the two helper routines that PspCreateThread relies on are used instead: PspAllocateThread and PspInsertThread.
PspAllocateThread handles the actual creation and initialization of the executive thread object itself, while PspInsertThread handles the creation of the thread handle and security attributes and the call to KeStartThread to turn the executive object into a schedulable thread on the system. However, the thread won’t do anything yet—it is created in a suspended state and isn’t resumed until the process is completely initialized (as described in Stage 5).

**Note** The thread parameter (which can’t be specified in CreateProcess but can be specified in CreateThread) is the address of the PEB. This parameter will be used by the initialization code that runs in the context of this new thread (as described in Stage 6).

PspAllocateThread performs the following steps:

1. It prevents user-mode scheduling (UMS) threads from being created in Wow64 processes, as well as preventing user-mode callers from creating threads in the system process.

2. An executive thread object is created and initialized.

3. If CPU rate limiting is enabled, the CPU quota block is initialized.

4. The various lists used by LPC, I/O Management, and the Executive are initialized.

5. The thread’s create time is set, and its thread ID (TID) is created.

6. Before the thread can execute, it needs a stack and a context in which to run, so these are set up. The stack size for the initial thread is taken from the image—there’s no way to specify another size. If this is a Wow64 process, the Wow64 thread context will also be initialized.

7. The thread environment block (TEB) is allocated for the new thread.

8. The user-mode thread start address is stored in the ETHREAD. This is the system-supplied thread startup function in Ntdll.dll (RtlUserThreadStart). The user’s specified Windows start address is stored in the ETHREAD in a different location so that debugging tools such as Process Explorer can query the information.

9. KeInitThread is called to set up the KTHREAD structure. The thread’s initial and current base priorities are set to the process’ base priority, and its affinity and quantum are set to that of the process. This function also sets the initial thread ideal processor. (See the section “Ideal and Last Processor” for a description of how this is chosen.) KeInitThread next allocates a kernel stack for the thread and initializes the machine-dependent hardware context for the thread, including the context, trap, and exception frames. The thread’s context is set up so that the thread will start in kernel mode in KiThreadStartup. Finally, KeInitThread sets the thread’s state to Initialized and returns to PspAllocateThread.

10. If this is a UMS thread, PspUmsInitThread is called to initialize the UMS state.
Once that work is finished, \texttt{NtCreateUserProcess} calls \texttt{PsInsertThread} to perform the following steps:

1. A check is made to ensure that the thread’s group affinity does not violate job limitations (which we already described earlier). In the process create path, this check is skipped because it was already done at the earlier stage.

2. Checks are made to ensure that the process hasn’t already been terminated, that the thread hasn’t already been terminated, or that the thread hasn’t even been able to start running. If any of these cases are true, thread creation will fail.

3. The KTHREAD part of the thread object is initialized by calling \texttt{KeStartThread}. This involves inheriting scheduler settings from the owner process, setting the ideal node and processor, updating the group affinity, and inserting the thread in the process list maintained by KPROCESS (a separate list from the one in EPROCESS). Additionally, on x64 systems, another systemwide list of processes, \texttt{KiProcessListHead}, is used by PatchGuard to maintain the integrity of the executive’s \texttt{PsActiveProcessHead}. Finally, the stack count of the process is incremented.

4. The thread count in the process object is incremented, and the owner process’ I/O priority and page priority are inherited. If this is the highest number of threads the process has ever had, the thread count high watermark is updated as well. If this was the second thread in the process, the primary token is frozen (that is, it can no longer be changed, unless the process is a POSIX subsystem process).

5. If the thread is a UMS thread, the count of UMS threads is incremented.

6. The thread is inserted in the process’ thread list, and the thread is suspended if the creating process requested it.

7. If CPU rate limiting is enabled, the rate control APC is initialized and the \texttt{CpuThrottled} bit is set in the KTHREAD.

8. The object is inserted, and any registered thread callbacks are called. If this was the first thread in the process (and therefore, the operation happened as part of the \texttt{CreateProcess} path), the registered kernel process callbacks are also called.

9. The handle is created with \texttt{ObOpenObjectByPointer}.

10. The thread is readied for execution by calling \texttt{KeReadyThread}. It enters the deferred ready queue, the process is paged out, and a page in is requested.

\textbf{Stage 5: Performing Windows Subsystem–Specific Post-Initialization}

Once \texttt{NtCreateUserProcess} returns with a success code, all the necessary executive process and thread objects have been created. Kernel32.dll then performs various operations related to Windows subsystem–specific operations to finish initializing the process.
First of all, various checks are made for whether Windows should allow the executable to run. These checks include validating the image version in the header and checking whether Windows application certification has blocked the process (through a group policy). On specialized editions of Windows Server 2008 R2, such as Windows Web Server 2008 R2 and Windows HPC Server 2008 R2, additional checks are made to see whether the application imports any disallowed APIs.

If software restriction policies dictate, a restricted token is created for the new process. Afterward, the application-compatibility database is queried to see whether an entry exists in either the registry or system application database for the process. Compatibility shims will not be applied at this point—the information will be stored in the PEB once the initial thread starts executing (Stage 6).

At this point, Kernel32.dll sends a message to the Windows subsystem so that it can set up SxS information (see the end of this section for more information on side-by-side assemblies) such as manifest files, DLL redirection paths, and out-of-process execution for the new process. It also initializes the Windows subsystem structures for the process and initial thread. The message includes the following information:

- Process and thread handles
- Entries in the creation flags
- ID of the process’ creator
- Flag indicating whether the process belongs to a Windows application (so that Csrss can determine whether or not to show the startup cursor)
- UI language information
- DLL redirection and .local flags
- Manifest file information

The Windows subsystem performs the following steps when it receives this message:

1. `CsrCreateProcess` duplicates a handle for the process and thread. In this step, the usage count of the process and the thread is incremented from 1 (which was set at creation time) to 2.

2. If a process priority class isn’t specified, `CsrCreateProcess` sets it according to the algorithm described earlier in this section.

3. The Csrss process structure (CSR_PROCESS) is allocated.

4. The new process’ exception port is set to be the general function port for the Windows subsystem so that the Windows subsystem will receive a message when a second-chance exception occurs in the process. (For further information on exception handling, see Chapter 3.)

5. The Csrss thread structure (CSRTHREAD) is allocated and initialized.

6. `CsrCreateThread` inserts the thread in the list of threads for the process.
7. The count of processes in this session is incremented.

8. The process shutdown level is set to 0x280 (the default process shutdown level—see `SetProcessShutdownParameters` in the MSDN Library documentation for more information).

9. The new Csrss process structure is inserted into the list of Windows subsystem-wide processes.

10. The per-process data structure used by the kernel-mode part of the Windows subsystem (W32PROCESS) is allocated and initialized.

11. The application start cursor is displayed. This cursor is the familiar rolling doughnut shape—the way that Windows says to the user, “I’m starting something, but you can use the cursor in the meantime.” If the process doesn’t make a GUI call after two seconds, the cursor reverts to the standard pointer. If the process does make a GUI call in the allotted time, `CsrCreateProcess` waits five seconds for the application to show a window. After that time, `CsrCreateProcess` resets the cursor again.

After Csrss has performed these steps, CreateProcess checks whether the process was run elevated (which means it was executed through `ShellExecute` and elevated by the AppInfo service after the consent dialog box was shown to the user). This includes checking whether the process was a setup program. If it was, the process’ token is opened, and the virtualization flag is turned on so that the application is virtualized. (See the information on UAC and virtualization in Chapter 6.) If the application contained elevation shims or had a requested elevation level in its manifest, the process is destroyed and an elevation request is sent to the AppInfo service. (See Chapter 6 for more information on elevation.)

Note that most of these checks are not performed for protected processes; because these processes must have been designed for Windows Vista or later, there’s no reason why they should require elevation, virtualization, or application-compatibility checks and processing. Additionally, allowing mechanisms such as the shim engine to use its usual hooking and memory-patching techniques on a protected process would result in a security hole if someone could figure how to insert arbitrary shims that modify the behavior of the protected process. Additionally, because the Shim Engine is installed by the parent process, which might not have access to its child protected process, even legitimate shimming cannot work.

Stage 6: Starting Execution of the Initial Thread

At this point, the process environment has been determined, resources for its threads to use have been allocated, the process has a thread, and the Windows subsystem knows about the new process. Unless the caller specified the CREATE_SUSPENDED flag, the initial thread is now resumed so that it can start running and perform the remainder of the process initialization work that occurs in the context of the new process (Stage 7).
Stage 7: Performing Process Initialization in the Context of the New Process

The new thread begins life running the kernel-mode thread startup routine `KiThreadStartup`. `KiThreadStartup` lowers the thread’s IRQL level from deferred procedure call (DPC)/dispatch level to APC level and then calls the system initial thread routine, `PspUserThreadStartup`. The user-specified thread start address is passed as a parameter to this routine.

First, this function disables the ability to swap the primary process token at runtime, which is reserved for POSIX support only (to emulate `setuid` behavior). It then sets the Locale ID and the ideal processor in the TEB, based on the information present in kernel-mode data structures, and then it checks whether thread creation actually failed. Next it calls `DbgkCreateThread`, which checks whether image notifications were sent for the new process. If they weren’t, and notifications are enabled, an image notification is sent first for the process and then for the image load of Ntdll.dll. Note that this is done in this stage rather than when the images were first mapped because the process ID (which is required for the kernel callouts) is not yet allocated at that time.

Once those checks are completed, another check is performed to see whether the process is a debuggee. If it is, `PspUserThreadStartup` checks whether the debugger notifications have already been sent for this process. If not, a create process message is sent through the debug object (if one is present) so that the process startup debug event (CREATE_PROCESS_DEBUG_INFO) can be sent to the appropriate debugger process. This is followed by a similar thread startup debug event and by another debug event for the image load of Ntdll.dll. `DbgkCreateThread` then waits for a reply from the debugger (via the `ContinueDebugEvent` function).

Now that the debugger has been notified, `PspUserThreadStartup` looks at the result of the initial check on the thread’s life. If it was killed on startup, the thread is terminated. This check is done after the debugger and image notifications to be sure that the kernel-mode and user-mode debuggers don’t miss information on the thread, even if the thread never got a chance to run.

Otherwise, the routine checks whether application prefetching is enabled on the system and, if so, calls the prefcher (and Superfetch) to process the prefetch instruction file (if it exists) and prefetch pages referenced during the first 10 seconds the last time the process ran. (For details on the prefcher and Superfetch, see Chapter 10 in Part 2.)

`PspUserThreadStartup` then checks whether the systemwide cookie in the `SharedUserData` structure has been set up yet. If it hasn’t, it generates it based on a hash of system information such as the number of interrupts processed, DPC deliveries, and page faults. This systemwide cookie is used in the internal decoding and encoding of pointers, such as in the heap manager to protect against certain classes of exploitation. (For more information on heap manager security, see Chapter 10 in Part 2.)

Finally, `PspUserThreadStartup` sets up the initial thunk context to run the image-loader initialization routine (`LdrInitializeThunk` in Ntdll.dll), as well as the systemwide thread startup stub.
(RtlUserThreadStart in Ntdll.dll). These steps are done by editing the context of the thread in place and then issuing an exit from system service operation, which loads the specially crafted user context. The LdrInitializeThunk routine initializes the loader, the heap manager, NLS tables, thread-local storage (TLS) and fiber-local storage (FLS) arrays, and critical section structures. It then loads any required DLLs and calls the DLL entry points with the DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH function code.

Once the function returns, NtContinue restores the new user context and returns to user mode—thread execution now truly starts.

RtlUserThreadStart uses the address of the actual image entry point and the start parameter and calls the application’s entrypoint. These two parameters have also already been pushed onto the stack by the kernel. This complicated series of events has two purposes. First, it allows the image loader inside Ntdll.dll to set up the process internally and behind the scenes so that other user-mode code can run properly. (Otherwise, it would have no heap, no thread-local storage, and so on.)

Second, having all threads begin in a common routine allows them to be wrapped in exception handling so that when they crash, Ntdll.dll is aware of that and can call the unhandled exception filter inside Kernel32.dll. It is also able to coordinate thread exit on return from the thread’s start routine and to perform various cleanup work. Application developers can also call SetUnhandledExceptionFilter to add their own unhandled exception-handling code.

EXPERIMENT: Tracing Process Startup

Now that we’ve looked in detail at how a process starts up and the different operations required to begin executing an application, we’re going to use Process Monitor to look at some of the file I/O and registry keys that are accessed during this process.

Although this experiment will not provide a complete picture of all the internal steps we’ve described, you’ll be able to see several parts of the system in action, notably prefetch and Superfetch, image-file execution options and other compatibility checks, and the image loader’s DLL mapping.

We’ll look at a very simple executable—Notepad.exe—and launch it from a Command Prompt window (Cmd.exe). It’s important that we look both at the operations inside Cmd.exe and those inside Notepad.exe. Recall that a lot of the user-mode work is performed by CreateProcess, which is called by the parent process before the kernel has created a new process object.

To set things up correctly, add two filters to Process Monitor: one for Cmd.exe, and one for Notepad.exe—these are the only two processes you should include. Be sure that you don’t have
any currently running instances of these two processes so that you know you’re looking at the right events. The filter window should look like this:

Next, make sure that event logging is currently disabled (clear File, Capture Events), and then start up the command prompt. Enable event logging (using the File menu again, or simply press CTRL+E or click the magnifying glass icon on the toolbar), and then type `Notepad.exe` and press Enter. On a typical Windows system, you should see anywhere between 500 and 1500 events appear. Hide the Sequence and Time Of Day columns so that you can focus your attention on the columns of interest. Your window should look similar to the one shown next.

![Filter window](image)

Next, make sure that event logging is currently disabled (clear File, Capture Events), and then start up the command prompt. Enable event logging (using the File menu again, or simply press CTRL+E or click the magnifying glass icon on the toolbar), and then type `Notepad.exe` and press Enter. On a typical Windows system, you should see anywhere between 500 and 1500 events appear. Hide the Sequence and Time Of Day columns so that you can focus your attention on the columns of interest. Your window should look similar to the one shown next.

![Command prompt window](image)

Just as described in Stage 1 of the `CreateProcess` flow, one of the first things to notice is that just before the process is started and the first thread is created, Cmd.exe does a registry read at HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options. Because there were no image-execution options associated with Notepad.exe, the process was created as is.

As with this and any other event in Process Monitor’s log, you have the ability to see whether each part of the process creation flow was performed in user mode or kernel mode, and by
which routines, by looking at the stack of the event. To do this, double-click on the `RegOpenKey` event and switch to the Stack tab. The following screen shows the standard stack on a 32-bit Windows machine.

![Event Properties](image)

This stack shows that you already reached the part of process creation performed in kernel mode (through `NtCreateUserProcess`) and that the helper routine `PspAllocateProcess` is responsible for this check.

Going down the list of events after the thread and process have been created, you will notice three groups of events. The first is a simple check for application-compatibility flags, which will let the user-mode process creation code know if checks inside the application-compatibility database are required through the shim engine.

This check is followed by multiple reads to Side-By-Side, Manifest, and MUI/Language keys, which are part of the assembly framework mentioned earlier. Finally, you might see file I/O to one or more .sdb files, which are the application-compatibility databases on the system. This I/O is where additional checks are done to see if the shim engine needs to be invoked for this application. Because Notepad is a well-behaved Microsoft program, it doesn’t require any shims.

The following screen shows the next series of events, which happen inside the Notepad process itself. These are actions initiated by the user-mode thread startup wrapper in kernel mode, which performs the actions described earlier. The first two are the Notepad.exe and Ntdll.dll image load debug notification messages, which can be generated only now that code is running inside Notepad’s process context and not the context for the command prompt.
Next, the prefetcher kicks in, looking for a prefetch database file that has already been generated for Notepad. (For more information on the prefetcher, see Chapter 10 in Part 2.) On a system where Notepad has already been run at least once, this database will exist, and the prefetcher will begin executing the commands specified inside it. If this is the case, scrolling down you will see multiple DLLs being read and queried. Unlike typical DLL loading, which is done by the user-mode image loader by looking at the import tables or when an application manually loads a DLL, these events are being generated by the prefetcher, which is already aware of the libraries that Notepad will require. Typical image loading of the DLLs required happens next, and you will see events similar to the ones shown here:

These events are now being generated from code running inside user mode, which was called once the kernel-mode wrapper function finished its work. Therefore, these are the first events coming from *LdrInitializeProcess*, which we mentioned is the internal system wrapper function for any new process, before the start address wrapper is called. You can confirm this
on your own by looking at the stack of these events—for example, the kernel32.dll image load event, which is shown in the next screen:

Further events are generated by this routine and its associated helper functions until you finally reach events generated by the `WinMain` function inside Notepad, which is where code under the developer’s control is now being executed. Describing in detail all the events and user-mode components that come into play during process execution would fill up this entire chapter, so exploration of any further events is left as an exercise for the reader.

**Thread Internals**

Now that we’ve dissected processes, let’s turn our attention to the structure of a thread. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, you can assume that anything in this section applies to both user-mode threads and kernel-mode system threads (which are described in Chapter 2).

**Data Structures**

At the operating-system level, a Windows thread is represented by an executive thread object. The executive thread object encapsulates an ETHREAD structure, which in turn contains a KTHREAD structure as its first member. These are illustrated in Figure 5-8. The ETHREAD structure and the other structures it points to exist in the system address space, with the exception of the thread environment block (TEB), which exists in the process address space (again, because user-mode components need to access it).
The Windows subsystem process (Csrss) maintains a parallel structure for each thread created in a Windows subsystem application, called the CSR_THREAD. For threads that have called a Windows subsystem USER or GDI function, the kernel-mode portion of the Windows subsystem (Win32k.sys) maintains a per-thread data structure (called the W32THREAD) that the KTHREAD structure points to.

**Note** The fact that the executive, high-level, graphics-related, Win32k thread structure is pointed to by the KTHREAD, instead of the ETHREAD, appears to be a layer violation or oversight in the standard kernel’s abstraction architecture—the scheduler and other low-level components do not use this field.

---

**FIGURE 5-8** Important fields of the executive thread structure and its embedded kernel thread structure
Most of the fields illustrated in Figure 5-8 are self-explanatory. The first member of the ETHREAD is called the Tcb, for “Thread control block”; this is a structure of type KTHREAD. Following that are the thread identification information, the process identification information (including a pointer to the owning process so that its environment information can be accessed), security information in the form of a pointer to the access token and impersonation information, and finally, fields relating to Asynchronous Local Procedure Call (ALPC) messages and pending I/O requests. Some of these key fields are covered in more detail elsewhere in this book. For more details on the internal structure of an ETHREAD structure, you can use the kernel debugger dt command to display its format.

Let’s take a closer look at two of the key thread data structures referred to in the preceding text: the KTHREAD and the TEB. The KTHREAD structure (which is the Tcb member of the ETHREAD) contains information that the Windows kernel needs to perform thread scheduling, synchronization, and timekeeping functions.

**EXPERIMENT: Displaying ETHREAD and KTHREAD Structures**

The ETHREAD and KTHREAD structures can be displayed with the dt command in the kernel debugger. The following output shows the format of an ETHREAD on a 32-bit system:

```
lkd> dt nt!_ethread
nt!_ETHREAD
    +0x000 Tcb : _KTHREAD
    +0x1e0 CreateTime : _LARGE_INTEGER
    +0x1e8 ExitTime : _LARGE_INTEGER
    +0x1e8 KeyedWaitChain : _LIST_ENTRY
    +0x1f0 ExitStatus : Int4B
    ...
    +0x270 AlpcMessageId : Uint4B
    +0x274 AlpcMessage : Ptr32 Void
    +0x274 AlpcReceiveAttributeSet : Uint4B
    +0x278 AlpcWaitListEntry : _LIST_ENTRY
    +0x280 CacheManagerCount : Uint4B

The KTHREAD can be displayed with a similar command or by typing dt nt!_ETHREAD Tcb, as was shown in the EPROCESS/KPROCESS experiment earlier:

```
```
lkd> dt nt!_kthread
nt!_KTHREAD
    +0x000 Header : _DISPATCHER_HEADER
    +0x010 CycleTime : Uint8B
    +0x018 HighCycleTime : Uint4B
    +0x020 QuantumTarget : Uint8B
    ...
    +0x05e WaitIrql : UChar
    +0x05f WaitMode : Char
    +0x060 WaitStatus : Int4B
```
EXPERIMENT: Using the Kernel Debugger \texttt{!thread} Command

The kernel debugger \texttt{!thread} command dumps a subset of the information in the thread data structures. Some key elements of the information the kernel debugger displays can't be displayed by any utility, including the following information: internal structure addresses; priority details; stack information; the pending I/O request list; and, for threads in a wait state, the list of objects the thread is waiting for.

To display thread information, use either the \texttt{!process} command (which displays all the threads of a process after displaying the process information) or the \texttt{!thread} command with the address of a thread object to display a specific thread.

EXPERIMENT: Viewing Thread Information

The following output is the detailed display of a process produced by using the Tlist utility in the Debugging Tools for Windows. Notice that the thread list shows Win32StartAddr. This is the address passed to the \texttt{CreateThread} function by the application. All the other utilities, except Process Explorer, that show the thread start address show the actual start address (a function in Ntdll.dll), not the application-specified start address.

C:\Program Files\Windows Kits\8.0\Debuggers\x86>tlist winword
3232 WINWORD.EXE  648739_Chap05.docx - Microsoft Word
CWD:   C:\Users\Alex Ionescu\Documents\ 
CmdLine: "C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE" /n "C:\Users\Alex Ionescu\Documents\Chapter5.docx"

VirtualSize:  531024 KB  PeakVirtualSize:  585248 KB
WorkingSetSize:122484 KB  PeakWorkingSetSize:181532 KB
NumberOfThreads:  12
2104 Win32StartAddr:0x2fde10ec LastErr:0x00000000 State:Waiting
2992 Win32StartAddr:0x7778fd0d LastErr:0x00000000 State:Waiting
3556 Win32StartAddr:0x3877e970 LastErr:0x00000000 State:Waiting
2436 Win32StartAddr:0x3877e875 LastErr:0x00000000 State:Waiting
3136 Win32StartAddr:0x3877e875 LastErr:0x00000000 State:Waiting
3412 Win32StartAddr:0x3877e875 LastErr:0x00000000 State:Waiting
1096 Win32StartAddr:0x3877e875 LastErr:0x00000000 State:Waiting
912 Win32StartAddr:0x74497832 LastErr:0x00000000 State:Waiting
1044 Win32StartAddr:0x389b0926 LastErr:0x00000000 State:Waiting
1972 Win32StartAddr:0x694532fb LastErr:0x00000000 State:Waiting
4056 Win32StartAddr:0x75f9c83e LastErr:0x00000000 State:Waiting
1124 Win32StartAddr:0x777903e9 LastErr:0x00000000 State:Waiting
14.0.5123.5000 shp  0x2FDE0000  C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
6.1.7601.17725 shp  0x77760000  C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll
6.1.7601.17651 shp  0x75C00000  C:\Windows\system32\kernel32.dll

The TEB, illustrated in Figure 5-9, is one of the data structures explained in this section that exists in the process address space (as opposed to the system space). Internally, it is made up of a header called the \texttt{TIB} (Thread Information Block), which mainly existed for compatibility with OS/2 and Win9x applications. It also allows exception and stack information to be kept into a smaller structure when creating new threads by using an \texttt{Initial TIB}. 
The TEB stores context information for the image loader and various Windows DLLs. Because these components run in user mode, they need a data structure writable from user mode. That’s why this structure exists in the process address space instead of in the system space, where it would be writable only from kernel mode. You can find the address of the TEB with the kernel debugger !thread command.

![Figure 5-9 Fields of the thread environment block](image)

**EXPERIMENT: Examining the TEB**

You can dump the TEB structure with the !teb command in the kernel debugger. The output looks like this:

```
kd> !teb
TEB at 7ffde000
    ExceptionList: 019e8e44
    StackBase: 019f0000
    StackLimit: 019db000
    SubSystemTib: 00000000
    FiberData: 00001e00
    ... 
    PEB Address: 7ffd9000
    LastErrorValue: 0
    LastStatusValue: c0000139
    Count Owned Locks: 0
    HardErrorMode: 0
```
The CSR_THREAD, illustrated in Figure 5-10 is analogous to the data structure of CSR_PROCESS, but it's applied to threads. As you might recall, this is maintained by each Csrss process within a session and identifies the Windows subsystem threads running within it. The CSR_THREAD stores a handle that Csrss keeps for the thread, various flags, and a pointer to the CSR_PROCESS for the thread. It also stores another copy of the thread's creation time.

**FIGURE 5-10** Fields of the CSR thread

---

**EXPERIMENT: Examining the CSR THREAD**

You can dump the CSR_THREAD structure with the !dt command in the user-mode debugger while attached to a Csrss process. Follow the instructions in the CSR_PROCESS experiment from earlier to safely perform this operation. The output looks like this:

```
0:000> !dt v 001c7630
PCSR_THREAD @ 001c7630:
+0x000 CreateTime       : _LARGE_INTEGER 0x1cb9fb6'00f90498
+0x008 Link             : _LIST_ENTRY [ 0x1c0ab0 - 0x1c0f00 ]
+0x010 HashLinks        : _LIST_ENTRY [ 0x75f19b38 - 0x75f19b38 ]
+0x018 ClientId         : _CLIENT_ID
+0x020 Process          : 0x001c0aa0 _CSR_PROCESS
+0x024 ThreadHandle     : 0x000005c4
+0x028 Flags            : 0
+0x02c ReferenceCount   : 1
+0x030 ImpersonateCount : 0
```

Finally, the W32THREAD structure, illustrated in Figure 5-11, is analogous to the data structure of WIN32PROCESS, but it's applied to threads. This structure mainly contains information useful for the GDI subsystem (brushes and DC attributes) as well as for the User Mode Print Driver framework (UMPD) that vendors use to write user-mode printer drivers. Finally, it contains a rendering state useful for desktop compositing and anti-aliasing.
FIGURE 5-11 Fields of the Win32k thread

EXPERIMENT: Examining the W32THREAD

You can dump the W32THREAD structure by looking at the output of the \texttt{!thread} command, which gives a pointer to it in the Win32Thread output field. Alternatively, if you use the \texttt{dt} command, the KTHREAD block has a field called Win32Thread that contains the pointer to this structure. Recall that only a GUI thread will have a W32THREAD structure, so it’s possible that certain threads, such as background or worker threads, will not have an associated W32THREAD. Because there is no extension to view a W32THREAD, you need to use the \texttt{dt} command, as shown here:

\begin{verbatim}
dt win32k!_w32thread ffb79dd8
  +0x000 pEThread       : 0x83ad4b60 _ETHREAD
  +0x004 RefCount       : 1
  +0x008 ptlW32         : (null)
  +0x00c pgdiDcattr     : 0x00130740
  +0x010 pgdiBrushAttr  : (null)
  +0x014 pUMPDObjs      : (null)
  +0x018 pUMPDHeap      : (null)
  +0x01c pUMPDObj       : (null)
  +0x0a8 bEnableEngUpdateDeviceSurface : 0 ''
  +0x0a9 bIncludeSprites : 0 ''
  +0x0ac ulWindowSystemRendering : 0
\end{verbatim}

Birth of a Thread

A thread’s life cycle starts when a program creates a new thread. The request filters down to the Windows executive, where the process manager allocates space for a thread object and calls the kernel to initialize the thread control block (KTHREAD). The steps in the following list are taken inside the Windows CreateThread function in Kernel32.dll to create a Windows thread:

1. *CreateThread* converts the Windows API parameters to native flags and builds a native structure describing object parameters (OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES). See Chapter 3 for more information.

2. *CreateThread* builds an attribute list with two entries: client ID and TEB address. This allows *CreateThread* to receive those values once the thread has been created. (For more information on attribute lists, see the section “Flow of *CreateProcess*” earlier in this chapter.)

3. *NtCreateThreadEx* is called to create the user-mode context and probe and capture the attribute list. It then calls *PspCreateThread* to create a suspended executive thread object. For a description of the steps performed by this function, see the descriptions of Stage 3 and Stage 5 in the section “Flow of *CreateProcess*.”

4. *CreateThread* allocates an activation context for the thread used by side-by-side assembly support. It then queries the activation stack to see if it requires activation, and it does so if needed. The activation stack pointer is saved in the new thread’s TEB.

5. *CreateThread* notifies the Windows subsystem about the new thread, and the subsystem does some setup work for the new thread.

6. The thread handle and the thread ID (generated during step 3) are returned to the caller.

7. Unless the caller created the thread with the CREATE_SUSPENDED flag set, the thread is now resumed so that it can be scheduled for execution. When the thread starts running, it executes the steps described in the earlier section “Stage 7: Performing Process Initialization in the Context of the New Process” before calling the actual user’s specified start address.

Examining Thread Activity

Examining thread activity is especially important if you are trying to determine why a process that is hosting multiple services is running (such as Svchost.exe, Dllhost.exe, or Lsass.exe) or why a process is hung.
There are several tools that expose various elements of the state of Windows threads: WinDbg (in user-process attach and kernel-debugging mode), Performance Monitor, and Process Explorer. (The tools that show thread-scheduling information are listed in the section “Thread Scheduling.”)

To view the threads in a process with Process Explorer, select a process and open the process properties (by double-clicking on the process or clicking on the Process, Properties menu item). Then click on the Threads tab. This tab shows a list of the threads in the process and four columns of information. For each thread, it shows its ID, the percentage of CPU consumed (based on the refresh interval configured), the number of cycles charged to the thread, and the thread start address. You can sort by any of these four columns.

New threads that are created are highlighted in green, and threads that exit are highlighted in red. (The highlight duration can be configured with the Options, Difference Highlight Duration menu item.) This might be helpful to discover unnecessary thread creation occurring in a process. (In general, threads should be created at process startup, not every time a request is processed inside a process.)

As you select each thread in the list, Process Explorer displays the thread ID, start time, state, CPU time counters, number of cycles charged, number of context switches, the ideal processor and its group, and the base and current priority. There is a Kill button, which will terminate an individual thread, but this should be used with extreme care. Another option is the Suspend button, which will prevent the thread from forward execution and thus prevent a runaway thread from consuming CPU time. However, this can also lead to deadlocks and should be used with the same care as the Kill button. Finally, the Permissions button allows you to view the security descriptor. (See Chapter 6, “Security,” for more information on security descriptors) of the thread.

Unlike Task Manager and all other process/processor monitoring tools, Process Explorer uses the clock cycle counter designed for thread run-time accounting (as described later in this chapter), instead of the clock interval timer, so you will see a significantly different view of CPU consumption using Process Explorer. This is because many threads run for such a short amount of time that they are seldom (if ever) the currently running thread when the clock interval timer interrupt occurs, so they are not charged for much of their CPU time, leading clock-based tools to perceive a CPU usage of 0%. On the other hand, the total number of clock cycles represents the actual number of processor cycles that each thread in the process accrued. It is independent of the clock interval timer’s resolution because the count is maintained internally by the processor at each cycle and updated by Windows at each interrupt entry. (A final accumulation is done before a context switch.)

The thread start address is displayed in the form “module!function”, where module is the name of the .exe or .dll. The function name relies on access to symbol files for the module. (See “Experiment: Viewing Process Details with Process Explorer” in Chapter 1.) If you are unsure what the module is, click the Module button. This opens an Explorer file properties window for the module containing the thread’s start address (for example, the .exe or .dll).
For threads created by the Windows `CreateThread` function, Process Explorer displays the function passed to `CreateThread`, not the actual thread start function. That is because all Windows threads start at a common thread startup wrapper function (`RtlUserThreadStart` in Ntdll.dll). If Process Explorer showed the actual start address, most threads in processes would appear to have started at the same address, which would not be helpful in trying to understand what code the thread was executing. However, if Process Explorer can’t query the user-defined startup address (such as in the case of a protected process), it will show the wrapper function, so you will see all threads starting at `RtlUserThreadStart`.

However, the thread start address displayed might not be enough information to pinpoint what the thread is doing and which component within the process is responsible for the CPU consumed by the thread. This is especially true if the thread start address is a generic startup function (for example, if the function name does not indicate what the thread is actually doing). In this case, examining the thread stack might answer the question. To view the stack for a thread, double-click on the thread of interest (or select it and click the Stack button). Process Explorer displays the thread’s stack (both user and kernel, if the thread was in kernel mode).

While the user mode debuggers (WinDbg, Ntsd, and Cdb) permit you to attach to a process and display the user stack for a thread, Process Explorer shows both the user and kernel stack in one easy click of a button. You can also examine user and kernel thread stacks using WinDbg in local kernel debugging mode.

Viewing the thread stack can also help you determine why a process is hung. As an example, on one system, Microsoft Office PowerPoint was hanging for one minute on startup. To determine why it was hung, after PowerPoint was started, Process Explorer was used to examine the thread stack of the one thread in the process. The result is shown in Figure 5-12.

![Hung thread stack in PowerPoint](image)

This thread stack shows that PowerPoint (line 10) called a function in Mso.dll (the central Microsoft Office DLL), which called the `OpenPrinterW` function in Winspool.drv (a DLL used to connect to printers). Winspool.drv then dispatched to a function `OpenPrinterRPC`, which then called a function in the RPC runtime DLL, indicating it was sending the request to a remote printer. So, without having
to understand the internals of PowerPoint, the module and function names displayed on the thread stack indicate that the thread was waiting to connect to a network printer. On this particular system, there was a network printer that was not responding, which explained the delay starting PowerPoint. (Microsoft Office applications connect to all configured printers at process startup.) The connection to that printer was deleted from the user’s system, and the problem went away.

Finally, when looking at 32-bit applications running on 64-bit systems as a Wow64 process (see Chapter 3 for more information on Wow64), Process Explorer shows both the 32-bit and 64-bit stack for threads. Because at the time of the system call proper, the thread has been switched to a 64-bit stack and context, simply looking at the thread’s 64-bit stack would reveal only half the story—the 64-bit part of the thread, with Wow64’s thunking code. So, when examining Wow64 processes, be sure to take into account both the 32-bit and 64-bit stacks. An example of a Wow64 thread inside Microsoft Office Word 2007 is shown in Figure 5-13. The highlighted stack frame and all stack frames below it are the 32-bit stack frames from the 32-bit stack. The stack frames above the highlighted frame are on the 64-bit stack.

**FIGURE 5-13** Example Wow64 stack

### Limitations on Protected Process Threads

As we discussed in the process internals section, protected processes have several limitations in terms of which access rights will be granted, even to the users with the highest privileges on the system. These limitations also apply to threads inside such a process. This ensures that the actual code running inside the protected process cannot be hijacked or otherwise affected through standard Windows functions, which require access rights that are not granted for protected process threads. In fact, the only permissions granted are THREAD_SUSPEND_RESUME and THREAD_SET/QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION.
EXPERIMENT: Viewing Protected Process Thread Information

In the previous section, we took a look at how Process Explorer can be helpful in examining thread activity to determine the cause of potential system or application issues. This time, we'll use Process Explorer to look at a protected process and see how the different access rights being denied affect its ability and usefulness on such a process.

Find the Audiodg.exe service inside the process list. This is a process responsible for much of the core work behind the user-mode audio stack in Windows, and it requires protection to ensure that high-definition decrypted audio content does not leak out to untrusted sources. Bring up the process properties view, and take a look at the Performance tab. Notice how the numbers for WS Private, WS Shareable, and WS Shared are 0, although the total Working Set is still displayed. This is an example of the THREAD_QUERY_INFORMATION versus THREAD_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION rights.

More importantly, take a look at the Threads tab. As you can see here, Process Explorer is unable to show the Win32 thread start address and instead displays the standard thread start wrapper inside Ntdll.dll. If you try clicking the Stack button, you'll get an error, because Process Explorer needs to read the virtual memory inside the protected process, which it can't do.

Finally, note that although the Base and Dynamic priorities are shown, the I/O and Memory priorities are not, which is another example of the limited versus full query information access right. As you try to kill a thread inside Audiodg.exe, notice yet another access denied error: recall the lack of THREAD_TERMINATE access.
Worker Factories (Thread Pools)

Worker factories refer to the internal mechanism used to implement user-mode thread pools. The legacy thread pool routines were completely implemented in user mode inside the Ntdll.dll library, and the Windows API provided various routines to call into the relevant routines, which provided waitable timers, wait callbacks, and automatic thread creation and deletion, depending on the amount of work being done.

Because the kernel can have direct control over thread scheduling, creation, and termination without the typical costs associated with doing these operations from user mode, most of the functionality required to support the user-mode thread pool implementation in Windows is now located in the kernel instead, which also simplifies the code that developers need to write. For example, creating a worker pool in a remote process can be done with a single API call, instead of the complex series of virtual memory calls this normally requires. Under this model, Ntdll.dll merely provides the interfaces and high-level APIs required for interfacing with the worker factory code.

This kernel-managed thread pool functionality in Windows is managed by an object manager type called TpWorkerFactory, as well as four native system calls for managing the factory and its workers (NtCreateWorkerFactory, NtWorkerFactoryWorkerReady, NtReleaseWorkerFactoryWorker, NtShutdownWorkerFactory), two query/set native calls (NtQueryInformationWorkerFactory and NtSetInformationWorkerFactory), and a wait call (NtWaitForWorkViaWorkerFactory).

Just like other native system calls, these calls provide user mode with a handle to the TpWorkerFactory object, which contains information such as the name and object attributes, the desired access mask, and a security descriptor. Unlike other system calls wrapped by the Windows API, however, thread-pool management is handled by Ntdll.dll’s native code, which means that developers work with an opaque descriptor (a TP_WORK pointer) owned by Ntdll.dll, in which the actual handle is stored.

As its name suggests, the worker factory implementation is responsible for allocating worker threads (and calling the given user-mode worker thread entry point), maintaining a minimum and maximum thread count (allowing for either permanent worker pools or totally dynamic pools), as well as other accounting information. This enables operations such as shutting down the thread pool to be performed with a single call to the kernel, because the kernel has been the only component responsible for thread creation and termination.

Because the kernel dynamically creates new threads as needed, based on minimum and maximum numbers provided, this also increases the scalability of applications using the new thread-pool implementation. A worker factory will create a new thread whenever all of the following conditions are met:

- The number of available workers is lower than the maximum number of workers configured for the factory (default of 500).
- The worker factory has bound objects (a bound object can be, for example, an ALPC port that this worker thread is waiting on) or a thread has been activated into the pool.
- There are pending I/O request packets (IRPs; see Chapter 8, “I/O System,” in Part 2, for more information) associated with a worker thread.

- Dynamic thread creation is enabled.

And it will terminate threads whenever they’ve become idle for more than 10 seconds (by default).

Furthermore, while developers have always been able to take advantage of as many threads as possible (based on the number of processors on the system) through the old implementation, but through support for dynamic processors in Windows Server (see the section on this topic later in this chapter), it’s now possible for applications using thread pools to automatically take advantage of new processors added at run time.

Note that the worker factory support is merely a wrapper to manage mundane tasks that would otherwise have to be performed in user mode (at a loss of performance), and much of the logic of the new thread-pool code remains in the Ntdll.dll side of this architecture. (Theoretically, by using undocumented functions, a different thread-pool implementation can be built around worker factories.) Also, it is not the worker factory code that provides the scalability, wait internals, and efficiency of work processing. Instead, it is a much older component of Windows that we already discussed—I/O completion ports, or more correctly, kernel queues (KQUEUE; see Chapter 8 in Part 2 for more information).

In fact, when creating a worker factory, an I/O completion port must have already been created by user mode, and the handle needs to be passed on. It is through this I/O completion port that the user-mode implementation will queue work and also wait for work—but by calling the worker factory system calls instead of the I/O completion port APIs. Internally, however, the “release” worker factory call (which queues work) is a wrapper around IoSetIoCompletionEx, which increases pending work, while the “wait” call is a wrapper around IoRemoveIoCompletion. Both these routines call into the kernel queue implementation.

Therefore, the job of the worker factory code is to manage either a persistent, static, or dynamic thread pool; wrap the I/O completion port model into interfaces that try to prevent stalled worker queues by automatically creating dynamic threads; and to simplify global cleanup and termination operations during a factory shutdown request (as well as to easily block new requests against the factory in such a scenario).

Unfortunately, the data structures used by the worker factory implementation are not in the public symbols, but it is still possible to look at some worker pools, as we’ll show in the next experiment. Additionally, the NtQueryInformationWorkerFactory API dumps almost every field in the worker factory structure.
EXPERIMENT: Looking at Thread Pools

Because of the advantages of using the thread-pool mechanism, many core system components and applications make use of it, especially when dealing with resources such as ALPC ports (to dynamically process incoming requests at an appropriate and scalable level). One of the ways to identify which processes are using a worker factory is to look at the handle list in Process Explorer. Follow these steps to look at some details behind them:

1. Run Process Explorer, and select Show Unnamed Handles And Mappings from the View menu. Unfortunately, worker factories aren’t named by Ntdll.dll, so you need to take this step in order to see the handles.

2. Select Lsm.exe from the list of processes, and look at the handle table. Make sure that the lower pane is shown (View, Show Lower Pane) and is displaying handle table mode (View, Lower Pane View, Handles).

3. Right-click on the lower pane columns, and then click on Select Columns. Make sure that the Type column is selected to be shown, and click it to sort by type.

4. Now scroll down the handles, looking at the Type column, until you find a handle of type TpWorkerFactory. You should see something like this:

Notice how the TpWorkerFactory handle is immediately preceded by an IoCompletion handle (numerically; sort by “Handle” to see this). As was described previously, this occurs because before creating a worker factory, a handle to an I/O completion port on which work will be sent must be created.
5. Now double-click Lsm.exe in the list of processes, and click on the Threads tab. You should see something similar to the image here:

![Image of Thread List](image)

On this system (with two processors), the worker factory has created six worker threads at the request of Lsm.exe (processes can define a minimum and maximum number of threads) and based on its usage and the count of processors on the machine. These threads are identified as `TppWorkerThread`, which is Ntdll.dll's worker entry point when calling the worker factory system calls.

6. Ntdll.dll is responsible for its own internal accounting inside the worker thread wrapper (`TppWorkerThread`) before calling the worker callback that the application has registered. By looking at the Wait reason in the State information for each thread, you
can get a rough idea of what each worker thread might be doing. Double-click on one of the threads inside an LPC wait to look at its stack. Here’s an example:

This specific worker thread is being used by Lsm.exe for LPC communication. Because the local session manager needs to communicate with other components such as Smss and Csrss through LPC, it makes sense that it would want a number of its threads to be busy replying and waiting for LPC messages. (The more threads doing this, the less stalling there is on the LPC pipeline.)

If you look at other worker threads, you’ll see some are waiting for objects such as events. A process can have multiple thread pools, and each thread pool can have a variety of threads doing completely unrelated tasks. It’s up to the developer to assign work and to call the thread pool APIs to register this work through Ntdll.dll.
Thread Scheduling

This section describes the Windows scheduling policies and algorithms. The first subsection provides a condensed description of how scheduling works on Windows and a definition of key terms. Then Windows priority levels are described from both the Windows API and the Windows kernel points of view. After a review of the relevant Windows utilities and tools that relate to scheduling, the detailed data structures and algorithms that make up the Windows scheduling system are presented, including a description of common scheduling scenarios and how thread selection, as well as processor selection, occurs.

Overview of Windows Scheduling

Windows implements a priority-driven, preemptive scheduling system—at least one of the highest-priority runnable (ready) threads always runs, with the caveat that certain high-priority threads ready to run might be limited by the processors on which they might be allowed or preferred to run on, a phenomenon called processor affinity. Processor affinity is defined based on a given processor group, which collects up to 64 processors. By default, threads can run only on any available processors within the processor group associated with the process (to maintain compatibility with older versions of Windows which supported only 64 processors), but developers can alter processor affinity by using the appropriate APIs or by setting an affinity mask in the image header, while users can use tools to change affinity at runtime or at process creation. However, although multiple threads in a process can be associated with different groups, a thread on its own can run only on the processors available within its assigned group. Additionally, developers can choose to create group-aware applications, which use extended scheduling APIs to associate logical processors on different groups with the affinity of their threads. Doing so converts the process into a multigroup process that can theoretically run its threads on any available processor within the machine.

EXPERIMENT: Viewing Ready Threads

You can view the list of ready threads with the kernel debugger !ready command. This command displays the thread or list of threads that are ready to run at each priority level. In the following example, generated on a 32-bit machine with a dual-core processor, two threads are ready to run at priority 8 on the first logical processor, and one thread at priority 10, two threads at priority 9, and three threads at priority 8 are ready to run on the second logical processor. Determining which of these threads get to run on their respective processor is a simple matter of picking the first thread on top of the highest priority queue (thread 857d9030 for logical processor 0, and thread 857c0030 for logical processor 1), but why the queues contain the threads they do is a complex result at the end of several algorithms that the scheduler uses. We will cover this topic later in this section.
After a thread is selected to run, it runs for an amount of time called a quantum. A quantum is the length of time a thread is allowed to run before another thread at the same priority level is given a turn to run. Quantum values can vary from system to system and process to process for any of three reasons:

- System configuration settings (long or short quantums, variable or fixed quantums, and priority separation)
- Foreground or background status of the process
- Use of the job object to alter the quantum

These details are explained in more details in the “Quantum” section later in the chapter, as well as in the “Job Objects” section).

A thread might not get to complete its quantum, however, because Windows implements a preemptive scheduler: if another thread with a higher priority becomes ready to run, the currently running thread might be preempted before finishing its time slice. In fact, a thread can be selected to run next and be preempted before even beginning its quantum!

The Windows scheduling code is implemented in the kernel. There’s no single “scheduler” module or routine, however—the code is spread throughout the kernel in which scheduling-related events occur. The routines that perform these duties are collectively called the kernel’s dispatcher. The following events might require thread dispatching:

- A thread becomes ready to execute—for example, a thread has been newly created or has just been released from the wait state.
- A thread leaves the running state because its time quantum ends, it terminates, it yields execution, or it enters a wait state.
- A thread’s priority changes, either because of a system service call or because Windows itself changes the priority value.
- A thread’s processor affinity changes so that it will no longer run on the processor on which it was running.
At each of these junctions, Windows must determine which thread should run next on the logical processor that was running the thread, if applicable, or on which logical processor the thread should now run on. After a logical processor has selected a new thread to run, it eventually performs a context switch to it. A context switch is the procedure of saving the volatile processor state associated with a running thread, loading another thread’s volatile state, and starting the new thread’s execution.

As already noted, Windows schedules at the thread granularity. This approach makes sense when you consider that processes don’t run but only provide resources and a context in which their threads run. Because scheduling decisions are made strictly on a thread basis, no consideration is given to what process the thread belongs to. For example, if process A has 10 runnable threads, process B has 2 runnable threads, and all 12 threads are at the same priority, each thread would theoretically receive one-twelfth of the CPU time—Windows wouldn’t give 50 percent of the CPU to process A and 50 percent to process B.

**Priority Levels**

To understand the thread-scheduling algorithms, one must first understand the priority levels that Windows uses. As illustrated in Figure 5-14, internally Windows uses 32 priority levels, ranging from 0 through 31. These values divide up as follows:

- Sixteen real-time levels (16 through 31)
- Sixteen variable levels (0 through 15), out of which level 0 is reserved for the zero page thread

![Figure 5-14: Thread priority levels](image)

Thread priority levels are assigned from two different perspectives: those of the Windows API and those of the Windows kernel. The Windows API first organizes processes by the priority class to which they are assigned at creation (the numbers represent the internal PROCESS_PRIORITY_CLASS_ index recognized by the kernel): Real-time (4), High (3), Above Normal (7), Normal (2), Below Normal (5), and Idle (1).
It then assigns a relative priority of the individual threads within those processes. Here, the numbers represent a priority delta that is applied to the process base priority: Time-critical (15), Highest (2), Above-normal (1), Normal (0), Below-normal (–1), Lowest (–2), and Idle (–15).

Therefore, in the Windows API, each thread has a base priority that is a function of its process priority class and its relative thread priority. In the kernel, the process priority class is converted to a base priority by using the `PspPriorityTable` and the `PROCESS_PRIORITY_CLASS` indices shown earlier, which sets priorities of 4, 8, 13, 14, 6, and 10, respectively. (This is a fixed mapping that cannot be changed.) The relative thread priority is then applied as a differential to this base priority. For example, a “Highest” thread will receive a thread base priority of two levels higher than the base priority of its process.

This mapping from Windows priority to internal Windows numeric priority is shown in Table 5-3.

**TABLE 5-3 Mapping of Windows Kernel Priorities to the Windows API**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Class Relative Priority</th>
<th>Realtime</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Above Normal</th>
<th>Normal</th>
<th>Below Normal</th>
<th>Idle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time Critical (+ SATURATION)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest (+2)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above Normal (+1)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal (0)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below Normal (-1)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowest (-2)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idle (- SATURATION)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

You’ll note that the Time-Critical and Idle relative thread priorities maintain their respective values regardless of the process priority class (unless it is Realtime). This is because the Windows API requests saturation of the priority from the kernel, by actually passing in 16 or -16 as the requested relative priority (instead of 15 or -15). This is then recognized by the kernel as a request for saturation, and the Saturation field in KTHREAD is set. This causes, for positive saturation, the thread to receive the highest possible priority within its priority class (dynamic or real-time), or for negative saturation, the lowest possible one. Additionally, future requests to change the base priority of the process will no longer affect the base priority of these threads, because saturated threads are skipped in the processing code.

Whereas a process has only a single base priority value, each thread has two priority values: current and base. Scheduling decisions are made based on the current priority. As explained in the following section on priority boosting, the system under certain circumstances increases the priority of threads in the dynamic range (0 through 15) for brief periods. Windows never adjusts the priority of threads in the real-time range (16 through 31), so they always have the same base and current priority.
A thread’s initial base priority is inherited from the process base priority. A process, by default, inherits its base priority from the process that created it. This behavior can be overridden on the `CreateProcess` function or by using the command-line start command. A process priority can also be changed after being created by using the `SetPriorityClass` function or various tools that expose that function, such as Task Manager and Process Explorer (by right-clicking on the process and choosing a new priority class). For example, you can lower the priority of a CPU-intensive process so that it does not interfere with normal system activities. Changing the priority of a process changes the thread priorities up or down, but their relative settings remain the same.

Normally, user applications and services start with a normal base priority, so their initial thread typically executes at priority level 8. However, some Windows system processes (such as the session manager, service control manager, and local security authentication process) have a base process priority slightly higher than the default for the Normal class (8). This higher default value ensures that the threads in these processes will all start at a higher priority than the default value of 8.

**Real-Time Priorities**

You can raise or lower thread priorities within the dynamic range in any application; however, you must have the increase scheduling priority privilege to enter the real-time range. Be aware that many important Windows kernel-mode system threads run in the real-time priority range, so if threads spend excessive time running in this range, they might block critical system functions (such as in the memory manager, cache manager, or other device drivers).

Using the standard Windows APIs, once a process has entered the real-time range, all of its threads (even Idle ones) must run at one of the real-time priority levels. It is thus impossible to mix real-time and dynamic threads within the same process through standard interfaces. This is because the `SetThreadPriority` API calls the native `NtSetInformationThread` API with the `ThreadBasePriority` information class, which allows priorities to remain only in the same range. Furthermore, this information class allows priority changes only in the recognized Windows API deltas of –2 to 2 (or real-time/idle), unless the request comes from CSRSS or a real-time process. In other words, this means that a real-time process does have the ability to pick thread priorities anywhere between 16 and 31, even though the standard Windows API relative thread priorities would seem to limit its choices based on the table that was shown earlier.

However, by calling this API with the `ThreadActualBasePriority` information class, the kernel base priority for the thread can be directly set, including in the dynamic range for a real-time process.

**Note** As illustrated in Figure 5-15, which shows the interrupt request levels (IRQLs), although Windows has a set of priorities called real-time, they are not real-time in the common definition of the term. This is because Windows doesn’t provide true, real-time operating system facilities, such as guaranteed interrupt latency or a way for threads to obtain a guaranteed execution time.
Interrupt Levels vs. Priority Levels

As illustrated in Figure 5-15 of the interrupt request levels (IRQLs) for a 32-bit system, threads normally run at IRQL 0 (called passive level, because no interrupts are in process and none are blocked) or IRQL 1 (APC level). (For a description of how Windows uses interrupt levels, see Chapter 3.) User-mode code always runs at passive level. Because of this, no user-mode thread, regardless of its priority, can ever block hardware interrupts (although high-priority, real-time threads can block the execution of important system threads).

Threads running in kernel mode, although initially scheduled at passive level or APC level, can raise IRQL to higher levels—for example, while executing a system call that involves thread dispatching, memory management, or input/output. If a thread does raise IRQL to dispatch level or above, no further thread-scheduling behavior will occur on its processor until it lowers IRQL below dispatch level. A thread executing at dispatch level or above blocks the activity of the thread scheduler and prevents thread context switches on its processor.

A thread running in kernel mode can be running at APC level if it is running a special kernel APC; or it can temporarily raise IRQL to APC level to block the delivery of special kernel APCs. (For more information on APCs, see Chapter 3.) However, executing at APC level does not alter the scheduling behavior of the thread vs. other threads; it affects only the delivery of kernel APCs to that thread. In fact, a thread executing in kernel mode at APC level can be preempted in favor of a higher priority thread running in user mode at passive level.
Using Tools to Interact with Priority

You can change (and view) the base-process priority with Task Manager and Process Explorer. You can kill individual threads in a process with Process Explorer (which should be done, of course, with extreme care).

You can view individual thread priorities with the Performance Monitor, Process Explorer, or WinDbg. Although it might be useful to increase or lower the priority of a process, it typically does not make sense to adjust individual thread priorities within a process, because only a person who thoroughly understands the program (in other words, typically only the developer himself) would understand the relative importance of the threads within the process.

The only way to specify a starting priority class for a process is with the start command in the Windows command prompt. If you want to have a program start every time with a specific priority, you can define a shortcut to use the start command by beginning the command with `cmd /c`. This runs the command prompt, executes the command on the command line, and terminates the command prompt. For example, to run Notepad in the low-process priority, the shortcut is `cmd /c start /low Notepad.exe`.

**EXPERIMENT: Examining and Specifying Process and Thread Priorities**

Try the following experiment:

1. From an elevated command prompt, type `start /realtime notepad`. Notepad should open.

2. Run Process Explorer, and select Notepad.exe from the list of processes. Double-click on Notepad.exe to show the process properties window, and then click on the Threads tab, as shown here. Notice that the dynamic priority of the thread in Notepad is 24. This matches the real-time value shown in the following image.
3. Task Manager can show you similar information. Press Ctrl+Shift+Esc to start Task Manager, and click on the Processes tab. Right-click on the Notepad.exe process, and select the Set Priority option. You can see that Notepad’s process priority class is Realtime, as shown in the following dialog box:
Windows System Resource Manager

Windows Server 2008 R2 Enterprise Edition and Windows Server 2008 R2 Datacenter Edition include an optionally installable component called Windows System Resource Manager (WSRM). It permits the administrator to configure policies that specify CPU utilization, affinity settings, and memory limits (both physical and virtual) for processes. In addition, WSRM can generate resource utilization reports that can be used for accounting and verification of service-level agreements with users.

Policies can be applied for specific applications (by matching the name of the image with or without specific command-line arguments), users, or groups. The policies can be scheduled to take effect at certain periods or can be enabled all the time.

After you set a resource-allocation policy to manage specific processes, the WSRM service monitors CPU consumption of managed processes and adjusts process base priorities when those processes do not meet their target CPU allocations.

The physical memory limitation uses the function `SetProcessWorkingSetSizeEx` to set a hard-working set maximum. The virtual memory limit is implemented by the service checking the private virtual memory consumed by the processes. (See Chapter 10 in Part 2 for an explanation of these memory limits.) If this limit is exceeded, WSRM can be configured to either kill the processes or write an entry to the Event Log. This behavior can be used to detect a process with a memory leak before it consumes all the available committed memory on the system. Note that WSRM memory limits do not apply to Address Windowing Extensions (AWE) memory, large page memory, or kernel memory (nonpaged or paged pool).

Thread States

Before you can comprehend the thread-scheduling algorithms, you need to understand the various execution states that a thread can be in. The thread states are as follows:

- **Ready**  A thread in the ready state is waiting to execute (or ready to be in-swapped after completing a wait). When looking for a thread to execute, the dispatcher considers only the pool of threads in the ready state.

- **Deferred ready**  This state is used for threads that have been selected to run on a specific processor but have not actually started running there. This state exists so that the kernel can minimize the amount of time the per-processor lock on the scheduling database is held.

- **Standby**  A thread in the standby state has been selected to run next on a particular processor. When the correct conditions exist, the dispatcher performs a context switch to this thread. Only one thread can be in the standby state for each processor on the system. Note that a thread can be preempted out of the standby state before it ever executes (if, for example, a higher priority thread becomes runnable before the standby thread begins execution).
Running Once the dispatcher performs a context switch to a thread, the thread enters the running state and executes. The thread’s execution continues until its quantum ends (and another thread at the same priority is ready to run), it is preempted by a higher priority thread, it terminates, it yields execution, or it voluntarily enters the waiting state.

Waiting A thread can enter the waiting state in several ways: a thread can voluntarily wait for an object to synchronize its execution, the operating system can wait on the thread’s behalf (such as to resolve a paging I/O), or an environment subsystem can direct the thread to suspend itself. When the thread’s wait ends, depending on the priority, the thread either begins running immediately or is moved back to the ready state.

Transition A thread enters the transition state if it is ready for execution but its kernel stack is paged out of memory. Once its kernel stack is brought back into memory, the thread enters the ready state.

Terminated When a thread finishes executing, it enters the terminated state. Once the thread is terminated, the executive thread object (the data structure in a nonpaged pool that describes the thread) might or might not be deallocated. (The object manager sets the policy regarding when to delete the object.)

Initialized This state is used internally while a thread is being created.

Table 5-4 describes the state transitions for threads, and Figure 5-16 illustrates a simplified version. (The numeric values shown represent the value of the thread-state performance counter.) In the simplified version, the Ready, Standby, and Deferred Ready states are represented as one. This reflects the fact that the Standby and Deferred Ready states act as temporary placeholders for the scheduling routines. These states are almost always very short-lived; threads in these states always transition quickly to Ready, Running, or Waiting. More details on what happens at each transition are included later in this section.

**Table 5-4  Thread States and Transitions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Init</th>
<th>Ready</th>
<th>Running</th>
<th>Standby</th>
<th>Terminated</th>
<th>Waiting</th>
<th>Transition</th>
<th>Deferred Ready</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Init</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ready</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Running</td>
<td>Selected by KiSearch-ForNew-Thread</td>
<td>Picked up for execution by local CPU</td>
<td>Preemption after wait satisfaction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A thread becomes Initialized during the first few moments of its creation (KeStartThread).

A thread is added in the dispatcher-ready database of its ideal processor.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Init (0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ready (1)</td>
<td>Selected by KiSelect-NextThread</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Running (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standby (3)</td>
<td>Selected by KiDeferred-ReadyThread for remote CPU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terminated (4)</td>
<td>Killed before PspInsert-Thread finished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waiting (5)</td>
<td>Thread enters a wait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition (6)</td>
<td>Kernel stack no longer resident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deferred Ready (7)</td>
<td>Last step in PspInsert-Thread</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Affinity change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thread becomes preempted (if old processor is no longer available)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Affinity change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wait satisfaction (but no preemption)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kernel stack swap-in completed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 5-16** Simplified version of thread states and transitions
EXPERIMENT: Thread-Scheduling State Changes

You can watch thread-scheduling state changes with the Performance tool in Windows. This utility can be useful when you’re debugging a multithreaded application and you’re unsure about the state of the threads running in the process. To watch thread-scheduling state changes by using the Performance tool, follow these steps:

1. Run Notepad (Notepad.exe).
2. Start the Performance tool by selecting All Programs from the Start menu and then selecting Performance Monitor from the Administrative Tools menu. Click on the Performance Monitor entry under Monitoring Tools.
3. Select the chart view if you’re in some other view.
4. Right-click on the graph, and choose Properties.
5. Click on the Graph tab, and change the chart vertical scale maximum to 7. (As you’ll see from the explanation text for the performance counter, thread states are numbered from 0 through 7.) Click OK.
6. Click the Add button on the toolbar to bring up the Add Counters dialog box.
7. Select the Thread performance object, and then select the Thread State counter. Select the Show Description check box to see the definition of the values:

```

8. In the Instances box, select <All instances> and type Notepad before clicking Search. Scroll down until you see the Notepad process (notepad/0); select it, and click the Add button.
9. Scroll back up in the Instances box to the Mmc process (the Microsoft Management Console process running the System Monitor), select all the threads (mmc/0, mmc/1, and so on), and add them to the chart by clicking the Add button. Before you click Add, you should see something like the dialog box that follows.
```
10. Now close the Add Counters dialog box by clicking OK.

11. You should see the state of the Notepad thread (the very top line in the following figure) as a 5. As shown in the explanation text you saw under step 7, this number represents the waiting state (because the thread is waiting for GUI input):
12. Notice that one thread in the Mmc process (running the Performance tool snap-in) is in the running state (number 2). This is the thread that’s querying the thread states, so it’s always displayed in the running state.

13. You’ll never see Notepad in the running state (unless you’re on a multiprocessor system) because Mmc is always in the running state when it gathers the state of the threads you’re monitoring.

Dispatcher Database

To make thread-scheduling decisions, the kernel maintains a set of data structures known collectively as the dispatcher database, illustrated in Figure 5-17. The dispatcher database keeps track of which threads are waiting to execute and which processors are executing which threads.

To improve scalability, including thread-dispatching concurrency, Windows multiprocessor systems have per-processor dispatcher ready queues, as illustrated in Figure 5-17. In this way, each CPU can check its own ready queues for the next thread to run without having to lock the systemwide ready queues.

The per-processor ready queues, as well as the per-processor ready summary, are part of the processor control block (PRCB) structure. (To see the fields in the PRCB, type dt nt!_kprcb in the kernel debugger.) The names of each component that we will talk about (in italics) are field members of the PRCB structure.

The dispatcher ready queues (DispatcherReadyListHead) contain the threads that are in the ready state, waiting to be scheduled for execution. There is one queue for each of the 32 priority levels. To speed up the selection of which thread to run or preempt, Windows maintains a 32-bit bit mask called the ready summary (ReadySummary). Each bit set indicates one or more threads in the ready queue for that priority level. (Bit 0 represents priority 0, and so on.)

Instead of scanning each ready list to see whether it is empty or not (which would make scheduling decisions dependent on the number of different priority threads), a single bit scan is performed as a native processor command to find the highest bit set. Regardless of the number of threads in the ready queue, this operation takes a constant amount of time, which is why you might sometimes see the Windows scheduling algorithm referred to as an O(1), or constant time, algorithm.
The dispatcher database is synchronized by raising IRQL to DISPATCH_LEVEL. (For an explanation of interrupt priority levels, see the “Trap Dispatching” section in Chapter 3.) Raising IRQL in this way prevents other threads from interrupting thread dispatching on the processor because threads normally run at IRQL 0 or 1. However, more is required than just raising IRQL, because other processors can simultaneously raise to the same IRQL and attempt to operate on their dispatcher database. How Windows synchronizes access to the dispatcher database is explained in the “Multiprocessor Systems” section later in the chapter.

Quantum

As mentioned earlier in the chapter, a quantum is the amount of time a thread gets to run before Windows checks to see whether another thread at the same priority is waiting to run. If a thread completes its quantum and there are no other threads at its priority, Windows permits the thread to run for another quantum.

On client versions of Windows, threads run by default for 2 clock intervals; on server systems, by default, a thread runs for 12 clock intervals. (We’ll explain how you can change these values later.) The rationale for the longer default value on server systems is to minimize context switching. By having a longer quantum, server applications that wake up as the result of a client request have a better chance of completing the request and going back into a wait state before their quantum ends.
The length of the clock interval varies according to the hardware platform. The frequency of the clock interrupts is up to the HAL, not the kernel. For example, the clock interval for most x86 uniprocessors is about 10 milliseconds (note that these machines are no longer supported by Windows and are only used here for example purposes), and for most x86 and x64 multiprocessors it is about 15 milliseconds. This clock interval is stored in the kernel variable `KeMaximumIncrement` as hundreds of nanoseconds.

Because thread run-time accounting is based on processor cycles, although threads still run in units of clock intervals, the system does not use the count of clock ticks as the deciding factor for how long a thread has run and whether its quantum has expired. Instead, when the system starts up, a calculation is made whose result is the number of clock cycles that each quantum is equivalent to. (This value is stored in the kernel variable `KiCyclesPerClockQuantum`.) This calculation is made by multiplying the processor speed in Hz (CPU clock cycles per second) with the number of seconds it takes for one clock tick to fire (based on the `KeMaximumIncrement` value described earlier).

The result of this accounting method is that threads do not actually run for a quantum number based on clock ticks; they instead run for a quantum target, which represents an estimate of what the number of CPU clock cycles the thread has consumed should be when its turn would be given up. This target should be equal to an equivalent number of clock interval timer ticks because, as you just saw, the calculation of clock cycles per quantum is based on the clock interval timer frequency, which you can check using the following experiment. On the other hand, because interrupt cycles are not charged to the thread, the actual clock time might be longer.

**EXPERIMENT: Determining the Clock Interval Frequency**

The Windows `GetSystemTimeAdjustment` function returns the clock interval. To determine the clock interval, download and run the Clockres program from Windows Sysinternals (www.microsoft.com/technet/sysinternals). Here’s the output from a dual-core 64-bit Windows 7 system:

```
C:\>clockres

ClockRes v2.0 - View the system clock resolution
Copyright (C) 2009 Mark Russinovich
SysInternals - www.sysinternals.com

Maximum timer interval: 15.600 ms
Minimum timer interval: 0.500 ms
Current timer interval: 15.600 ms
```

**Quantum Accounting**

Each process has a quantum reset value in the process control block (KPROCESS). This value is used when creating new threads inside the process and is duplicated in the thread control block (KTHREAD), which is then used when giving a thread a new quantum target. The quantum reset
value is stored in terms of actual quantum units (we’ll discuss what these mean soon), which are then multiplied by the number of clock cycles per quantum, resulting in the quantum target.

As a thread runs, CPU clock cycles are charged at different events (context switches, interrupts, and certain scheduling decisions). If at a clock interval timer interrupt, the number of CPU clock cycles charged has reached (or passed) the quantum target, quantum end processing is triggered. If there is another thread at the same priority waiting to run, a context switch occurs to the next thread in the ready queue.

Internally, a quantum unit is represented as one third of a clock tick. (So one clock tick equals three quantums.) This means that on client Windows systems, threads, by default, have a quantum reset value of $6$ ($2 \times 3$), and that server systems have a quantum reset value of $36$ ($12 \times 3$). For this reason, the $\text{KiCyclesPerClockQuantum}$ value is divided by three at the end of the calculation previously described, because the original value describes only CPU clock cycles per clock interval timer tick.

The reason a quantum was stored internally as a fraction of a clock tick rather than as an entire tick was to allow for partial quantum decay-on-wait completion on versions of Windows prior to Windows Vista. Prior versions used the clock interval timer for quantum expiration. If this adjustment were not made, it would have been possible for threads never to have their quantums reduced. For example, if a thread ran, entered a wait state, ran again, and entered another wait state but was never the currently running thread when the clock interval timer fired, it would never have its quantum charged for the time it was running. Because threads now have CPU clock cycles charged instead of quantums, and because this no longer depends on the clock interval timer, these adjustments are not required.

---

**EXPERIMENT: Determining the Clock Cycles per Quantum**

Windows doesn’t expose the number of clock cycles per quantum through any function, but with the calculation and description we’ve given, you should be able to determine this on your own using the following steps and a kernel debugger such as WinDbg in local debugging mode:

1. Obtain your processor frequency as Windows has detected it. You can use the value stored in the PRCB’s MHz field, which can be displayed with the `!cpuinfo` command. Here is a sample output of a dual-core Intel system running at 2829 MHz:

   ```
   lkd> !cpuinfo
   CP  F/M/S Manufacturer  MHz PRCB Signature    MSR 8B Signature Features
   0  6,15,6 GenuineIntel 2829 000000c700000000 >000000c700000000=a00f3fff
   1  6,15,6 GenuineIntel 2829 000000c700000000                   a00f3fff
       Cached Update Signature 000000c700000000
       Initial Update Signature 000000c700000000
   ```

2. Convert the number to Hertz (Hz). This is the number of CPU clock cycles that occur each second on your system. In this case, 2,829,000,000 cycles per second.
3. Obtain the clock interval on your system by using `clockres`. This measures how long it takes before the clock fires. On the sample system used here, this interval was 15.600100 ms.

4. Convert this number to the number of times the clock interval timer fires each second. One second is 1000 ms, so divide the number derived in step 3 by 1000. In this case, the timer fires every 0.0156001 seconds.

5. Multiply this count by the number of cycles each second that you obtained in step 2. In our case, 44,132,682.9 cycles have elapsed after each clock interval.

6. Remember that each quantum unit is one-third of a clock interval, so divide the number of cycles by three. In our example, this gives us 14,710,894, or 0xE0786E in hexadecimal. This is the number of clock cycles each quantum unit should take on a system running at 2829 MHz with a clock interval of around 15 ms.

7. To verify your calculation, dump the value of `KiCyclesPerClockQuantum` on your system—it should match.

```
lkd> dd nt!KiCyclesPerClockQuantum L1
81d31ae8  00e0786e
```

**Controlling the Quantum**

You can change the thread quantum for all processes, but you can choose only one of two settings: short (2 clock ticks, which is the default for client machines) or long (12 clock ticks, which is the default for server systems).

**Note** By using the job object on a system running with long quantums, you can select other quantum values for the processes in the job. For more information on the job object, see the “Job Objects” section later in the chapter.

To change this setting, right-click on your Computer icon on the desktop, or in Windows Explorer, choose Properties, click the Advanced System Settings label, click on the Advanced tab, click the Settings button in the Performance section, and finally click on the Advanced tab. The dialog box displayed is shown in Figure 5-18.
The Programs setting designates the use of short, variable quantums—the default for client versions of Windows. If you install Terminal Services on a server system and configure the server as an application server, this setting is selected so that the users on the terminal server have the same quantum settings that would normally be set on a desktop or client system. You might also select this manually if you were running Windows Server as your desktop operating system.

The Background Services option designates the use of long, fixed quantums—the default for server systems. The only reason you might select this option on a workstation system is if you were using the workstation as a server system. However, because changes in this option take effect immediately, it might make sense to use it if the machine is about to run a background/server-style workload. For example, if a long-running computation, encoding or modeling simulation needs to run overnight, Background Services mode could be selected at night, and the system put back in Programs mode in the morning.

Finally, because Programs mode enables variable quantums, let us now explain what controls their variability.
Variable Quantums

When variable quantums are enabled, the variable quantum table (PspVariableQuantums) is loaded into the PspForegroundQuantum table that is used by the PspComputeQuantum function. Its algorithm will pick the appropriate quantum index based on whether or not the process is a foreground process (that is, whether it contains the thread that owns the foreground window on the desktop). If this is not the case, an index of zero is chosen, which corresponds to the default thread quantum described earlier. If it is a foreground process, the quantum index corresponds to the priority separation. This priority separation value determines the priority boost (described in a later section of this chapter) that the scheduler will apply to foreground threads, and it is thus paired with an appropriate extension of the quantum: for each extra priority level (up to 2), another quantum is given to the thread. For example, if the thread receives a boost of one priority level, it receives an extra quantum as well. By default, Windows sets the maximum possible priority boost to foreground threads, meaning that the priority separation will be 2, therefore selecting quantum index 2 in the variable quantum table, leading to the thread receiving two extra quantums, for a total of 3 quantums.

Table 5-5 describes the exact quantum value (recall that this is stored in a unit representing 1/3rd of a clock tick) that will be selected based on the quantum index and which quantum configuration is in use.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Short Quantum Index</th>
<th>Long Quantum Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, when a window is brought into the foreground on a client system, all the threads in the process containing the thread that owns the foreground window have their quantums tripled: threads in the foreground process run with a quantum of 6 clock ticks, whereas threads in other processes have the default client quantum of 2 clock ticks. In this way, when you switch away from a CPU-intensive process, the new foreground process will get proportionally more of the CPU, because when its threads run they will have a longer turn than background threads (again, assuming the thread priorities are the same in both the foreground and background processes).

Quantum Settings Registry Value

The user interface to control quantum settings described earlier modifies the registry value HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\PriorityControl\Win32PrioritySeparation. In addition to specifying the relative length of thread quantums (short or long), this registry value also defines whether or not variable quantums should be used, as well as the priority separation (which, as you’ve seen, will determine the quantum index used when variable quantums are enabled). This value consists of 6 bits divided into the three 2-bit fields shown in Figure 5-19.
The fields shown in Figure 5-19 can be defined as follows:

- **Short vs. Long** A value of 1 specifies long quantums, and 2 specifies short ones. A setting of 0 or 3 indicates that the default appropriate for the system will be used (short for client systems, long for server systems).

- **Variable vs. Fixed** A setting of 1 means to enable the variable quantum table based on the algorithm shown in the “Variable Quantums” section. A setting of 0 or 3 means that the default appropriate for the system will be used (variable for client systems, fixed for server systems).

- **Priority Separation** This field (stored in the kernel variable `PsPrioritySeparation`) defines the priority separation (up to 2) as explained in the “Variable Quantums” section.

Note that when you’re using the Performance Options dialog box (which was shown in Figure 5-18), you can choose from only two combinations: short quantums with foreground quantums tripled, or long quantums with no quantum changes for foreground threads. However, you can select other combinations by modifying the `Win32PrioritySeparation` registry value directly.

Note that the threads part of a process running in the idle process priority class always receive a single thread quantum (2 clock ticks), ignoring any sort of quantum configuration settings, whether set by default or set through the registry.

On Windows Server systems configured as applications servers, the initial value of the `Win32PrioritySeparation` registry value will be hex 26, which is identical to the value set by the Optimize Performance For Programs option in the Performance Options dialog box. This selects quantum and priority boost behavior like that on Windows client systems, which is appropriate for a server primarily used to host users’ applications.

On Windows client systems and on servers not configured as application servers, the initial value of the `Win32PrioritySeparation` registry value will be 2. This provides values of 0 for the Short vs. Long and Variable vs. Fixed bit fields, relying on the default behavior of the system (depending on whether it is a client system or a server system) for these options, but it provides a value of 2 for the Priority Separation field. Once the registry value has been changed by use of the Performance Options dialog box, it cannot be restored to this original value other than by modifying the registry directly.
EXPERIMENT: Effects of Changing the Quantum Configuration

Using a local debugger (Kd or WinDbg), you can see how the two quantum configuration settings, Programs and Background Services, affect the *PsPrioritySeparation* and *PspForegroundQuantum* tables, as well as modify the *QuantumReset* value of threads on the system. Take the following steps:

1. Open the System utility in Control Panel (or right-click on your computer name's icon on the desktop, and choose Properties). Click the Advanced System Settings label, click on the Advanced tab, click the Settings button in the Performance section, and finally click on the Advanced tab. Select the Programs option, and click Apply. Keep this window open for the duration of the experiment.

2. Dump the values of *PsPrioritySeparation* and *PspForegroundQuantum*, as shown here. The values shown are what you should see on a Windows system after making the change in step 1. Notice how the variable, short quantum table is being used, and that a priority boost of 2 will apply to foreground applications:

   ```
   lkd> dd PsPrioritySeparation L1
   81d3101c  00000002
   lkd> db PspForegroundQuantum L3
   81d0946c  06 0c 12
   ...
   ```

3. Now take a look at the *QuantumReset* value of any process on the system. As described earlier, this is the default, full quantum of each thread on the system when it is replenished. This value is cached into each thread of the process, but the KPROCESS structure is easier to look at. Notice in this case it is 6, because WinDbg, like most other applications, gets the quantum set in the first entry of the *PspForegroundQuantum* table:

   ```
   lkd> .process
   Implicit process is now 85b32d90
   lkd> dt nt!_KPROCESS 85b32d90 QuantumReset
   nt!_KPROCESS
   +0x061 QuantumReset     : 6 ''
   ```

4. Now change the Performance option to Background Services in the dialog box you opened in step 1.

5. Repeat the commands shown in steps 2 and 3. You should see the values change in a manner consistent with our discussion in this section:

   ```
   lkd> dd nt!PsPrioritySeparation L1
   81d3101c  00000000
   lkd> db nt!PspForegroundQuantum L3
   81d0946c  24 24 24 $$$
   lkd> dt nt!_KPROCESS 85b32d90 QuantumReset
   nt!_KPROCESS
   +0x061 QuantumReset     : 36 ''
   ```
Priority Boosts

The Windows scheduler periodically adjusts the current priority of threads through an internal priority-boosting mechanism. In many cases, it does so for decreasing various latencies (that is, to make threads respond faster to the events they are waiting on) and increasing responsiveness. In others, it applies these boosts to prevent inversion and starvation scenarios. Here are some of the boost scenarios that will be described in this section (and their purpose):

- Boosts due to scheduler/dispatcher events (latency reduction)
- Boosts due to I/O completion (latency reduction)
- Boosts due to UI input (latency reduction/responsiveness)
- Boosts due to a thread waiting on an executive resource for too long (starvation avoidance)
- Boosts when a thread that’s ready to run hasn’t been running for some time (starvation and priority-inversion avoidance)

Like any scheduling algorithms, however, these adjustments aren’t perfect, and they might not benefit all applications.

**Note** Windows never boosts the priority of threads in the real-time range (16 through 31). Therefore, scheduling is always predictable with respect to other threads in the real-time range. Windows assumes that if you’re using the real-time thread priorities, you know what you’re doing.

Client versions of Windows also include another pseudo-boosting mechanism that occurs during multimedia playback. Unlike the other priority boosts, which are applied directly by kernel code, multimedia playback boosts are actually managed by a user-mode service called the MultiMedia Class Scheduler Service (MMCSS), but they are not really boosts—the service merely sets new base priorities for the threads as needed (by calling the user-mode native API to change thread priorities). Therefore, none of the rules regarding boosts apply. We'll first cover the typical kernel-managed priority boosts and then talk about MMCSS and the kind of “boosting” it performs.

**Boosts Due to Scheduler/Dispatcher Events**

Whenever a dispatch event occurs, the *KiExitDispatcher* routine is called, whose job it is to process the deferred ready list by calling *KiProcessThreadWaitList* and then call *KiCheckForThreadDispatch* to check whether any threads on the local processor should not be scheduled. Whenever such an event occurs, the caller can also specify which type of boost should be applied to the thread, as well as what priority increment the boost should be associated with. The following scenarios are considered as *AdjustUnwait* dispatch events because they deal with a dispatcher object entering a signaled state, which might cause one or more threads to wake up:

- An APC is queued to a thread.
- An event is set or pulsed.
A timer was set, or the system time was changed, and timers had to be reset.

A mutex was released or abandoned.

A process exited.

An entry was inserted in a queue, or the queue was flushed.

A semaphore was released.

A thread was alerted, suspended, resumed, frozen, or thawed.

A primary UMS thread is waiting to switch to a scheduled UMS thread.

For scheduling events associated with a public API (such as `SetEvent`), the boost increment applied is specified by the caller. Windows recommends certain values to be used by developers, which will be described later. For alerts, a boost of 2 is applied, because the alert API does not have a parameter allowing a caller to set a custom increment.

The scheduler also has two special `AdjustBoost` dispatch events, which are part of the lock ownership priority mechanism. These boosts attempt to fix situations in which a caller that owns the lock at priority X ends up releasing the lock to a waiting thread at priority <= X. In this situation, the new owner thread must wait for its turn (if running at priority X), or worse, it might not even get to run at all if its priority is lower than X. This entails the releasing thread continuing its execution, even though it should have caused the new owner thread to wake up and take control of the processor.

The following two dispatcher events cause an `AdjustBoost` dispatcher exit:

- An event is set through the `KeSetEventBoostPriority` interface, which is used by the ERESOURCE reader-writer kernel lock

- A gate is set through the `KeSignalGateBoostPriority` interface, which is used by various internal mechanisms when releasing a gate lock.

**Unwait Boosts**

Unwait boosts attempt to decrease the latency between a thread waking up due to an object being signaled (thus entering the Ready state) and the thread actually beginning its execution to process the unwait (thus entering the Running state). Because the event that the thread is waiting on could give some sort of information about, say, the state of available memory at the moment, it is important for this state not to change behind the scenes while the thread is still stuck in the Ready state—otherwise, it might become irrelevant or incorrect once the thread does start running.

The various Windows header files specify recommended values that kernel-mode callers of APIs such as `KeSetEvent` and `KeReleaseSemaphore` should use, which correspond to definitions such as MUTANT_INCREMENT and EVENT_INCREMENT. These definitions have always been set to 1 in the headers, so it is safe to assume that most unwaits on these objects result in a boost of 1. In the user-mode API, an increment cannot be specified, nor do the native system calls such as `NtSetEvent` have parameters to specify such a boost. Instead, when these APIs call the underlying `Ke` interface, they use the default _INCREMENT definition automatically. This is also the case when mutexes are abandoned.
or timers are reset due to a system time change: the system uses the default boost that normally would’ve been applied when the mutex would have been released. Finally, the APC boost is completely up to the caller. Soon, you’ll see a specific usage of the APC boost related to I/O completion.

**Note** Some dispatcher objects don’t have boosts associated with them. For example, when a timer is set or expires, or when a process is signaled, no boost is applied.

All these boosts of +1 attempt to solve the initial problem by making the assumption that both the releasing and waiting threads are running at the same priority. By boosting the waiting thread by one priority level, the waiting thread should preempt the releasing thread as soon as the operation completes. Unfortunately on uniprocessor systems, if this assumption does not hold, the boost might not do much: if the waiting thread is waiting at priority 4 vs. the releasing thread at priority 8, waiting at priority 5 won’t do much to reduce latency and force preemption. On multiprocessor systems, however, due to the stealing and balancing algorithms, this higher priority thread may have a higher chance to get picked up by another logical processor. This reality is due to a design choice made in the initial NT architecture, which is not to track lock ownership (except a few locks). That means the scheduler can’t be sure who really owns an event, and if it’s really being used as a lock. Even with lock ownership tracking, ownership is not usually passed in order to avoid convoy issues, other than in the ERESOURCE case which we’ll explain below.

However, for certain kinds of lock objects using events or gates as their underlying synchronization object, the lock ownership boost resolves the dilemma. Also, due to the processor-distribution and load-balancing schemes you’ll see later, on a multiprocessor machine, the ready thread might get picked up on another processor, and its high priority might increase the chances of it running on that secondary processor instead.

**Lock Ownership Boosts**

Because the executive-resource (ERESOURCE) and critical-section locks use underlying dispatcher objects, releasing these locks results in an unwait boost as described earlier. On the other hand, because the high-level implementation of these objects does track the owner of the lock, the kernel can make a more informed decision as to what kind of boost should be applied, by using the *AdjustBoost* reason. In these kinds of boosts, *AdjustIncrement* is set to the current priority of the releasing (or setting) thread, minus any GUI foreground separation boost, and before the *KiExitDispatcher* function is called, *KiRemoveBoostThread* is called by the event and gate code to return the releasing thread back to its regular priority (through the *KiComputeNewPriority* function). This step is needed to avoid a lock convoy situation, in which two threads repeatedly passing the lock between one another get ever-increasing boosts.

Note that pushlocks, which are unfair locks because ownership of the lock in a contended acquisition path is not predictable (rather, it’s random, just like a spinlock), do not apply priority boosts due to lock ownership. This is because doing so only contributes to preemption and priority proliferation, which isn’t required because the lock becomes immediately free as soon as it is released (bypassing the normal wait/unwait path).
CHAPTER 5  Processes, Threads, and Jobs

433

Other differences between the lock ownership boost and the unwait boost will be exposed in the way that the scheduler actually applies boosting, which is the upcoming topic after this section.

Priority Boosting After I/O Completion

Windows gives temporary priority boosts upon completion of certain I/O operations so that threads that were waiting for an I/O have more of a chance to run right away and process whatever was being waited for. Although you’ll find recommended boost values in the Windows Driver Kit (WDK) header files (by searching for “#define IO” in Wdm.h or Ntddk.h), the actual value for the boost is up to the device driver. (These values are listed in Table 5-6.) It is the device driver that specifies the boost when it completes an I/O request on its call to the kernel function, IoCompleteRequest. In Table 5-6, notice that I/O requests to devices that warrant better responsiveness have higher boost values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Device</th>
<th>Boost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disk, CD-ROM, parallel, video</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network, mailslot, named pipe, serial</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keyboard, mouse</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note  You might intuitively expect “better responsiveness” from your video card or disk than a boost of 1, but in fact, the kernel is trying to optimize for latency, which some devices (as well as human sensory inputs) are more sensitive to than others. To give you an idea, a sound card expects data around every 1 ms to play back music without perceptible glitches, while a video card needs to output at only 24 frames per second, or once every 40 ms, before the human eye can notice glitches.

As hinted earlier, these I/O completion boosts rely on the unwait boosts seen in the previous section. In Chapter 8 of Part 2, the mechanism of I/O completion will be shown in depth. For now, the important detail is that the kernel implements the signaling code in the IoCompleteRequest API through the use of either an APC (for asynchronous I/O) or through an event (for synchronous I/O). When a driver passes in, for example, IO_DISK_INCREMENT to IoCompleteRequest for an asynchronous disk read, the kernel calls KeInsertQueueApc with the boost parameter set to IO_DISK_INCREMENT. In turn, when the thread’s wait is broken due to the APC, it receives a boost of 1.

Be aware that the boost values given in the previous table are merely recommendations by Microsoft—driver developers are free to ignore them if they choose to do so, and certain specialized drivers can use their own values. For example, a driver handling ultrasound data from a medical device, which must notify a user-mode visualization application of new data, would probably use a boost value of 8 as well, to satisfy the same latency as a sound card.
In most cases, however, due to the way Windows driver stacks are built (again, see Chapter 8, “I/O System,” in Part 2 for more information), driver developers often write minidrivers, which call into a Microsoft-owned driver that supplies its own boost to IoCompleteRequest. For example, RAID or SATA controller card developers would typically call StorPortCompleteRequest to complete processing their requests. This call does not have any parameter for a boost value, because the Storport.sys driver fills in the right value when calling the kernel.

Additionally, in newer versions of Windows, whenever any file system driver (identified by setting its device type to FILE_DEVICE_DISK_FILE_SYSTEM or FILE_DEVICE_NETWORK_FILE_SYSTEM) completes its request, a boost of IO_DISK_INCREMENT is always applied if the driver passed in IO_NO_INCREMENT instead. So this boost value has become less of a recommendation and more of a requirement enforced by the kernel.

**Boosts During Waiting on Executive Resources**

When a thread attempts to acquire an executive resource (ERESOURCE; see Chapter 3 for more information on kernel-synchronization objects) that is already owned exclusively by another thread, it must enter a wait state until the other thread has released the resource. To limit the risk of deadlocks, the executive performs this wait in intervals of five seconds instead of doing an infinite wait on the resource.

At the end of these five seconds, if the resource is still owned, the executive attempts to prevent CPU starvation by acquiring the dispatcher lock, boosting the owning thread or threads to 14 (only if the original owner priority is less than the waiter’s and not already 14), resetting their quantums, and performing another wait.

Because executive resources can be either shared or exclusive, the kernel first boosts the exclusive owner and then checks for shared owners and boosts all of them. When the waiting thread enters the wait state again, the hope is that the scheduler will schedule one of the owner threads, which will have enough time to complete its work and release the resource. Note that this boosting mechanism is used only if the resource doesn’t have the Disable Boost flag set, which developers can choose to set if the priority-inversion mechanism described here works well with their usage of the resource.

Additionally, this mechanism isn’t perfect. For example, if the resource has multiple shared owners, the executive boosts all those threads to priority 14, resulting in a sudden surge of high-priority threads on the system, all with full quantums. Although the initial owner thread will run first (because it was the first to be boosted and therefore is first on the ready list), the other shared owners will run next, because the waiting thread’s priority was not boosted. Only after all the shared owners have had a chance to run and their priority has been decreased below the waiting thread will the waiting thread finally get its chance to acquire the resource. Because shared owners can promote or convert their ownership from shared to exclusive as soon as the exclusive owner releases the resource, it’s possible for this mechanism not to work as intended.
Priority Boosts for Foreground Threads After Waits

As will be shortly described, whenever a thread in the foreground process completes a wait operation on a kernel object, the kernel boosts its current (not base) priority by the current value of PsPrioritySeparation. (The windowing system is responsible for determining which process is considered to be in the foreground.) As described in the section on quantum controls, PsPrioritySeparation reflects the quantum-table index used to select quantums for the threads of foreground applications. However, in this case, it is being used as a priority boost value.

The reason for this boost is to improve the responsiveness of interactive applications—by giving the foreground application a small boost when it completes a wait, it has a better chance of running right away, especially when other processes at the same base priority might be running in the background.

EXPERIMENT: Watching Foreground Priority Boosts and Decays

Using the CPU Stress tool (downloadable from http://live.sysinternals.com/WindowsInternals), you can watch priority boosts in action. Take the following steps:

1. Open the System utility in Control Panel (or right-click on your computer name’s icon on the desktop, and choose Properties). Click the Advanced System Settings label, click on the Advanced tab, click the Settings button in the Performance section, and finally click on the Advanced tab. Select the Programs option. This causes PsPrioritySeparation to get a value of 2.

2. Run Cpustres.exe, and change the activity of thread 1 from Low to Busy.

3. Start the Performance tool by selecting Programs from the Start menu and then selecting Performance Monitor from the Administrative Tools menu. Click on the Performance Monitor entry under Monitoring Tools.

4. Click the Add Counter toolbar button (or press Ctrl+I) to bring up the Add Counters dialog box.

5. Select the Thread object, and then select the % Processor Time counter.
6. In the Instances box, select <All Instances> and click Search. Scroll down until you see the CPUSTRES process. Select the second thread (thread 1). (The first thread is the GUI thread.) You should see something like this:

7. Click the Add button, and then click OK.

8. Select Properties from the Action menu. Change the Vertical Scale Maximum to 16 on the Graph tab, and set the interval to 1 in Sample Every box of the Graph Elements area on the General tab.
9. Now bring the CPUSTRES process to the foreground. You should see the priority of the CPUSTRES thread being boosted by 2 and then decaying back to the base priority as follows:

![Graph showing priority boosts](image)

10. The reason CPUSTRES receives a boost of 2 periodically is because the thread you’re monitoring is sleeping about 25 percent of the time and then waking up. (This is the Busy Activity level). The boost is applied when the thread wakes up. If you set the Activity level to Maximum, you won’t see any boosts because Maximum in CPUSTRES puts the thread into an infinite loop. Therefore, the thread doesn’t invoke any wait functions and, as a result, doesn’t receive any boosts.

11. When you’ve finished, exit Performance Monitor and CPU Stress.

**Priority Boosts After GUI Threads Wake Up**

Threads that own windows receive an additional boost of 2 when they wake up because of windowing activity such as the arrival of window messages. The windowing system (Win32k.sys) applies this boost when it calls `KeSetEvent` to set an event used to wake up a GUI thread. The reason for this boost is similar to the previous one—to favor interactive applications.
EXPERIMENT: Watching Priority Boosts on GUI Threads

You can also see the windowing system apply its boost of 2 for GUI threads that wake up to process window messages by monitoring the current priority of a GUI application and moving the mouse across the window. Just follow these steps:

1. Open the System utility in Control Panel (or right-click on your computer name's icon on the desktop, and choose Properties). Click the Advanced System Settings label, click on the Advanced tab, click the Settings button in the Performance section, and finally click on the Advanced tab. Be sure that the Programs option is selected. This causes *PsPrioritySeparation* to get a value of 2.

2. Run Notepad from the Start menu by selecting All Programs/Accessories/Notepad.

3. Start the Performance tool by selecting Programs from the Start menu and then selecting Performance Monitor from the Administrative Tools menu. Click on the Performance Monitor entry under Monitoring Tools.

4. Click the Add Counter toolbar button (or press Ctrl+N) to bring up the Add Counters dialog box.

5. Select the Thread object, and then select the Priority Current counter.

6. In the Instances box, type **Notepad**, and then click Search. Scroll down until you see Notepad/0. Click it, click the Add button, and then click OK.

7. As in the previous experiment, select Properties from the Action menu. Change the Vertical Scale Maximum to 16 on the Graph tab, set the interval to 1 in Sample Every box of the Graph Elements area of the General tab, and click OK.

8. You should see the priority of thread 0 in Notepad at 8 or 10. Because Notepad entered a wait state shortly after it received the boost of 2 that threads in the foreground process receive, it might not yet have decayed from 10 to 8.

9. With Performance Monitor in the foreground, move the mouse across the Notepad window. (Make both windows visible on the desktop.) You'll see that the priority sometimes remains at 10 and sometimes at 9, for the reasons just explained. (The reason you won't likely catch Notepad at 8 is that it runs so little after receiving the GUI thread boost of 2 that it never experiences more than one priority level of decay before waking up again because of additional windowing activity and receiving the boost of 2 again.)

10. Now bring Notepad to the foreground. You should see the priority rise to 12 and remain there (or drop to 11, because it might experience the normal priority decay that occurs for boosted threads on the quantum end) because the thread is receiving...
two boosts: the boost of 2 applied to GUI threads when they wake up to process windowing input, and an additional boost of 2 because Notepad is in the foreground.

11. If you then move the mouse over Notepad (while it’s still in the foreground), you might see the priority drop to 11 (or maybe even 10) as it experiences the priority decay that normally occurs on boosted threads as they complete their turn. However, the boost of 2 that is applied because it’s the foreground process remains as long as Notepad remains in the foreground.

12. When you’ve finished, exit Performance Monitor and Notepad.

**Priority Boosts for CPU Starvation**

Imagine the following situation: you have a priority 7 thread that’s running, preventing a priority 4 thread from ever receiving CPU time; however, a priority 11 thread is waiting for some resource that the priority 4 thread has locked. But because the priority 7 thread in the middle is eating up all the CPU time, the priority 4 thread will never run long enough to finish whatever it’s doing and release the resource blocking the priority 11 thread. What does Windows do to address this situation?

You previously saw how the executive code responsible for executive resources manages this scenario by boosting the owner threads so that they can have a chance to run and release the resource. However, executive resources are only one of the many synchronization constructs available to developers, and the boosting technique will not apply to any other primitive. Therefore, Windows also includes a generic CPU starvation-relief mechanism as part of a thread called the balance set manager (a system thread that exists primarily to perform memory-management functions and is described in more detail in Chapter 10 of Part 2).

Once per second, this thread scans the ready queues for any threads that have been in the ready state (that is, haven’t run) for approximately 4 seconds. If it finds such a thread, the balance-set manager boosts the thread’s priority to 15 and sets the quantum target to an equivalent CPU clock cycle count of 3 quantum units. Once the quantum expires, the thread’s priority decays immediately to its original base priority. If the thread wasn’t finished and a higher priority thread is ready to run, the decayed thread returns to the ready queue, where it again becomes eligible for another boost if it remains there for another 4 seconds.

The balance-set manager doesn’t actually scan all of the ready threads every time it runs. To minimize the CPU time it uses, it scans only 16 ready threads; if there are more threads at that priority level, it remembers where it left off and picks up again on the next pass. Also, it will boost only 10 threads per pass—if it finds 10 threads meriting this particular boost (which indicates an unusually busy system), it stops the scan at that point and picks up again on the next pass.
Note We mentioned earlier that scheduling decisions in Windows are not affected by the number of threads and that they are made in constant time, or $O(1)$. Because the balance-set manager needs to scan ready queues manually, this operation depends on the number of threads on the system, and more threads will require more scanning time. However, the balance-set manager is not considered part of the scheduler or its algorithms and is simply an extended mechanism to increase reliability. Additionally, because of the cap on threads and queues to scan, the performance impact is minimized and predictable in a worst-case scenario.

Will this algorithm always solve the priority-inversion issue? No—it’s not perfect by any means. But over time, CPU-starved threads should get enough CPU time to finish whatever processing they were doing and re-enter a wait state.

EXPERIMENT: Watching Priority Boosts for CPU Starvation

Using the CPU Stress tool, you can watch priority boosts in action. In this experiment, you’ll see CPU usage change when a thread’s priority is boosted. Take the following steps:

1. Run Cpustres.exe. Change the activity level of the active thread (by default, Thread 1) from Low to Maximum. Change the thread priority from Normal to Below Normal. The screen should look like this:

![CPU Stress Screen Screenshot](image)

2. Start the Performance tool by selecting Programs from the Start menu and then selecting Performance Monitor from the Administrative Tools menu. Click on the Performance Monitor entry under Monitoring Tools.
3. Click the Add Counter toolbar button (or press Ctrl+N) to bring up the Add Counters dialog box.

4. Select the Thread object, and then select the Priority Current counter.

5. In the Instances box, type CPUSTRES, and then click Search. Scroll down until you see the second thread (thread 1). (The first thread is the GUI thread.) You should see something like this:

![Add Counters dialog box](image)

6. Click the Add button, and then click OK.

7. Raise the priority of Performance Monitor to real time by running Task Manager, clicking on the Processes tab, and selecting the Mmc.exe process. Right-click the process, select Set Priority, and then select Realtime. (If you receive a Task Manager Warning message box warning you of system instability, click the Yes button.) If you have a multiprocessor system, you also need to change the affinity of the process: right-click and select Set Affinity. Then clear all other CPUs except for CPU 0.

8. Run another copy of CPU Stress. In this copy, change the activity level of Thread 1 from Low to Maximum.

9. Now switch back to Performance Monitor. You should see CPU activity every six or so seconds because the thread is boosted to priority 15. You can force updates to occur more frequently than every second by pausing the display with Ctrl+F, and then pressing Ctrl+U, which forces a manual update of the counters. Keep Ctrl+U pressed for continual refreshes.

When you’ve finished, exit Performance Monitor and the two copies of CPU Stress.
EXPERIMENT: “Listening” to Priority Boosting

To “hear” the effect of priority boosting for CPU starvation, perform the following steps on a system with a sound card:

1. Because of MMCSS’ priority boosts (which we will describe in the next subsection), you need to stop the MultiMedia Class Scheduler Service by opening the Services management interface (Start, Programs, Administrative Tools, Services).

2. Run Windows Media Player (or some other audio-playback program), and begin playing some audio content.

3. Run Cpustres, and set the activity level of Thread 1 to Maximum.

4. Use Task Manager to set the affinities of both Windows Media Player and Cpustres to a single CPU.

5. Raise the priority of Thread 1 of Cpustres from Normal to Time Critical.

6. You should hear the music playback stop as the computer-bound thread begins consuming all available CPU time.

7. Every so often, you should hear bits of sound as the starved thread in the audio playback process gets boosted to 15 and runs enough to send more data to the sound card.

8. Stop Cpustres and Windows Media Player, and start the MMCSS service again.

Applying Boosts

Back in KiExitDispatcher, you saw that KiProcessThreadWaitList is called to process any threads in the deferred ready list. It is here that the boost information passed by the caller is processed. This is done by looping through each DeferredReady thread, unlinking its wait blocks (only Active and Bypassed blocks are unlinked), and then setting two key values in the kernel’s thread control block: AdjustReason and AdjustIncrement. The reason is one of the two Adjust possibilities seen earlier, and the increment corresponds to the boost value. KiDeferredReadyThread is then called, which makes the thread ready for execution, by running two algorithms: the quantum and priority selection algorithm, which you are about to see in two parts, and the processor selection algorithm, which is shown in its respective section later in this topic.

Let’s first look at when the algorithm applies boosts, which happens only in the cases where a thread is not in the real-time priority range.

For an AdjustUnwait boost, it will be applied only if the thread is not already experiencing an unusual boost and only if the thread has not disabled boosting by calling SetThreadPriorityBoost, which sets the DisableBoost flag in the KTHREAD. Another situation that can disable boosting in
this case is if the kernel has realized that the thread actually exhausted its quantum (but the clock interrupt did not fire to consume it) and the thread came out of a wait that lasted less than two clock ticks.

If these situations are not currently true, the new priority of the thread will be computed by adding the \textit{AdjustIncrement} to the thread’s current base priority. Additionally, if the thread is known to be part of a foreground process (meaning that the memory priority is set to MEMORY\_PRIORITY\_FOREGROUND, which is configured by Win32k.sys when focus changes), this is where the priority-separation boost (\textit{PsPrioritySeparation}) is applied by adding its value on top of the new priority. This is also known as the Foreground Priority boost, which was explained earlier.

Finally, the kernel checks whether this newly computed priority is higher than the current priority of the thread, and it limits this value to an upper bound of 15 to avoid crossing into the real-time range. It then sets this value as the thread’s new current priority. If any foreground separation boost was applied, it sets this value in the \textit{ForegroundBoost} field of the KTHREAD, which results in a \textit{PriorityDecrement} equal to the separation boost.

For \textit{AdjustBoost} boosts, the kernel checks whether the thread’s current priority is lower than the \textit{AdjustIncrement} (recall this is the priority of the setting thread) and whether the thread’s current priority is below 13. If so, and priority boosts have not been disabled for the thread, the \textit{AdjustIncrement} priority is used as the new current priority, limited to a maximum of 13. Meanwhile, the \textit{UnusualBoost} field of the KTHREAD contains the boost value, which results in a \textit{PriorityDecrement} equal to the lock ownership boost.

In all cases where a \textit{PriorityDecrement} is present, the quantum of the thread is also recomputed to be the equivalent of only one clock tick, based on the value of \textit{KiLockQuantumTarget}. This ensures that foreground and unusual boosts will be lost after one clock tick instead of the usual two (or other configured value), as will be shown in the next section. This also happens when an \textit{AdjustBoost} is requested but the thread is running at priority 13 or 14 or with boosts disabled.

After this work is complete, \textit{AdjustReason} is now set to \textit{AdjustNone}.

\section*{Removing Boosts}

Removing boosts is done in \textit{KiDeferredReadyThread} just as boosts and quantum recomputations are being applied (as shown in the previous section). The algorithm first begins by checking the type of adjustment being done.

For an \textit{AdjustNone} scenario, which means the thread became ready due to perhaps a preemption, the thread’s quantum will be recomputed if it already hit its target but the clock interrupt has not yet noticed, as long as the thread was running at a dynamic priority level. Additionally, the thread’s priority will be recomputed. For an \textit{AdjustUnwait} or \textit{AdjustBoost} scenario on a non-real-time thread, the kernel checks whether the thread silently exhausted its quantum (just as in the prior section). If it did, or if the thread was running with a base priority of 14 or higher, or if no \textit{PriorityDecrement} is present and the thread has completed a wait that lasted longer than two clock ticks, the quantum of the thread is recomputed, as is its priority.
Priority recomputation happens on non-real-time threads, and it’s done by taking the thread’s current priority, subtracting its foreground boost, subtracting is unusual boost (the combination of these last two items is the PriorityDecrement), and finally subtracting one. Finally, this new priority is bounded with the base priority as the lowest bound, and any existing priority decrement is zeroed out (clearing unusual and foreground boosts). This means that in the case of a lock ownership boost, or any of the unusual boosts explained, the entire boost value is now lost. On the other hand, for a regular AdjustUnwait boost, the priority naturally trickles down by one due to the subtraction by one. This lowering eventually stops when the base priority is hit due to the lower bound check.

There is another instance where boosts must be removed, which goes through the KiRemoveBoostThread function. This is a special-case boost removal, which occurs due to the lock-ownership boost rule, which specifies that the setting thread must lose its boost when donating its current priority to the waking thread (to avoid a lock convoy). It is also used to undo the boost due to targeted DPC-calls as well as the boost against ERESOURCE lock-starvation boost. The only special detail about this routine is that when computing the new priority, it takes special care to separate the ForegroundBoost vs. UnusualBoost components of the PriorityDecrement in order to maintain any GUI foreground-separation boost that the thread accumulated. This behavior, new to Windows 7, ensures that threads relying on the lock-ownership boost do not behave erratically when running in the foreground, or vice-versa.

Figure 5-20 displays an example of how normal boosts are removed from a thread as it experiences quantum end.

![Figure 5-20 Priority boosting and decay](image)

**Priority Boosts for Multimedia Applications and Games**

As you just saw in the last experiment, although Windows’ CPU-starvation priority boosts might be enough to get a thread out of an abnormally long wait state or potential deadlock, they simply cannot deal with the resource requirements imposed by a CPU-intensive application such as Windows Media Player or a 3D computer game.
Skipping and other audio glitches have been a common source of irritation among Windows users in the past, and the user-mode audio stack in Windows makes the situation worse because it offers even more chances for preemption. To address this, client versions of Windows incorporate a service (called MMCSS, described earlier in this chapter) whose purpose is to ensure glitch-free multimedia playback for applications that register with it.

MMCSS works by defining several tasks, including the following:

- Audio
- Capture
- Distribution
- Games
- Playback
- Pro Audio
- Window Manager

**Note** You can find the settings for MMCSS, including a list of tasks (which can be modified by OEMs to include other specific tasks as appropriate) in the registry keys under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Multimedia\SystemProfile. Additionally, the *SystemResponsiveness* value allows you to fine-tune how much CPU usage MMCSS guarantees to low-priority threads.

In turn, each of these tasks includes information about the various properties that differentiate them. The most important one for scheduling is called the Scheduling Category, which is the primary factor determining the priority of threads registered with MMCSS. Table 5-7 shows the various scheduling categories.

**TABLE 5-7** Scheduling Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>23-26</td>
<td>Pro Audio threads running at a higher priority than any other thread on the system except for critical system threads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>16-22</td>
<td>The threads part of a foreground application such as Windows Media Player</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>8-15</td>
<td>All other threads that are not part of the previous categories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exhausted</td>
<td>1-7</td>
<td>Threads that have exhausted their share of the CPU and will continue running only if no other higher priority threads are ready to run</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main mechanism behind MMCSS boosts the priority of threads inside a registered process to the priority level matching their scheduling category and relative priority within this category for a guaranteed period of time. It then lowers those threads to the Exhausted category so that other, nonmultimedia threads on the system can also get a chance to execute.
By default, multimedia threads get 80 percent of the CPU time available, while other threads receive 20 percent (based on a sample of 10 ms; in other words, 8 ms and 2 ms, respectively). MMCSS itself runs at priority 27 because it needs to preempt any Pro Audio threads in order to lower their priority to the Exhausted category.

Keep in mind that the kernel still does the actual boosting of the values inside the KTHREAD (MMCSS simply makes the same kind of system call any other application would), and the scheduler is still in control of these threads. It is simply their high priority that makes them run almost uninterrupted on a machine, because they are in the real-time range and well above threads that most user applications run in.

As was discussed earlier, changing the relative thread priorities within a process does not usually make sense, and no tool allows this because only developers understand the importance of the various threads in their programs. On the other hand, because applications must manually register with MMCSS and provide it with information about what kind of thread this is, MMCSS does have the necessary data to change these relative thread priorities (and developers are well aware that this will be happening).

EXPERIMENT: “Listening” to MMCSS Priority Boosting

You’ll now perform the same experiment as the prior one but without disabling the MMCSS service. In addition, you’ll look at the Performance tool to check the priority of the Windows Media Player threads.

1. Run Windows Media Player (because other playback programs might not yet take advantage of the API calls required to register with MMCSS), and begin playing some audio content.

2. If you have a multiprocessor machine, be sure to set the affinity of the Wmplayer.exe process so that it runs on only one CPU (because you’ll use only one CPUSTRES worker thread).

3. Start the Performance tool by selecting Programs from the Start menu and then selecting Performance Monitor from the Administrative Tools menu. Click on the Performance Monitor entry under Monitoring Tools.

4. Click the Add Counter toolbar button (or press Ctrl+N) to bring up the Add Counters dialog box.

5. Select the Thread object, and then select the Priority Current.

6. In the Instances box, type **Wmplayer**, click Search, and then select all its threads. Click the Add button, and then click OK.
7. As in the previous experiment, select Properties from the Action menu. Change the Vertical Scale Maximum to 31 on the Graph tab, set the interval to 1 in Sample Every Seconds of the Graph Elements area on the General tab, and click OK.

You should see one or more priority 21 threads inside Wmplayer, which will be constantly running unless there is a higher-priority thread requiring the CPU after they are dropped to the Exhausted category.

8. Run Cpustres, and set the activity level of Thread 1 to Maximum.

9. Raise the priority of Thread 1 from Normal to Time Critical.

10. You should notice the system slowing down considerably, but the music playback will continue. Every so often, you'll be able to get back some responsiveness from the rest of the system. Use this time to stop Cpustres.

11. If the Performance tool was unable to capture data during the time Cpustres ran, run it again, but use Highest instead of Time Critical. This change will slow down the system less, but it still requires boosting from MMCSS. Because once the multimedia thread is put in the Exhausted category there will always be a higher priority thread requesting the CPU (CPUSTRES), you should notice Wmplayer's priority 21 thread drop every so often, as shown here:
MMCSS’ functionality does not stop at simple priority boosting, however. Because of the nature of network drivers on Windows and the NDIS stack, deferred procedure calls (DPCs) are quite common mechanisms for delaying work after an interrupt has been received from the network card. Because DPCs run at an IRQL level higher than user-mode code (see Chapter 3 for more information on DPCs and IRQLs), long-running network card driver code can still interrupt media playback during network transfers or when playing a game, for example.

Therefore, MMCSS also sends a special command to the network stack, telling it to throttle network packets during the duration of the media playback. This throttling is designed to maximize playback performance, at the cost of some small loss in network throughput (which would not be noticeable for network operations usually performed during playback, such as playing an online game). The exact mechanisms behind it do not belong to any area of the scheduler, so we’ll leave them out of this description.

**Note** The original implementation of the network throttling code had some design issues that caused significant network throughput loss on machines with 1000 Mbit network adapters, especially if multiple adapters were present on the system (a common feature of midrange motherboards). This issue was analyzed by the MMCSS and networking teams at Microsoft and later fixed.

### Context Switching

A thread’s context and the procedure for context switching vary depending on the processor’s architecture. A typical context switch requires saving and reloading the following data:

- Instruction pointer
- Kernel stack pointer
- A pointer to the address space in which the thread runs (the process’ page table directory)

The kernel saves this information from the old thread by pushing it onto the current (old thread’s) kernel-mode stack, updating the stack pointer, and saving the stack pointer in the old thread’s KTHREAD structure. The kernel stack pointer is then set to the new thread’s kernel stack, and the new thread’s context is loaded. If the new thread is in a different process, it loads the address of its page table directory into a special processor register so that its address space is available. (See the description of address translation in Chapter 10 in Part 2.) If a kernel APC that needs to be delivered is pending, an interrupt at IRQL 1 is requested. (For more information on APCs, see Chapter 3.) Otherwise, control passes to the new thread’s restored instruction pointer and the new thread resumes execution.
Scheduling Scenarios

Windows bases the question of “Who gets the CPU?” on thread priority, but how does this approach work in practice? The following sections illustrate just how priority-driven preemptive multitasking works on the thread level.

Voluntary Switch

First a thread might voluntarily relinquish use of the processor by entering a wait state on some object (such as an event, a mutex, a semaphore, an I/O completion port, a process, a thread, a window message, and so on) by calling one of the Windows wait functions (such as `WaitForSingleObject` or `WaitForMultipleObjects`). Waiting for objects is described in more detail in Chapter 3.

Figure 5-21 illustrates a thread entering a wait state and Windows selecting a new thread to run. In Figure 5-21, the top block (thread) is voluntarily relinquishing the processor so that the next thread in the ready queue can run (as represented by the halo it has when in the Running column). Although it might appear from this figure that the relinquishing thread’s priority is being reduced, it’s not—it’s just being moved to the wait queue of the objects the thread is waiting for.

Preemption

In this scheduling scenario, a lower-priority thread is preempted when a higher-priority thread becomes ready to run. This situation might occur for a couple of reasons:

- A higher-priority thread’s wait completes. (The event that the other thread was waiting for has occurred.)
- A thread priority is increased or decreased.
In either of these cases, Windows must determine whether the currently running thread should still continue to run or whether it should be preempted to allow a higher-priority thread to run.

**Note** Threads running in user mode can preempt threads running in kernel mode—the mode in which the thread is running doesn't matter. The thread priority is the determining factor.

When a thread is preempted, it is put at the head of the ready queue for the priority it was running at. Figure 5-22 illustrates this situation.

![Preemptive thread scheduling](image)

In Figure 5-22, a thread with priority 18 emerges from a wait state and repossesses the CPU, causing the thread that had been running (at priority 16) to be bumped to the head of the ready queue. Notice that the bumped thread isn’t going to the end of the queue but to the beginning; when the preempting thread has finished running, the bumped thread can complete its quantum.

**Quantum End**

When the running thread exhausts its CPU quantum, Windows must determine whether the thread’s priority should be decremented and then whether another thread should be scheduled on the processor.

If the thread priority is reduced, Windows looks for a more appropriate thread to schedule. (For example, a more appropriate thread would be a thread in a ready queue with a higher priority than the new priority for the currently running thread.) If the thread priority isn’t reduced and there are other threads in the ready queue at the same priority level, Windows selects the next thread in the ready queue at that same priority level and moves the previously running thread to the tail of that queue (giving it a new quantum value and changing its state from running to ready). This case is
illustrated in Figure 5-23. If no other thread of the same priority is ready to run, the thread gets to run for another quantum.

As you saw, instead of simply relying on a clock interval timer–based quantum to schedule threads, Windows uses an accurate CPU clock cycle count to maintain quantum targets. One factor we haven’t yet mentioned is that Windows also uses this count to determine whether quantum end is currently appropriate for the thread—something that might have happened previously and is important to discuss.

Using a scheduling model that relies only on the clock interval timer, the following situation can occur:

- Threads A and B become ready to run during the middle of an interval. (Scheduling code runs not just at each clock interval, so this is often the case.)
- Thread A starts running but is interrupted for a while. The time spent handling the interrupt is charged to the thread.
- Interrupt processing finishes and thread A starts running again, but it quickly hits the next clock interval. The scheduler can assume only that thread A had been running all this time and now switches to thread B.
- Thread B starts running and has a chance to run for a full clock interval (barring pre-emption or interrupt handling).

In this scenario, thread A was unfairly penalized in two different ways. First, the time it spent handling a device interrupt was accounted to its own CPU time, even though the thread probably had nothing to do with the interrupt. (Recall that interrupts are handled in the context of whichever thread was running at the time.) It was also unfairly penalized for the time the system was idling inside that clock interval before it was scheduled.

Figure 5-24 represents this scenario.
Because Windows keeps an accurate count of the exact number of CPU clock cycles spent doing work that the thread was scheduled to do (which means excluding interrupts), and because it keeps a quantum target of clock cycles that should have been spent by the thread at the end of its quantum, both of the unfair decisions that would have been made against thread A will not happen in Windows.

Instead, the following situation occurs:

- Threads A and B become ready to run during the middle of an interval.
- Thread A starts running but is interrupted for a while. The CPU clock cycles spent handling the interrupt are not charged to the thread.
- Interrupt processing finishes and thread A starts running again, but it quickly hits the next clock interval. The scheduler looks at the number of CPU clock cycles charged to the thread and compares them to the expected CPU clock cycles that should have been charged at quantum end.
- Because the former number is much smaller than it should be, the scheduler assumes that thread A started running in the middle of a clock interval and might have been additionally interrupted.
- Thread A gets its quantum increased by another clock interval, and the quantum target is recalculated. Thread A now has its chance to run for a full clock interval.
- At the next clock interval, thread A has finished its quantum, and thread B now gets a chance to run.

Figure 5-25 represents this scenario.
Termination

When a thread finishes running (either because it returned from its main routine, called `ExitThread`, or was killed with `TerminateThread`), it moves from the running state to the terminated state. If there are no handles open on the thread object, the thread is removed from the process thread list and the associated data structures are deallocated and released.

Idle Threads

When no runnable thread exists on a CPU, Windows dispatches that CPU's idle thread. Each CPU has its own dedicated idle thread, because on a multiprocessor system one CPU can be executing a thread while other CPUs might have no threads to execute. Each CPU's idle thread is found via a pointer in that CPU's PRCB.

All of the idle threads belong to the idle process. The idle process and idle threads are special cases in many ways. They are, of course, represented by EPROCESS/KPROCESS and ETHREAD/KTHREAD structures, but they are not executive manager processes and thread objects. Nor is the idle process on the system process list. (This is why it does not appear in the output of the kernel debugger's `!process 0 0` command.) However, the idle thread or threads and their process can be found in other ways.

EXPERIMENT: Displaying the Structures of the Idle Threads and Idle Process

The idle thread and process structures can be found in the kernel debugger via the `!pcr` command. "PCR" is short for "processor control region." This command displays a subset of information from the PCR and also from the associated PRCB (processor control block). `!pcr` takes a single numeric argument, which is the number of the CPU whose PCR is to be displayed. The boot processor is processor number 0, and it is always present, so `!pcr 0` should always work. The following output shows the results of this command from a memory dump taken from a 64-bit, four-processor system:

```plaintext
3: kd> !pcr 0
KPCR for Processor 0 at fffff800039fdd00:
    Major 1 Minor 1
    NtTib.ExceptionList: fffff80000b95000
    NtTib.StackBase: fffff80000b96080
    NtTib.StackLimit: 000000000008e2d8
    NtTib.SubSystemTib: fffff800039fdd00
    NtTib.Version: 00000000039fde80
    NtTib.UserPointer: fffff800039fe4f0
    NtTib.SelfTib: 00000007efdb000
    SelfPcr: 0000000000000000
    Prcb: fffff800039fde080
    Irql: 0000000000000000
    IRR: 0000000000000000
```
This output shows that CPU 0 was executing a thread other than its idle thread at the time the memory dump was obtained, because the `CurrentThread` and `IdleThread` pointers are different. (If you have a multi-CPU system you can try `!pcr 1`, `!pcr 2`, and so on, until you run out; observe that each `IdleThread` pointer is different.)

Now use the `!thread` command on the indicated idle thread address:

```
3: kd> !thread fffff80003a0bcc0
THREAD fffff80003a0bcc0  Cid 0000.0000  Teb: 0000000000000000 Win32Thread: 0000000000000000
    RUNNING on processor 0
Not impersonating
DeviceMap                 fffff8a000008aa0
Owning Process            fffff80003a0c1c0       Image:         Idle
Attached Process          fffffa800792a040       Image:         System
Wait Start TickCount      50774016       Ticks: 12213 (0:00:03:10.828)
Context Switch Count      1147613282
UserTime                  00:00:00.000
KernelTime                8 Days 07:21:56.656
Win32 Start Address nt!KiIdleLoop (0xfffff8000387f910)
Stack Init fffff80000b9cd80 Current fffff80000b9cd40
Base fffff80000b9d000 Limit fffff80000b97000 Call 0
Priority 16 BasePriority 0 UnusualBoost 0 ForegroundBoost 0 IoPriority 0 PagePriority 0
Child-SP          RetAddr           : Args to Child     [...]: Call Site
fffff80000b9cd80 0000000000000000 : fffff80000b9d000 [...]: nt!KiIdleLoop+0x10d
```

Finally, use the `!process` command on the “Owning Process” shown in the preceding output. For brevity, we’ll add a second parameter value of 3, which causes `!process` to emit only minimal information for each thread:

```
3: kd> !process fffff80003a0c1c0 3
PROCESS fffff80003a0c1c0
    SessionId: none  Cid: 0000  Peb: 00000000  ParentCid: 0000
    DirBase: 00187000  ObjectTable: fffff8a000001630  HandleCount: 1338.
    Image: Idle
    VadRoot fffff8a000004a40 Vads 1 Clone 0 Private 1. Modified 0. Locked 0.
    DeviceMap 0000000000000000
    Token fffff8a000000a40
    ElapsedTime 00:00:00.000
    UserTime 00:00:00.000
    KernelTime 00:00:00.000
```
The preceding experiment shows some of the anomalies associated with the idle process and its threads. The debugger indicates an “Image” name of “Idle” (which comes from the EPROCESS structure’s `ImageFileName` member), but various Windows utilities report the idle process using different names. Task Manager and Process Explorer call it “System Idle Process,” while Tlist calls it “System Process.” The process ID and thread IDs (the “client IDs”, or “Cid” in the debugger’s output) are zero, as are the PEB and TEB pointers, and there are many other fields in the idle process or its threads that might be reported as 0. This occurs because the idle process has no user-mode address space and its threads execute no user-mode code, so they have no need of the various data needed to manage a user-mode environment. Also, the idle process is not an object-manager process object, and its idle threads are not object-manager thread objects. Instead, the initial idle thread and idle process structures are statically allocated and used to bootstrap the system before the process manager and the object manager are initialized. Subsequent idle thread structures are allocated dynamically (as simple allocations from nonpaged pool, bypassing the object manager) as additional processors are brought online. Once process management initializes, it uses the special variable `PsIdleProcess` to refer to the idle process.

Perhaps the most interesting anomaly regarding the idle process is that Windows reports the priority of the idle threads as 0 (16 on x64 systems, as shown earlier). In reality, however, the values of the idle threads’ priority members are irrelevant, because these threads are selected for dispatching only when there are no other threads to run. Their priority is never compared with that of any other thread, nor are they used to put an idle thread on a ready queue; idle threads are never part of any
ready queues. (Remember, only one thread per Windows system is actually running at priority 0—the zero page thread, explained in Chapter 10 in Part 2.)

Just as the idle threads are special cases in terms of selection for execution, they are also special cases for preemption. The idle thread’s routine, KiIdleLoop, performs a number of operations that preclude its being preempted by another thread in the usual fashion. When no non-idle threads are available to run on a processor, that processor is marked as idle in its PRCB. After that, if a thread is selected for execution on the idle processor, the thread’s address is stored in the NextThread pointer of the idle processor’s PRCB. The idle thread checks this pointer on each pass through its loop.

Although some details of the flow vary between architectures, the basic sequence of operations of the idle thread is as follows:

1. Enables interrupts briefly, allowing any pending interrupts to be delivered, and then disables them again (using the STI and CLI instructions on x86 and x64 processors). This is desirable because significant parts of the idle thread execute with interrupts disabled.

2. On the debug build on some architectures, checks whether there is a kernel debugger trying to break into the system and, if so, gives it access.

3. Checks whether any DPCs (described in Chapter 3) are pending on the processor. DPCs could be pending if a DPC interrupt was not generated when they were queued. If DPCs are pending, the idle loop calls KiRetireDpcList to deliver them. This will also perform timer expiration, as well as deferred ready processing; the latter is explained in the upcoming multiprocessor scheduling section. KiRetireDpcList must be entered with interrupts disabled, which is why interrupts are left disabled at the end of step 1. KiRetireDpcList exits with interrupts disabled as well.

4. Checks whether a thread has been selected to run next on the processor and, if so, dispatches that thread. This could be the case if, for example, a DPC or timer expiration processed in step 3 resolved the wait of a waiting thread, or if another processor selected a thread for this processor to run while it was already in the idle loop.

5. If requested, checks for threads ready to run on other processors and, if possible, schedules one of them locally. (This operation is explained in the upcoming “Idle Scheduler” section.)

6. Calls the registered power management processor idle routine (in case any power management functions need to be performed), which is either in the processor power driver (such as intelppm.sys) or in the HAL if such a driver is unavailable.

**Thread Selection**

Whenever a logical processor needs to pick the next thread to run, it calls the KiSelectNextThread scheduler function. This can happen in a variety of scenarios:

- A hard affinity change has occurred, making the currently running or standby thread ineligible for execution on its selected logical processor, so another must be chosen.
The currently running thread reached its quantum end, and the SMT set it was currently running on has now become busy, while other SMT sets within the ideal node are fully idle. (SMT is the abbreviation for Symmetric Multi-Threading, the technical name for the Hyperthreading technology described in Chapter 2.) The scheduler performs a quantum end migration of the current thread, so another must be chosen.

A wait operation has completed, and there were pending scheduling operations in the wait status register (in other words, the Priority and/or Affinity bits were set).

In these scenarios, the behavior of the scheduler is as follows:

- Call KiSelectReadyThread to find the next ready thread that the processor should run, and check whether one was found.
- If a ready thread was not found, the idle scheduler is enabled, and the idle thread is selected for execution.
- Or, if a ready thread was found, it is put in the Standby state and set as the NextThread in the KPRCB of the logical processor.

The KiSelectNextThread operation is performed only when the logical processor needs to pick, but not yet run, the next schedulable thread (which is why the thread will enter Standby). Other times, however, the logical processor is interested in immediately running the next ready thread or performing another action if one is not available (instead of going idle), such as when the following occurs:

- A priority change has occurred, making the current standby or running thread no longer the highest priority ready thread on its selected logical processor, so a higher priority ready thread must now run.
- The thread has explicitly yielded with YieldProcessor or NtYieldExecution, and another thread might be ready for execution.
- The quantum of the current thread has expired, and other threads at the same priority level need their chance to run as well
- A thread has lost its priority boost, causing a similar priority change to the scenario just described.
- The idle scheduler is running and needs to check whether a ready thread has not appeared in the interval between which idle scheduling was requested and the idle scheduler ran.

A simple way to remember the difference between which routine runs is to check whether or not the logical processor must run a different thread (in which case KiSelectNextThread is called) or if it should, if possible, run a different thread (in which case KiSelectReadyThread is called).

In either case, because each processor has its own database of threads that are ready to run (the dispatcher database’s ready queues in the KPRCB), KiSelectReadyThread can simply check the current LP’s queues, removing the first highest priority thread that it finds, unless this priority is lower than the one of the currently running thread (depending on whether the current thread is still allowed to
run, which would not be the case in the KiSelectNextThread scenario). If there is no higher priority thread (or no threads are ready at all), no thread is returned.

Idle Scheduler
Whenever the idle thread runs, it checks whether idle scheduling has been enabled, such as in one of the scenarios described in the previous section. If so, the idle thread then begins scanning other processor’s ready queues for threads it can run by calling KiSearchForNewThread. Note that the runtime costs associated with this operation are not charged as idle thread time, but are instead charged as interrupt and DPC time (charged to the processor), so idle scheduling time is considered system time. The KiSearchForNewThread algorithm, which is based on the functions seen in the “Thread Selection” section earlier, will be explained in the upcoming section.

Multiprocessor Systems
On a uniprocessor system, scheduling is relatively simple: the highest-priority thread that wants to run is always running. On a multiprocessor system, it is more complex, because Windows attempts to schedule threads on the most optimal processor for the thread, taking into account the thread’s preferred and previous processors, as well as the configuration of the multiprocessor system. Therefore, although Windows attempts to schedule the highest-priority runnable threads on all available CPUs, it guarantees only to be running one of the highest-priority threads somewhere.

Before we describe the specific algorithms used to choose which threads run where and when, let’s examine the additional information Windows maintains to track thread and processor state on multiprocessor systems and the three different types of multiprocessor systems supported by Windows (SMT, multicore, and NUMA).

Package Sets and SMT Sets
Windows uses five fields in the KPRCB to determine correct scheduling decisions when dealing with logical processor topologies. The first field, CoresPerPhysicalProcessor, determines whether this logical processor is part of a multicore package, and it’s computed from the CPUID returned by the processor and rounded to a power of two. The second field, LogicalProcessorsPerCore determines whether the logical processor is part of an SMT set, such as on an Intel processor with HyperThreading enabled, and is also queried through CPUID and rounded. Multiplying these two numbers yields the number of logical processors per package, or an actual physical processor that fits into a socket. With these numbers, each PRCB can then populate its PackageProcessorSet value, which is the affinity mask describing which other logical processors within this group (because packages are constrained to a group) belong to the same physical processor. Similarly, the CoreProcessorSet value connects other logical processors to the same core, also called an SMT set. Finally, the GroupSetMember value identifies this very logical processor. For example, the logical processor 3 normally has a GroupSetMember of 8 (2^3).
EXPERIMENT: Viewing Logical Processor Information

You can examine the information Windows maintains for SMT processors using the `lsmt` command in the kernel debugger. The following output is from a dual-core Intel Core i5 system with SMT (four logical processors):

```
SMT Summary:
KeActiveProcessors:
****------------------------------------------------------------ (000000000000000f)
KiIdleSummary:
-*=------------------------------------------------------------ (000000000000000a)
---------------------------------------------------------------- (0000000000000000)
---------------------------------------------------------------- (0000000000000000)
---------------------------------------------------------------- (0000000000000000)

No PRCB SMT Set APIC Id
0 fffff8000324ae80 **-------------------------------------------------------------- (0000000000000003) 0x00000000
1 fffff880009e5180 **-------------------------------------------------------------- (0000000000000003) 0x00000001
2 fffff88002f65180 --**------------------------------------------------------------ (000000000000000c) 0x00000002
3 fffff88002fd7180 --**------------------------------------------------------------ (000000000000000c) 0x00000003

Maximum cores per physical processor: 8
Maximum logical processors per core: 2
```

NUMA Systems

Another type of multiprocessor system supported by Windows is one with a nonuniform memory access (NUMA) architecture. In a NUMA system, processors are grouped together in smaller units called nodes. Each node has its own processors and memory and is connected to the larger system through a cache-coherent interconnect bus. These systems are called "nonuniform" because each node has its own local high-speed memory. Although any processor in any node can access all of memory, node-local memory is much faster to access.

The kernel maintains information about each node in a NUMA system in a data structure called KNODE. The kernel variable `KeNodeBlock` is an array of pointers to the KNODE structures for each node. The format of the KNODE structure can be shown using the `dt` command in the kernel debugger, as shown here:

```
lkd> dt nt!_KNODE
+0x000 PagedPoolSListHead : _SLIST_HEADER
+0x008 NonPagedPoolSListHead : [3] _SLIST_HEADER
+0x020 Affinity : _GROUP_AFFINITY
+0x02c ProximityId : Uint4B
+0x030 NodeNumber : Uint2B
...
+0x060 ParkLock : Int4B
+0x064 NodePad1 : Uint4B
```
EXPERIMENT: Viewing NUMA Information

You can examine the information Windows maintains for each node in a NUMA system using the !numa command in the kernel debugger. The following partial output is from a 64-processor NUMA system from Hewlett-Packard with four processors per node:

```
26: kd> !numa
NUMA Summary:
-------------
Number of NUMA nodes : 16
Number of Processors : 64
MmAvailablePages : 0x03F55E67
KeActiveProcessors : 7fffffffffffffff

NODE 0 (E000000084261900):
  ProcessorMask : ****------------------------------------------------------------
...
NODE 1 (E0000145FF992200):
  ProcessorMask : ----****--------------------------------------------------------
...
```

Applications that want to gain the most performance out of NUMA systems can set the affinity mask to restrict a process to the processors in a specific node, although Windows already restricts nearly all threads to a single NUMA node due to its NUMA-aware scheduling algorithms.

How the scheduling algorithms take into account NUMA systems will be covered in the upcoming section “Processor Selection” (and the optimizations in the memory manager to take advantage of node-local memory are covered in Chapter 10 in Part 2).

Processor Group Assignment

While querying the topology of the system to build the various relationships between logical processors, SMT sets, multicore packages and physical sockets, Windows assigns processors to an appropriate group that will describe their affinity (through the extended affinity mask seen earlier). This work is done by the KePerformGroupConfiguration routine, which is called during initialization before any other Phase 1 work is done. Note that regardless of the group assignment steps below, NUMA node 0 is always assigned to group 0, no matter what.

First, the function queries all detected nodes (KeNumberOfNodes) and computes the capacity of each node (that is, how many logical processors can be part of the node). This value is stored as the MaximumProcessors in the KeNodeBlock, which identifies all NUMA nodes on the system. If the system supports NUMA Proximity IDs, the proximity ID is queried for each node as well and saved in the node block. Second, the NUMA distance array is allocated (KeNodeDistance), and the distance between each NUMA node is computed as was described in Chapter 3.
The next series of steps deal with specific user-configuration options that override default NUMA assignments. For example, on a system with Hyper-V installed (and the hypervisor configured to auto-start), only one processor group will be enabled, and all NUMA nodes (that can fit) will be associated with group 0. This means that Hyper-V scenarios cannot take advantage of machines with over 64 processors at the moment.

Next, the function checks whether any static group assignment data was passed by the loader (and thus configured by the user). This data specifies the proximity information and group assignment for each NUMA node.

**Note**  Users dealing with large NUMA servers that might need custom control of proximity information and group assignments for testing or validation purposes can input this data through the Group Assignment and Node Distance registry values in the HKLM\SYSTEM \CurrentControlSet\Control\NUMA registry key. The exact format of this data includes a count, followed by an array of proximity IDs and group assignments, which are all 32-bit values.

Before treating this data as valid, the kernel queries the proximity ID to match the node number and then associates group numbers as requested. It then makes sure that NUMA node 0 is associated with group 0, and that the capacity for all NUMA nodes is consistent with the group size. Finally, the function checks how many groups still have remaining capacity.

Next, the kernel dynamically attempts to assign NUMA nodes to groups, while respecting any statically configured nodes if passed-in as we just described. Normally, the kernel tries to minimize the number of groups created, combining as many NUMA nodes as possible per group. However, if this behavior is not desired, it can be configured differently with the /MAXGROUP loader parameter, which is configured through the `maxgroup` BCD option. Turning this value on overrides the default behavior and causes the algorithm to spread as many NUMA nodes as possible into as many groups as possible (while respecting that the currently implemented group limit is 4). If there is only one node, or if all nodes can fit into a single group (and `maxgroup` is off), the system performs the default setting of assigning all nodes to group 0.

If there is more than one node, Windows checks the static NUMA node distances (if any), and then sorts all the nodes by their capacity so that the largest nodes come first. In the group-minimization mode, by adding up all the capacities, the kernel figures out how many maximum processors there can be. By dividing that by the number of processors per group, the kernel assumes there will be this many total groups on the machine (limited to a maximum of 4). In the group-maximization mode, the initial estimate is that there will be as many groups as nodes (limited again to 4).

Now the kernel begins the final assignment process. All fixed assignments from earlier are now committed, and groups are created for those assignments. Next, all the NUMA nodes are reshuffled to minimize the distance between the different nodes within a group. In other words, closer nodes are put in the same group and sorted by distance. Next, the same process is performed for any
dynamically configured node to group assignments. Finally, any remaining empty nodes are assigned to group 0.

Logical Processors per Group

Generally, Windows assigns 64 processors per group as explained earlier, but this configuration can also be customized by using different load options, such as the /GROUPSIZE option, which is configured through the *groupsize* BCD element. By specifying a number that is a power of two, groups can be forced to contain fewer processors than normal, for purposes such as testing group awareness in the system (for example, a system with 8 logical processors can be made to appear to have 1, 2, or 4 groups). To force the issue, the /FORCEGROUPAWARE option (BCD element *groupaware*) furthermore makes the kernel avoid group 0 whenever possible, assigning the highest group number available in actions such as thread and DPC affinity selection and process group assignment. Avoid setting a group size of 1, because this will force almost all applications on the system to behave as if they’re running on a uniprocessor machine, because the kernel sets the affinity mask of a given process to span only one group until the application requests otherwise (which most applications today will not do).

Note that in the edge case where the number of logical processors in a package cannot fit into a single group, Windows adjusts these numbers so that a package can fit into a single group, shrinking the *CoresPerPhysicalProcessor* number, and if the SMT cannot fit either, doing this as well for *LogicalProcessorsPerCore*. The exception to this rule is if the system actually contains multiple NUMA nodes within a single package. Although this is not a possibility as of this writing, future Multiple-Chip Modules (MCMs, an extension of multicore packages) are due to ship from processor manufacturers in the future. In these modules, two sets of cores as well as two memory controllers are on the same die/package. If the ACPI SRAT table defines the MCM as having two NUMA nodes, depending on group configuration algorithms, Windows might associate the two nodes with two different groups. In this scenario, the MCM package would span more than one group.

Other than causing significant driver and application compatibility problems (which they are designed to identify and root out, when used by developers), these options have an even greater impact on the machine: they will force NUMA behaviors even on a non-NUMA machine. This is because Windows will never allow a NUMA node to span multiple groups, as was shown in the assignment algorithms. So, if the kernel is creating artificially small groups, those two groups must each have their own NUMA node. For example, on a quad-core processor with a group size of two, this will create two groups, and thus two NUMA nodes, which will be subnodes of the main node. This will affect scheduling and memory-management policies in the same way a true NUMA system would, which can be useful for testing.

Logical Processor State

In addition to the ready queues and the ready summary, Windows maintains two bitmasks that track the state of the processors on the system. (How these bitmasks are used is explained in the upcoming section “Processor Selection.”) Following are the bitmasks that Windows maintains.
The first one is the active processor mask (\textit{KeActiveProcessors}), which has a bit set for each usable processor on the system. This might be fewer than the number of actual processors if the licensing limits of the version of Windows running supports fewer than the number of available physical processors. To check this, use the variable \textit{KeRegisteredProcessors} to see how many processors are actually licensed on the machine. In this instance, “processors” refers to physical packages. The \textit{KeMaximumProcessors} variable, on the other hand, is the maximum number of logical processors, including all future possible dynamic processor additions, bounded within the licensing limit, and any platform limitations that are queried by calling the HAL and checking with the ACPI SRAT table, if any.

The idle summary (\textit{KiIdleSummary}) is actually an array of two extended bitmasks. In the first entry, called \textit{CpuSet}, each set bit represents an idle processor, while in the second entry, \textit{SMTSet}, each bit describes an idle SMT set.

The nonparked summary (\textit{KiNonParkedSummary}) defines each nonparked logical processor through a bit.

**Scheduler Scalability**

Because on a multiprocessor system one processor might need to modify another processor’s per-CPU scheduling data structures (such as inserting a thread that would like to run on a certain processor), these structures are synchronized by using a per-PRCB queued spinlock, which is held at DISPATCH\_LEVEL. Thus, thread selection can occur while locking only an individual processor’s PRCB. If needed, up to one more processor’s PRCB can also be locked, such as in scenarios of thread stealing, which will be described later. Thread context switching is also synchronized by using a finer-grained per-thread spinlock.

There is also a per-CPU list of threads in the deferred ready state. These represent threads that are ready to run but have not yet been readied for execution; the actual ready operation has been deferred to a more appropriate time. Because each processor manipulates only its own per-processor deferred ready list, this list is not synchronized by the PRCB spinlock. The deferred ready thread list is processed by \textit{KiProcessDeferredReadyList} after a function has already done modifications to process or thread affinity, priority (including due to priority boosting), or quantum values.

This function calls \textit{KiDeferredReadyThread} for each thread on the list, which performs the algorithm shown later in the “Processor Selection” section, which could either cause the thread to run immediately; to be put on the ready list of the processor; or if the processor is unavailable, to be potentially put on a different processor’s deferred ready list, in a standby state, or immediately executed. This property is used by the Core Parking engine when parking a core: all threads are put into the deferred ready list, and it is then processed. Because \textit{KiDeferredReadyThread} skips parked cores (as will be shown), it causes all of this processor’s threads to wind up on other processors.

**Affinity**

Each thread has an affinity mask that specifies the processors on which the thread is allowed to run. The thread affinity mask is inherited from the process affinity mask. By default, all processes (and therefore all threads) begin with an affinity mask that is equal to the set of all active processors on
their assigned group—in other words, the system is free to schedule all threads on any available processor within the group associated with the process.

However, to optimize throughput, partition workloads to a specific set of processors, or both, applications can choose to change the affinity mask for a thread. This can be done at several levels:

- Calling the `SetThreadAffinityMask` function to set the affinity for an individual thread.
- Calling the `SetProcessAffinityMask` function to set the affinity for all the threads in a process. Task Manager and Process Explorer provide a GUI to this function if you right-click a process and choose Set Affinity. The Psexec tool (from Sysinternals) provides a command-line interface to this function. (See the --a switch in its help output.)
- By making a process a member of a job that has a jobwide affinity mask set using the `SetInformationJobObject` function. (Jobs are described in the upcoming “Job Objects” section.)
- By specifying an affinity mask in the image header when compiling the application. (For more information on the detailed format of Windows images, search for “Portable Executable and Common Object File Format Specification” on www.microsoft.com.)

An image can also have the “uniprocessor” flag set at link time. If this flag is set, the system chooses a single processor at process creation time (`MmRotatingProcessorNumber`) and assigns that as the process affinity mask, starting with the first processor and then going round-robin across all the processors within the group. For example, on a dual-processor system, the first time an image marked as uniprocessor is launched, it is assigned to CPU 0; the second time, CPU 1; the third time, CPU 0; the fourth time, CPU 1; and so on. This flag can be useful as a temporary workaround for programs that have multithreaded synchronization bugs that, as a result of race conditions, surface on multiprocessor systems but that don’t occur on uniprocessor systems. If an image exhibits such symptoms and is unsigned, the flag can be manually added by editing the image header with a tool such as Imagecfg.exe. A better solution, also compatible with signed executables, is to use the Microsoft Application Compatibility Toolkit and add a shim to force the compatibility database to mark the image as uniprocessor-only at launch time.

**EXPERIMENT: Viewing and Changing Process Affinity**

In this experiment, you will modify the affinity settings for a process and see that process affinity is inherited by new processes:

1. Run the command prompt (Cmd.exe).
2. Run Task Manager or Process Explorer, and find the Cmd.exe process in the process list.
3. Right-click the process, and select Set Affinity. A list of processors should be displayed. For example, on a dual-processor system you will see this:

![Processor Affinity dialog box](image)

4. Select a subset of the available processors on the system, and click OK. The process’ threads are now restricted to run on the processors you just selected.

5. Now run Notepad.exe from the command prompt (by typing `Notepad.exe`).

6. Go back to Task Manager or Process Explorer and find the new Notepad process. Right-click it, and choose Affinity. You should see the same list of processors you chose for the command-prompt process. This is because processes inherit their affinity settings from their parent.

Windows won’t move a running thread that could run on a different processor from one CPU to a second processor to permit a thread with an affinity for the first processor to run on the first processor. For example, consider this scenario: CPU 0 is running a priority 8 thread that can run on any processor, and CPU 1 is running a priority 4 thread that can run on any processor. A priority 6 thread that can run on only CPU 0 becomes ready. What happens? Windows won’t move the priority 8 thread from CPU 0 to CPU 1 (preempting the priority 4 thread) so that the priority 6 thread can run; the priority 6 thread has to stay in the ready state.

Therefore, changing the affinity mask for a process or a thread can result in threads getting less CPU time than they normally would, because Windows is restricted from running the thread on certain processors. Therefore, setting affinity should be done with extreme care—in most cases, it is optimal to let Windows decide which threads run where.

**Extended Affinity Mask**

To support more than 64 processors, which is the limit enforced by the affinity mask structure (composed of 64 bits on a 64-bit system), Windows uses an extended affinity mask (KAFFINITY_EX) that is an array of affinity masks, one for each supported processor group (currently defined to 4). When the scheduler needs to refer to a processor in the extended affinity masks, it first de-references the correct bitmask by using its group number and then accesses the resulting affinity directly. In the kernel API, extended affinity masks are not exposed; instead, the caller of the API inputs the group number as a parameter, and receives the legacy affinity mask for that group. In the Windows API, on the other hand, only information about a single group can usually be queried, which is the group of the currently running thread (which is fixed).
The extended affinity mask and its underlying functionality are also how a process can escape the boundaries of its original assigned processor group. By using the extended affinity APIs, threads in a process can choose affinity masks on other processor groups. For example, if a process has 4 threads and the machine has 256 processors, thread 1 can run on processor 4, thread 2 can run on processor 68, thread 3 on processor 132, and thread 4 on processor 196, if each thread set an affinity mask of 0x10 (0b10000 in binary) on groups 0, 1, 2, and 3. Alternatively, the threads can each set an affinity of 0xFFFFFFFF for their given group, and the process then can execute its threads on any available processor on the system (with the limitation, that each thread is restricted to running within its own group only).

Taking advantage of extended affinity must be done at creation time, by specifying a group number in the thread attribute list when creating a new thread. (See the previous topic on thread creation for more information on attribute lists.)

**System Affinity Mask**

Because Windows drivers usually execute in the context of the calling thread or in the context of an arbitrary thread (that is, not in the safe confines of the System process), currently running driver code might be subject to affinity rules set by the application developer, which are not currently relevant to the driver code and might even prevent correct processing of interrupts and other queued work. Driver developers therefore have a mechanism to temporarily bypass user thread affinity settings, by using the APIs KeSetSystemAffinityThread(Ex)/KeSetSystemGroupAffinityThread and KeRevertToUserAffinityThread(Ex)/KeRevertToUserGroupAffinityThread.

**Ideal and Last Processor**

Each thread has three CPU numbers stored in the kernel thread control block:

- Ideal processor, or the preferred processor that this thread should run on
- Last processor, or the processor on which the thread last ran
- Next processor, or the processor that the thread will be, or is already, running on

The ideal processor for a thread is chosen when a thread is created using a seed in the process control block. The seed is incremented each time a thread is created so that the ideal processor for each new thread in the process rotates through the available processors on the system. For example, the first thread in the first process on the system is assigned an ideal processor of 0. The second thread in that process is assigned an ideal processor of 1. However, the next process in the system has its first thread’s ideal processor set to 1, the second to 2, and so on. In that way, the threads within each process are spread across the processors.

Note that this assumes the threads within a process are doing an equal amount of work. This is typically not the case in a multithreaded process, which normally has one or more housekeeping threads and then a number of worker threads. Therefore, a multithreaded application that wants to
take full advantage of the platform might find it advantageous to specify the ideal processor numbers for its threads by using the `SetThreadIdealProcessor` function. To take advantage of processor groups, developers should call `SetThreadIdealProcessorEx` instead, which allows selection of a group number for the affinity.

64-bit Windows uses the Stride field in the KPRCB to balance the assignment of newly created threads within a process. The stride is a scalar number that represents the number of affinity bits within a given NUMA node that must be skipped to attain a new independent logical processor slice, where “independent” means on another core (if dealing with an SMT system) or another package (if dealing with a non-SMT but multicore system). Because 32-bit Windows doesn’t support large processor configuration systems, it doesn’t use a stride, and it simply selects the next processor number, trying to avoid sharing the same SMT set if possible. For example, on a dual-processor SMT system with four logical processors, if the ideal processor for the first thread is assigned to logical processor 0, the second thread would be assigned to logical processor 2, the third thread to logical processor 1, the fourth thread to logical process 3, and so forth. In this way, the threads are spread evenly across the physical processors.

**Ideal Node**

On NUMA systems, when a process is created, an ideal node for the process is selected. The first process is assigned to node 0, the second process to node 1, and so on. Then the ideal processors for the threads in the process are chosen from the process’ ideal node. The ideal processor for the first thread in a process is assigned to the first processor in the node. As additional threads are created in processes with the same ideal node, the next processor is used for the next thread’s ideal processor, and so on.

**Thread Selection on Multiprocessor Systems**

Before covering multiprocessor systems in more detail, I should summarize the algorithms discussed in the “Thread Selection” section. They either continued executing the current thread (if no new candidate was found) or started running the idle thread (if the current thread had to block). However, there is a third algorithm for thread selection, which was hinted at in the “Idle Scheduler” section earlier, called `KiSearchForNewThread`. This algorithm is called in one specific instance: when the current thread is about to block due to a wait on an object, including when doing an `NtDelayExecutionThread` call, also known as the Sleep API in Windows.

**Note** This shows a subtle difference between the commonly used `Sleep(1)` call, which makes the current thread block until the next timer tick, and the `SwitchToThread()` call, which was shown earlier. The “sleep” will use the algorithm about to be described, while the “yield” uses the previously shown logic.
KiSearchForNewThread initially checks whether there is already a thread that was selected for this processor (by reading the NextThread field); if so, it dispatches this thread immediately in the Running state. Otherwise, it calls the KiSelectReadyThread routine and, if a thread was found, performs the same steps.

If a thread was not found, however, the processor is marked as idle (even though the idle thread is not yet executing) and a scan of other logical processors queues is initiated (unlike the other standard algorithms, which would now give up). Also, because the processor is now considered idle, if the Distributed Fair Share Scheduling mode (described in the next topic) is enabled, a thread will be released from the idle-only queue if possible and scheduled instead. On the other hand, if the processor core is now parked, the algorithm will not attempt to check other logical processors, as it is preferable to allow the core to enter the parking state instead keeping it busy with new work.

Barring these two scenarios, the work-stealing loop now runs. This code looks at the current NUMA node and removes any idle processors (because they shouldn’t have threads that need stealing). Then, starting from the highest numbered processor, the loop calls KIFindReadyThread but points it to the remote KPRCB instead of the current one, causing this processor to find the best ready thread from the other processor’s queue. If this is unsuccessful and Distributed Fair Share Scheduler is enabled, a thread from the idle-only queue of the remote logical processor is released on the current processor instead, if possible.

If no candidate ready thread is found, the next lower numbered logical processor is attempted, and so on, until all logical processors have been exhausted on the current NUMA node. In this case, the algorithm keeps searching for the next closest node, and so on, until all nodes in the current group have been exhausted. (Recall that Windows allows a given thread to have affinity only on a single group.) If this process fails to find any candidates, the function returns NULL and the processor enters the idle thread in the case of a wait (which will skip idle scheduling). If this work was already being done from the idle scheduler, the processor enters a sleep state.

Processor Selection

Up until now, we’ve described how Windows picks a thread when a logical processor needs to make a selection (or when a selection must be made for a given logical processor) and assumed the various scheduling routines have an existing database of ready threads to choose from. Now we’ll see how this database gets populated in the first place—in other words, how Windows chooses which LP’s ready queues a given ready thread will be associated with. Having described the types of multiprocessor systems supported by Windows as well as the thread affinity and ideal processor settings, we’re now ready to examine how this information is used for this purpose.

Choosing a Processor for a Thread When There Are Idle Processors

When a thread becomes ready to run, the KiDeferredReadyThread scheduler function is called, causing Windows to perform two tasks: adjust priorities and refresh quantums as needed, as was explained in the “Priority Boosts” section, and then pick the best logical processor for the thread.
Windows first looks up the thread’s ideal processor, and then it computes the set of idle processors within the thread’s hard affinity mask. This set is then pruned as follows:

- Any idle logical processors that have been parked by the Core Parking mechanism are removed. (See Chapter 9, “Storage Management,” in Part 2 for more information on Core Parking.) If this causes no idle processors to remain, idle processor selection is aborted, and the scheduler behaves as if no idle processors were available (which is described in the upcoming section).

- Any idle logical processors that are not on the ideal node (defined as the node containing the ideal processor) are removed, unless this would cause all idle processors to be eliminated.

- On an SMT system, any non-idle SMT sets are removed, even if this might cause the elimination of the ideal processor itself. In other words, Windows prioritizes a non-ideal, idle SMT set over an ideal processor.

- Windows then checks whether the ideal processor is among the remaining set of idle processors. If it isn’t, it must then find the most appropriate idle processor. It does so by first checking whether the processor that the thread last ran on is part of the remaining idle set. If so, this processor is considered to be a temporary ideal processor and chosen. (Recall that the ideal processor attempts to maximize processor cache hits, and picking the last processor a thread ran on is a good way of doing so.)

- If the last processor is not part of the remaining idle set, Windows next checks whether the current processor (that is, the processor currently executing this scheduling code) is part of this set; if so, it applies the same logic as in the prior step.

- If neither the last nor the current processor is idle, Windows performs one more pruning operation, by removing any idle logical processors that are not on the same SMT set as the ideal processor. If there are none left, Windows instead removes any processors not on the SMT set of the current processor, unless this, too, eliminates all idle processors. In other words, Windows prefers idle processors that share the same SMT set as the unavailable ideal processor and/or last processor it would’ve liked to pick in the first place. Because SMT implementations share the cache on the core, this has nearly the same effect as picking the ideal or last processor from the caching perspective.

- Finally, if this last step results in more than one processor remaining in the idle set, Windows picks the lowest numbered processor as the thread’s current processor.

Once a processor has been selected for the thread to run on, that thread is put in the standby state and the idle processor’s PRCB is updated to point to this thread. If the processor is idle, but not halted, a DPC interrupt is sent so that the processor handles the scheduling operation immediately.

Whenever such a scheduling operation is initiated, $KiCheckForThreadDispatch$ is called, which will realize that a new thread has been scheduled on the processor and cause an immediate context switch if possible (as well as pending APC deliveries), or it will cause a DPC interrupt to be sent.
Choosing a Processor for a Thread When There Are No Idle Processors

If there are no idle processors when a thread wants to run, or if the only idle processors were eliminated by the first pruning (which got rid of parked idle processors), Windows first checks whether the latter situation has occurred. In this scenario, the scheduler calls `KiSelectCandidateProcessor` to ask the Core Parking engine for the best candidate processor. The Core Parking engine selects the highest-numbered processor that is unparked within the ideal node. If there are no such processors, the engine forcefully overrides the park state of the ideal processor and causes it to be unparked. Upon returning to the scheduler, it will check whether the candidate it received is idle; if so, it will pick this processor for the thread, following the same last steps as in the previous scenario.

If this fails, Windows compares the priority of the thread running (or the one in the standby state) on the thread’s ideal processor to determine whether it should preempt that thread.

If the thread’s ideal processor already has a thread selected to run next (waiting in the standby state to be scheduled) and that thread’s priority is less than the priority of the thread being readied for execution, the new thread preempts that first thread out of the standby state and becomes the next thread for that CPU. If there is already a thread running on that CPU, Windows checks whether the priority of the currently running thread is less than the thread being readied for execution. If so, the currently running thread is marked to be preempted, and Windows queues a DPC interrupt to the target processor to preempt the currently running thread in favor of this new thread.

If the ready thread cannot be run right away, it is moved into the ready state on the priority queue appropriate to its thread priority, where it will await its turn to run. As seen in the scheduling scenarios earlier, the thread will be inserted either at the head or the tail of the queue, based on whether it entered the ready state due to preemption.

As such, regardless of the underlying scenario and various possibilities, note that threads are always put on their ideal processor’s per-processor ready queues, guaranteeing the consistency of the algorithms that determine how a logical processor picks a thread to run.

Processor Share-Based Scheduling

In the previous section, the standard thread-based scheduling implementation of Windows was described, which has served general user and server scenarios reliably since its appearance in the first Windows NT release (with scalability improvements done throughout each release). However, because thread-based scheduling attempts to fairly share the processor or processors only among competing threads of same priority, it does not take into account higher-level requirements such as the distribution of threads to users and the potential for certain users to benefit from more overall CPU time at the expense of other users. This kind of behavior, as it turns out, is highly sought after in terminal-services environments, where dozens of users can be competing for CPU time and a single high-priority thread from a given user has the potential to starve threads from all users on the machine if only thread-based scheduling is used.
Distributed Fair Share Scheduling

In this section, two alternative scheduling modes implemented by recent versions of Windows will be described: the session-based Distributed Fair Share Scheduler (DFSS) and an older, legacy SID-based CPU Rate Limit implementation.

DFSS Initialization

During the very last parts of system initialization, as the SOFTWARE hive is initialized by Smss, the process manager initiates the final post-boot initialization in PsBootPhaseComplete, which calls PsInitializeCpuQuota. It is here that the system decides which of the two CPU quota mechanisms (DFSS or legacy) will be employed. For DFSS to be enabled, the EnableCpuQuota registry value must be set to 1 in both of the two quota keys: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Session Manager\Quota System for the policy-based setting (that can be configured through the Group Policy Editor under Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Remote Desktop Services\Remote Desktop Session Host\Connections - Turn off Fair Share CPU Scheduling), as well as under the system key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Quota System, which determines if the system supports the functionality (which, by default, is set to TRUE on Windows Server with the Remote Desktop role).

Note Due to a bug (which you can learn more about at http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee808941(WS.10).aspx), the group policy setting to turn off DFSS is not honored. The system setting must be manually turned off.

If DFSS is enabled, the PsCpuFairShareEnabled variable is set to true, which will instruct the kernel, through various scheduling code paths, to behave differently and/or to call into the DFSS engine. Additionally, the default quota is set up to 150 milliseconds for each DFSS cycle, a number called credit that will be explained in more detail shortly.

Once DFSS is enabled, the global PspCpuQuotaControl data structure is used to maintain DFSS information, such as the list of per-session CPU quota blocks (as well as a spinlock and count) and the total weight of all sessions on the system. It also stores an array of per-processor DFSS data structures, which you’ll see next.

Per-Session CPU Quota Blocks

After DFSS is enabled, whenever a new session is created (other than Session 0), MiSessionCreate calls PsAllocateCpuQuotaBlock to set up the per-session CPU quota block. The first time this happens on the system (for example, for Session 1), this calls PspLazyInitializeCpuQuota to finalize the initialization of DFSS.

This results in the allocation of per-CPU DFSS data structures mentioned in the previous sections, which contain the DPC used for managing the quota (PspCpuQuotaDpcRoutine, seen later) and the
total number of cycles credited as well as accumulated. This structure also keeps the block generation a monotonically increasing sequence to guarantee atomicity, as well as keeping the idle-only queue lock protecting the list of the same name, which is a central element of the DFSS mechanism yet to be described. Each per-CPU DFSS data structure, in turn, is connected through a sorted doubly-linked list to the various per-session CPU quota blocks that were mentioned at the beginning of this discussion.

When the first-time initialization of DFSS is complete, *PsAllocateCpuQuotaBlock* can continue, first by allocating the actual CPU quota block for this session. This structure maintains overall accounting information on the session, as well as per-CPU tracking—including the cycles remaining and initially allocated, as well as the idle-only queue itself, in a per-CPU quota entry structure.

To begin with, the session ID is stored, and the CPU share weight is set to its default of 5. You’ll see shortly what a weight is, how it can be computed, and its effects on the DFSS engine. Because the quota block has just been created, the initial cycle values are all set to their maximum value for now. Next, this new per-session CPU block must be visible to the system. Therefore, the *PspCpuQuotaControl* data structure is updated with the new total weight of all sessions (by adding this weight), and the quota block is inserted into the block list (sorted by session ID). Finally, *PspCalculateCpuQuotaBlockCycleCredits* enumerates every other session’s quota block and captures the new total weight of the system.

Once this is done, the per-session CPU quota block is finalized, and the memory manager sets it in the *CpuQuotaBlock* field of the MM_SESSION_SPACE structure for this session. Likewise, the current EPROCESS (part of this new session’s *CpuQuotaBlock* field) is also updated to point to this session’s CPU quota block. Now that the process has received a CPU quota block as soon as it became part of the session, future threads created by this process (including the first thread itself) will be allocated with an extra structure after their typical ETHREAD—a per-process CPU Quota APC structure. Additionally, the ETHREAD’s *RateApcState* field will be set to *PsRateApcContained*, indicating that this is an embedded Quota APC, as used by the DFSS mechanism (rather than the pool-allocated legacy APC). Finally, the *CpuThrottled* bit is set in the KTHREAD’s *ThreadControlFlags*.

At this point, the global quota-control structure contains a pointer to the DFSS per-CPU data structure array, which itself is linked to all the per-session CPU blocks that have been created for each session and associated with the EPROCESS structure of the member processes. In turn, each thread part of such a process has CPU throttling turned on. There is a per-CPU DPC ready to execute, as well as per-thread APCs for each throttled thread.

When the last process in the session loses all its references, *PsDeleteCpuQuotaBlock* is called. It removes the block from the list, refreshes the total weights, and calls *PspCalculateCpuQuotaBlockCycleCredits* to update all other per-session CPU quota blocks.

**Charging of Cycles to Throttled Threads**

After everything is set up, the entire DFSS mechanism is triggered by the consumption of CPU cycles—something that was already explained in the earlier sections. In other words, not only are consumed cycles used for quantum accounting and providing finer-grained information to thread
APIs, but they also can be “charged” against the thread (and thus against its quota). This operation is done by the \texttt{PsChargeProcessCpuCycles} function that is called whenever a thread has completed the accumulation of cycles in its current execution timeline.

The first operation involves accumulating the additional cycles to the per-CPU DFSS data structure for this processor, increasing the \texttt{TotalCyclesAccumulated} value. If this accumulation has reached the total credit, the quota DPC is immediately queued. Once the DPC ultimately executes, it calls \texttt{PspStartNewFairShareInterval}, which updates the generation, resets the cycles accumulated, and resets the credit to 150 ms. Finally, the idle-only queue is flushed on each processor associated with a given session. (You'll see what this queue is and what flushing it entails, later.) This part of the algorithm manages the 150-ms interval that controls DFSS.

A second possibility is that the generation of the per-CPU quota entry contained in the current process' CPU quota block (owned by the session) does not manage the generation of the current per-CPU DFSS data structure. This generation mismatch suggests that a new interval has been reached and no cycle limits have yet been set, so \texttt{PspReplenishCycleCredit} is called to do the work. This reads the per-CPU weight and the total weight that were captured earlier in \texttt{PspCalculateCpuQuotaBlockCycleCredits}, and it uses them to set the base cycle allowance for the current per-CPU data inside the process' CPU quota block. To do this, it uses a simple formula: the process receives the equivalent of its cycle credit (150 ms) divided by the total weight of all sessions on the system. Then the amount of cycles it will be permitted to run for \texttt{(CyclesRemaining)} is set to the base cycle allowance multiplied by the weight of this particular session. In other words, the process runs for a fairly-divided chunk of time based on the number of other sessions on the system, calculated as a percentage based on its relative weight compared to the overall system weight. When the computation is completed, the generation is set to match.

In all other cases, \texttt{PsChargeProcessCpuCycles} merely subtracts the amount of cycles from \texttt{CyclesRemaining} and then calls \texttt{PsCheckThreadCpuQuota} to see whether these cycles have been exhausted (reaching zero). Note that this function can sometimes also be called directly from the context switch code when control is about to pass to a thread that has CPU throttling enabled.

\texttt{PsCheckThreadCpuQuota} recovers the CPU quota block for this process (that is, for the session), and then further extracts the precise per-CPU information out of it. Once again, it checks whether the generation does not match, which would indicate this is the first charge for this 150-ms credit cycle, and then it calls \texttt{PspReplenishCycleCredit}. Next, it checks whether the CPU quota block for the process indicates there are no more cycles remaining. If cycles still remain, the function returns; otherwise, it prepares to suspend the thread's execution.

Before stopping execution, the function extracts the per-CPU DPC, making sure that it (or the associated per-thread APC) is not already running. If this operation is happening due to the context-switch scenario brought up earlier, the per-thread APC is queued, which will preempt the thread's execution as soon as the context switch completes. Otherwise, if this is occurring as result of cycle charging (which happens at DISPATCH\_LEVEL or higher), the per-CPU DPC is queued instead, which will later queue the per-thread APC. (This forces a near-immediate response to the CPU quota...
restriction.) In case further cycle accumulation has occurred past the 150-ms cycle credit, the DPC also calls `PspStartNewFairShareInterval`, which was explained earlier.

**CPU Throttling and Quota Enforcement**

So far, you’ve seen how DFSS initializes, how CPU quota blocks are created for each session (and then associated with member processes), and how threads running with the CPU throttling bit (implying they are part of processes that are members of a session with DFSS enabled) will consume cycles out of their total weight-relative allowance, resetting every 150 ms. You also saw how, eventually, an APC is queued in all cases where a thread has exhausted its allowed cycles. You’ll now see how the APC enforces the CPU quota restriction.

The APC first enters an infinite loop, creating a stack-allocated Quota Wait Block that contains the current thread being restricted, as well as a resume event. It is this event that ultimately allows the thread to continue its execution. Next, the APC gets the per-CPU DFSS data structure pointer and acquires the idle-only queue lock referenced earlier. It then checks whether the idle-only queue on the current processor (which comes from the per-CPU quota entry contained in the process’ CPU quota block) is empty. If the list is empty, it implies that this CPU has never been inserted in the sorted block list that is contained in the per-CPU DFSS data structure (part of the `PspCpuQuotaControl` global array). The `PspInsertQuotaBlockCpuEntry` function is thus called to rectify the situation.

Because the DFSS scheduler itself (which has yet to be described) uses this data structure, it must be inserted in the most optimal way—in this case, sorted by the base cycle allowance of each per-CPU data contained within the per-process CPU quota block. Recall that the base cycle allowance is initially the 150-ms credit cycle divided by the total weight of the system (that is, a full allowance), but you’ll see how the allowance can be later modified by the DFSS scheduler.

Next, now that the per-CPU Quota Entry is in the sorted block list (or it might already have been if the idle-only queue was not empty), this thread is inserted at the end of the idle-only queue, and it’s connected by a linked list entry that’s present in the Quota Wait Block. Because this wait block contains the resume event initialized earlier, the DFSS scheduler is able to control the thread when needed.

Finally, the APC enters a wait on this resume event, with the wait reason `WrCpuRateControl`. By using a tool such as Sysinternals PsList, or Process Explorer—all of which display wait reasons (as well as a kernel debugger)—you can see such threads intermittently blocked on a DFSS system.
Resuming Execution

With more and more threads possibly hitting their CPU quota restrictions and block on their respective idle-queues, how will they eventually resume execution? One of the possibilities is that a new 150-ms interval has started. Recall from the earlier discussion that `PspStartNewFairShareInterval` was said to “flush the idle-only queue.” This operation, performed by `PspFlushProcessorIdleOnlyQueue`, essentially scans every per-CPU quota entry for this processor (which is located in the sorted block list), and then scans the idle-only queue of each such processor. Picking every thread in the list, the function removes the thread and manually sets the resume event. Thus, any blocked thread on the current CPU gets to resume execution after 150 ms.

Obviously, flushing is not the usual mechanism through which the idle-only queue threads are managed. This work typically is done by the DFSS scheduler itself, which provides the `PsReleaseThreadFromIdleOnlyQueue` routine as a callback that the regular thread scheduler, when the system is about to go idle, can use whenever DFSS-related work is required. Specifically, it is the `KiSearchForNewThread` function, thoroughly described earlier, that calls DFSS in the following two scenarios:

- If `KiSelectReadyThread`, which is called initially, has not found a new thread for the current processor, before it checks other processors’ dispatcher ready queues, `KiSearchForNewThread` will ask DFSS to release a thread from the idle-only queue.
Otherwise, as each CPU’s dispatcher ready queues are scanned (by looping 
`KiSelectReadyThread` calls on each PRCB), if once again no thread is found, the DFSS scheduler 
is called to release a thread from the idle-only queue on the target processor as well.

Finally, you’ll see what work `PsReleaseThreadFromIdleOnlyQueue` actually does and how the DFSS 
scheduler is implemented.

**DFSS Idle-Only Queue Scheduling**

`PsReleaseThreadFromIdleOnlyQueue` initially checks whether the sorted block list is empty (which 
would imply there aren’t even any valid per-CPU quota entries), and it exits if this is the case. 
Otherwise, it acquires the idle-only queue spinlock from the per-CPU DFSS data structure and calls 
`PspFindHighestPriorityThreadToRun`. This function scans the sorted block list, recovering every per-
CPU quota entry, and then scans every entry (which, if you recall, points to the Quota Wait Block for 
the thread). Unfortunately, because threads are not inserted by priority (such as real dispatcher ready 
queues), the entire idle-only queue must be scanned, and the highest priority found to this point is 
recorded in each iteration. (Because the lock is acquired, no new per-CPU quota entries or idle-only 
queue threads can be inserted during the scan.)

**Note** Because DFSS is not truly integrated with the regular thread scheduler, the reason 
the threads are not sorted by priority is obvious: DFSS is not aware of priority changes after 
idle-only queue threads have been inserted in its lists. A user could still modify the priority, 
and because the thread scheduler does not notify DFSS of this, an incorrect thread would 
be picked.

Additionally, affinity is carefully checked to ensure only correctly affinitized threads are scanned. 
Although each idle-only queue contains only threads for the current processor, scenario #2 in the 
preceding section showed how remote processor idle-only queues can also be scanned. DFSS must 
ensure that the current CPU will run an appropriate remote-CPU, idle-only thread.

Once the highest priority thread has been found on the current per-CPU quota entry, it is removed 
from the idle-only queue and returned to the caller. Additionally, if this was the last thread on the 
idle-only queue, the per-CPU entry is removed from the sorted block list. Therefore, note that the 
other per-CPU quota entries are not checked unless a runnable highest-priority thread was not found 
on the first per-CPU quota entry (that is, the one with the highest base cycle allowance).

Once the thread is found, `PsReleaseThreadFromIdleOnlyQueue` resumes its execution and once 
more queues the DPC responsible for eventually launching the per-thread APC from earlier (after 
making sure the DPC is not already running). Thus, the APC is never directly queued in this case, 
because this function runs as part of the thread scheduler, already at DISPATCH_LEVEL. Additionally, 
it wouldn’t make sense to queue another per-thread APC just to notify the original APC; instead, the 
DPC itself will wake up the thread.
This is done by a special check in the DPC routine that checks whether the
ThreadWaitBlockForRelease field in the per-CPU DFSS data structure is set. If so, the DPC knows that
this is a wake-up, not a stop, request, and it sets the resume event associated with the Quota Wait
Block. Additionally, it forces the Idle Scheduler on the current CPU to run, by setting the IdleSchedule
field in the KPRCB that was brought up in the earlier idle scheduler section.

One detail has been glossed over, however: once the idle-only thread is picked, as soon
as a context switch is initiated, the cycle accumulation once again detects that the thread
has exhausted its cycles, and it re-inserts the thread in the idle-only queue. Therefore,
PsReleaseThreadFromIdleOnlyQueue must update the cycles remaining for the current per-CPU quota
entry, allowing this CPU to run the thread for a little bit longer. How much longer exactly is deter-
mined by the value of KiCyclesPerClockQuantum, which was shown in the earlier “Quantum” section.
Therefore, this CPU is allowed to run the current thread for an entire quantum, at most.

Additionally, the base cycle allowance for this entry must be updated, because the quota for the
CPU is actually exhausted and no longer working on a 150-ms cycle credit. Therefore, the allowance
is now updated to include an extra KiCyclesPerClockQuantum divided by the weight of the session”
cycle. Because the base cycle allowance has changed, the sorted block list is reparsed, and the entries
are re-sorted correctly to account for this change. Thus, this block will now migrate to the front of the
list and have a higher chance to be picked once a future idle-only thread (within this interval) needs
to be picked.

Session Weight Configuration

So far, the weight associated to sessions has been described as its default value of 5. However, this
weight can be set to anywhere between 1 and 9, and DFSS provides two internal APIs for managing
weight information: PsQueryCpuInformation and its Set equivalent.

Given an array of session handles (to session objects) and associated weights, the Set API sets the
new weight for each session, as well as updating the total weight stored in the PspCpuQuotaControl
global. By calling PspCalculateCpuQuotaBlockCycleCredits again, the new settings will be propagated.
Likewise, the Query API returns an array of weights and session IDs. The SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege is
required in both cases, as well as SESSION_MODIFY_ACCESS for each session whose weight is being
modified. Accessing these APIs is done through the native API function NtQuerySystemInformation,
with the SystemCpuQuotaInformation call.

This API, although not provided by the Windows API directly, is what the Windows System
Resource Manager uses when the administrator assigns different priorities to different users when the
Weighted_Remote_Sessions policy is enabled. The three priorities—Premium, Standard, and Basic—
map to the 1, 5, and 9 weights in the internal DFSS scheduler mechanism, respectively.
CPU Rate Limits

As part of the hard quota management system in Windows (based on the original soft-limit quota support present since the first version of Windows NT), support for limiting CPU usage exists in the system in three different ways: per-session, per-user, or per-system. Unfortunately, there is no tool that is part of the operating system that allows you to set these limits—you must modify the registry settings manually. Because all the quotas—save one—are memory quotas, we will cover those in Chapter 10 in Part 2, which deals with the memory manager, and instead focus our attention here on the CPU rate limit.


The new quota system can be accessed through the registry key HKLM\SYSTEM \CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\QuotaSystem, as well as through the standard NtSetInformationProcess system call. CPU rate limits can therefore be set in one of three ways:

- By creating a new DWORD value called CpuRateLimit and entering the rate information.
- By creating a new key with the security ID (SID) of the account you want to limit, and creating a CpuRateLimit DWORD value inside that key.
- By calling NtSetInformationProcess and giving it the process handle of the process to limit and the CPU rate limiting information, if the process is tied to the system quota block.

In all three cases, the CPU rate limit data is a straightforward value; it is simply a rate limit expressed as a percentage. For example, to limit a user’s applications to consume at most 10% of CPU time, you set CpuRateLimit to 10. The process manager, which is responsible for enforcing the CPU rate limit, uses various system mechanisms to do its job. First, rate limiting works reliably because of the CPU cycle count improvements discussed earlier, which allow the process manager to accurately determine how much CPU time a process has taken and know whether the limit should be enforced.

It then uses a combination of DPC and APC routines to throttle down DPC and APC CPU usage, which are outside the direct control of user-mode developers but still result in CPU usage in the system (in the case of a systemwide CPU rate limit).

Finally, the main mechanism through which rate limiting works is by creating an artificial wait on an event object (making the thread uniquely bound to this object and putting it in a wait state, which does not consume CPU cycles). Threads that are artificially waiting because of CPU rate limits can be observed because their wait reason code is set to WrCpuRateControl. This mechanism operates through the normal routine of an APC object queued to the thread or threads inside the process currently responsible for the work. The event is eventually signaled by the DPC routine associated with a timer (firing every half a second) responsible for replenishing systemwide CPU usage requests.
Dynamic Processor Addition and Replacement

As you’ve seen, developers can fine-tune which threads are allowed to (and in the case of the ideal processor, should) run on which processor. This works fine on systems that have a constant number of processors during their run time. (For example, desktop machines require shutting down the computer to make any sort of hardware changes to the processor or their count.)

Today's server systems, however, cannot afford the downtime that CPU replacement or addition normally requires. In fact, one example of when adding a CPU is required for a server is at times of high load that is above what the machine can support at its current level of performance. Having to shut down the server during a period of peak usage would defeat the purpose. To meet this requirement, the latest generation of server motherboards and systems support the addition of processors (as well as their replacement) while the machine is still running. The ACPI BIOS and related hardware on the machine have been specifically built to allow and be aware of this need, but operating system participation is required for full support.

Dynamic processor support is provided through the HAL, which notifies the kernel of a new processor on the system through the function `KeStartDynamicProcessor`. This routine does similar work to that performed when the system detects more than one processor at startup and needs to initialize the structures related to them. When a dynamic processor is added, various system components perform some additional work. For example, the memory manager allocates new pages and memory structures optimized for the CPU. It also initializes a new DPC kernel stack while the kernel initializes the global descriptor table (GDT), the interrupt Dispatch table (IDT), the processor control region (PCR), the process control block (PRCB), and other related structures for the processor.

Other executive parts of the kernel are also called, mostly to initialize the per-processor look-aside lists for the processor that was added. For example, the I/O manager, executive look-aside list code, cache manager, and object manager all use per-processor look-aside lists for their frequently allocated structures.

Finally, the kernel initializes threaded DPC support for the processor and adjusts exported kernel variables to report the new processor. Different memory-manager masks and process seeds based on processor counts are also updated, and processor features need to be updated for the new processor to match the rest of the system (for example, enabling virtualization support on the newly added processor). The initialization sequence completes with the notification to the Windows Hardware Error Architecture (WHEA) component that a new processor is online.

The HAL is also involved in this process. It is called once to start the dynamic processor after the kernel is aware of it, and it is called again after the kernel has finished initialization of the processor. However, these notifications and callbacks only make the kernel aware and respond to processor changes. Although an additional processor increases the throughput of the kernel, it does nothing to help drivers.

To handle drivers, the system has a new default executive callback object, the `ProcessorAdd` callback, that drivers can register with for notifications. Similar to the callbacks that notify drivers of
power state or system time changes, this callback allows driver code to, for example, create a new
worker thread if desirable so that it can handle more work at the same time.

Once drivers are notified, the final kernel component called is the Plug and Play manager, which
adds the processor to the system’s device node and rebalances interrupts so that the new processor
can handle interrupts that were already registered for other processors. CPU-hungry applications are
also able to take advantage of newer processors as well.

However, a sudden change of affinity can have potentially breaking changes for a running
application (especially when going from a single-processor to a multiprocessor environment) through
the appearance of potential race conditions or simply misdistribution of work (because the process
might have calculated the perfect ratios at startup, based on the number of CPUs it was aware of). As
a result, applications do not take advantage of a dynamically added processor by default—they must
request it.

The Windows APIs `SetProcessAffinityUpdateMode` and `QueryProcessAffinityMode` (which use
the undocumented `NtSet/QueryInformationProcess` system call) tell the process manager that
these applications should have their affinity updated (by setting the `AffinityUpdateEnable` flag in
EPROCESS), or that they do not want to deal with affinity updates (by setting the `AffinityPermanent`
flag in EPROCESS). Once an application has told the system that its affinity is permanent, it cannot
later change its mind and request affinity updates, so this is a one-time change.

As part of `KeStartDynamicProcessor`, a new step has been added after interrupts are
rebalanced, which is to call the process manager to perform affinity updates through
`PsUpdateActiveProcessAffinity`. Some Windows core processes and services already have affinity
calls enabled, while third-party software will need to be recompiled to take advantage of the new
API. The System process, `Svchost` processes, and `Smss` are all compatible with dynamic processor
addition.

---

**Job Objects**

A job object is a nameable, securable, shareable kernel object that allows control of one or more
processes as a group. A job object’s basic function is to allow groups of processes to be managed and
manipulated as a unit. A process can be a member of only one job object. By default, its association
with the job object can’t be broken and all processes created by the process and its descendants are
associated with the same job object as well. The job object also records basic accounting information
for all processes associated with the job and for all processes that were associated with the job but
have since terminated.

Jobs can also be associated with an I/O completion port object, which other threads might be
waiting for, with the Windows `GetQueuedCompletionStatus` function. This allows interested parties
(typically, the job creator) to monitor for limit violation and events that could affect the job’s security
(such as a new process being created or a process abnormally exiting).
Job Limits
The following are some of the CPU-related and memory-related limits you can specify for a job:

- **Maximum number of active processes**  Limits the number of concurrently existing processes in the job.

- **Jobwide user-mode CPU time limit**  Limits the maximum amount of user-mode CPU time that the processes in the job can consume (including processes that have run and exited). Once this limit is reached, by default all the processes in the job are terminated with an error code and no new processes can be created in the job (unless the limit is reset). The job object is signaled, so any threads waiting for the job will be released. You can change this default behavior with a call to `SetInformationJobObject` to set the `EndOfJobTimeAction` information class and request a notification to be sent through the job's completion port instead.

- **Per-process user-mode CPU time limit**  Allows each process in the job to accumulate only a fixed maximum amount of user-mode CPU time. When the maximum is reached, the process terminates (with no chance to clean up).

- **Job processor affinity**  Sets the processor affinity mask for each process in the job. (Individual threads can alter their affinity to any subset of the job affinity, but processes can’t alter their process affinity setting.)

- **Job group affinity**  Sets a list of groups to which the processes in the job can be assigned to. Any affinity changes are then subject to the group selection imposed by the limit. This is treated as a group-aware version of the job processor affinity limit (legacy), and prevents that limit from being used.

- **Job process priority class**  Sets the priority class for each process in the job. Threads can’t increase their priority relative to the class (as they normally can). Attempts to increase thread priority are ignored. (No error is returned on calls to `SetThreadPriority`, but the increase doesn’t occur.)

- **Default working set minimum and maximum**  Defines the specified working set minimum and maximum for each process in the job. (This setting isn’t jobwide—each process has its own working set with the same minimum and maximum values.)

- **Process and job committed virtual memory limit**  Defines the maximum amount of virtual address space that can be committed by either a single process or the entire job.

You can also place security limits on processes in a job. You can set a job so that each process runs under the same jobwide access token. You can then create a job to restrict processes from impersonating or creating processes that have access tokens that contain the local administrator's group. In addition, you can apply security filters so that when threads in processes contained in a job impersonate client threads, certain privileges and security IDs (SIDs) can be eliminated from the impersonation token.
Finally, you can also place user-interface limits on processes in a job. Such limits include being able to restrict processes from opening handles to windows owned by threads outside the job, reading and/or writing to the clipboard, and changing the many user-interface system parameters via the Windows `SystemParametersInfo` function. These user-interface limits are managed by the Windows subsystem GDI/USER driver, Win32k.sys, and are enforced through one of the special callouts that it registers with the process manager, the job callout.

**Job Sets**

The job implementation also allows for finer grained control of which job object a given process will be associated with by enabling the creation of job sets. A job set is an array that associates a job member level with each job object that was created by the caller. Later, when the process manager attempts to associate a process with a job, it picks the correct job object from the set based on the job member level that was associated with the newly created process (which must be higher than or equal to the parent’s job member level). This allows the parent process to have created multiple job objects, and for its children to pick the appropriate one depending on which limits the parent might want to enforce.

### EXPERIMENT: Viewing the Job Object

You can view named job objects with the Performance tool. (See the Job Object and Job Object Details performance objects.) You can view unnamed jobs with the kernel debugger `!job` or `dt nt\_ejob` command.

To see whether a process is associated with a job, you can use the kernel debugger `!process` command or Process Explorer. Follow these steps to create and view an unnamed job object:

1. From the command prompt, use the `runas` command to create a process running the command prompt (Cmd.exe). For example, type `runas /user:<domain>\<username> cmd`. You’ll be prompted for your password. Enter your password, and a Command Prompt window will appear. The Windows service that executes `runas` commands creates an unnamed job to contain all processes (so that it can terminate these processes at logoff time).

2. From the command prompt, run Notepad.exe.

3. Then run Process Explorer, and notice that the Cmd.exe and Notepad.exe processes are highlighted as part of a job. (You can configure the colors used to highlight
processes that are members of a job by clicking Options, Configure Colors.) Here is a screen shot showing these two processes:

4. Double-click either the Cmd.exe or Notepad.exe process to bring up the process properties. You will see a Job tab in the process properties dialog box.

5. Click the Job tab to view the details about the job. In this case, there are no quotas associated with the job, but there are two member processes:

6. Now run the kernel debugger on the live system, display the process list with !process, and find the recently created process running Cmd.exe. Then display the process by using !process <process ID>, find the address of the job object, and finally display the job object with the !job command. Here's some partial debugger output of these commands on a live system:

```
lkd> !process 0 1 cmd.exe
PROCESS 8567b758 SessionId: 1 Cid: 0fc4 Peb: 7ffdf000 ParentCid: 00b0
     DirBase: 1b3fb000 ObjectTable: e18dd7d0 HandleCount: 19.
     Image: Cmd.exe
     ...
     BasePriority          8
```
CommitCharge
   636
... Job
   85557988

lkd> !job 85557988
Job at 85557988
   TotalPageFaultCount  0
   TotalProcesses       2
   ActiveProcesses      2
   TotalTerminatedProcesses 0
   LimitFlags          0
...

7. You can also use the dt command to display the job object and see the additional fields shown about the job, such as its member level, if it is part of a job set:

lkd> dt nt!_ejob 85557988
nt!_EJOB
+0x000 Event            : _KEVENT
... +0x0b8 EndOfJobTimeAction : 0
+0x0bc CompletionPort   : 0x87e3d2e8
+0x0c0 CompletionKey    : 0x07a89508
+0x0c4 SessionId        : 1
+0x0c8 SchedulingClass  : 5
...
+0x120 MemberLevel      : 0
+0x124 JobFlags         : 0

8. Finally, if the job has UI limits, you can use the dt command to display the Win32k job structure (tagW32JOB). To do this, you must first obtain the W32PROCESS structure pointer as shown in the experiment at the beginning of this chapter, and then display the pW32Job field within it.

For example, here is the Win32k job structure for a process using the Block Access To Global Atom Table UI limitation. The structure shows the local atom table this process is using in pAtomTable. You can further explore this structure with the dt nt!_RTL_ATOM_TABLE command and see which atoms are defined:

lkd> ?? ((win32k!tagPROCESSINFO*)((nt!_EPROCESS*)0x847c4740)->Win32Process))-pW32Job
struct tagW32JOB * 0xfd573300
+0x000 pNext            : 0xff87c5d8 tagW32JOB
+0x004 Job              : 0x8356ab90 _EJOB
+0x008 pAtomTable       : 0x8e03eb18
+0x00c restrictions     : 0xff
+0x010 uProcessCount    : 1
+0x014 uMaxProcesses    : 4
+0x018 ppiTable         : 0xfe5072c0  -> 0xff97db18 tagPROCESSINFO
+0x01c ughCrt           : 0
+0x020 ughMax           : 0
+0x024 pgh              : (null)
Conclusion

In this chapter, we examined the structure of processes and threads and jobs, saw how they are created, and looked at how Windows decides which threads should run and for how long, and on which processor or processors.

In the next chapter, we’ll look at a part of the system that sometimes receives more attention than anything else: the Windows security reference monitor.
Preventing unauthorized access to sensitive data is essential in any environment in which multiple users have access to the same physical or network resources. An operating system, as well as individual users, must be able to protect files, memory, and configuration settings from unwanted viewing and modification. Operating system security includes obvious mechanisms such as accounts, passwords, and file protection. It also includes less obvious mechanisms, such as protecting the operating system from corruption, preventing less privileged users from performing actions (rebooting the computer, for example), and not allowing user programs to adversely affect the programs of other users or the operating system.

In this chapter, we explain how every aspect of the design and implementation of Microsoft Windows was influenced in some way by the stringent requirements of providing robust security.

Security Ratings

Having software, including operating systems, rated against well-defined standards helps the government, corporations, and home users protect proprietary and personal data stored in computer systems. The current security rating standard used by the United States and many other countries is the Common Criteria (CC). To understand the security capabilities designed into Windows, however, it’s useful to know the history of the security ratings system that influenced the design of Windows, the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC).

Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria

The National Computer Security Center (NCSC) was established in 1981 as part of the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD) National Security Agency (NSA). One goal of the NCSC was to create a range of security ratings, listed in Table 6-1, to be used to indicate the degree of protection commercial operating systems, network components, and trusted applications offer. These security ratings, which can be found at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/history/dod85.pdf, were defined in 1983 and are commonly referred to as “the Orange Book.”

The TCSEC standard consists of “levels of trust” ratings, where higher levels build on lower levels by adding more rigorous protection and validation requirements. No operating system meets the A1, or “Verified Design,” rating. Although a few operating systems have earned one of the B-level ratings, C2 is considered sufficient and the highest rating practical for a general-purpose operating system.
In July 1995, Windows NT 3.5 (Workstation and Server) with Service Pack 3 was the first version of Windows NT to earn the C2 rating. In March 1999, Windows NT 4 with Service Pack 3 achieved an E3 rating from the U.K. government’s Information Technology Security (ITSEC) organization, a rating equivalent to a U.S. C2 rating. In November 1999, Windows NT 4 with Service Pack 6a earned a C2 rating in both stand-alone and networked configurations.

The following were the key requirements for a C2 security rating, and they are still considered the core requirements for any secure operating system:

- A secure logon facility, which requires that users can be uniquely identified and that they must be granted access to the computer only after they have been authenticated in some way.

- Discretionary access control, which allows the owner of a resource (such as a file) to determine who can access the resource and what they can do with it. The owner grants rights that permit various kinds of access to a user or to a group of users.

- Security auditing, which affords the ability to detect and record security-related events or any attempts to create, access, or delete system resources. Logon identifiers record the identities of all users, making it easy to trace anyone who performs an unauthorized action.

- Object reuse protection, which prevents users from seeing data that another user has deleted or from accessing memory that another user previously used and then released. For example, in some operating systems, it’s possible to create a new file of a certain length and then examine the contents of the file to see data that happens to have occupied the location on the disk where the file is allocated. This data might be sensitive information that was stored in another user’s file but had been deleted. Object reuse protection prevents this potential security hole by initializing all objects, including files and memory, before they are allocated to a user.

Windows also meets two requirements of B-level security:

- Trusted path functionality, which prevents Trojan horse programs from being able to intercept users’ names and passwords as they try to log on. The trusted path functionality in Windows comes in the form of its Ctrl+Alt+Delete logon-attention sequence, which cannot be
intercepted by nonprivileged applications. This sequence of keystrokes, which is also known as the secure attention sequence (SAS), always displays a system-controlled Windows security screen (if a user is already logged on) or the logon screen so that would-be Trojan horses can easily be recognized. (The secure attention sequence can also be sent programmatically via the SendSAS API, if group policy allows it.) A Trojan horse presenting a fake logon dialog box will be bypassed when the SAS is entered.

- Trusted facility management, which requires support for separate account roles for administrative functions. For example, separate accounts are provided for administration (Administrators), user accounts charged with backing up the computer, and standard users.

Windows meets all of these requirements through its security subsystem and related components.

The Common Criteria

In January 1996, the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Canada, and the Netherlands released the jointly developed Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CCITSE) security evaluation specification. CCITSE, which is usually referred to as the Common Criteria (CC), is the recognized multinational standard for product security evaluation. The CC home page is at www.niap-ccevs.org/cc-scheme/.

The CC is more flexible than the TCSEC trust ratings and has a structure closer to the ITSEC standard than to the TCSEC standard. The CC includes the concept of a Protection Profile (PP), used to collect security requirements into easily specified and compared sets, and the concept of a Security Target (ST), which contains a set of security requirements that can be made by reference to a PP. The CC also defines a range of seven Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs), which indicate a level of confidence in the certification. In this way, the CC (like the ITSEC standard before it) removes the link between functionality and assurance level that was present in TCSEC and earlier certification schemes.

Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, and Windows Vista Enterprise all achieved Common Criteria certification under the Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP). This is roughly equivalent to a TCSEC C2 rating. All received a rating of EAL 4+, the “plus” denoting “flaw remediation.” EAL 4 is the highest level recognized across national boundaries.

Security System Components

These are the core components and databases that implement Windows security:

- **Security reference monitor (SRM)** A component in the Windows executive (%SystemRoot%\System32\Ntoskrnl.exe) that is responsible for defining the access token data structure to represent a security context, performing security access checks on objects, manipulating privileges (user rights), and generating any resulting security audit messages.

- **Local Security Authority subsystem (LSASS)** A user-mode process running the image %SystemRoot%\System32\Lsass.exe that is responsible for the local system security policy (such as which users are allowed to log on to the machine, password policies, privileges granted to users and groups, and the system security auditing settings), user authentication, and sending security audit messages to the Event Log. The Local Security Authority service (Lsasrv—%SystemRoot%\System32\Lsasrv.dll), a library that LSASS loads, implements most of this functionality.

- **LSASS policy database** A database that contains the local system security policy settings. This database is stored in the registry in an ACL-protected area under HKLM\SECURITY. It includes such information as what domains are entrusted to authenticate logon attempts, who has permission to access the system and how (interactive, network, and service logons), who is assigned which privileges, and what kind of security auditing is to be performed. The LSASS policy database also stores “secrets” that include logon information used for cached domain logons and Windows service user-account logons. (See Chapter 4, “Management Mechanisms,” for more information on Windows services.)

- **Security Accounts Manager (SAM)** A service responsible for managing the database that contains the user names and groups defined on the local machine. The SAM service, which is implemented as %SystemRoot%\System32\Samsrv.dll, is loaded into the LSASS process.

- **SAM database** A database that contains the defined local users and groups, along with their passwords and other attributes. On domain controllers, the SAM does not store the domain-defined users, but stores the system’s administrator recovery account definition and password. This database is stored in the registry under HKLM\SAM.

- **Active Directory** A directory service that contains a database that stores information about objects in a domain. A domain is a collection of computers and their associated security groups that are managed as a single entity. Active Directory stores information about the objects in the domain, including users, groups, and computers. Password information and privileges for domain users and groups are stored in Active Directory, which is replicated across the computers that are designated as domain controllers of the domain. The Active Directory server, implemented as %SystemRoot%\System32\Ntdsa.dll, runs in the LSASS process. For more information on Active Directory, see Chapter 7, “Networking.”
**Authentication packages**  These include dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that run both in the context of the LSASS process and client processes, and implement Windows authentication policy. An authentication DLL is responsible for authenticating a user, by checking whether a given user name and password match, and if so, returning to the LSASS information detailing the user's security identity, which LSASS uses to generate a token.

**Interactive logon manager (Winlogon)**  A user-mode process running %SystemRoot%\System32\Winlogon.exe that is responsible for responding to the SAS and for managing interactive logon sessions. Winlogon creates a user’s first process when the user logs on, for example.

**Logon user interface (LogonUI)**  A user-mode process running %SystemRoot%\System32\LogonUI.exe that presents users with the user interface they can use to authenticate themselves on the system. LogonUI uses credential providers to query user credentials through various methods.

**Credential providers (CPs)**  In-process COM objects that run in the LogonUI process (started on demand by Winlogon when the SAS is performed) and used to obtain a user’s name and password, smartcard PIN, or biometric data (such as a fingerprint). The standard CPs are %SystemRoot%\System32\authui.dll and %SystemRoot%\System32\SmartcardCredentialProvider.dll.

**Network logon service (Netlogon)**  A Windows service (%SystemRoot%\System32\Netlogon.dll) that sets up the secure channel to a domain controller, over which security requests—such as an interactive logon (if the domain controller is running Windows NT 4) or LAN Manager and NT LAN Manager (v1 and v2) authentication validation—are sent. Netlogon is also used for Active Directory logons.

**Kernel Security Device Driver (KSecDD)**  A kernel-mode library of functions that implement the advanced local procedure call (ALPC) interfaces that other kernel mode security components, including the Encrypting File System (EFS), use to communicate with LSASS in user mode. KSecDD is located in %SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Ksecdd.sys.

**AppLocker**  A mechanism that allows administrators to specify which executable files, DLLs, and scripts can be used by specified users and groups. AppLocker consists of a driver (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\AppId.sys) and a service (%SystemRoot%\System32\AppIdSvc.dll) running in a SvcHost process.

Figure 6-1 shows the relationships among some of these components and the databases they manage.
FIGURE 6-1  Windows security components

EXPERIMENT: Looking Inside HKLM\SAM and HKLM\Security

The security descriptors associated with the SAM and Security keys in the registry prevent access by any account other than the local system account. One way to gain access to these keys for exploration is to reset their security, but that can weaken the system’s security. Another way is to execute Regedit.exe while running as the local system account. This can be done using the PsExec tool from Windows Sysinternals with the –s option, as shown here:

C:\>psexec –s –i –d c:\windows\regedit.exe
The SRM, which runs in kernel mode, and LSASS, which runs in user mode, communicate using the ALPC facility described in Chapter 3, “System Mechanisms.” During system initialization, the SRM creates a port, named SeRmCommandPort, to which LSASS connects. When the LSASS process starts, it creates an ALPC port named SeLsaCommandPort. The SRM connects to this port, resulting in the creation of private communication ports. The SRM creates a shared memory section for messages longer than 256 bytes, passing a handle in the connect call. Once the SRM and LSASS connect to each other during system initialization, they no longer listen on their respective connect ports. Therefore, a later user process has no way to connect successfully to either of these ports for malicious purposes—the connect request will never complete.

Figure 6-2 shows the communication paths as they exist after system initialization.
Protecting Objects

Object protection and access logging is the essence of discretionary access control and auditing. The objects that can be protected on Windows include files, devices, mailslots, pipes (named and anonymous), jobs, processes, threads, events, keyed events, event pairs, mutexes, semaphores, shared memory sections, I/O completion ports, LPC ports, waitable timers, access tokens, volumes, window stations, desktops, network shares, services, registry keys, printers, Active Directory objects, and so on—theoretically, anything managed by the executive object manager. In practice, objects that are not exposed to user mode (such as driver objects) are usually not protected. Kernel-mode code is trusted and usually uses interfaces to the object manager that do not perform access checking. Because system resources that are exported to user mode (and hence require security validation) are implemented as objects in kernel mode, the Windows object manager plays a key role in enforcing object security.

We described the object manager in Chapter 3, showing how the object manager maintains the security descriptor for objects. This is illustrated in Figure 6-3 using the Sysinternals Winobj tool, showing the security descriptor for a section object in the user’s session. Although files are the resources most commonly associated with object protection, Windows uses the same security model and mechanism for executive objects as it does for files in the file system. As far as access controls are concerned, executive objects differ from files only in the access methods supported by each type of object.

As you will see later, what is shown in Figure 6-3 is actually the object’s discretionary access control list, or DACL. We will describe DACLs in detail in a later section.

To control who can manipulate an object, the security system must first be sure of each user’s identity. This need to guarantee the user’s identity is the reason that Windows requires authenticated logon before accessing any system resources. When a process requests a handle to an object, the object manager and the security system use the caller’s security identification and the object’s security descriptor to determine whether the caller should be assigned a handle that grants the process access to the object it desires.
As discussed later in this chapter, a thread can assume a different security context than that of its process. This mechanism is called impersonation, and when a thread is impersonating, security validation mechanisms use the thread’s security context instead of that of the thread’s process. When a thread isn’t impersonating, security validation falls back on using the security context of the thread’s owning process. It’s important to keep in mind that all the threads in a process share the same handle table, so when a thread opens an object—even if it’s impersonating—all the threads of the process have access to the object.

Sometimes, validating the identity of a user isn’t enough for the system to grant access to a resource that should be accessible by the account. Logically, one can think of a clear distinction between a service running under the Alice account and an unknown application that Alice downloaded while browsing the Internet. Windows achieves this kind of intra-user isolation with the Windows integrity mechanism, which implements integrity levels. The Windows integrity mechanism is used by User Account Control (UAC) elevations, Protected Mode Internet Explorer (PMIE), and User Interface Privilege Isolation (UIPI).

**Access Checks**

The Windows security model requires that a thread specify up front, at the time that it opens an object, what types of actions it wants to perform on the object. The object manager calls the SRM to perform access checks based on a thread’s desired access, and if the access is granted, a handle is assigned to the thread’s process with which the thread (or other threads in the process) can perform further operations on the object. As explained in Chapter 3, the object manager records the access permissions granted for a handle in the process’ handle table.
One event that causes the object manager to perform security access validation is when a process opens an existing object using a name. When an object is opened by name, the object manager performs a lookup of the specified object in the object manager namespace. If the object isn’t located in a secondary namespace, such as the configuration manager’s registry namespace or a file system driver’s file system namespace, the object manager calls the internal function `ObpCreateHandle` once it locates the object. As its name implies, `ObpCreateHandle` creates an entry in the process’ handle table that becomes associated with the object. `ObpCreateHandle` first calls `ObpGrantAccess` to see if the thread has permission to access the object; if the thread does, `ObpCreateHandle` calls the executive function `ExCreateHandle` to create the entry in the process handle table. `ObpGrantAccess` calls `ObCheckObjectAccess` to initiate the security access check.

`ObpGrantAccess` passes to `ObCheckObjectAccess` the security credentials of the thread opening the object, the types of access to the object that the thread is requesting (read, write, delete, and so forth), and a pointer to the object. `ObCheckObjectAccess` first locks the object’s security descriptor and the security context of the thread. The object security lock prevents another thread in the system from changing the object’s security while the access check is in progress. The lock on the thread’s security context prevents another thread (from that process or a different process) from altering the security identity of the thread while security validation is in progress. `ObCheckObjectAccess` then calls the object’s security method to obtain the security settings of the object. (See Chapter 3 for a description of object methods.) The call to the security method might invoke a function in a different executive component. However, many executive objects rely on the system’s default security management support.

When an executive component defining an object doesn’t want to override the SRM’s default security policy, it marks the object type as having default security. Whenever the SRM calls an object’s security method, it first checks to see whether the object has default security. An object with default security stores its security information in its header, and its security method is `SeDefaultObjectMethod`. An object that doesn’t rely on default security must manage its own security information and supply a specific security method. Objects that rely on default security include mutexes, events, and semaphores. A file object is an example of an object that overrides default security. The I/O manager, which defines the file object type, has the file system driver on which a file resides manage (or choose not to implement) the security for its files. Thus, when the system queries the security on a file object that represents a file on an NTFS volume, the I/O manager file object security method retrieves the file’s security using the NTFS file system driver. Note, however, that `ObCheckObjectAccess` isn’t executed when files are opened, because they reside in secondary namespaces; the system invokes a file object’s security method only when a thread explicitly queries or sets the security on a file (with the Windows `SetFileSecurity` or `GetFileSecurity` functions, for example).

After obtaining an object’s security information, `ObCheckObjectAccess` invokes the SRM function `SeAccessCheck`. `SeAccessCheck` is one of the functions at the heart of the Windows security model. Among the input parameters `SeAccessCheck` accepts are the object’s security information, the security identity of the thread as captured by `ObCheckObjectAccess`, and the access that the thread is requesting. `SeAccessCheck` returns True or False, depending on whether the thread is granted the access it requested to the object.
Another event that causes the object manager to execute access validation is when a process references an object using an existing handle. Such references often occur indirectly, as when a process calls on a Windows API to manipulate an object and passes an object handle. For example, a thread opening a file can request read permission to the file. If the thread has permission to access the object in this way, as dictated by its security context and the security settings of the file, the object manager creates a handle—representing the file—in the handle table of the thread’s process. The types of accesses the process is granted through the handle are stored with the handle by the object manager.

Subsequently, the thread could attempt to write to the file using the \texttt{WriteFile} Windows function, passing the file’s handle as a parameter. The system service \texttt{NtWriteFile}, which \texttt{WriteFile} calls via \texttt{Ntdll.dll}, uses the object manager function \texttt{ObReferenceObjectByHandle} to obtain a pointer to the file object from the handle. \texttt{ObReferenceObjectByHandle} accepts the access that the caller wants from the object as a parameter. After finding the handle entry in the process’ handle table, \texttt{ObReferenceObjectByHandle} compares the access being requested with the access granted at the time the file was opened. In this example, \texttt{ObReferenceObjectByHandle} will indicate that the write operation should fail because the caller didn’t obtain write access when the file was opened.

The Windows security functions also enable Windows applications to define their own private objects and to call on the services of the SRM (through the AuthZ user-mode APIs, described later) to enforce the Windows security model on those objects. Many kernel-mode functions that the object manager and other executive components use to protect their own objects are exported as Windows user-mode APIs. The user-mode equivalent of \texttt{SeAccessCheck} is the AuthZ API \texttt{AccessCheck}. Windows applications can therefore leverage the flexibility of the security model and transparently integrate with the authentication and administrative interfaces that are present in Windows.

The essence of the SRM’s security model is an equation that takes three inputs: the security identity of a thread, the access that the thread wants to an object, and the security settings of the object. The output is either “yes” or “no” and indicates whether or not the security model grants the thread the access it desires. The following sections describe the inputs in more detail and then document the model’s access-validation algorithm.

\textbf{Security Identifiers}

Instead of using names (which might or might not be unique) to identify entities that perform actions in a system, Windows uses security identifiers (SIDs). Users have SIDs, and so do local and domain groups, local computers, domains, domain members, and services. A SID is a variable-length numeric value that consists of a SID structure revision number, a 48-bit identifier authority value, and a variable number of 32-bit subauthority or relative identifier (RID) values. The authority value identifies the agent that issued the SID, and this agent is typically a Windows local system or a domain. Subauthority values identify trustees relative to the issuing authority, and RIDs are simply a way for Windows to create unique SIDs based on a common base SID. Because SIDs are long and Windows takes care to generate truly random values within each SID, it is virtually impossible for Windows to issue the same SID twice on machines or domains anywhere in the world.
When displayed textually, each SID carries an S prefix, and its various components are separated with hyphens:

*S-1-5-21-1463437245-1224812800-863842198-1128*

In this SID, the revision number is 1, the identifier authority value is 5 (the Windows security authority), and four subauthority values plus one RID (1128) make up the remainder of the SID. This SID is a domain SID, but a local computer on the domain would have a SID with the same revision number, identifier authority value, and number of subauthority values.

When you install Windows, the Windows Setup program issues the computer a machine SID. Windows assigns SIDs to local accounts on the computer. Each local-account SID is based on the source computer's SID and has a RID at the end. RIDs for user accounts and groups start at 1000 and increase in increments of 1 for each new user or group. Similarly, Dcpromo.exe (Domain Controller Promote), the utility used to create a new Windows domain, reuses the computer SID of the computer being promoted to domain controller as the domain SID, and it re-creates a new SID for the computer if it is ever demoted. Windows issues to new domain accounts SIDs that are based on the domain SID and have an appended RID (again starting at 1000 and increasing in increments of 1 for each new user or group). A RID of 1028 indicates that the SID is the twenty-ninth SID the domain issued.

Windows issues SIDs that consist of a computer or domain SID with a predefined RID to many predefined accounts and groups. For example, the RID for the administrator account is 500, and the RID for the guest account is 501. A computer's local administrator account, for example, has the computer SID as its base with the RID of 500 appended to it:

*S-1-5-21-13124455-12541255-61235125-500*

Windows also defines a number of built-in local and domain SIDs to represent well-known groups. For example, a SID that identifies any and all accounts (except anonymous users) is the Everyone SID: S-1-1-0. Another example of a group that a SID can represent is the network group, which is the group that represents users who have logged on to a machine from the network. The network-group SID is S-1-5-2. Table 6-2, reproduced here from the Windows SDK documentation, shows some basic well-known SIDs, their numeric values, and their use. Unlike users' SIDs, these SIDs are predefined constants, and have the same values on every Windows system and domain in the world. Thus, a file that is accessible by members of the Everyone group on the system where it was created is also accessible to Everyone on any other system or domain to which the hard drive where it resides happens to be moved. Users on those systems must, of course, authenticate to an account on those systems before becoming members of the Everyone group.

**Note** See Microsoft Knowledge Base article 243330 for a list of defined SIDs at [http://support.microsoft.com/kb/243330](http://support.microsoft.com/kb/243330).

Finally, Winlogon creates a unique logon SID for each interactive logon session. A typical use of a logon SID is in an access control entry (ACE) that allows access for the duration of a client's logon session. For example, a Windows service can use the *LogonUser* function to start a new logon session. The *LogonUser* function returns an access token from which the service can extract the logon SID. The
service can then use the SID in an ACE that allows the client's logon session to access the interactive window station and desktop. The SID for a logon session is S-1-5-5-0, and the RID is randomly generated.

**TABLE 6-2 A Few Well-Known SIDs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SID</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S-1-0-0</td>
<td>Nobody</td>
<td>Used when the SID is unknown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-1-1-0</td>
<td>Everyone</td>
<td>A group that includes all users except anonymous users.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-1-2-0</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Users who log on to terminals locally (physically) connected to the system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-1-3-0</td>
<td>Creator Owner ID</td>
<td>A security identifier to be replaced by the security identifier of the user who created a new object. This SID is used in inheritable ACEs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-1-3-1</td>
<td>Creator Group ID</td>
<td>Identifies a security identifier to be replaced by the primary-group SID of the user who created a new object. Use this SID in inheritable ACEs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-1-9-0</td>
<td>Resource Manager</td>
<td>Used by third-party applications performing their own security on internal data (such as Microsoft Exchange).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EXPERIMENT: Using PsGetSid and Process Explorer to View SIDs**

You can easily see the SID representation for any account you’re using by running the PsGetSid utility from Sysinternals.

PsGetSid’s options allow you to translate machine and user account names to their corresponding SIDs and vice versa.

If you run PsGetSid with no options, it prints the SID assigned to the local computer. By using the fact that the Administrator account always has a RID of 500, you can determine the name assigned to the account (in cases where a system administrator has renamed the account for security reasons) simply by passing the machine SID appended with -500 as PsGetSid’s command-line argument.

To obtain the SID of a domain account, enter the user name with the domain as a prefix:

c:\>psgetsid redmond\daryl

You can determine the SID of a domain by specifying the domain’s name as the argument to PsGetSid:

c:\>psgetsid Redmond

Finally, by examining the RID of your own account, you know at least a number of security accounts (equal to the number resulting from subtracting 999 from your RID) have been created in your domain or on your local machine (depending on whether you are using a domain or local machine account). You can determine what accounts have been assigned RIDs by passing a SID with the RID you want to query to PsGetSid. If PsGetSid reports that no mapping between the SID and an account name was possible and the RID is lower than that of your account, you know that the account assigned the RID has been deleted.
For example, to find out the name of the account assigned the twenty-eighth RID, pass the domain SID appended with -1027 to PsGetSid:

c:\>psgetsid S-1-5-21-1787744166-3910675280-2727264193-1027
Account for S-1-5-21-1787744166-3910675280-2727264193-1027:
User: redmond\daryl

Process Explorer can also show you information on account and group SIDs on your system through its Security tab. This tab shows you information such as who owns this process and which groups the account is a member of. To view this information, simply double-click on any process (for example, Explorer.exe) in the Process list, and then click on the Security tab. You should see something similar to the following:

The information displayed in the User field contains the friendly name of the account owning this process, while the SID field contains the actual SID value. The Group list includes information on all the groups that this account is a member of. (Groups are described later in this chapter.)

**Integrity Levels**

As mentioned earlier, integrity levels can override discretionary access to differentiate a process and objects running as and owned by the same user, offering the ability to isolate code and data within a user account. The mechanism of mandatory integrity control (MIC) allows the SRM to have more detailed information about the nature of the caller by associating it with an integrity level. It also provides information on the trust required to access the object by defining an integrity level for it.
These integrity levels are specified by a SID. Though integrity levels can be arbitrary values, the system uses five primary levels to separate privilege levels, as described in Table 6-3.

**TABLE 6-3** Integrity Level SIDs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SID</th>
<th>Name (Level)</th>
<th>Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S-1-16-0x0</td>
<td>Untrusted (0)</td>
<td>Used by processes started by the Anonymous group. It blocks most write access.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-1-16-0x1000</td>
<td>Low (1)</td>
<td>Used by Protected Mode Internet Explorer. It blocks write access to most objects (such as files and registry keys) on the system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-1-16-0x2000</td>
<td>Medium (2)</td>
<td>Used by normal applications being launched while UAC is enabled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-1-16-0x3000</td>
<td>High (3)</td>
<td>Used by administrative applications launched through elevation when UAC is enabled, or normal applications if UAC is disabled and the user is an administrator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-1-16-0x4000</td>
<td>System (4)</td>
<td>Used by services and other system-level applications (such as Wininit, Winlogon, Smss, and so forth).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EXPERIMENT: Looking at the Integrity Level of Processes**

You can use Process Explorer from Sysinternals to quickly display the integrity level for the processes on your system. The following steps demonstrate this functionality.

1. Launch Internet Explorer in Protected Mode.
2. Open an elevated Command Prompt window.
3. Open Microsoft Paint normally (without elevating it).
4. Now open Process Explorer, right-click on any of the columns in the Process list, and then click Select Columns. You should see a dialog box similar to the one shown here:
5. Select the Integrity Level check box, and click OK to close the dialog box and save the change.

6. Process Explorer will now show you the integrity level of the processes on your system. You should see the Protected Mode Internet Explorer process at Low, Microsoft Paint at Medium, and the elevated command prompt at High. Also note that the services and system processes are running at an even higher integrity level, System.

Every process has an integrity level that is represented in the process' token and propagated according to the following rules:

- A process normally inherits the integrity level of its parent (which means an elevated command prompt will spawn other elevated processes).
- If the file object for the executable image to which the child process belongs has an integrity level and the parent process' integrity level is medium or higher, the child process will inherit the lower of the two.
- A parent process can create a child process with an explicit integrity level lower than its own (for example, when launching Protected Mode Internet Explorer from an elevated command prompt). To do this, it uses `DuplicateTokenEx` to duplicate its own access token, it uses `SetTokenInformation` to change the integrity level in the new token to the desired level, and then it calls `CreateProcessAsUser` with that new token.
EXPERIMENT: Understanding Protected Mode Internet Explorer

As mentioned earlier, one of the users of the Windows integrity mechanism is Internet Explorer’s Protected Mode, also called Protected Mode Internet Explorer (PMIE). This feature was added in Internet Explorer 7 to take advantage of the Windows integrity levels. This experiment will show you how PMIE utilizes integrity levels to provide a safer Internet experience. To do this, we’ll use Process Monitor to trace Internet Explorer’s behavior.

1. Make sure that you haven’t disabled UAC and PMIE on your systems (they are both on by default), and close any running instances of Internet Explorer.

2. Run Process Monitor, and select Filter, Filter to display the filtering dialog box. Add an include filter for the process name Iexplore.exe, as shown next:

3. Run Process Explorer, and repeat the previous experiment to display the Integrity Level column.

4. Now launch Internet Explorer. You should see a flurry of events appear in the Process Monitor window and a quick succession of events in Process Explorer, showing some processes starting and some exiting.

   Once Internet Explorer is running, Process Explorer will show you two new Iexplore.exe processes, the parent Iexplore.exe running at medium integrity level and its child running at low integrity level.

   Part of the added protection offered by PMIE is that Iexplore.exe processes that access websites run at low integrity. Because Internet Explorer hosts tabs in multiple processes, if you create additional tabs you might see additional instances of Iexplore.exe. There is one parent Iexplore.exe process that acts as a broker, providing access to parts of the system not accessible by those running at low integrity—for example, to save or open files from other parts of the file system.
Table 6-3 lists the integrity level associated with processes, but what about objects? Objects also have an integrity level stored as part of their security descriptor, in a structure that is called the mandatory label.

To support migrating from previous versions of Windows (whose registry keys and files would not include integrity-level information), as well as to make it simpler for application developers, all objects have an implicit integrity level to avoid having to manually specify one. This implicit integrity level is the medium level, meaning that the mandatory policy (described shortly) on the object will be performed on tokens accessing this object with an integrity level lower than medium.

When a process creates an object without specifying an integrity level, the system checks the integrity level in the token. For tokens with a level of medium or higher, the implicit integrity level of the object remains medium. However, when a token contains an integrity level lower than medium, the object is created with an explicit integrity level that matches the level in the token.

The reason that objects that are created by high or system integrity-level processes have a medium integrity level themselves is so that users can disable and enable UAC: if object integrity levels always inherited their creator’s integrity level, the applications of an administrator who disables UAC and subsequently re-enables it would potentially fail because the administrator would not be able to modify any registry settings or files created when running at the high integrity level. Objects can also have an explicit integrity level that is set by the system or by the creator of the object. For example, the following objects are given an explicit integrity level by the kernel when it creates them:

- Processes
- Threads
- Tokens
- Jobs

The reason for assigning an integrity level to these objects is to prevent a process for the same user, but one running at a lower integrity level, from accessing these objects and modifying their content or behavior (for example, DLL injection or code modification).

**EXPERIMENT: Looking at the Integrity Level of Objects**

You can use the Accesschk tool from Sysinternals to display the integrity level of objects on the system, such as files, processes, and registry keys. Here’s an experiment showing the purpose of the LocalLow directory in Windows.

1. Browse to C:\Users\UserName\ in a command prompt.
2. Try running Accesschk on the AppData folder, as follows:

   C:\Users\UserName> accesschk –v appdata

3. Note the differences between Local and LocalLow in your output, similar to the one shown here:

   C:\Users\UserName\AppData\Local
     Medium Mandatory Level (Default) [No-Write-Up]
   [...]C:\Users\UserName\AppData\LocalLow
     Low Mandatory Level [No-Write-Up]
   [...]C:\Users\UserName\AppData\Roaming
     Medium Mandatory Level (Default) [No-Write-Up]
     [...]  

4. Notice that the LocalLow directory has an integrity level that is set to Low, while the Local and Roaming directories have an integrity level of Medium (Default). The default means the system is using an implicit integrity level.

5. You can pass the –e flag to Accesschk so that it displays only explicit integrity levels.

   If you run the tool on the AppData folder again, you’ll notice only the LocalLow information is displayed.

   The –o (Object), –k (Registry Key), and –p (Process) flags allow you to specify something other than a file or directory.

Apart from an integrity level, objects also have a mandatory policy, which defines the actual level of protection that’s applied based on the integrity-level check. Three types are possible, shown in Table 6-4. The integrity level and the mandatory policy are stored together in the same ACE.

### TABLE 6-4 Object Mandatory Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Present on, by Default</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No-Write-Up</td>
<td>Implicit on all objects</td>
<td>Used to restrict write access coming from a lower integrity level process to the object.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No-Read-Up</td>
<td>Only on process objects</td>
<td>Used to restrict read access coming from a lower integrity level process to the object. Specific use on process objects protects against information leakage by blocking address space reads from an external process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No-Execute-Up</td>
<td>Only on binaries implementing COM classes</td>
<td>Used to restrict execute access coming from a lower integrity level process to the object. Specific use on COM classes is to restrict launch-activation permissions on a COM class.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Tokens**

The SRM uses an object called a token (or access token) to identify the security context of a process or thread. A security context consists of information that describes the account, groups, and privileges associated with the process or thread. Tokens also include information such as the session ID, the integrity level, and UAC virtualization state. (We’ll describe both privileges and UAC’s virtualization mechanism later in this chapter.)

During the logon process (described at the end of this chapter), LSASS creates an initial token to represent the user logging on. It then determines whether the user logging on is a member of a powerful group or possesses a powerful privilege. The groups checked for in this step are as follows:

- Built-In Administrators
- Certificate Administrators
- Domain Administrators
- Enterprise Administrators
- Policy Administrators
- Schema Administrators
- Domain Controllers
- Enterprise Read-Only Domain Controllers
- Read-Only Domain Controllers
- Account Operators
- Backup Operators
- Cryptographic Operators
- Network Configuration Operators
- Print Operators
- System Operators
- RAS Servers
- Power Users
- Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access
Many of the groups listed are used only on domain-joined systems and don’t give users local administrative rights directly. Instead, they allow users to modify domainwide settings.

The privileges checked for are

- SeBackupPrivilege
- SeCreateTokenPrivilege
- SeDebugPrivilege
- SeImpersonatePrivilege
- SeLabelPrivilege
- SeLoadDriverPrivilege
- SeRestorePrivilege
- SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege
- SeTcbPrivilege

These privileges are described in detail in a later section.

If one or more of these groups or privileges are present, LSASS creates a restricted token for the user (also called a filtered admin token), and it creates a logon session for both. The standard user token is attached to the initial process or processes that Winlogon starts (by default, Userinit.exe).

**Note** If UAC has been disabled, administrators run with a token that includes their administrator group memberships and privileges.

Because child processes by default inherit a copy of the token of their creators, all processes in the user’s session run under the same token. You can also generate a token by using the Windows LogonUser function. You can then use this token to create a process that runs within the security context of the user logged on through the LogonUser function by passing the token to the Windows CreateProcessAsUser function. The CreateProcessWithLogon function combines these into a single call, which is how the Runas command launches processes under alternative tokens.

Tokens vary in size because different user accounts have different sets of privileges and associated group accounts. However, all tokens contain the same types of information. The most important contents of a token are represented in Figure 6-4.
The security mechanisms in Windows use two components to determine what objects can be accessed and what secure operations can be performed. One component comprises the token's user account SID and group SID fields. The security reference monitor (SRM) uses SIDs to determine whether a process or thread can obtain requested access to a securable object, such as an NTFS file.

The group SIDs in a token indicate which groups a user's account is a member of. For example, a server application can disable specific groups to restrict a token's credentials when the server application is performing actions requested by a client. Disabling a group produces nearly the same effect as if the group wasn't present in the token. (It results in a deny-only group, described later. Disabled SIDs are used as part of security access checks, described later in the chapter.) Group SIDs can also include a special SID that contains the integrity level of the process or thread. The SRM uses another field in
the token, which describes the mandatory integrity policy, to perform the mandatory integrity check described later in the chapter.

The second component in a token that determines what the token’s thread or process can do is the privilege array. A token’s privilege array is a list of rights associated with the token. An example privilege is the right for the process or thread associated with the token to shut down the computer. Privileges are described in more detail later in this chapter.

A token’s default primary group field and default discretionary access control list (DACL) field are security attributes that Windows applies to objects that a process or thread creates when it uses the token. By including security information in tokens, Windows makes it convenient for a process or thread to create objects with standard security attributes, because the process or thread doesn’t need to request discrete security information for every object it creates.

Each token’s type distinguishes a primary token (a token that identifies the security context of a process) from an impersonation token (a type of token that threads use to temporarily adopt a different security context, usually of another user). Impersonation tokens carry an impersonation level that signifies what type of impersonation is active in the token. (Impersonation is described later in this chapter.)

A token also includes the mandatory policy for the process or thread, which defines how MIC will behave when processing this token. There are two policies:

- `TOKEN_MANDATORY_NO_WRITE_UP`, which is enabled by default, sets the No-Write-Up policy on this token, specifying that the process or thread will not be able to access objects with a higher integrity level for write access.

- `TOKEN_MANDATORY_NEW_PROCESS_MIN`, which is also enabled by default, specifies that the SRM should look at the integrity level of the executable image when launching a child process and compute the minimum integrity level of the parent process and the file object’s integrity level as the child’s integrity level.

Token flags include parameters that determine the behavior of certain UAC and UIPI mechanisms, such as virtualization and user interface access. Those mechanisms will be described later in this chapter.

Each token can also contain attributes that are assigned by the Application Identification service (part of AppLocker) when AppLocker rules have been defined. AppLocker and its use of attributes in the access token are described later in this chapter.

The remaining fields in a token serve informational purposes. The token source field contains a short textual description of the entity that created the token. Programs that want to know where a token originated use the token source to distinguish among sources such as the Windows Session Manager, a network file server, or the remote procedure call (RPC) server. The token identifier is a locally unique identifier (LUID) that the SRM assigns to the token when it creates the token. The Windows executive maintains the executive LUID, a monotonically increasing counter it uses to assign a unique numeric identifier to each token. A LUID is guaranteed to be unique only until the system is shut down.
The token authentication ID is another kind of LUID. A token’s creator assigns the token’s authentication ID when calling the `LsaLogonUser` function. If the creator doesn’t specify a LUID, LSASS obtains the LUID from the executive LUID. LSASS copies the authentication ID for all tokens descended from an initial logon token. A program can obtain a token’s authentication ID to see whether the token belongs to the same logon session as other tokens the program has examined.

The executive LUID refreshes the modified ID every time a token’s characteristics are modified. An application can test the modified ID to discover changes in a security context since the context’s last use.

Tokens contain an expiration time field that can be used by applications performing their own security to reject a token after a specified amount of time. However, Windows itself does not enforce the expiration time of tokens.

**Note** To guarantee system security, the fields in a token are immutable (because they are located in kernel memory). Except for fields that can be modified through a specific system call designed to modify certain token attributes (assuming the caller has the appropriate access rights to the token object), data such as the privileges and SIDs in a token can never be modified from user mode.

**EXPERIMENT: Viewing Access Tokens**

The kernel debugger `dt _TOKEN` command displays the format of an internal token object. Although this structure differs from the user-mode token structure returned by Windows API security functions, the fields are similar. For further information on tokens, see the description in the Windows SDK documentation.

The following output is from the kernel debugger’s `dt nt!_TOKEN` command:

```
kd> dt nt!_TOKEN
   +0x000 TokenSource : _TOKEN_SOURCE
   +0x010 TokenId : _LUID
   +0x018 AuthenticationId : _LUID
   +0x020 ParentTokenId : _LUID
   +0x028 ExpirationTime : _LARGE_INTEGER
   +0x030 TokenLock : Ptr32 _ERESOURCE
   +0x034 ModifiedId : _LUID
   +0x040 Privileges : _SEP_TOKEN_PRIVILEGES
   +0x058 AuditPolicy : _SEP_AUDIT_POLICY
   +0x074 SessionId : Uint4B
   +0x078 UserAndGroupId : Uint4B
   +0x07c RestrictedSidCount : Uint4B
   +0x080 VariableLength : Uint4B
   +0x084 DynamicCharged : Uint4B
   +0x088 DynamicAvailable : Uint4B
   +0x08c DefaultOwnerIndex : Uint4B
```
You can examine the token for a process with the `!token` command. You'll find the address of the token in the output of the `!process` command, as shown here:

```
lkd> !process d6c 1
Searching for Process with Cid == d6c
PROCESS 85450508  SessionId: 1  Cid: 0d6c    Peb: 7ffda000  ParentCid: 0ecc
   DirBase: cc9525e0  ObjectTable: afd75518  HANDLECOUNT: 18.
   Image: cmd.exe
   VadRoot 85328e78 Vads 24 Clone 0 Private 148. Modified 0. Locked 0.
   DeviceMap a0688138
   Token                             afd48470
   ElapsedTime                       01:10:14.379
   UserTime                          00:00:00.000
   KernelTime                        00:00:00.000
   QuotaPoolUsage[PagedPool]         42864
   QuotaPoolUsage[NonPagedPool]      1152
   Working Set Sizes (now,min,max)   (566, 50, 345) (2264KB, 200KB, 1380KB)
   PeakWorkingSetSize                582
   VirtualSize                       22 Mb
   PeakVirtualSize                   25 Mb
   PageFaultCount                    680
   MemoryPriority                    BACKGROUND
   BasePriority                      8
   CommitCharge                      437
```

```
lkd> !token afd48470
_TOKEN afd48470
   TS Session ID: 0x1
   User: S-1-5-21-2778343003-3541292008-524615573-500 (User: ALEX-LAPTOP\Administrator)
   Groups:
   00 S-1-5-21-2778343003-3541292008-524615573-513 (Group: ALEX-LAPTOP\None)
     Attributes - Mandatory Default Enabled
   01 S-1-1-0 (Well Known Group: localhost\Everyone)
     Attributes - Mandatory Default Enabled
```
02 S-1-5-21-2778343003-3541292008-524615573-1000 (Alias: ALEX-LAPTOP\Debugger Users)
   Attributes - Mandatory Default Enabled
03 S-1-5-32-544 (Alias: BUILTIN\Administrators)
   Attributes - Mandatory Default Enabled Owner
04 S-1-5-32-545 (Alias: BUILTIN\Users)
   Attributes - Mandatory Default Enabled
05 S-1-5-4 (Well Known Group: NT AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE)
   Attributes - Mandatory Default Enabled
06 S-1-5-11 (Well Known Group: NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users)
   Attributes - Mandatory Default Enabled
07 S-1-5-15 (Well Known Group: NT AUTHORITY\This Organization)
   Attributes - Mandatory Default Enabled
08 S-1-5-0-89263 (no name mapped)
   Attributes - Mandatory Default Enabled LogonId
09 S-1-2-0 (Well Known Group: localhost\LOCAL)
   Attributes - Mandatory Default Enabled
10 S-1-5-64-10 (Well Known Group: NT AUTHORITY\NTLM Authentication)
   Attributes - Mandatory Default Enabled
11 S-1-16-12288 Unrecognized SID
   Attributes - GroupIntegrity GroupIntegrityEnabled
Primary Group: S-1-5-21-2778343003-3541292008-524615573-513 (Group: ALEX-LAPTOP\None)
Privs:
05 0x000000005 SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege Attributes -
08 0x000000008 SeSecurityPrivilege Attributes -
09 0x000000009 SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege Attributes -
10 0x00000000a SeLoadDriverPrivilege Attributes -
11 0x00000000b SeSystemProfilePrivilege Attributes -
12 0x00000000c SeSystemtimePrivilege Attributes -
13 0x00000000d SeProfileSingleProcessPrivilege Attributes -
14 0x00000000e SeIncreaseBasePriorityPrivilege Attributes -
15 0x00000000f SeCreatePagefilePrivilege Attributes -
17 0x000000011 SeBackupPrivilege Attributes -
18 0x000000012 SeRestorePrivilege Attributes -
19 0x000000013 SeShutdownPrivilege Attributes -
20 0x000000014 SeDebugPrivilege Attributes -
22 0x000000016 SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege Attributes -
23 0x000000017 SeChangeNotifyPrivilege Attributes - Enabled Default
24 0x000000018 SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege Attributes -
25 0x000000019 SeUndockPrivilege Attributes -
28 0x00000001c SeManageVolumePrivilege Attributes -
29 0x00000001d SeImpersonatePrivilege Attributes - Enabled Default
30 0x00000001e SeCreateGlobalPrivilege Attributes - Enabled Default
33 0x000000021 SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Attributes -
34 0x000000022 SeTimeZonePrivilege Attributes -
35 0x000000023 SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege Attributes -
Authentication ID: (0,be1a2)
Impersonation Level: Identification
TokenType: Primary
Source: User32 TokenFlags: 0x0 (Token in use)
Token ID: 711076 ParentToken ID: 0
Modified ID: (0, 711081)
RestrictedSidCount: 0 RestrictedSids: 00000000
OriginatingLogonSession: 3e7
You can indirectly view token contents with Process Explorer’s Security tab in its process Properties dialog box. The dialog box shows the groups and privileges included in the token of the process you examine.

**EXPERIMENT: Launching a Program at Low Integrity Level**

When you elevate a program, either by using the Run As Administrator option or because the program is requesting it, the program is explicitly launched at high integrity level; however, it is also possible to launch a program (other than PMIE) at low integrity level by using Psexec from Sysinternals:

1. Launch Notepad at low integrity level by using the following command:
   
   ```
   c:\psexec -l notepad.exe
   ```

2. Try opening a file (such as one of the .XML files) in the `%SystemRoot%\System32` directory. Notice that you can browse the directory and open any file contained within it.

3. Now use Notepad’s File | New command, enter some text in the window, and try saving it in the `%SystemRoot%\System32` directory. Notepad should present a message box indicating a lack of permissions and recommend saving the file in the Documents folder.

4. Accept Notepad’s suggestion. You will get the same message box again, and repeatedly for each attempt.

![Save As dialog box](image)

5. Now try saving the file in the LocalLow directory of your user profile, shown in an experiment earlier in the chapter.

In the previous experiment, saving a file in the LocalLow directory worked because Notepad was running with low integrity level, and only the LocalLow directory also had low integrity level. All the other locations where you tried to write the file had an implicit medium integrity level. (You can verify this with Accesschk.) However, reading from the `%SystemRoot%\System32` directory, as well as opening files within it, did work, even though the directory and its file also have an implicit medium integrity level.
Impersonation

Impersonation is a powerful feature Windows uses frequently in its security model. Windows also uses impersonation in its client/server programming model. For example, a server application can provide access to resources such as files, printers, or databases. Clients wanting to access a resource send a request to the server. When the server receives the request, it must ensure that the client has permission to perform the desired operations on the resource. For example, if a user on a remote machine tries to delete a file on an NTFS share, the server exporting the share must determine whether the user is allowed to delete the file. The obvious way to determine whether a user has permission is for the server to query the user’s account and group SIDs and scan the security attributes on the file. This approach is tedious to program, prone to errors, and wouldn’t permit new security features to be supported transparently. Thus, Windows provides impersonation services to simplify the server’s job.

Impersonation lets a server notify the SRM that the server is temporarily adopting the security profile of a client making a resource request. The server can then access resources on behalf of the client, and the SRM carries out the access validations, but it does so based on the impersonated client security context. Usually, a server has access to more resources than a client does and loses some of its security credentials during impersonation. However, the reverse can be true: the server can gain security credentials during impersonation.

A server impersonates a client only within the thread that makes the impersonation request. Thread-control data structures contain an optional entry for an impersonation token. However, a thread’s primary token, which represents the thread’s real security credentials, is always accessible in the process’ control structure.

Windows makes impersonation available through several mechanisms. For example, if a server communicates with a client through a named pipe, the server can use the \textit{ImpersonateNamedPipeClient} Windows API function to tell the SRM that it wants to impersonate the user on the other end of the pipe. If the server is communicating with the client through Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) or RPC, it can make similar impersonation requests using \textit{DdeImpersonateClient} and \textit{RpcImpersonateClient}. A thread can create an impersonation token that’s simply a copy of its process token with the \textit{ImpersonateSelf} function. The thread can then alter its impersonation token, perhaps to disable SIDs or privileges. A Security Support Provider Interface (SSPI) package can impersonate its clients with \textit{ImpersonateSecurityContext}. SSPIs implement a network authentication protocol such as LAN Manager version 2 or Kerberos. Other interfaces such as COM expose impersonation through APIs of their own, such as \textit{CoImpersonateClient}.

After the server thread finishes its task, it reverts to its primary security context. These forms of impersonation are convenient for carrying out specific actions at the request of a client and for ensuring that object accesses are audited correctly. (For example, the audit that is generated gives the identity of the impersonated client rather than that of the server process.) The disadvantage to these forms of impersonation is that they can’t execute an entire program in the context of a client. In addition, an impersonation token can’t access files or printers on network shares unless it is a delegation-level impersonation (described shortly) and has sufficient credentials to authenticate to the remote machine, or the file or printer share supports null sessions. (A null session is one that results from an anonymous logon.)
If an entire application must execute in a client’s security context or must access network resources without using impersonation, the client must be logged on to the system. The LogonUser Windows API function enables this action. LogonUser takes an account name, a password, a domain or computer name, a logon type (such as interactive, batch, or service), and a logon provider as input, and it returns a primary token. A server thread can adopt the token as an impersonation token, or the server can start a program that has the client’s credentials as its primary token. From a security standpoint, a process created using the token returned from an interactive logon via LogonUser, such as with the CreateProcessAsUser API, looks like a program a user starts by logging on to the machine interactively. The disadvantage to this approach is that a server must obtain the user’s account name and password. If the server transmits this information across the network, the server must encrypt it securely so that a malicious user snooping network traffic can’t capture it.

To prevent the misuse of impersonation, Windows doesn’t let servers perform impersonation without a client’s consent. A client process can limit the level of impersonation that a server process can perform by specifying a security quality of service (SQOS) when connecting to the server. For instance, when opening a named pipe, a process can specify SECURITY_ANONYMOUS, SECURITY_IDENTIFICATION, SECURITY_IMPERSONATION, or SECURITY_DELEGATION as flags for the Windows CreateFile function. Each level lets a server perform different types of operations with respect to the client’s security context:

- **SecurityAnonymous** is the most restrictive level of impersonation—the server can’t impersonate or identify the client.
- **SecurityIdentification** lets the server obtain the identity (the SIDs) of the client and the client’s privileges, but the server can’t impersonate the client.
- **SecurityImpersonation** lets the server identify and impersonate the client on the local system.
- **SecurityDelegation** is the most permissive level of impersonation. It lets the server impersonate the client on local and remote systems.

Other interfaces such as RPC use different constants with similar meanings (for example, RPC_C_IMP_LEVEL_IMPERSONATE).

If the client doesn’t set an impersonation level, Windows chooses the SecurityImpersonation level by default. The CreateFile function also accepts SECURITY_EFFECTIVE_ONLY and SECURITY_CONTEXT_TRACKING as modifiers for the impersonation setting:

- **SECURITY_EFFECTIVE_ONLY** prevents a server from enabling or disabling a client’s privileges or groups while the server is impersonating.
- **SECURITY_CONTEXT_TRACKING** specifies that any changes a client makes to its security context are reflected in a server that is impersonating it. If this option isn’t specified, the server adopts the context of the client at the time of the impersonation and doesn’t receive any changes. This option is honored only when the client and server processes are on the same system.
To prevent spoofing scenarios in which a low integrity process could create a user interface that captured user credentials and then used LogonUser to obtain that user’s token, a special integrity policy applies to impersonation scenarios: a thread cannot impersonate a token of higher integrity than its own. For example, a low-integrity application cannot spoof a dialog box that queries administrative credentials and then attempt to launch a process at a higher privilege level. The integrity-mechanism policy for impersonation access tokens is that the integrity level of the access token that is returned by LsaLogonUser must be no higher than the integrity level of the calling process.

**Restricted Tokens**
A restricted token is created from a primary or impersonation token using the CreateRestrictedToken function. The restricted token is a copy of the token it’s derived from, with the following possible modifications:

- Privileges can be removed from the token’s privilege array.
- SIDs in the token can be marked as deny-only. These SIDs remove access to any resources for which the SID’s access is denied by using a matching access-denied ACE that would otherwise be overridden by an ACE granting access to a group containing the SID earlier in the security descriptor.
- SIDs in the token can be marked as restricted. These SIDs are subject to a second pass of the access-check algorithm, which will parse only the restricted SIDs in the token. The results of both the first pass and the second pass must grant access to the resource or no access is granted to the object.

Restricted tokens are useful when an application wants to impersonate a client at a reduced security level, primarily for safety reasons when running untrusted code. For example, the restricted token can have the shutdown-system privilege removed from it to prevent code executed in the restricted token’s security context from rebooting the system.

**Filtered Admin Token**
As you saw earlier, restricted tokens are also used by UAC to create the filtered admin token that all user applications will inherit. A filtered admin token has the following characteristics:

- The integrity level is set to medium.
- The administrator and administrator-like SIDs mentioned previously are marked as deny-only to prevent a security hole if the group was removed altogether. For example, if a file had an access control list (ACL) that denied the Administrators group all access but granted some access to another group the user belongs to, the user would be granted access if the Administrators group was absent from the token, which would give the standard user version of the user’s identity more access than the user’s administrator identity.
- All privileges are stripped except Change Notify, Shutdown, Undock, Increase Working Set, and Time Zone.
EXPERIMENT: Looking at Filtered Admin Tokens

You can make Explorer launch a process with either the standard user token or the administrator token by following these steps on a Windows machine with UAC enabled:

1. Log on to an account that's a member of the Administrators group.
2. Click Start, Programs, Accessories, Command Prompt, right-click on the shortcut, and then select Run As Administrator. You will see a command prompt with the word Administrator in the title bar.
3. Now repeat the process, but simply click on the shortcut—this will launch a second command prompt without administrative privileges.
4. Run Process Explorer, and view the Security tab in the Properties dialog boxes for the two command prompt processes you launched. Note that the standard user token contains a deny-only SID and a Medium Mandatory Label, and that it has only a couple of privileges. The properties on the right in the following screen shot are from a command prompt running with an administrator token, and the properties on the left are from one running with the filtered administrative token:
Virtual Service Accounts

Windows provides a specialized type of account known as a virtual service account (or simply virtual account) to improve the security isolation and access control of Windows services with minimal administrative effort. (See Chapter 4 for more information on Windows services.) Without this mechanism, Windows services must run either under one of the accounts defined by Windows for its built-in services (such as Local Service or Network Service) or under a regular domain account. The accounts such as Local Service are shared by many existing services and so offer limited granularity for privilege and access control; furthermore, they cannot be managed across the domain. Domain accounts require periodic password changes for security, and the availability of services during a password change cycle might be affected. Furthermore, for best isolation, each service should run under its own account, but with ordinary accounts this multiplies the management effort.

With virtual service accounts, each service runs under its own account with its own security ID. The name of the account is always “NT SERVICE\" followed by the internal name of the service. Virtual service accounts can appear in access control lists and can be associated with privileges via Group Policy like any other account name. They cannot, however, be created or deleted through the usual account management tools, nor assigned to groups.

Windows automatically sets and periodically changes the password of the virtual service account. Similar to the “Local System and other service accounts” account, there is a password, but the password is unknown to the system administrators.

EXPERIMENT: Using Virtual Service Accounts

You can create a service that runs under a virtual service account by using the Sc (service control) tool by following these steps:

1. In an Administrator command prompt, use the create command of the command-line tool Sc (service control) to create a service and a virtual account in which it will run. This example uses the “srvany” service from an earlier Windows Resource Kit:

   C:\Windows\system32>sc create srvany obj= "NT SERVICE\srvany" binPath= "d:\a\test\srvany.exe"
   [SC] CreateService SUCCESS

2. The previous command created the service (in the registry and also in the service controller manager’s internal list) and also created the virtual service account. Now Run the Services MMC snap-in (services.msc), select the new service, and look at the Log On tab in the Properties dialog.
3. You can also use the service properties dialog to create a virtual service account for an existing service. To do so, change the account name to “NT SERVICE\servicename and clear both password fields. Note, however, that existing services might not run correctly under a virtual service account, because that account might not have access to files or other resources needed by the service.

4. If you run Process Explorer and view the Security tab in the Properties dialog boxes for a service that uses a virtual account, you can observe the virtual account name and its security ID (SID).
5. The virtual service account can appear in an access control entry for any object (such as a file) the service needs to access. If you open the Properties dialog’s Security tab for a file and create an ACL that references the virtual service account, you will find that the account name you typed (for example, NT SERVICE\srvany) is changed to simply the service name (srvany) by the Check Names function, and it appears in the access control list in this shortened form.
6. The virtual service account can be granted permissions (or user rights) via Group Policy. In this example, the virtual account for the srvany service has been granted the right to create a pagefile.

![Create a pagefile Properties](image)

7. You won’t see the virtual service account in user administration tools like lusrmgr.msc because it is not stored in the SAM registry hive. However, if you examine the registry within the context of the built-in System account (as described previously), you will see evidence of the account in the HKLM\Security\Policy\Secrets key:

```
c:\>psexec -s -i -d c:\windows\regedit.exe
```

![Registry Editor](image)
Security Descriptors and Access Control

Tokens, which identify a user’s credentials, are only part of the object security equation. Another part of the equation is the security information associated with an object, which specifies who can perform what actions on the object. The data structure for this information is called a security descriptor. A security descriptor consists of the following attributes:

- **Revision number**  The version of the SRM security model used to create the descriptor.
- **Flags**  Optional modifiers that define the behavior or characteristics of the descriptor. These flags are listed in Table 6-5.
- **Owner SID**  The owner’s security ID.
- **Group SID**  The security ID of the primary group for the object (used only by POSIX).
- **Discretionary access control list (DACL)**  Specifies who has what access to the object.
- **System access control list (SACL)**  Specifies which operations by which users should be logged in the security audit log and the explicit integrity level of an object.

**TABLE 6-5 Security Descriptor Flags**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flag</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SE_OWNER_DEFAULTED</td>
<td>Indicates a security descriptor with a default owner security identifier (SID). Use this bit to find all the objects that have default owner permissions set.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE_GROUP_DEFAULTED</td>
<td>Indicates a security descriptor with a default group SID. Use this bit to find all the objects that have default group permissions set.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE_DACL_PRESENT</td>
<td>Indicates a security descriptor that has a DACL. If this flag is not set, or if this flag is set and the DACL is NULL, the security descriptor allows full access to everyone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE_DACL_DEFAULTED</td>
<td>Indicates a security descriptor with a default DACL. For example, if an object creator does not specify a DACL, the object receives the default DACL from the access token of the creator. This flag can affect how the system treats the DACL, with respect to access control entry (ACE) inheritance. The system ignores this flag if the SE_DACL_PRESENT flag is not set.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE_SACL_PRESENT</td>
<td>Indicates a security descriptor that has a system access control list (SACL).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE_SACL_DEFAULTED</td>
<td>Indicates a security descriptor with a default SACL. For example, if an object creator does not specify an SACL, the object receives the default SACL from the access token of the creator. This flag can affect how the system treats the SACL with respect to ACE inheritance. The system ignores this flag if the SE_SACL_PRESENT flag is not set.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE_DACL_UNTRUSTED</td>
<td>Indicates that the ACL pointed to by the DACL of the security descriptor was provided by an untrusted source. If this flag is set and a compound ACE is encountered, the system will substitute known valid SIDs for the server SIDs in the ACEs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE_SERVER_SECURITY</td>
<td>Requests that the provider for the object protected by the security descriptor should be a server ACL based on the input ACL, regardless of its source (explicit or defaulting). This is done by replacing all the GRANT ACEs with compound ACEs granting the current server access. This flag is meaningful only if the subject is impersonating.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flag</td>
<td>Meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE_DACL_AUTO_INHERIT_REQ</td>
<td>Requests that the provider for the object protected by the security descriptor automatically propagate the DACL to existing child objects. If the provider supports automatic inheritance, the DACL is propagated to any existing child objects, and the SE_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED bit in the security descriptor of the parent and child objects is set.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE_SACL_AUTO_INHERIT_REQ</td>
<td>Requests that the provider for the object protected by the security descriptor automatically propagate the SACL to existing child objects. If the provider supports automatic inheritance, the SACL is propagated to any existing child objects, and the SE_SACL_AUTO_INHERITED bit in the security descriptors of the parent object and child objects is set.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED</td>
<td>Indicates a security descriptor in which the DACL is set up to support automatic propagation of inheritable ACEs to existing child objects. The system sets this bit when it performs the automatic inheritance algorithm for the object and its existing child objects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE_SACL_AUTO_INHERITED</td>
<td>Indicates a security descriptor in which the SACL is set up to support automatic propagation of inheritable ACEs to existing child objects. The system sets this bit when it performs the automatic inheritance algorithm for the object and its existing child objects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE_DACL_PROTECTED</td>
<td>Prevents the DACL of a security descriptor from being modified by inheritable ACEs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE_SACL_PROTECTED</td>
<td>Prevents the SACL of a security descriptor from being modified by inheritable ACEs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE_RM_CONTROL_VALID</td>
<td>Indicates that the resource control manager bits in the security descriptor are valid. The resource control manager bits are 8 bits in the security descriptor structure that contains information specific to the resource manager accessing the structure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE_SELF_RELATIVE</td>
<td>Indicates a security descriptor in self-relative format, with all the security information in a contiguous block of memory. If this flag is not set, the security descriptor is in absolute format.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An access control list (ACL) is made up of a header and zero or more access control entry (ACE) structures. There are two types of ACLs: DACLs and SACLs. In a DACL, each ACE contains a SID and an access mask (and a set of flags, explained shortly), which typically specifies the access rights (Read, Write, Delete, and so forth) that are granted or denied to the holder of the SID. There are nine types of ACEs that can appear in a DACL: access allowed, access denied, allowed object, denied object, allowed callback, denied callback, allowed object callback, denied-object callback, and conditional claims. As you would expect, the access-allowed ACE grants access to a user, and the access-denied ACE denies the access rights specified in the access mask. The callback ACEs are used by applications that make use of the AuthZ API (described later) to register a callback that AuthZ will call when it performs an access check involving this ACE.

The difference between allowed object and access allowed, and between denied object and access denied, is that the object types are used only within Active Directory. ACEs of these types have a GUID (globally unique identifier) field that indicates that the ACE applies only to particular objects or subobjects (those that have GUID identifiers). In addition, another optional GUID indicates what type of child object will inherit the ACE when a child is created within an Active Directory container that has the ACE applied to it. (A GUID is a 128-bit identifier guaranteed to be universally unique.) The conditional claims ACE is stored in a *-callback type ACE structure and is described in the section on the AuthZ APIs.
The accumulation of access rights granted by individual ACEs forms the set of access rights granted by an ACL. If no DACL is present (a null DACL) in a security descriptor, everyone has full access to the object. If the DACL is empty (that is, it has zero ACEs), no user has access to the object.

The ACEs used in DACLs also have a set of flags that control and specify characteristics of the ACE related to inheritance. Some object namespaces have containers and objects. A container can hold other container objects and leaf objects, which are its child objects. Examples of containers are directories in the file system namespace and keys in the registry namespace. Certain flags in an ACE control how the ACE propagates to child objects of the container associated with the ACE. Table 6-6, reproduced in part from the Windows SDK, lists the inheritance rules for ACE flags.

### TABLE 6-6 Inheritance Rules for ACE Flags

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flag</th>
<th>Inheritance Rule</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONTAINER_INHERIT_ACE</td>
<td>Child objects that are containers, such as directories, inherit the ACE as an effective ACE. The inherited ACE is inheritable unless the NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT_ACE bit flag is also set.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INHERIT_ONLY_ACE</td>
<td>This flag indicates an inherit-only ACE that doesn’t control access to the object it’s attached to. If this flag is not set, the ACE controls access to the object to which it is attached.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INHERITED_ACE</td>
<td>This flag indicates that the ACE was inherited. The system sets this bit when it propagates an inheritable ACE to a child object.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT_ACE</td>
<td>If the ACE is inherited by a child object, the system clears the OBJECT_INHERIT_ACE and CONTAINER_INHERIT_ACE flags in the inherited ACE. This action prevents the ACE from being inherited by subsequent generations of objects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBJECT_INHERIT_ACE</td>
<td>Noncontainer child objects inherit the ACE as an effective ACE. For child objects that are containers, the ACE is inherited as an inherit-only ACE unless the NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT_ACE bit flag is also set.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A SACL contains two types of ACEs, system audit ACEs and system audit-object ACEs. These ACEs specify which operations performed on the object by specific users or groups should be audited. Audit information is stored in the system Audit Log. Both successful and unsuccessful attempts can be audited. Like their DACL object-specific ACE cousins, system audit-object ACEs specify a GUID indicating the types of objects or subobjects that the ACE applies to and an optional GUID that controls propagation of the ACE to particular child object types. If a SACL is null, no auditing takes place on the object. (Security auditing is described later in this chapter.) The inheritance flags that apply to DACL ACEs also apply to system audit and system audit-object ACEs.

Figure 6-5 is a simplified picture of a file object and its DACL.

![FIGURE 6-5 Discretionary access control list (DACL)](image)
As shown in Figure 6-5, the first ACE allows USER1 to query the file. The second ACE allows members of the group TEAM1 to have read and write access to the file, and the third ACE grants all other users (Everyone) execute access.

**EXPERIMENT: Viewing a Security Descriptor**

Most executive subsystems rely on the object manager's default security functionality to manage security descriptors for their objects. The object manager's default security functions use the security descriptor pointer to store security descriptors for such objects. For example, the process manager uses default security, so the object manager stores process and thread security descriptors in the object headers of process and thread objects, respectively. The security descriptor pointer of events, mutexes, and semaphores also store their security descriptors. You can use live kernel debugging to view the security descriptors of these objects once you locate their object header, as outlined in the following steps. (Note that both Process Explorer and AccessChk can also show security descriptors for processes.)

1. Start the kernel debugger.

2. Type `!process 0 0 explorer.exe` to obtain process information about Explorer:

   ```
   lkd> !process 0 0 explorer.exe
   PROCESS 85a3e030  SessionId: 1  Cid: 0aa4  Pef: 7ff4d000  ParentCid: 0a84
   DirBase: 0f419000  ObjectTable: 952cdd18  HandleCount: 1046.
   Image: explorer.exe
   ```

3. Type `!object` with the address following the word PROCESS in the output of the previous command as the argument to show the object data structure:

   ```
   lkd> !object 85a3e030
   Object: 85a3e030  Type: (842339e0) Process
   ObjectHeader: 85a3e030 (new version)
   HandleCount: 8  PointerCount: 497
   ```

4. Type `dt _OBJECT_HEADER` and the address of the object header field from the previous command's output to show the object header data structure, including the security descriptor pointer value:

   ```
   lkd> dt _OBJECT_HEADER 85a3e018
   nt!_OBJECT_HEADER
   +0x000 PointerCount : 0x497
   +0x004 HandleCount : 0x8
   +0x004 NextToFree : 0x00000008 Void
   +0x008 Lock : _EX_PUSH_LOCK
   +0x00c TypeIndex : 0x7 ''
   +0x00d TraceFlags : 0 ''
   +0x00e InfoMask : 0x8 ''
   +0x00f Flags : 0 ''
   +0x010 ObjectCreateInfo : 0x8577e940 _OBJECT_CREATE_INFORMATION
   +0x010 QuotaBlockCharged : 0x8577e940 Void
   +0x014 SecurityDescriptor : 0x97ed0b94 Void
   +0x018 Body : _QUAD
   ```
5. Finally, use the debugger’s `!sd` command to dump the security descriptor. The security descriptor pointer in the object header uses some of the low-order bits as flags, and these must be zeroed before following the pointer. On 32-bit systems there are three flag bits, so use `& ~8` with the security descriptor address displayed in the object header structure, as follows. On 64-bit systems there are four flag bits, so you use `& ~10` instead.

```
lkd> !sd 0x97ed0b94 & -8
->Revision: 0x1
->Sbz1    : 0x0
->Control : 0x8814
   SE_DACL_PRESENT
   SE_SACL_PRESENT
   SE_SACL_AUTO_INHERITED
   SE_SELF_RELATIVE
->Owner   : S-1-5-21-1488595123-1430011218-1163345924-1000
->Group   : S-1-5-21-1488595123-1430011218-1163345924-513
->Dacl    :
   ->AclRevision: 0x2
   ->Sbz1       : 0x0
   ->AclSize    : 0x5c
   ->AceCount   : 0x3
   ->Sbz2       : 0x0
   ->Ace[0]: 
      ->AceType: ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE
      ->AceFlags: 0x0
      ->AceSize: 0x24
      ->Mask : 0x001fffff
      ->Ace[0]: 
         ->SID: S-1-5-21-1488595123-1430011218-1163345924-1000
   ->Ace[1]: 
      ->AceType: ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE
      ->AceFlags: 0x0
      ->AceSize: 0x14
      ->Mask : 0x001fffff
      ->Ace[1]: 
         ->SID: S-1-5-18
   ->Ace[2]: 
      ->AceType: ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE
      ->AceFlags: 0x0
      ->AceSize: 0x1c
      ->Mask : 0x00121411
      ->Ace[2]: 
         ->SID: S-1-5-5-0-178173
->Sacl    :
   ->AclRevision: 0x2
   ->Sbz1       : 0x0
   ->AclSize    : 0x1c
   ->AceCount   : 0x1
   ->Sbz2       : 0x0
   ->Ace[0]: 
      ->AceType: SYSTEM_MANDATORY_LABEL_ACE_TYPE
      ->AceFlags: 0x0
      ->AceSize: 0x14
      ->mask : 0x00000003
      ->Ace[0]: 
         ->SID: S-1-16-8192
```
The security descriptor contains three access-allowed ACEs: one for the current user (S-1-5-21-1488595123-1430011218-1163345924-1000), one for the System account (S-1-5-18), and the last for the Logon SID (S-1-5-5-0-178173). The system access control list has one entry (S-1-16-8192) labeling the process as medium integrity level.

ACL Assignment
To determine which DACL to assign to a new object, the security system uses the first applicable rule of the following four assignment rules:

1. If a caller explicitly provides a security descriptor when creating the object, the security system applies it to the object. If the object has a name and resides in a container object (for example, a named event object in the \BaseNamedObjects object manager namespace directory), the system merges any inheritable ACEs (ACEs that might propagate from the object’s container) into the DACL unless the security descriptor has the SE_DACL_PROTECTED flag set, which prevents inheritance.

2. If a caller doesn’t supply a security descriptor and the object has a name, the security system looks at the security descriptor in the container in which the new object name is stored. Some of the object directory’s ACEs might be marked as inheritable, meaning that they should be applied to new objects created in the object directory. If any of these inheritable ACEs are present, the security system forms them into an ACL, which it attaches to the new object. (Separate flags indicate ACEs that should be inherited only by container objects rather than by objects that aren’t containers.)

3. If no security descriptor is specified and the object doesn’t inherit any ACEs, the security system retrieves the default DACL from the caller’s access token and applies it to the new object. Several subsystems on Windows have hard-coded DACLs that they assign on object creation (for example, services, LSA, and SAM objects).

4. If there is no specified descriptor, no inherited ACEs, and no default DACL, the system creates the object with no DACL, which allows everyone (all users and groups) full access to the object. This rule is the same as the third rule, in which a token contains a null default DACL.

The rules the system uses when assigning a SACL to a new object are similar to those used for DACL assignment, with some exceptions. The first is that inherited system audit ACEs don’t propagate to objects with security descriptors marked with the SE_SACL_PROTECTED flag (similar to the SE_DACL_PROTECTED flag, which protects DACLs). Second, if there are no specified security audit ACEs and there is no inherited SACL, no SACL is applied to the object. This behavior is different from that used to apply default DACLs because tokens don’t have a default SACL.

When a new security descriptor containing inheritable ACEs is applied to a container, the system automatically propagates the inheritable ACEs to the security descriptors of child objects. (Note that a security descriptor’s DACL doesn’t accept inherited DACL ACEs if its SE_DACL_PROTECTED flag is
enabled, and its SACL doesn't inherit SACL ACEs if the descriptor has the SE_SACL_PROTECTED flag set.) The order in which inheritable ACEs are merged with an existing child object’s security descriptor is such that any ACEs that were explicitly applied to the ACL are kept ahead of ACEs that the object inherits. The system uses the following rules for propagating inheritable ACEs:

- If a child object with no DACL inherits an ACE, the result is a child object with a DACL containing only the inherited ACE.
- If a child object with an empty DACL inherits an ACE, the result is a child object with a DACL containing only the inherited ACE.
- For objects in Active Directory only, if an inheritable ACE is removed from a parent object, automatic inheritance removes any copies of the ACE inherited by child objects.
- For objects in Active Directory only, if automatic inheritance results in the removal of all ACEs from a child object's DACL, the child object has an empty DACL rather than no DACL.

As you’ll soon discover, the order of ACEs in an ACL is an important aspect of the Windows security model.

Note Inheritance is generally not directly supported by the object stores, such as file systems, the registry, or Active Directory. Windows APIs that support inheritance, including SetEntriesInAcl, do so by invoking appropriate functions within the security inheritance support DLL (%SystemRoot%\System32\Ntmarta.dll) that know how to traverse those object stores.

Determining Access

Two methods are used for determining access to an object:

- The mandatory integrity check, which determines whether the integrity level of the caller is high enough to access the resource, based on the resource’s own integrity level and its mandatory policy.
- The discretionary access check, which determines the access that a specific user account has to an object.

When a process tries to open an object, the integrity check takes place before the standard Windows DACL check in the kernel’s SeAccessCheck function because it is faster to execute and can quickly eliminate the need to perform the full discretionary access check. Given the default integrity policies in its access token (TOKEN_MANDATORY_NO_WRITE_UP and TOKEN_MANDATORY_NEW_PROCESS_MIN, described previously), a process can open an object for write access if its integrity level is equal to or higher than the object’s integrity level and the DACL also grants the process the accesses it desires. For example, a low-integrity-level process cannot open a medium-integrity-level process for write access, even if the DACL grants the process write access.
With the default integrity policies, processes can open any object—with the exception of process, thread, and token objects—for read access as long as the object’s DACL grants them read access. That means a process running at low integrity level can open any files accessible to the user account in which it’s running. Protected Mode Internet Explorer uses integrity levels to help prevent malware that infects it from modifying user account settings, but it does not stop malware from reading the user’s documents.

Recall that process and thread objects are exceptions because their integrity policy also includes No-Read-Up. That means a process integrity level must be equal to or higher than the integrity level of the process or thread it wants to open, and the DACL must grant it the accesses it wants for an attempt to open it to succeed. Assuming the DACLs allow the desired access, Figure 6-6 shows the types of access that the processes running at medium or low have to other processes and objects.

**Figure 6-6** Access to processes versus objects for medium and low integrity level processes

---

**User Interface Privilege Isolation**

The Windows messaging subsystem also honors integrity levels to implement User Interface Privilege Isolation (UIPI). The subsystem does this by preventing a process from sending window messages to the windows owned by a process having a higher integrity level, with the following informational messages being exceptions:

- WM_NULL
- WM_MOVE
- WM_SIZE
- WM_GETTEXT
- WM_GETTEXTLENGTH
This use of integrity levels prevents standard user processes from driving input into the windows of elevated processes or from performing a shatter attack (such as sending the process malformed messages that trigger internal buffer overflows, which can lead to the execution of code at the elevated process' privilege level). UIPI also blocks window hooks from affecting the windows of higher integrity level processes so that a standard user process can't log the keystrokes the user types into an administrative application, for example. Journal hooks are also blocked in the same way to prevent lower integrity level processes from monitoring the behavior of higher integrity level processes.

Processes can choose to allow additional messages to pass the guard by calling the `ChangeWindowMessageEx` API. This function is typically used to add messages required by custom controls to communicate outside native common controls in Windows. An older API, `ChangeWindowMessageFilter` performs a similar function, but it is per-process rather than per-window. With `ChangeWindowMessageFilter` it is possible for two custom controls inside the same process to be using the same internal window messages, which could lead to one control’s potentially malicious window message to be allowed through, simply because it happens to be a query-only message for the other custom control.

Because accessibility applications such as the On-Screen Keyboard (Osk.exe) are subject to UIPI’s restrictions (which would require the accessibility application to be executed for each kind of visible integrity-level process on the desktop), these processes can enable UI Access. This flag can be present in the manifest file of the image and will run the process at a slightly higher integrity level than medium (between 0x2000 and 0x3000) if launched from a standard user account, or at high integrity level if launched from an administrator account. Note that in the second case, an elevation request won’t actually be displayed. For a process to set this flag, its image must also be signed and in one of several secure locations, including `%SystemRoot%` and `%ProgramFiles%`.

After the integrity check is complete, and assuming the mandatory policy allows access to the object based on the caller's integrity, one of two algorithms is used for the discretionary check to an object, which will determine the final outcome of the access check:

- Determine the maximum access allowed to the object, a form of which is exported to user mode with the Windows `GetEffectiveRightsFromAcl` function. This is also used when a program
specifies a desired access of MAXIMUM_ALLOWED, which is what the legacy APIs that don’t have a desired access parameter use.

- Determine whether a specific desired access is allowed, which can be done with the Windows 
AccessCheck function or the AccessCheckByType function.

The first algorithm examines the entries in the DACL as follows:

1. If the object has no DACL (a null DACL), the object has no protection and the security system 
grants all access.

2. If the caller has the take-ownership privilege, the security system grants write-owner access 
before examining the DACL. (Take-ownership privilege and write-owner access are explained 
in a moment.)

3. If the caller is the owner of the object, the system looks for an OWNER_RIGHTS SID and uses 
that SID as the SID for the next steps. Otherwise, read-control and write-DACL access rights 
are granted.

4. For each access-denied ACE that contains a SID that matches one in the caller’s access token, 
the ACE’s access mask is removed from the granted-access mask.

5. For each access-allowed ACE that contains a SID that matches one in the caller’s access token, 
the ACE’s access mask is added to the granted-access mask being computed, unless that 
access has already been denied.

When all the entries in the DACL have been examined, the computed granted-access mask is 
returned to the caller as the maximum allowed access to the object. This mask represents the total set 
of access types that the caller will be able to successfully request when opening the object.

The preceding description applies only to the kernel-mode form of the algorithm. The Windows 
version implemented by GetEffectiveRightsFromAcl differs in that it doesn’t perform step 2, and it 
considers a single user or group SID rather than an access token.

---

**Owner Rights**

Because owners of an object can normally override the security of an object by always being 
granted read-control and write-DACL rights, a specialized method of controlling this behavior is 
exposed by Windows: the Owner Rights SID.

The Owner Rights SID exists for two main reasons: improving service hardening in the op-
erating system, and allowing more flexibility for specific usage scenarios. For example, suppose 
an administrator wants to allow users to create files and folders but not to modify the ACLs on 
those objects. (Users could inadvertently or maliciously grant access to those files or folders to 
unwanted accounts.) By using an inheritable Owner Rights SID, the users can be prevented from 
editing or even viewing the ACL on the objects they create. A second usage scenario relates to 
group changes. Suppose an employee has been part of some confidential or sensitive group,
has created several files while a member of that group, and has now been removed from the group for business reasons. Because that employee is still a user, he could continue accessing the sensitive files.

As mentioned, Windows also uses the Owner Rights SID to improve service hardening. Whenever a service creates an object at run time, the Owner SID associated with that object is the account the service is running in (such as local system or local service) and not the actual service SID. This means that any other service in the same account would have access to the object by being an owner. The Owner Rights SID prevents that unwanted behavior.

The second algorithm is used to determine whether a specific access request can be granted, based on the caller's access token. Each open function in the Windows API that deals with securable objects has a parameter that specifies the desired access mask, which is the last component of the security equation. To determine whether the caller has access, the following steps are performed:

1. If the object has no DACL (a null DACL), the object has no protection and the security system grants the desired access.

2. If the caller has the take-ownership privilege, the security system grants write-owner access if requested and then examines the DACL. However, if write-owner access was the only access requested by a caller with take-ownership privilege, the security system grants that access and never examines the DACL.

3. If the caller is the owner of the object, the system looks for an OWNER_RIGHTS SID and uses that SID as the SID for the next steps. Otherwise, read-control and write-DACL access rights are granted. If these rights were the only access rights that the caller requested, access is granted without examining the DACL.

4. Each ACE in the DACL is examined from first to last. An ACE is processed if one of the following conditions is satisfied:
   
   a. The ACE is an access-deny ACE, and the SID in the ACE matches an enabled SID (SIDs can be enabled or disabled) or a deny-only SID in the caller’s access token.

   b. The ACE is an access-allowed ACE, and the SID in the ACE matches an enabled SID in the caller’s token that isn’t of type deny-only.

   c. It is the second pass through the descriptor for restricted-SID checks, and the SID in the ACE matches a restricted SID in the caller’s access token.

   d. The ACE isn’t marked as inherit-only.
5. If it is an access-allowed ACE, the rights in the access mask in the ACE that were requested are granted; if all the requested access rights have been granted, the access check succeeds. If it is an access-denied ACE and any of the requested access rights are in the denied-access rights, access is denied to the object.

6. If the end of the DACL is reached and some of the requested access rights still haven’t been granted, access is denied.

7. If all accesses are granted but the caller’s access token has at least one restricted SID, the system rescans the DACL's ACEs looking for ACEs with access-mask matches for the accesses the user is requesting and a match of the ACE’s SID with any of the caller’s restricted SIDs. Only if both scans of the DACL grant the requested access rights is the user granted access to the object.

The behavior of both access-validation algorithms depends on the relative ordering of allow and deny ACEs. Consider an object with only two ACEs, where one ACE specifies that a certain user is allowed full access to an object and the other ACE denies the user access. If the allow ACE precedes the deny ACE, the user can obtain full access to the object, but if the order is reversed, the user cannot gain any access to the object.

Several Windows functions, such as SetSecurityInfo and SetNamedSecurityInfo, apply ACEs in the preferred order of explicit deny ACEs preceding explicit allow ACEs. Note that the security editor dialog boxes with which you edit permissions on NTFS files and registry keys, for example, use these functions. SetSecurityInfo and SetNamedSecurityInfo also apply ACE inheritance rules to the security descriptor on which they are applied.

Figure 6-7 shows an example access validation demonstrating the importance of ACE ordering. In the example, access is denied a user wanting to open a file even though an ACE in the object’s DACL grants the access because the ACE denying the user access (by virtue of the user’s membership in the Writers group) precedes the ACE granting access.

As we stated earlier, because it wouldn’t be efficient for the security system to process the DACL every time a process uses a handle, the SRM makes this access check only when a handle is opened, not each time the handle is used. Thus, once a process successfully opens a handle, the security system can’t revoke the access rights that have been granted, even if the object’s DACL changes. Also keep in mind that because kernel-mode code uses pointers rather than handles to access objects, the access check isn’t performed when the operating system uses objects. In other words, the Windows executive trusts itself (and all loaded drivers) in a security sense.

The fact that an object’s owner is always granted write-DACL access to an object means that users can never be prevented from accessing the objects they own. If, for some reason, an object had an empty DACL (no access), the owner would still be able to open the object with write-DACL access and then apply a new DACL with the desired access permissions.
A Warning Regarding the GUI Security Editors

When you use the GUI permissions editors to modify security settings on a file, a registry, or an Active Directory object, or on another securable object, the main security dialog box shows you a potentially misleading view of the security that’s applied to the object. If you allow Full Control to the Everyone group and deny the Administrator group Full Control, the list might lead you to believe that the Everyone group access-allowed ACE precedes the Administrator deny ACE because that’s the order in which they appear. However, as we’ve said, the editors place deny ACEs before allow ACEs when they apply the ACL to the object.
The Permissions tab of the Advanced Security Settings dialog box shows the order of ACEs in the DACL. However, even this dialog box can be confusing because a complex DACL can have deny ACEs for various accesses followed by allow ACEs for other access types.

The only definitive way to know what accesses a particular user or group will have to an object (other than having that user or a member of the group try to access the object) is to use the Effective Permissions tab of the dialog box that is displayed when you click the Advanced
button in the Properties dialog box. Enter the name of the user or group you want to check, and the dialog box shows you what permissions they are allowed for the object.

The AuthZ API

The AuthZ Windows API provides authorization functions and implement the same security model as the security reference monitor, but it implements the model totally in user mode in the \%SystemRoot\%\system32\Authz.dll library. This gives applications that want to protect their own private objects, such as database tables, the ability to leverage the Windows security model without incurring the cost of user mode to kernel mode transitions that they would make if they relied on the security reference monitor.

The AuthZ API uses standard security descriptor data structures, SIDs, and privileges. Instead of using tokens to represent clients, AuthZ uses AUTHZ_CLIENT_CONTEXT. AuthZ includes user-mode equivalents of all access-check and Windows security functions—for example, AuthzAccessCheck is the AuthZ version of the AccessCheck Windows API that uses the SeAccessCheck security reference monitor function.

Another advantage available to applications that use AuthZ is that they can direct AuthZ to cache the results of security checks to improve subsequent checks that use the same client context and security descriptor. AuthZ is fully documented in the Windows SDK.
The discretionary access control security mechanisms described previously have been part of the Windows NT family since the beginning, and they work well enough in a static, controlled environment. This type of access checking, using a security ID (SID) and security group membership, is known as identity-based access control (IBAC), and it requires that the security system knows the identity of every possible accessor when the DACL is placed in an object’s security descriptor.

Windows includes support for Claims Based Access Control (CBAC), where access is granted not based upon the accessor’s identity or group membership, but upon arbitrary attributes assigned to the accessor and stored in the accessor’s access token. Attributes are supplied by an attribute provider, such as AppLocker. The CBAC mechanism provides many benefits, including the ability to create a DACL for a user whose identity is not yet known or dynamically-calculated user attributes. The CBAC ACE (also known as a conditional ACE) is stored in a *-callback ACE structure, which is essentially private to AuthZ and is ignored by the system SeAccessCheck API. The kernel-mode routine SeSrpAccessCheck does not understand conditional ACEs, so only applications calling the AuthZ APIs can make use of CBAC. The only system component that makes use of CBAC is AppLocker, for setting attributes such as path, or publisher. Third-party applications can make use of CBAC by taking advantage of the CBAC AuthZ APIs.

Using CBAC security checks allows powerful management policies, such as the following:

- Run only applications approved by the corporate IT department.
- Allow only approved applications to access your Microsoft Outlook contacts or calendar.
- Allow only people on a particular building’s floor to access printers on that floor.
- Allow access to an intranet website only to full-time employees (as opposed to contractors).

Attributes can be referenced in what is known as a conditional ACE, where the presence, absence, or value of one or more attributes is checked. An attribute name can contain any alphanumeric Unicode characters, as well as ":/_.". The value of an attribute can be one of the following: 64-bit integer, Unicode string, byte string, or array.

**Conditional ACEs**

The format of SDDL (Security Descriptor Definition Language) strings has been expanded to support ACEs with conditional expressions. The new format of an SDDL string is this: AceType;AceFlags;Rights;ObjectGuid;InheritObjectGuid;AccountSid;(ConditionalExpression).

The AceType for a conditional ACE is either XA (for SDDL_CALLBACK_ACCESS_ALLOWED) or XD (for SDDL_CALLBACK_ACCESS_DENIED). Note that ACEs with conditional expressions are used for claims-type authorization (specifically, the AuthZ APIs and AppLocker) and are not recognized by the object manager or file systems.

A conditional expression can include any of the elements shown in Table 6-7.
### TABLE 6-7  Acceptable Elements for a Conditional Expression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expression Element</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>AttributeName</code></td>
<td>Tests whether the specified attribute has a nonzero value.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>exists AttributeName</code></td>
<td>Tests whether the specified attribute exists in the client context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>AttributeName Operator Value</code></td>
<td>Returns the result of the specified operation. The following operators are defined for use in conditional expressions to test the values of attributes. All of these are binary operators (as opposed to unary) and are used in the form <code>AttributeName Operator Value</code>. Operators: Contains any_of, ==, !=, &lt;, &lt;=, &gt;, &gt;=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>`ConditionalExpression</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>ConditionalExpression &amp;&amp; ConditionalExpression</code></td>
<td>Tests whether both of the specified conditional expressions are true.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>!(ConditionalExpression)</code></td>
<td>The inverse of a conditional expression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>Member_of{SidArray}</code></td>
<td>Tests whether the SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES array of the client context contains all of the security identifiers (SIDs) in the comma-separated list specified by <code>SidArray</code>.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A conditional ACE can contain any number of conditions, and it is either ignored if the resultant evaluation of the condition is false or applied if the result is true. A conditional ACE can be added to an object using the `AddConditionalAce` API and checked using the `AuthzAccessCheck` API.

A conditional ACE could specify that access to certain data records within a program should be granted only to a user who meets the following criteria:

- Holds the `Role` attribute, with a value of Architect, Program Manager, or Development Lead, and the Division attribute with a value of Windows
- Whose `ManagementChain` attribute contains the value John Smith
- Whose `CommissionType` attribute is Officer and whose `PayGrade` attribute is greater than 6 (that is, the rank of General Officer in the US military)

Windows does not include tools to view or edit conditional ACEs.

### Account Rights and Privileges

Many operations performed by processes as they execute cannot be authorized through object access protection because they do not involve interaction with a particular object. For example, the ability to bypass security checks when opening files for backup is an attribute of an account, not of a particular object. Windows uses both privileges and account rights to allow a system administrator to control what accounts can perform security-related operations.

A privilege is the right of an account to perform a particular system-related operation, such as shutting down the computer or changing the system time. An account right grants or denies the account to which it’s assigned the ability to perform a particular type of logon, such as a local logon or interactive logon, to a computer.
A system administrator assigns privileges to groups and accounts using tools such as the Active Directory Users and Groups MMC snap-in for domain accounts or the Local Security Policy Editor (%SystemRoot%\System32\secpol.msc). You access the Local Security Policy Editor in the Administrative Tools folder of the Control Panel or the Start menu (if you’ve configured your Start menu to contain an Administrative Tools link). Figure 6-8 shows the User Rights Assignment configuration in the Local Security Policy Editor, which displays the complete list of privileges and account rights available on Windows. Note that the tool makes no distinction between privileges and account rights. However, you can differentiate between them because any user right that does not contain the words log on is an account privilege.

![Local Security Policy Editor user rights assignment](image)

**FIGURE 6-8** Local Security Policy Editor user rights assignment
Account Rights

Account rights are not enforced by the security reference monitor, nor are they stored in tokens. The function responsible for logon is LsaLogonUser. Winlogon, for example, calls the LogonUser API when a user logs on interactively to a computer, and LogonUser calls LsaLogonUser. LogonUser takes a parameter that indicates the type of logon being performed, which includes interactive, network, batch, service, and Terminal Server client.

In response to logon requests, the Local Security Authority (LSA) retrieves account rights assigned to a user from the LSA policy database at the time that a user attempts to log on to the system. LSA checks the logon type against the account rights assigned to the user account logging on and denies the logon if the account does not have the right that permits the logon type or it has the right that denies the logon type. Table 6-8 lists the user rights defined by Windows.

Windows applications can add and remove user rights from an account by using the LsaAddAccountRights and LsaRemoveAccountRights functions, and they can determine what rights are assigned to an account with LsaEnumerateAccountRights.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>User Right</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deny logon locally, Allow logon locally</td>
<td>Used for interactive logons that originate on the local machine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deny logon over the network, Allow logon over the network</td>
<td>Used for logons that originate from a remote machine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deny logon through Terminal Services, Allow logon through Terminal Services</td>
<td>Used for logons through a Terminal Server client</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deny logon as a service, Allow logon as a service</td>
<td>Used by the service control manager when starting a service in a particular user account</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deny logon as a batch job, Allow logon as a batch job</td>
<td>Used when performing a logon of type batch</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Privileges

The number of privileges defined by the operating system has grown over time. Unlike user rights, which are enforced in one place by the LSA, different privileges are defined by different components and enforced by those components. For example, the debug privilege, which allows a process to bypass security checks when opening a handle to another process with the OpenProcess Windows API, is checked for by the process manager. Table 6-9 is a full list of privileges, and it describes how and when system components check for them.

When a component wants to check a token to see whether a privilege is present, it uses the PrivilegeCheck or LsaEnumerateAccountRights APIs if running in user mode and SeSinglePrivilegeCheck or SePrivilegeCheck if running in kernel mode. The privilege-related APIs are not account-right aware, but the account-right APIs are privilege-aware.
Unlike account rights, privileges can be enabled and disabled. For a privilege check to succeed, the privilege must be in the specified token and it must be enabled. The idea behind this scheme is that privileges should be enabled only when their use is required so that a process cannot inadvertently perform a privileged security operation.

**EXPERIMENT: Seeing a Privilege Get Enabled**

By following these steps, you can see that the Date and Time Control Panel applet enables the SeTimeZonePrivilege privilege in response to you using its interface to change the time zone of the computer:

1. Run Process Explorer, and set the refresh rate to Paused.
2. Open the Date And Time item by right-clicking on the clock in the system tray region of the taskbar, and then select Adjust Date/Time. A new Rundll32 process will appear with a green highlight when you force a refresh with F5.
3. Hover the mouse over the Rundll32 process, and verify that the target contains the text “Time Date Control Panel Applet” as well as a path to Timedate.cpl. The presence of this argument tells Rundll32, which is a Control Panel DLL hosting process, to load the DLL that implements the user interface that enables you to change the time and date.
4. View the Security tab of the process Properties dialog box for your Rundll32 process. You should see that the SeTimeZonePrivilege privilege is disabled.
5. Now click the Change Time Zone button in the Control Panel item, close the process Properties dialog box, and then open it again. On the Security tab, you should now see that the SeTimeZonePrivilege privilege is enabled.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Privilege</th>
<th>User Right</th>
<th>Privilege Usage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege</td>
<td>Replace a process-level token</td>
<td>Checked for by various components, such as NtSetInformationJob, that set a process' token.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeAuditPrivilege</td>
<td>Generate security audits</td>
<td>Required to generate events for the Security event log with the ReportEvent API.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeBackupPrivilege</td>
<td>Back up files and directories</td>
<td>Causes NTFS to grant the following access to any file or directory, regardless of the security descriptor that's present: READ_CONTROL, ACCESS_SYSTEM_SECURITY, FILE_GENERIC_READ, FILE_TRAVERSE. Note that when opening a file for backup, the caller must specify the FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS flag. Also allows corresponding access to registry keys when using RegSaveKey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeChangeNotifyPrivilege</td>
<td>Bypass traverse checking</td>
<td>Used by NTFS to avoid checking permissions on intermediate directories of a multilevel directory lookup. Also used by file systems when applications register for notification of changes to the file system structure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeCreateGlobalPrivilege</td>
<td>Create global objects</td>
<td>Required for a process to create section and symbolic link objects in the directories of the object manager namespace that are assigned to a different session than the caller.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeCreatePagefilePrivilege</td>
<td>Create a pagefile</td>
<td>Checked for by NtCreatePagingFile, which is the function used to create a new paging file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeCreatePermanentPrivilege</td>
<td>Create permanent shared objects</td>
<td>Checked for by the object manager when creating a permanent object (one that doesn’t get deallocated when there are no more references to it).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege</td>
<td>Create symbolic links</td>
<td>Checked for by NTFS when creating symbolic links on the file system with the CreateSymbolicLink API.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeCreateTokenPrivilege</td>
<td>Create a token object</td>
<td>NtCreateToken, the function that creates a token object, checks for this privilege.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeDebugPrivilege</td>
<td>Debug programs</td>
<td>If the caller has this privilege enabled, the process manager allows access to any process or thread using NtOpenProcess or NtOpenThread, regardless of the process’ or thread’s security descriptor (except for protected processes).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeEnableDelegationPrivilege</td>
<td>Enable computer and user accounts to be trusted for delegation</td>
<td>Used by Active Directory services to delegate authenticated credentials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeImpersonatePrivilege</td>
<td>Impersonate a client after authentication</td>
<td>The process manager checks for this when a thread wants to use a token for impersonation and the token represents a different user than that of the thread’s process token.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeIncreaseBasePriorityPrivilege</td>
<td>Increase scheduling priority</td>
<td>Checked for by the process manager and is required to raise the priority of a process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege</td>
<td>Adjust memory quotas for a process</td>
<td>Enforced when changing a process’ working set thresholds, a process’ paged and nonpaged pool quotas, and a process’ CPU rate quota.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege</td>
<td>Increase a process working set</td>
<td>Required to call SetProcessWorkingSetSize to increase the minimum working set. This indirectly allows the process to lock up to the minimum working set of memory using VirtualLock.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privilege</td>
<td>User Right</td>
<td>Privilege Usage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeLoadDriverPrivilege</td>
<td>Load and unload device drivers</td>
<td>Checked for by the NtLoadDriver and NtUnloadDriver driver functions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeLockMemoryPrivilege</td>
<td>Lock pages in memory</td>
<td>Checked for by NtLockVirtualMemory, the kernel implementation of VirtualLock.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeMachineAccountPrivilege</td>
<td>Add workstations to the domain</td>
<td>Checked for by the Security Accounts Manager on a domain controller when creating a machine account in a domain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeManageVolumePrivilege</td>
<td>Perform volume maintenance tasks</td>
<td>Enforced by file system drivers during a volume open operation, which is required to perform disk checking and defragmenting activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeProfileSingleProcessPrivilege</td>
<td>Profile single process</td>
<td>Checked by Superfetch and the prefetcher when requesting information for an individual process through the NtQuerySystemInformation API.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeRelabelPrivilege</td>
<td>Modify an object label</td>
<td>Checked for by the SRM when raising the integrity level of an object owned by another user, or when attempting to raise the integrity level of an object higher than that of the caller’s token.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege</td>
<td>Force shutdown from a remote system</td>
<td>Winlogon checks that remote callers of the InitiateSystemShutdown function have this privilege.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeRestorePrivilege</td>
<td>Restore files and directories</td>
<td>This privilege causes NTFS to grant the following access to any file or directory, regardless of the security descriptor that’s present: WRITE_DAC, WRITE_OWNER, ACCESS_SYSTEM_SECURITY, FILE_GENERIC_WRITE, FILE_ADD_FILE, FILE_ADD_SUBDIRECTORY, DELETE. Note that when opening a file for restore, the caller must specify the FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS flag. Allows corresponding access to registry keys when using RegSaveKey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeSecurityPrivilege</td>
<td>Manage auditing and security log</td>
<td>Required to access the SACL of a security descriptor, and to read and clear the security event log.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeShutdownPrivilege</td>
<td>Shut down the system</td>
<td>This privilege is checked for by NtShutdownSystem and NtRaiseHardError, which presents a system error dialog box on the interactive console.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeSyncAgentPrivilege</td>
<td>Synchronize directory service data</td>
<td>Required to use the LDAP directory synchronization services. It allows the holder to read all objects and properties in the directory, regardless of the protection on the objects and properties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege</td>
<td>Modify firmware environment variables</td>
<td>Required by NtSetSystemEnvironmentValue and NtQuerySystemEnvironmentValue to modify and read firmware environment variables using the hardware abstraction layer (HAL).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeSystemProfilePrivilege</td>
<td>Profile system performance</td>
<td>Checked for by NtCreateProfile, the function used to perform profiling of the system. This is used by the Kernprof tool, for example.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeSystemTimePrivilege</td>
<td>Change the system time</td>
<td>Required to change the time or date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privilege</td>
<td>User Right</td>
<td>Privilege Usage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege</td>
<td>Take ownership of files and other objects</td>
<td>Required to take ownership of an object without being granted discretionary access.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeTcbPrivilege</td>
<td>Act as part of the operating system</td>
<td>Checked for by the security reference monitor when the session ID is set in a token, by the Plug and Play manager for Plug and Play event creation and management, by <code>BroadcastSystemMessageEx</code> when called with BSM_ALLDESKTOPS, by <code>LsaRegisterLogonProcess</code>, and when specifying an application as a VDM with <code>NtSetInformationProcess</code>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeTimeZonePrivilege</td>
<td>Change the time zone</td>
<td>Required to change the time zone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeTrustedCredManAccessPrivilege</td>
<td>Access credential manager as a trusted caller</td>
<td>Checked by the credential manager to verify that it should trust the caller with credential information that can be queried in plain text. It is granted only to Winlogon by default.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeUndockPrivilege</td>
<td>Remove computer from a docking station</td>
<td>Checked for by the user-mode Plug and Play manager when either a computer undock is initiated or a device eject request is made.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeUnsolicitedInputPrivilege</td>
<td>Receive unsolicited data from a terminal device</td>
<td>This privilege isn’t currently used by Windows.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EXPERIMENT: The Bypass Traverse Checking Privilege**

If you are a systems administrator, you must be aware of the Bypass Traverse Checking privilege (internally called `SeNotifyPrivilege`) and its implications. This experiment demonstrates that not understanding its behavior can lead to improperly applied security.

1. Create a folder and, within that folder, a new text file with some sample text.

2. Navigate in Explorer to the new file, and go to the Security tab of its Properties dialog box. Click the Advanced button, and clear the check box that controls inheritance. Select Copy when you are prompted as to whether you want to remove or copy inherited permissions.

3. Next, modify the security of the new folder so that your account does not have any access to the folder. Do this by selecting your account and selecting all the Deny boxes in the permissions list.

4. Run Notepad, and browse using the File, Open dialog box to the new directory. You should be denied access to the directory.

5. In the File Name field of the Open dialog box, type the full path of the new file. The file should open.

If your account does not have the Bypass Traverse Checking privilege, NTFS performs an access check on each directory of the path to a file when you try to open a file, which results in you being denied access to the file in this example.
Super Privileges

Several privileges are so powerful that a user to which they are assigned is effectively a “super user” who has full control over a computer. These privileges can be used in an infinite number of ways to gain unauthorized access to otherwise off-limit resources and to perform unauthorized operations. However, we’ll focus on using the privilege to execute code that grants the user privileges not assigned to the user, with the knowledge that this capability can be leveraged to perform any operation on the local machine that the user desires.

This section lists the privileges and discusses the ways that they can be exploited. Other privileges, such as Lock Pages In Physical Memory, can be exploited for denial-of-service attacks on a system, but these are not discussed. Note that on systems with UAC enabled, these privileges will be granted only to applications running at high integrity level or higher, even if the account possesses them:

- **Debug programs**  A user with this privilege can open any process on the system (except for a Protected Process) without regard to the security descriptor present on the process. The user could implement a program that opens the LSASS process, for example, copy executable code into its address space, and then inject a thread with the `CreateRemoteThread` Windows API to execute the injected code in a more-privileged security context. The code could grant the user additional privileges and group memberships.

- **Take ownership**  This privilege allows a holder to take ownership of any securable object (even protected processes and threads) by writing his own SID into the owner field of the object’s security descriptor. Recall that an owner is always granted permission to read and modify the DACL of the security descriptor, so a process with this privilege could modify the DACL to grant itself full access to the object and then close and reopen the object with full access. This would allow the owner to see sensitive data and to even replace system files that execute as part of normal system operation, such as LSASS, with his own programs that grant a user elevated privileges.

- **Restore files and directories**  A user assigned this privilege can replace any file on the system with her own. She could exploit this power by replacing system files as described in the preceding paragraph.

- **Load and unload device drivers**  A malicious user could use this privilege to load a device driver into the system. Device drivers are considered trusted parts of the operating system that can execute within it with System account credentials, so a driver could launch privileged programs that assign the user other rights.

- **Create a token object**  This privilege can be used in the obvious way to generate tokens that represent arbitrary user accounts with arbitrary group membership and privilege assignment.

- **Act as part of operating system**  `LsaRegisterLogonProcess`, the function a process calls to establish a trusted connection to LSASS, checks for this privilege. A malicious user with this privilege can establish a trusted-LSASS connection and then execute `LsaLogonUser`, a function used to create new logon sessions. `LsaLogonUser` requires a valid user name and password and accepts an optional list of SIDs that it adds to the initial token created for a new logon session.
The user could therefore use her own user name and password to create a new logon session that includes the SIDs of more privileged groups or users in the resulting token.

Note that the use of an elevated privilege does not extend past the machine boundary to the network, because any interaction with another computer requires authentication with a domain controller and validation of domain passwords. Domain passwords are not stored on a computer either in plain text or encrypted form, so they are not accessible to malicious code.

Access Tokens of Processes and Threads

Figure 6-9 brings together the concepts covered so far in this chapter by illustrating the basic process and thread security structures. In the figure, notice that the process object and the thread objects have ACLs, as do the access token objects themselves. Also in this figure, thread 2 and thread 3 each have an impersonation token, whereas thread 1 uses the default process access token.

**FIGURE 6-9** Process and thread security structures
Security Auditing

The object manager can generate audit events as a result of an access check, and Windows functions available to user applications can generate them directly. Kernel-mode code is always allowed to generate an audit event. Two privileges, SeSecurityPrivilege and SeAuditPrivilege, relate to auditing. A process must have the SeSecurityPrivilege privilege to manage the security Event Log and to view or set an object’s SACL. Processes that call audit system services, however, must have the SeAuditPrivilege privilege to successfully generate an audit record.

The audit policy of the local system controls the decision to audit a particular type of security event. The audit policy, also called the local security policy, is one part of the security policy LSASS maintains on the local system, and it is configured with the Local Security Policy Editor as shown in Figure 6-10.

The audit policy configuration (both the basic settings under Local Policies and the Advanced Audit Policy Configuration to be described later) is stored in the registry as a bitmapped value in the key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SECURITY\Policy\PolAdtEv.

FIGURE 6-10 Local Security Policy Editor audit policy configuration

LSASS sends messages to the SRM to inform it of the auditing policy at system initialization time and when the policy changes. LSASS is responsible for receiving audit records generated based on the audit events from the SRM, editing the records, and sending them to the Event Logger. LSASS (instead of the SRM) sends these records because it adds pertinent details, such as the information needed to more completely identify the process that is being audited.

The SRM sends audit records via its ALPC connection to LSASS. The Event Logger then writes the audit record to the security Event Log. In addition to audit records the SRM passes, both LSASS and the SAM generate audit records that LSASS sends directly to the Event Logger, and the AuthZ APIs allow for applications to generate application-defined audits. Figure 6-11 depicts this overall flow.
Audit records are put on a queue to be sent to the LSA as they are received—they are not submitted in batches. The audit records are moved from the SRM to the security subsystem in one of two ways. If the audit record is small (less than the maximum ALPC message size), it is sent as an ALPC message. The audit records are copied from the address space of the SRM to the address space of the LSASS process. If the audit record is large, the SRM uses shared memory to make the message available to LSASS and simply passes a pointer in an ALPC message.

Object Access Auditing
An important use of the auditing mechanism in many environments is to maintain a log of accesses to secured objects, files in particular. To do this, the Audit Object Access policy must be enabled, and there must be audit ACEs in System Access Control Lists that enable auditing for the objects in question.

When an accessor attempts to open a handle to an object, the security reference monitor first determines whether the attempt is allowed or denied. If object access auditing is enabled, the SRM then scans the System ACL of the object. There are two types of audit ACEs, access allowed and access denied. An audit ACE must match any of the security IDs held by the accessor, it must match any of the access methods requested, and its type (access allowed or access denied) must match the result of the access check in order to generate an object access audit record.

Object access audit records include not just the fact of access allowed or denied, but also the reason for the success or failure. This “reason for access” reporting generally takes the form of an access control entry, specified in SDDL (Security Descriptor Definition Language), in the audit record. This allows for a diagnosis of scenarios in which an object to which you believe access should be
denied is being permitted, or vice versa, by identifying the specific access control entry that caused the attempted access to succeed or fail.

As can be seen in Figure 6-10, object access auditing is disabled by default (as are all other auditing policies).

EXPERIMENT: Object Access Auditing
You can demonstrate object access auditing by following these steps:

1. In Explorer, navigate to a file to which you would normally have access. In its Properties dialog box, click on the Security tab and then select the Advanced settings. Click on the Auditing tab, and click through the administrative privileges warning. The resulting dialog box allows you to add auditing of access control entries to the file’s System Access Control List.

2. Click the Add button. In the resulting Select User Or Group dialog box, enter your own user name or a group to which you belong, such as Everyone, and click Check Names and then OK. This presents a dialog box for creating an Auditing Access Control Entry for this user or group for this file.
3. In the Successful column, select Full control (which will cause all of the other access methods to be selected as well). Click OK four times to close the file Properties dialog box.

4. In Explorer, double-click on the file to open it with its associated program.

5. In Event Viewer, navigate to the Security log. Note that there is no entry for access to the file. This is because the audit policy for object access is not yet configured.

6. In the Local Security Policy Editor, navigate to Local Policies, Audit Policy. Double-click on Audit Object Access, and then click Success to enable auditing of successful access to files.

7. In Event Viewer, click Action, Refresh. Note that the changes to audit policy resulted in audit records.

8. In Explorer, double-click on the file to open it again.

9. In Event Viewer, click Action, Refresh. Note that several file access audit records are now present.

Find one of the file access audit records for Event ID 4656. This shows up as “a handle to an object was requested.” Scroll down in the text box to find the Access Reasons section. The following example shows that two access methods, READ_CONTROL and ReadAttributes, were requested. The former was granted because the accessor was the owner of the file, and the latter was granted because of the indicated Access Control Entry. The ACE includes the SID of the user who attempted the access and includes the designation A:FA, indicating that this SID is Allowed (A) all file access methods (FA) to the file.
Global Audit Policy

In addition to object-access ACEs on individual objects, a global audit policy can be defined for the system that enables object access auditing for all file system objects, for all registry keys, or for both. A security auditor can therefore be certain that the desired auditing will be performed, without having to set or examine SACLs on all of the individual objects of interest.

An administrator can set or query the global audit policy via the AuditPol command with the /resourceSACL option. This can also be done with a program calling the AuditSetGlobalSacl and AuditQueryGlobalSacl APIs. As with changes to objects’ SACLs, changing these global SACLs requires SeSecurityPrivilege.

EXPERIMENT: Setting Global Audit Policy

You can use the AuditPol command to enable global audit policy.

1. If not already done in the previous experiment, in the Local Security Policy Editor, navigate to the Audit Policy settings (as shown in Figure 6-10), double-click Audit Object Access, and enable auditing for both success and failure. Note that on most systems, SACLs specifying object access auditing are uncommon, so few if any object access audit records will be produced at this point.
2. In an elevated command prompt window, enter the following command:

```cmd
C:\> auditpol /resourceSACL
```

This will produce a summary of the commands for setting and querying global audit policy.

3. In the same elevated command prompt window, enter the following commands:

```cmd
C:\> auditpol /resourceSACL /type:File /view
C:\> auditpol /resourceSACL /type:Key /view
```

On a typical system, each of these commands will report that no Global SACL exists for the respective resource type. (Note that the keywords “File” and “Key” are case-sensitive.)

4. In the same elevated command prompt window, enter the following command:

```cmd
C:\> auditpol /resourceSACL /set /type:File /user:yourusername /success /failure /access:FW
```

This will set a global audit policy such that all attempts to open files for write access (FW) by the indicated user will result in audit records, whether the open attempts succeed or fail. The user name can be a specific user name on the system, a group such as Everyone, a domain-qualified user name such as domainname\username, or a SID.

5. While running under the user name indicated, use Explorer or other tools to open a file. Then look at the security log in the system Event Log to find the audit records.

6. At the end of the experiment, use the auditpol command to remove the global SACL you created in step 4, as follows:

```cmd
C:\> auditpol /resourceSACL /remove /type:File /user:yourusername
```

The global audit policy is stored in the registry as a pair of system access control lists in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SECURITY\Policy\GlobalSaclNameFile and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SECURITY\Policy\GlobalSaclNameKey. These keys can be examined by running Regedit.exe under the System account, as described earlier in the “Security System Components” section. These keys will not exist until the corresponding global SACLs have been set at least once.

The global audit policy cannot be overridden by SACLs on objects, but object-specific SACLs can allow for additional auditing. For example, global audit policy could require auditing of read access by all users to all files, but SACLs on individual files could add auditing of write access to those files by specific users or by more specific user groups.

Global audit policy can also be configured via the Local Security Policy Editor in the Advanced Audit Policy settings, described in the next subsection.
Advanced Audit Policy Settings

In addition to the Audit Policy settings described previously, the Local Security Policy Editor offers a much more fine-grained set of audit controls under the Advanced Audit Policy Configuration heading, as shown in Figure 6-12.

Each of the nine audit policy settings under Local Policies, as illustrated previously in Figure 6-10, maps to a group of settings here that provide more detailed control. For example, while the Audit Object Access settings under Local Policies allow access to all objects to be audited, the settings here allow auditing of access to various types of objects to be controlled individually. Enabling one of the audit policy settings under Local Policies implicitly enables all of the corresponding advanced audit policy events, but if finer control over the contents of the audit log is desired, the advanced settings can be set individually. The standard settings then become a product of the advanced settings; however, this is not visible in the Local Security Policy Editor. Attempts to specify audit settings by using both the basic and the advanced options can cause unexpected results.

The Global Object Access Auditing option under the Advanced Audit Policy Configuration item can be used to configure the Global SACLs described in the previous section, using a graphical interface identical to that seen in Explorer or the Registry Editor for security descriptors in the file system or the registry.
Logon

Interactive logon (as opposed to network logon) occurs through the interaction of the logon process (Winlogon), the logon user interface process (LogonUI) and its credential providers, LSASS, one or more authentication packages, and the SAM or Active Directory. Authentication packages are DLLs that perform authentication checks. Kerberos is the Windows authentication package for interactive logon to a domain, and MSV1_0 is the Windows authentication package for interactive logon to a local computer, for domain logons to trusted pre–Windows 2000 domains, and for times when no domain controller is accessible.

Winlogon is a trusted process responsible for managing security-related user interactions. It coordinates logon, starts the user’s first process at logon, handles logoff, and manages various other operations relevant to security, including launching LogonUI for entering passwords at logon, changing passwords, and locking and unlocking the workstation. The Winlogon process must ensure that operations relevant to security aren’t visible to any other active processes. For example, Winlogon guarantees that an untrusted process can’t get control of the desktop during one of these operations and thus gain access to the password.

Winlogon relies on the credential providers installed on the system to obtain a user’s account name or password. Credential providers are COM objects located inside DLLs. The default providers are %SystemRoot%\System32\authui.dll and %SystemRoot%\System32\SmartcardCredentialProvider.dll, which support both password and smartcard PIN authentication. Allowing other credential providers to be installed allows Windows to use different user-identification mechanisms. For example, a third party might supply a credential provider that uses a thumbprint recognition device to identify users and extract their passwords from an encrypted database.

To protect Winlogon’s address space from bugs in credential providers that might cause the Winlogon process to crash (which, in turn, will result in a system crash, because Winlogon is considered a critical system process), a separate process, LogonUI.exe, is used to actually load the credential providers and display the Windows logon interface to users. This process is started on demand whenever Winlogon needs to present a user interface to the user, and it exits after the action has finished. It also allows Winlogon to simply restart a new LogonUI process should it crash for any reason.

Winlogon is the only process that intercepts logon requests from the keyboard, which are sent through an RPC message from Win32k.sys. Winlogon immediately launches the LogonUI application to display the user interface for logon. After obtaining a user name and password from credential providers, Winlogon calls LSASS to authenticate the user attempting to log on. If the user is authenticated, the logon process activates a logon shell on behalf of that user. The interaction between the components involved in logon is illustrated in Figure 6-13.
In addition to supporting alternative credential providers, LogonUI can load additional network provider DLLs that need to perform secondary authentication. This capability allows multiple network providers to gather identification and authentication information all at one time during normal logon. A user logging on to a Windows system might simultaneously be authenticated on a UNIX server. That user would then be able to access resources of the UNIX server from the Windows machine without requiring additional authentication. Such a capability is known as one form of single sign-on.

**Winlogon Initialization**

During system initialization, before any user applications are active, Winlogon performs the following steps to ensure that it controls the workstation once the system is ready for user interaction:

1. Creates and opens an interactive window station (for example, \Sessions\1\Windows\\WindowStations\\WinSta0 in the object manager namespace) to represent the keyboard, mouse, and monitor. Winlogon creates a security descriptor for the station that has one and only one ACE containing only the System SID. This unique security descriptor ensures that no other process can access the workstation unless explicitly allowed by Winlogon.

2. Creates and opens two desktops: an application desktop (\Sessions\1\Windows\\WinSta0\Default, also known as the interactive desktop) and a Winlogon desktop (\Sessions\1\Windows\\WinSta0\Winlogon, also known as the secure desktop). The security on the Winlogon desktop is created so that only Winlogon can access that desktop. The other desktop allows both Winlogon and users to access it. This arrangement means that any time the Winlogon desktop is active, no other process has access to any active code or data.
associated with the desktop. Windows uses this feature to protect the secure operations that involve passwords and locking and unlocking the desktop.

3. Before anyone logs on to a computer, the visible desktop is Winlogon’s. After a user logs on, pressing Ctrl+Alt+Delete switches the desktop from Default to Winlogon and launches LogonUI. (This explains why all the windows on your interactive desktop seem to disappear when you press Ctrl+Alt+Delete, and then return when you dismiss the Windows Security dialog box.) Thus, the SAS always brings up a secure desktop controlled by Winlogon.

4. Establishes an ALPC connection with LSASS’s LsaAuthenticationPort. This connection will be used for exchanging information during logon, logoff, and password operations and is made by calling LsaRegisterLogonProcess.

5. Registers the Winlogon RPC message server, which listens for SAS, logoff, and workstation lock notifications from Win32k. This measure prevents Trojan horse programs from gaining control of the screen when the SAS is entered.

Note The Wininit process performs steps similar to steps 1 and 2 to allow legacy interactive services running on session 0 to display windows, but it does not perform any other steps because session 0 is not available for user logon. (See Chapter 3 for more information on Wininit and session isolation.)

How SAS Is Implemented

The SAS is secure because no application can intercept the Ctrl+Alt+Delete keystroke combination or prevent Winlogon from receiving it. Win32k.sys reserves the Ctrl+Alt+Delete key combination so that whenever the Windows input system (implemented in the raw input thread in Win32k) sees the combination, it sends an RPC message to Winlogon’s message server, which listens for such notifications. The keystrokes that map to a registered hot key are otherwise not sent to any process other than the one that registered it, and only the thread that registered a hot key can unregister it, so a Trojan horse application cannot deregister Winlogon’s ownership of the SAS.

A Windows function, SetWindowsHook, enables an application to install a hook procedure that’s invoked every time a keystroke is pressed, even before hot keys are processed, and it allows the hook to squash keystrokes. However, the Windows hot key processing code contains a special case for Ctrl+Alt+Delete that disables hooks so that the keystroke sequence can’t be intercepted. In addition, if the interactive desktop is locked, only hot keys owned by Winlogon are processed.

Once the Winlogon desktop is created during initialization, it becomes the active desktop. When the Winlogon desktop is active, it is always locked. Winlogon unlocks its desktop only to switch to the
application desktop or the screen-saver desktop. (Only the Winlogon process can lock or unlock a desktop.)

**User Logon Steps**

Logon begins when a user presses the SAS (Ctrl+Alt+Delete). After the SAS is pressed, Winlogon starts LogonUI, which calls the credential providers to obtain a user name and password. Winlogon also creates a unique local logon SID for this user that it assigns to this instance of the desktop (keyboard, screen, and mouse). Winlogon passes this SID to LSASS as part of the *LsaLogonUser* call. If the user is successfully logged on, this SID will be included in the logon process token—a step that protects access to the desktop. For example, another logon to the same account but on a different system will be unable to write to the first machine’s desktop because this second logon won’t be in the first logon’s desktop token.

When the user name and password have been entered, Winlogon retrieves a handle to a package by calling the LSASS function *LsaLookupAuthenticationPackage*. Authentication packages are listed in the registry under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa. Winlogon passes logon information to the authentication package via *LsaLogonUser*. Once a package authenticates a user, Winlogon continues the logon process for that user. If none of the authentication packages indicates a successful logon, the logon process is aborted.

Windows uses two standard authentication packages for interactive logons: Kerberos and MSV1_0. The default authentication package on a stand-alone Windows system is MSV1_0 (%SystemRoot%\System32\Msv1_0.dll), an authentication package that implements LAN Manager 2 protocol. LSASS also uses MSV1_0 on domain-member computers to authenticate to pre–Windows 2000 domains and computers that can’t locate a domain controller for authentication. (Computers that are disconnected from the network fall into this latter category.) The Kerberos authentication package, %SystemRoot%\System32\Kerberos.dll, is used on computers that are members of Windows domains. The Windows Kerberos package, with the cooperation of Kerberos services running on a domain controller, supports the Kerberos protocol. This protocol is based on Internet RFC 1510. (Visit the Internet Engineering Task Force [IETF] website, [www.ietf.org](http://www.ietf.org), for detailed information on the Kerberos standard.)

The MSV1_0 authentication package takes the user name and a hashed version of the password and sends a request to the local SAM to retrieve the account information, which includes the hashed password, the groups to which the user belongs, and any account restrictions. MSV1_0 first checks the account restrictions, such as hours or type of accesses allowed. If the user can’t log on because of the restrictions in the SAM database, the logon call fails and MSV1_0 returns a failure status to the LSA.

MSV1_0 then compares the hashed password and user name to that obtained from the SAM. In the case of a cached domain logon, MSV1_0 accesses the cached information by using LSASS functions that store and retrieve “secrets” from the LSA database (the SECURITY hive of the registry). If the information matches, MSV1_0 generates a LUID for the logon session and creates the logon session by calling LSASS, associating this unique identifier with the session and passing the information
needed to ultimately create an access token for the user. (Recall that an access token includes the user’s SID, group SIDs, and assigned privileges.)

**Note** MSV1_0 does not cache a user’s entire password hash in the registry because that would enable someone with physical access to the system to easily compromise a user’s domain account and gain access to encrypted files and to network resources the user is authorized to access. Instead, it caches half of the hash. The cached half-hash is sufficient to verify that a user’s password is correct, but it isn’t sufficient to gain access to EFS keys and to authenticate as the user on a domain because these actions require the full hash.

If MSV1_0 needs to authenticate using a remote system, as when a user logs on to a trusted pre–Windows 2000 domain, MSV1_0 uses the Netlogon service to communicate with an instance of Netlogon on the remote system. Netlogon on the remote system interacts with the MSV1_0 authentication package on that system, passing back authentication results to the system on which the logon is being performed.

The basic control flow for Kerberos authentication is the same as the flow for MSV1_0. However, in most cases, domain logons are performed from member workstations or servers (rather than on a domain controller), so the authentication package must communicate across the network as part of the authentication process. The package does so by communicating via the Kerberos TCP/IP port (port 88) with the Kerberos service on a domain controller. The Kerberos Key Distribution Center service (%SystemRoot%\System32\Kdcsvc.dll), which implements the Kerberos authentication protocol, runs in the LSASS process on domain controllers.

After validating hashed user name and password information with Active Directory’s user account objects (using the Active Directory server %SystemRoot%\System32\Ntdsa.dll), Kdcsvc returns domain credentials to LSASS, which returns the result of the authentication and the user’s domain logon credentials (if the logon was successful) across the network to the system where the logon is taking place.

**Note** This description of Kerberos authentication is highly simplified, but it highlights the roles of the various components involved. Although the Kerberos authentication protocol plays a key role in distributed domain security in Windows, its details are outside the scope of this book.

After a logon has been authenticated, LSASS looks in the local policy database for the user’s allowed access, including interactive, network, batch, or service process. If the requested logon doesn’t match the allowed access, the logon attempt will be terminated. LSASS deletes the newly created logon session by cleaning up any of its data structures and then returns failure to Winlogon, which in turn displays an appropriate message to the user. If the requested access is allowed, LSASS adds the appropriate additional security IDs (such as Everyone, Interactive, and the like). It then checks its policy database for any granted privileges for all the SIDs for this user and adds these privileges to the user’s access token.
When LSASS has accumulated all the necessary information, it calls the executive to create the access token. The executive creates a primary access token for an interactive or service logon and an impersonation token for a network logon. After the access token is successfully created, LSASS duplicates the token, creating a handle that can be passed to Winlogon, and closes its own handle. If necessary, the logon operation is audited. At this point, LSASS returns success to Winlogon along with a handle to the access token, the LUID for the logon session, and the profile information, if any, that the authentication package returned.

EXPERIMENT: Listing Active Logon Sessions

As long as at least one token exists with a given logon session LUID, Windows considers the logon session to be active. You can use the LogonSessions tool from Sysinternals, which uses the LsaEnumerateLogonSessions function (documented in the Windows SDK) to list the active logon sessions:

C:\>logonsessions
Logonsesions v1.21
Copyright (C) 2004–2010 Bryce Cogswell and Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

[0] Logon session 00000000:000003e7:
  User name:    KERNELS\LAPT8$
  Auth package: NTLM
  Logon type:   (none)
  Session:      0
  Sid:          S-1-5-18
  Logon time:   2012-01-16 22:03:38
  Logon server:  
  DNS Domain:   
  UPN:         

[1] Logon session 00000000:0000cf19:
  User name:    
  Auth package: NTLM
  Logon type:   (none)
  Session:      0
  Sid:          (none)
  Logon time:   2012-01-16 22:03:38
  Logon server:  
  DNS Domain:   
  UPN:         

[2] Logon session 00000000:000003e4:
  User name:    KERNELS\LAPT8$
  Auth package: Negotiate
  Logon type:   Service
  Session:      0
  Sid:          S-1-5-20
  Logon time:   2012-01-16 22:03:40
  Logon server:  
  DNS Domain:   
  UPN:         

560  Windows Internals, Sixth Edition, Part 1
Information reported for a session includes the SID and name of the user associated with the session, as well as the session’s authentication package and logon time. Note that the Negotiate authentication package, seen in logon session 2 in the preceding output, will attempt to authenticate via Kerberos or NTLM, depending on which is most appropriate for the authentication request.

The LUID for a session is displayed on the “Logon Session” line of each session block, and using the Handle utility (also from Sysinternals), you can find the tokens that represent a
Winlogon then looks in the registry at the value HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Current Version\Winlogon\Userinit and creates a process to run whatever the value of that string is. (This value can be several .EXEs separated by commas.) The default value is Userinit.exe, which loads the user profile and then creates a process to run whatever the value of HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Current Version\Winlogon\Shell is, if that value exists. That value does not exist by default. If it doesn't exist, Userinit.exe does the same for HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Current Version\Winlogon\Shell, which defaults to Explorer.exe. Userinit then exits (which is why Explorer.exe shows up as having no parent when examined in Process Explorer). For more information on the steps followed during the user logon process, see Chapter 13, “Startup and Shutdown,” in Part 2.

**Assured Authentication**

A fundamental problem with password-based authentication is that passwords can be revealed, or stolen, and used by malicious third parties. New in Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008/R2 is a mechanism that tracks the authentication strength of how a user authenticated with the system, which allows objects to be protected from access if a user did not authenticate securely. (Smartcard authentication is considered to be a stronger form of authentication than password authentication.)

On systems that are joined to a domain, the domain administrator can specify a mapping between an Object Identifier (OID), which is a unique numeric string representing a specific object type, on a certificate used for authenticating a user (such as on a smartcard or hardware security token) and a
Security ID (SID) that is placed into the user's access token when the user successfully authenticates with the system. An ACE in a DACL on an object can specify such a SID be part of a user’s token in order for the user to gain access to the object. Technically, this is known as a group claim. In other words, the user is claiming membership in a particular group, which is allowed certain access rights on specific objects, with the claim based upon the authentication mechanism. This feature is not enabled by default, and it must be configured by the domain administrator in a domain with certificate-based authentication.

Assured Authentication builds upon existing Windows security features in a way that provides a great deal of flexibility to IT administrators and anyone concerned with enterprise IT security. The enterprise decides which OIDs to embed in the certificates it uses for authenticating users and the mapping of particular OIDs to Active Directory universal groups (SIDs). A user’s group membership can be used to identify whether a certificate was used during the logon operation. Different certificates can have different issuance policies and, thus, different levels of security, which can be used to protect highly sensitive objects (such as files or anything else that might have a security descriptor).

Authentication protocols (APs) retrieve OIDs from certificates during certificate-based authentication. These OIDs must be mapped to SIDs, which are in turn processed during group membership expansion, and placed in the access token. The mapping of OID to universal group is specified in Active Directory.

As an example, an organization might have several certificate issuance policies with the names Contractor, Full Time Employee, and Senior Management, which map to the universal groups Contractor-Users, FTE-Users, and SM-Users, respectively. A user named Abby has a smartcard with a certificate issued using the Senior Management issuance policy, and when she logs in using her smartcard, she receives an additional group membership (which is represented by a SID in her access token) indicating that she is a member of the SM-Users group. Permissions can be set on objects (using an ACL) such that only members of the FTE-Users or SM-Users group (identified by their SIDs within an ACE) are granted access. If Abby logs in using her smartcard, she can access those objects, but if she logs in with just her user name and password (without the smartcard), she cannot access those objects because she will not have either the FTE-Users or SM-Users group in her access token. A user named Toby who logs in with a smartcard that has a certificate issued using the Contractor issuance policy would not be able to access an object that has an ACE requiring FTE-Users or SM-Users group membership.

Biometric Framework for User Authentication

Windows provides a standardized mechanism for supporting certain types of biometric devices—specifically, fingerprint scanners—to support user identification via a fingerprint swipe. Like many other such frameworks, the Windows Biometric Framework was developed to isolate the various functions involved in supporting such devices, so as to minimize the code required to implement a new device.
The primary components of the Windows Biometric Framework are shown in Figure 6-14. Except as noted in the following list, all of these components are supplied by Windows:

- **The Windows Biometric Service (%SystemRoot%\System32\Wbiosrvc.dll** This provides the process execution environment in which one or more biometric service providers can execute.

- **The Windows Biometric API** This allows existing Windows components such as WinLogon and LoginUI to access the biometric service. Third-party applications have access to the biometric API and can use the biometric scanner for functions other than logging in to Windows. An example of a function in this API is `WinBioEnumServiceProviders`. The Biometric API is exposed by %SystemRoot%\System32\Winbio.dll.

- **The Fingerprint Biometric Service Provider** This wraps the functions of biometric-type-specific adapters so as to present a common interface, independent of the type of biometric, to the Windows Biometric Service. In the future, additional types of biometrics, such as retinal scans or voiceprint analyzers, might be supported by additional Biometric Service Providers. The Biometric Service Provider in turn uses three adapters, which are user-mode DLLs:
  - The sensor adapter exposes the data-capture functionality of the scanner. The sensor adapter will usually use Windows I/O calls to access the scanner hardware. Windows provides a sensor adapter that can be used with simple sensors, those for which a Windows Biometric Device Interface (WBDI) driver exists. For more complex sensors, the sensor adapter is written by the sensor vendor.
  - The engine adapter exposes processing and comparison functionality specific to the scanner’s raw data format and other features. The actual processing and comparison might be performed within the engine adapter DLL, or the DLL might communicate with some other module. The engine adapter is always provided by the sensor vendor.
  - The storage adapter exposes a set of secure storage functions. These are used to store and retrieve templates against which scanned biometric data is matched by the engine adapter. Windows provides a storage adapter using Windows cryptography services and standard disk file storage. A sensor vendor might provide a different storage adapter.

- **The Windows Biometric Driver Interface** This is a set of interface definitions (IRP major function codes, DeviceIoControl codes, and so forth) to which any driver for a biometric scanner device must conform if it is to be compatible with the Windows Biometric Service. WBDI is described in the Windows Driver Kit documentation. The Windows Driver Kit includes a sample WBDI driver.

- **The functional device driver for the actual biometric scanner device** This exposes the WBDI at its upper edge, and it usually uses the services of a lower-level bus driver, such as the USB bus driver, to access the scanner device. It can be a User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF) driver, a Kernel-Mode Driver Framework (KMDF) driver, or a Windows Driver Model (WDM) driver. This driver is always provided by the sensor vendor. Microsoft recommends the use of UMDF and a USB hardware interface for the scanner.
A typical sequence of operations to support logging in via a fingerprint scan might be as follows:

1. After initialization, the sensor adapter receives from the service provider a request for capture data. The sensor adapter in turn sends a `DeviceIoControl` request with the IOCTL_BIOMETRIC_CAPTURE_DATA control code to the WBDI driver for the fingerprint scanner device.

2. The WBDI driver puts the scanner into capture mode and queues the IOCTL_BIOMETRIC_CAPTURE_DATA request until a fingerprint scan occurs.

3. A prospective user swipes a finger across the scanner. The WBDI driver receives notification of this, obtains the raw scan data from the sensor, and returns this data to the sensor driver in a buffer associated with the IOCTL_BIOMETRIC_CAPTURE_DATA request.

4. The sensor adapter provides the data to the Fingerprint Biometric Service Provider, which in turn passes the data to the engine adapter.

5. The engine adapter processes the raw data into a form compatible with its template storage.

6. The Fingerprint Biometric Service Provider uses the storage adapter to obtain templates and corresponding security IDs from secure storage. It invokes the engine adapter to compare each template to the processed scan data. The engine adapter returns a status indicating whether it’s a match or not a match.

7. If a match is found, the Biometric Service notifies WinLogon, via a credential provider DLL, of a successful login and passes it the security ID of the identified user. This notification is sent via an Advanced Local Procedure Call message, providing a path that cannot be spoofed.
User Account Control and Virtualization

UAC is meant to enable users to run with standard user rights, as opposed to administrative rights. Without administrative rights, users cannot accidentally (or deliberately) modify system settings, malware can’t normally alter system security settings or disable antivirus software, and users can’t compromise the sensitive information of other users on shared computers. Running with standard user rights can thus mitigate the impact of malware and protect sensitive data on shared computers.

UAC had to address several problems to make it practical for a user to run with a standard user account. First, because the Windows usage model has been one of assumed administrative rights, software developers assumed their programs would run with those rights and so could access and modify any file, registry key, or operating system setting. The second problem UAC had to address was that users sometimes need administrative rights to perform such operations as installing software, changing the system time, and opening ports in the firewall.

The UAC solution to these problems is to run most applications with standard user rights, even though the user is logged in to an administrative account; but at the same time, UAC makes it possible for standard users to access administrative rights when they need them—whether for legacy applications that require them or for changing certain system settings.

As described previously, UAC accomplishes this by creating a filtered admin token as well as the normal admin token when a user logs in to an administrative account. All processes created under the user's session will normally have the filtered admin token in effect so that applications that can run with standard user rights will do so. However, the administrative user can run a program or perform other functions that require full administrator rights by performing UAC Elevation.

Windows also allows certain tasks that were previously considered reserved for administrators to be performed by standard users, enhancing the usability of the standard user environment. For example, Group Policy settings exist that can enable standard users to install printer and other device drivers approved by IT administrators and to install ActiveX controls from administrator-approved sites.

Finally, when software developers test in the UAC environment, they are encouraged to develop applications that can run without administrative rights. Fundamentally, nonadministrative programs should not need to run with Administrator privileges; programs that often require Administrator privileges are typically legacy programs using old APIs or techniques, and they should be updated.

Together, these changes obviate the need for users to run with administrative rights all the time.

File System and Registry Virtualization

Although some software legitimately requires administrative rights, many programs needlessly store user data in system-global locations. When an application executes, it can be running in different user accounts, and it should therefore store user-specific data in the per-user %AppData% directory and save per-user settings in the user’s registry profile under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software. Standard
user accounts don’t have write access to the %ProgramFiles% directory or HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE \Software, but because most Windows systems are single-user and most users have been administrators until UAC was implemented, applications that incorrectly saved user data and settings to these locations worked anyway.

Windows enables these legacy applications to run in standard user accounts through the help of file system and registry namespace virtualization. When an application modifies a system-global location in the file system or registry and that operation fails because access is denied, Windows redirects the operation to a per-user area. When the application reads from a system-global location, Windows first checks for data in the per-user area and, if none is found, permits the read attempt from the global location.

Windows will always enable this type of virtualization unless

- The application is 64-bit. Because virtualization is purely an application-compatibility technology meant to help legacy applications, it is enabled only for 32-bit applications. The world of 64-bit applications is relatively new and developers should follow the development guidelines for creating standard user-compatible applications.
- The application is already running with administrative rights. In this case, there is no need for any virtualization.
- The operation came from a kernel-mode caller.
- The operation is being performed while the caller is impersonating. For example, any operations not originating from a process classified as legacy according to this definition, including network file-sharing accesses, are not virtualized.
- The executable image for the process has a UAC-compatible manifest (specifying a requestedExecutionLevel setting, described in the next section).
- The administrator does not have write access to the file or registry key. This exception exists to enforce backward compatibility, because the legacy application would have failed before UAC was implemented even if the application was run with administrative rights.
- Services are never virtualized.

You can see the virtualization status (as discussed previously, the process’ virtualization status is stored as a flag in its token) of a process by adding the UAC Virtualization column to Task Manager’s Processes page, as shown in Figure 6-15. Most Windows components—including the Desktop Window Manager (Dwm.exe), the Client Server Run-Time Subsystem (Csrss.exe), and Explorer—have virtualization disabled because they have a UAC-compatible manifest or are running with administrative rights and so do not allow virtualization. Internet Explorer (Iexplore.exe) has virtualization enabled because it can host multiple ActiveX controls and scripts and must assume that they were not written to operate correctly with standard user rights.

In addition to file system and registry virtualization, some applications require additional help to run correctly with standard user rights. For example, an application that tests the account in which it’s running for membership in the Administrators group might otherwise work, but it won’t run if
it’s not in that group. Windows defines a number of application-compatibility shims to enable such applications to work anyway. The shims most commonly applied to legacy applications for operation with standard user rights are shown in Table 6-10. Note that, if required, virtualization can be completely disabled for a system using a local security policy setting.

**FIGURE 6-15** Using Task Manager to view virtualization status

**TABLE 6-10** UAC Virtualization Shims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flag</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ElevateCreateProcess</td>
<td>Changes <code>CreateProcess</code> to handle <code>ERROR_ELEVATION_REQUIRED</code> errors by calling the application information service to prompt for elevation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ForceAdminAccess</td>
<td>Spoofs queries of Administrator group membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VirtualizeDeleteFile</td>
<td>Spoofs successful deletion of global files and directories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LocalMappedObject</td>
<td>Forces global section objects into the user’s namespace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VirtualizeHKCRLite</td>
<td>Redirects global registration of COM objects to a per-user location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VirtualizeRegisterTypeLib</td>
<td>Converts per-machine <code>typelib</code> registrations to per-user registrations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**File Virtualization**

The file system locations that are virtualized for legacy processes are `%ProgramFiles%`, `%ProgramData%`, and `%SystemRoot%`, excluding some specific subdirectories. However, any file with an executable extension—including `.exe`, `.bat`, `.scr`, `.vbs`, and others—is excluded from virtualization. This means that programs that update themselves from a standard user account fail instead of creating private versions of their executables that aren’t visible to an administrator running a global updater.
To add additional extensions to the exception list, enter them in the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Luafv\Parameters\ExcludedExtensionsAdd registry key and reboot. Use a multistring type to delimit multiple extensions, and do not include a leading dot in the extension name.

Modifications to virtualized directories by legacy processes are redirected to the user’s virtual root directory, %LocalAppData%\VirtualStore. The Local component of the path highlights the fact that virtualized files don’t roam with the rest of the profile when the account has a roaming profile. If you navigate in Explorer to a directory containing virtualized files, Explorer displays a button labeled Compatibility Files in its toolbar, as shown in Figure 6-16. Clicking the button takes you to the corresponding VirtualStore subdirectory to show you the virtualized files.

The UAC File Virtualization Filter Driver (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Luafv.sys) implements file system virtualization. Because this is a file system filter driver, it sees all local file system operations, but it implements functionality only for operations from legacy processes. As shown in Figure 6-17, the filter driver changes the target file path for a legacy process that creates a file in a system-global location but does not for a nonvirtualized process with standard user rights. Default permissions on the \Windows directory deny access to the application written with UAC support, but the legacy process acts as though the operation succeeds, when it really created the file in a location fully accessible by the user.
FIGURE 6-17 UAC File Virtualization Filter Driver operation

EXPERIMENT: File Virtualization Behavior
In this experiment, we will enable and disable virtualization on the command prompt and see several behaviors to demonstrate UAC file virtualization:

1. Open a nonelevated command prompt (you must have UAC enabled for this to work), and enable virtualization for it. You can change the virtualization status of a process by selecting UAC Virtualization from the shortcut menu that appears when you right-click the process in Task Manager.

2. Navigate to the C:\Windows directory, and use the following command to write a file:
   ```bash
echo hello-1 > test.txt
```

3. Now list the contents of the directory:
   ```bash
dir test.txt
```
   You’ll see that the file appears.

4. Now disable virtualization by right-clicking on the process on the Processes page in Task Manager and deselecting UAC Virtualization, and then list the directory as in step 3. Notice that the file is gone. However, a directory listing of the VirtualStore directory will reveal the file:
   ```bash
dir %LOCALAPPDATA%\VirtualStore\Windows\test.txt
```
5. Enable virtualization again for this process.

6. To take a look at a more complex scenario, create a new command prompt window, but elevate it this time, and then repeat steps 2 and 3 using the string “hello-2”.

7. Examine the text inside these files by using the following command in both command prompts:

   echo test.txt

   The following two screen shots show the expected output.

8. Finally, from your elevated command prompt, delete the test.txt file:

   del test.txt

9. Repeat step 6 of the experiment. Notice that the elevated command prompt cannot find the file anymore, while the standard user command prompt shows the old contents of the file again. This demonstrates the failover mechanism described earlier—read operations will look in the per-user virtual store location first, but if the file doesn’t exist, read access to the system location will be granted.

Registry Virtualization

Registry virtualization is implemented slightly differently from file system virtualization. Virtualized registry keys include most of the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software branch, but there are numerous exceptions, such as the following:

- HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows
- HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT
- HKLM\Software\Classes

Only keys that are commonly modified by legacy applications, but that don’t introduce compatibility or interoperability problems, are virtualized. Windows redirects modifications of virtualized keys by a legacy application to a user’s registry virtual root at HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\VirtualStore. The key is located in the user’s Classes hive, %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat, which, like any other virtualized file data, does not roam with a roaming user profile. Instead of maintaining a fixed list of virtualized locations as Windows does for the file system, the virtualization status of a key is stored as a combination of flags, shown in Table 6-11.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flag</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REG_KEY_DONT_VIRTUALIZE</td>
<td>Specifies whether virtualization is enabled for this key. If the flag is set, virtualization is disabled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REG_KEY_DONT_SILENT_FAIL</td>
<td>If the REG_KEY_DONT_VIRTUALIZE flag is set (virtualization is disabled), this key specifies that a legacy application that would be denied access performing an operation on the key is instead granted MAXIMUM_ALLOWED rights to the key (any access the account is granted), instead of the rights the application requested. If this flag is set, it implicitly disables virtualization as well.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REG_KEY_RECURSE_FLAG</td>
<td>Determines whether the virtualization flags will propagate to the child keys (subkeys) of this key.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

You can use the Reg.exe utility included in Windows, with the flags option, to display the current virtualization state for a key or to set it. In Figure 6-18, note that the HKLM\Software key is fully virtualized, but the Windows subkey (and all its children) have only silent failure enabled.

Unlike file virtualization, which uses a filter driver, registry virtualization is implemented in the configuration manager. (See Chapter 4 for more information on the registry and the configuration manager.) As with file system virtualization, a legacy process creating a subkey of a virtualized key is
redirected to the user’s registry virtual root, but a UAC-compatible process is denied access by default permissions. This is shown in Figure 6-19.

![Diagram of UAC registry virtualization operation]

**FIGURE 6-19** UAC registry virtualization operation

### Elevation

Even if users run only programs that are compatible with standard user rights, some operations still require administrative rights. For example, the vast majority of software installations require administrative rights to create directories and registry keys in system-global locations or to install services or device drivers. Modifying system-global Windows and application settings also requires administrative rights, as does the parental controls feature. It would be possible to perform most of these operations by switching to a dedicated administrator account, but the inconvenience of doing so would likely result in most users remaining in the administrator account to perform their daily tasks, most of which do not require administrative rights.

It’s important to be aware that UAC elevations are conveniences and not security boundaries. A security boundary requires that security policy dictate what can pass through the boundary. User accounts are an example of a security boundary in Windows, because one user can’t access the data belonging to another user without having that user’s permission.

Because elevations aren’t security boundaries, there’s no guarantee that malware running on a system with standard user rights can’t compromise an elevated process to gain administrative rights. For example, elevation dialog boxes only identify the executable that will be elevated; they say nothing about what it will do when it executes.
Running with Administrator Rights

Windows includes enhanced “run as” functionality so that standard users can conveniently launch processes with administrative rights. This functionality requires giving applications a way to identify operations for which the system can obtain administrative rights on behalf of the application, as necessary. (We’ll say more on this topic shortly.)

To enable users acting as system administrators to run with standard user rights but not have to enter user names and passwords every time they want to access administrative rights, Windows makes use of a mechanism called Admin Approval Mode (AAM). This feature creates two identities for the user at logon: one with standard user rights and another with administrative rights. Since every user on a Windows system is either a standard user or acting for the most part as a standard user in AAM, developers must assume that all Windows users are standard users, which will result in more programs working with standard user rights without virtualization or shims.

Granting administrative rights to a process is called elevation. When elevation is performed by a standard user account (or by a user who is part of an administrative group but not the actual Administrators group), it’s referred to as an over-the-shoulder (OTS) elevation because it requires the entry of credentials for an account that’s a member of the Administrators group, something that’s usually completed by a user typing over the shoulder of a standard user. An elevation performed by an AAM user is called a consent elevation because the user simply has to approve the assignment of his administrative rights.

Stand-alone systems, which are typically home computers, and domain-joined systems treat AAM access by remote users differently because domain-connected computers can use domain administrative groups in their resource permissions. When a user accesses a stand-alone computer’s file share, Windows requests the remote user’s standard user identity, but on domain-joined systems, Windows honors all the user’s domain group memberships by requesting the user’s administrative identity. Executing an image that requests administrative rights causes the application information service (AIS, contained in %SystemRoot%\System32\Appinfo.dll), which runs inside a service host process (%SystemRoot%\System32\Svchost.exe), to launch Consent.exe (%SystemRoot%\System32\Consent.exe). Consent captures a bitmap of the screen, applies a fade effect to it, switches to a desktop that’s accessible only to the local system account (the secure desktop), paints the bitmap as the background, and displays an elevation dialog box that contains information about the executable. Displaying this dialog box on a separate desktop prevents any application present in the user’s account from modifying the appearance of the dialog box.

If an image is a Windows component digitally signed by Microsoft and the image is in the Windows system directory, the dialog box displays a blue stripe across the top, as shown at the top of Figure 6-20, with a blue and gold shield at the left end of the stripe. If the image is signed by someone other than Microsoft, or if it is signed by Microsoft but resides in a directory tree other than the Windows directory tree, the shield becomes solid blue with a question mark over it. If the image is unsigned, the shield background and the stripe both become orange, the shield has an exclamation point over it, and the prompt stresses the unknown origin of the image. The elevation dialog box shows the image’s icon, description, and publisher for digitally signed images, but it shows only the file name and “Unknown publisher” for unsigned images. This difference makes it harder for malware...
to mimic the appearance of legitimate software. The Details button at the bottom of the dialog box expands it to show the command line that will be passed to the executable if it launches.

![Image of User Account Control dialog boxes]

**FIGURE 6-20** AAC UAC elevation dialog boxes based on image signature

The OTS consent dialog box, shown in Figure 6-21, is similar, but prompts for administrator credentials. It will list any accounts with administrator rights.

![Image of OTS consent dialog box]

**FIGURE 6-21** OTS consent dialog box
If a user declines an elevation, Windows returns an access-denied error to the process that initiated the launch. When a user agrees to an elevation by either entering administrator credentials or clicking Continue, AIS calls `CreateProcessAsUser` to launch the process with the appropriate administrative identity. Although AIS is technically the parent of the elevated process, AIS uses new support in the `CreateProcessAsUser` API that sets the process' parent process ID to that of the process that originally launched it. (See Chapter 5, “Processes and Threads,” for more information on processes and this mechanism.) That’s why elevated processes don’t appear as children of the AIS service-hosting process in tools such as Process Explorer that show process trees. Figure 6-22 shows the operations involved in launching an elevated process from a standard user account.

![Figure 6-22 Launching an administrative application as a standard user](image)

**Requesting Administrative Rights**

There are a number of ways the system and applications identify a need for administrative rights. One that shows up in the Explorer user interface is the Run As Administrator context menu command and shortcut option. These items also include a blue and gold shield icon that should be placed next to any button or menu item that will result in an elevation of rights when it is selected. Choosing the Run As Administrator command causes Explorer to call the `ShellExecute` API with the “runas” verb.

The vast majority of installation programs require administrative rights, so the image loader, which initiates the launch of an executable, includes installer-detection code to identify likely legacy
installers. Some of the heuristics it uses are as simple as detecting internal version information or whether the image has the words setup, install, or update in its file name. More sophisticated means of detection involve scanning for byte sequences in the executable that are common to third-party installation wrapper utilities. The image loader also calls the application compatibility library to see if the target executable requires administrator rights. The library looks in the application compatibility database to see whether the executable has the RequireAdministrator or RunAsInvoker compatibility flag associated with it.

The most common way for an executable to request administrative rights is for it to include a requestedExecutionLevel tag in its application manifest file. The element’s level attribute can have one of the three values shown in Table 6-12.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elevation Level</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Usage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As Invoker</td>
<td>No need for administrative rights; never ask for elevation.</td>
<td>Typical user applications that don’t need administrative privileges—for example, Notepad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest Available</td>
<td>Request approval for highest rights available. If the user is logged on as a standard user, the process will be launched as invoker; otherwise, an AAM elevation prompt will appear, and the process will run with full administrative rights.</td>
<td>Applications that can function without full administrative rights but expect users to want full access if it’s easily accessible. For example, the Registry Editor, Microsoft Management Console, and the Event Viewer use this level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Require Administrator</td>
<td>Always request administrative rights—an OTS elevation dialog box prompt will be shown for standard users; otherwise, AAM.</td>
<td>Applications that require administrative rights to work, such as the Firewall Settings editor, which affects systemwide security.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The presence of the trustInfo element in a manifest (which you can see in the excerpted string dump of eventvwr.exe discussed next) denotes an executable that was written with support for UAC and the requestedExecutionLevel element nests within it. The uiAccess attribute is where accessibility applications can use the UIPI bypass functionality mentioned earlier.

C:\>strings c:\Windows\System32\eventvwr.exe
...
<trustInfo xmlns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v3">
    <security>
        <requestedPrivileges>
            <requestedExecutionLevel
                level="highestAvailable"
                uiAccess="false"
            />
        </requestedPrivileges>
    </security>
</trustInfo>
<asmv3:application>
        <autoElevate>true</autoElevate>
    </asmv3:windowsSettings>
</asmv3:application>
...
An easier way to determine the values specified by an executable is to view its manifest with the Sysinternals Sigcheck utility, like this:

\texttt{sigcheck -m <executable>}

\begin{quote}
\textbf{EXPERIMENT: Using Application-Compatibility Flags}
\end{quote}

In this experiment, we will use an application-compatibility flag to run the Registry Editor as a standard user process. This will bypass the \texttt{RequireAdministrator} manifest flag and force virtualization on Regedit.exe, allowing you to make changes to the virtualized registry directly.

1. Navigate to your \texttt{%SystemRoot\%} directory, and copy the Regedit.exe file to another path on your system (such as C:\ or your Desktop folder).

2. Go to the \texttt{HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Layers} registry key, and create a new string value whose name is the path where you copied Regedit.exe, such as c:\regedit.exe.

3. Set the value of this key to \texttt{RUNASINVOKER}.

4. Now start Regedit.exe from its location. (Be sure to close any running copies of the Registry Editor first.) You will not see the typical AAM dialog box, and Regedit.exe will now run with standard user rights. You will also be subject to the virtualized view of the registry, meaning you can now see what legacy applications see when accessing the registry.

\textbf{Auto-Elevation}

In the default configuration (see the next section for information on changing this), most Windows executables and control panel applets do not result in elevation prompts for administrative users, even if they need administrative rights to run. This is because of a mechanism called auto-elevation. Auto-elevation is intended to preclude administrative users from seeing elevation prompts for most of their work; the programs will automatically run under the user’s full administrative token.

Auto-elevation has several requirements. The executable in question must be considered as a Windows executable. This means it must be signed by the Windows publisher (not just by Microsoft), and it must be in one of several directories considered secure: %SystemRoot\%\System32 and most of its subdirectories, %Systemroot\%\Ehome, and a small number of directories under %ProgramFiles%—for example, those containing Windows Defender and Windows Journal.

There are additional requirements, depending on the type of executable.

.exe files other than Mmc.exe auto-elevate if they are requested via an \texttt{autoElevate} element in their manifest. The string dump of EventVwr.exe in the previous section illustrates this.
Windows also includes a short internal list of executables that are auto-elevated without the autoElevate element. Two examples are Spinstall.exe, the service pack installer, and Pkgmgr.exe, the package manager. They are handled this way because they are also supplied external to Windows 7; they must be able to run on earlier versions of Windows where the autoExecute element in their manifest might cause an error. These executables must still meet the signing and directory requirements for Windows executables as described previously.

Mmc.exe is treated as a special case, because whether it should auto-elevate or not depends on which system management snap-ins it is to load. Mmc.exe is normally invoked with a command line specifying an .msc file, which in turn specifies which snap-ins are to be loaded. When Mmc.exe is run from a protected administrator account (one running with the limited administrator token), it asks Windows for administrative rights. Windows validates that Mmc.exe is a Windows executable and then checks the .msc. The .msc must also pass the tests for a Windows executable, and furthermore must be on an internal list of auto-elevate .msc's. This list includes nearly all .msc files in Windows.

Finally, COM objects can request administrative rights within their registry key. To do so requires a subkey named Elevation with a REG_DWORD value named Enabled, having a value of 1. Both the COM object and its instantiating executable must meet the Windows executable requirements, though the executable need not have requested auto-elevation.

Controlling UAC Behavior

UAC can be modified via the dialog box shown in Figure 6-23. This dialog box is available under Control Panel, Action Center, Change User Account Control Settings. Figure 6-23 shows the control in its default position for Windows 7.

![User Account Control Settings](image)

**FIGURE 6-23** User Account Control settings
The four possible settings have the effects described in Table 6-13.

**TABLE 6-13 User Account Control Options**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Slider Position</th>
<th>When administrative user not running with administrative rights…</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highest position (“Always notify”)</td>
<td>...attempts to change Windows settings, for example, use certain Control Panel applets...attempts to install software, or run a program whose manifest calls for elevation, or uses Run As Administrator</td>
<td>UAC elevation prompt appears on the secure desktop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second position</td>
<td>UAC elevation occurs automatically with no prompt or notification</td>
<td>UAC elevation prompt appears on the secure desktop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third position</td>
<td>UAC elevation occurs automatically with no prompt or notification</td>
<td>UAC elevation prompt appears on the secure desktop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowest position (“Never notify”)</td>
<td>UAC is turned off for administrative users</td>
<td>UAC is turned off for administrative users</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The third position is not recommended because the UAC elevation prompt appears not on the secure desktop but on the normal user’s desktop. This could allow a malicious program running in the same session to change the appearance of the prompt. It is intended for use only in systems where the video subsystem takes a long time to dim the desktop or is otherwise unsuitable for the usual UAC display.

The lowest position is strongly discouraged because it turns UAC off completely as far as administrative accounts are concerned. All processes run by a user with an administrative account will be run with the user’s full administrative rights in effect; there is no filtered admin token. Registry and file system virtualization are disabled as well for these accounts, and the Protected mode of Internet Explorer is disabled. However, virtualization is still in effect for nonadministrative accounts, and non-administrative accounts will still see an OTS elevation prompt when they attempt to change Windows settings, run a program that requires elevation, or use the Run As Administrator context menu option in Explorer.

The UAC setting is stored in four values in the registry under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System, as shown in Table 6-14. ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin controls the UAC elevation prompt for administrators running with a filtered admin token, and ConsentPromptBehaviorUser controls the UAC prompt for users other than administrators.
### Application Identification (AppID)

Historically, security decisions in Windows have been based upon a user’s identity (in the form of the user’s SID and group membership), but a growing number of security components (AppLocker, firewall, antivirus, antimalware, Rights Management Services, and others) need to make security decisions based upon what code is to be run. In the past, each of these security components used their own proprietary method for identifying applications, which led to inconsistent and overly-complicated policy authoring. The purpose of AppID is to bring consistency to how the security components recognize applications by providing a single set of APIs and data structures.

**Note** This is not the same as the AppID used by DCOM/COM+ applications, where a GUID represents a process that is shared by multiple CLSIDs, nor is it the AppID used by Windows Live applications.

Just as a user is identified when she logs in, an application is identified just before it is started by generating the main program’s AppID. An AppID can be generated from any of the following attributes of the application: Fields within a code-signing certificate embedded within the file allow for different combinations of publisher name, product name, file name, and version. APPID://FQBN is a Fully Qualified Binary Name, and it is a string in the following form: `{Publisher\Product\Filename,Version}. The Publisher name is the Subject field of the x.509 certificate used to sign the code, using the following fields: O = Organization, L = Locality, S = State or Province, and C = Country.
File hash. There are several methods that can be used for hashing. The default is APPID://SHA256HASH. However, for backward compatibility with SRP and most x.509 certificates, SHA-1 (APPID://SHA1HASH) is still supported. APPID://SHA256HASH specifies the SHA-256 hash of the file.

The partial or complete path to the file. APPID://Path specifies a path with optional wildcard characters ("*").

**Note** An AppID does not serve as a means for certifying the quality or security of an application. An AppID is simply a way of identifying an application so that administrators can reference the application in security policy decisions.

The AppID is stored in the process’s access token, allowing any security component to make authorization decisions based upon a single, consistent identification. AppLocker uses conditional ACEs (described earlier) for specifying whether a particular program is allowed to be run by the user.

When an AppID is created for a signed file, the certificate from the file is cached and verified to a trusted root certificate. The certificate path is re-verified daily to ensure the certificate path remains valid. Certificate caching and verification are recorded in the system event log. See Figure 6-24.

![Event Viewer showing AppID service verifying signature of a program.](image)

**FIGURE 6-24** Event Viewer showing AppID service verifying signature of a program.
AppLocker

New to Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008/R2 (Enterprise and Ultimate editions) is a feature known as AppLocker, which allows an administrator to lockdown a system to prevent unauthorized programs from being run. Windows XP introduced Software Restriction Policies (SRP), which was the first step toward this capability, but SRP suffered from being difficult to manage, and it couldn’t be applied to specific users or groups. (All users were affected by SRP rules.) App Locker is a replacement for SRP, and yet coexists alongside SRP, with App Locker’s rules being stored separately from SRP’s rules. If both App Locker and SRP rules are in the same Group Policy object (GPO), only the App Locker rules will be applied. Another feature that makes App Locker superior to SRP is App Locker’s auditing mode, which allows an administrator to create an App Locker policy and examine the results (stored in the system event log) to determine whether the policy will perform as expected—without actually performing the restrictions. App Locker auditing mode can be used to monitor which applications are being used by one, or more, users on a system.

App Locker allows an administrator to restrict the following types of files from being run:

- Executable images (.EXE and .COM)
- Dynamic-Link Libraries (.DLL and .OCX)
- Microsoft Software Installer (.MSI and .MSP) for both install and uninstall
- Scripts
- Windows PowerShell (.PS1)
- Batch (.BAT and .CMD)
- Visual Basic Script (.VBS)
- Java Script (.JS)

App Locker provides a simple GUI rule-based mechanism, which is very similar to network firewall rules, for determining which applications or scripts are allowed to be run by specific users and groups, using conditional ACEs and AppID attributes. There are two types of rules in App Locker:

- Allow the specified files to run, denying everything else.
- Deny the specified files from being run, allowing everything else. “Deny” rules take precedence over “allow” rules.

Each rule can also have a list of exceptions to exclude files from the rule. Using an exception, you could create a rule to “Allow everything in the C:\Windows or C:\Program Files directories to be run, except the built-in games.”

App Locker rules can be associated with a specific user or group. This allows an administrator to support compliance requirements by validating and enforcing which users can run specific applications. For example, you can create a rule to “Allow users in the Finance security group to run the finance line-of-business applications.” This blocks everyone who is not in the Finance security group.
from running finance applications (including administrators) but still provides access for those that have a business need to run the applications. Another useful rule would be to prevent users in the Receptionists group from installing or running unapproved software.

AppLocker rules depend upon conditional ACEs and attributes defined by AppID. Rules can be created using the following criteria:

- Fields within a code-signing certificate embedded within the file, allowing for different combinations of publisher name, product name, file name, and version. For example, a rule could be created to “Allow all versions greater than 9.0 of Contoso Reader to run” or “Allow anyone in the graphics group to run the installer or application from Contoso for GraphicsShop as long as the version is 14.*”. For example, the following SDDL string denies execute access to any signed programs published by Contoso for the user account RestrictedUser (identified by the user’s SID):

  D:\(XD;\;FX;\;S-1-5-21-3392373855-1129761602-2459801163-1028;((Exists APPID://FQBN) && (APPID://FQBN) >= {{"O=CONTOSO, INCORPORATED, L=REDMOND, S=WASHINGTON, C=US"\,"",0)}})

- Directory path, allowing only files within a particular directory tree to run. This can also be used to identify specific files. For example, the following SDDL string denies execute access to the programs in the directory C:\Tools for the user account RestrictedUser (identified by the user’s SID):

  D:\(XD;\;FX;\;S-1-5-21-3392373855-1129761602-2459801163-1028;(APPID://PATH Contains "%OSDRIVE\%TOOLS\"))

- File hash. Using a hash will also detect if a file has been modified and prevent it from running, which can also be a weakness if files are changed frequently, because the hash rule will need to be updated frequently. File hashes are often used for scripts because few scripts are signed. For example, this SDDL string denies execute access to programs with the specified hash values for the user account RestrictedUser (identified by the user’s SID):

  D:\(XD;\;FX;\;S-1-5-21-3392373855-1129761602-2459801163-1028;(APPID://SHA256HASH Any_of {#7a334d2b99d484448eedd308dfca63b8a3b7b4404496ee2f8e236f5997f1b647, #2a782f76cb94eece307dc52c338f02edbbfddca83906674e35c682724a8a92a76b}))

AppLocker rules can be defined on the local machine using the Security Policy MMC snap-in (%SystemRoot%\System32\secpol.msc) or a Windows PowerShell script, or they can be pushed to machines within a domain using group policy. AppLocker rules are stored in multiple locations within the registry:

- HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\SrpV2 This key is also mirrored to HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\SrpV2. The rules are stored in XML format.
The rules are stored as SDDL and a binary ACE.

AppLocker policy pushed down from a domain as part of a Group Policy Object (GPO) are stored here in XML format.

Certificates for files that have been run are cached in the registry under the key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\AppID\CertStore. AppLocker also builds a certificate chain (stored in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\AppID\CertChainStore) from the certificate found in a file back to a trusted root certificate. See Figure 6-25.

![AppLocker configuration page in Local Security Policy](image)

**FIGURE 6-25** AppLocker configuration page in Local Security Policy

There are also AppLocker-specific PowerShell commands (also known as cmdlets) to enable deployment and testing via scripting. Figure 6-26 demonstrates using PowerShell commands to determine which files in a directory tree have been signed, saving the current App Locker policy in an XML file, and displaying which executable files in a directory tree could be run by a user named RestrictedUser.
The AppID and SRP services co-exist in the same binary (%SystemRoot%\System32\AppIdSvc.dll), which runs within an SvcHost process. The service requests a registry change notification to monitor any changes under that key, which is written by either a GPO or the AppLocker UI in the Local Security Policy MMC snap-in. When a change is detected, the AppID service triggers a user-mode task (%SystemRoot%\System32\AppIdPolicyConverter.exe), which reads the new XML rules and translates them into binary format ACEs and SDDL strings, which are understandable by both the user-mode and kernel-mode AppID and AppLocker components. The task stores the translated rules under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Srp\Gp. This key is writable only by SYSTEM and Administrators, and it is marked read-only for authenticated users. Both user-mode and kernel-mode AppID components read the translated rules from the registry directly. The service also monitors the local machine trusted root certificate store, and it invokes a user-mode task (%SystemRoot%\System32\AppIdCertStoreCheck.exe) to reverify the certificates at least once per day and whenever there is a change to the certificate store. The AppID kernel-mode driver (%SystemRoot%\System32\drivers\AppId.sys) is notified about rule changes by the AppID service through an APPID_POLICY_CHANGED DeviceIoControl request. See Figure 6-27.
An administrator can track which applications are being allowed or denied by looking at the system Event Log using the event viewer (once AppLocker has been configured and the service started). See Figure 6-28.
The implementations of AppID, AppLocker, and SRP are somewhat blurred and violate strict layering, with various logical components co-existing within the same executables, and the naming is not as consistent as one would like.

The AppID service runs as LocalService so that it has access to the Trusted Root Certificate Store on the system. This also enables it to perform certificate verification. The AppID service is responsible for the following:

- Verification of publisher certificates
- Adding new certificates to the cache
- Detecting AppLocker rule updates, and notifying the AppID driver

The AppID driver performs the majority of the AppLocker functionality and relies upon communication (via DeviceIoControl requests) from the AppID service, so its device object is protected by an ACL, granting access only to the NT SERVICE\AppIDSvc, NT SERVICE\LOCAL SERVICE and BUILTIN\Administrators groups. Thus, the driver cannot be spoofed by malware.

When the AppID driver is first loaded, it requests a process creation callback (CreateProcessNotifyEx) by calling PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx. When the CreateProcessNotifyEx routine is called, it is passed a PPS_CREATE_NOTIFY_INFO structure (describing the process being created). It then gathers the AppID attributes that identify the executable image and writes them to the process’ access token. Then it calls the undocumented routine SeSrpAccessCheck, which examines the process token and the conditional ACE AppLocker rules, and determines whether the process should be allowed to run. If the process should not be allowed to run, the driver writes STATUS_ACCESS_DISABLED_BY_POLICY_OTHER to the Status field of the PPS_CREATE_NOTIFY_INFO structure, which causes the process creation to be canceled (and sets the process’ final completion status).

To perform DLL restriction, the image loader will send a DeviceIoControl request to the AppID driver whenever it loads a DLL into a process. The driver then checks the DLL’s identity against the AppLocker conditional ACEs, just like it would for an executable.

**Note** Performing these checks for every DLL load is time consuming and might be noticeable to end users. For this reason, DLL rules are normally disabled, and they must be specifically enabled via the Advanced tab in the AppLocker properties page in the Local Security Policy snap-in.

The scripting engines and the MSI installer have been modified to call the user-mode SRP APIs whenever they open a file, to check whether a file is allowed to be opened. The user-mode SRP APIs call the AuthZ APIs to perform the conditional ACE access check.
Software Restriction Policies

Windows also contains a user-mode mechanism called Software Restriction Policies that enables administrators to control what images and scripts execute on their systems. The Software Restriction Policies node of the Local Security Policy Editor, shown in Figure 6-29, serves as the management interface for a machine’s code execution policies, although per-user policies are also possible using domain group policies.

Several global policy settings appear beneath the Software Restriction Policies node:

- The Enforcement policy configures whether restriction policies apply to libraries, such as DLLs, and whether policies apply to users only or to administrators as well.
- The Designated File Types policy records the extensions for files that are considered executable code.
- Trusted Publishers control who can select which certificate publishers are trusted.

![Software Restriction Policy configuration](image)

When configuring a policy for a particular script or image, an administrator can direct the system to recognize it using its path, its hash, its Internet Zone (as defined by Internet Explorer), or its cryptographic certificate, and she can specify whether it is associated with the Disallowed or Unrestricted security policy.

Enforcement of Software Restriction Policies takes place within various components where files are treated as containing executable code. Some of these components are listed here:

- The user-mode Windows `CreateProcess` function in %SystemRoot%\System32\Kernel32.dll enforces it for executable images.
- The DLL loading code of Ntdll (%SystemRoot%\System32\Ntdll.dll) enforces it for DLLs.
- The Windows command prompt (%SystemRoot%\System32\cmd.exe) enforces it for batch file execution.
Windows Scripting Host components that start scripts—%SystemRoot%\System32\Cscript.exe (for command-line scripts), %SystemRoot%\System32\Wscript.exe (for UI scripts), and %SystemRoot%\System32\Scrobj.dll (for script objects)—enforce it for script execution.

Each of these components determines whether the restriction policies are enabled by reading the registry value HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Policies\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers\TransparentEnabled, which if set to 1 indicates that policies are in effect. Then it determines whether the code it’s about to execute matches one of the rules specified in a subkey of the CodeIdentifiers key and, if so, whether or not the execution should be allowed. If there is no match, the default policy, as specified in the DefaultLevel value of the CodeIdentifiers key, determines whether the execution is allowed.

Software Restriction Policies are a powerful tool for preventing the unauthorized access of code and scripts, but only if properly applied. Unless the default policy is set to disallow execution, a user can make minor changes to an image that’s been marked as disallowed so that he can bypass the rule and execute it. For example, a user can change an innocuous byte of a process image so that a hash rule fails to recognize it, or copy a file to a different location to avoid a path-based rule.

**EXPERIMENT: Watching Software Restriction Policy Enforcement**

You can indirectly see Software Restriction Policies being enforced by watching accesses to the registry when you attempt to execute an image that you’ve disallowed.

1. Run secpol.msc to open the Local Security Policy Editor, and navigate to the Software Restriction Policies node.
2. Choose Create New Policies from the context menu if no policies are defined.
3. Create a path-based disallow restriction policy for %SystemRoot%\System32\Notepad.exe.
4. Run Process Monitor, and set an include filter for Safer. (See Chapter 4 for a description of Process Monitor.)
5. Open a command prompt, and run Notepad from the prompt.

Your attempt to run Notepad should result in a message telling you that you cannot execute the specified program, and Process Monitor should show the command prompt (cmd.exe) querying the local machine restriction policies.

**Conclusion**

Windows provides an extensive array of security functions that meet the key requirements of both government agencies and commercial installations. In this chapter, we’ve taken a brief tour of the internal components that are the basis of these security features. In the next chapter, we’ll look at the I/O system.
Microsoft Windows was designed with networking in mind, and it includes broad networking support that is integrated with the I/O system and the Windows APIs. The four basic types of network software components are services, APIs, protocols, and drivers for network adapters—with each component layered on top of the next to form a network stack. Windows has well-defined interfaces for each layer, so in addition to using the wide variety of APIs, protocols, and network adapter device drivers that ship with Windows, third parties can extend the operating system’s networking capabilities by developing their own components.

In this chapter, we take you from the top of the Windows networking stack to the bottom. First, we present the mapping between the Windows networking software components and the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) reference model. Then we briefly describe the networking APIs available on Windows and explain how they are implemented. You’ll learn how multiple redirector support and name resolution work, see how to access and cache remote files, and learn how a multitude of drivers interact to form a network protocol stack. After looking at the implementation of network adapter device drivers, we examine binding, which is the glue that connects services, protocol stacks, and network adapters.

**Windows Networking Architecture**

The goal of network software is to take a request (in the form of an I/O request) from an application on one machine, pass it to another machine, execute the request on the remote machine, and return the results to the first machine. In the course of this process, the request must be transformed several times. A high-level request, such as “read x number of bytes from file y on machine z,” requires software that can determine how to get to machine z and what communication software that machine understands. Then the request must be altered for transmission across a network—for example, divided into short packets of information. When the request reaches the other side, it must be checked for completeness, decoded, and sent to the correct operating system component for execution. Finally, the reply must be encoded for sending back across the network.
The OSI Reference Model

To help different computer manufacturers standardize and integrate their networking software, in 1984 the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) defined a software model for sending messages between machines. The result was the *Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) reference model*. The model defines six layers of software and one physical layer of hardware, as shown in Figure 7-1.

![OSI Reference Model Diagram](image)

**FIGURE 7-1** OSI reference model

The OSI reference model is an idealized scheme that few systems implement precisely, but it’s often used to frame discussions of networking principles. Each layer on one machine assumes that it is “talking to” the same layer on the other machine. Both machines “speak” the same language, or protocol, at the same level. In reality, however, a network transmission must pass down each layer on the client machine, be transmitted across the network, and then pass up the layers on the destination machine until it reaches a layer that can understand and implement the request.

The purpose of each layer in the OSI model is to provide services to higher layers and to abstract how the services are implemented at lower layers. Describing the details of each layer is beyond the scope of this book, but following is a brief description of each layer in the OSI model.

### Physical
This is the lowest layer in the OSI model, and it exchanges signals between cooperating network entities over some physical medium (wire, radio, fiber, or other type). The physical layer specifies the mechanical, electrical, functional, and procedural standards for accessing the medium, such as connectors, cabling, signaling, and so on. Common examples are Ethernet (IEEE 802.3) and Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11).

### Datalink
This layer exchanges data frames (also called *packets*) between *physically adjacent* network entities (known as *stations*) using the services provided by the physical layer. By its nature, the datalink layer is tightly tied to the physical layer and is really more of an architectural abstraction than the other layers within the model. The datalink layer provides each station
with its own unique address on the network, and it provides point-to-point communications between stations (such as between two systems connected to the same Ethernet). The capabilities of the datalink layer vary considerably, depending upon the physical layer. Typically, transmit and receive errors are detected by the datalink layer, and in some instances, the error might be corrected. A datalink layer can be connection oriented, which is typically used in wide area networks (WANs), or connectionless, which is typically used in local area networks (LANs). The IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) 802 committee is responsible for the majority of the LAN architectures used throughout the world, and they specify the physical and datalink layers of most networking equipment. They divide the datalink layer into two sublayers: the Logical Link Control (LLC) and the Medium Access Control (MAC). The LLC layer provides a single access method for the network layer to communicate with any 802.x MAC, insulating the network layer from the physical LAN type. The MAC layer provides access-control functions to the shared network medium, and it specifies signaling, the sharing protocol, address recognition, frame generation, CRC generation, and so on. The datalink layer does not guarantee that frames will be delivered to their destination.

Network The network layer implements node addresses and routing functions to allow packets to traverse multiple datalinks. This layer understands the network topology (hiding it from the transport layer) and knows how to direct packets to the nearest router. Any network entity containing the network, datalink, and physical layers is considered to be a node, and the network layer can transfer data between any two nodes on the network. There are two types of nodes implemented by the network layer: end nodes, which are the source or destination of data, and intermediate nodes (usually referred to as routers), which route packets between end nodes. Network-layer service can be either connection oriented, where all packets traveling between the end nodes follow the same path through the network, or connectionless, where each packet is routed independently. The network layer does not guarantee that packets will be delivered to their destination.

Transport The transport layer provides a transparent data-transfer mechanism between end nodes. On the sending side, the transport layer receives an unstructured stream of data from the layer above and segments the data into discrete packets, which can be sent across the network, using the services of the network layer beneath it. On the receiving side, the transport layer reassembles the packets received from the network layer into a stream of data and provides it to the layer above. This layer provides reliable data transfer and will re-transmit lost or corrupted packets to ensure that the data stream received is identical to the data stream that was sent.

Session This layer implements a connection or pipe between cooperating applications. Each connection endpoint has its own address (often called a port), which is unique on that system. There are a variety of communications services provided by session layers, such as two-way simultaneous (full-duplex), two-way alternate (single-duplex), or one-way. Once a connection is established, the systems typically send periodic messages to each other to ensure that each end of the connection is functioning. If an uncorrectable transmission error is detected over a connection, the connection is typically terminated and disconnected.
- **Presentation** The presentation layer is responsible for preserving the information content of data sent over the network. It handles data formatting, including issues such as whether lines end in a carriage return/line feed (CR/LF) or just a carriage return (CR), whether data is to be compressed or encrypted, converting binary data from little-endian to big-endian, and so on. This layer is not present in most network protocol stacks, so its functionality is implemented at the application layer.

- **Application** This is a layer that handles the information transfer between two network applications, including functions such as security checks, identification of the participating machines, and initiation of the data exchange. This is the protocol that is used by two communicating applications, and is application specific.

The gray lines in Figure 7-1 represent protocols used in transmitting a request to a remote machine. As stated earlier, each layer of the hierarchy assumes that it is speaking to the same layer on another machine and uses a common protocol. The collection of protocols through which a request passes on its way down and back up the layers of the network is called a *protocol stack*.

Not all network protocol suites implement all the layers in the OSI model. (The presentation layer is rarely provided.) In particular, the TCP/IP protocol stack (which predates the OSI model) matches poorly to the abstractions of OSI. As data travels down the network stack, each layer adds a header (and possibly a trailer) to the data payload, building up a structure that is very similar to the layers of an onion. When this structure is received on a remote node, it travels up the network stack, with each layer stripping off its header (and trailer) until the data payload is delivered to the receiving application.

### Windows Networking Components

Figure 7-2 provides an overview of the components of Windows networking, showing how each component fits into the OSI reference model and which protocols are used between layers. The mapping between OSI layers and networking components isn’t precise, which is the reason that some components cross layers. The various components include the following:

- **Networking APIs** provide a protocol-independent way for applications to communicate across a network. Networking APIs can be implemented in user mode or in both user mode and kernel mode. In some cases, they are wrappers around another networking API that implements a specific programming model or provides additional services. (Note that the term *networking API* also describes any programming interfaces provided by networking-related software.)

- **Transport Driver Interface (TDI) clients** are legacy kernel-mode device drivers that usually implement the kernel-mode portion of a networking API’s implementation. TDI clients get their name from the fact that the I/O request packets (IRPs) they send to protocol drivers are formatted according to the Windows Transport Driver Interface standard (documented in the Windows Driver Kit). This standard specifies a common programming interface for kernel-mode device drivers. (See Chapter 8, “I/O System,” in Part 2 for more information about IRPs.) The TDI interface is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Windows. The TDI
interface is now being exported by the TDI Extension (TDX) Driver. Kernel-mode network clients should now use the Winsock Kernel (WSK) interface for accessing the network stack.

- **TDI transports** (also known as *transports*) and Network Driver Interface Specification (NDIS) protocol drivers (or protocol drivers) are kernel-mode network protocol drivers. They accept IRPs from TDI clients and process the requests these IRPs represent. This processing might require network communications with a peer, prompting the TDI transport to add protocol-specific headers (for example, TCP, UDP, and/or IP) to data passed in the IRP, and to communicate with adapter drivers using NDIS functions (also documented in the Windows Driver Kit). TDI transports generally facilitate application network communications by transparently performing message operations such as segmentation and reassembly, sequencing, acknowledgment, and retransmission.

- Microsoft has decided that TCP/IP has won the network protocol wars, so it has re-architected the network protocol portion of the network stack from being protocol-neutral to being TCP/IP-centric. The interface between the TCP/IP protocol driver and Winsock is known as the **Transport Layer Network Provider Interface (TLNPI)** and is currently undocumented.

- **Winsock Kernel (WSK)** is a transport-independent, kernel-mode networking API that replaces the legacy TDI. WSK provides network communication by using socket-like programming semantics similar to user-mode Winsock, while also providing unique features such as asynchronous I/O operations built on IRPs and event callbacks. WSK also natively supports IP version 6 (IPv6) functionality in the Next Generation TCP/IP network stack in Windows.

- The **Windows Filtering Platform (WFP)** is a set of APIs and system services that provide the ability to create network filtering applications. The WFP allows applications to interact with packet processing at different levels of the Windows networking stack, much like file system filters. Similarly, network data can be traced, filtered, and also modified before it reaches its destination.

- **WFP callout drivers** are kernel-mode drivers that implement one or more *callouts*, which extend the capabilities of the WFP by processing TCP/IP-based network data in ways that extend the basic functionality provided by the WFP.

- The **NDIS library** (Ndis.sys) provides an abstraction mechanism that encapsulates Network Interface Card (NIC) drivers (also known as *NDIS miniports*), hiding from them the specifics of the Windows kernel-mode environment. The NDIS library exports functions for use by TCP/IP and legacy TDI transports.

- **NDIS miniport drivers** are kernel-mode drivers that are responsible for interfacing the network stack to a particular NIC. NDIS miniport drivers are written so that they are wrapped by the Windows NDIS library. NDIS miniport drivers don’t process IRPs; rather, they register a call-table interface to the NDIS library that contains pointers to functions that perform simple operations on the NIC, such as sending a packet or querying properties. NDIS miniport drivers communicate with network adapters by using NDIS library functions that resolve to hardware abstraction layer (HAL) functions.
As Figure 7-2 shows, the OSI layers don’t correspond to actual software. WSK transport providers, for example, frequently cross several boundaries. In fact, the bottom three layers of software and the hardware layer are often referred to collectively as the transport. Software components residing in the upper three layers are referred to as users or clients of the transport.”
Networking APIs

Windows implements multiple networking APIs to provide support for legacy applications and compatibility with industry standards. In this section, we’ll briefly look at the networking APIs and describe how applications use them. Keep in mind that the decision about which API an application uses depends on characteristics of the API, such as which protocols the API can layer over, whether the API supports reliable (or bidirectional) communication, and the API’s portability to other Windows platforms the application might run on. We’ll discuss the following networking APIs:

- Windows Sockets (Winsock)
- Winsock Kernel (WSK)
- Remote procedure call (RPC)
- Web access APIs
- Named pipes and mailslots
- NetBIOS
- Other networking APIs

Windows Sockets

The original Windows Sockets (Winsock) (version 1.0) was Microsoft’s implementation of BSD (Berkeley Software Distribution) Sockets, a programming API that became the standard by which UNIX systems have communicated over the Internet since the 1980s. Support for sockets on Windows makes the task of porting UNIX networking applications to Windows relatively straightforward. The modern versions of Winsock include most of the functionality of BSD Sockets but also include Microsoft-specific enhancements, which continue to evolve. Winsock supports reliable, connection-oriented communication as well as unreliable, connectionless communication. ("Reliable," in this sense, indicates whether the sender is notified of any problems in the delivery of data to the receiver.) Windows provides Winsock 2.2, which adds numerous features beyond the BSD Sockets specification, such as functions that take advantage of Windows asynchronous I/O, to offer far better performance and scalability than straight BSD Sockets programming.

Winsock includes the following features:

- Support for scatter-gather and asynchronous application I/O.
- Quality of Service (QoS) conventions so that applications can negotiate latency and bandwidth requirements when the underlying network supports QoS.
- Extensibility so that Winsock can be used with third-party protocols (deprecated).
- Support for integrated namespaces with third-party namespace providers. A server can publish its name in Active Directory, for example, and by using namespace extensions, a client can look up the server’s address in Active Directory.
- Support for multicast messages, where messages transmit from a single source to multiple receivers.

We'll examine typical Winsock operation and then describe ways that Winsock can be extended.

**Winsock Client Operation**

The first step a Winsock application takes is to initialize the Winsock API with a call to an initialization function. A Winsock application’s next step is to create a socket that will represent a communications endpoint. The application obtains the address of the server to which it wants to connect by calling `getaddrinfo` (and later calling `freeaddrinfo` to release the information). The `getaddrinfo` function returns the list of protocol-specific addresses assigned to the server, and the client attempts to connect to each one in turn until it is able to establish a connection with one of them. This ensures that a client that supports both IP version 4 (IPv4) and IPv6 will connect to the appropriate and/or most efficient address on a server that might have both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses assigned to it. (IPv6 is preferred over IPv4.) Winsock is a protocol-independent API, so an address can be specified for any protocol installed on the system over which Winsock operates. After obtaining the server address, a connection-oriented client attempts to connect to the server by using `connect` and specifying the server address.

When a connection is established, the client can send and receive data over its socket using the `recv` and `send` APIs. A connectionless client specifies the remote address with connectionless APIs, such as the connectionless equivalents of `send` and `recv`, and `sendto` and `recvfrom`. Clients can also use the `select` and `WSAPoll` APIs to wait on or poll multiple sockets for synchronous I/O operations, or to check their state.

**Winsock Server Operation**

The sequence of steps for a server application differs from that of a client. After initializing the Winsock API, the server creates a socket and then binds it to a local address by using `bind`. Again, the address family specified—whether it’s TCP/IPv4, TCP/IPv6, or some other address family—is up to the server application.

If the server is connection oriented, it performs a `listen` operation on the socket, indicating the backlog, or the number of connections the server asks Winsock to hold until the server is able to accept them. Then it performs an `accept` operation to allow a client to connect to the socket. If there is a pending connection request, the `accept` call completes immediately; otherwise, it completes when a connection request arrives. When a connection is made, the `accept` function returns a new socket that represents the server’s end of the connection. (The original socket used for listening is not used for communications, only for receiving connection requests.) The server can perform receive and send operations by using functions such as `recv` and `send`. Like Winsock clients, servers can use the `select` and `WSAPoll` functions to query the state of one or more sockets; however, the Winsock `WSAEventSelect` function and overlapped (asynchronous) I/O extensions are preferred for better scalability. Figure 7-3 shows connection-oriented communication between a Winsock client and server.
After binding an address, a connectionless server is no different from a connectionless client: it can send and receive data over the socket simply by specifying the remote address with each operation. Most connectionless protocols are unreliable and, in general, will not know whether the destination actually received the sent data packets (which are known as datagrams). Datagram protocols are ideal for quick message passing, where the overhead of establishing a connection is too much and reliability is not required (although an application can build reliability on top of the protocol).

**Winsock Extensions**

In addition to supporting functions that correspond directly to those implemented in BSD Sockets, Microsoft has added a handful of functions that aren’t part of the BSD standard. Two of these functions, `AcceptEx` (the Ex suffix is short for Extended) and `TransmitFile`, are worth describing because many Web servers on Windows use them to achieve high performance. `AcceptEx` is a version of the `accept` function that, in the process of establishing a connection with a client, returns the client’s address and the client’s first message. `AcceptEx` allows the server application to queue multiple accept operations so that high volumes of incoming connection requests can be handled. With this function, a web server avoids executing multiple Winsock functions that would otherwise be required.

After establishing a connection with a client, a web server frequently sends a file, such as a web page, to the client. The `TransmitFile` function’s implementation is integrated with the Windows cache manager so that a file can be sent directly from the file system cache. Sending data in this way is called zero-copy because the server doesn’t have to read the file data to send it; it simply specifies a handle to a file and the byte range (offset and length) of the file to send. In addition, `TransmitFile` allows a server to add prefix or suffix data to the file’s data so that the server can send header information, trailer information, or both, which might include the name of the web server and a field that indicates to the client the size of the message the server is sending. Internet Information Services (IIS), which is included with Windows, uses both `AcceptEx` and `TransmitFile` to achieve better performance.

Windows also supports a handful of other multifunction APIs, including `ConnectEx`, `DisconnectEx`, and `TransmitPackets`. `ConnectEx` establishes a connection and sends the first message on the connection. `DisconnectEx` closes a connection and allows the socket handle representing the connection to be reused in a call to `AcceptEx` or `ConnectEx`. Finally, `TransmitPackets` is similar to `TransmitFile`, except that it allows for the sending of in-memory data in addition to, or in lieu of, file data. Finally, by using the `WSAImpersonateSocketPeer` and `WSArevertImpersonation` functions, Winsock servers can perform...
impersonation (described in Chapter 6, “Security”) to perform authorization or to gain access to resources based on the client’s security credentials.

**Extending Winsock**

Winsock is an extensible API on Windows because third parties can add a *transport service provider* that interfaces Winsock with other protocols, or layers on top of existing protocols, to provide functionality such as proxying. Third parties can also add a *namespace service provider* to augment Winsock’s name-resolution facilities. Service providers plug into Winsock by using the Winsock *service provider interface* (SPI). When a transport service provider is registered with Winsock, Winsock uses the transport service provider to implement socket functions, such as *connect* and *accept*, for the address types that the provider indicates it implements. There are no restrictions on how the transport service provider implements the functions, but the implementation usually involves communicating with a transport driver in kernel mode.

**Note** Layered service providers are not secure and can be bypassed; secure network protocol layering must be done in kernel mode. Installing itself as a Winsock layered service provider (LSP) is a technique used frequently by malware and spyware.

A requirement of any Winsock client/server application is for the server to make its address available to clients so that the clients can connect to the server. Standard services that execute on the TCP/IP protocol use *well-known addresses* to make their addresses available. As long as a browser knows the name of the computer a Web server is running on, it can connect to the web server by specifying the well-known web server address (the IP address of the server concatenated with :80, the port number used for HTTP). Namespace service providers make it possible for servers to register their presence in other ways. For example, one namespace service provider might on the server side register the server’s address in Active Directory and on the client side look up the server’s address in Active Directory. Namespace service providers supply this functionality to Winsock by implementing standard Winsock name-resolution functions such as *getaddrinfo* and *getnameinfo*.

**EXPERIMENT: Looking at Winsock Service and Namespace Providers**

The Network Shell (Netsh.exe) utility included with Windows is able to show the registered Winsock transport and namespace providers by using the *netsh winsock show catalog* command. For example, if there are two TCP/IP transport service providers, the first one listed is the default provider for Winsock applications using the TCP/IP protocol. Here’s sample output from Netsh showing the registered transport service providers:

```
C:\Users\Toby>netsh winsock show catalog
```
Winsock Catalog Provider Entry
----------------------------------------
Entry Type: Base Service Provider
Description: MSAFD Tcpip [TCP/IP]
Provider ID: {E70F1AA0-AB8B-11CF-8CA3-00805F48A192}
Provider Path: %SystemRoot%\system32\mswsock.dll
Catalog Entry ID: 1001
Version: 2
Address Family: 2
Max Address Length: 16
Min Address Length: 16
Socket Type: 1
Protocol: 6
Service Flags: 0x20066
Protocol Chain Length: 1

Winsock Catalog Provider Entry
----------------------------------------
Entry Type: Base Service Provider
Description: MSAFD Tcpip [UDP/IP]
Provider ID: {E70F1AA0-AB8B-11CF-8CA3-00805F48A192}
Provider Path: %SystemRoot%\system32\mswsock.dll
Catalog Entry ID: 1002
Version: 2
Address Family: 2
Max Address Length: 16
Min Address Length: 16
Socket Type: 2
Protocol: 17
Service Flags: 0x20609
Protocol Chain Length: 1

Winsock Catalog Provider Entry
----------------------------------------
Entry Type: Base Service Provider
Description: MSAFD Tcpip [RAW/IP]
Provider ID: {E70F1AA0-AB8B-11CF-8CA3-00805F48A192}
Provider Path: %SystemRoot%\system32\mswsock.dll
Catalog Entry ID: 1003
Version: 2
Address Family: 2
Max Address Length: 16
Min Address Length: 16
Socket Type: 3
Protocol: 0
Service Flags: 0x20609
Protocol Chain Length: 1
.
.
.
Name Space Provider Entry
----------------------------------------
Description: Network Location Awareness Legacy (NLAv1) Namespace
Provider ID: {6642243A-3BA8-4AA6-BAA5-2E0BD71FDD83}
Name Space: 15
Active: 1
Version: 0
Name Space Provider Entry
--------------------------------------------
Description: E-mail Naming Shim Provider
Provider ID: {964ACBA2-B2BC-40EB-8C6A-A6DB40161CAE}
Name Space: 37
Active: 1
Version: 0

Name Space Provider Entry
--------------------------------------------
Description: PNRP Cloud Namespace Provider
Provider ID: {03FE89CE-766D-4976-B9C1-BB9BC42C7B4D}
Name Space: 39
Active: 1
Version: 0
.
.
.

You can also use the Autoruns utility from Windows Sysinternals (www.microsoft.com/technet/sysinternals) to view namespace and transport providers, as well as to disable or delete those that might be causing problems or unwanted behavior on the system.

Winsock Implementation

Winsock's implementation is shown in Figure 7-4. Its application interface consists of an API DLL, Ws2_32.dll (%SystemRoot%\System32\Ws2_32.dll), which provides applications access to Winsock functions. Ws2_32.dll calls on the services of namespace and transport service providers to carry out name and message operations. The Mswsock.dll (%SystemRoot%\System32\mswsock.dll) library acts as a transport service provider for the protocols supported by Microsoft and uses Winsock Helper libraries that are protocol specific to communicate with kernel-mode protocol drivers. For example, Wshtcpip.dll (%SystemRoot%\System32\wshtcpip.dll) is the TCP/IP helper. Mswsock.dll implements the Microsoft Winsock extension functions, such as TransmitFile, AcceptEx, and WSARecvEx.

Windows ships with helper DLLs for TCP/IPv4, TCPv6, Bluetooth, NetBIOS, IrDA (Infrared Data Association), and PGM (Pragmatic General Multicast). It also includes namespace service providers for DNS (TCP/IP), Active Directory (NTDS), NLA (Network Location Awareness), PNRP (Peer Name Resolution Protocol), and Bluetooth.

Like the named-pipe and mailslot APIs (described later in this chapter), Winsock integrates with the Windows I/O model and uses file handles to represent sockets. This support requires the aid of a kernel-mode driver, so Msafd.dll (%SystemRoot%\System32\msafd.dll) uses the services of the Ancillary Function Driver (AFD—%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Afd.sys) to implement socket-based functions. AFD is a Transport Layer Network Provider Interface (TLNPI) client and executes network socket operations, such as sending and receiving messages. TLNPI is the undocumented interface between AFD and the TCP/IP protocol stack. If a legacy protocol driver is installed, Windows will use the TDI-TLNPI translation driver TDX (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\tdx.sys) to map TDI IRPs to TLNPI requests.
Winsock Kernel

To enable kernel-mode drivers and modules to have access to networking API interfaces similar to those available to user-mode applications, Windows implements a socket-based networking programming interface called Winsock Kernel (WSK). WSK replaces the legacy TDI API interface present on older versions of Windows but maintains the TDI API interface for transport providers. Compared to TDI, WSK provides better performance, better security, better scalability, and a much easier programming paradigm, because it relies less on internal kernel behavior and more on socket-based semantics. Additionally, WSK was written to take full advantage of the latest technologies in the Windows TCP/IP stack, which TDI was not originally anticipated to support. As shown in Figure 7-5, WSK makes use of the Network Module Registrar (NMR) component of Windows (part of %SystemRoot%\System32\drivers\NetIO.sys) to attach and detach from transport protocols, and it can be used, just like Winsock, to support many types of network clients—for example, the Http.sys driver for the HTTP Server API (mentioned later in the chapter) is a WSK client. Using NMR with WSK is rather complicated, so registration-support APIs are provided to register with WSK (WskRegister, WskDeregister, WskCaptureProviderNPI, and WskReleaseProviderNPI).

Note The Raw transport protocol is not really a protocol and does not perform any encapsulation of the user data. This allows the client to directly control the contents of the frames transmitted and received by the network interface.
WSK enhances security by restricting address sharing—which allows multiple sockets to use the same transport (TCP/IP) address—through the use of nondefault sharing and security descriptors on addresses. WSK uses the security descriptor specified by the first socket for an address, and it checks the owning process and thread for each subsequent attempt to use that address.

FIGURE 7-5 WSK overview

WSK Implementation

WSK’s implementation is shown in Figure 7-6. At its core is the WSK subsystem itself, which uses the Next Generation TCP/IP Stack (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Tcpip.sys) and the NetIO support library (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\NetIO.sys) but is actually implemented in AFD. The subsystem is responsible for the provider side of the WSK API. The subsystem interfaces with the TCP/IP transport protocols (shown at the bottom of Figure 7-5). Attached to the WSK subsystem are WSK clients, which are kernel-mode drivers that implement the client-side WSK API in order to perform network operations. The WSK subsystem calls WSK clients to notify them of asynchronous events.

FIGURE 7-6 WSK implementation

WSK clients are bound to the WSK subsystem through the NMR or through the WSK’s registration functions, which allow WSK clients to dynamically detect when the WSK subsystem becomes available and then load their own dispatch table to describe the provider and client-side implementations of the WSK API. These implementations provide the standard WSK socket-based functions, such as WskSocket, WskAccept, WskBind, WskConnect, WskReceive, and WskSend, which have similar semantics (but not necessarily similar parameters) as their user-mode Winsock counterparts. However, unlike
user-mode Winsock, the WSK subsystem defines four kinds of socket categories, which identify which functions and events are available:

- Basic sockets, which are used only to get and set information on the transport. They cannot be used to send or receive data or be bound to an address.
- Listening sockets, which are used for sockets that accept only incoming connections.
- Datagram sockets, which are used solely for sending and receiving datagrams.
- Connection-oriented sockets, which support all the functionality required to send and receive network traffic over an established connection.

Apart from the socket functions described, WSK also provides events through which clients are notified of network status. Unlike the model for socket functions, in which a client controls the connection, events allow the subsystem to control the connection and merely notify the client. These include the WskAcceptEvent, WskInspectEvent, WskAbortEvent, WskReceiveFromEvent, WskReceiveEvent, WskDisconnectEvent, and WskSendBacklogEvent routines.

Finally, like user-mode Winsock, WSK can be extended through extension interfaces that clients can associate with sockets. These extensions can enhance the default functionality provided by the WSK subsystem.

Remote Procedure Call

Remote procedure call (RPC) is a network programming standard originally developed in the early 1980s. The Open Software Foundation (now The Open Group) made RPC part of the distributed computing environment (DCE) distributed computing standard. Although there is a second RPC standard, SunRPC, the Microsoft RPC implementation is compatible with the OSF/DCE standard. RPC builds on other networking APIs, such as named pipes or Winsock, to provide an alternate programming model that in some respects hides the details of networking programming from an application developer. Fundamentally, RPC provides a mechanism for creating programs that are distributed across a network, with portions of the application running transparently on one or more systems.

RPC Operation

An RPC facility is one that allows a programmer to create an application consisting of any number of procedures, some that execute locally and others that execute on remote computers via a network. It provides a procedural view of networked operations rather than a transport-centered view, thus simplifying the development of distributed applications.

Networking software is traditionally structured around an I/O model of processing. In Windows, for example, a network operation is initiated when an application issues an I/O request. The operating system processes the request accordingly by forwarding it to a redirector, which acts as a remote file system by making the client interaction with the remote file system invisible to the client. The redirector passes the operation to the remote file system, and after the remote system fulfills the request
and returns the results, the local network card interrupts. The kernel handles the interrupt, and the original I/O operation completes, returning results to the caller.

RPC takes a different approach altogether. RPC applications are like other structured applications, with a main program that calls procedures or procedure libraries to perform specific tasks. The difference between RPC applications and regular applications is that some of the procedure libraries in an RPC application are stored and execute on remote computers, as shown in Figure 7-7, whereas others execute locally.

To the RPC application, all the procedures appear to execute locally. In other words, instead of making a programmer actively write code to transmit computational or I/O-related requests across a network, handle network protocols, deal with network errors, wait for results, and so forth, RPC software handles these tasks automatically. And the Windows RPC facility can operate over any available transport protocols loaded into the system.

To write an RPC application, the programmer decides which procedures will execute locally and which will execute remotely. For example, suppose an ordinary workstation has a network connection to a supercomputer (a very fast machine usually designed for high-speed vector operations). If the programmer were writing an application that manipulated large matrices, it would make sense from a performance perspective to offload the mathematical calculations to the supercomputer by writing the program as an RPC application.

RPC applications work like this: As an application runs, it calls local procedures as well as procedures that aren’t present on the local machine. To handle the latter case, the application is linked to a local library or DLL that contains stub procedures, one for each remote procedure. For simple applications, the stub procedures are statically linked with the application, but for bigger components the stubs are included in separate DLLs. In DCOM, covered later in the chapter, the latter method is typically used. The stub procedures have the same name and use the same interface as the remote procedures, but instead of performing the required operations, the stub takes the parameters passed to it and marshals them for transmission across the network. Marshaling parameters means ordering and packaging them in a particular way to suit a network link, such as resolving references and picking up a copy of any data structures that a pointer refers to.
The stub then calls RPC run-time procedures that locate the computer where the remote procedure resides, determines which network transport mechanisms that computer uses, and sends the request to it using local transport software. When the remote server receives the RPC request, it *unmarshals* the parameters (the reverse of marshaling), reconstructs the original procedure call, and calls the procedure with the parameters passed from the calling system. When the server finishes, it performs the reverse sequence to return results to the caller.

In addition to the synchronous function-call-based interface described here, Windows RPC also supports *asynchronous RPC*. Asynchronous RPC lets an RPC application execute a function but not wait until the function completes to continue processing. Instead, the application can execute other code and later, when a response has arrived from the server, the RPC runtime notifies the client that the operation has completed. The RPC runtime uses the notification mechanism requested by the client. If the client uses an event synchronization object for notification, it waits for the signaling of the event object by calling either `WaitForSingleObject` or `WaitForMultipleObjects`. If the client provides an asynchronous procedure call (APC), the runtime queues the execution of the APC to the thread that executed the RPC function. (The APC will not be delivered until the requesting thread enters an *alertable* wait state. See Chapter 3, “System Mechanisms,” for more information on APCs.) If the client program uses an I/O completion port as its notification mechanism, it must call `GetQueuedCompletionStatus` to learn of the function’s completion. Alternatively, a client can poll for completion by calling `RpcAsyncGetCallStatus`.

In addition to the RPC runtime, Microsoft’s RPC facility includes a compiler, called the *Microsoft Interface Definition Language* (MIDL) compiler. The MIDL compiler simplifies the creation of an RPC application by generating the necessary stub routines. The programmer writes a series of ordinary function prototypes (assuming a C or C++ application) that describe the remote routines and then places the routines in a file. The programmer then adds some additional information to these prototypes, such as a network-unique identifier for the package of routines and a version number, plus attributes that specify whether the parameters are input, output, or both. The embellished prototypes form the developer’s Interface Definition Language (IDL) file.

Once the IDL file is created, the programmer compiles it with the MIDL compiler, which produces client-side and server-side stub routines (mentioned previously), as well as header files to be included in the application. When the client-side application is linked to the stub routines file, all remote procedure references are resolved. The remote procedures are then installed, using a similar process, on the server machine. A programmer who wants to call an existing RPC application need only write the client side of the software and link the application to the local RPC run-time facility.

The RPC runtime uses a generic RPC *transport provider interface* to talk to a transport protocol. The provider interface acts as a thin layer between the RPC facility and the transport, mapping RPC operations onto the functions provided by the transport. The Windows RPC facility implements transport provider DLLs for named pipes, HTTP, TCP/IP, and UDP. In a similar fashion, the RPC facility is designed to work with different network security facilities.

Most of the Windows networking services are RPC applications, which means that both local applications and applications on remote computers might call them. Thus, a remote client computer might call the server service to list shares, open files, write to print queues, or activate users on your
server, all subject to security constraints, of course. The majority of client-management APIs are implemented using RPC.

*Server name publishing*, which is the ability of a server to register its name in a location accessible for client lookup, is in RPC and is integrated with Active Directory. If Active Directory isn’t installed, the RPC name locator services fall back on NetBIOS broadcast. This behavior allows RPC to function on stand-alone servers and workstations.

**RPC Security**

Windows RPC includes integration with security support providers (SSPs) so that RPC clients and servers can use authenticated or encrypted communications. When an RPC server wants secure communication, it tells the RPC runtime what authentication service to add to the list of available *authentication services*. When a client wants to use secure communication, it binds to the server. At that time, it must tell the RPC runtime the authentication service and *authentication level* it wants. Various authentication levels exist to ensure that only authorized clients connect to a server, verify that each message a server receives originates at an authorized client, check the integrity of RPC messages to detect manipulation, and even encrypt RPC message data. Obviously, higher authentication levels require more processing. The client can also optionally specify the server *principal name*. A principal is an entity that the RPC security system recognizes. The server must register its SSP-specific principal name with an SSP.

An SSP handles the details of performing network communication authentication and encryption, not only for RPC but also for Winsock. Windows includes a number of built-in SSPs, including a Kerberos SSP to implement Kerberos version 5 authentication (including AES support) and Secure Channel (SChannel), which implements Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols. SChannel also supports TLS and SSL extensions, which allow you to use the AES cipher as well as elliptic curve cryptographic (ECC) ciphers on top of the protocols. Also, because it supports an open *cryptographic interface* (OCI) and crypto-agile capabilities, SChannel allows an administrator to replace or add to the existing cryptographic algorithms. In the absence of a specified SSP, RPC software uses the built-in security of the underlying transport. Some transports, such as named pipes or local RPC, have built-in security. Others, like TCP, do not, and in this case RPC makes unsecure calls in the absence of a specified SSP.

> **Note** The use of unencrypted RPC might pose serious security issues for your organization.

Another feature of RPC security is the ability of a server to impersonate the security identity of a client with the *RpcImpersonateClient* function. After a server has finished performing impersonated operations on behalf of a client, it returns to its own security identity by calling *RpcRevertToSelf* or *RpcRevertToSelfEx*. (See Chapter 6 for more information on impersonation.)
RPC Implementation

RPC implementation is depicted in Figure 7-8, which shows that an RPC-based application links with the RPC run-time DLL (%SystemRoot%\System32\Rpcrt4.dll). The RPC run-time DLL provides marshaling and unmarshaling functions for use by an application’s RPC function stubs as well as functions for sending and receiving marshaled data. The RPC run-time DLL includes support routines to handle RPC over a network as well as a form of RPC called local RPC. Local RPC can be used for communication between two processes located on the same system, and the RPC run-time DLL uses the advanced local procedure call (ALPC) facilities in kernel mode as the local networking API. (See Chapter 3 for more information on ALPCs.) When RPC is based on nonlocal communication mechanisms, the RPC run-time DLL uses the Winsock or named pipe APIs.

![Figure 7-8: RPC implementation](image)

The RPC subsystem (RPCSS—%SystemRoot%\System32\Rpcss.dll) is implemented as a Windows service. RPCSS is itself an RPC application that communicates with instances of itself on other systems to perform name lookup, registration, and dynamic endpoint mapping. (For clarity, Figure 7-8 doesn’t show RPCSS linked with the RPC run-time DLL.)

Windows also includes support for RPC in kernel mode through the kernel-mode RPC driver (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Msrpc.sys). Kernel-mode RPC is for internal use by the system and is implemented on top of ALPC. Winlogon includes an RPC server with a documented set of interfaces that user-mode RPC clients might call, while Win32k.sys includes an RPC client that communicates with Winlogon for internal notifications, such as the secure attention sequence (SAS). (See Chapter 6 for more information.) The TCP/IP stack in Windows (as well as the WFP) also uses kernel-mode RPC to communicate with the Network Storage Interface (NSI) service, which handles network configuration information.
Web Access APIs

To ease the development of Internet applications, Windows provides both client and server Internet APIs. By using the APIs, applications can provide HTTP services and use FTP and HTTP services without knowledge of the intricacies of the corresponding protocols. The client APIs include Windows Internet, also known as WinInet, which enables applications to interact with the FTP and HTTP protocols, and WinHTTP, which enables applications to interact with the HTTP protocol and is more suitable than WinInet in certain situations (Windows services and middle-tier applications). HTTP Server is a server-side API that enables the development of web server applications.

WinInet

WinInet supports the HTTP, FTP, and Gopher protocols. The APIs break down into sub-API sets specific to each protocol. Using the FTP-related APIs—such as InternetConnect to connect to an HTTP server, followed by HttpOpenRequest to open an HTTP request handle, HttpSendRequestEx to send a request to the server and receive a response, InternetWriteFile to send a file, and InternetReadFileEx to receive a file—an application developer avoids the details of establishing a connection and formatting TCP/IP messages to the various protocols. The HTTP-related APIs also provide cookie persistence, client-side file caching, and automatic credential dialog handling. WinInet is used by core Windows components such as Windows Explorer and Internet Explorer.

Note WinInet does not support server implementations or use by services. For these types of usage, use WinHTTP instead.

WinHTTP provides an abstraction of the HTTP v1.1 protocol for HTTP client applications similar to what the WinInet HTTP-related APIs provide. However, whereas the WinInet HTTP API is intended for user-interactive, client-side applications, the WinHTTP API is designed for server applications that communicate with HTTP servers. Server applications are often implemented as Windows services that do not provide a user interface and so do not desire the dialog boxes that WinInet APIs display. In addition, the WinHTTP APIs are more scalable (such as supporting uploads of greater than 4 GB) and offer security functionality, such as thread impersonation, that is not available from the WinInet APIs.

HTTP

Using the HTTP Server API implemented by Windows, server applications can register to receive HTTP requests for particular URLs, receive HTTP requests, and send HTTP responses. The HTTP Server API includes SSL support so that applications can exchange data over secure HTTP connections. The API includes server-side caching capabilities, synchronous and asynchronous I/O models, and both IPv4 and IPv6 addressing. The HTTP server APIs are used by IIS and other Windows services that rely on HTTP as a transport.

The HTTP Server API, which applications access through %SystemRoot%\System32\Httpapi.dll, relies on the kernel-mode %SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Http.sys driver. Http.sys starts on demand the first time any application on the system calls HttpInitialize. Applications then call HttpCreateServerSession to initialize a server session for the HTTP Server API. Next they use HttpCreateRequestQueue to create
a private request queue and `HttpCreateUrlGroup` to create a URL group, specifying the URLs that they want to handle requests for with `HttpAddUrlToUrlGroup`. Using the request queues and their registered URLs (which they associate by using `HttpSetUrlGroupProperty`), Http.sys allows more than one application to service HTTP requests on a given port (port 80 for example), with each servicing HTTP requests to different parts of the URL namespace, as shown in Figure 7-9.

![HTTP request queues and URL groups](image_url)

**FIGURE 7-9** HTTP request queues and URL groups

`HttpReceiveHttpRequest` receives incoming requests directed at registered URLs, and `HttpSendHttpResponse` sends HTTP responses. Both functions offer asynchronous operation so that an application can use `GetOverlappedResult` or I/O completion ports to determine when an operation is completed.

Applications can use Http.sys to cache data in nonpaged physical memory by calling `HttpAddFragmentToCache` and associating a fragment name (specified as a URL prefix) with the cached data. Http.sys invokes the memory manager function `MmAllocatePagesForMdlEx` to allocate unmapped physical pages. (For large requests, Http.sys also attempts to use large pages to optimize access to the buffered data.) When Http.sys requires a virtual address mapping for the physical memory described by an entry in the cache—for instance, when it copies data to the cache or sends data from the cache—it uses `MmMapLockedPagesSpecifyCache` and then `MmUnmapLockedPages` after it completes its access. Http.sys maintains cached data until an application invalidates it or an optional application-specified timeout associated with the data expires. Http.sys also trims cached data in a worker thread that wakes up when the low-memory notification event is signaled. (See Chapter 10, “Memory Management,” in Part 2 for information on the low-memory notification event.) When an application specifies one or more fragment names in a call to `HttpSendHttpResponse`,
Http.sys passes a pointer to the cached data in physical memory to the TCP/IP driver and avoids a copy operation. Http.sys also contains code for performing server-side authentication, including full SSL support, which removes the need to call back to the user-mode API to perform encryption and decryption of traffic.

Finally, the HTTP Server API contains many configuration options that clients can use to set functionality, such as authentication policies, bandwidth throttling, logging, connection limits, server state, response caching, and SSL certificate binding.

**Named Pipes and Mailslots**

Named pipes and mailslots are programming APIs for interprocess communication. Named pipes provide for reliable bidirectional communications, whereas mailslots provide unreliable, unidirectional data transmission. An advantage of mailslots is that they support broadcast capability. In Windows, both APIs make use of standard Windows security authentication and authorization mechanisms, which allow a server to control precisely which clients can connect to it.

The names that servers assign to named pipes and clients conform to the Windows Universal Naming Convention (UNC), which is a protocol-independent way to identify resources on a Windows network. The implementation of UNC names is described later in the chapter.

**Named-Pipe Operation**

Named-pipe communication consists of a named-pipe server and a named-pipe client. A named-pipe server is an application that creates a named pipe to which clients can connect. A named pipe’s name has the format `\\Server\Pipe\PipeName`. The `Server` component of the name specifies the computer on which the named-pipe server is executing. (A named-pipe server can’t create a named pipe on a remote system.) The name can be a DNS name (for example, `mspress.microsoft.com`), a NetBIOS name (`mspress`), or an IP address (131.107.0.1). The `Pipe` component of the name must be the string “Pipe”, and `PipeName` is the unique name assigned to a named pipe. The unique portion of the named pipe’s name can include subdirectories; an example of a named-pipe name with a subdirectory is `\\MyComputer\Pipe\MyServerApp\ConnectionPipe`.

A named-pipe server uses the `CreateNamedPipe` Windows function to create a named pipe. One of the function’s input parameters is a pointer to the named-pipe name, in the form `\\\Pipe\PipeName`. The “\\” is a Windows-defined alias for “this system,” because a pipe must be created on the local system (although it can be accessed from a remote system). Other parameters the function accepts include an optional security descriptor that protects access to the named pipe, a flag that specifies whether the pipe should be bidirectional or unidirectional, a value indicating the maximum number of simultaneous connections the pipe supports, and a flag specifying whether the pipe should operate in byte mode or message mode.

Most networking APIs operate only in byte mode, which means that a message sent with one send function might require the receiver to perform multiple receive operations, building up the complete
message from fragments. A named pipe operating in message mode simplifies the implementation of a receiver because there is a one-to-one correspondence between send and receive requests. A receiver therefore obtains an entire message each time it completes a receive operation and doesn’t have to concern itself with keeping track of message fragments.

The first call to CreateNamedPipe for a particular name creates the first instance of that name and establishes the behavior of all named-pipe instances having that name. A server creates additional instances, up to the maximum specified in the first call, with additional calls to CreateNamedPipe. After creating at least one named-pipe instance, a server executes the ConnectNamedPipe Windows function, which enables the named pipe the server created to establish connections with clients. ConnectNamedPipe can be executed synchronously or asynchronously, and it doesn’t complete until a client establishes a connection with the instance (or an error occurs).

A named-pipe client uses the Windows CreateFile or CallNamedPipe function, specifying the name of the pipe a server has created, to connect to a server. If the server has performed a ConnectNamedPipe call, the client’s security profile and the access it requests to the pipe (read, write) are validated against the named pipe’s security descriptor. (See Chapter 6 for more information on the security-check algorithms Windows uses.) If the client is granted access to a named pipe, it receives a handle representing the client side of a named-pipe connection and the server’s call to ConnectNamedPipe completes.

After a named-pipe connection is established, the client and server can use the ReadFile and WriteFile Windows functions to read from and write to the pipe. Named pipes support both synchronous and asynchronous operations for message transmittal, depending upon how the handle to the pipe was opened. Figure 7-10 shows a server and client communicating through a named-pipe instance.

Another characteristic of the named-pipe networking API is that it allows a server to impersonate a client by using the ImpersonateNamedPipeClient function. See the “Impersonation” section in Chapter 6 for a discussion of how impersonation is used in client/server applications. A second advanced area of functionality of the named-pipe API is that it allows for atomic send and receive operations through the TransactNamedPipe API, which behaves according to a simple transactional model in which a message is both sent and received in the same operation. In other words, it combines a write operation and a read operation into a single operation by not completing a write request until it has been read by the recipient.
Mailslot Operation

Mailslots provide an unreliable, unidirectional, multicast network transport. Multicast is a term used to describe a sender sending a message on the network to one or more specific listeners, which is different from a broadcast, which all systems would receive. One example of an application that can use this type of communication is a time-synchronization service, which might send a source time across the domain every few seconds. Such a message would be received by all applications listening on the particular mailslot. Receiving the source-time message isn’t crucial for every computer on the network (because time updates are sent relatively frequently); therefore, a source-time message is a good example for the use of mailslots, because the loss of a message will not cause any harm.

Like named pipes, mailslots are integrated with the Windows API. A mailslot server creates a mailslot by using the CreateMailslot function. CreateMailslot accepts a UNC name of the form “\\Mailslot\MailslotName” as an input parameter. Again like named pipes, a mailslot server can create mailslots only on the machine it’s executing on, and the name it assigns to a mailslot can include subdirectories. CreateMailslot also takes a security descriptor that controls client access to the mailslot. The handles returned by CreateMailslot are overlapped, which means that operations performed on the handles, such as sending and receiving messages, are asynchronous.

Because mailslots are unidirectional and unreliable, CreateMailslot doesn’t take many of the parameters that CreateNamedPipe does. After it creates a mailslot, a server simply listens for incoming client messages by executing the ReadFile function on the handle representing the mailslot.

Mailslot clients use a naming format similar to that used by named-pipe clients but with variations that make it possible to send messages to all the mailslots of a given name within the client’s domain or a specified domain. To send a message to a particular instance of a mailslot, the client calls CreateFile, specifying the computer-specific name. An example of such a name is “\\Server\Mailslot\MailslotName”. (The client can specify “\.” to represent the local computer.) If the client wants to obtain a handle representing all the mailslots of a given name on the domain it’s a member of, it specifies the name in the format “\\Mailslot\MailslotName”, and if the client wants to broadcast to all the mailslots of a given name within a different domain, the format it uses is “\\DomainName\Mailslot\MailslotName”.

After obtaining a handle representing the client side of a mailslot, the client sends messages by calling WriteFile. Because of the way mailslots are implemented, only messages smaller than 424 bytes can be sent. If a message is larger than 424 bytes, the mailslot implementation uses a reliable communications mechanism that requires a one-to-one client/server connection, which precludes multicast capability. This limitation makes mailslots generally unsuitable for messages larger than 424 bytes. Figure 7-11 shows an example of a client broadcasting to multiple mailslot servers within a domain.
Named Pipe and Mailslot Implementation

As evidence of their tight integration with Windows, named-pipe and mailslot functions are all implemented in the Kernel32.dll Windows client-side DLL. ReadFile and WriteFile, which are the functions applications use to send and receive messages using named pipes or mailslots, are the primary Windows I/O routines. The CreateFile function, which a client uses to open either a named pipe or a mailslot, is also a standard Windows I/O routine. However, the names specified by named-pipe and mailslot applications specify file-system namespaces managed by the named-pipe file-system driver (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Npfs.sys) and the mailslot file-system driver (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Msfs.sys), as shown in Figure 7-12.

The named-pipe file-system driver creates a device object named \Device\NamedPipe and a symbolic link to that object named \Global??\Pipe. The mailslot file-system driver creates a device object named \Device\Mailslot and a symbolic link named “\Global??\Mailslot”, which points to that device object. (See Chapter 3 for an explanation of the \Global?? object manager directory.) Names passed to CreateFile of the form “\\Pipe\…” and “\\Mailslot\…” have their prefix of “\\” translated to “\Global??\" so that the names resolve through a symbolic link to a device object.

The special functions CreateNamedPipe and CreateMailslot use the corresponding native functions NtCreateNamedPipeFile and NtCreateMailslotFile, which ultimately call IoCreateFile.
Later in the chapter, we'll discuss how the redirector file system driver is involved when a name that specifies a remote named pipe or mailslot resolves to a remote system. However, when a named pipe or mailslot is created by a server or opened by a client, the appropriate file-system driver (FSD) on the machine where the named pipe or mailslot is located is eventually invoked. The reason that named pipes and mailslots are implemented as FSDs is that they can take advantage of the existing infrastructure in the object manager, the I/O manager, the redirector (covered later in this chapter), and the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol. (For more information about SMB, see Chapter 12, “File Systems,” in Part 2.) This integration results in several benefits:

- The FSDs use kernel-mode security functions to implement standard Windows security for named pipes and mailslots.
- Applications can use `CreateFile` to open a named pipe or mailslot because FSDs integrate with the object manager namespace.
- Applications can use Windows functions such as `ReadFile` and `WriteFile` to interact with named pipes and mailslots.
- The FSDs rely on the object manager to track handle and reference counts for file objects representing named pipes and mailslots.
- The FSDs can implement their own named pipe and mailslot namespaces, complete with subdirectories.

**EXPERIMENT: Listing the Named-Pipe Namespace and Watching Named-Pipe Activity**

It's not possible to use the Windows API to open the root of the named-pipe FSD and perform a directory listing, but you can do this by using native API services. The PipeList tool from Sysinternals shows you the names of the named pipes defined on a computer as well as the number of instances that have been created for a name and the maximum number of instances as defined by a server's call to `CreateNamedPipe`. Here's an example of PipeList output:

```
C:\>pipelist

PipeList v1.01
by Mark Russinovich
http://www.sysinternals.com

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pipe Name</th>
<th>Instances</th>
<th>Max Instances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>InitShutdown</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lsass</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>protected_storage</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ntsvcs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scerpc</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Max Instances</th>
<th>Current Instances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>net\NtControlPipe1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plugplay</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>net\NtControlPipe2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winsock2\CatalogChangeListener-394-0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>epmapper</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winsock2\CatalogChangeListener-25c-0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM_API_service</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>net\NtControlPipe3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eventlog</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>net\NtControlPipe4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winsock2\CatalogChangeListener-3f8-0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>net\NtControlPipe5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>net\NtControlPipe6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>net\NtControlPipe0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>atsvc</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winsock2\CatalogChangeListener-438-0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winsock2\CatalogChangeListener-2c8-0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>net\NtControlPipe7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>net\NtControlPipe8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>net\NtControlPipe9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>net\NtControlPipe10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>net\NtControlPipe11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>net\NtControlPipe12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142CDF96-10CC-483c-A516-3E9057526912</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>net\NtControlPipe13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>net\NtControlPipe14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSVNCache-0000000000001b017</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSVNCacheCommand-0000000000001b017</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winsock2\CatalogChangeListener-2b0-0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winsock2\CatalogChangeListener-468-0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TermSrv_API_service</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctx_WinStation_API_service</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIPEEVENTROOT\CIMV2SCM EVENT PROVIDER</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>net\NtControlPipe15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>keysvc</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It’s clear from this output that several system components use named pipes as their communications mechanism. For example, the InitShutdown pipe is created by WinInit to accept remote shutdown commands, and the Atsvc pipe is created by the Task Scheduler service to enable applications to communicate with it to schedule tasks. You can determine what process has each of these pipes open by using the object search facility in Process Explorer.

**Note** A Max Instances value of –1 means that there is no upper limit on the number of instances.
NetBIOS

Until the 1990s, the Network Basic Input/Output System (NetBIOS) programming API had been the most widely used network programming API on PCs. NetBIOS allows for both reliable connection-oriented and unreliable connectionless communication. Windows supports NetBIOS for its legacy applications. Microsoft discourages application developers from using NetBIOS because other APIs, such as named pipes and Winsock, are much more flexible and portable. NetBIOS is supported by the TCP/IP protocol on Windows.

NetBIOS Names

NetBIOS relies on a naming convention whereby computers and network services are assigned a 16-byte NetBIOS name. The sixteenth byte of a NetBIOS name is treated as a modifier that can specify a name as unique or as part of a group. Only one instance of a unique NetBIOS name can be assigned to a network, but multiple applications can assign the same group name. A client can send multicast messages by sending them to a group name.

To support interoperability with Windows NT 4 systems as well as Windows 9x/Me, Windows automatically defines a NetBIOS name for a domain that includes up to the first 15 bytes of the left-most Domain Name System (DNS) name that an administrator assigns to the domain. For example, if a domain were named `mspress.microsoft.com`, the NetBIOS name of the domain would be `mspress`.

Another concept used by NetBIOS is that of LAN adapter (LANA) numbers. A LANA number is assigned to every NetBIOS-compatible protocol that layers above a network adapter. For example, if a computer has two network adapters and TCP/IP and NWLink can use either adapter, there would be four LANA numbers. LANA numbers are important because a NetBIOS application must explicitly assign its service name to each LANA through which it’s willing to accept client connections. If the application listens for client connections on a particular name, clients can access the name only via protocols on the network adapters for which the name is registered.

NetBIOS Operation

A NetBIOS server application uses the NetBIOS API to enumerate the LANAs present on a system and assign a NetBIOS name representing the application’s service to each LANA. If the server is connection oriented, it performs a NetBIOS listen command to wait for client connection attempts. After a client is connected, the server executes NetBIOS functions to send and receive data. Connectionless communication is similar, but the server simply reads messages without establishing connections.

A connection-oriented client uses NetBIOS functions to establish a connection with a NetBIOS server and then executes further NetBIOS functions to send and receive data. An established NetBIOS connection is also known as a `session`. If the client wants to send connectionless messages, it simply specifies the NetBIOS name of the server with the send function.
NetBIOS consists of a number of functions, but they all route through the same interface: `Netbios`. This routing scheme is the result of a legacy left over from the time when NetBIOS was implemented on MS-DOS as an MS-DOS interrupt service. A NetBIOS application would execute an MS-DOS interrupt and pass a data structure to the NetBIOS implementation that specified every aspect of the command being executed. As a result, the `Netbios` function in Windows takes a single parameter, which is a data structure that contains the parameters specific to the service the application requests.

**EXPERIMENT: Using `Nbtstat` to See NetBIOS Names**

You can use the `Nbtstat` command, which is included with Windows, to list the active sessions on a system, the NetBIOS-to-TCP/IP name mappings cached on a computer, and the NetBIOS names defined on a computer. Here’s an example of the `Nbtstat` command with the `-n` option, which lists the NetBIOS names defined on the computer:

```bash
C:\Users\Toby>nbtstat -n
Local Area Connection:
Node IpAddress: [192.168.0.193] Scope Id: []

NetBIOS Local Name Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WIN-NLRTE02W2ILZ&lt;00&gt;</td>
<td>UNIQUE</td>
<td>Registered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORKGROUP</td>
<td>GROUP</td>
<td>Registered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIN-NLRTE02W2ILZ&lt;20&gt;</td>
<td>UNIQUE</td>
<td>Registered</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

**NetBIOS API Implementation**

The components that implement the NetBIOS API are shown in Figure 7-13. The `Netbios` function is exported to applications by `%SystemRoot%\System32\Netbios.dll`. Netbios.dll opens a handle to the kernel-mode driver named the `NetBIOS emulator (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Netbios.sys)` and issues Windows `DeviceIoControl` file commands on behalf of an application. The NetBIOS emulator translates NetBIOS commands issued by an application into TDI commands that it sends to protocol drivers.
If an application wants to use NetBIOS over the TCP/IP protocol, the NetBIOS emulator requires the presence of the NetBT driver (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Netbt.sys). NetBT is known as the NetBIOS over TCP/IP driver and is responsible for supporting NetBIOS semantics that are inherent to the NetBIOS Extended User Interface (NetBEUI) protocol (included in previous versions of Windows) but not the TCP/IP protocol. For example, NetBIOS relies on NetBEUI’s message-mode transmission and NetBIOS name-resolution facilities, so the NetBT driver implements them on top of the TCP/IP protocol.

**Other Networking APIs**

Windows includes other networking APIs that are used less frequently or are layered on the APIs already described (and outside the scope of this book). Five of these, however—Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS), Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM), Message Queuing (MSMQ), Peer-to-Peer Infrastructure (P2P), and Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) with Plug and Play Extensions (PnP-X)—are important enough to the operation of a Windows system and many applications to merit brief descriptions.
Background Intelligent Transfer Service

BITS is a service and an API that provides reliable asynchronous transfer of files between systems, using either the SMB, HTTP, or HTTPS protocol. BITS normally runs in the background, making use of unutilized network bandwidth by monitoring network utilization and throttling itself so that it consumes only resources that would otherwise be unused; however, BITS transfers might also take place in the foreground and compete for resources with other processes running on the system.

BITS keeps track of ongoing, or scheduled, transfers in what are known as transfer jobs (not to be confused with jobs and job objects as described in Chapter 5, “Processes and Threads”) for each user. Each job is an entry in a queue and describes the files to transfer, the security context (access tokens) to run under, and the priority of the job. BITS version 4.0 is integrated into BranchCache (described later in this chapter) to further reduce network bandwidth.

BITS is used by many other components in Windows, such as Microsoft Update, Windows Update, Internet Explorer (version 9 and later, for downloading files), Microsoft Outlook (for downloading address books), Microsoft Security Essentials (for downloading daily virus signature updates), and others, making BITS the most widely used network file-transfer system in use today.

BITS provides the following capabilities:

- **Seamless data transfer**  Components create BITS transfer jobs that will then run until the files are transferred. When a user logs out, the system restarts, or the system loses network connectivity, BITS pauses the transfer. The transfer resumes from where it left off once the user logs in again or network connectivity is restored. The application that created a transfer job does not need to remain running, but the user must remain logged in, while the transfer is taking place. Transfer jobs created under service accounts (such as Windows Update) are always considered to be logged on, allowing those jobs to run continuously.

- **Multiple transfer types**  BITS supports three transfer types: download (server to client), upload (client to server), and upload-reply (client to server, with a notification receipt from the server).

- **Prioritization of transfers**  When a transfer job is created, the priority is specified (either Foreground, Background High, Background Normal, or Background Low). All background priority jobs make use only of unutilized network resources, while jobs with foreground priority compete with applications for network resources. If there are multiple jobs, BITS processes them in priority order, using a round-robin scheduling system within a particular priority so that all jobs make progress on their transfers.

- **Secure data transfer**  BITS normally runs the transfer job using the security context of the job’s creator, but you can also use the BITS API to specify the credentials to use for impersonating a user. For privacy across the network, you should use the HTTPS protocol.

- **Management**  The BITS API consists of methods for creating, starting, stopping, monitoring, enumerating, modifying, or requesting notification of transfer-job status changes. Tools include BITSAdmin (which is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Windows), and Windows PowerShell cmdlets (the preferred management mechanism).
When downloading files, BITS writes the file to a temporary hidden file in the destination directory. Of course, BITS will impersonate the user to ensure that file-system security and quotas are enforced properly. When the application calls the `IBackgroundCopyJob::Complete` method (or the `Complete-BitsTransfer` cmdlet in PowerShell), BITS renames the temporary files to their destination names, and the files are available to the client. If there is already a file in the destination directory with the same name, BITS overwrites the file.

When uploading files, by default, BITS does not allow overwriting an existing file. When the transfer is finished and BITS would overwrite the file, an error is returned to the client. To allow overwrites, set the `BITSAllowOverwrites` property to `True` in the Internet Information Services (IIS) metabase using PowerShell or Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) scripting.

The BITS server is a server-side component that lets you configure an IIS server to allow BITS clients to perform file transfers to IIS virtual directories. Upon completion of a file upload, the BITS server can notify a web application of the new file’s presence (via an HTTP POST message) so the web application can process the uploaded files.

The BITS server extends IIS to support throttled, restartable uploads of files. To make use of the upload feature, you must create an IIS virtual directory on the server where you want the clients to upload their files. BITS adds properties to the IIS metabase for the virtual directory you create and uses these properties to determine how to upload the files.

For security reasons, BITS will not permit uploading files to a virtual directory that has scripting and execute permissions enabled. If you upload a file to a virtual directory that has these permissions enabled, the job will fail. Also, BITS does not require the virtual directory to be write-enabled, so it is recommended that you turn off write access to the virtual directory; however, the user must have write access to the physical directory.

In some cases, the BITS Compact Server might be used instead of IIS. The Compact Server is intended for use by enterprise and small business customers that meet the following conditions:

- The anticipated usage is a maximum of 25 URL groups, and each URL group supports up to three simultaneous file transfers
- File transfers occur between systems in the same domain or mutually trusted domains
- File transfers are not intended for Internet-facing clients

Figure 7-14 demonstrates how to load the BITS module within PowerShell, and some of the BITS PowerShell cmdlets.

Figure 7-15 demonstrates the use of the BITSAdmin tool, which is now deprecated in favor of PowerShell for managing and using BITS.
FIGURE 7-14 Using BITS from PowerShell

FIGURE 7-15 BitsAdmin tool
Figure 7-16 shows BITS messages written to the event log.

Peer-to-Peer Infrastructure

Peer-to-Peer Infrastructure is a set of APIs that cover different technologies to enhance the Windows networking stack by providing flexible peer-to-peer (P2P) support for applications and services. The P2P infrastructure covers four major technologies, shown in Figure 7-17.
Here are the major peer-to-peer components:

- **Peer-to-Peer Graphing**  Allows applications to pass data between peers efficiently and reliably by using nodes and events.

- **Peer-to-Peer Namespace Provider**  Enables serverless name resolution of peers and their services (described later in the “Name Resolution” section).

- **Peer-to-Peer Grouping**  Combines graphing and namespace technologies to group and isolate services and/or peers into a defined group and uniquely identify it.

- **Peer-to-Peer Identity Manager**  Enhances the services offered by the namespace provider to securely create, publish, and identify peer names, as well as to identify group members that are part of the grouping API.

The Peer-to-Peer Infrastructure in Windows is also paired with the Peer-to-Peer Collaboration Interface, which adds support for creating collaborative P2P applications (such as online games and group instant messaging) and supersedes the Real-Time Communications (RTC) architecture in earlier versions of Windows. It also provides presence capabilities through the People Near Me (PNM) architecture.

**DCOM**

Microsoft’s COM API lets applications consist of different components, each component being a replaceable, self-contained module. A COM object exports an object-oriented interface to methods for manipulating the data within the object. Because COM objects present well-defined interfaces, developers can implement new objects to extend existing interfaces and dynamically update applications with the new support.

DCOM (Distributed Component Object Model) extends COM by letting an application’s components reside on different computers, which means that applications don’t need to be concerned that one COM object might be on the local computer and another might be across the network. DCOM thus provides location transparency, which simplifies developing distributed applications. DCOM isn’t a self-contained API but relies on RPC to carry out its work.

**Message Queuing**

Message Queuing is a general-purpose platform for developing distributed applications that take advantage of loosely coupled messaging. Message Queuing is therefore an API and a messaging infrastructure. Its flexibility comes from the fact that its queues serve as message repositories in which senders can queue messages for receivers, and receivers can de-queue the messages at their discretion. Senders and receivers do not need to establish connections to use Message Queuing, nor do they need to be executing at the same time, which allows for disconnected asynchronous message exchange.
A notable feature of Message Queuing is that it is integrated with Microsoft Transaction Server (MTS) and SQL Server, so it can participate in Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator (MS DTC) coordinated transactions. Using MS DTC with Message Queuing allows you to develop reliable transaction functionality for three-tier applications.

**UPnP with PnP-X**

Universal Plug and Play is an architecture for peer-to-peer network connectivity of intelligent appliances, devices, and *control points*. It is designed to bring easy-to-use, flexible, standards-based connectivity to ad-hoc, managed, or unmanaged networks, whether these networks are in the home, in small businesses, or attached directly to the Internet. Universal Plug and Play is a distributed, open networking architecture that uses existing TCP/IP and Web technologies to enable seamless proximity networking in addition to control and data transfer among networked devices.

Universal Plug and Play supports zero-configuration, invisible networking, and automatic discovery for a range of device categories from a wide range of vendors. This enables a device to dynamically join a network, obtain an IP address, and convey its capabilities upon request. Then other control points can use the Control Point API with UPnP technology to learn about the presence and capabilities of other devices. A device can leave a network smoothly and automatically when it is no longer in use.

Plug and Play Extensions (PnP-X), shown in Figure 7-18, is an additional component of Windows that allows network-attached devices to integrate with the Plug and Play manager in the kernel. With PnP-X, network-connected devices are shown in the Device Manager like locally attached devices and provide the same installation, management, and behavioral experience as a local device. (For example, installation is performed through the standard Add New Hardware Wizard.)

![PnP-X implementation](image)

**FIGURE 7-18** PnP-X implementation

PnP-X uses a virtual network bus driver that uses an IP bus enumerator service (%SystemRoot%\System32\Ipbusenum.dll) to discover PnP-X compatible devices, which include UPnP devices (through the Simple Service Discovery Protocol) and the newer Device Profile for Web Services (DPWS) devices (using the WS-Discovery protocol). The IP bus enumerator reports devices it discovers to the Plug and Play manager, which uses user-mode Plug and Play manager services if needed (such as for driver installation). It’s similar to wireless discovery (like Bluetooth) and unlike wired device
discovery (like USB), however, PnP-X enumeration and driver installation must be explicitly requested by a user from the Network Explorer.

**Note** DPWS v1.1 became an OASIS standard in June 2009 and has goals similar to those of UPnP, but it is tightly integrated with web services standards and frameworks and allows greater extensibility than UPnP.

## Multiple Redirector Support

Applications access file-system resources on remote systems (often called *file shares*) using UNC paths—for example, `\servername\sharename\file`. Resources can be accessed directly using the UNC name if it is already known and the logged-on user’s credentials are sufficient. Optionally, the Windows Networking (WNet) API can be used to enumerate computers and resources that those computers export for sharing, map drive letters to UNC paths, and explicitly specify credentials. To access SMB servers from a client, Microsoft supplies an SMB client, which has a kernel-mode component called the *mini-redirector* and a user-mode component called the *Workstation service*. (SMB is described in Chapter 12 in Part 2.) Microsoft also makes available redirectors that can access WebDAV resources, NFS v2/v3 resources (Windows Professional and Enterprise editions only), and Terminal Services–shared drives. Third parties can add their own redirectors to Windows. In this section, we’ll examine the software that decides which redirector to invoke for file access using UNC paths. Here are the responsible components:

- **Multiple Provider Router** (MPR) is a DLL (%SystemRoot%\System32\Mpr.dll) that determines which network to access when an application uses the Windows WNet API for browsing remote file resources.
- **Multiple UNC Provider** (MUP) is a driver (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Mup.sys) that determines which network to access when an application uses the Windows I/O APIs to open remote files through UNC paths or drive letters mapped to UNC paths.

## Multiple Provider Router

The Windows WNet functions allow applications (including the Network and Sharing Center) to connect to network resources, such as file servers and printers, and to browse the different share points. Because the WNet API can be called to work across different networks using different transport protocols, software must be present to send the request to the correct network and to understand the results that the remote server returns. Figure 7-19 shows the redirector software responsible for these tasks.
A *provider* is software that establishes Windows as a client of a remote network server. Some of the operations a WNet provider performs include making and breaking network connections, as well as supporting network printing. The built-in SMB WNet provider includes a DLL, the Workstation service, and the redirector. Other network vendors need to supply only a DLL and a redirector.

When an application calls a WNet routine, the call passes directly to the MPR DLL. MPR takes the call and determines which network provider recognizes the resource being accessed. Each provider DLL beneath MPR supplies a set of standard functions collectively called the **network provider interface**. This interface allows MPR to determine which network the application is trying to access and to direct the request to the appropriate WNet provider software. The SMB Workstation service's provider is %SystemRoot%\System32\Ntlanman.dll, as specified by the *ProviderPath* value under the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanWorkstation\NetworkProvider registry key.

When called by the *WNetAddConnection2* or *WNetAddConnection3* API function to connect to a remote network resource, MPR checks the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\NetworkProvider\HwOrder\ProviderOrder registry value to determine which network providers are loaded. It polls them one at a time, in the order in which they’re listed in the registry, until a provider recognizes the resource or until all available providers have been polled. You can change the *ProviderOrder* by using the Advanced Settings dialog box shown in Figure 7-20. You can access the dialog box by opening the Start menu, typing *view network connections* in the search box, and pressing Enter. This brings up the Network Connections dialog box. Press the Alt key on the keyboard, which will display the menus in the dialog box. Click on the Advanced drop-down menu, and choose Advanced Settings, and then click on the Provider Order tab.
The WNetAddConnection function can also assign a drive letter or device name to a remote resource. When called to do so, WNetAddConnection routes the call to the appropriate network provider. The provider, in turn, creates a symbolic-link object in the object manager’s namespace that maps the drive letter being defined to the redirector (that is, the remote FSD) for that network.

Figure 7-21 shows the Session 0 DosDevices directory corresponding to the LUID of the user who performed the drive-letter mapping, which is where connections to remote file shares are stored. The symbolic link created by network providers relies on MUP to serve as the connection between a network path and the corresponding redirector. The figure shows that MUP creates a device object named \Device\LanmanRedirector, which is itself a symbolic link to \Device\MUP (which is not shown in the figure because the symbolic link is in the \Device directory), with additional text included in the symbolic link’s value indicating to the MUP redirector which mini-redirector the drive letter corresponds to. The “\Global??” directory shows you the drive letters available to the system session—others will be mapped in the session-specific DosDevices directory.

Then, when the WNet or other API calls the object manager to open a resource on a different network, the object manager uses the device object as a jumping-off point into the remote file system. It calls an I/O manager parse method associated with the device object to locate the redirector FSD that can handle the request. (See Chapter 12 in Part 2 for more information on file system drivers.)
Multiple UNC Provider

The Multiple UNC Provider (MUP, %SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\mup.sys) is a file-system driver that exposes remote file systems to Windows. It is a single point where file system filter drivers can be layered to filter any and all I/O requests made to remote file systems. (Prior to Windows Vista, there were many inconsistencies and difficulties regarding filtering remote file systems.) MUP receives I/O requests for access to remote file systems (via UNC paths or drive letters mapped to them) and determines which redirector will handle the request. The term *redirector* is used because it redirects an I/O request to a remote system. Before, and optionally after, calling the redirector, MUP will call any registered *surrogate providers* that might provide file caching and path rewriting.

MUP implements what is known as a *prefix cache*, which is a list of which remote file system paths (\<server name>\<share name>) that are handled by each redirector. It is possible that multiple redirectors could handle a particular prefix, so there is a list in the registry (HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\NetworkProvider\Order\ProviderOrder) containing a comma-separated list of the priority order in which MUP forwards requests to the redirectors. This list is also used to load the providers. Under *ProviderOrder*, there are two subkeys (*HwOrder* and *Order*) containing identical information in a value named *ProviderOrder*. A typical value is the following:

ProviderOrder REG_SZ RDPNP,LanmanWorkstation,webClient
Each entry specifies the name of a service in HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services, where another subkey named NetworkProvider is found. For example, in the key HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\RDPNP\NetworkProvider are the following values:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DeviceName</th>
<th>REG_SZ</th>
<th>\Device\RdpDr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DisplayName</td>
<td>REG_EXPAND_SZ</td>
<td>@%systemroot%\system32\drprov.dll,-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>REG_SZ</td>
<td>Microsoft Terminal Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ProviderPath</td>
<td>REG_EXPAND_SZ</td>
<td>%SystemRoot%\System32\drprov.dll</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The DeviceName value is the name assigned to the kernel-mode redirector's device object. DisplayName is the formal name of the provider. (This can be either a string or the location of a string in the resource section of a DLL, as seen here.) Name is the name that will be displayed by net use to identify which redirector owns a particular drive. ProviderPath specifies the path where the provider DLL is located.

Note Not all redirectors are, or have to be, listed in provider order. (Typically, you will see only RDPNP, LanmanWorkstation, webclient listed.) The priority of the redirectors not listed in the registry follows those that are listed in decreasing order and is then based upon the order in which the mini-redirector registered with MUP via FsRtlRegisterUncProviderEx via RxRegisterMinirdr.

The components of a prefix (server name and share name) that are claimed by a redirector varies; most redirectors usually claim both the server name and the share name of a UNC path (\<server name>\<share name>\<path>). For example, for the path \Server\Users\Brian\Documents, a redirector might claim the prefix \Server\Users, which would cause MUP to route all requests containing that prefix to that particular redirector, such as \Server\Users\David\Documents\Chapter7.doc; however, a path with the prefix \Server\Backups will have to be resolved by querying the redirectors in priority order. If a redirector claims a prefix consisting of just a server name (for example, \Server), MUP sends requests for all shares (for example, \Server\Users, \Server\WebDAV, and so on) on that server to the redirector.

MUP uses the names found in ProviderOrder to look up the name of the device implementing the redirector, by looking in HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\<redirector name>\NetworkProvider\DeviceName. DeviceName is a symbolic link, pointing back to MUP—for example, \Device\MUP\LanmanRedirector. (The semicolon identifies this as a “targeted open,” meaning that MUP will not look in the prefix cache.)

The relationships between MUP and the other components that are part of the remote file system are shown in Figure 7-22.
Surrogate Providers

Prior to Windows Vista, the caching of remote file systems (Offline Files) was implemented inside the SMB mini-redirector, and the DFS-N (Distributed File System Namespace) client was implemented inside MUP. A unified cache was needed, so the remote file system architecture was redesigned for Windows Vista. The DFS-N client was moved into a separate driver component known as a MUP surrogate provider, and Offline Files became a separate driver acting both as a mini-redirector and a surrogate provider. Currently, there are two surrogate providers:

- Offline Files (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\csc.sys), which determines whether a requested file should be or has been cached locally. Offline Files is hardcoded to be the highest priority surrogate.
Distributed File System Client (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\dfsc.sys), which determines whether the path to a requested file needs to be changed (rewritten) to point to another server or share. (The essence of DFS-N is that it collects one or more network shares in the same namespace.) DFSCDFS is hardcoded to be the second highest priority surrogate.

It might appear that having surrogates in the path between MUP and the redirectors would cause a performance penalty, but Offline Files does not process paths that are not enabled for offline access, and after rejecting a path, MUP will not forward Offline Files further I/Os directed at the path. Likewise, DFS does not process non-DFS paths.

The list of surrogates is hardcoded, so MUP does not support the addition of additional surrogates.

Redirector

A network redirector consists of software components installed on a system that support access to various types of resources on remote systems, using various network file protocols. The types of resources a redirector supports depends upon the redirector and the capabilities of the protocol system. Virtually all redirectors support UNC names, which allows the remote sharing of resources such as files, printers, named pipes, and mailslots (although a redirector might opt out of supporting pipes and mailslots, while still supporting printers and files). All redirectors shipping as part of Windows include the following components:

- A DLL loaded by MPR in user mode, to perform non-file-related operations such as determining the capabilities of the network provider, enumerating remote network resources, logging on to a remote network, and mounting remote network shares.

- A kernel-mode driver known as a mini-redirector that imports the RDBSS (Redirected Drive Buffering SubSystem) export driver (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\rdbss.sys). The mini-redirector services file I/O requests directed at remote systems.

Some redirectors require one or more of the following optional components:

- A service process to assist the DLL and possibly store sensitive information or information that is global across client applications using a particular network or share. For example, the Workstation service (running in an SVCHOST process) keeps track of drive-letter to \server\share mappings.

- A network protocol driver that implements the legacy Transport Driver Interface (TDI) on its upper edge is required if the redirector uses a network protocol not supplied by Windows. (In essence, this means anything other than TCP/IP.) Such a protocol driver is responsible for implementing communications with the remote system.

- A service process to assist the redirector. For example, the WebDav redirector forwards file-access operations to the WebClient user-mode service, which in turn issues the actual WebDav network protocol requests using HTTP APIs.
A redirector presents resources that are attached to remote systems as if they were attached to the local system. In Windows, there are no special file I/O APIs required to access resources on a remote system. When accessing a resource, an application generally does not know—nor does it care—whether the resource is located on the local system or on a remote system. The name “redirector” is used because it redirects file system operations to the remote system and returns to the application the responses from the remote system.

All redirectors that ship with Windows are implemented using the mini-redirector architecture, where protocol-specific code is implemented in a mini-redirector driver that imports the RDBSS library. RDBSS is implemented like a class driver, and the mini-redirectors are akin to port drivers. RDBSS registers with MUP by calling FsRtlRegisterUncProviderEx.

When a mini-redirector registers with RDBSS via RxRegisterMiniRdr, RDBSS in turn registers with MUP by calling FsRtlRegisterUncProviderEx. MUP routes requests (IRPs) to RDBSS, which performs processing that is common to all remote file systems, and then issues simplified requests via callback routines that mini-redirectors linked against it have registered. RDBSS provides common functionality such as a data structure and locking model, Cache Manager and Memory Manager integration, and handling of IRPs. This simplifies the implementation of the mini-redirectors, and it vastly reduces the amount of code that needs to be written and debugged.

Because RDBSS integrates with Cache Manager, RDBSS mini-redirectors might not directly see read and write requests on buffered handles (handles opened without specifying the FILE_FLAG_NO_BUFFERING flag to the CreateFile API); changes are cached by the cache manager on the local system until they need to be written back to the remote system. This improves response time, and it saves network bandwidth by aggregating writes and eliminating duplicate reads. RDBSS relies on the mini-redirector to tell it when it is safe to cache data for read and/or write. For example, the SMB mini-redirector uses opportunistic locks (more commonly known as oplocks, which are discussed in Chapter 12 in Part 2) to manage caching. An oplock is a cache coherency mechanism that allows file-system consumers to dynamically alter their caching state for a given file or stream (see Chapter 12 in Part 2 for more information about file system streams), while maintaining cache coherency between multiple concurrent users of a file. If the file (or stream) is not currently opened for read or write by another accessor (either locally or remotely), a client can locally cache reads, writes, and byte range locks. If the file is open by others but is not being written, writes and locks will not be locally cached, but reads can still be cached.

**Mini-Redirectors**

A mini-redirector implements a protocol necessary to contact a remote system and access its shared resources. The mini-redirector tries to make access to remote resources as transparent as possible to the local client application. For example, if there are network problems, a redirector might retry a request multiple times before it returns an error to the client application.
There are several mini-redirectors included with Windows:

- RDPDR (Remote Desktop Protocol Device Redirection), which allows access from a Terminal Server system to the client system’s files and printers (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers \rdpdr.sys)
- SMB (Server Message Block), which is the standard remote file system used by Windows (also known as CIFS, or Common Internet File System) (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers \MRxSMB.SYS). MRxSMB.SYS will load sub-redirectors, which are covered in the next section.
- WebDAV (Web Differencing and Versioning), which enables access to files over the HTTP(S) protocol (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\MRxDav.SYS).
- MailSlot (part of MRxSMB.SYS). Mailslots are handled very differently from named pipes. The surrogates are not called for I/Os sent to a mailslot, and prefix caching is not used. (All paths having “mailslot” as the share name are targeted directly at the mailslot mini-redirector.) There can be, at most, one mailslot mini-redirector, and it is currently reserved for the SMB redirector.
- Network File System (NFS) is an optional component that was formerly installed with Services For Unix (SFU) and is now an optional Windows component (available on all Server editions, but only Enterprise and Ultimate editions of Windows client) that can be installed using the Programs and Features control panel. (Click Turn Windows Features On Or Off, and then select Services For NFS.) NFS protocol versions 2 and 3 are supported.

Offline Files, covered in a following section, optionally enables disk caching and offline access to files accessed through the SMB protocol. Offline Files also registers as a MUP surrogate provider.

**Server Message Block and Sub-Redirectors**

The Server Message Block (SMB) protocol is the primary remote file-access protocol used by Windows clients and servers, and dates back to the 1980s. SMB version 1.0 (generally referred to as just SMB) was designed to operate in a friendly LAN environment, where speeds were typically 10 Mb/s and no one was trying to steal your data. To accomplish many common tasks required a series of synchronous messages between the client and the server. Little thought was given to WANs, because WANs were scarce at the time. In 1996, SMB was submitted to the IETF as the Common Internet File System (CIFS). Microsoft documents the CIFS/SMB protocol in the MS-CIFS and MS-SMB protocol documents.

The SMB 2.0 protocol was released in Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, and it was a complete redesign of the main remote file protocol for Windows. SMB 2.0 provides a number of improvements over SMB, such as the following:

- Greatly reduced complexity. The number of opcodes was reduced from over 100 to just 19.
- Reduced the *chattiness* of the protocol to make it more suitable for running across WANs, which generally have much longer latencies and lower bandwidth than LANs.
- **Compound requests** allow multiple requests to be sent in a single network packet.

- **Pipelining requests** allow multiple requests and data to be sent before the answer to a previous request is received (also known as *credit-based flow control*).

- Larger reads and writes.

- Caching of folder and file properties.

- Improved message-signing algorithm (HMAC SHA-256 replaced MD5).

- Improved scalability of file sharing.

- Works well with Network Address Translation (NAT).

- Support for symbolic links.

Version 2.1 of the SMB protocol (released with Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008/R2) is a minor release (documented in the MS-SMB2 protocol specification). It adds the following improvements:

- A new opportunistic lock (oplock) leasing model, which allows greater file and handle caching opportunities—without requiring changes to existing applications

- Support for even larger transmission units (large MTU), from a previous maximum of 64 KB to 1 MB (by default, but configurable up to 8 MB via the registry).

To maintain backward compatibility with SMB servers, an SMB2 client uses the existing SMB connection setup mechanisms, and then advertises that it supports a higher version of the protocol. The SMB mini-redirector contains all the functionality that is common between the different versions of the protocol, with a separate sub-redirector implementing each variant of the SMB protocol. An SMB2 client establishes a connection and sends an SMB negotiate request that contains both the supported SMB and SMB2 dialects. If the server supports SMB2, it responds with an SMB2 negotiate response, and the client hands the connection to the SMB2 sub-redirector. At that point, all messages on the connection are SMB2. If the server does not support SMB2, it responds with an SMB negotiate response, and the client hands the connection to the SMB1 sub-redirector:

- The common portions are implemented by `%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\MRxSMB.sys.`

- The SMB 1 protocol is implemented by `%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\MRxSMB10.sys.`

- The SMB 2 protocol is implemented by `%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\MRxSMB20.sys.`
Distributed File System Namespace

Distributed File System Namespace (DFS-N) is a namespace aggregation and availability feature of Windows. As organizations grow, the number of file servers tends to increase, and users find it increasingly difficult to find the files they need because the files might be spread over a number of different servers with completely unrelated names. DFS-N allows an administrator to create a new file share (also known as a root or namespace) that aggregates multiple file shares, from the same or different servers, into a single namespace. For example, assume the Aura Corporation had the following shares: \\Development\Projects, \\Accounting\FY2012, and \\Marketing\CoolStuff. These shares could be presented to users through a DFS-N namespace \\Aura\Teams containing DFS-N links called \\Aura\Teams\Aura\Development, \\Aura\Teams\Accounting, and \\Aura\Teams \Marketing. The redirection of a client accessing the path \\Aura\Teams\Marketing to the real share path \\Marketing\CoolStuff is invisible to the user. In this example, \\Marketing\CoolStuff is the link target of \\Aura\Teams\Marketing. Link targets can, in fact, refer to paths below the root of a share like \\Marketing\CoolStuff\Presentations.

Other benefits that DFS-N provides are redundancy and location-aware redirection. Another major capability of DFS is availability, through a feature known as DFS Replication (DFSR). Replication provides two benefits: high availability in case of a failure, and load balancing. As an organization grows geographically, accessing file servers from remote offices with wide area network (WAN) connections might be slow and inefficient. An administrator could create a replicated version of a file server within the remote office, providing high-speed access to the files from the users within the remote office. A DFS-N link, such as \\Aura\Teams\Accounting in the preceding example, might have multiple link targets associated with it—for example, \\AccountingEurope\FY2012 and \\AccountingUS\FY2012. In this case, the DFS-N server returns to the client an ordered list of available target servers and takes into account the location of the client and the target servers (using Active Directory site information) when ordering the list so that the client can access the closest target first. If access to one link target fails, DFS-N tries the next available target, if available. When a DFS-N link has multiple target shares, the targets should normally contain the same data because the client accessing the namespace will access only one of the targets at a time. This can be accomplished using DFS Replication (DFS-R), discussed in the next section. A server-side implementation of DFS-N consists of a Windows service (%SystemRoot%\System32\Dfssvc.exe) and a device driver (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Dfs.sys). The DFSSVC service is responsible for exporting DFS topology-management interfaces and maintaining the DFS topology in either the registry (on non–Active Directory systems) or Active Directory. The DFS driver performs topology lookups when it receives a client request touching a link so that it can direct the client to the share where the file it is requesting resides.

On the client side, DFS-N support is implemented in a MUP surrogate provider driver (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Dfsc.sys) and an MPR/WNet provider implemented in %SystemRoot%\System32\Ntlanman.dll. The Distributed File System Client (DFSC) driver is responsible for determining if a UNC path is a DFS namespace, and if so, it translates the specified path into the name of one or more target shares. Communication with DFS-N servers is accomplished using the SMB redirector. The DFS-N client is only part of the I/O path when a file or directory is being created.
The DFS-N protocols are documented in the MS-DFSC and MS-DFSNM protocol documents.

## Distributed File System Replication

Distributed File System Replication (DFS-R) provides bandwidth-efficient, asynchronous, multimaster replication of file-system changes between servers. In addition to general-purpose, file-system replication (for example, keeping data on multiple DFS-N link target shares in sync), DFS-R is also used for replicating a domain controller’s SYSVOL directory, which is where Windows domain controllers store logon scripts and Group Policy files. (Group Policy permits administrators to define usage and security policies for the computers that belong to a domain.) Because DFS-R supports multimaster replication, file-system changes can occur on any server, potentially simultaneously, and DFS-R will automatically handle conflicts and maintain synchronization of the file-system contents.

The fundamental unit of DFS replication is a DFS replicated folder, which is a directory tree whose contents will be synchronized across multiple servers according to an administratively defined schedule and replication topology. Replication schedules allow administrators to restrict replication activity to specific windows of time or restrict the amount of bandwidth that DFS-R will use.

Replication topologies allow administrators to define the network connections between a set of servers (called a replication group). Arbitrary topologies are supported, including common topologies such as ring, star, or mesh. The replication topology configuration is stored in Active Directory. Only directories on NTFS volumes can be replicated because DFS-R relies on the NTFS USN journal to detect changes to the contents of a replicated folder.

DFS-R uses several technologies to conserve network bandwidth, making it well-suited to replication over WANs that might have high latency and low bandwidth. Remote Differential Compression (RDC) allows DFS-R to identify and replicate only those pieces of a file that have changed, rather than the whole file. DFS-R also compresses content before sending it to a remote partner, providing additional bandwidth savings. On Enterprise or Datacenter SKUs, DFS-R makes use of an extended version of RDC called RDC Similarity to provide further bandwidth savings; if content is modified in a replicated folder on server A, and chunks of the modified content are similar to chunks of any file in partner server B’s replicated folder, server B satisfies the similar chunks of the update’s content locally from the similar files, rather than downloading all of the modified content from server A.

New capabilities for DFS-R in Windows Server 2008 R2 include support for clustering and true read-only replicas.

DFS-R is implemented as a Windows service (%SystemRoot%\System32\DfsrS.exe) that uses authenticated RPC with encryption to communicate between instances of itself running on different computers. There is also a WMI interface for configuration and management of the service, a file system minifilter used to protect read-only replicas from modification, and a cluster resource DLL for integration with MSCS. The DFS-R protocol is documented in the MS-FRS2 specification.
Offline Files

Offline Files (also known internally as client-side caching, or CSC) transparently caches files from a remote system (a file server) on the local machine to make the files available when the local machine is not connected to the network. Offline Files caches files for remote files accessed over the SMB protocol. Files can be cached by users by simply right-clicking on a remote file, folder, or drive and selecting Always Available Offline, thus pinning the selected files to the cache. Cached items can be viewed in the Sync Center control panel. Caching also can be specified administratively using Group Policy.

There is a single Offline Files cache on the system, which is shared by all users of the system. All cached files are stored in an ACL-protected directory, which by default is %SystemRoot%\CSC. If you choose, you can encrypt the files in the Offline Files cache (accessed by going to Control Panel, Sync Center, and then clicking Manage Offline Files, clicking on the Encryption tab, and clicking the Encrypt button). Access to the cache is permitted only by using Offline File tools and the IOfflineFilesXxx COM APIs. The easiest way to examine the contents of the cache is to use the Sync Center control panel interface (click Manage Offline Files, and then click the View Your Offline Files button).

Offline Files understands two types of objects:

- **Files** Includes files, folders, and symbolic links. Caching is not done at the NTFS level, so not all file NTFS attributes are cached or are cacheable. Cacheable attributes include the standard Win32 file attributes (metadata), such as the name, ACL, and the contents—only a file's (unnamed) data stream will be cached.

- **Scope** A scope is the portion of a namespace that corresponds to a physical share. In a DFS namespace, the root of a scope is the object that is pointed to by a DFS link, which can contain additional DFS links to other scopes. If DFS is not being used, a scope and a share are the same thing.

Offline Files does not support complete NTFS semantics for cached files and has the following limitations:

- Offline Files does not cache alternate data streams, which are therefore not available offline. When online, access to alternate data streams works because I/O requests for streams go directly to the server.

- Offline Files does not cache Extended Attributes (EAs). An implication of this is that if a file containing EAs is cached and the cached version is modified while the server is offline, any EAs on the server are deleted when changes are written back to the server.

Offline Files consists of the following components, as shown in Figure 7-23:

- A user-mode agent (%SystemRoot%\System32\cscsvc.dll) running as a service in an SVCHOST process. This service is primarily concerned with maintaining synchronization between the cache and remote file systems. It also implements the COM interfaces used to interact with the Offline Files cache.
- A remote file system driver (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\csc.sys) that acts as both a MUP surrogate provider and a mini-redirector. This driver is responsible for controlling when I/O requests are sent to the cache or to the remote file system. The driver also implements the local cache, updating the cached data as appropriate based on the I/O requests seen.

- An Explorer extension DLL (%SystemRoot%\System32\cscui.dll) for selecting which files, folders, or drives to pin in the Offline Files cache, and for displaying icon overlays to identify offline (cached) files. CSCUI links against %SystemRoot%\System32\cscobj.dll, which provides the interface to the Offline Files service.

- A DLL (%SystemRoot%\System32\cscapi.dll) containing publicly available Win32 APIs for interacting with the Offline Files from applications.

- An in-process COM object (%SystemRoot%\System32\cscobj.dll) used by application clients of Offline Files COM APIs.

![Offline Files architecture](image-url)
Caching Modes
Offline Files has five caching modes. The mode for an object is dependent upon the object’s connection status, which is determined by whether or not the local system has a network connection to the file server.

Online
This is the default mode for objects cached by Offline Files. In this mode, the server is available. The file system metadata operations and write operations flow to the server, and the cache state is updated as required. Read operations are serviced from the cache. When working online, Offline Files attempt to cache data only if the SMB client has been granted at least read-caching privileges from the file server.

Offline (Slow Connection)
To isolate the user from fluctuations in network performance, Offline Files transition into Offline (Slow Connection) mode when the network performance meets the configured slow-link latency or bandwidth thresholds. In Windows 7, a default slow-link latency threshold is configured at 80 milliseconds (ms). The latency and bandwidth thresholds can be controlled via the Group Policy editor (%SystemRoot%\gpedit.msc) via the Configure Slow-Link Mode policy.

When working in this mode, all file-system operations are serviced by the Offline Files cache. The data is synchronized back to the server every six hours by default, but this synchronization frequency can be controlled through Group Policy via the Configure Background Sync policy.

The Offline Files Service periodically checks the network performance of the shares in the Offline Files cache. If the network latency improves to be less than half the configured slow-link latency threshold, the user will transition back to working online.

The slow-link behavior can be controlled via the Group Policy editor (%SystemRoot%\gpedit.msc) as shown in Figure 7-24.
Offline (Working Offline)

The user can force the client to work offline by clicking the Work Offline button in Explorer. When running in this mode, all file-system operations are satisfied from the cache. Periodic background synchronization of the data can be enabled in this mode through the Configure Background Sync policy, but by default they are not enabled. If the user wants to work online again, he must click the Work Online button in Explorer.

Offline (Not Connected)

A cached object is in Offline (Not Connected) mode when the server is not accessible. The transition to offline is transparently satisfied through the Offline Files cache, without the application knowing. When the network connection to the server is re-established, any changes written to the file are synchronized back to the server by the Offline Files agent. If a file is modified on both the client and the remote system while the file was offline, the conflict must be resolved by the user through Sync Center.

Offline (Need to Sync)

When a user transitions back online after making changes to the version of the file in the local cache, the status of this file will be Offline (Need to Sync) until the changes are synchronized back to the server. Offline Files keep the user working offline for the affected files until that synchronization is complete to ensure that the user sees a consistent view of the files, including the changes made while working offline.
Ghosts
When files are selected to be available offline, they must be copied from the server to the client. Until the transfer is complete, not all the files will be visible on the client. This can cause confusion for the user if the server drops offline and the user tries to access a file before it is in the cache. To address this case, Offline Files creates ghosts of the files and directories on the server within the cache as soon as caching is enabled. The ghosts are markers for files and directories that have not been copied and are unavailable in the cache. Explorer displays ghosted files with an overlay on the file’s icon. As the cache is filled, the ghost entries eventually disappear. If the user tries to access a ghosted file and the server is online, the file is copied immediately to the cache and the ghost overlay is removed.

When a subdirectory of a share is pinned into the Offline Files cache, ghosts are also used to provide the user context to the surrounding namespace that is not cached. When offline, the sibling files and directories appear in a ghosted state so that the user does not think that this other content somehow disappeared. When files and directories are ghosted for this purpose, they are neither cached by Offline Files nor are they available while working offline, unless they are explicitly pinned in the Offline Files cache.

Data Security
The goal of Offline Files is to provide the same file-access experience for remote files that the user experience for local files. To achieve that end, Offline Files caches the users and their effective access for each file and directory in the cache. This information is used by the Offline Files driver to enforce the appropriate access on the objects in the cache. Encrypted files using EFS on the server are also encrypted in the cache.

Offline Files caches access for a given user as the data is accessed or synchronized on behalf of that user. For example, if two users, Able and Baker, share a laptop, and user Able marks a file on the server to be available offline, the file is copied to the cache and only Able’s access is cached. If the server drops offline, user Baker would not be able to access the file in the cache; however, when the server is online again, and Baker tries to access the file, Offline Files updates the cache to reflect user Baker’s access, allowing both users to access the file when working offline.

Files protected with EFS remain protected but are encrypted in the security context of the first user to bring the data into the cache. When working offline, only this user will be able to access the data in the cache.

Cache Structure
By default, the root directory for the Offline Files cache is located in %SystemRoot%\CSC and is protected with a DACL that grants Administrators full control of the directory and everyone else read, Read & Execute, and List Folder Contents access. As shown in Figure 7-25, beneath the root directory is a subdirectory with a name equal to the current version of the database schema (currently, 2.0.6) and a security descriptor specifying an owner SID of S-1-5-12, which is used to indicate it is owned by restricted code and cannot be accessed by anyone other than the Offline Files service. This security descriptor is inherited by all files and subdirectories beneath the schema version directory.
In the schema version directory are two files and two directories. The files consist of the Priority Queue (pq) and SID Map (sm) databases. The Priority Queue is a database that tracks the usage of the files within the cache and orders them from most recently used to least recently used. The Offline Files agent threads walk the queue tail to head when pushing files out of the cache when the cache’s disk quota has been exceeded. Within the Offline Files cache, an internal user ID is used to represent a user when storing that user’s access. The SID Map is used to map these internal user IDs to SIDs. This becomes important when the server is offline and Offline Files must validate the user’s access itself.

The namespace directory is the root of the cache and contains a directory for each server that Offline Files is caching. The temp directory is for encryption and is also used as a temporary location for files that are removed from the namespace before they are deleted. The temp directory is used as a scratch area by Offline Files.

For every file in the Offline Files cache, Offline Files adds a sparse NTFS alternate data stream named CscBitmapStream, which contains a bitmap indicating which pages of the file have been modified while the file was “offline” (server not reachable). Each bit in the bitmap represents a 4-KB page within the file. This bitmap is not created until the first offline write to a file. Writes that extend the file are not included in the bitmap. If the file is truncated while offline, the bitmap is also truncated to match the new length of the file. When the server is next online, only the changed pages are written to the server.
BranchCache

BranchCache is a generalized content-caching mechanism designed to reduce network bandwidth, especially over WANs. The name BranchCache comes from the concept of branch offices within a company connecting to the company’s centralized servers via WAN links, which are typically hundreds of times slower than LAN links and caching content used by computers in the branch office within that branch office. Moving the content cache to the branch office drastically reduces the time to access the content because the data does not have to traverse the WAN.

Unlike Offline Files, which caches only files, BranchCache caches content, which is anything that can be identified by a URL, such as files, web pages, an HTTP video stream, or even a blob accessed from a database or cloud service.

BranchCache does not access the files in the CSC cache, because CSC is a client of BranchCache. Instead, Offline Files uses BranchCache to populate its own cache.

A variety of protocols make use of BranchCache, including the following ones:

- **Server Message Block (SMB)** Used to access files on file servers
- **HTTP(S)** Web pages, video streams, and other content identified by a URL
- **Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS)** Used to transfer files, and runs over HTTP/TLS 1.1

Figure 7-26 depicts the BranchCache architecture.

![Figure 7-26 BranchCache architecture](image)

BranchCache’s operation is transparent to the applications accessing the content being cached, as shown in Figure 7-26. When BranchCache is enabled on a client, a request made by that client to a content server carries headers/metadata (the exact mechanism depends upon the protocol used) to let the remote content server know that the client has BranchCache enabled. In this case, the content server returns content information (CI) describing that content, rather than the requested content. The CI contains hashes of all the segments and blocks in which the content is chunked. (This is covered in more detail later.) The client uses the CI for retrieving part, or all, of the content from the local BranchCache. If any part of the content is not available locally, the client goes back to the remote content server to retrieve the data that was not present in the local BranchCache and, once the data is retrieved, offers the missing data to the local BranchCache so that the same data can be served to other clients in the future.
BranchCache operates in two caching modes, as shown in Figure 7-27:

- **Hosted Cache**  A single server in a branch office (running Windows Server 2008/R2, or later), with the BranchCache feature enabled, contains the entire content cache for all BranchCache-enabled systems within that branch office.

- **Distributed Cache**  Instead of a hosted cache server caching content for the remote office, the clients within the remote office cache the content files themselves. The cache is spread across all the clients on the same subnet. There is no effort to evenly distribute the contents of the cache among peers within a branch office. In general, until the maximum local cache size is reached, each client has a copy of all the content it has accessed (resulting in content being duplicated throughout the distributed cache). This is desirable because it adds redundancy and some resiliency to the cache, especially when clients join and leave the branch office network frequently, as is often the case when the users are working on laptops. The distributed cache is implemented using peer-to-peer networking, using the Web Services Discovery (WS-D) multicast protocol to locate which client has the content in its cache, with a 300-millisecond timeout.

**FIGURE 7-27** Types of BranchCache caching

BranchCache is fully compatible with end-to-end encryption, such as IPsec. Just like with CSC, Windows' existing security mechanisms are used to ensure that access to cached content operates the same way that it would if the content were not cached.
BranchCache is similar to Offline Files, but it differs in several important ways. The most important of which is that content in the BranchCache is not available if the WAN is down. This is because the content is identified by a hash list generated and stored on the server, which the client uses to locate the cached content within the BranchCache (distributed or hosted). Some BranchCache features the following behaviors:

- Data transfer uses AES encryption.
- For content that is not file-based, BranchCache caches only content that is larger than 64 KB. (This can be changed by editing the registry value HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services \PeerDistKM\Parameters\MinContentLength on the server.)

### Caching Modes

BranchCache maintains two different local caches on each BranchCache-enabled system (which can be BranchCache content servers on one side of the WAN link, and BranchCache clients and BranchCache hosted cache servers on other side):

- The **publication cache** stores content information metadata for content published using the BranchCache Server APIs (PeerDistServerXxx). The content information structure contains hashes of the various segments and blocks in which BranchCache breaks up the content into chunks, along with the secret needed to generate public and private content identifiers and the encryption key.

- Publishing is usually thought of as a server-side operation, though any BranchCache client can publish content. With regard to publishing, BranchCache offers two different approaches to its client applications/protocols for generating/managing/storing BranchCache content information metadata:
  - An application and/or protocol that uses BranchCache acceleration can ask BranchCache to store content information metadata on its behalf (in the BranchCache publication cache), allowing BranchCache to manage the lifetime of that metadata according to rules, timelines, and limits shared across multiple applications using BranchCache. This is achieved by publishing via the PeerDistServerXxx APIs, and it is what the HTTP-BranchCache and BITS-BranchCache integrations do.
  - Alternatively, an application/protocol that wants to use BranchCache acceleration can ask BranchCache to generate only content information metadata without storing it, and instead simply return the metadata to the application or protocols. In this case, the application or protocol has to implement its own way to store or manage that metadata. This is what the SMB-BranchCache integrations does.

In both cases, the protocol integrated with BranchCache or the application using BranchCache directly is responsible for transporting that content information metadata through the WAN link from the publishing content server to the clients in the remote branches. BranchCache does not have, or control, a data channel crossing the WAN link. The transport of content information metadata is intentionally left to the protocol or application using BranchCache.
acceleration, so that the metadata can be transported with the same level of security, authentication, and authorization that would have been used for retrieving the actual content when BranchCache is not used. This is consistent with the fact that, from a security standpoint, owning a copy of the BranchCache content information for a given content is equivalent to owning the entire content and therefore being authorized to retrieve a copy of it from other BranchCache entities (clients, hosted cache servers, or third-party implementations).

The publication cache does not store any actual data of the published content; it stores only content information metadata. Publications tend to last for long periods of time, though the actual length of time is determined by the application that publishes the content. By default, the publication cache is constrained to consume no more than one percent of the volume on which it is located, which is specified by %SystemRoot%\ServiceProfiles\NetworkService\AppData\Local\PeerDistPub. The size and location of the publication cache can be changed using NetSh:

- netsh branchcache set publicationcache directory=C:\PublicationCacheFolder
- netsh branchcache set publicationcachesize size=20 percent=TRUE

The republication cache contains both metadata (but no secrets) and actual data (chunked in segments and blocks) for the BranchCache content retrieved by the local BranchCache client. It is stored with the purpose of making those chunks of content available to other BranchCache clients. Republished content is stored for up to 28 days, but it can be flushed out earlier if the republication cache has reached its limit and space is needed for newer content to be republished. By default, the republication cache is constrained to consume no more than five percent of the volume on which it is located, which is by specified by %SystemRoot%\ServiceProfiles\NetworkService\AppData\Local\PeerDistRepub. The location and the size of the republication cache can be changed using NetSh:

- netsh branchcache set localcache directory=C:\BranchCache\Localcache
- netsh branchcache set localcache size=20 percent=TRUE

BranchCache attempts to persist the republication cache across system reboots through the use of an index file that contains the database of segment descriptors. When the system reboots, BranchCache validates the general integrity of the republication cache by checking that it was properly closed. If the republication cache fails this consistency check, it is discarded. The publication cache is not persisted across reboots. The private SMB-BranchCache publication cache needs no explicit persistence; persistence comes for free, as a result of the SMB-BranchCache integration (which was covered previously) and the fact that with the SMB all published content is actual files. The hashes are validated before access to the files in the cache is allowed.

Configuration

BranchCache can be configured using the Local Security Group Policy editor as shown in Figure 7-28, using the network shell (NetSh) as shown in Figure 7-29, or as part of Group Policy pushed by an administrator (within a domain).
BranchCache Implementationservice in %SystemRoot%\PeerDistSvc.dll. This service starts when the BranchCache is enabled on both clients and servers, and it interacts with the kernel-mode components (drivers).

HTTP extension driver in %SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\PeerDistKM.sys. This driver registers with the Network Module Registrar (NMR) as a client of the http.sys driver and examines all HTTP packets going into and out of the system. It adds files to the cache and retrieves cached content information for published content from the BranchCache service, rather than sending the request to the web server.
- BranchCache APIs (PeerDistXxx) are exported by %SystemRoot%\System32\PeerDist.dll, which uses LRPC/ALPC to communicate with the BranchCache service.

- The BranchCache HTTP transport in %SystemRoot%\System32\PeerDistHttpTrans.dll implements the transport on top of which the Peer Content Caching and Retrieval: Retrieval Protocol [MS-PCCRR] exchanges data between BranchCache clients and/or hosted cache servers. Each MS-PCCRR message is encapsulated in a simple transport message, which in turn, is sent over an HTTP request.

- The Web Services Discovery Provider in %SystemRoot%\System32\PeerDistWSDDiscoProv.dll implements the WS-D protocol to discover which clients on the LAN are caching a particular file (or part of a file).

- The BranchCache Network Shell Helper in %SystemRoot%\System32\PeerDistSh.dll is an extension to the Network Shell (%SystemRoot%\System32\Netsh.exe) application that provides users with a means of monitoring and configuring the BranchCache service. Network Shell helper DLLs are installed by adding a string value to HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\NetSh, which provides the Network Shell with the path to the helper DLL.

- A standalone variant of all the BranchCache APIs are implemented in %SystemRoot%\System32\PeerDistHashPeerDistHash.dll (only present on Windows Server systems), which contains all of the BranchCache APIs and functionality and does not require the use of the BranchCache service. This component is designed for use by other Windows features that are tightly integrated with BranchCache, such as the SMB Groveler, which generates the hashes on the server.

- Hash groveler service in %SystemRoot%\System32\smbhash.exe (only on Windows Server systems). The groveler runs on the file or web server and generates hashes when clients request a hash list. The groveler monitors a given namespace or share and ensures that the BranchCache hashes are updated for all files within that namespace. All groveler I/O runs at low I/O priority so as not to interfere with the normal operation of the system.

BranchCache uses the following protocols, which are documented at www.microsoft.com:

- Peer Content Caching and Retrieval: Content Identification, as defined in [MS-PCCRC], defines the content information structures previously described. Peer Content Caching and Retrieval: Discovery Protocol, as defined in [MS-PCCRD], specifies a multicast to discover and locate services based on the Web Services Dynamic Discovery (WS-Discovery) protocol [WS-Discovery]. There are two modes of operations in WS-Discovery: client-initiated probes and service-initiated announcements. Both are sent through IP multicast to a predefined group. The primary role in the Content Caching and Retrieval System is Content Discovery.

- Peer Content Caching and Retrieval: Retrieval Protocol, as defined in [MS-PCCRR], specifies the messages that are necessary for querying peer-role servers or a hosted cache server for the availability of certain content, and for retrieving the content. The primary role in the Content Caching and Retrieval System is Content Retrieval.
■ Peer Content Caching and Retrieval: Hosted Cache Protocol, as defined in [MS-PCHC], specifies an HTTPS-based mechanism for clients to notify a hosted cache server regarding the availability of content and for a hosted cache server to indicate interest in the content. The primary role in the Content Caching and Retrieval System is Content Notification.

■ Peer Content Caching and Retrieval: Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Extensions, as defined in [MS-PCCRTTP], specifies a content encoding known as PeerDist that is used by an HTTP/1.1 client and an HTTP/1.1 server to communicate content to each other. The primary role in the Content Caching and Retrieval System is Metadata (Hash) Retrieval.

■ Server Message Block (SMB) Version 2.1 Protocol, as defined in [MS-SMB2]. Version 2.1 of this protocol has enhancements for the detection of content caching-enabled shares and retrieval of metadata related to content caching. The primary role in the Content Caching and Retrieval System is Metadata (Hash) Retrieval.

Supporting SMB-BranchCache integration requires the following changes on both the clients and servers. On the client, the functionality of the existing client-side caching (CSC) components were extended. On the server, the SMB Server Driver (srv2.sys) was extended to support hash list retrieval from the server, and a new service was added, the SMB Hash Generation Service (also known as the Groveler), to manage the generation, updating, and deletion of hashes for content on an SMB share.

BranchCache Optimized Application Retrieval: SMB Sequence

The following sequence describes how content that is cached by BranchCache is delivered to an application without requiring any changes to the application, as shown in Figure 7-30. This sequence refers to the case when the channel/protocol of choice for that application is SMB—for example, the application opens the file from the remote share with CreateFile (or something that calls CreateFile, such as fopen) and reads from the file. If the application decides to retrieve the data via an HTTP request (backed by either WinHTTP or WinInet), the sequence is very different, but it is still a sequence completely transparent to the application.

BranchCache and SMB are integrated through the Offline Files component in Windows. The Offline Files service opportunistically tries to prefetch files accessed via SMB to optimize network usage and user experience on the client side. The offline files driver might temporarily delay the application's read to give the prefetch from BranchCache an opportunity to stay ahead of the application's read position. This delay is calculated based on the measured latency to the file server.

Data retrieval begins with an application reading data from a file on a remote SMB share. When Offline Files is enabled on the client and BranchCache is not enabled, the application's read request flow through the offline files driver to the SMB server. When both offline files and BranchCache are enabled on the client, the following steps occur:
1. The offline files driver intercepts the read I/O request and determines whether the following specific conditions have been met to initiate prefetching the file:
   a. The data is not already stored in the offline files cache. If the data is already present, the application’s read will be satisfied by this data without making any data requests to the file server.
   b. The latency to the server (as observed by the client so far) is above the configured threshold.
   c. BranchCache hash generation is enabled on the file share.
   d. The target file size is at least 64 KB.
   e. The read is beyond the first 64 KB of the file.

2. If the preceding conditions are met, the offline files driver notifies the offline files service to start prefetching the file.

3. The offline files service then retrieves the content information from the file server. If the server has the up-to-date content information for the specified file, it returns it to the client. If there is no content information for the specified file or if it is out of date, the SMB hash-generation service on the file server will be requested to generate new content information for this file, and no content information is returned to the client, causing offline files to skip BranchCache retrieval for this file.

4. If content information is retrieved from the file server, the offline files service then uses that information to attempt to retrieve data from BranchCache.

5. BranchCache attempts to retrieve the data either from peers or the hosted cache (depending on the configuration). If data is found, it is returned to the offline files service; otherwise, an error is returned.

6. If data is found in BranchCache, the data is written to the offline files cache and the prefetch thread continues to attempt to retrieve data from BranchCache until it has retrieved up to 8 MB of data or it fails to retrieve data.

7. When the application’s read operation is allowed to proceed, it attempts to read the data from the offline files cache, which is prepopulated by data from BranchCache if the prefetch thread successfully retrieved data. Otherwise, the application’s read is allowed to flow to the server to retrieve data. Data retrieved from the file server is then cached in the offline files cache for later publication to BranchCache.

8. When the Offline Files Service is requested to prefetch data from BranchCache, it also attempts to publish any data to BranchCache for the file from the offline files cache. File data is stored in the offline files cache until the offline files cache needs to reclaim space for newer files. The same data is also stored in BranchCache’s republication cache so that it can be shared with other BranchCache clients and across different protocols/applications integrated with BranchCache.
If the client accesses the same content again (after closing the file and opening it again) and the content has not been changed on the server, the application will be able to retrieve the data from the Offline Files cache without doing the BranchCache lookup. This is called **transparent caching**.

If the requested data cannot be found through BranchCache, once it is retrieved from the SMB server it will be republished to the BranchCache for access by other clients. (These steps are not shown in Figure 7-30.)

![BranchCache request flows](image)

**FIGURE 7-30** BranchCache request flows

**BranchCache Optimized Application Retrieval: HTTP Sequence**

The following sequence describes how content that is cached by BranchCache is delivered to an application without requiring any changes to the application. This sequence covers the case when the channel/protocol of choice for that application is HTTP, for example the application retrieves the content via an HTTP request based on either WinInet or WinHTTP APIs.

BranchCache and HTTP are tightly integrated, both in terms of HTTP.sys on the server side and WinInet and WinHTTP on the client side. In contrast with the SMB-BranchCache integration, when BranchCache is enabled on both client and server, an application’s HTTP requests are always stalled, waiting for BranchCache retrievals. The HTTP-BranchCache integration is focuses on minimizing the usage of the WAN’s bandwidth (even when the WAN happens to be very fast and has very low latency), and all the data that can be retrieved via BranchCache will be transferred via BranchCache.
1. Data retrieval begins with an application issuing an HTTP Request.

2. When BranchCache is enabled on the client, the HTTP client stack (either WinInet or WinHTTP) adds headers to the request indicating that the client is capable of understanding the PeerDist HTTP encoding (as defined in [MS-PCCRTP]).

3. The HTTP client stack sends the request to the remote content server, typically across the WAN link.

4. The kernel-mode HTTP driver (HTTP.sys) receives the request on the content server. If BranchCache is enabled on that server, HTTP.sys forwards a copy of the request to the BranchCache HTTP extension driver (PeerDistKM.sys), which keeps track of the request and retrieves content information for that content (identified by its URL and content tags) from the BranchCache service.

5. The kernel-mode HTTP driver delivers the HTTP request to the associated web server in user mode (typically, IIS or a web service) and waits for a response.

6. The HTTP server authenticates and authorizes the client, it generates the response accordingly, and it starts streaming the response down to HTTP.sys.

7. Because BranchCache is enabled, HTTP.sys redirects the response through PeerDistKM.sys.

8. If the content information for that HTTP content is not available (or not yet available) or if the content tags do not match, the following steps occur:
   a. PeerDistKM.sys sends a copy of the response stream to the BranchCache service for publication so that the next request for the same URL will find the content information.
   b. It allows the response stream to go back to HTTP.sys unchanged.
   c. HTTP.sys sends out the response with actual data in it and no BranchCache metadata.

9. If, instead, the content information for that HTTP content is available and, based on content tags, it is found to be up to date with the content returned, the following steps occur:
   a. PeerDistKM.sys replaces the body of the response with the content information describing it in BranchCache terms.
   b. It modifies the response headers adding that the response is now PeerDist-encoded.
   c. It returns the modified (and, in general, much shorter) response stream to HTTP.sys.
   d. HTTP.sys sends out the modified response, containing only BranchCache content information metadata, but not any actual content data.

10. The response is received on the client side. If the response contains BranchCache content information, the HTTP client stack passes that metadata to the BranchCache service, and it
starts serving the first application read for the actual contents of that response by asking BranchCache to retrieve the content data associated with the size of that first read.

11. BranchCache retrieves that data from the local republication cache (if available), or it retrieves a superset including the requested data either from other BranchCache clients in the LAN or from the hosted cache server (depending on the configuration).

12. If any of the requested data is missing, BranchCache signals to the HTTP stack the range of missing data, and the HTTP stack issues a range request back to the remote server for the missing data (or a superset including it).

13. Once all the data is reassembled for the specific application read, it is returned to the application in a way completely transparent to the application.

14. The last three steps are repeated until all the application’s reads on the HTTP response in question are completed.

**Name Resolution**

Name resolution is the process by which a character-based name, such as www.microsoft.com or Mycomputer, is translated into a numeric address, such as 192.168.1.1, that the network protocol stack can recognize. This section describes the three TCP/IP-related name resolution protocols provided by Windows: Domain Name System (DNS), Windows Internet Name Service (WINS), and Peer Name Resolution Protocol (PNRP).

**Domain Name System**

Domain Name System (DNS) is the standard (RFC 1035, et al.) by which Internet names (such as www.microsoft.com) are translated to their corresponding IP addresses. A network application that wants to resolve a DNS name to an IP address sends a DNS lookup request using the UDP/IP protocol (TCP/IP is used for requests whose response size exceeds 512 bytes) to a DNS server. DNS servers implement a distributed database of name/IP address pairs that are used to perform translations, and each server maintains the translations for a particular zone. Describing the details of DNS is outside the scope of this book, but DNS is the foundation of naming in Windows and so it is the primary Windows name resolution protocol.

The Windows DNS server is implemented as a Windows service (%SystemRoot%\System32\Dns.exe) that is included in server versions of Windows. Standard DNS server implementation relies on a text file as the translation database, but the Windows DNS server can be configured to store zone information in Active Directory.
Peer Name Resolution Protocol

The Peer Name Resolution Protocol (PNRP) is a distributed peer-to-peer protocol that allows for dynamic name resolution and publication exclusively across IPv6 networks. It allows Internet-connected devices to publish peer names and their associated IPv6 address, as well as optional information. Other devices will then resolve the peer name, retrieve the IPv6 address, and establish a connection.

PNRP offers significant advantages over DNS, mainly by being distributed, which means that it is essentially serverless (other than for early bootstrapping), can scale to potentially millions of names, and is fault tolerant and bottleneck free. Because it includes secure name publication services, changes to name records can be performed from any system. DNS generally requires contacting a DNS server administrator to perform updates. PNRP name updates also occur in real time, making it appropriate for highly mobile devices, whereas DNS caches results. Finally, PNRP allows for naming more than just computers and services by allowing extended information to be published with name records. The specification for the Peer Name Resolution Protocol [MS-PNRP] can be found at www.microsoft.com.

Windows exposes PNRP via a PNRP API for applications and services, as well as by extending the getaddrinfo Winsock API described earlier in the chapter to perform resolution of PNRP IDs (described next) when an address includes the reserved .pnrp.net domain suffix.

PNRP peer names (also called P2P IDs) are made up of two components:

- **Authority** For secure clients (which have their name records signed by a certifying authority), the authority is identified by a SHA-1 hash of an associated public key, and for unsecured clients, it is zero. If a client is secure, PNRP validates the name record before publishing it.

- **Classifier** The classifier uses a simple string to identify a service provided by a peer, which allows multiple services to be provided by the same device.

To create a PNRP ID, PNRP hashes the P2P ID and combines it with a unique 128-bit ID called the service location, as shown in Figure 7-31. The service location identifies different instances of the same P2P ID in the same cloud. (PNRP uses two clouds: a global cloud, which corresponds to all IPv6 addresses on the Internet, and the link-local cloud, which corresponds to IPv6 addresses with the fe80::/10 prefix and is analogous to an IPv4 subnet.)
PNRP Resolution and Publication

PNRP name resolution occurs in two phases:

- **Endpoint determination**  In this phase, the requesting peer determines the IPv6 address associated with the peer responsible for publishing the PNRP ID of the desired service.

- **PNRP ID resolution**  In this phase, once the requesting peer has located and confirmed the availability of the peer associated with the IPv6 address, it sends a PNRP request message for the PNRP ID of the service being requested. The peer providing the service replies to confirm the PNRP ID and can supply a comment and up to 4 KB of additional data, such as context information related to the service.

  During the first phase, PNRP iterates over nodes while locating the publishing node, such that the node performing name resolution will be responsible for contacting nodes that are successively closer to the desired PNRP ID. Each iteration works as follows: Once a peer receives a request message, it performs a lookup in its cache for the requested PNRP ID. If a match is found, the request message is sent directly; otherwise, it is sent to the next closest PNRP ID (by seeing how much of the ID matches).

  When a node receives a request message for which it cannot find a PNRP ID, it checks the distance of any other IDs in the cache to the target ID. If it finds a node that is closer, the requested node sends a reply to the requesting node, where the reply contains the IPv6 address of the peer that most closely matches the target PNRP ID. The requesting node can then use the IPv6 address to send another query to that address' node. If no node is closer, the requesting node is notified, and that node sends the request to the next closest node. Assuming PNRP IDs of 200, 350, 450, 500, and 800, Figure 7-32 depicts a possible endpoint determination phase for an example in which peer A is trying to find the endpoint for PNRP 800 (peer E).

  To publish its PNRP ID(s), a peer first sends PNRP publication messages to its closest neighbors (entries in its cache that have IDs that are in the lowest levels) to seed their caches. It then randomly chooses nodes in the cloud that are not neighbors and sends them PNRP name resolution requests for its own PNRP ID. Through a mechanism described earlier, the endpoint determination phase results in the seeding of the PNRP ID across the caches of the random nodes that were chosen in the cloud.
Peer A sends a PNRP request message to the node that registered the PNRP ID of 500 (peer C) because it is the closest (numerically) to 800.

Peer C does not have an entry for the PNRP ID of 800 or any entries that are closer to 800, so it sends back a response indicating that it could not find an entry closer to 800.

Peer A now sends a PNRP request message to the next closest PNRP ID (450), peer B.

Peer B does have an entry in its cache for the PNRP ID of 800, so it sends the IPv6 address of peer E to peer A.

Peer A sends a PNRP request to peer E.

Peer E sends a positive name resolution response back to peer A.

FIGURE 7-32 Example of PNRP name resolution

Location and Topology

Today, networked computers often move between networks that require different configuration settings—for example, a corporate LAN and a home-based wireless network. Windows includes the Network Location Awareness (NLA) service to enable the dynamic configuration of network applications and settings based on location, and Link-Layer Topology Discovery (LLTD) to enable the intelligent discovery and mapping of networked devices.

Network Location Awareness

The Network Location Awareness (NLA) service provider is implemented as a Winsock Namespace Provider (NSP) and provides the necessary framework for allowing computers and devices that move across different networks to select the most appropriate configuration settings. For example, an application taking advantage of NLA can detect when the user moves from a high-speed LAN to a high-latency wireless network and fine-tune its bandwidth use appropriately. NLA can also detect
when a home computer on a LAN might also have a secondary VPN connection to the office and select the proper configuration options.

Instead of having developers rely on manual network interface information to figure out the type of network, and the IP addresses or DNS names associated with them, NLA provides a standardized query API for enumerating all the local network attachment information and correlating it with network interface information. The NLA API also includes notifications that enable applications to respond to changes when they occur. NLA provides applications two pieces of location information:

- **Logical network identity**  This identity is based on the logical network’s DNS domain name. If one does not exist, NLA uses custom static information stored in the registry together with the network’s subnet address as the identity.

- **Logical network interfaces**  For each network that a device is attached to, NLA creates an adapter name that identifies interfaces such as NICs or RAS connections in a unique fashion. Applications use adapter names with the IP Helper API (%SystemRoot%\System32\iphlpapi.dll) to query interface information and characteristics.

Each logical network is implemented as a service class with an associated GUID and properties. NLA creates instances of that service class when it returns information about a logical network. Service classes are schemas that describe a namespace; they define the name, identifier, and namespace-specific information that is common to all instances. These classes are then used in combination with the WSALookupServiceXxx APIs when performing name resolution.

The best way to get network location information programmatically is to use the Network List Manager (NLM) APIs—for example INetworkListManager, INetwork, IEnumNetworks, INetworkEvents, and so on.

**Network Connectivity Status Indicator**

Network Connectivity Status Indicator (NCSI) determines in real time the connectivity level of network connections on a system. It is loaded by the NLA service and functions solely as an information provider for NLA. NLA enables network-interacting programs to change their behavior based on how the computer is connected to the network. NCSI does not register as a client of NLA, but it does receive certain private notifications directly from it. NCSI detects local vs. Internet connectivity, hotspot networks, and corporate connectivity detection and level.

The connectivity level of a network connection is assessed and is based on whether or not the system has access to the Internet and to network devices such as the default gateway, DNS servers, and web proxy servers. This network connectivity information is used by various applications such as the Networking Tray Icon, Mini Map, Network Connection Wizard, Windows Media Center, DirectAccess, Windows Update, and Outlook. NCSI information is displayed in the tray as an overlay on the network icon. Most of NCSI’s activity is disabled if a user is not logged in.

NCSI performs the primary tasks described in the following sections.
Passive Poll

Every five seconds (configurable in the registry), NCSI activates to perform its general processing. The main purpose of this action is to query the network stack using the Network Storage Interface (NSI), and looks for:

1. Evidence that some traffic has been received. NSI returns packet counts for each network interface. If any packets have been received on an interface, that interface will have at least local connectivity.

2. Evidence that traffic has been received from either the Internet or corporate network. This is a little more complex and is determined by calculating the average number of hops a packet takes to depart from a system’s local ISP network (in a home/nondomain environment) or intranet (in a corporate environment). NSI returns the largest hop count seen since the last time the hop counts were requested. If this value exceeds the average for a given IP family (for example, IPv4 vs. IPv6) on a given interface, that interface has internet connectivity.

3. Evidence that the host is communicating with a web proxy. The IP addresses for web proxies will have been identified using Web Proxy AutoDetect (WPAD), or DNS, and proxies configured manually through Internet control panel. NSI returns details of the current TCP paths from the network stack. If this is a new path to a proxy, that interface has internet connectivity.

4. Evidence that an IPSEC Security Association (SA) has been established between the system and a host that has an IPv6 address matching the corporate network prefix defined in the registry. (This is passive corporate connectivity detection.)

5. Evidence that there is a reachable path reported by NSI to a host with an IPv6 prefix matching the corporate network prefix in the registry. The interface is marked with corporate connectivity.

In addition to handling the NSI queries, the passive poll is also used by NCSI to carry out most time-based processing. If there are no networks connected, NCSI continues to poll, but stops polling three polling periods after the last data is received.

Network Change Monitoring

NCSI has to be aware of changes to the configuration of interfaces on the system. This is handled by two event monitors that watch for NSI interface change notifications and DHCP status change notifications.

When NCSI detects that the network has changed, it records the current time in a data structure associated with each interface. The passive poll task queries this value and, if it is older than 15 seconds, it will perform an active probe. The 15-second delay (for example, three poll periods have elapsed) is used to re-evaluate the Internet connectivity state if it has seen one or more unreachable paths.

NCSI registers for DHCP events and responds to them immediately (that is, there is no dampening that happens). If in that callback, DHCP reports that an interface is stable, an active probe is queued for that interface.
Registry Change Monitoring

NCSI monitors two parent keys in the registry for any changes to themselves or their children using the registry change notification API. Any changes trigger NCSI to reload all values under each key:

- HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\NlaSvc\Parameters\Internet
- HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\NetworkConnectivityStatusIndicator

Active Probe

NCSI has two mechanisms for actively testing an interface to determine whether it has Internet connectivity, both of which are configurable (and can be disabled) using the registry keys.

The first time an active probe is performed on an interface, it will be a web probe. This consists of an attempt to download the file http://www.msftncsi.com/ncsi.txt, and it compares the contents of that file with the expected value of “Microsoft NCSI”. If the comparison succeeds, the active probe is considered successful.

If NCSI has detected proxy servers, it checks to see if the interface being probed is the best interface over which to reach the first proxy server. If so, it applies the proxy settings to the HTTP request. Otherwise, it first tries without the proxy settings, only applying them and making a second attempt if the first failed with name resolution failure. This is to support multihomed scenarios, where one interface is connected via proxy and the interface being probed is not.

If an active probe succeeds, either the IPv4 or IPv6 Internet state will be brought to internet connectivity. Because NCSI does not know whether the request was satisfied using IPv4 or IPv6 connectivity, it makes a guess based on the existence of default gateways for each address family, with IPv4 being selected if an exact determination cannot be made.

The next time an active probe is to be performed, if the hardware address of the default gateway is already in the list of known proxy-less gateways, a DNS probe is performed instead of a web probe. This is an optimization that produces quicker results. A DNS probe performs a simple DNS lookup for the name listed in the registry, with the default being dns.msftncsi.com.

HTTP probe behavior changes in multihomed scenarios when a proxy is detected. When an active probe is executed on an interface, a check is made whether or not that interface is preferred by the network stack to reach the first proxy server address. If so, the web probe is continued as normal. If not, the web probe is first attempted without the use of the proxy. If that fails because the name could not be resolved via DNS, NCSI concludes it must be behind the proxy after all and applies the proxy server settings and retries the probe.

The content retrieved by the HTTP request is compared to known content in the registry. If the content does not match, NCSI assumes that the interface is connected to a hotspot network (which has rerouted the HTTP request to a login page). It then uses the Network List Manager (NLM) APIs to send a message to the PNIDUI (%SystemRoot%\System32\pnidui.dll) Shell Service Object (SSO), which then displays a balloon to indicate to the user that she needs to log in before connecting to the Internet. The gateway MAC address is also recorded in a known hotspot gateway list for proxy detection optimization later.
NSCI can be configured via Group Policy, as shown in Figure 7-33, or via the registry.

![Figure 7-33 NCSI parameters in the Group Policy editor](image)

**Link-Layer Topology Discovery**

The Link-Layer Topology Discovery (LLTD) protocol operates over both wired and wireless networks and enables applications to discover the topology of a network. For example, the *Network Map* functionality in Windows uses LLTD to draw the local network topology for the connected devices that support the LLTD protocol. Additionally, LLTD supports Quality of Service (QoS) extensions, which allow applications to diagnose network problems such as low signal strength on a wireless network and bandwidth constraints on home networks. Because it operates on the OSI data-link layer, LLTD works only on a single LAN or subnet and cannot cross routers, but its capabilities make it suitable for most home and small-office networks. The specification for the Link-Layer Topology Discovery protocol [MS-LLTD] can be found at [www.microsoft.com](http://www.microsoft.com).

The *LLTD Mapper I/O* and the *LLTD Responder* components implement LLTD. The former is responsible for the discovery process and for generating network maps. Because it uses a protocol different from IP, the LLTD Mapper uses NDIS APIs to directly send commands to the network via the network adapter. The LLTD Responder listens for and responds to discovery commands with information about the computer. As mentioned earlier, only devices that have a responder are shown in the network map.
Protocol Drivers

Network drivers take high-level I/O requests and translate them into low-level network protocol requests for transmission across the network. The network APIs rely on transport protocol drivers in kernel mode to perform the actual translation. Separating APIs from underlying protocols gives the networking architecture the flexibility of letting each API use a number of different protocols. The Internet’s explosive growth and reliance on the TCP/IP protocol has made TCP/IP the preeminent protocol in Windows. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) developed TCP/IP in 1969, specifically as the foundation for a large-scale, fault-tolerant network that became the Internet; therefore, TCP/IP has WAN-friendly characteristics such as routability and good WAN performance. TCP/IP is the preferred Windows protocol and is installed by default.

The 4-byte network addresses used by the IPv4 protocol on the legacy TCP/IP stack limits the number of public IP addresses to roughly four billion, which is nearly exhausted as more and more devices, such as cell phones and PDAs, acquire an Internet presence. For this reason, the IPv6 protocol, which has 16-byte addresses, is gaining adoption. Windows includes a combined TCP/IP stack, called the Next Generation TCP/IP Stack, which supports both IPv4 and IPv6 simultaneously, with IPv6 being the preferred protocol. When operating on IPv6 networks, the stack also supports coexistence with IPv4 networks through the use of tunneling. The Next Generation TCP/IP Stack offers several advanced features to improve network performance, some of which are outlined in the following list:

■ **Receive Window Auto Tuning**  The TCP protocol defines a *receive window size*, which determines how much data a receiver can accept before the server requires an acknowledgment. Optimally, the receive window size should be equal to the bandwidth-delay product, which is the network link’s capacity multiplied by its end-to-end delay. This calculates the amount of data that can be “in transit” between the sender and receiver at any given time. The Windows TCP/IP stack analyzes the conditions of a network link and chooses the optimal receive window size, adjusting it as needed if the network conditions change.

■ **Compound TCP (CTCP)**  Network congestion occurs when a node or link reaches its carrying capacity. CTCP implements a congestion-avoidance algorithm that monitors network bandwidth, latency, and packet losses. It aggressively increases the amount of data that can be sent by a machine when the network will support it, and it backs off when the network is congested. Using CTCP on a high-bandwidth, low-latency network can significantly improve transfer speeds.

■ **Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN)**  Whenever a TCP packet is lost (unacknowledged), the TCP protocol assumes that the data was dropped because of router congestion and enforces congestion control, which dramatically lowers the sender’s transmission rate. ECN allows routers to explicitly mark packets as being forwarded during congestion, which is read by the Windows TCP/IP stack as a sign that transmission rates should be lowered. Lowering rates in this manner results in better performance than relying on loss-based congestion control. ECN is disabled by default, because many outdated routers might drop packets with...
the ECN bit set instead of ignoring the bit. To determine whether your network supports ECN, you can use the Microsoft Internet Connectivity Evaluation Tool (http://www.microsoft.com/windows/using/tools/igd/default.mspx). You can examine and modify the ECN capability using the network shell (from an Admin command window), as shown in Figure 7-34.

![Image](image.png)

**FIGURE 7-34** Using the network shell to examine and configure TCP parameters

- High-loss throughput improvements, including the NewReno Fast Recovery Algorithm, Enhanced Selective Acknowledgment (SACK), Forward RTO-Recovery (F-RTO), and Limited Transit. These algorithms reduce the overall retransmission of acknowledgments or TCP segments during high-loss scenarios while still maintaining the integrity of the TCP stream. This allows for greater bandwidth in these environments and preserves TCP’s reliable transport semantics.

The Next Generation TCP/IP Stack (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Tcpip.sys), shown in Figure 7-35, implements TCP, UDP, IP, ARP, ICMP, and IGMP. To support legacy protocols such as NetBIOS, which make use of the deprecated TDI interface, the network stack also includes a component called TDX (TDI translation), which creates device objects that represent legacy protocols so that clients can obtain a file object representing a protocol and issue network I/O to the protocol using TDI IRPs. The TDX component creates several device objects that represent various TDI client-accessible protocols: \Device\Tcp6, \Device\Tcp, \Device\Udp6, \Device\Udp, \Device\Rawip, and \Device\Tdx.
**EXPERIMENT: Looking at TCP/IP’s Device Objects**

Using the kernel debugger to look at a live system, you can examine TCP/IP’s device objects. After performing the `!drvobj` command to see the addresses of each of the driver’s device objects, execute `!devobj` to view the name and other details about the device object.

```
kd> !drvobj tdx
Driver object (861d9478) is for:  \\Driver\tdx
Driver Extension List: (id, addr)

Device Object list:
861db310  861db440  861d8440  861d03e8
861cd440  861d2318  861d9350
kd> !devobj 861cd440
Device object (861cd440) is for:  Tcp6 \\Driver\tdx DriverObject 861d9478
Current Irp 00000000  RefCount 7  Type 00000012  Flags 00000050
Dacl 8b1bc54c  DevExt 861cd4f8  DevObjExt 861cd500
ExtensionFlags (0x00000800)
Unknown flags 0x00000800

Device queue is not busy.

kd> !devobj 861db440
Device object (861db440) is for:  RawIp \\Driver\tdx DriverObject 861d9478
Current Irp 00000000  RefCount 0  Type 00000012  Flags 00000050
Dacl 8b1bc54c  DevExt 861db4f8  DevObjExt 861db500
ExtensionFlags (0x00000800)
Unknown flags 0x00000800
```
Device queue is not busy.
lkd> !devobj 861d8440
Device object (861d8440) is for:
   Udp6 \Driver\tdx DriverObject 861d9478
Current Irp 00000000 RefCount 0 Type 00000012 Flags 00000050
Dacl 8b1bc54c DevExt 861d84f8 DevObjExt 861d8500
ExtensionFlags (0x00000800)
   Unknown flags 0x00000800
Device queue is not busy.
lkd> !devobj 861d03e8
Device object (861d03e8) is for:
   Udp \Driver\tdx DriverObject 861d9478
Current Irp 00000000 RefCount 6 Type 00000012 Flags 00000050
Dacl 8b1bc54c DevExt 861d04a0 DevObjExt 861d04a8
ExtensionFlags (0x00000800)
   Unknown flags 0x00000800
Device queue is not busy.
lkd> !devobj 861cd440
Device object (861cd440) is for:
   Tcp6 \Driver\tdx DriverObject 861d9478
Current Irp 00000000 RefCount 7 Type 00000012 Flags 00000050
Dacl 8b1bc54c DevExt 861cd4f8 DevObjExt 861cd500
ExtensionFlags (0x00000800)
   Unknown flags 0x00000800
Device queue is not busy.
lkd> !devobj 861d2318
Device object (861d2318) is for:
   Tcp \Driver\tdx DriverObject 861d9478
Current Irp 00000000 RefCount 167 Type 00000012 Flags 00000050
Dacl 8b1bc54c DevExt 861d23d0 DevObjExt 861d23d8
ExtensionFlags (0x00000800)
   Unknown flags 0x00000800
Device queue is not busy.
lkd> !devobj 861d9350
Device object (861d9350) is for:
   Tdx \Driver\tdx DriverObject 861d9478
Current Irp 00000000 RefCount 0 Type 00000021 Flags 00000050
Dacl 8b0649a8 DevExt 00000000 DevObjExt 861d9408
ExtensionFlags (0x00000800)
   Unknown flags 0x00000800
Device queue is not busy.
Windows Filtering Platform

Windows includes a rich and extensible platform for monitoring, intercepting, and processing network traffic at all levels in the network stack. Other Windows networking services extend basic networking features of the TCP/IP protocol driver by relying on Windows Filtering Platform (WFP). These include Network Address Translation (NAT), IP filtering, IP inspection, and Internet Protocol Security (IPsec). Figure 7-36 shows how the different components of the WFP are integrated with the TCP/IP stack. These include

- **Filter engine** The filter engine is implemented in both user mode and kernel mode and performs all the filtering operations on the network. Each filter engine component consists of filtering layers, one for each component of the network stack. The user-mode engine, responsible for RPC and IPsec keying policy, among other things, contains approximately 10 filters, while the kernel-mode engine, which performs the network and transport layer filtering of the TCP/IP stack, contains around 50.

- **Shims** Shims are the kernel-mode components that reside between the network stack and the filter engine. They are responsible for making the decision to allow or block network traffic based on their filtering behavior, which is defined by the filter engine. A shim operates in three steps: it parses the incoming data to match incoming values with entries in the filter engine, calls the filter engine to return an action based on the incoming values, and then interprets the action (drop the packet, for example).

- **Base filtering engine (BFE)** The BFE is a user-mode service (%SystemRoot%\System32\Bfe.dll) that manages all WFP operations. It is responsible for adding and removing filters from the WFP stack, managing the filter configuration, and enforcing security on the filter database.

- **Callout drivers** Callout drivers are kernel-mode components that add custom filtering functionality outside the basic support provided by the WFP. Callout drivers associate callout functions with one or more kernel-mode filtering layers, and the WFP enables callout functions to perform deep packet inspection and modification. Network Address Translation (described next) and IPsec are implemented as callout drivers, for example.
FIGURE 7-36 Windows Filtering Platform architecture
Network Address Translation

Network Address Translation (NAT) is a routing service that allows multiple private IP addresses to map to a single public IP address. Without NAT, each computer of a LAN must be assigned a public IP address to communicate across the Internet. NAT allows one computer of the LAN to be assigned an IP address and the other computers to use private IP addresses and be connected to the Internet through that computer. NAT translates between private IP addresses and the public IP address as necessary, routing packets between LAN computers and the Internet.

NAT components on Windows consist of a NAT device driver, %SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\ipnat.sys, that interfaces with the WFP stack as a callout driver, as well as packet editors that can perform additional packet processing beyond address and port translation.

IP Filtering

Windows includes a very basic IP filtering capability with which a user can choose to allow only certain ports or IP protocols into or out of the network. Although this capability can serve to protect a computer from unauthorized network accesses, its drawback is that it is static and does not automatically create new filters for traffic initiated by applications running on the computer.

Windows also includes a host firewall capability, called Windows Firewall, that goes beyond the basic filtering just described. Windows Firewall uses WFP to provide a stateful firewall, which is one that keeps track of traffic flow so that it distinguishes between TCP/IP traffic that originates on the local LAN and unsolicited traffic that originates on the Internet. When Windows Firewall is enabled on an interface, one of three profiles can be applied—public, private, and domain. By default, when the public profile is chosen (or until a profile is selected), all unsolicited incoming traffic received by the computer is discarded. A user or application can define exceptions so that services running on the computer, such as file and printer sharing or a website, can be accessed from other computers.

The Windows Firewall service, which executes in a Svchost process, uses the BFE to pass exception rules defined in the configuration user interface to the IPNat driver. The WFP filter engine executes the callback functions of each registered callout driver as it processes both inbound and outbound IP packets. A callback function can provide NAT functionality by modifying source and destination addresses in a packet, or as a firewall by returning a status code to TCP/IP that requests that TCP/IP drop the packet and cease processing for it. In kernel mode, Windows Firewall uses the Microsoft Protection Service driver (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Mpsdrv.sys) that provides support for PPTP and FTP filtering, because those protocols provide their own independent control and data channels. The driver must analyze the control channel to figure out which data channel to manipulate. The driver is also used for displaying notification windows when an application starts listening on a socket.

Internet Protocol Security

Internet Protocol Security (IPsec), which is integrated with the Windows TCP/IP stack, helps protect unicast (IPsec itself supports multicast, but the Windows implementation does not) IP data against attacks such as eavesdropping, sniffer attacks, data modification, IP address spoofing, and man-in-the-middle attacks (as long as the identity of the remote machine can be verified, such as a VPN).
You can use IPsec to provide defense-in-depth against network-based attacks from untrusted computers; certain attacks that can result in the denial-of-service of applications, services, or the network; data corruption, data theft, and user-credential theft; and the administrative control over servers, other computers, and the network. IPsec helps defend against network-based attacks through cryptography-based security services, security protocols, and dynamic key management.

IPsec provides the following properties for unicast IP packets sent between trusted hosts:

- Data origin authentication, which verifies the origin of an IP packet and ensures that unauthenticated parties cannot access data.
- Data integrity, which protects an IP packet from being modified in transit without being detected.
- Data confidentiality, which encrypts the payload of IP packets before transmission. Data confidentiality ensures that only the IPsec peer with which a computer is communicating can read and interpret the contents of the packets. This property is optional.
- Anti-replay (or replay protection), which ensures that each IP packet is unique and can’t be reused. This property prevents an attacker from intercepting IP packets and inserting modified packets into a data stream between a source computer and a destination computer. When anti-replay is used, attackers cannot reply to captured messages to establish a session or gain unauthorized access to data.

You can use IPsec to help defend against network-based attacks by configuring host-based IPsec packet filtering and enforcing trusted communications. When you use IPsec for host-based IPsec packet filtering, IPsec can permit or block specific types of unicast IP traffic based on source and destination address combinations and specific protocols and specific ports.

In an Active Directory environment, Group Policy can be used to configure domains, sites, and organizational units (OUs), and IPsec policies (called connection security rules) can then be assigned as required to Group Policy objects (GPOs) through Windows Firewall with Advanced Security configuration settings. Alternatively, you can configure and assign local IPsec policies. Active Directory–based connection security rules are stored in Active Directory, and a copy of the current policy is maintained in a cache in the local registry. Local connection security rules are stored in the local system registry.

To establish trusted communications, IPsec uses mutual authentication, and it supports the following authentication methods through AuthIP, Microsoft’s extension to Internet Key Exchange (IKE):

- Interactive user Kerberos 5 credentials or interactive user NTLMv2 credentials
- User x.509 certificates
- Computer SSL certificates
- NAP health certificates
Anonymous authentication (optional authentication)

Preshared key

If AuthIP is not available, plain IKE is also supported by IPsec. The Windows implementation of IPsec is based on IPsec Requests for Comments (RFCs). The Windows IPsec architecture includes Windows Firewall with Advanced Security, the legacy IPsec Policy Agent, the IKE and Authenticated Internet Protocol (AuthIP) protocols, and an IPsec WFP callout driver, which are described in the following list:

- **Windows Firewall with Advanced Security** In addition to the filtering functionality described earlier, the Windows Firewall service is also responsible for providing the security and policy configuration settings for IPsec, which can be configured through Group Policy either locally or on an Active Directory domain.

- **Legacy IPsec Policy Agent** The legacy IPsec Policy Agent runs as a service. In the Services snap-in in the Microsoft Management Console (MMC), the IPsec Policy Agent appears in the list of computer services under the name IPsec Policy Agent. The IPsec Policy Agent obtains the legacy IPsec policy from an Active Directory domain or the local registry and then passes IP address filters to the IPsec driver and authentication and security settings to IKE. These policies are honored to enable compatibility with older versions of Windows, which implement IPsec management through Active Directory domain.

- **IKE and AuthIP** IKE is a protocol that supports the authentication and key negotiation services required by IPsec. For outgoing traffic, IKE waits for requests to negotiate security associations (SAs) from the IPsec driver, negotiates the SAs, and then sends the SA settings back to the IPsec driver. For incoming traffic, IKE receives a negotiation request directly from the remote peer, and all other traffic from the peer is dropped until the SAs have been successfully negotiated. SAs are a combination of mutually agreeable IPsec policy settings and keys that defines the security services, mechanisms, and keys that are used to help secure communications between IPsec peers. Each SA is a one-way or simplex connection that secures the traffic it carries. IKE negotiates main mode SAs and quick mode SAs when requested by the IPsec driver. The IKE main mode (or ISAKMP) SA protects the IKE negotiation. The quick mode (or IPsec) SAs protect application traffic. AuthIP is a proprietary extension to IKE supported by Windows Vista and later, while Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 also add support for IKEv2, an equivalent standardized extension. It adds a secondary authentication mechanism to increase security and simplify maintenance and configuration of IPsec.

- **IPsec WFP callout driver** The IPsec WFP callout driver is a device driver (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\FwpckInt.sys) that is bound to WFP and processes packets that pass through the TCP/IP driver. The IPsec driver monitors and secures outbound unicast IP traffic, and it monitors, decrypts, and validates inbound unicast IP packets. WFP receives filters from the IPsec Policy Agent and invokes the callout, which then permits, blocks, or secures packets as required. To secure traffic, the IPsec driver uses active SA settings, or it requests that new SAs be created.
You can use the Windows Firewall with Advanced Security (%SystemRoot%\System32\Wf.msc) snap-in that is available in MMC to create and manage connection security rules by using the New Connection Security Rule Wizard, shown in Figure 7-37. This snap-in can be used to create, modify, and store local connection security rules or Active Directory–based connection security rules, and to modify connection security rules on remote computers. Alternatively, you can use the Netsh utility with the netsh advfirewall consec command to manage connection security rules. After IPsec-secured communication is established, you can monitor IPsec information for local computers and for remote computers by using the Windows Firewall with Advanced Security snap-in or the Netsh utility with the netsh advfirewall monitor command.

![Figure 7-37 New Connection Security Rule Wizard](image)

**FIGURE 7-37** New Connection Security Rule Wizard

### NDIS Drivers

When a protocol driver wants to read or write messages formatted in its protocol’s format from or to the network, the driver must do so using a network adapter. Expecting protocol drivers to understand the nuances of every network adapter on the market (proprietary network adapters number in the thousands) is not reasonable, so network adapter vendors provide device drivers that can take network messages and transmit them via the vendors’ proprietary hardware. In 1989, Microsoft and 3Com jointly developed the Network Driver Interface Specification (NDIS), which lets protocol drivers communicate with network adapter drivers in a device-independent manner. Network adapter drivers that conform to NDIS are called **NDIS drivers** or **NDIS miniport drivers**. The version of NDIS that ships with Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 is NDIS 6.20.

The NDIS library (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Ndis.sys) implements the boundary that exists between network transports, such as the TCP/IP driver, and adapter drivers. The NDIS library
is a helper library that NDIS driver clients use to format commands they send to NDIS drivers. NDIS drivers interface with the library to receive requests and send back responses. Figure 7-38 shows the relationship between various NDIS-related components.

![NDIS components diagram](image)

**FIGURE 7-38** NDIS components

Instead of merely providing the NDIS boundary helper routines, the NDIS library provides NDIS drivers with an entire execution environment. NDIS drivers do not follow the standard Windows device driver I/O model, and they cannot function without the encapsulation the NDIS library gives them. This insulation layer wraps NDIS drivers so thoroughly that NDIS drivers don’t accept and process IRPs. Rather, protocol drivers such as TCP/IP call a function in the NDIS library, `NdisAllocateNetBufferList`, and pass the packets to an NDIS miniport by calling an NDIS library function (`NdisSendNetBufferLists`). Additionally, to make development simpler, all components of the Windows Next Generation TCP/IP stack make use of the `NET_BUFFER_LIST` structure, including TCP/IP and WSK, which streamlines communications with NDIS.

NDIS includes the following features:

- NDIS drivers can report whether or not their network medium is active, which allows Windows to display a network connected/disconnected icon on the taskbar. This feature also allows protocols and other applications to be aware of this state and react accordingly. The TCP/IP transport, for example, uses this information to determine when it should reevaluate addressing information it receives from DHCP.
NDIS drivers can be paused and resumed, which enables run-time reconfiguration, such as adding or removing an NDIS Lightweight Filter driver. A lightweight filter replaces most instances of NDIS intermediate drivers used prior to NDIS version 6. (Intermediate drivers are still supported in NDIS 6, but their complexity makes them suitable for only a small class of problems.) Lightweight filter drivers are covered in more detail in the upcoming sections.

TCP/IP offloading, including task and chimney offloading. Task offloading allows a network interface card to implement some or all of the TCP/IP protocol stack, providing a substantial increase in network performance. NDIS includes support for IPsec Task Offload Version 2, which includes support for additional cryptography suites used in IPsec, such as AES, as well as IPv6 support. Chimney offloading provides a direct connection (the so-called chimney) between network applications and the network card hardware, enabling greater offloading and connection state management to be implemented by the network card. These offloading operations can improve system performance by relieving the CPU from the tasks.

Receive-side scaling enables systems with multiple processors to perform packet receive operations based on the most efficient use of available target processors. NDIS supports the receive-side scaling (RSS) interface at the hardware level and targets interrupts and DPCs to the appropriate processors.

Wake-on-LAN allows a wake-on-LAN-capable network adapter to bring the system out of a suspended power state. Events that can trigger the network adapter to signal the system include media connections (such as plugging a network cable into the adapter), the receipt of protocol-specific patterns registered by a protocol (the TCP/IP transport asks to be woken for Address Resolution Protocol [ARP] requests), and, for Ethernet adapters, the receipt of a magic packet (a network packet that contains 16 contiguous copies of the adapter's Ethernet address).

Header-data split allows compatible network cards to improve network performance by splitting the data and header part of an Ethernet frame into different buffers and subsequently combining the buffers into smaller regions of memory than if the buffers were combined. This allows more efficient memory usage as well as better caching because multiple headers can fit in a single page.

Connection-oriented NDIS (CoNDIS) allows NDIS drivers to manage connection-oriented media (typically, a WAN), such as ISDN or PPP devices. (CoNDIS is described in more detail shortly.)

The interfaces that the NDIS library provides for NDIS drivers to interface with network adapter hardware are available via functions that translate directly to corresponding functions in the HAL.
EXPERIMENT: Listing the Loaded NDIS Miniports

The Ndiskd kernel debugger extension library includes the `!miniports` and `!miniport` commands, which let you list the loaded miniports using a kernel debugger and, given the address of a miniport block (a data structure Windows uses to track miniports), see detailed information about the miniport driver. The following example shows the `!miniports` and `!miniport` commands being used to list all the miniports and then specifics about the miniport responsible for interfacing the system to a PCI Ethernet adapter. (Note that WAN miniport drivers work with dial-up connections.)

```
lkd> .load ndiskd
Loaded ndiskd extension DLL

lkd> !miniports
NDIS Driver verifier level: 0
NDIS Failed allocations   : 0
Miniport Driver Block: 86880d78, Version 0.0
    Miniport: 868cf0e8, NetLuidIndex: 1, IfIndex: 9, RAS Async Adapter
Miniport Driver Block: 84c3be60, Version 4.0
    Miniport: 84c3c0e8, NetLuidIndex: 3, IfIndex: 15, VMware Virtual Ethernet Adapter
Miniport Driver Block: 84c29240, Version 0.0
    Miniport: 84c2b438, NetLuidIndex: 0, IfIndex: 2, WAN Miniport (SSTP)
...
lkd> !miniport 84bcc0e8

Miniport 84bcc0e8 : Broadcom NetXtreme 57xx Gigabit Controller, v6.0
```

```
AdapterContext : 85f6b000
Flags          : 0c452218
    BUS_MASTER, 64BIT_DMA, IGNORE_TOKEN_RING_ERRORS
    DESERIALIZED, RESOURCES_AVAILABLE, SUPPORTS_MEDIA_SENSE
    DOES_NOT_Do_LOOPBACK, SG_DMA,
    NOT_MEDIA_CONNECTED,
PnPFlags       : 00610021
    PM_SUPPORTED, DEVICE_POWER_ENABLED, RECEIVED_START
    HARDWARE_DEVICE, NDIS_WDM_DRIVER,
MiniportState        : STATE_RUNNING
IfIndex                  : 10
Ndis5MiniportInNdis6Mode : 0
InternalResetCount    : 0000
MiniportResetCount    : 0000
References            : 5
UserModeOpenReferences: 0
PnPDeviceState        : PNP_DEVICE_STARTED
CurrentDevicePowerState : PowerDeviceDO
Bus PM capabilities
    DeviceD1: 0
    DeviceD2: 0
    WakeFromD0: 0
```
WakeFromD1: 0
WakeFromD2: 0
WakeFromD3: 1

SystemState        DeviceState
PowerSystemUnspecified    PowerDeviceUnspecified
S0            D0
S1            PowerDeviceUnspecified
S2            PowerDeviceUnspecified
S3            D3
S4            D3
S5            D3
SystemWake: S5
           DeviceWake: D3

WakeupMethods Enabled 2:
       WAKE_UP_PATTERN_MATCH
WakeUpCapabilities:
MinMagicPacketWakeUp: 4
MinPatternWakeUp: 4
MinLinkChangeWakeUp: 0
Current PnP and PM Settings: : 00000030
       DISABLE_WAKE_UP, DISABLE_WAKE_ON_RECONNECT,
Translated Allocated Resources:
       Memory: ecef0000, Length: 10000
       Interrupt Level: 9, Vector: a8
MediaType      : 802.3
DeviceObject   : 84bcc030, PhysDO : 848fd6b0  Next DO: 848fc7b0
MapRegisters   : 00000000
FirstPendingPkt: 00000000
DriverVerifyFlags  : 00000000
Miniport Interrupt : 85f72000
Miniport version 6.0
Miniport Filter List:
Miniport Open Block Queue:
       8669bad0: Protocol 86699530 = NDISUIO, ProtocolBindingContext 8669be88, v6.0
       86690008: Protocol 86691008 = VMNETBRIDGE, ProtocolBindingContext 866919b8, v5.0
       84f81c50: Protocol 849fb918 = TCPIP6, ProtocolBindingContext 84f7b930, v6.1
       84f7b230: Protocol 849f43c8 = TCPIP, ProtocolBindingContext 84f7b5e8, v6.1

The Flags field for the miniport that was examined indicates that the miniport supports
64-bit direct memory access operation (64BIT_DMA), that the media is currently not active
(NOT_MEDIA_CONNECTED), and that it can dynamically detect whether the media is connected
or disconnected (SUPPORTS_MEDIA_SENSE). Also listed are the adapter's system-to-device
power-state mappings and the bus resources that the Plug and Play manager assigned to the
adapter. (See the section "The Power Manager" in Chapter 8 in Part 2 for more information on
power-state mappings.)
Variations on the NDIS Miniport

The NDIS model also supports hybrid network transport NDIS drivers, called NDIS intermediate drivers. These drivers lie between transport drivers and NDIS miniport drivers. To an NDIS miniport driver, an NDIS intermediate driver looks like a transport driver; to a transport driver, an NDIS intermediate driver looks like an NDIS miniport driver. NDIS intermediate drivers can see all network traffic taking place on a system because the drivers lie between protocol drivers and network drivers. Software that provides fault-tolerant and load-balancing options for network adapters, such as Microsoft's Network Load Balancing Provider, are based on NDIS intermediate drivers. Finally, the NDIS model also implements lightweight filter drivers (LWF), which are similar to intermediate drivers but specifically designed for filtering network traffic. LWFs support dynamic insertion and removal while the protocol stack is running. Filter drivers have the ability to filter all communications to and from the underlying miniport adapter. They also have the ability to select specify types of filtering (packet data or control messages) and to be bypassed for those that they are not interested in.

Connection-Oriented NDIS

Support for connection-oriented network hardware (for example, PPP) is native in Windows, which makes connection management and establishment standard in the Windows network architecture. Connection-oriented NDIS drivers use many of the same APIs that standard NDIS drivers use; however, connection-oriented NDIS drivers send packets through established network connections rather than placing them on the network medium.

In addition to miniport support for connection-oriented media, NDIS includes definitions for drivers that work to support a connection-oriented miniport driver:

- Call managers are NDIS drivers that provide call setup and teardown services for connection-oriented clients (described shortly). A call manager uses a connection-oriented miniport to exchange signaling messages with network switches or another connection-oriented network medium. A call manager supports one or more signaling protocols. A call manager is implemented as a network protocol driver.

- An integrated miniport call manager (MCM) is a connection-oriented miniport driver that also provides call manager services to connection-oriented clients. An MCM is essentially an NDIS miniport driver with a built-in call manager.

- A connection-oriented client uses the call setup and teardown services of a call manager or MCM and the send and receive services of a connection-oriented NDIS miniport driver. A connection-oriented client can provide its own protocol services to higher levels in the network stack, or it can implement an emulation layer that interfaces connectionless legacy protocols and connection-oriented media.
Figure 7-39 shows the relationships between these components.

**FIGURE 7-39** Connection-oriented NDIS drivers

**EXPERIMENT: Using Network Monitor to Capture Network Packets**

Microsoft provides a tool named Network Monitor that lets you capture packets that flow through one or more NDIS miniport drivers on your system by installing an NDIS lightweight filter driver (Netmon). You can obtain the latest version of Network Monitor by going to [http://www.microsoft.com/download/en/details.aspx?id=4865](http://www.microsoft.com/download/en/details.aspx?id=4865). Don’t forget to download the NetMon protocol parsers from [http://nmparsers.codeplex.com/](http://nmparsers.codeplex.com/); otherwise, you won’t be able to decode the Microsoft protocols. When you first start Network Monitor, you’ll see a window similar to the one shown in Figure 7-40.
In the Select Networks pane, Network Monitor lets you select which network connection you want to monitor. After selecting one or more, start the capture environment by clicking the New Capture button on the toolbar. You can now initiate monitoring by clicking the Start button on the toolbar. Perform operations that generate network activity on the connection you’re monitoring (such as browsing to a website), and after you see that Network Monitor has captured packets, stop monitoring by clicking the Stop button. In the Frame Summary pane, you will see all the raw network traffic during the capture period. The Network Conversations pane displays network traffic isolated by process, whenever possible. By clicking on the Iexplore.exe process in this example, Network Monitor shows only the relevant frames in the Frame Summary view, as shown in Figure 7-41.
FIGURE 7-41 Capturing packets with Network Monitor

The window shows the HTTP packets that Network Monitor captured as the Microsoft website was accessed through Internet Explorer. If you click on a frame, Network Monitor displays a view of the packet that breaks it apart to show various layered application and protocol headers in the Frame Details pane, as shown in the previous screen shot.

Network Monitor also includes a number of other features, such as capture triggers and filters, that make it a powerful tool for troubleshooting network problems. You can also add parsers for other protocols, as well as view and modify their source code. Network Monitor parsers are hosted on CodePlex (http://nmparsers.codeplex.com), the Microsoft open source project site.

Remote NDIS

Prior to the development of Remote NDIS, a vendor that developed a USB network device had to provide a driver that interfaced with NDIS as a miniport driver as well as interfacing with a USB WDM bus driver, as shown in Figure 7-42.
Remote NDIS is a specification for network devices on USB. The specification eliminates the need for a hardware vendor to write an NDIS miniport driver by defining messages and the mechanism by which the messages are transmitted over USB. Remote NDIS messages mirror the NDIS interface and include messages for initializing and resetting a device, transmitting and receiving packets, setting and querying device parameters, and indicating media link status.

The Remote NDIS architecture, in Figure 7-43, relies on a Microsoft-supplied NDIS miniport driver, %SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Rndismp.sys, that translates NDIS commands and forwards them to a USB device. The architecture allows for a single NDIS miniport driver to be used for all Remote NDIS devices on USB.

Currently, USB is the only bus supported by RNDIS on Windows.
QoS

If no special measures are taken, IP network traffic is delivered on a first-come, first-served basis. Applications have no control over the priority of their messages, and they can experience bursty network behavior, where they occasionally obtain high throughput and low latencies but otherwise receive poor network performance. While this level of service is acceptable in most situations (such as transferring files or browsing the Web), an increasing number of network applications demand more consistent service levels, or Quality of Service (QoS) guarantees. Video conferencing, media streaming, and enterprise resource planning (ERP) are examples of applications that require consistent network performance. QoS allows an application to specify minimum bandwidth and maximum latencies, which can be satisfied only if every networking software and hardware component between a sender and a receiver supports QoS standards such as IEEE 802.1P, an industry standard that specifies the format of QoS packets and how OSI layer 2 devices (switches and network adapters) respond to them.

Windows supports QoS through a policy-based QoS implementation that takes full advantage of the Next Generation TCP/IP network stack, WFP, and NDIS lightweight filter drivers. The implementation allows for managing or prioritizing bandwidth use based on different conditions, such as the application, the source or destination IP address, the protocol being used, and the source or destination ports. Network administrators typically apply QoS settings to a logon session or a computer with Active Directory–based Group Policy, but they can be applied locally as well.

Policy-based QoS provides two methods through which bandwidth can be managed. The first uses a special field in the IP header called the Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP). Routers that support DSCP read the value and separate packets into specific priority queues. The QoS architecture in Windows can mark outgoing packets with the appropriate DSCP field so that network devices can provide differentiated levels of service. The other bandwidth management method is the ability to simply throttle outgoing traffic based on the conditions outlined earlier, where the QoS components limit bandwidth to a specified rate.

The Windows QoS implementation consists of several components, as shown in Figure 7-44. First, the QoS Client Side Extension (%SystemRoot%\System32\Gptext.dll) notifies the Group Policy client and the QoS Inspection Module that QoS settings have changed. Next, the QoS Inspection Module (Enterprise Quality of Service, eQoS), which is a WFP packet-inspection component implemented in the TCP/IP driver that reacts to policy changes, retrieves the updated policy and works with the transport layer and QoS Packet Scheduler to mark traffic that matches the policy. Finally, the QoS Packet Scheduler, or Pacer (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Pacer.sys), provides the NDIS lightweight filter functionality, such as throttling and setting the DSCP value, to control packet scheduling based on the QoS policies. Pacer also provides the GQoS (Generic QoS) and TC (Traffic Control) API support for legacy Windows applications that used these mechanisms.

In addition to the systemwide, policy-based QoS support provided by the QoS architecture, Windows enables specific classes of socket-based applications to have individual and specific control of QoS behavior through an API called the Quality Windows Audio/Video Experience, or qWAVE.
Network-based multimedia applications, such as Voice over IP (VoIP), can use the qWAVE API to query information on real-time network bandwidth and adapt to changing network conditions, as well as to prioritize packets to efficiently use the available bandwidth. qWAVE also takes advantage of the topology protocols described earlier to dynamically determine if the current network devices will support the required bandwidth for a video stream, for example. It can notify applications of diminishing bandwidth, at which point the multimedia application is expected to reduce the stream quality, for example.

![Policy-based QoS architecture](image)

qWAVE is implemented in the QoS2 (%SystemRoot%\System32\Qwave.dll) API library and provides four main components:

- Admission control, which determines, when a new network multimedia stream is started, if the current network can support the sustained bandwidth requested.

- Caching, which allows the detailed admission control checks to be bypassed if similar usage patterns occurred in the past and the calculation result was already cached.

- Monitoring and probing, which keep track of available bandwidth and notify applications during low-bandwidth or high-latency situations.

- Traffic tagging and shaping, which uses the 802.11p and DSCP technologies mentioned earlier to tag packets with the appropriate priority to ensure timely delivery.
Figure 7-45 shows the general overview of the qWAVE architecture:

![qWAVE Architecture Diagram]

**FIGURE 7-45** qWAVE architecture

### Binding

The final piece in the Windows networking architecture puzzle is the way in which the components at the various layers—networking API layer, transport driver layer, NDIS driver layer—locate one another. The name of the process that connects the layers is *binding*. You've witnessed binding taking place if you've changed your network configuration by adding or removing a component using the Network Connections folder.

When you install a networking component, you must supply an INF file for the component. (INF files are described in Chapter 8 in Part 2.) This file includes directions that setup API routines must follow to install and configure the component, including binding dependencies or binding relationships. A developer can specify binding dependencies for a proprietary component so that the Service Control Manager (the Service Control Manager is described in Chapter 4, “Management Mechanisms”) will not only load the component in the correct order but will load the component only if other dependent components are present on the system. Binding relationships, which the bind engine determines with the aid of additional information in a component’s INF file, establish connections between components at the various layers. The connections specify which components a network component on one layer can use on the layer beneath it.

For example, the Workstation service (redirector) automatically binds to the TCP/IP protocol. The order of the binding, which you can examine on the Adapters And Bindings tab in the Advanced Settings dialog box (shown in Figure 7-46), determines the priority of the binding. (See the section “Multiple Redirector Support” earlier in this chapter for instructions on how to launch the Advanced Settings dialog box.) When the redirector receives a request to access a remote file, it submits the request to both protocol drivers simultaneously. When the response comes, the redirector waits until
it has also received responses from any higher-priority protocol drivers. Only then will the redirector return the result to the caller. Thus, it can be advantageous to reorder bindings so that bindings of high priority are also the most performance efficient or applicable to most of the computers in your network. You can also manually remove bindings with the Advanced Settings dialog box.

**FIGURE 7-46** Editing bindings with the Advanced Settings dialog box

The *Bind* value, in the Linkage subkey of a network component's registry configuration key, stores binding information for that component. For example, if you examine HKLM\SYSTEM \CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanWorkstation\Linkage\Bind, you’ll see the binding information for the Workstation service.

### Layered Network Services

Windows includes network services that build on the APIs and components we’ve presented in this chapter. Describing the capabilities and detailed internal implementation of all these services is outside the scope of this book, but this section provides a brief overview of remote access, Active Directory, Network Load Balancing, and Distributed File System (DFS), including DFS Replication (DFSR).

### Remote Access

Remote access, which is available with Windows Server with the Routing and Remote Access service, allows remote access clients to connect to remote access servers and access network resources such as files, printers, and network services as if the client were physically connected to the remote access server’s network. Windows provides two types of remote access:

- Dial-up remote access is used by clients that connect to a remote access server via a telephone or other telecommunications infrastructure. The telecommunications medium is used to create a temporary physical or virtual connection between the client and the server.
Virtual private network (VPN) remote access lets a VPN client establish a virtual point-to-point connection to the server over an IP network such as the Internet. Windows also supports the Secure Socket Transmission Protocol (SSTP), which is a newer tunneling protocol for VPN connections that has the ability to pass through most firewalls and routers that block PPTP or L2TP/IPsec traffic. It does so by packaging PPP data over the SSL channel of the HTTPS protocol. Because the latter operates on port 443 and is usually part of typical Web browsing behavior, it is much more likely to be available than traditional VPN tunneling protocols.

Remote access differs from remote control solutions because remote access acts as a proxy connection to a Windows network, whereas remote control software executes applications on a server, presenting a user interface to the client.

Active Directory

Active Directory is the Windows implementation of Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) directory services (RFC 4510). Fundamentally, Active Directory is a database that stores objects representing resources defined by applications in a Windows network. For example, the structure and membership of a Windows domain, including user accounts and password information, are stored in Active Directory.

Object classes and the attributes that define properties of objects are specified by a schema. The objects in the Active Directory are hierarchically arranged, much like the registry’s logical organization, where container objects can store other objects, including other container objects. (See Chapter 6 for more information on container objects.)

Active Directory supports a number of APIs that clients can use to access objects within an Active Directory database:

- The LDAP C API is a C language API that uses the LDAP networking protocol. Applications written in C or C++ can use this API directly, and applications written in other languages can access the APIs through translation layers.

- Active Directory Service Interfaces (ADSI) is a COM interface to Active Directory implemented on top of LDAP that abstracts the details of LDAP programming. ADSI supports multiple languages, including Microsoft Visual Basic, C, and Microsoft Visual C++. ADSI can also be used by Microsoft Windows Script Host (WSH) applications.

- Messaging API (MAPI) is supported for compatibility with Microsoft Exchange client and Outlook Address Book client applications.

- Security Account Manager (SAM) APIs are built on top of Active Directory to provide an interface to logon authentication packages such as MSV1_0 (%SystemRoot%\System32\Msv1_0.dll, which is used for legacy NT LAN Manager authentication) and Kerberos (%SystemRoot%\System32\Kdcsvc.dll).

- Windows NT 4 networking APIs (Net APIs) are used by Windows NT 4 clients to gain access to Active Directory through SAM.
- NTDS API is used to look up SIDs and GUIDs in an Active Directory implementation (via *DsCrackNames* mostly) as well as for its main purposes, Active Directory management and replication. Several third parties have written applications that monitor Active Directory from these APIs.

Active Directory is implemented as a database file that, by default, is named `%SystemRoot%\Ntds\Ntds.dit` and replicated across the domain controllers in a domain. The Active Directory directory service, which is a Windows service that executes in the Local Security Authority Subsystem (LSASS) process, manages the database, using DLLs that implement the on-disk structure of the database as well as provide transaction-based updates to protect the integrity of the database. The Active Directory database store is based on a version of the Extensible Storage Engine (ESE), also known as the JET Blue, database used by Microsoft Exchange Server 2007, Desktop Search, and Windows Mail. The ESE library (%SystemRoot%\System32\Esent.dll) provides routines for accessing the database, which are open for other applications to use as well. Figure 7-47 shows the Active Directory architecture.

![Active Directory architecture](image-url)

*FIGURE 7-47  Active Directory architecture*
Network Load Balancing

As stated earlier in the chapter, Network Load Balancing, which is included with server versions of Windows, is based on NDIS lightweight filter technology. Network Load Balancing allows for the creation of a cluster containing up to 32 computers, which are called *cluster hosts* in Network Load Balancing. The cluster can maintain multiple dedicated IP addresses and a single virtual IP address that is published for access by clients. Client requests go to all the computers in the cluster, but only one cluster host responds to the request. The Network Load Balancing NDIS drivers effectively partition the client space among available cluster hosts in a distributed manner. This way, each host handles its portion of incoming client requests, and every client request always gets handled by one and only one host. The cluster host that determines it should handle a client request allows the request to propagate up to the TCP/IP protocol driver and eventually a server application; the other cluster hosts don’t. If a cluster host fails, the rest of the cluster realizes that the cluster host is no longer a candidate for processing requests and redistributes the incoming client requests to the remaining cluster hosts. No new client requests are sent to the failed cluster host. Another cluster host can be added to the cluster as a replacement, and it will then seamlessly start handling client requests.

Network Load Balancing isn’t a general-purpose clustering solution because the server application that clients communicate with must have certain characteristics: the first is that it must be based on protocols supported by the Windows TCP/IP stack, and the second is that it must be able to handle client requests on any system in a Network Load Balancing cluster. This second requirement typically means that an application that must have access to shared state in order to service client requests must manage the shared state itself—Network Load Balancing doesn’t include services for automatically distributing shared state across cluster hosts. Applications that are ideally suited for Network Load Balancing include a web server that serves static content, Windows Media Server, and Terminal Services. Figure 7-48 shows an example of a Network Load Balancing operation.
One of the most difficult challenges that network administrators face is ensuring that systems that connect to their private networks are up to date and meet the organization's health policy requirements. A health policy contains the specific requirements that a system must meet, such as the minimum required system hotfixes, or a minimum antivirus signature version. Enforcing these requirements is even more difficult when the systems, such as home computers or laptops, are not under the network administrator’s control. Attackers often create malware that targets out-of-date software, so users who do not keep their systems up to date with the most recent operating system updates or antivirus signatures risk exposing the organization’s private network assets to attacks and viruses.

Network Access Protection (NAP) provides a mechanism that helps network administrators enforce compliance with health requirement policies for all systems that require network access. Systems that do not meet the required health policies are isolated from the network and are placed in quarantine. While in quarantine, the noncompliant system’s network connectivity is severely limited, and it can only see the remediation servers from which it can receive the necessary updates to bring it back into compliance. This ensures that only systems that comply with the health policy requirements are allowed to access the organization’s network. NAP is not designed to protect a network from malicious users; it is designed to help administrators maintain the health of the systems on the network, which in turn helps maintain the network’s overall integrity. NAP is a multivendor system, with clients running on other operating systems, such as Mac OS X and Linux, and several third-party System Health Agents, System Health Validators, and Enforcement Clients.
An exhaustive description of NAP is beyond the scope of this book; however, Figures 7-49 and 7-50 illustrate the various components that implement NAP on client and server systems. A detailed description of NAP can be found at http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/network/bb545879.aspx.

**FIGURE 7-49** NAP client-side architecture

In brief, the components of NAP on the client include the following:

- **System Health Agent (SHA)** Monitors one or more aspects of a client’s health, and provides one or more Statements of Health (SoH) to the local system’s NAP Agent. For example, an antivirus SHA might examine the version numbers of the antivirus engine and virus signature file, and place that information in its SoH. A SHA can be matched to a remediation server so that a noncompliant system will know how to become compliant. For example, a SHA for checking antivirus signatures could be matched to a server that contains the latest antivirus signature file and the antivirus application package. Some SHAs do not need to be matched with a remediation server. For example, a SHA might just report local system settings that a System Health Validator (SHV) running on the NAP server SHV can use to determine whether the system’s firewall is enabled. Windows XP Service Pack 3 and later provide a SHA (%SystemRoot%\System32\Mssha.dll) that monitors the settings of the Windows Action Center (SHA-WAC). This SHA is typically referred to as the Windows SHA, or WSH. To write a SHA, look at the `INapSystemHealthAgentBinding2`, `INapSystemHealthAgentCallback`, and...
INapSystemHealthAgentRequest APIs. The SHA is dependent upon the System Health Validator (SHV), and it is expected that the author of a SHA also provide a SHV.

**Note** SHA vendors should understand that the evaluation process can happen before the system has an IP address (for example, using 802.1x), so the SHA cannot look for data outside the client system. In addition, the IP address can change at any point in time (for example, if NAP causes the client to move to the quarantine VLAN), so the SHA should not cache sockets or make any assumptions about its IP address.

- **NAP Agent** %SystemRoot%\System32\qagentRT.dll (quarantine agent service runtime). Runs on each client computer, collects the SoH from each SHA, and relays that information to the NAP Server. The NAP Agent communicates with the NAP Server running on the Network Policy Server using the Microsoft Statement of Health protocol [MS-SoH].

- **Enforcement Client (EC)** Responsible for communicating with an Enforcement Point when trying to connect to a network, and for enforcing machine compliance with NAP policies. An Enforcement Point is a server or network access device that can be used with NAP to require the evaluation of a NAP client’s health state and provide restricted network access or communication. If the machine’s health is not compliant, the NAP EC indicates the restricted status to the NAP Agent. Windows provides ECs for IPsec (%SystemRoot%\System32\NapIpsec.dll), 802.1X and VPN EAP-authenticated connections (%SystemRoot%\System32\Eapqec.dll), DHCP (%SystemRoot%\System32\Dhcpqec.dll), and a Remote Desktop gateway (%SystemRoot%\System32\Tsgqec.dll). To write an EC, look at the INapEnforcementClientBinding, INapEnforcementClientCallback, and INapEnforcementClientConnection2 APIs.

**Note** The name “enforcement client” can be somewhat confusing. The name refers to its role as a client of a network enforcement point, so it is more about how a client system accesses a network (although access control is generally part of its function).

The following diagram shows the NAP components on a server. On the server side, the entire mechanism is an add-on to the Network Policy Server (NPS) Server (part of the IAS service). In general, the health requests arrive at the NPS as an addition to RADIUS requests sent to the NPS by the enforcement point. The servers, the NPS then passes the Statement of Health (SoH) to the health validation layer, which passes the SoH to the appropriate SHV.

From the NPS perspective, the requests are coming from RADIUS clients (for example, 802.1x network switch, VPN server, DHCP server, and so on) in RADIUS UDP packets. Or it allows private ALPC calls. (Instead of going through UDP, the ALPC is used by the other Windows
Server roles—for example, DHCP server—to simplify the programming model.) The RADIUS specification (RFC 2865) provides for a maximum packet size of 4096, which has a significant impact on the amount of data that a SHA can send.

The client IPsec EC talks to a Health Registration Authority (HRA) server over HTTP. The HRA is an IIS ISAPI filter, which passes the SoH to the NPS (using the ALPC interface) and is responsible for issuing the certificates (when the machine is identified as qualified for a certificate). The HRA server list can be configured using DNS, by adding HRA server records and configuring the client to get the list from DNS. Third parties can implement a RADIUS client to talk to the NPS over UDP.

- **System Health Validator (SHV)** Evaluates a SoH received from the corresponding SHA on a client and determines whether the client is in compliance with the organization's health policy by checking with a Health Requirements Server (HRS). For example, an antivirus HRS might specify the minimum antivirus engine version and virus signature file version.
Note  The presence of a Health Requirements Server is an implementation detail; an SHV can perform all the necessary work on its own.

The SHV uses this information to determine whether the SoH provided by the client SHA is in compliance with the health policy provided by the HRS. To write a SHV, look at the INapSystemHealthValidator and INapSystemHealthValidationRequest2 APIs. The SHV is dependent upon the System Health Agent (SHA), and it is expected that the author of a SHA also provide a SHV.

Not pictured in the diagram are one or more Remediation Servers, which allow a client to be brought into compliance (for example, a Windows Update server). The SHV is not connected to the Remediation Servers, but it is aware of their existence (configured administratively). It passes information about the servers to the client when the SoH indicates that the client is not compliant with the current policy requirements.

NAP client configuration is typically done in the Group Policy editor with the Enforcement Client snap-in, but it can also be performed using the NAP client configuration MMC snap-in (%SystemRoot%\System32\Napclcfg.msc) or the network shell (%SystemRoot%\System32\Netsh.exe), as shown in Figures 7-51, 7-52, and 7-53.

Note  Group Policy always takes precedence over other configurations, followed by the local configuration, and then by DNS auto-discovery.

FIGURE 7-51  NAP Client configuration
FIGURE 7-52 NAP Client configuration

```plaintext
C:\Users\Brian>netsh nap show config
NAP client configuration:
_________________________________________________________________________
Cryptographic service provider (CSP) = Microsoft RSA CChannel Cryptographic Provider,
hash algorithm = sha256 (1.2.14.3.2.27)
Enforcement clients:

Name: DHCP Quarantine Enforcement Client
ID: 79417
Admin: Disabled

Name: First Relying Party
ID: 79418
Admin: Enabled

Name: RD Gateway Quarantine Enforcement Client
ID: 79419
Admin: Disabled

Name: EAP Quarantine Enforcement Client
ID: 79420
Admin: Enabled

Client tracing:
State: Disabled
Level: Disabled

Trusted server group configuration:
Group = MSIT
  Require Https = Enabled
  URL = https://th5radw01.redmond.corp.microsoft.com/NondomainHRx/hc
  Processing order = 1
Group = MSIT
  Require Https = Enabled
  URL = https://th5radw02.redmond.corp.microsoft.com/NondomainHRx/hc
  Processing order = 2
Group = MSIT
  Require Https = Enabled
  URL = https://nondomainHRx.corp.microsoft.com/NondomainHRx/hc
  Processing order = 3
Group = MSIT
  Require Https = Enabled
  URL = https://nondomainHRx.corp.microsoft.com/NondomainHRx/hc
  Processing order = 4

User interface settings:
Title = Microsoft IT Network Access Protection
Description = For remediation options, click the 'More Information' button if available.
Image =

Health Registration Authority (HRA) configuration:
The system cannot find the file specified.
```

FIGURE 7-53 Configuring NAP using the network shell
Direct Access

In Windows 7 Ultimate and Enterprise editions, Microsoft added an always-on Virtual Private Network (VPN) capability known as DirectAccess (DA), which allows a remote client on the Internet access to a corporate domain-based network. A DA connection to a corporate network is created when the client system boots, and it lasts for as long as the client is running and connected to the Internet. If network problems cause the connection to be dropped, the connection will be automatically re-established when network connections permit. DA uses IPsec running over IPv6, which can be encapsulated in IPv4 using a variety of mechanisms (described later) if the local system does not have end-to-end IPv6 connectivity to the private network. Remote systems can even use DA when they are behind a firewall, because DA can use HTTPS (TCP port 443) as a transport (IP-HTTPS).

Unlike traditional VPN products, remote systems using DA to access a corporate network are always visible and manageable—just as if the machine was directly plugged into the corporate network. The corporate IT department can manage remote systems by updating Group Policy settings or push software updates at any time the remote systems are attached to the Internet. The IT department can also specify which corporate network resources (applications, servers, subnets, and so on) can be accessed by a user or remote system that is connected using DA.

For enhanced security, Authentication Mechanism Assurance (described in Chapter 6) can be required on DA clients. This requires two-factor authentication (for example, a smart card or other hardware token) to log on or unlock a system.

As shown in Figure 7-54, there are many mechanisms available for connecting a DA client to a corporate network: IPv6, Intra-Site Automatic Tunnel Addressing Protocol (ISATAP), IPv4 encrypted with IPsec, 6to4 tunnel, or Teredo. In all cases, a connection is made between the remote client and a DA server. This server provides Denial of Service (DoS) protection by rate-limiting connection negotiation traffic used to connect to it, and it acts as an IPv6 tunnel gateway between the remote client and the corporate network. The DA server also functions as an IPv6-based IPsec security gateway, similar to a VPN server or VPN client access concentrator, to control access to the corporate network.

A client typically has two IPv6 tunnels to the DA server: an infrastructure tunnel and an intranet tunnel. The infrastructure tunnel is for communicating with corporate infrastructure servers, such as a Domain Name System (DNS) server, and domain controllers. The infrastructure tunnel is created automatically when the client boots, and it does not require the user to be logged in. The intranet tunnel is established when a user logs in, and it carries network traffic for the user.

DA also works with NAP. In this case, a Health Registration Authority (HRA) server is placed outside the corporate firewall (often referred to as the DMZ, or DeMilitarized Zone). The client is configured with the name of the HRA (which can be resolved to an IP address using a public DNS server). When the client boots, it contacts the HRA and sends its Statement of Health. If the client is not healthy, it must access remediation servers, which are also in the DMZ. Once the client is healthy, it obtains a health certificate that can then be used with IPsec to connect to the DA server.
**Conclusion**

The Windows network architecture provides a flexible infrastructure for networking APIs, network protocol drivers, and network adapter drivers. The Windows networking architecture takes advantage of I/O layering to give networking support the extensibility to evolve as computer networking evolves. Similarly, new APIs can interface to existing Windows protocol drivers. Finally, the range of networking APIs implemented on Windows affords network application developers a range of possible implementations, each with different programming models and protocol support.
Index

Symbols

3Com, 672
16-bit applications, Wow64 support, 228
32-bit applications
    execution on 64-bit systems, 224–228
    frame-based exception handlers, 125
32-bit programming interfaces, 2
32-bit Windows
    address space layout, 16
    kernel mode security, 17
    object headers, 150
    processor selection, 467
    system calls, 133
64-bit applications
    DLL versioning check, 237
    structured exception handling, 125
64-bit programming interfaces, 2
64-bit Windows
    address space, 16
    device driver verification, 17
    object headers, 150
    stride value, 467
    system calls, 135
    Win32 emulation, 224. See Wow64
!dp command, 366
!dt command, 396
!handle command, 364
!numa command, 460
!pcr command, 453
!peb command, 365
!process command, 363–364, 394, 454
!ready command, 408
!reg dumppool command, 298–299
!reg findkcb command, 301
/SUBSYSTEM qualifier, 48
%SystemRoot%\System32 directory, 352
%SystemRoot%\System32\Wbem directory, 352
!teb command, 395
!thread command, 394, 395, 397

A

AAM (Admin Approval Mode), 574–576
aborts, 80
abstract classes, 345
AcceptEx function, 599
access
    caching, 643
determining, 528–536
network, 689–690
AccessCheck, 25, 531
    object integrity levels, viewing, 504–505
    object security checks, 164
AccessCheckByType function, 531
access checks, 495–497
access token-based, 532–533
discretionary, 528, 530–531
user-mode equivalents, 536
access control, 523–536
    claims based, 537
discretionary, 488
    forms of, 23
    identity-based, 537
access control entries (ACEs). See ACEs
access control entries (ACEs) (access control entries)
access control lists (ACLs). See ACLs (access control lists)
access denied errors, 292
access logging, 494–495
access mask, specifying, 165
access rights
    administrative vs. user, 566
group claims, 563
to objects, 163
    process requests, 368
protected processes and, 368
revocation, 533
access tokens, 5, 14, 506–513, 547
access checks based on, 532–533
ApplIDs in, 582
creation, 560
geneneration, 77
privileges, adding, 559
user, 559
access validation
    ACE ordering, 533–534
    algorithms, 530–533
account profiles, loading, 325
account rights, 540
defined, 538
ACEs (access control entries), 523
audit types, 549
conditional, 537–538, 582, 584
flags, 524
inheritance, 527–528
order of, 528, 533–536
processing, 532
propagation, 528
in SACLs, 524
viewing, 535–536
ACLs (access control lists)
    accumulation of access rights, 524
    ACE order in, 528
    assigning, 527–528
displaying, 163–164
    services, permissions for, 316
types, 523
    virtual service accounts in, 518, 520–521
act as part of operating system privilege, 546
Action Center, viewing crashes in, 130
activation contexts, 237
active desktop, 557–558
Active Directory, 286, 490, 686–687
    ACEs used in, 523
    APIs to access objects, 686–687
    architecture, 687
directory service, 687
schema, 686
server name publishing integration, 608
Active Directory Service Interfaces (ADSI), 686
Active Directory Users and Groups MMC snap-in, 539
active logon sessions, listing, 560–562
active probes, 661
ActiveX controls, 344
addresses. See also IP addresses
    well-known, 600
    address mapping, 15
    address ordering, 189
    address sharing, restricting, 604
    address space
        initial process, 378–379
        layout, 16
for Wow64 processes, 224–225
Address Windowing Extension (AWE), 16
AdjustBoost dispatch events, 431
AdjustBoost priority boosts, 443
AdjustUnwait dispatch events, 430–431
AdjustUnwait priority boosts, 442–443
Admin Approval Mode (AAM), 574–576
administrative rights, 566
operations requiring, 573
requesting, 576–578
running with, 574–576
Administrator account name, 499
administrators
Bypass Traverse Checking privilege, 545
privileges assignment, 539
admission control, 683
ADSI (Active Directory Service Interfaces), 686
Advanced Local Procedure Call (ALPC), See ALPC (Advanced Local Procedure Call)
Advanced Security Settings dialog box
Effective Permissions tab, 535–536
Permissions tab, 535
Advanced Settings dialog box
And Bindings tab, 684–685
Advapi32.dll, 37
process-creation routines, 369
virtual DLL files, 246
AFD (Ancillary Function Driver), 602
affinity masks, 40, 458. See also processor affinity
extended, 465–466
process, 464–465
restricting to specific node, 460
thread, 463–465
affinity policy, interrupts, 102–104
altable wait state, 112
ALPC (Advanced Local Procedure Call), 56, 209–219
asynchronous operation, 213–214
attributes, 215
blobs, 215–216
collection list, 213–214
collection model, 210–211
debugging, 218–219
handles, 215–216
handle table, 216
message model, 211–213
message queues, 212
message zones, 217
performance, 217
ports, 210, 212–213
regions, 214–215
resources, 215–216
sections, 214–215
security, 214, 216–217
tracing, 218–219
uses, 209
views, 214–215
altitudes of registry callbacks, 303
AMD-V Rapid Virtualization Indexing (RVI), 259
Ancillary Function Driver (AFD), 602
ANSI character text strings, converting to Unicode, 24
antivirus products, use of callback mechanism, 303
APC boosts, 432
APC delivery
disabling, 196–197, 198
in Wow64, 225
APC interrupt level, 91, 386, 413
APC objects, 110
APC queue, 110
APCs (asynchronous procedure calls), 110–112, 607
CPU quota enforcement, 474
disabling, 110
insertion and delivery behavior, 111
pending, 448, 469
per-process CPU Quota APC structure, 472
per-thread, 472–473, 476
queuing to thread, 430
rate control, 383
signaling code implementation, 433
User APC reserve object, 162
APIC (Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controller), 84
architecture, 84
interrupt assignment, 90
viewing, 85–86
virtualizing, 257
API redirection
for application compatibility, 244–245
image loader support, 233
APIs
application-compatibility risks, 244
categorization, 245–247
separating from underlying protocols, 663
API Sets, 245–247
image loader support, 233
ApplD, 581–582
certificate verification, 588
application-compatibility flags, 578
application-compatibility shims, 568
application desktop, 556
application failures, troubleshooting, 291–293
application layer in OSI reference model, 594
application load failures, 243, 244
application manifests
execution level information, 577–578
version-specific GUIDs in, 244
applications
administrative rights, requesting, 576–578
affinity updates, 480
ApplDs, 581–582
buffer overflows, 292
compatibility levels, 245
displaying startup, 233–234
dynamic configuration, 658
group-aware, 408
identification for security purposes, 581–582
initialization, 232
I/O control functions, 227–228
nonadministrative, 566
notification of registry changes, 290
peer-to-peer support, 624–625
private objects, 497
problem diagnosis requests, 354
registry key creation, 301
registry settings, 279
registry settings, locating, 290–291
response times, 113
RPC, 606–607
single-instancing, 172–173
standard user rights, running with, 566–573
startup, 278
subsystem DLL calls, 49
unprivileged user accounts, running in, 292
user data, saving, 566–567
USER function calls, 51
user-mode execution, 232
virtualization, 385
Winsock functions, access to, 602
application setup programs
service initialization, 305
service registration, 305
application start cursor, 385
AppLocker, 491, 583–588
auditing mode, 583
CBAC use, 537
conditional ACEs, 582, 584
PowerShell commands, 585–586
registry change notifications, 586
rules, 583
storage location of rules, 584–585
APs (authentication protocols), 563
arbiters, 97
argument table, 135
artificial wait state, 478
ASMP (asymmetric multiprocessing), 38
assembly language, 38
ASSERT checks, 45–46
association classes, 349–350
Assured Authentication, 562–563
asymmetric multiprocessing (ASMP), 38
asynchronous callbacks, for change notifications, 278
asynchronous events, interrupts, 80. See also interrupts
asynchronous execution, 204
asynchronous file transfer, 621
asynchronous messaging, 211–214
message zones, 217
asynchronous notifications, 213–214
asynchronous procedure calls (APCs).
See APCs (asynchronous procedure calls)
asynchronous RPC, 607
atomic lock operations, 197
attributes
ALPC, 215
cacheable, 639
CBAC, 537
process, 372–373
Audio Device Graph process (Audiodg.exe), 368
auditing
advanced policy settings, 554
audit events, generating, 548
Audit Object Access policy, 549
local system policies, 548
mechanisms for, 548–554
policy configuration, 548
Audit Log, 524
Audit Object Access policy, 549
AuditPol command, 552
AuditQueryGlobalSacl API, 552
audit records
ACEs in, 549–550
flow of, 549
generation, 548
object-access, 549–550
AuditSetGlobalSacl API, 552
authentication
Assured Authentication, 562–563
biometric framework, 563–568
certificate-based, 563
credential providers, 77
Kerberos, 559–560
levels, 608
MSV1_0, 558–559
network communication, 608
password-based, 558–562
remote, 559
smartcard, 562
user, 555–556, 558–560
authentication packages, 491, 555
for user logon, 558–559
authentication protocols (APs), 563
authentication services, 608
AuthIP, 670, 671
authorization, 536–538
AUTHZ_CLIENT_CONTEXT, 536
AuthZ Windows API, 497, 536–538
Autochk.exe, 73
auto-elevation, 578–579
automated problem detection, 354,
See also WDI (Windows Diagnostic Infrastructure)
auto-start services, 305, 321, 323, 327
dependencies, 327
availability, 637
AWE (Address Windowing Extension), 16
B
Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS), 621–624, 645
balancer, 262
balance set manager, 69–70, 439–441
balance-set-manager thread, 188
base filtering engine (BFE), 667
BaseNamedObjects directory, 147
Base Services, 2
basic sockets, 605
BCD (Boot Configuration Database), 278
registry hive, 283–284
remote editing, 284–285
BCDEdit, 284
BFE (base filtering engine), 667
binary dependencies
manifests, 237
resolving, 235
binary MOF (BMF) files, 348
binding, 684–685
bindings priority, 684–685
bins for registry cells, 296–298
allocation, 301
biometrics, 563–568
bitmasks, processor state, 462–463
BITs (Background Intelligent Transfer Service), 621–624
BITAdmin tool, 622–623
BranchCache use, 645
capabilities, 621
Compact Server, 622
downloading files, 622
messages in event log, 624
PowerShell cmdlets, 622–623
uploading files, 622
blobs, 215–216
blocked threads, resuming execution, 475
blocking calls timeout parameter, 213
blocking IPC mechanisms, 213
blocks, registry hive, 296–298
boots. See priority boosts
Boot Configuration Database (BCD).
See BCD (Boot Configuration Database)
Boot.ini file, 283
boot loader, 278
boot menu, 324
boot process
auto-start and delayed auto-start services, 327
debugging mode, 369
failures, 328
information storage location, 286
last known good configuration, 328
performance diagnostics, 356
safe mode, 324
startup repair tool, 356
successful, 328
boot-start drivers, 321–322
boot-verification programs, 329
boundary descriptors, 171
BranchCache, 645–655
acceleration, 647
APIs, 650
application retrieval: HTTP sequence, 653–655
application retrieval: SMB sequence, 651–653
architecture, 645
availability, 647
caching modes, 646–651
configuration, 648–651
hash groveler service, 650
HTTP extension driver, 649
Implementation service, 649
Network Shell Helper, 650
operation, 645
protocols used by, 650–651
publication cache, 647–648
republication cache, 648
broadcasting, 614, 615
BSD (Berkeley Software Distribution) Sockets, 597
buffer overflows, 292
bus drivers, 64, 90
busy wait loops, 180
Bypass Traverse Checking privilege, 545
byte mode, 612–613
C
cacheable attributes, 639
cache-aware pushlocks, 200–201
cache manager, 55
caches
accessing, 639
BranchCache, 647
Offline Files, 639
republication, 648
structure, 643–644
caching
client-side, 639–644
content, 645–655
files, 639–644
network usage information, 683
security, 646
callable functions, 2–3
callbacks
allocation and deallocation, 216
asynchronous, 162, 278
to completion routine, 112
DPC, 117
executive objects, 214
NAT functionality, 669
pre and post, 176
registry, 303–304
Shim Engine, 244
user, 226
verifying, 176
call managers, 677
callout drivers, 667
Client/Server Run-Time Subsystem (Csrss.exe), 49. See also Csrss.exe (Client/Server Run-Time Subsystem) client-side caching (CSC), 639–644

clock cycles

DFSS, triggering, 472
per quantum, 424–425
for quantum targets, 451–452
thread run time, 399, 423
threads, charging to, 472–474
clock interrupt handler, 107
clock interrupts, 83, 89–90, 112
minimizing, 122
clock intervals
change request tracing, 113–115
frequency, 423
length of, 423
modification, 112–113
for running threads, 422
clock interval timer, scheduling on, 451
Clockres program, 423
close method, 154
CLR (Common Language Runtime), 3
Windows DLLs, 3
CLR via C#, 3rd edition (Richter), 3
Clustered Shared Volumes (CSV), 267–268
cluster hosts, 688
clustering, 688
coalescing, timer, 122–123
code
atomic execution, 204
critical sections, 177, 179, 201, 203
dispatch, 95
integrity, 274–276
kernel-mode, 136, 274, 494
Self-Monitoring Analysis and Reporting Technology (SMART) code, 356
cold patches, 270
COM API, 344
COM class registrations, 283
commands, task-based, 341
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CCITSE), 22, 489
Common Information Model (CIM), 343–349
Common Language Runtime. See CLR (Common Language Runtime)
Common Language Runtime (CLR), 3
common-model classes, 345
communication ports, 210
COM objects, administrative rights requests, 579
Compaq, 37
compatibility, 34
dynamic runtime, 233
completion lists
ALPC, 213–214
ALPC support, 217
completion ports, 214
Component Based Servicing (CBS) stack, 285–286
Component Services, 2
components, identifying, 286
compositing, 18
compound TCP (CTCP), 663
conditional ACEs, 537–538, 582, 584
conditional expressions, 537–538
condition variables (CondVars), 183, 202–203
configuration data
reading, 278
storage location, 286
configuration manager, 54
cell mapping, 298–300
hive syncs, 302–303
key and value name storage, 304
key control block lookups, 304
memory management, 297
naming parsing, 300
object manager’s object support, 300
performance optimizations, 304
registry filtering, 303–304
registry management, 293–305
registry namespace implementation, 154
registry virtualization, 572
subkey searches, 298
congestion. See also network traffic avoidance algorithm, 663
ConnectEx API, 599
connection blobs, 216
connectionless networking protocols, 599
connection-oriented clients, 677
connection-oriented NDIS (CoNDIS), 674, 677–678
connection-oriented network hardware, 677–678
connection-oriented sockets, 605
connections. See network connections
connectivity status, 659–662
console applications, 52
services, 305
console window host (Conhost.exe), 51–52
consumers
of debug events, 230
trace data, 220
UBPM registration, 339–340
content
caching, 645–655
identification, 650
publishing, 647
republished, 648
contention count, 199
context attribute, 215
CONTEXT block, 12
context switches, 13, 424, 448
defined, 410
processor-specific implementations, 60
thread, 448
control handlers, 309

callouts, 595
CBAC (Claims Based Access Control), 537
CBI (Component Based Servicing) stack, 285–286
cell indexes, 297
cells, registry hive, 296
data types, 296–297
certificate-based authentication, 563
certificate chains, 585
certificate paths, revalidation, 582
certificate verification, 588
change notifications, asynchronous callbacks for, 278
Change Notify privilege, 314
ChangeServiceConfig2 API, 314
ChangeWindowMessageEx API, 530
ChangeWindowMessageFilter API, 530
checked build, 45–46
ALPC message logging, 218
child partitions, 251–254. See also hypervisor (Hyper-V)
access to hardware, 251–252
access to memory, 258
emulated devices for, 255
enlightenments, 253–254
processors, adding, 257
viewing, 252–253
virtualization components, 252
virtual processors, 257
child processes
integrity level, 502
token inheritance, 507
chimney offloading, 674
CIM (Common Information Model), 343–349
classes, 345
CIM_ManagedSystemElement class, 345
CIMV2 namespace, 350
Claims Based Access Control (CBAC), 537
classes
abstract, 345
associations, 349–350
CIM, 345
common-model, 345
definitions, 348
extended-model, 345–346
MOF definitions, viewing, 347
objects in, enumerating, 349
registrations in registry, 283
static, 347
client communication ports, 210
client IDs, 12
client operating systems. See also operating systems vs. server versions, 41–43
client processes, impersonation limits, 515
clients
connectionless, 598
health monitoring, 690–691
of the transport, 596
Component Based Servicing (CBS) stack, 285–286
Component Services, 2
components, identifying, 286
compositing, 18
compound TCP (CTCP), 663
conditional ACEs, 537–538, 582, 584
conditional expressions, 537–538
condition variables (CondVars), 183, 202–203
configuration data
reading, 278
storage location, 286
configuration manager, 54
cell mapping, 298–300
hive syncs, 302–303
key and value name storage, 304
key control block lookups, 304
memory management, 297
naming parsing, 300
object manager’s object support, 300
performance optimizations, 304
registry filtering, 303–304
registry management, 293–305
registry namespace implementation, 154
registry virtualization, 572
subkey searches, 298
congestion. See also network traffic avoidance algorithm, 663
ConnectEx API, 599
connection blobs, 216
connectionless networking protocols, 599
connection-oriented clients, 677
connection-oriented NDIS (CoNDIS), 674, 677–678
connection-oriented network hardware, 677–678
connection-oriented sockets, 605
connections. See network connections
connectivity status, 659–662
console applications, 52
services, 305
console window host (Conhost.exe), 51–52
consumers
of debug events, 230
trace data, 220
UBPM registration, 339–340
content
caching, 645–655
identification, 650
publishing, 647
republished, 648
contention count, 199
context attribute, 215
CONTEXT block, 12
context switches, 13, 424, 448
defined, 410
processor-specific implementations, 60
thread, 448
control handlers, 309
controllers, 220
control objects, 57
control points, 626
control sets, last known good, 286
ConvertThreadToFiber function, 13
core parking, 118
Core Parking engine, 470
CoreProcessorSetvalue, 458
CoresPerPhysicalProcessor value, 458
core system files, 37
corporate networks, accessing, 695–696
corrected machine check interrupt level, 91
C programming language, 35, 38
CPs (credential providers), 77, 491
alternative, 555–556
loading, 555
user identification tasks, 555
CPU. See also logical processors; processors
idle thread, 453–456
share weight, 472
CPU 0 congestion, 118
CPU quotas, 471–478
enforcement, 474
per-session blocks, 471–472
recovering, 476
updating and extending, 477
CPU rate limits, 478
CPU starvation
prevention, 434
thread priority boosts for, 439–441
CPU Stress tool, viewing priority boosts, 435–437, 440–441
CPU throttling, 383, 448
clock cycles, charging to threads, 472–474
quota enforcement, 474
CPU usage
displaying, 10, 26
limiting, 478
multimedia threads, 446
specifying, 416
system threads, mapping to, 70–71
threads, 399, 423
crash dump files, 28
crashed applications
error reporting, 130–132
user, informing, 130
create a token object privilege, 546
CreateEventEx API, 165
CreateFile function, 515
create global object privilege, 174
CreateMailslot function, 614
CreateMutexEx API, 165
CreateNamedPipe function, 612–613
CreatePrivateNamespace API, 171
CreateProcessAsUser function, 326, 576
CreateProcess function
flags and parameters, creating and validating, 371–373
flow of, 369–391
stage 1 decision tree, 375–376
CreateRestrictedToken function, 516
CreateSemaphoreEx API, 165
CreateService function, 305–306
CreateThread function, 398, 456–457
CreationFlags parameter, 371
Creator Group ID SID, 499
Creator Owner ID SID, 499
critical providers (CPs). See CPs
(credential providers)
critical sections, 201
limitations, 201
mutually exclusive access, 178
spinlocks on, 179
SRW Locks, replacement by, 203
critical structure corruptions, 274
critical worker threads, 206
CSC (client-side caching), 639–644
CrScreateProcess function, 384
CSR_PROCESS, 359–360, 365–366
allocation, 384
dumping, 366
pointer to, 396
Csrss.exe (Client/Server Run-Time
Subsystem), 49
CSR_PROCESS maintenance, 365
CSR_THREAD maintenance, 396
parallel proc structures, 359–360
parallel thread structures, 392
process-creation routines, 369
process information, 365
SCM, killing, 332
shutdown routine, 331
CSR_THREAD, 392, 396
allocation, 384
dumping, 396
fields, 396
C-state intervals, 122
CSV (Clustered Shared Volumes), 267–268
CTCP (compound TCP), 663
Ctrl+Alt+Delete key combination, 557
CurrentControlSet key, 328–329
current directory, path, 236
current user, See also users
preferences and software configuration, 281
D
DACLSs (discretionary access control lists), 165, 494, 523, 524
access checks, 531, 533
ACEs in, 523–524
assigning, 527–528
null, 524
DA (DirectAccess), 695–696
daisy-chain configurations, 101
dangling dependencies, 246
data execution prevention (DEP), 243
data formatting for transmission, 594
datagrams, 599
datagram sockets, 605
datalink layer in OSI reference model, 592–593
Logical Link Control, 593
Medium Access Control, 593
data structures
abstraction layer, 362
CSR_PROCESS, 365–366
CSR_THREAD, 396
dispatcher database, 421–422
EPROCESS, 359–364
fields, displaying, 362–363
idle process and idle thread, 453
KPROCESS, 362–364
KTHREAD, 392–393
vs. objects, 22
PEB, 364–365
process, 359–371
PspCpuQuotaControl, 471
synchronization of access, 176–205
TEB, 394–395
thread, 360, 391–397
W32PROCESS, 367
W32THREAD, 396–397
of wait operations, 188–191
data transfer
BITS management, 621
congestion, 663
downloading, 622
high-loss scenarios, 664
prioritization, 621
transfer type, 593, 597
seamless, 621
transfer types, 621
uploading, 622
data transmission
bidirectional, 612–613
formatting for, 594
unreliable, unidirectional, 614–617
data view attribute, 215
DbgkCreateThread, 386
DbgUi APIs, 229, 230, 232
dce (distributed computing environment), 605
DCOM (Distributed Component Object Model), 625
DdeImpersonateClient function, 514
deadline requirements, 100
deadlocks
avoiding, 213
detection, 201
limiting, 434
debg events, kernel-mode, 229
debugger. See also kernel debugger;
user-mode debugger
breakpoints, 124, 126
debg event requests, 230
extension commands, 29
image loader, watching, 233–234
debugger (continued)
notifications, 46, 386
objects, viewing, 231
ports, 125
processes, breaking into, 230
system timers, listing, 119–121
timer resolution information, 114
debugger-based attacks, 369
Debugger.chm help file, 29
debugging
application startup, 233–234
crashing processes, 129
handles and object, 167
kernel, 26–31
kernel support, 229–230
loader snaps, 233–234
user-mode, 27, 229–232
debugging mode, booting in, 28
debugging Tools for Windows, 27
help file, 31
Tlist.exe tool, 6
updates, 27
debug object, 229
debug programs privilege, 546
debug version of Windows, 45
default security, 496. See also security
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), 663
deferred delete operations, 166
deferred procedure calls (DPCs).
See DPCs (deferred procedure calls)
deferred ready threads, 383, 416
processing, 442
DelayedAutoStart parameter, 308
delayed auto-start services, 324
startup, 327
delayed worker threads, 205–206
delay load, 243
delete method, 154
delete operations, deferred, 166
DEP (data execution prevention), 243
dependencies
of auto-start services, 327
binding, 684
dangling, 246
defining and fulfilling, 242–243
dependency Walker, 25
of services, 324
image type, viewing, 48
kernel and HAL images, viewing, 61–62
KernelOnGroup parameter, 308, 324
KernelOnService parameter, 308
Description parameter, 308
desktop
creating and opening, 556–557
locking or unlocking, 558
process association with, 372
protecting access to, 558
UAC prompts, 580
desktop object, 144
okay-to-close routine, 155
open method, 154
Desktops tool, 8
Developing Drivers with the Windows Driver Foundation (Orwick and Smith), 32
development environment, 3
device drivers, 36, 63–67. See also drivers
32-bit, 272
APC blocking, 111
auto-start, 323
biometric scanner, 564
characteristics, 306–308
development frameworks, 64–65
DPCs, 107
dynamically allocated queued spinlocks, 182
fast mutexes, 196–197
installed, viewing, 65
integrity of code, 274–276
interrupt request restriction violations, 95
I/O control functions, 227–228
kernel-mode APCs, 111–112
kernel-mode contexts, 63
loading, 322
minidrivers, 434
object access, 156
parameters, 309
priority boost specification, 433
registry settings, 279
spinlocks, 180
startup failures, 322
structured exception handling, 125
system calls access, 136
system threads, mapping to, 70–71
system worker thread use, 205
TDI clients, 594
types, 63
verification of, 17
WDM environment, 64
Windows internals, accessing with, 63
device interrupts, 81, 91
Device Manager, 286
Device Profile for Web Services (DPWS), 626–627
devices
eventual, 251
symbolic link creation, 73
device-to-driver mappings, 286
DFS-N (Distributed File System Namespace), 637–638
DFS-R (Distributed File System Replication), 637, 638
DFSS (Distributed Fair Share Scheduler), 471–477
clock cycles, charging to threads, 472–474
idle-only queue thread management, 475–477
initialization, 471
per-session CPU quota blocks, 471–472
quota enforcement, 474
scheduler, 476–477
session weight management, 477
turning off, 471
Dhcp service, 314–315
DiagLog session, 354
Diagnostic Policy Service (DPS), 354–355
diagnostic scenarios
built-in, 356–357
diagnostics instrumentation, 354
dial-up remote access, 685–686
Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP), 682
Digital Equipment Corporation Alpha AXP, 37
digital rights management, protected processes and, 368
Direct2D, 18
DirectAccess (DA), 695–696
directed context switches, 13
directory object type, 144
DisconnectEx API, 599
discretionary access checks, 528
discretionary access control, 23, 488
access logging, 494
object protection, 494
discretionary access control lists (DACls),
See DACls (discretionary access control lists)
disk diagnostics, 356
disk, paging data to, 15
dispatch code, 95
dispatcher, 409, 421
dispatcher database, 421–422
dispatcher synchronizing, 422
dispatcher headers, 188
flags, 192–193
interpreting, 192
dispatcher objects, 57, 153, 184, 187
thread state changes, 186
waiting for, 184–185
dispatcher synchronization objects, 117
dispatch events, thread priority boosts, 430–431
dispatching
interrupt, 81–112
trap, 79–140
dispatch interrupts, 104–110, 413
display I/O functionality, 51
DisplayName parameter, 308
distributed applications, loosely coupled messaging, 625
Distributed Cache caching mode, 646
Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM), 625
distributed computing environment (DCE), 605
Distributed Fair Share Scheduler (DFSS),
See DFSS (Distributed Fair Share Scheduler)
exception dispatcher

Distributed File System Client, 633
Distributed File System Namespace (DFS-N), 637–638
Distributed File System Replication (DFS-R), 638
Distributed Management Task Force (DMTF), 342
Dllhost.exe, 11
DllMain routines, 244
DLL restriction, 588
DLLs
credential providers, 77
defined, 5
importing and loading, 242
initialization tasks, 244
KPP-protected, 272
loading and unloading by image loader, 233, 235
name redirection rules, 236–238
name resolution by image loader, 235–236
opening, 73
search path, 236
sub-DLLs, 245–247
subsystem, 36
DMTF (Distributed Management Task Force), 342
DNS (Domain Name System), 655
lookup requests, 655
DNS servers, 655
domain accounts, SIDs, 499
Domain Name System (DNS), 655
downloads, 622
DPC/dispatch interrupts, 91, 94, 104–110
name resolution by image loader, 233, 235
name redirection rules, 236–238
name resolution by image loader, 235–236
operation, 99
search path, 238
sub-DLLs, 245–247
subsystem, 36
Dynamic Memory, 261–262
Dynamic Memory, 260–263
architecture, 260
calculating, 262
configuring, 261
watching, 263–265
dynamic processors, 479–480
adding, 72
threaded DPC support, 479
dynamic providers, 347
dynamic runtime compatibility
mitigations, 233
dynamic worker threads, 206

E
ECN (Explicit Congestion Notification), 663–664
elevation shims, 385
elevation, UAC, 573–590
auto-elevation, 578–579
declining, 576
defined, 574
elevation prompts, 580
over-the-shoulder, 574
requested levels, 577
emulation, device, 251, 255
EnableCpuQuota registry value, 471
crash analysis server, sending to, 130
destination, configuring, 130
Windows Error Reporting, 129–132
events
access-denied, 292
automated detection and resolution, 354. See also WDI (Windows Diagnostic Infrastructure)
fatal, 125
service startup, 327–328
system startup, 328
transmit and receive, 593
Ethernet frames, header–data split, 674
Ethernet frames, header–data split, 674
ETHREAD, 359, 391–397, 453
displaying, 393–394
executive thread object encapsulation, 391
EventLog consumers, 144
ETW (Event Tracing for Windows), 56, 220
for ALPC messages, 218–219
clock interval change requests, 113
DiagLog session, 354
TCP/IP activity, tracing, 222–223
trace classes, 220–221
trace event header, 220
Ex wReg objects, 144
Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs), 489
event-based problem diagnosis, 354
event classes, 220
event handles, 155
Event Log provider, 344–345
association class, 350
inheritance, 346
Event Log, service startup error entries, 327–328
event objects, 143
sighaled state, 186
events
asynchronous, 80
default security, 496
intercepts for, 266
network-status, 605
synchronous, 80
Event Tracing for Windows (ETW).
See ETW (Event Tracing for Windows)
event tracing, kernel, 220–223
event unwait operations, 198
Event Viewer, 587
Everyone SID, 498, 499
Ex APIs, 165
exception dispatcher, 124–126
exception dispatching

exception dispatching, 123–132
Windows Error Reporting, 129–132
Wow64, 225
exception handlers
frame-based, 125
vectored, 125
exception ports, 126
exceptions
aborts, 80
architecture-independent, 124
defined, 79–80
interrupt numbers, 124
kernel-mode, 125
reproducing, 80
from SRW Lock failure, 203
unhandled, 127–129
exclusive access, 198–199
executable images
integrity of, 274–276
opening, 373–376
running, decision tree, 375–376
executable pages, integrity of, 275–276
executables
administrative rights requests, 576–578
auto-elevation, 578–579
default configuration, 578
service applications, 305–321
virtualization and, 568
Windows, 578
execution
modes, 17–32
profiling, 91–95
executive components
object access, 156
system worker thread use, 205
executive interlocked functions, 182
executive LUID, 509, 510
executive mutexes, 196–198
executive objects, 57, 142–144
access methods, 494
creation, 143
object types, viewing, 143
primary, 143–144
security descriptor, 495
executive process object
creation, 370, 376–381
EPROCESS object setup, 376–378
final setup, 381
initial thread creation, 381–383
PEB setup, 380–381
process address space setup, 378–380
executive resources, 184, 198–199
listing, 198–199
thread waits on, 434
executive thread object
creation, 381–383
execution, starting, 385
fields of, 392
thread parameter, 382
thread representation, 391
executive, Windows, 36, 54–57
abstraction layer, 362
access token creation, 560
components, 54–55
functions, 54
infrastructure routines, 56–57
kernel-mode APCs, 111
prefixes, 66
process-creation routines, 369
support functions, 56
symbolic link objects, 173
system service stubs, 53
system worker thread management, 206
user-mode debugging module, 229
ExitWindowsEx function, 331
experiments, 25
expiration time, token, 510
Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN), 663–664
Explorer, 562
display of virtualized files, 569
export tables, parsing by image loader, 233
extended-model classes, 345–346
extensibility, 33
extension interfaces, 605
extensions, virtualization exceptions, 568–569

F

facilities, displaying, 44
FailureActions parameter, 308, 330
FailureCommand parameter, 308, 330
failures
application, 291–293
application startup, 243–244
services, 330–331
fast mutexes, 196–198
acquiring, 196
vs. guarded mutexes, 197
fast user switching, 21
fatal errors, 125
FCL (Framework Class Library), 3
features enabled, determining, 43–44
fibers, 13
file access, caching, 643
file extensions
associations in HKCR, 283
virtualization exceptions, 568–569
file handles, 155
file hash, 582
for Applocker rules, 584
file mapping objects, 14
file objects, 22, 143
default security overrides, 496
integrity level, 502
file renames, 73
file requests
compounding, 636
pipelining, 636
files
access methods, 494
caching on local machine, 639
ghosted, 643
locking down, 583
file shares, 627
aggregating, 637
caching files on local machine, 639
file sharing, and symbolic links, 173
file-system drivers (FSDs). See FSDs (file-system drivers)
file system minfililters, 274
file system namespace, 154
file system objects, global audit policy, 552
file-system runtime library, 57
file system virtualization, 567–573
file transfer. See also data transfer asynchronous, 621
file virtualization, 568–571
enabling and disabling, 570–571
filter drivers, 63, 64
lightweight, 677
filtered admin tokens, 507
characteristics, 516
UAC use, 566
viewing, 517
filter engine, 667
Fingerprint Biometric Service Provider, 564
fingerprint scanners, 563
firewalls
rules, 318
stateful, 669
flags
ACE, 524
application-compatibility, 578
dispatcher header, 192
global, 207–209
handle table entry, 159–160
object, 147–148
object attribute, 147
object header, 146
PRCB, 116
registry virtualization, 572
security descriptor, 522–523
floating-point exceptions, 124
floating-point state, saving, 96
foreground threads
priority boosts, 435–437
quantum length, 427
fragment names, 611
frame-based exception handlers, 125
Framework Class Library (FCL), 3
free build, 45
FSDs (file-system drivers), 63, 154
filter drivers, 63
invoking, 616
MUP, 630
thread priority boost values, 434
function drivers, 64
functions
intrinsic, 178
name prefixes, 66–67
splitting across discrete files, 246
system call numbers, mapping to, 139
user-mode, 49
Windows executive calls, 49
Fusion (SxS) redirection, 237

G

games, thread priority boosts for, 444–448
gates, 197
pushlocks, 199–201
Gdi32.dll, 37
GDI functions, 51
GDI subsystem, 396
GDI/User objects, 142
getaddrinfo function, 598
GetEffectiveRightsFromAcl function, 530–531
GetSystemTimeAdjustment function, 423
GetThreadContext function, 12
Gflags.exe, 207–208
ghosts, 643
global audit policy, 552–553
additional auditing, 553
configuring, 553
querying, 552
setting, 552–553
storage location, 553
Global Descriptor Table (GDT), 272
global flags, 207–209
changing, 207–208
maintain objects list, 141
viewing, 207–208
Global Flags tool, 25
global namespace, 173
accessing, 174
global resources, mutually exclusive
access, 178
global spinlocks, 181
Graphics and Multimedia Services, 3
group-aware applications, 408
group claims, 563
Group parameter, 307
GroupSetMember value, 458
group SIDs, 508
groups, processor
assignment, 460–462
number per group, 462
guarded mutexes, 196–198
acquiring, 197
vs. fast mutexes, 197
guest operating systems, 248, See
also hypervisor (Hyper-V); operating systems
address translation, virtual and physical, 258

H
Hal.dll, 37
HAL (hardware abstraction layer), 36, 60–62
checked build version, 46
dynamic processor support, 479–480
interrupt levels, 90
version, determining, 61
x86 versions, 60
handle attribute, 215
handle data blobs, 216
handle leaks, 167
handlers, control, 309
handles
defined, 22
existing, referencing objects with, 497
hive, 293
process, 360
to registry keys, 280
transaction, 288
handles, object, 155–160
debugging mechanisms, 167
kernel handle table, 160
maximum number, 159
open, searching for, 161
references, viewing, 167
resource accounting, 168
tracing, 165, 167
viewing, 156–157
handle tables, 158
ALPC-specific, 216
entries, structure of, 159–160
kernel handle table, 160
viewing, 160–161
Handle tool, 157
handle tracing database, 167
Handle Viewer, 25
hardware
device-to-driver mappings, 286
exceptions and interrupts, 80
interrupt processing, 82–84
in OSI reference model, 592–594
virtual address space, 15
virtualized, 248, 254–268
hardware abstraction layer (HAL).
See HAL (hardware abstraction layer)
hardware device drivers, 63
hardware exceptions, 80–81
hardware-generated interrupts, 81
hardware profiles, 286
hashing, 582
header-data split, 674
header files, 32
health policies, 689
Health Requirements Server (HRS), 692–693
heap manager, 54
helper DLLs, 602
high-frequency timers, 113–115
high interrupt level, 90
high-loss scenarios, 664
hive handles, 295
hives, registry, 293–294
bins, 296
cell indexes, 297
cell maps, 298–300
cells, 296
corruption, 303
loading and unloading, 294
log hives, 302–303
nonvolatile, 302
on-disk file names, 293–294
opening, 295
page pool usage, viewing, 298–299
recoverable state, 303
size limits, 295
structure, 296–298
hive syncs, 302–303
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Current Version\Winlogon\Shell value, 562
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT, 280–281, 283
HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG, 280–281, 286
HKEY_CURRENT_USER, 280–281
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, 24, 280–281, 283–284
HKEY_PERFORMANCE_DATA, 280–281, 287
HKEY_USERS, 280–281, 282
HKLM\SAM key, 492
HKLM\Security key, 492
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Current Version\Winlogon\Userinit value, 562
host-based IPsec packet filtering, 670
host-based virtualization, 248
Hosted Cache caching mode, 646
hot key processing code, 557
hotpatching, 233, 270–272
compile time, 271–272
limitations, 272
operations, 270–271
patch descriptors, 271
housekeeping threads, 466
HTTP
BranchCache application retrieval
sequence, 653–655
BranchCache integration, 653
requests and responses, 610–611
HTTPS, 621
BranchCache use, 645
HTTP Server API

HTTP Server API, 610–612
Http.sys, 611
hung processes, 400
hvboot.sys driver, 251
hypercalls, 251
hypercritical worker threads, 206
Hyper-Threading, 39
hypervisor (Hyper-V), 248–268
architectural stack, 249
child partitions, 251–254
emulated devices, 255
enlightenments, 253–254
enlightenments, kernel patch protection, 273
guest physical address space, 258
hardware emulation and support, 254–268
hardware management, 254
hypercalls, 251
initialization, 251
intercepts, 265–266
Live Migration, 266–268
parent partition, 249–251
parent partition operating system, 250 partitions, 249
security rating, 489
shadow page tables, 258
SLAT use, 259
synthetic devices, 255–257
VDevs, 254
virtual machine management service, 250–251
virtual processors, 257
Windows driver architecture use, 249–250
hypervisor library, 56
hypervisor stack, 249–250
remote processor, 476
scheduling, 476–477
thread management, 475
thread reinserion, 477
thread release, 468
threads, adding to, 474
threads, resuming execution, 476
idle process, 453–455
name, 455
idle processors, 468–469
registry activity, viewing, 290
idle scheduling, 458
idle/sleep processor states, 122
idle threads, 453–456
operations, 456
preemption, 456
priority level, 455
ready queue scanning, 458
idle-time duration, optimizing, 122
IDT (interrupt dispatch table), 82
viewing, 82–83
Iexplore.exe, 503
IKE (Internet Key Exchange), 671
image database, 325
image loader, 54, 232–247
API Sets use, 245–247
application initialization tasks, 232
context information, 395
DLL name redirection, 236–238
DLL name resolution, 235–236
DLL restriction, 588
DLL search, 242
DLL search order, viewing, 237–238
early process initialization, 234–235
import parsing, 242–243
initialization, 386
internals, 240–241
legacy installer identification, 576–577
loaded module database, 238–241
post-import initialization tasks, 243–244
SwitchBack, 244–245
tasks of, 233
watching, 233–234
ImagePath parameter, 307, 325
images
execution, 589–590
global flags, 208
uniprocessor flag, 464
image subsystem, 48
ImpersonateNamedPipeClient function, 514, 613
ImpersonateSecurityContext function, 514
impersonation, 14, 495, 514–516
client, 608, 613
impersonation tokens, 509, 514
import parsing, 242–243
import tables, parsing by image loader, 233, 235
increase scheduling priority privilege, 412
increaseuserva qualifier, 15
indirection, 155
inheritance
of ACE flags, 524
of ACEs, 527–528
class, 346
priority levels, 412
Windows API support, 528
initialization
Distributed Fair Share Scheduler, 471
hypervisor, 251
of processes, 232
system, 205, 556
of Unified Background Process Manager, 337
Winlogon, 556–558
initialization tasks
atomic execution, 204–205
import parsing, 242–243
post-import tasks, 243–244
initialized threads, 417
initial process address space, creating, 378–379
init once, 204–205
in-memory structures, 277
input string parameters, 24
installers, 228
administrative rights for, 576–577
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802 committee, 593
integer divide-by-zero exceptions, 124
integer overflow, 124
integration components (ICs), 255–256
integrity checks, mandatory, 528–529
integrity levels, 500–505
access based on, 529
implementation, 495
low, launching programs at, 513
object, 504–505
process, 502–503
propagation, 502
Protected Mode Internet Explorer use, 503
for User Interface Privilege Isolation, 529–530
integrity protection, 22
integrity state, 275
intelligent timer tick distribution, 121–122
Intel processors, 37
Intel VT Extended/Nested Page Table (NPT) technology, 259–260
interactive logon, 555
authentication packages, 555, 558
interactive logon manager (Winlogon), 491. See also Winlogon
interactive processes, 318
interactive services, 319–321, 326
Interactive Services Detection (UISDetect) service, 320
intercepts, 265–266
interfaces, testing, 661
I/O intrinsic functions, intra-user isolation, interrupt trap handlers, interrupt service routine (ISR), interrupts interrupt requests (IRQs), interrupt request levels (IRQLs), interrupt objects, interrupt controllers

IA64, 85
x64, 85
x86, 84

Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT), 273
interrupt dispatching, 81–112
interrupt dispatch table (IDT), 82–83
interrupt objects, 95
address, 99
connecting and disconnecting, 100
ISR, registering, 101
viewing details, 97–100
interrupt request levels (IRQLs). See IRQLs (interrupt request levels)
iperrupt requests (IRQs). See IRQs (interrupt requests)

interrupts
affinity, 102–104
APC, 110–112
defined, 79–80
dispatch or DPC, 104–110
handling, 451
hardware processing, 82–84
interrupt control flow, 96
IRQL mapping to, 90–91
line-based, 101–102
masking, 87–88, 178
message signaled-based, 101–102
monitoring, 108–109
prioritization, 84–92, 102–104
routing algorithms, 84
service routines, 86–87
sharing, 101
software, 104–112
interrupt service routine (ISR), 81,
100–101
interrupt trap handlers, 81
intra-user isolation, 495
intrinsic functions, 178
I/O control functions, 227–228
device interrupts, 80, 81
per-file information, 26
priority boosts on completion, 433–434
I/O Completion packet reserve object, 162–163
I/O completion ports
jobs associated with, 480
scalability, wait internals, and efficiency of work processing, 404
I/O manager, 55
file system namespace implementation, 154
I/O model of processing, 605–606
I/O requests, 594, 663
I/O transfers, 81
IP addresses
cornerstone, 668
private to public mapping, 669
public, 663
IPC parsing bugs, 216
IP filtering, 669
IPsec (interprocessor interrupts), 89
IPsec Policy Agent, 671
IPv4, 663
IPv6, 663
IRPs (I/O request packets), 594
IRQ lines, interrupts based on, 101–102
IRQLs (interrupt request levels), 86–91
APC level, 88
Dispatcher_LEVEL, 422
interrupts, mapping to, 90–91
lazy, 87
passive level, 88
predefined, 90–91
raising and lowering, 88
save locations, 89
on spinlocks, 178–179
vs. thread priorities, 412–413
viewing, 88–91
IRQs (interrupt requests), 82
IRQ 1, 99
prioritization, 103–104
isolation
 intra-user, 495
service, 315–318
Session Zero Isolation, 318–321
transaction, 288
ISR (interrupt service routine), 81
interrupt level, connecting and disconnecting, 100
registering, 101

job objects, 480–484
job sets, 482
limits, specifying, 481–482
process accounting information, 480
quantum values, 425
viewing, 482–484
job object type, 143
jobs, 14
transfer, 621

Kd.exe, 28
KeAcquireInStackQueuedSpinLock function, 182
KeAcquireInterruptSpinLock API, 180
KeAcquire/ReleaseSpinLockForDpc API, 107
KeAcquireSpinLock function, 180
KeAddSystemServiceTable function, 137
KeAreAllApcsDisabled function, 198
KeAreApcsDisabled function, 197
KeEnterGuardedRegion, 111
KeInitializeProcess function, 379
KePerformGroupConfiguration routine, 460
Kerberos authentication, 555, 558–560
TCP/IP port (port 88), 559
Kerberos Key Distribution Center service, 559
KeReleaseInStackQueuedSpinLock function, 182
KeReleaseInterruptSpinLock API, 180
KeReleaseSpinLock function, 180
kernel, 36, 57–60
attributes management, 215
blob management, 216
daisy-chain configuration support, 101
design, 37–41
dispatcher database, 421–422
dispatcher objects, 184, 187
DPC processing, 105–107
driver and DLL loader, 240
dynamic thread creation, 403
exceptions and interrupts, distinguishing between, 80
exception trapping and handling, 124
hardware support, 59–60
interrupt objects, 95
lock ordering scheme, 189
mutual exclusion functions, 177
NUMA system information, 459–460
objects, 57
portable interfaces, 59
 processor control region, 58
protection mechanisms, 34
real-time, 100
scalability features, 40–41
kernel

(kernel continued)
software interrupts, 90
structured exception handling, 125
system interrupts, 80
threaded DPC support for dynamic
processors, 479
thread priority assignment, 411
thread scheduling, creation, and
termination, 403. See also thread
scheduling
user-mode debugging support,
229–230
Windows scheduling code, 409
x86-specific interfaces, 60
Kernel32.dll, 37
process-creation tasks, 369
thread creation, 398
user-mode debugging component, 232
virtual DLL files, 246
Windows subsystem-specific
operations, 383–385
kernel boot process, 278
kernel debugger, 25
commands, 28
EPROCESS fields, displaying, 362–363
ETHREAD and KTHREAD, displaying,
393–394
executive resources, listing, 198–199
extension commands, 29
handle table, viewing, 160–161
job objects, viewing, 482–484
key control blocks, viewing, 301–302
library, 56
NDIS mini-ports, listing, 675–676
NTGlobalFlag variable, viewing and
setting, 209
PEB, displaying, 365
lprocess command, 363–364
ready threads, viewing, 408–409
security descriptors, viewing, 525–527
system worker threads, listing, 207
TCP/IP device objects, viewing, 665–666
TEB, dumping, 395
thread data structures, dumping, 394
tokens, viewing, 510–513
kernel debugging, 26–31
local, 28
system not booted in debug mode, 31
kernel dispatcher, 409
ready queues, 421
kernel event tracing, 220–223
kernel handles, 368
kernel handle table, 160
registry hives, opening, 295
kernel image
checked build version, 46
client and server version, 42
kernel logger, 220
TCP/IP activity, tracing, 222–223
trace classes, enabling, 220–221
kernel mode, 17–20, 34, 35
protected processes support, 368
RPC support, 609
transitioning to user mode, 18
kernel-mode APCs, 110–111, 162
kernel-mode code
signing, 274
system calls, 136
trust level, 494
Kernel Mode Code Signing (KMCS) policy,
17, 274
kernel-mode components, 36–37
device drivers, 63
Kernel-Mode Driver Framework (KMDF),
64
kernel-mode exceptions, 125
kernel-mode RPC, 609
kernel-mode system threads, 69
kernel-mode threads, 413
kernel-mode trampolines, 136–137
kernel objects, 142
Kernel Patch Protection (KPP), 272–274
c Kernel processor control block (KPRCB), 58
viewing, 58–59
Kernel Profiler (Kernrate), 91–95
kernel queues, 404
Kernel Security Device Driver (KSecDD),
491
kernel stacks, 273
kernel streaming filter drivers, 63
kernel structures
substructures, 30
type information, displaying, 29
kernel support functions, defined, 4
kernel support routines, defined, 4
Kernel Transaction Manager (KTM), 56,
268–270
KeServiceDescriptorTable, 137, 139
KeServiceDescriptorTableShadow, 137,
139
KeStartDynamicProcessor function, 479
KeStartThread function, 382
KeUpdateRunTime routine, 115
KeUpdateSystemTime routine, 115
keyboard, logon requests from, 555
key control blocks
allocation, 300
deletion, 301
fast access to, 304
key name references, 304
viewing, 301–302
keyed events, 194–196
performance, 196
signaling, 195
waiter lists, 195–196
key object allocation, 300
key object type, 144
keys, registry, 279
access, protecting, 304
CurrentControlSet, 328–329
global audit policy, 552
linking, 295
missing, 291–292
naming scheme, 279
safe mode, 324
virtualized, 571–572
keystrokes, squashing, 557
KiCheckForThread function, 469
KiCyclesPerClockQuantum value,
423–425, 477
KiDeferredReadyThread function, 463,
468–469
KiFloatingDispatch function, 96
KiIdleLoop routine, 456
KiInterruptDispatch function, 96
KiInterruptDispatchNoEOI handler,
95–96
KiInterruptDispatchNoLock handler, 95
KiProcessDeferredReadyList function, 463
KiSearchForNewThread function, 458,
467, 468, 475
KiSelectCandidateProcessor function, 470
KiSelectNextThread function, 456–458
KiSelectReadyThread function, 457
KiSystemService function, 456
KiThreadStartup function, 386
KMCS (Kernel Mode Code Signing) policy,
17
KMDF (Kernel-Mode Driver Framework),
64
KNODE, 459
Known DLLs, 237
KPCR (kernel processor control region), 58
viewing, 58–59
KPP (Kernel Patch Protection), 272–274
KPRCB (kernel processor control block),
58
viewing, 58–59
KPROCESS, 453
KPROCESS, 364, 453
initializing, 379
viewing, 362–363
KQUEUE, 404
KSecDD, 491
KTHREAD, 391–397, 453
displaying, 393–394
Win32Thread field, 397
KTM (Kernel Transaction Manager), 56,
268–270
KTM objects, 269
deferred deletion, 166
Ktmutill.exe, 270

L
LAN adapter (LANA) numbers, 618
language packs, 24
LANs, datalink layer, 593
last known good control set, 286,
328–330
last processor, 466
Advanced Audit Policy Configuration settings, 554
audit policy configuration, 548
BranchCache configuration, 648–649
Software Restriction Policies node, 589
User Rights Assignment configuration, 539
local service account, 312–313, 333
table privileges, 312
group membership, 311
network resource access, 312
services running in, 310, 313
LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation service group, 333
LocalServiceNetworkRestricted service group, 333
LocalServiceNoNetwork service group, 333
Local Service group, 333
Local Session Manager (Lsm.exe), 76–77
Local SID, 499
local system audit policy, 548
connecting to, 28
local system account access to resources, 315–316
characteristics, 311
core operating system components
in, 310
group membership, 311–312
privileges, 311–312
services, running in, 310–312
LocalSystemNetworkRestricted service group, 334
location, network, 658–662
Network Location Awareness service, 658–659
lock convey, 200
lockdown, system, 583–588
locking mechanisms
order of objects, 189
SRW Locks, 202–203
user-mode, 201–202
locking primitives
spinlocks, 179–180
for user-mode code, 183
lock ownership priority boosts, 431–433,
442
logging
ALPC messages, 218
transacted operations, 288
log hives, 302–303
Logical Link Control (LLC), 593
logical network identity, 659
logical network interfaces, 659
logical networks, 659
logical prefetcher, 55
logical processors, 257. See also processors
active, 463
affinity mask, 458
candidate processor selection, 470
text switch to new thread, 410
dynamic, 479–480
ikut assignment, 460–462
ideal, last, and next, 466–467
idle, 463
nonparked, 463
number per group, 462
ready queue population, 468–470
state information, 458–459, 462–463
thread selection, 456–458
LogicalProcessorsPerCore value, 458
logon aborted, 558
account rights retrieval, 540
active sessions, listing, 560–562
authentication requirements, 494
components of, 556
configuration data use, 278
via fingerprint scan, 565
interactive, 555
manager, 77–78
registry activity during, 292–293
secure, 488
security, 555–565
service logon, 325
successful, 328–329
termination, 559
type, determining, 540
user, 558–562
Winlogon management of, 555
logon sessions active, listing, 560–562
LUID for, 558
SID for, 498
LogonSessions, 560–562
local SIDs, 498
LogonUI, 77, 491, 555
launching, 557
network provider DLLs, loading, 556
LogonUserEx function, 325
LogonUser function, 515
low-memory situations, 194
LPC, 209
LsaAddAccountRights function, 540
LsaAuthenticationPort function, 557
LsaEnumerateAccountRights function, 540
LsaEnumerateLogonSessions function, 560
Lsa (Local Security Authority), 540
LsaLogonUser calls, 558
LsaLogonUser function, 540
LsaRemoveAccountRights function, 540
LSASS (Local Security Authority subsystem), 318, 322, 490
allowed access checks, 559
audit policy maintenance, 548
groups and privileges checks, 506
logon termination, 559
policy database, 490
LSASS (Local Security Authority subsystem)

LSASS (continued)
processes shared by, 332
service startup, 322, 325
SRM connection, 493
user logon tasks, 558–560
LsaStorePrivateData function, 325
Lsm.exe, 76–77
LSPs (layered service providers), 600
LUID (locally unique identifier), 509
logon session, 558–561
token authentication ID, 510
LWF (lightweight filter drivers), 677

M
machines. See also hardware; processors; servers
location, network, 658–662
SIDs, 498
MailSlot mini-redirector, 635
mailslots, 612–617
client naming format, 614
creation, 73
as FSDs, 616
implementation, 615–616
malicious operations, 546–547, See also security
Managed Object Format (MOF) language, 344–348
binary MOF (BFO) files, 348
class definitions, 347
management applications, 342–343
objects, examining, 350
management mechanisms
registry, 277–304
services, 305–336
Unified Background Process Manager, 336–342
Windows Diagnostic Infrastructure, 354–357
Windows Management Instrumentation, 342–353
management policies, 537
mandatory integrity checks, 528–529
mandatory integrity control (MIC), 23
mandatory policies, 505
in tokens, 509
manifests, 237
image loader management, 233
manual reset events, 186
MAPI (Messaging API), 686
mapped files, 73
mapping, address, 15
Margosis, Aaron, 32
marshaling/unmarshaling, 606, 609
Max Instances values, 617
MCM (miniport call manager), 677
Media Foundation API, 368
Medium Access Control (MAC), 593
memory
accessing, 94
access violations, 124
child partition access, 258
displaying statistics, 26
paging data, 15
sharing, 177
virtual, 15–16, 258
memory diagnostic tool, 356
memory leaks
detecting, 416
diagnosing, 356
memory management
with hypervisor, 254
process data structures used, 359
specifying limits, 416
on virtual machines, 260–263
memory management events, 69
memory manager, 55
mapping operations, 15
paging operations, 15
pushlock use, 201
memory translation, 259
message passing. See also data transfer
ALPC for, 209–211. See also ALPC
(Advanced Local Procedure Call)
canceled, 212
notifications, asynchronous, 213–214
Message Queuing, 625–626
messages
attributes, 215
blobs, 216
delayed copying of, 217
hypercalls, 251
resources, 216
message-signaled interrupts (MSI), 102
message zones, 212, 217
Messaging and Collaboration, 3
Messaging API (MAPI), 686
MIC (mandatory integrity control), 500
Microsoft Developer Network (MSDN), 2
Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator (MS DTC), 626
Microsoft Interface Definition Language (MIDL) compiler, 607
Microsoft Internet Connectivity Evaluation Tool, 664
Microsoft .NET Framework, 3
Microsoft scripts, 351
Microsoft TechNet Scripting Center, 351
mindrivers, 434
miniport call manager (MCM), 677
miniport drivers, 595
mini-redirectors, 627, 632–635
architecture, 634
MinWin, 51, 246
API Set redirection, 236
image loader support, 233
MIPS architecture, 37
Mmc.exe auto-elevation, 579
MMCSS (MultiMedia Class Scheduler Service), 430
network packet throttling, 448
scheduling categories, 445
tasks, 445
MmSessionCreate function, 73
mode transitions, 18
modules, loaded, 238–239
Motorola PowerPC, 37
MPR (Multiple Provider Router), 627–630
Msafdd.dll, 602
MSDN (Microsoft Developer Network), 2
MS-DOS executables, 375–376
MS DTC (Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator), 626
MSI (message-signaled interrupts), 102
Msinfo32, 65
MSI-X, 102
MSV1_0 authentication, 555, 558–559
remote authentication, 559
Mswock.dll, 602
multicasting, 598, 614
multicore systems, 39
MultiMedia Class Scheduler Service (MMCSS), 430
multimedia playback boosts, 430, 444–448
multimedia response times, 113
Multiple Provider Router (MPR), 627–630
multiple sessions management, 72
Multiple UNC Provider (MUP), 630–632
multiple user sessions, 20
multiprocessor environments, 196–276
Multiprocessor Specification (MP Specification), 84
multiprocessor systems, 38–39
affinity, 463–465
affinity mask, extended, 465–466
affinity mask, system, 466
dispatcher database, 421–422
ideal and last processors, 466–467
ideal node, 467
NUMA systems, 459–460
package sets, 458
processor group assignment, 460–462
processors per group, 462
processor state, 462–463
scheduler scalability, 463
SMT sets, 458–459
thread scheduling, 458–467
thread selection, 467–468
multitasking, defined, 38
multithreaded applications, 466–467
MUP (Multiple UNC Provider), 630–632
MUP surrogate providers, 632–633
music content, protected, 368
mutants, 144
mutexes, 144
default security, 496
fast and guarded, 196–198
mutex objects
abandonment, 186
signaled state, 186
mutual exclusion, 176–177
multiprocessor, 179–180

N
named pipes, 612–617
activity, viewing, 616–617
connections, establishing, 613
creation, 73
as FSDs, 616
implementation, 615–616
modes, 612–613
namespace, listing, 616–617
servers and clients, 612
target systems, connecting, 28
name parsing, 300
name resolution, 235–236, 655–658
DNS, 655
PNRP, 656–658
name retention, 165
namespace extensions, 597
namespaces
aggregation and availability, 637–638
CIMV2, 350
file-system, 154
global, 173
instanting, 173–175
private, 171
registry, 154
scopes, 639
security, 353
session, 173–174
WMI, 348–349
namespace service providers, 602
Winsock, adding to, 600
NAP Agent, 691
NAP (Network Access Protection), 689–694
client configuration, 693–694
client-side architecture, 690–691
DA and, 695
Group Policy settings, 693
server-side, 691–692
Nasarre, Christophe, 2, 123, 188
National Computer Security Center (NCSC), 487
native system calls
definition, 4
worker factory management, 403
native system services, defined, 4
NAT (Network Address Translation), 669
Nbsts command, 619
NCSI (Network Connectivity Status Indicator), 659–662
active probing, 661
network change monitoring, 660
passive polling, 660
registry change monitoring, 661
NDIS drivers, 595, 672–684
connection-oriented, 677–678
execution environment, 673
intermediate, 677
network medium activity, 673
pausing and resuming, 674
Remote NDIS, 680–681
Ndiskd kernel debugger extension library, 675–676
NDIS library, 595, 672–673
NDIS Lightweight Filter driver, 630, 674
NDIS miniport drivers, 595
listing, 675–676
packets through, capturing, 678–680
for USB network devices, 680–681
NDIS (Network Driver Interface Specification), 672
components, 673
collection-oriented, 674, 677–678
features, 673–674
lightweight filter drivers, 674, 677
receive-side scaling, 674
TCP/IP offloading, 674
Ndis.sys, 595
Net APIs, 686
NetBIOS, 618–620
implementation, 619–620
names, listing, 619
naming convention, 618
operation, 618–619
routing scheme, 619
sessions, 618
NetBIOS Extended User Interface
(NetBEUI) protocol, 620
Netbios function, 619
NetBT (NetBIOS over TCP/IP) driver, 620
.NET Framework
Common Language Runtime, 3
components, 3
Framework Class Library, 3
Netlogon, 559
Netsh
BranchCache configuration, 648–649
connection security settings, 672
publication and replication cache
configuration, 648
Winsock service and namespace
providers, viewing, 600–602
network access, protecting, 689–696
Network Access Protection (NAP), 689–694
network activity, displaying, 26
network adapter drivers, 672
NDIS drivers, 672–684
network adapters, 672
Wake-on-LAN, 674
Network Address Translation (NAT), 669
network applications
dynamic configuration, 658
service levels, 682–684
network bandwidth
conserving, 638
managing and prioritizing, 682
real-time information, 683
reducing, 645
network-based attack prevention, 669–670
Network Basic Input/Output System (NetBIOS), 618–620
network communication, authentication and encryption, 608
network connections
connectivity level, determining, 659–662
establishing, 593
monitoring, 679–680
peer-to-peer, 626–627
security configuration, 672
Network Connections dialog box, 628
Network Connectivity Status Indicator (NCSI), 659–662
network diagnostics, 356
network drive letter assignment, 323
Network Driver Interface Specification (NDIS). See NDIS (Network Driver Interface Specification)
Network File System (NFS), 635
network group, 498
networking, 3, 591–969
APIs, 597–627
architecture, 591–596
binding, 684–685
BranchCache, 645–655
collection-oriented network hardware, 677–678
Distributed File System Namespace, 637–638
Distributed File System Replication, 638
filtering operations, 667–676
high-loss scenarios, 664
location-based configuration settings, 658–662
name resolution, 655–658
NDIS drivers, 672–684
network services, 685–696
Offline Files, 639–644
OSI reference model, 592–594
performance features, 663–664
privacy, 621
protocol drivers, 663–672
Quality of Service, 682–684
redirectors, 627–636
slow-link latency threshold, 641
software components, 591
surrogate providers, 632–633
topology discovery and mapping, 658–662
UNC names, 612
Windows components, 594–597
Windows Filtering Platform, 667–676
networking APIs, 594, 597–627
Background Intelligent Transfer Service, 621–624
See
See networking protocols, 3, 591–969
See also network communication, authentication and encryption, 608
See also network connections
See also network devices, 591–969
See also networking
See also networking APIs
See also networking components, 669–677
networking APIs

networking APIs (continued)
byte mode and message mode, 612–613
Distributed Component Object Model, 625
Internet APIs, 610–612
mailslots, 612–617
Message Queuing, 625–626
named pipes, 612–617
NetBIOS, 618–620
Peer-to-Peer Infrastructure, 624–625
remote procedure call, 605–609
Universal Plug and Play, 626–627
Windows Sockets, 597–603
Winsock Kernel, 595, 603–605
networking components
connection-oriented, 677
health policies for, 689
installing, 684
logical network identity and interfaces, 659
network connectivity, testing, 661
network layer in OSI reference model, 593
Network List Manager (NLM) APIs, 659
Network Load Balancing, 688–689
Network Location Awareness (NLA) service, 658–659
network logon service (Netlogon), 491
Network Module Registrar (NMR), 603
Network Monitor
downloading, 678
packet capture, 678–680
packet net wor k throttling, 448
network protocol requests, 663
network provider interface, 628
network providers, 628
drive-letter mapping, 629
network redirectors, See redirectors
network restriction rules, 318
networks
bursty behavior, 682
changes on, monitoring, 660
IPv6, 663
logical, 659
mapping, 662
network servers, 63
network service account, 312
account privileges, 312
group membership, 311
services running in, 310
NetworkServiceAndNoImpersonation
service group, 334
network services, 685–696
Active Directory, 686–687
DirectAccess, 695–696
Network Access Protection, 689–694
Network Load Balancing, 688–689
remote access, 685–686
RPC applications, 607–608
NetworkService service group, 334
Network Shell (Netsh.exe), See Netsh
network stack, 591
IPV4 and IPV6 coexistence, 663
legacy protocol support, 664
WFP integration, 667
network status events, 605
network traffic
authentication and key negotiation, 671
first-come, first-served delivery, 682
monitoring, interpreting, and processing, 667–676
polling for, 660
tagging and shaping, 683
network transmissions
multicast messages, 598
OSI reference model, traversing, 592
requests and replies, 591
zero-copy, 599
New Connection Security Rule Wizard, 672
Next Generation TCP/IP Stack, 663–665
next processor, 466
NFS (Network File System), 635
NIC driver encapsulation, 595
NLA (Network Location Awareness) service, 658–659
NMR (Network Module Registrar), 603
Nobody SID, 499
node addresses, 593
nodes, 39
devices, 39
intermediate, 593
No-Execute-Up mandatory policy, 505
nonuniform memory access (NUMA) systems, 459–460
No-Read-Up mandatory policy, 505, 529
Notepad registry settings, 290
notifications
asynchronous, 213–214
change, 278, 290
preshutdown, 308, 332
from services, 320, 326
shutdown, 320, 326
time-change, 337
NotifyBootConfigStatus function, 328–329
No-Write-Up mandatory policy, 505
NtAllocateReserveObject system call, 162
NtAlpcCreatePortSection API, 214
NtCreateThreadEx function, 398
NtCreateUserProcess function, 370
calling, 373
e xecutable file, opening, 373–376
e xec utive pr ocess object creation, 376–381
NtDelayExecutionThread calls, 467
Ntdll.dll, 37, 53–54, 234
DbgUi functions, 230
image loader, 232
worker factory interface, 403
NTDS API, 687
NTGlobalFlag variable, 207
viewing and setting, 209
NtInitializeRegistry function, 329
NT Kernel Logger, 220
Ntkrnlpa.exe, 37
Ntoskrnl.exe, 27, 37, 42, 220
NtQueryInformationWorkerFactory API, 404
NtQueueUserApCThread system call, 162
NtSetIoCompletion API, 162
NtSetSystemInformation, 73
null sessions, 311, 514
NUMA distance array, 460
NUMA node 0, 460–461
NUMA nodes, 460
NUMA (nonuniform memory access) systems, 39, 459–460
NUMA Proximity IDs, 460
NUMA spanning, 262

O
ObCheckObjectAccess function, 496
ObDereferenceObjectWithTag function, 168
object access auditing, 549–552
demonstrating, 550–552
object attribute flags, 147–148
object attributes, 147
defined, 22
OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES, 398
ObjectAttributes parameter, 22
object bodies, 145–149
format and contents, 148
object directories, 169–171
object directory objects, 169
object handles, 155–160
object headers, 145–149
offsets, 146
quota charges attribute, 168
viewing, 150–152
Object Identifiers (OIDs), 562–563
object leaks, 167
object manager, 22, 56, 140–176
access permissions, recording, 495
access rights checking and storage, 163
audit event creation, 548
exploring, 140–141
filtering, 274
finding objects, 154–155
generic services, 149
goals, 141–142
handle creation, 155
kernel-managed thread pools, 403
name lookups, 169, 173
namespace, 141
namespace management, 174
object directory object, 169
object filtering, 176
object header and subheader access, 148
object header control, 145
object manager (continued)
object method calls, 153
object naming requirements, 169
object retention, 165–168
object security enforcement, 494
open handle counter, incrementing, 165
pushlock use, 201
reference count, incrementing, 165
remote file access, 170–171
security access validation, 496–497
security descriptor management, 525
symbolic link object, 173
type objects, 149–153
Object Manager (CIMOM), 343
object methods, 153–155
close method, 154
defined, 22
delete method, 154
okay-to-close method, 155
open method, 154
parse method, 154
query name method, 154
security method, 155
security routine, 153
ObjectName parameter, 308, 325
object name squatting, 171
object-oriented design, 35
object owners, write-DACL access, 533
object protection mechanisms, 494–536
access checks, 495–497
access control, 523–536
assured authentication, 562
filtered admin tokens, 516–517
impersonation, 514–516
integrity levels, 500–505
restricted tokens, 516
security descriptors, 522–536
SIDs, 497–517
tokens, 506–513
virtual service accounts, 518–521
object reference tagging, 167–168
object reference tracing, 167–168
object retention, 165–168
object reuse protection, 488
objects, 21
access, determining, 528–536
ACL assignment, 527–528
address ordering, 189
base named, viewing, 171–172
caching modes, 641–642
create, open, and query services, 149
default security, 496
deferred delete operations, 166
defined, 21
deleting, 166–167
desired access rights, 163
dispatcher objects, 153
executive-level, 57
existing handles, referencing by, 497
filtering, 176
integrity levels, 504–505
integrity protection, 22
internal structure, 22
job, 480–484
kernel, 57
locating in namespaces, 349
locking order, 189
management, 343. See also object manager
mandatory policies, 505
naming, 169, 170–171
open handle counter, 165
opening by name, 496
operating system tasks, 22
owner rights, 531–532
private, 497
protection, 23
referencing, 155
reserve, 162–163
resource accounting, 168
security, 163–165
security descriptors, 494, 522–523
security routine, 153
security settings, viewing, 534–536
sharing in global namespace, 169
signaled state, defining, 185–188
structure, 145
synchronization support, 153
temporary and permanent, 165–168
type objects, 149–153
types, 142
write-DACL access, 533
object security locks, 496
object subheaders, 145–147
conditions required for, 147
object types, defined, 21
Object Viewer, 25
ObpCreateHandle function, 496
ObReferenceObjectByHandle function, 497
ObReferenceObjectWithTag function, 168
OCI (open cryptographic interface), 608
ODBC (Open Database Connectivity) adapter, 344
Offline Files, 632, 639–644
architecture, 640
cache, 639
cache structure, 643–644
caching modes, 641–642
capabilities, 635
components, 639–640
data security, 643
ghosts, 643
Group Policy settings, 642
limitations, 639
object types, 639
prefetching files, 651
Offline (Need to Sync) caching mode, 642
Offline (Not Connected) caching mode, 642
Offline Registry Library, 278
Offline (Slow Connection) caching mode, 641
Offline (Working Offline) caching mode, 642
Offreg.dll, 278
OIDs (Object Identifiers), 562–563
okay-to-close method, 155
on-demand problem diagnosis, 354
one-time initialization, 204–205
Onex, Walter, 32
online caching mode, 641
open cryptographic interface (OCI), 608
Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) adapter, 344
Openfiles /query command, 140–141
open handle counter, 165
open method calls, 154
open object APIs, problems with, 177
openS3Manager function, 321
Open Software Foundation (Open Group), 605
Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model, 592–594
operating systems. See also Windows operating system
administrative rights, requesting, 576–578
child partitions, 251–254
dynamic processor support, 479–480
enlightenments, 248, 253–254
hypervisor component, 248. See also hypervisor (Hyper-V)
logical processors, 257. See also logical processors
parent partition, 249–251
ProcessorAdd callback, 479–480
security ratings, 487–489
software, kernel-mode execution, 17–32
tasks, objects role in, 22
updates and antivirus signatures, 689
virtualization, 248
virtual memory space, 15
operations, administrative rights for, 573
Orange Book, 487
Orwick, Penny, 32
OSI reference model, 592–594
over-the-shoulder (OTS) elevations, 574–575
Owner Rights SID, 531–532

P

packets, 592
capturing, 678–680
filtering by IPSec, 670
forwarding, 663
receive-side scaling, 674
routing, 593
throttling, 448
unicast, 669–670
page faults, 94–95
exception numbers, 82
paging data, 15
paging files, initialization, 73
parameters, marshaling, 606
Parameters subkey, 306
parent partition, 249–251. See also hypervisor (Hyper-V)
logical processors, 257
parent processes absent, 376
retrieving, 5–6
parse method, 154
remote file access, 170–171
partitions, 249. See also child partitions; parent partition
passive interrupt level, 91
password-based authentication, 558–562
passwords for user logon, 558–559
patch descriptors, 271
PatchGuard, 272–274
pause assembly instruction, 180
PCA (Program Compatibility Assistant), 357
Pcb (process control block) member, 362
PCR (processor control region), 89, 453
PEB (process environment block), 238, 359
address, 364
fields, 364
fields, viewing, 365
setting up, 380–381
Peer Content Caching and Retrieval, 650
Content Identification, 650
Hosted Cache Protocol, 651
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Extensions, 651
Retrieval Protocol, 650
Peer Name Resolution Protocol (PNRP), 656–658
Peer-to-Peer Collaboration Interface, 625
Peer-to-Peer Graphing, 625
Peer-to-Peer Grouping, 625
Peer-to-Peer Identity Manager, 625
Peer-to-Peer Infrastructure, 624–625
Peer-to-Peer Namespace Provider, 625
performance ALPC optimizations, 217
emulated devices, 255
network, 682–684
offloading operations, 674
playback, 448
problems, detecting and resolving, 356
performance counters accessing, 23, 287
descriptions, 25
Dynamic Memory-related, 263–265
mode-related, 18
System Calls/Sec, 140
Performance Data Helper (PDH) API and functions, 287
performance diagnostics, 356
Performance Monitor, 25–26
functions, 25
c kernel mode vs. user mode counter, 19
kernel mode vs. user mode usage, 20
performance counter descriptions, 25
providers, viewing, 338–339
System Monitor function, 25
thread activity, viewing, 399
Performance Options dialog box, 426, 428
Performance tool job objects, viewing, 482–484
multimedia thread boosts, viewing, 446–447
thread state transitions, viewing, 419–421
permanent objects, 165–168
permissions effective, viewing, 534–536
for protected process threads, 401
per-processor ready queues, 421–422
physical layer in OSI reference model, 592
Physical Memory counter, 264
physical memory, mapping to virtual memory, 15
PIC (Programmable Interrupt Controller), 84
viewing, 85–86
pipelining, 636
PipeList, 616–617
pipes, establishing, 593. See also named pipes
PIT (Programmable Interrupt Timer), 112
Pkgmgr.exe, auto-elevation, 579
platforms, portability across, 37–38
Plug and Play drivers, 64
code signing, 274
Plug and Play Extensions (PnP-X), 626–627
Plug and Play manager, 55
device interrupt assignment, 90
dynamic processor support, 480
PMP (Protected Media Path), 368, 369
PNRP (Peer Name Resolution Protocol), 656–658
ID generation, 656
peer names, 655
phases of name resolution, 657–658
pointers, KPP-protected, 273
point-to-point communications, 593
policy-based QoS, 682
policy settings, viewing, 43–44
Pool Monitor, 25
portability, 33
across hardware architectures, 37–38
HAL and, 60
port objects, 210
ports, 593
POSIX executables, 374
process section base address, 380
POSIX subsystem, 53
PostQueuedCompletionStatus API, 162
power fail interrupt level, 90
power management, 122
power manager, 55
Power Options, 64
PowerPC architecture, 37
PowerRequest objects, 144
PRCB (processor region control block), 89
global spinlock pointers, 181
per-processor ready queues and summary, 421
quantum reset value, 423
predictable-reads isolation level, 288
preemption, 445, 449–450
idle thread, 456
preemptive scheduler, 409
prefetching, 386
prefix cache, 630–631
presentation layer in OSI reference model, 594
preshutdown notifications, 308, 332
PreshutdownTimeout parameter, 308
previous mode, 136
primary tokens, 509
principal names, 608
printer drivers, 32-bit vs. 64-bit, 228
priority boosts, 430–448
AdjustBoost, 443
AdjustUnwait, 442–443
APC, 432
applying, 442–443
for CPU starvation, 439–441
effects of, 442
executive resources, waiting on, 434
foreground threads after waits, 435–437
GUI threads, 437–439
I/O completion, 433–434
lock ownership, 432–433
for multimedia applications and games, 430, 444–448
removing, 443–444
scheduler/dispatcher events, 430–431
unwait, 431–432, 432
viewing, 435–437, 440–441
priority class, process, 371
priority-driven, preemptive scheduling, 408–410, 449. See also thread scheduling
priority levels, 410–416
boosts, 430–448
boosts and quantum length, 427
changing, 414–415
idle thread, 455
inheritance, 412
vs. IRQLs, 412–413
mapping of Windows kernel to Windows API, 411
preemption and, 450
priority 0, 456
process, 414
processors

priority levels (continued)
ready queues, 421
real-time range, 412
recomputation, 442–444
thread-scheduling, 410–416
Priority Queue, 644
privacy, 621
private address spaces, 15
private namespaces, 171
private objects, 497
private virtual address spaces, 5
privilege arrays, 509
privileged access control, 23
privileges, 538–547
assignment, 539
auditing-related, 548
Bypass Traverse Checking privilege, 545
checks for, 507, 540
defined, 538
enabling and disabling, 541–542
enforcement, 540
exploitation, 546–547
list of, 543–545
local system account, 311–312
separating levels of, 501
services, specifying, 313–314
services, viewing, 314–315
super-user, 546–547
problem scenarios, automated detection and resolution, 354–358
procedures, local and remote, 606–607
process activity, viewing, 7–32
process address space
creating, 378–379
PEB in, 359
setting up, 379–380
TEB in, 391, 394
process creation, 369–391
executable file, opening, 373–376
executive thread object, stack, and context, creating, 381–383
flags and parameters, creating and validating, 371–373
initial thread execution, starting, 385
main stages, 370–371
process initialization in context of new process, 386–387
tracing, 387–391
Windows executive process object creation, 376–381
Windows subsystem–specific post-initialization, 383–385
process environment block (PEB). See PEB (process environment block)
processes
access rights requests, 368
access tokens, 547
affinity mask, 464–465. See also affinity masks
attaching to, 28
attribute list, 372–373
base priority, 411–412
breaking into, 230
components, 5
CPU utilization, 10. See also CPU usage
CreateProcess flow, 369–391. See also process creation
CSR_PROCESS, 359
Csrss-specific information, 365
data structures, 359–371
defined, 5
details, viewing, 10–12
error port, 132
handles, 155, 360
handles, acquiring, 155
handle tables, 158, 496
hung, 400–401
ideal node, 467
initialization, 234–235
integrity levels, 500–505, 529
integrity levels, viewing, 501–502
internals, 359–367
job objects, 480–484
loaded modules database, 238
multiple services, running, 309
network resource access, 311
open handles list, 14
overhead, 360
parent/child relationships, viewing, 6–7, 68
priority classes, 371–372
priority levels, specifying, 414
protected, 271, 368–369
quota structure, 168
resources, 14
security context, 14, 506
services. See services
services running in, viewing, 334–335
shared, 332–335
system resource access, 168
threads in, 12
threads, viewing, 399
timer resolution change requests, 114
user-mode, 36
virtualization status, 567
W32PROCESS, 360
work stations, 318
work factory use, viewing, 405–407
Process Explorer, 9–12, 25
access rights, 368
capabilities, 11–12
clock cycle counter use, 399
handle table, viewing, 164
hosting processes tooltips, 11
information in, 10
object handles, viewing, 156–157
parent processes, 5–6
priority levels, changing, 414–415
privileges, viewing enabled, 541–542
process details, viewing, 10–12
process integrity levels, viewing, 501–502
protected processes and, 369
protected process threads, viewing, 402
service processes, viewing details, 76
service security tokens, viewing, 314–315
services running in processes, viewing, 334–335
SIDs, viewing, 500
symbols, accessing, 10
thread activity, viewing, 399
thread pools, viewing, 405–407
threads, killing, 414
thread stack, displaying, 400
thread startup address, 400
thread user start address, viewing, 127–128
token contents, viewing, 513
Wmiprvse creation, viewing, 352
Wow64 processes, displaying, 401
process IDs, 5
processing
deferring, 104–105
real-time, 100
process manager, 55
CPU rate limit enforcement, 478
hypercritical work item use, 206
process memory, changing, 28
Process Monitor, 25
account privileges for, 289
administrative account, running in, 292
DLL search order, viewing, 237–238
DPC activity, monitoring, 108–109
internals, 289–293
Internet Explorer, tracing, 503
interrupts, monitoring, 108–109
process startup, tracing, 387–391
registry activity, monitoring, 289
troubleshooting techniques, 291–292
process notifications, 274
process objects, 360–362
creation, 232
information in, displaying, 363–364
process object type, 22, 143
processor access modes, 17–20
ProcessorAdd callback, 479–480
processor affinity, 408, 463–465. See also affinity masks
extended affinity mask, 465–466
group assignment, 460–462
specifying, 416
system affinity mask, 466
updating, 480
processor control region (PCR), 89, 453
processor groups, 40
Processor Machine State Registers (MSRs), 273
processor region control block (PRCB), See PRCB (processor region control block)
processors. See also logical processors
adding to child partitions, 257
processors (continued)
CPU 0, 118
dynamic, 479–480
idle/sleep states, 122
IDT, 83
interrupt request level settings, 87
interrupts, 82
IRQL, changing, 89
licensed, 40
look-aside lists, 479
multiple, 38
timer expiration, 116
timer selection, 118–120
tracking, 40
virtual, 257
processor selection, 468–470
processor share-based scheduling, 470–478
processor-specific data, 58
process security tokens, 9
process/thread runtime, updating, 116
process tree, 6–7, 11
Process Type object, 360
producers, 230
ProductPolicy registry value, 43
ProductSuite registry value, 42–43
ProductType registry value, 42–43
profile interrupt level, 90
profiles
loading and unloading, 283
roaming, 283, 569
security, 514
user, 282, 562
Program Compatibility Assistant (PCA), 357
Programmable Interrupt Timer (PIT), 112
Programming the Microsoft Windows
Driver Model, Second Edition (Onye)
programs. See also executables
defined, 5
low integrity level, launching, 513
Protected Media Path (PMP), 368, 369
Protected Mode Internet Explorer (PIME), 503, 529
protected processes, 271, 368–369
attribute list, 372
checks performed on, 385
protected process threads
information, viewing, 402
limitations, 401
Protection Profile (PP), 489
protocol drivers, 63
NDIS driver use, 672–684
network, 663–672
transport, 663
Windows Filtering Platform, 667–672
protocol stack, 594. See also network
stack
providers, 344–345
built-in, 344
COM and DCOM servers, 344
defined, 628
dynamic, 347
event tracing, 220
interface features, 344
UBPM registration, 338–339
unregistering, 338
viewing, 338–339
proxies, detecting, 661
proximity IDs, 460–461
PsAllocateCpuQuotaBlock function, 471–472
PsChangeProfileCpuCycles function, 473
PsCpuFairShareEnabled variable, 471
PsCreateSystemThread function, 69
PsGetSid function, 499–500
PsInvertedFunctionTable, 273
PsAllocateProcess function, 374, 376–381
PsAllocateThread function, 381–383
PsPcQuotaControl data structure, 471
PsPcCreateThread function, 398
PsFlushProcessorIdleOnlyQueue function, 475
PsInsertProcessIdleOnlyQueue function, 475
PsInsertProcessFunctionTable, 273
PsLazyInitializeCpuQuota function, 471
PsPrioritySeparation function, 428–429, 435, 438
PsStartNewShareInterval function, 475
PsUserThreadStartup function, 386
PsReleaseThreadFromIdleOnlyQueue routine, 475, 477
publication cache, 647–648
public IP addresses, 663
private address mapping to, 669
publishing content, 647
pushlocks, 199–201
priority boosts and, 432
structure, 200

Q
Quality of Service (QoS), 682–684
components, 682–683
Winsock support, 597
Quality Windows Audio/Video Experience (qWAVE), 682–684
quantum, 409, 422–429
clock cycles per, 424–425
clock tick adjustment, 424
configuration settings, changing, 429
controlling, 425–426
end of, 450–452
expiration, 107
Priority Separation field, 428
registry value, 427–428
reset value, 423–424
short vs. long, 428
threads in idle process priority class, 428
values, 427
variable, 427, 428
quarantine agent service runtime, 691
query name method, 154
query/set native calls, worker factory
management, 403
queued spinlocks, 181
QueueUserApc API, 162

R
race conditions, 480
rate limiting, CPU, 478
Raw transport protocol, 603
RDBSS (Redirected Drive Buffering
Subsystem), 633–634
mini-redirectors, 634
RDPDR mini-redirector, 635
read-commit isolation level, 288
ready queues
context switch to, 424
deferred, 383
dispatcher, 421, 457
per-processor dispatcher, 421
preempted threads, 450
scanning, 421, 439, 440, 458
systemwide, 421
thread association with, 468–470
ready summary, 421
ready threads, 416
priority boosts for, 439
in ready queue, 421
viewing, 408–409
Real Time Clock (RTC), 112
real-time processing, 100
reaper function, 206
reason for access reporting, 549
receive window auto tuning, 663
recv and send APIs, 598
Redirected Drive Buffering SubSystem
(RDBSS), 633–634
redirection
API Sets, 245–247
of DLL names, 236–238
in Wow64, 226
redirectors, 63, 605, 627–636
components, 633–634
mini-redirectors, 634–635
Multiple Provider Router, 627–630
Multiple UNC Provider, 630–632
prefix cache, 630–631
priority order, 631
Server Message Block, 635–636
surrogate providers, 632–633
reference count, object, 165–166
REG_BINARY values, 279
RegCreateKeyTransacted API, 287–288
RegDeleteKeyTransacted API, 287–288
SAPICs (Streamlined Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controllers)

REG_DWORD values, 279
Regedit.exe, 278
hives, loading and unloading, 294
local system account, running as, 492
Reg.exe, 278
virtualization state, displaying, 572
RegFlushKey API, 303
Regini.exe, 278
region blocks, 216
regions, mapping, 214–215
RegisterServiceCtrlHandler function, 309
registry, 23, 277–304
activity, monitoring, 289
applications settings, locating, 290–291
AppLocker rules, 584–585
blocks, 296
buffer overflows, 292
compacting, 297
configuration data in, 227
configuration manager management, 293–305
CurrentControlSet key, 328–329
data types, 279–280
ing, 277–278
EnableCpuQuota value, 471
error recovery, 287
filtering, 303–304
flushes, 302–303
global audit policy, 552
hives, 293–294. See also hives, registry
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT, 283
HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG, 286
HKEY_CURRENT_USER, 281
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, 283–284
HKEY_PERFORMANCE_DATA, 287
HKEY_USERS, 282
idle system activity, viewing, 290
initialization, 73
internals, 293–305
keys, 279
last known good configuration, 286,
328–330
links, 280
logical structure, 280–287
missing keys or values, 291–292
modification, 279
naming scheme, 279
Native and Wow64 portions, 227
performance counters, accessing, 23
performance optimizations, 304
permanent changes, 288
ProductPolicy value, 43
ProductSuite value, 42–43
ProductType value, 42–43
quantum settings, 427–428
root keys, 280–281
Services key, 305, 306
subsystem startup information, 49
symbolic links, 295
tools for editing, 277–278
transactional, 287
troubleshooting problems, 291–292
usage, 278–279
values, 279
viewing, 277–278
virtualization, 571–573, 578
Registry Editor, 284–285
registry filter notifications, 274
registry namespace, 154
virtualization, 567–590
REG_LINK values, 280
RegOpenKeyTransacted API, 287–288
REG_SZ values, 279
.retrans-ms extension, 289
relative identifiers (RIDs), 497–498
relative times, 115
reliability, 34
relocation, 242
Remediation Servers, 693
remote access, 685–686
remote authentication, 559
remote clients, network connectivity,
695–696
remote desktop connections, 20
remote editing of BCD, 284–285
remote files
 caching on local machine, 639
requests for, 635–636
remote file systems
 accessing, 630–633, 635–636
 caching, 632
Remote NDIS, 680–681
remote performance monitoring, 287
remote procedure call (RPC). See RPC
(remote procedure call)
remote resources, accessing, 629,
633–635
remoting, 20
replay protection, 670
replication
 benefits, 637
multimaster, 638
topologies, 638
replication groups, 638
replication cache, 648
RequiredPrivileges parameter, 308, 314
reserve blocks, 216
reserve objects, 162–163
resource accounting, 168
resource exhaustion prevention, 356
resource management, 416
Resource Manager (RM), 269
registry, 289
Resource Manager SID, 499
Resource Monitor
 object handles, viewing, 157
resources, displaying, 26
resources
 mutual exclusion and, 176–177
permissions, setting, 316
remote, 629, 633–635
service access to, 315–318
UNC name access, 627
responsiveness
 improving, 430, 435, 437–439
thread priority boosts and, 433
restore files and directories privilege, 546
restricted service SIDs, 316–318
restricted tokens, 507, 516
retail build, 45
Richter, Jeffrey, 2, 3, 123, 188
RIDs (relative identifiers), 497–498
viewing, 499
rings 0 through 3, 17
RM (Resource Manager), 269
roaming profiles
 registry values, 283
virtualized files and, 569
robustness, 34
root keys, registry, 280–281
root \Sessions directory, 73
routers, 593
 congestion, 663
routing functions, 593
routing modes, 84
RpcImpersonateClient function, 514, 608
RPC (remote procedure call), 605–609
asynchronous, 607
implementation, 609
local and remote execution, 606, 609
operation, 605–608
security, 608
server name publishing, 609
subsystem, 609
unencrypted, 608
RPCSS, 609
RTC (Real Time Clock), 112
RtlUserThreadStart, 387
RtlVerifyVersionInfo function, 43
Run As Administrator command, 576
Runs command, 283, 292, 574–576
running threads, 417
run-once initialization (InitOnce), 183,
204–205
runtime compatibility mitigations, 233
run-time patching, 233
Russinovich, Mark, 32
S

SACLs, 523, 524
assigning, 527–528
safe DLL search mode, 235–236
safe mode, 324
registry keys, 324
SAM APIs, 686
SAM database, 490
SAM (Security Accounts Manager), 490
security descriptors, 492
SAPICs (Streamlined Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controllers), 84–85
SAS (secure attention sequence)

SAS (secure attention sequence), 489
implementation, 557
logon startup, 558
SAs (security associations), 671
scalability, 40–41
scatter-gather, 597
ScAutoStartServices function, 323
sc command, 340
ScGenerateServiceDB function, 321
ScGenerateServiceTag function, 335
ScGetBootAndSystemDriverState function, 322
SChannel, 608
Scheduled Tasks service, 339
scheduling
processor share-based, 470–478
thread, 408–470
Windows system, 408–410
scheduling events, 69
thread priority boosts, 431
scheduling priorities, thread, 87. See also priority levels
ScInitDelayStart function, 327
ScLogonAndStartImage function, 325
SCM Extension DLL (Scext .dll), 336
SCM (Service Control Manager), 74–75, 321–323
boot-verification program startup, 329
commands, 320
internal service database, 321
last known good control set, 328–330
named pipe creation, 326
network drive letter tracking, 323
service characteristics, 306
service database, 321–322
service deletion, 306
service entry and group order lists, 321–322
service privileges, accounting, 314
service registry key creation, 305
service SID generation, 316
service-start command, 309, 326
shutdown routine, 331–332
startup, 321
SvcHost process launch, 333
UBPM initialization, 337
scopes, 639
script execution, controlling, 589–590
scripting API, 344
scripts, 351
ScStartService function, 325
ScTagQuery (Winsider Seminars & Solutions Inc.), 335
Sc tool, virtual service account creation, 518–521
SDDL (Security Descriptor Definition Language), 537
SeAccessCheck function, 496
SeAuditPrivilege, 548
second-chance notification, 126
Second-Level Address Translation (SLAT), 259
section blobs, 216
section objects, 143, 214–215, 373–374
mapping to API Sets, 247
security attention sequence (SAS). See SAS (secure attention sequence)
Secure Socket Transmission Protocol (SSTP), 686
security, 22. See also security mechanisms
access control, 23
of cache content, 646
console processes, 52
debugger-based attacks, 369
IPsec, 669–672
job object limits, 481
local system account characteristics, 311
for namespaces, 353
object, 163–165
object name squatting, 171
privilege exploitation, 546–547
regions and, 214–215
of registry keys, 304
of RPC, 608
section objects and, 214
service isolation, 315–318
service security contexts, 310
shatter attack prevention, 320, 530
spoofing prevention, 516
systemwide policies in registry, 286
WMI, 353
Security Accounts Manager (SAM), 490, 492
security associations (SAS), 671
security attribute, 215
security auditing, 23, 488, 548–554
global audit policy, 552–553
object access auditing, 549–552
security blobs, 216
security boundaries, 573
security checks, 536
security components
application identification, 581–582
communication paths, 493
security contexts
identifying, 506
process, 14
user, 23
security credentials, user, 23
security descriptors, 522–536
attributes, 522
flags, 522–523
thread, 399
viewing, 525–527
security identifiers (SIDs). See SIDs (security identifiers)
security mechanisms, 487–590
access checks, 495–497
access logging, 494–536
access tokens, 547
account rights, 538–547
ALPC mechanisms, 216–217
ApplD, 581–582
ApplLocker, 583–588
AuthZ Windows API, 536–538
core components, 490–493
logon, 555–565
object protection, 494–536
privileges, 538–547
ratings, 487–489
Software Restriction Policies, 589–590
UAC, 566–581
security method, 155
Security parameter, 308
security policy, 548
Security Policy MMC snap-in, AppLocker management, 584
security quality of service (SQOS), 515
security ratings
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, 489–495
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria, 487–489
security reference monitor (SRM), 55, 490
access rights checking, 163
security routine, 153
security support providers (SSPs), 608
Security Target (ST), 489
security tokens, 12
security validation of impersonating threads, 495
Self-Monitoring Analysis and Reporting Technology (SMART) code, 356
semaphore object type, 144
semaphores, 143, 144
default security, 496
ETHREAD, 196
object directory, 170
for shared resources, 202
for shared waiters, 198
signaled state, 186
SeNotifyPrivilege, 545
server communication ports, 210
server connection ports, 210
Server Message Block (SMB). See SMB (Server Message Block)
server name publishing, 608
server operating system versions vs. client versions, 41–43
servers
accept operations, queuing, 599
CPU addition and replacement, 479–480
file-system change replication, 637, 638
impersonation, 514
principal names, 608
quantum length, 422
Remediation Servers, 693
replication groups, 638
well-known addresses, 600
Service-0x0-3e7$ window station, 318
services, 305–321
SCPs, 305
Service Control Manager (SCM), 74–75
service control programs, 341–342
Service Control (Sc.exe), 314–315
service group NetworkService
service hardening, 531–532
Service Host (SvcHost), services running in, 332–333
service logon SIDs, 317
service processes, 36
management, 74–75
details, viewing, 76
in, mapping, 75
service provider interface (SPI), 600
services, 305–336. See also Windows services
account settings, 313
alternate accounts, running in, 313
authenticating to other machines, 311, 312
auto-start, 305, 321, 323
Change Notify privilege, 314
characteristics, 306–308
delayed auto-start, 324, 327
dependencies, 324
entry points, 309
FailureActions and FailureCommand values, 330
failures, 330–331
groupings, 333–334
startup ordering, 321, 324
ImagePath value, 325
initializing, 309
interactive, 319–321, 326
isolation, 315–318
least privilege, running with, 313–314
listing, 75–76
local system account, running in, 310–312
logon information, 325
main thread, 309–310
names, 74
ObjectName value, 325
Parameters subkey, 306
peer-to-peer support, 624–625
privileges, specifying, 313–314
privileges, viewing, 314–315
process, launching, 326
registering, 305
running in processes, viewing, 334–335
security context, 310
security descriptors, 342
service applications, 305–321
Service Control Manager, 321–323
service SIDs, 316–318
Services key, 305–306
service tags, 335–336
Session Zero Isolation, 318–321
shared processes, 332–335
shutdown, 331–332
shutdown notifications, 331
shutdown order, 332
startup, 74, 305, 323–327
startup errors, 327–328
status messages, 309
triggers, 340–341
user notifications, 320
well-known addresses, 600
window stations, 318–319
ServiceSidType parameter, 308
Services key, 305, 306
Services MMC snap-in, 342
tags, 335–336
SeSecurityPrivilege, 548
session create requests, 73
session layer in OSI reference model, 593
session manager (Smss), 49, 72–74
session namespace, 173–174
instanting, viewing, 175
sessions
accounting information, 472
active logon, listing, 560–562
disconnecting, 21
multiple, 20
NetBIOS, 618
session weight, 477
Session Zero Isolation, 318–321
Set API, 477
SetInformationJobObject function, 464
SetPriorityClass function, 412
SetProcessAffinityMask function, 464
SetProcessWorkingSetSizeEx function, 416
SetServiceStatus function, 309
SetThreadAffinityMask function, 464
deployment, 456
SetWindowsHook function, 557
shadow page tables (SPTs), 258
shared access, executive resources for,
198–199
shared memory
communication, 214
regions, 214–215
sections, 13
shared processes, 332–335
of services, 332–335
shatter attacks, 320, 530
ShellExecute API, 576
shifting, 123
shims, 233, 667
application-compatibility, 568
elevation, 385
shutdown
notifications, 331
ordering, 332
performance diagnostics, 356
services, 331–332
side-by-side assemblies, 384, 398
side-by-side redirection, 237
SIDs (security identifiers), 497–517
assignment, 498
firewall rules and, 318
integrity level, 501
list of, 498–499
local logon, 558
Owner Rights, 531–532
structure, 498
types, 316–317
values in, 497
viewing, 499–500
Sigcheck, viewing application manifests with, 578
signaled state, defining, 185–188
signed files, 582
silent process death, 130
solving, 132
simple problem scenarios, 354
single instancing, 172–173
SiPolicy tool, 43
SLAT (Second-Level Address Translation), 259
Sleep API, 467
SleepConditionVariableSRW API, 203
Slim Reader-Writer Locks (SRW Locks),
183, 202–203
slow-link latency locks, 641
smartcard authentication, 562
SMB 2.0, 635–636
SMB 2.1, 636, 651
SMB mini-redirector, 635, 636
SMB (Server Message Block), 635–636
backward compatibility, 636
BranchCache application retrieval sequence, 651–653
BranchCache integration, 651
BranchCache use, 645
SMB WNet provider, 628
Smith, Guy, 32
SMP (symmetric multiprocessing), 38–40
Smss (session manager), 72–74
initialization steps, 72–73
session startup instance, 73–74
subsystem startup, 49
SMT sets, 458
sockets
categories, 605
client connections to, 598
extension interfaces, 605
listen operations, 598
Windows support, 597
software. See also applications
exceptions and interrupts, 80
interrupt request levels, 86–91
interrupts, 81, 104–276
licensing, 43–44
in OSI reference model, 592–594
Software Restriction Policies (SRP).
See SRP (Software Restriction Policies)
special boot menu, 324
firewall rules and, 318
integrity level, 501
list of, 498–499
local logon, 558
Owner Rights, 531–532
structure, 498
types, 316–317
values in, 497
viewing, 499–500
Sigcheck, viewing application manifests with, 578
signaled state, defining, 185–188
signed files, 582
silent process death, 130
solving, 132
simple problem scenarios, 354
single instancing, 172–173
SiPolicy tool, 43
SLAT (Second-Level Address Translation), 259
Sleep API, 467
SleepConditionVariableSRW API, 203
Slim Reader-Writer Locks (SRW Locks),
183, 202–203
slow-link latency locks, 641
smartcard authentication, 562
SMB 2.0, 635–636
SMB 2.1, 636, 651
SMB mini-redirector, 635, 636
SMB (Server Message Block), 635–636
backward compatibility, 636
BranchCache application retrieval sequence, 651–653
BranchCache integration, 651
BranchCache use, 645
SMB WNet provider, 628
Smith, Guy, 32
SMP (symmetric multiprocessing), 38–40
Smss (session manager), 72–74
initialization steps, 72–73
session startup instance, 73–74
subsystem startup, 49
SMT sets, 458
sockets
categories, 605
client connections to, 598
e
spinlocks, 179–180
  global, 181
  implementation, 179
  instack queued, 182
  for interlocked functions, 182
  kernel-mode, 179–180
  queued, 181
  restrictions on, 183
  viewing, 181
Spininstall.exe, auto-elevation, 579
SPI (service provider interface), 600
spoofing prevention, 516
SPTs (shadow page tables), 258
SQOS (security quality of service), 515
squatting attacks, 171
SRM (security reference monitor), 55, 490
  audit policy, passing, 548
  LSASS connection, 493
  security model equation, 497
SRP (Software Restriction Policies), 384, 583, 586–590
  enforcement, 589–590
SRW Locks, 202–203
SSPs (security support providers), 608
SSTP (Secure Socket Transmission Protocol), 686
stack frames, exception handlers, 125
stack, thread, 400
stack traces, 167
standard user rights, 566
  application execution with, 566–573
  elevation, 574–576
  running as administrative rights, 574
standard user tokens, 507
standby/resume performance diagnostics, 356
standby threads, 416, 457, 469
start-of-thread function, 127
Start parameter, 307
StartServiceCtrlDispatcher function, 309
StartService function, 305
start-stop problem scenarios, 354
startup. See also boot process
  errors, 327–328, 328
  repair tool, 356
  services, 323–327
Startup Programs Viewer, 25
stations, 592
  point-to-point communications between, 593
Streamlined Advanced Programmable
  Interrupt Controllers (SAPICs), 84–85
stride value, 467
Strings, dumping API Set table with, 247
structured exception handling, 123
stub procedures, 606
  generating, 607
SUA (Subsystem for UNIX-based Applications), 53
sub-DLLs, 245–247
subkeys, registry, 279. See also keys, registry
  transacted deletion, 288
subsystem DLLs, 36, 48
  user-mode APIs, 229
Subsystem for UNIX-based Applications
  (SUA), 53
  executive objects, 143
  subsystem processes, creation, 73
subsystems
  GDI, 396
  internal support functions, 53
  POSIX, 53
  RPC, 609
  startup, 49–50
  Subsystem for UNIX-based Applications, 53
  Windows, 50–52
SunRPC, 605
Superfetch, 55
surrogate providers, 630, 632–633
SvCtrlMain function, 321
Svchost.exe, 171
SwitchBack, 244–245
  invoking, 245
SwitchBranch mechanism, 233
SwitchToFiber function, 13
SwitchToThread() call, 467
  symbol files, 27
  symbolic link objects, 173
  symbolic links, 173
  registry, 295
  SMB support, 636
  symbol server
    configuring, 11
    loading symbols from, 27
  symmetric multiprocessing (SMP), 38–40
    mutual exclusion, 177
Sync Center control panel interface, 639
synchronization, 176–205
  condition variables, 202–203
  critical sections, 201
  data structures, 188–191
  deadlocks, 201
  of dispatcher database, 422
  dispatcher objects, 184
  executive resources, 184, 198–199
  high-IRQL, 178–182
  interlocked operations, 178
  kernel mechanisms, 183–184
  low-IRQL, 183–205
  mutexes, 196–198
  object support of, 153
  pushlocks, 199–201
  run once initialization, 204–205
  scalable, pointer-size, 203
  user-mode objects, 201–202
  synchronization interrupt level, 91
  synchronization objects
    executive resources, 184
    keyed events, 194–196
rules of behavior, 185–186
state, 184–185
synchronous event exceptions, 80
synchronous execution, 204
synthetic devices, 255–257
sysenter instruction, 133
Sysinternals Site Blog, 32
Sysinternals tools, 32
system. See also operating systems;
  system mechanisms; Windows
  operating system
  affinity mask, 466
  architecture. See system architecture
  configuration, 283–284
  connecting live, 28
  crashes, 95
  global flags, 207–276
  health policies, 689
  idle, 290
  initialization. See system initialization
    license policy file, 40
    lockdown, 583–590
    registry settings, 279
    responsiveness performance
      diagnostics, 356
    security policies, 286
    service calls, 80
    support processes, 36
  System account security settings, 286
  system address space
    data structures in, 359
    ETHREAD and other structures in, 391
  system architecture, 33–78
    client vs. server versions, 41–44
    device drivers, 63–67
    diagram, 47
    environment subsystem, 48–53
    hardware abstraction layer, 60–62
    kernel, 57–60
    key system components, 46–78
    Ntdll.dll, 53–54
    overview, 35–46
    portability features, 37–38
    requirements and design goals, 33–34
    scalability features, 40–41
    symmetric multiprocessing capabilities,
      38–40
    system processes, 68–78
    Windows executive, 54–57
  system calls
    from 32-bit systems, 134
    from 64-bit systems, 135
    defined, 4
    exported, 136
    functions and arguments, mapping to, 139
    from kernel-mode code, 136
    in Wow64, 225
  System Calls/Sec performance counter, 140
threads

System Service Descriptor Table (SSDT), 273
system service dispatcher, 132–133
locating, 133–134
system service tables, locating, 137
system services, 54
activity, viewing, 140
dispatching, 132–276
dispatch stubs, 53
dispatch table, 135
numbers, 135
system service tables, 137
System software interrupts, 81
system-start drivers, 321–322
system threads, 69–72. See also threads
balance set manager, 439–441
device drivers, mapping to, 70–71
execution, mapping, 70
mode usage, 20
priority levels, 412
system time. See also clock cycles; system
clock
keeping track of, 115
updating, 107
system timers, 119–121
system traps, 80
system unresponsiveness. See also performance
DPCs and, 107
systemwide cookies, 386
systemwide thread startup stub, 386–387
system worker threads, 205–207. See also system threads; threads
dynamic, 206
listing, 207
number of, 206
types, 205–206

tagged TLB, 259
Tag parameter, 307
take ownership privilege, 546
targeted DPCs, 105
Taskeng.exe, 11
TaskHost, 341
Task Manager, 25
access rights, 368
Applications tab, 8–9
kernel mode vs. user mode counter, 20
priority levels, changing, 414–415
process activity, viewing, 7–9
Processes tab, 8
virtualization status, viewing, 567–568
task offloading, 674
Task (Process) List, 25
TCB (thread control block), 393
CPU numbers, 466–467
TCP/IP, 595
activity, tracing, 222–223
device objects, viewing, 665–666
Next Generation TCP/IP Stack, 663
offloading, 674
receive window auto tuning, 663
WAN-friendly characteristics, 663
well-known addresses, 600
WFP integration, 667
TCP/IP port (port 88), 559
TCP/IP protocol stack, 594
TDI Extension (TDX) Driver, 595
TDI (Transport Driver Interface), 603, 633
transports, 595
TDI (Transport Driver Interface) clients, 594–595
TEB (thread environment block), 391, 394–395
dumping, 395
fields, 395
dservice tags, 335
temporary objects, 165–168
terminal server sessions
detecting, 21
management, 76–77
terminal-services environments, 20
processor share-based scheduling, 470
window stations, 318
terminated threads, 417, 453
terms, definitions of, 4–5
Testlimit tool, 159
third-party device drivers, verification, 17
thread context, 12
32-bit and 64-bit, 13
thread data structures, 360
dumping, 394
thread dispatcher, activating, 104
threaded DPCs, 107
disabling, 107
thread environment block (TEB), See TEB
(thread environment block)
thread IDs, 12
Thread Information Block (TIB), 394
thread-local storage (TLS), 12
thread objects, 143
KeyedWaitSemaphore, 196
thread parameter, 382
thread pools, 403–407
shutting down, 403
viewing, 405–407
threads
access tokens, 14, 547
activation context stack, 237
activity, examining, 398–402
affinity mask, 463
alertable wait state, 112
APC queue, 110
artificially waiting, 478
clock cycle count, 399
clock cycles charged to, 472–474
components, 12
contention count, 199
threads

threads (continued)
context switching, 448. See also context switches
CPU consumption, 399
CPU numbers, 466–467
CreateThread function, 398
creation, 398
creation time, 396
data structures, 391–397
debug objects associated with, 230
defered ready state, 416–418
defined, 12
dispatching, 409
distribution of, 470
execution, 387, 398
execution states, 416–421
evolution, 416–418
execution state transitions, 417–418
execution state transitions, viewing, 419–421
executive resources, waiting on, 434
fibers, converting, 13
housekeeping, 466
idle thread, 453–456
impersonation, 495
impersonation tokens, 514
information, displaying, 394
information fields, 392–393
initialized state, 417–418
integrity levels, 529
internal start functions code, 128–129
internal structures, 391–398
killing, 399
mutual exclusion, 176–177
objects, waiting for, 184–185
passive interrupt level, 413
preempted, 409, 449–450
previous mode, 136
priority boosts, 411
priority levels, 410–416. See also priority levels
processor affinity, 408. See also affinity masks; processor affinity
quantum, 83, 409, 422–429
quantum expiration, 107
quorums, 379
ready state, 408–409, 416–418
reaper function, 206
running state, 417–418
run-time accounting, 399, 423
scheduling, 94, 408–470
scheduling on multiprocessor systems, 458–467
scheduling priorities, 87
security access validation, 496
security contexts, 506
security descriptors, 399
selection, 456–458
selection on multiprocessor systems, 467–468
shared and exclusive access, 198–199, 202
shared memory sections, 13
SIDs, 497–517
stack, 400
standby state, 416–418
start address, 394, 399–400
start address, viewing, 127–128
startup in common routine, 387
startup wrapper function, 400
suspension, 111, 399
synchronization, 153, 184
system worker, 205–207
terminated state, 417–418
termination, 111, 386
transition state, 417–418
trap frame, 81
virtual address space, 13
wait blocks list, 188
waiting state, 417–418
wait queues, viewing, 191–194
thread scheduling, 408–470
time slices, 421–422
time-sharing, 450
TIB (Thread Information Block), 394
Tlnipi (Transport Layer Network Provider Interface), 595
Tm objects, 144
TmEn objects, 144
TmRm objects, 144
TmTm objects, 144
TM (Transaction Manager), 269
TmTx objects, 144
TOKEN_MANDATORY_NEW_PROCESS_MIN policy, 509
TOKEN_MANDATORY_NO_WRITE_UP policy, 509
token object type, 143
tokens, 506–513
AppLocker attributes, 509
authentication ID, 510
contents of, 507–508
extpiration time, 510
filtered admin, 507, 566
generating, 507
impersonation, 514
informational fields, 509–510
LUID, 509
mandatory policies, 509
privilege arrays, 509
restricted, 507, 516
security information in, 509
types, 509
viewing, 510–513
write-restricted, 316–317
topology, network
discovery and mapping, 658–662
Link-Layer Topology Discovery, 662
T끌WorkerFactory, 144, 403
trace data, kernel, 220–276
transaction handles, 288
transaction managers, 270
Transaction Manager (TM), 269
transaction objects, 269
transactions, 288
isolation level, 288
transfer jobs, 621
priority, 621
security context, 621
transition threads, 417
TransmitFile function, 599
TransmitPackets API, 599
Transport Driver Interface (TDI) clients, 594–595
transport layer in OSI reference model, 593
Transport Layer Network Provider Interface (TLNPI), 595
transport provider interfaces, 607
transports, 595
transport service providers, 600
transport, the, 596
trap, defined, 79
trap dispatching, 79–140
exception dispatching, 123–132
interrupt dispatching, 81–112
system service dispatching, 132–142
timer processing, 112–123
trap frames, 81
trap handlers, 80, 81, 125
toggle consumers, registration, 339–340
toggle information, 339
viewing, 340–341
toggle providers, registration, 338–339
toggles, WDI, 354
Trojan horse prevention, 488
troubleshooting
modules, 355
registry-related problems, 291–292
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), 487–489
rating levels, 488
trusted facility management, 489
trusted path functionality, 488
tunneling, 663, 686
TxF, 269
TxR, 269, 287
common logging file system support, 288
type initializers, information in, 152
type objects, 145, 149–153
Process, 360
viewing, 150–152
Type parameter, 307, 309

U

UAC File Virtualization Filter Driver, 569–570
UAC (User Account Control), 77, 566–581
access tokens, 77
administrative rights requests, 576–578
administrative rights, running with, 574–576
auto-elevation, 578–579
elevation, 566, 573–590
modifying behavior of, 579–581
standard user rights, 566
storage location of settings, 580–581
turning off, 580
virtualization, file system and registry, 567–573
virtualized registry root, 283
UBPM (Unified Background Process Manager), 336–342
architecture, 336
consumer registration, 339–341
citizen thread creation, 337
ETW consumer initialization, 337
event manager setup, 337
event processing, 337
initialization, 337
internal tracing support, 337
provider registration, 338
service control programs, 341–342
TaskHost, 337, 341
UBPM API, 338
UIPI (User Interface Privilege Isolation), 529–530
UMDF (User-Mode Driver Framework), 64
UMPD (User Mode Print Driver) framework, 396
UMS (user-mode scheduling), 13
unauthorized access
preventing, 487. See also security mechanisms
Software Restriction Policies for, 590
unauthorized operations, 546–547
UNC names, 612
redirector support, 633
unconnected communication ports, 210
UNC paths, accessing, 627
undocumented interfaces, viewing, 66–67
unhandled exception filter calls, 129
unhandled exceptions, 127–129
debugging, 129
unicast packets, 669–670
Unicode, 24
Unified Background Process Manager (UBPM). See UBPM (Unified Background Process Manager)
Universal Naming Convention (UNC), 612, 627
Universal Plug and Play, 626–627
UNIX-based applications
networking, 597
subsystem for, 53
unrestricted service SIDs, 316
unwait boosts, 431–432
uploads, 622
USB network devices, 680–696
User32.dll, 37
user access restrictions, 23. See also access rights
User Account Control Settings dialog box, 579
User Account Control (UAC). See UAC (User Account Control)
user address space, 17
User APC reserve object, 162–163
user applications, 36
user mode vs. kernel mode, 18
user authentication, 23, 555–556
biometric framework, 563–568
user callbacks, 226
user environment initialization, 78
USER functions, 51
user identification, 555
Userinit.exe, 77–78, 562
User Interface Privilege Isolation (UIPI), 529–530
User Interface Services, 2
user logon, 558–562. See also logon
active sessions, listing, 560–562
Assured Authentication, 562–563
authentication, 558
via fingerprint scan, 565
management, 77
user mode, 17–20, 34, 35
timer use, 117
vectored exception handling, 125
user-mode code
locking primitives, 183
passive interrupt level, 413
SRW Locks for, 203
user-mode debugger
CSR_PROCESS, dumping, 366
CSR_THREAD, dumping, 396
thread stack, displaying, 400
user-mode debugging, 56, 229–232
kernel support, 229–230
native support, 230
WinDbg for, 231
Windows subsystem support, 232
User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF), 64
user-mode dump processes, 28
User Mode Print Driver framework (UMPD), 396
user-mode processes
debugging, 27
services, 74
session manager, 72–74
types, 36
user-mode scheduling (UMS), 13
user-mode synchronization objects, 201–202
critical sections, 194, 201
user-mode thread pools, 403
user-mode threads, preempting, 107
user profiles

HKU subkeys, 282
loading, 562
per-user settings, 566–567
storage location, 282
User Profiles management dialog box, 282
user rights, 566
adding, removing, enumerating, 540
users
CPU priority, 470
CPU rate limits, 478
group membership, 506, 508
identity validation, 494–495, 555
intra-user isolation, 495
local logon SID, 558
privileges, 507
security context, 23
security credentials, 23
service UI notifications, 320
of the transport, 596

V

VADs (virtual address descriptors), 14
values, registry, 279
missing, 291–292
types, 279–280
variable quantums, 427
variables
condition, 202–203
signaling change to, 202
VDevs (virtual devices), 254
vectored exception handling, 125
VerifyVersionInfo function, 43
version numbers, 2
video display support, 51
VID (VM infrastructure driver), 251
view blobs, 216
virtual address descriptors (VADs), 14
virtual address space, 15
virtual directory, uploading to, 622
virtual DLL files, 246
virtualization, 248
application, 385
application-compatibility shims, 568
architecture, 248
disallowed, 567
enlightenments, 253–254
exceptions list, 568–569
file, 568–571
file system, 567–573
guests, 248
host-based, 248
hosts, 248
hypervisor-based, 248. See also hypervisor (Hyper-V)
memory, 258
registry, 567–573, 578
virtualization service clients (VSCs), 253, 255–256
virtualization service providers (VSPs), 251, 255–256
virtual machine management service, 250–251
virtual machines
Dynamic Memory, 260–263
migrating between nodes, 266–268
virtual machine worker processes (VMWPs), 250–251
virtual memory, 15–16
access mode tag, 17
executive implementation, 55
limits, 416
virtual processors (VPs), 257
virtual service accounts, 518–521
passwords, 518
permissions, granting, 521
VMBus, 255–257
VM infrastructure driver (VID), 251
VMWPs (virtual machine worker processes), 250–251
volatile hives, 293–294
VPN remote access, 686
VPNs, always-on, 695
VSCs (virtualization service clients), 253, 255–256
VSPs (virtualization service providers), 251, 255–256
VT Extended/Nested Page Table (NPT) technology, 259

W

W32PROCESS, 360, 367
allocation, 385
dumping, 367
W32THREAD, 392, 396–397
dumping, 397
fields, 397
wait blocks, 188–189
for pushlocks, 199–200
state information, 188–189
wait information in, 188
wait calls, 449
worker factory management, 403
wait chain address ordering, 189
WaitForMultipleObjects function, 184
WaitForSingleObject function, 184
waiting threads, 417
boosting, 432
voluntary switching, 449
wait operations. See also synchronization data structures for, 188–191
wait queues
reordering, 112
viewing, 191–194
wants
committed state, 190
on keyed events, 195
resolution, 112
satisfied, 190
timed-out, 190
wait state
aborted, 190
alertable, 112
entering, 189
wait status register, 190
Wake-on-LAN, 674
wake operations, 195
WANs
content caching, 645
data link layer, 593
SMB 2.0 for, 635
WbemTest, viewing WMI class definition, 347
WBEM (Web-Based Enterprise Management), 342
WDF (Windows Driver Foundation), 64–65
WDI (Windows Diagnostic Infrastructure), 56, 354–357
diagnostic functionality, 356–357
Diagnostic Policy Service, 354–355
Group Policy settings, 355
instrumentation, 354
WDM (Windows Driver Model), 64
Web access APIs, 610
Web-Based Enterprise Management (WBEM), 342
WebDAV mini-redirector, 635
web servers. See servers
Web Services, 3
well-known addresses, 600
WerFault.exe process, 129
WER (Windows Error Reporting), 129–132
configuring, 129
dialog box, 130
protected mode, 368
registry configuration options, 130–132
WFP (Windows Filtering Platform), 667–672
callout drivers, 595
components, 667–668
IPsec WFP callout driver, 671
wide area networks (WANs). See WANs
Win16 executables, 374–376
Win32 API, 2
history, 4
objects created through, 147
Win32 emulation on 64-bit Windows. See Wow64
Win32k.sys, 37
GUI thread priority boosts, 437–439
per-thread data structure, 392
routine definition, 153
W32PROCESS, 360
Win32PrioritySeparation registry value, 428
Win32StartAddr, 394
Win32 subsystem process. See Csrss.exe
(Client/Server Run-Time Subsystem)
WinDbg, 28, 399
debugger objects, viewing, 231
loaded modules database, dumping, 239–241
windowing and graphics system, 37
window messages, integrity level and, 529–530
Windows 7, 1–2
AppLocker, 583–588
client versions, 41
custom, 245
security rating, 489
small-footprint versions, 100
vs. Windows Server 2008 R2, 41–43
Windows API, 2–4
description, 2
thread priority assignment, 410–411
user-mode APCs, 112
Windows API functions, defined, 4
Windows authentication, 77
Windows Biometric API, 564
Windows Biometric Driver Interface, 564
Windows Biometric Framework, 563–566
Windows Biometric Service, 564
Windows Boot Loader, 303
Windows Clustering, 267
Windows device drivers, 5. See also device drivers; drivers
Windows Diagnostic Infrastructure (WDI), See WDI (Windows Diagnostic Infrastructure)
Windows DLLs, 395
Windows Driver Foundation (WDF), 64–65
Windows Driver Kit (WDK), 31
boost value recommendations, 433
Offreg.dll, 278
Windows Driver Model (WDM), 64
Windows Driver Model Windows Management Instrumentation routines, 55
Windows Embedded Standard 7, 100
Windows Error Reporting (WER), See WER (Windows Error Reporting)
Windows executables, 578
Windows executive. See executive, Windows
Windows File Protection, 356
Windows Filtering Platform (WFP), 667–672
Windows Firewall
IPsec security and policy configuration, 671
Windows Filtering Platform use, 669
Windows Firewall with Advanced Security snap-in, 672
Windows functions, narrow and wide versions, 24
Windows GDI services, 137–138
Windows global flags, 207–209
Windows image, opening, 373–485
Windows Initialization Process, 74
Windows installation image, 285
Windows internals
exploring, 25
exposing, 24–32
kernel debugging, 26–31
Performance Monitor, 25
tools for viewing, 25
Windows logon process, 77. See also logon
Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), See WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation)
Windows Media Center Extender sessions, 21
Windows Media Center interactive sessions, 21
Windows Media Certificate, 368
Windows Networking (WNet) API, 627
Windows NT, 4
driver model, 64
requirements of, 33
Windows operating system
checked build version, 45–46
client editions, 21
client vs. server versions, 41–44
Common Criteria certification, 489
core system files, 37
crash dump files, 28
debuge version, 45–46
directory running, determining, 43
eventtracking, 428
hardware error architecture, 57
impersonation model, 217
integrity mechanism, 495
logon interface, 555
management mechanisms, 277–358
MinWin version, 246
model, 34–35
networking support, 591–696
object-oriented design, 35
portability, 37–38
post-initialization operations, 383–385
priority levels, 410–416
processor share-based scheduling, 470–478
registry, 23
releases, 1
requirements and design goals, 33–34
routine naming conventions, 67
scalability, 40–41
scheduling system, 408–410
security, 22, 536
security mechanisms, 487–590
SIDs, issuing, 498
system architecture, 33–78
TCSEC rating levels, 488
thread-based scheduling, 408–470
thread priority boosts, 411
Unicode, 24
versions, 1–2
version-specific GUID, 244
Windows API, 2
worldwide application binaries, 24
Windows PowerShell AppLocker commands, 584–585
Windows Server 2008 R2, 1–2
AppLocker, 583–588
security rating, 489
versions, 41
vs. Windows 7, 41–43
Windows service control manager, 4
Windows services, 305–336. See also services
defined, 4–5
DFS-R, 638
DNS server, 655
startup code, debugging, 374
virtual service accounts, 518–521
Windows Services MMC snap-in, 313
Windows Sockets, 597–603
Windows Software Development Kit (SDK) contents, 31
Debugging Tools for Windows, 27
Windows API description, 2
Windows subsystem, 50–52
applications, 392
executive objects, 143
GDI/User objects, 142
object-based security, 23
process communication functions, 54
processes, creation, 369–485
process initialization, 383–412
thread setup, 398
Windows support images, 374
Windows Sysinternals Administrator’s Reference (Russinovich and Margosis), 32
Windows System Resource Manager (WSRM), 416
WindowStation objects, 144
okay-to-close routine, 155
open method, 154
window stations, 318
creating and opening, 556
Service-0x0-3e7$, 318
WinSta0, 318
Windows Transport Driver Interface standard, 594
Windows USER services, 137–138
Windows via C++ (Richter and Nasarre), 2, 123, 188
windows, visible, 8
Windows XP, 583
WinHTTP, 610
Wininet, 557, 610
HTTP API, 610
instance of, 73
Winload startup tasks, 295
Winlogon, 78, 491
Ctrl+Alt+Delete key combination notification, 557

725
Winlogon (continued)
desktop, 556, 557–558
initialization, 556–558
instance of, 73
logon coordination, 555
logon failure messages, 559
LsaAuthenticationPort connection, 557
RPC message server registration, 557
user logon steps, 558–562
WinObj, 140
ALPC port objects, viewing, 212–213
base names objects, viewing, 171–172
object ACLs, displaying, 163–164
Winsider Seminars & Solutions, 43
Winsock, 597–603
AcceptEx function, 599
collection operation, 598
connection-oriented operation, 599
extending, 600
features, 597–598
Helper libraries, 602
implementation, 602–603
layered service providers, 600
namespace providers, viewing, 600–602
network communication authentication and encryption, 608
server operation, 598–599
service provider interface, 600
TransmitFile function, 599
transport providers, viewing, 600–602
Winsock 2.2, 597
Winsock Kernel (WSK). See WSK (Winsock Kernel)
WinSta0, 173
opening, 326
WMI Administrative Tools, 346
Wmic.exe, 352–353
WMI CIM Studio, 346
namespaces, viewing, 348
WMI COM API, 344
WMI Object Browser, 350
Wmiprvse process, 351
creation, viewing, 352
WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation), 342–353
ActiveX controls, 344
architecture, 342–344
CIMOM Object Repository, 343
class association, 349–351
class definitions, 348
Common Information Model, 345–349
Control application, 353
implementation, 351–353
namespace, 348–349
provider classifications, 344–345
providers, 344–345
scripting API, 344
scripting language support, 351
security, 353
System Control commands, 352
WNetAddConnection2 and
WNetAddConnection3 functions, 628
WNetAddConnection function, 629
WNet provider, 628
worker factories, 403–407
thread creation, 403–404
thread termination, 404
viewing, 405–407
worker threads
allocation, 403
viewing, 406–407
work items, 205
Workstation service, 627
work-stealing loop, 468
world SIDs, 317
worldwide application binaries, 24
Wow64, 224–228
16-bit application support, 228
32-bit and 64-bit thread stacks, 401
address space for processes, 224–225
APC delivery, 225
architecture, 224
console support, 225
DLL versioning check, 237
exception dispatching, 225
file system redirection, 226
I/O control functions, 227–228
printer driver porting, 228
registry redirection, 227
restrictions, 228
system calls, 225
user callbacks, 226
user-mode DLLs, 224
Wow64Cpu.dll, 224
Wow64.dll, 224
Wow64GetThreadContext function, 13
Wow64Win.dll, 224
Wow6432Node key, 227
Wowia32x.dll, 224
write-restricted SIDs, 317
write-restricted tokens, 316–317
WSK (Winsock Kernel), 595–597, 603–605
implementation, 604–605
WSRM (Windows System Resource Manager), 416

X

x64 architecture
interrupt controllers, 85
interrupt dispatch, 95–96
interrupt request levels, 87
system service dispatching, 133
x64 processors, 37
HAL image, 61
system code and data protection, 17
x86 architecture
exceptions and interrupt numbers, 124
HALs, 60
interrupt controllers, 84
interrupt request levels, 86
system code and data protection, 17
system service dispatching, 132–133
x86 interfaces, 60
Xperf Viewer, viewing DPC and ISR activity with, 110

Z

zero-copy file transmission, 599
zero page thread, 456
Zw versions of system calls, 136
About the Authors

Mark Russinovich is a Technical Fellow in Windows Azure at Microsoft, working on Microsoft’s cloud operating system. He is the author of the cyberthriller Zero Day (Thomas Dunne Books, 2011) and coauthor of Windows Sysinternals Administrator’s Reference (Microsoft Press, 2011). Mark joined Microsoft in 2006 when Microsoft acquired Winternals Software, the company he cofounded in 1996, as well as Sysinternals, where he still authors and publishes dozens of popular Windows administration and diagnostic utilities. He is a featured speaker at major industry conferences. Follow Mark on Twitter at @markrussinovich and on Facebook at http://facebook.com/markrussinovich.

David Solomon, president of David Solomon Expert Seminars (www.solsem.com), has focused on explaining the internals of the Microsoft Windows NT operating system line since 1992. He has taught his world-renowned Windows internals classes to thousands of developers and IT professionals worldwide. His clients include all the major software and hardware companies, including Microsoft. He was nominated a Microsoft Most Valuable Professional in 1993 and from 2005 to 2008.


In addition to organizing and teaching seminars, David is a regular speaker at technical conferences such as Microsoft TechEd and Microsoft PDC. He has also served as technical chair for several past Windows NT conferences. When he’s not researching Windows, David enjoys sailing, reading, and watching Star Trek.
Alex Ionescu is the founder of Winsider Seminars & Solutions Inc., specializing in low-level system software for administrators and developers as well as reverse engineering and security training for government and infosec clients. He also teaches Windows internals courses for David Solomon Expert Seminars, including at Microsoft. From 2003 to 2007, Alex was the lead kernel developer for ReactOS, an open source clone of Windows XP/Server 2003 written from scratch, for which he wrote most of the Windows NT-based kernel. While in school and part-time in summers, Alex worked as an intern at Apple on the iOS kernel, boot loader, firmware, and drivers on the original core platform team behind the iPhone, iPad, and AppleTV. Returning to his Windows security roots, Alex is now chief architect at CrowdStrike, a startup based in Seattle and San Francisco.

Alex continues to be very active in the security research community, discovering and reporting several vulnerabilities related to the Windows kernel, and presenting talks at conferences such as Blackhat, SyScan, and Recon. His work has led to the fixing of many critical kernel vulnerabilities, as well as to fixing over a few dozen nonsecurity bugs. Previous to his work in the security field, Alex’s early efforts led to the publishing of nearly complete NTFS data structure documentation, as well as the Visual Basic metadata and pseudo-code format specifications.
SIT DOWN WITH THE EXPERTS
who literally wrote the book on Windows internals!

If you liked their book, you’ll love hearing them in person. Get one of their video tutorials or come to a live class.

LIVE, INSTRUCTOR LED CLASSES
If you’re an IT professional deploying and supporting Windows servers and workstations, you need to be able to dig beneath the surface when things go wrong. In our classes, you’ll gain a deep understanding of the internals of the operating system and how to leverage advanced troubleshooting tools to solve system and application problems and understand performance issues more effectively. Attend a public class or schedule a private on site seminar at your location. For dates, course details, pricing, and registration information, see www.solsem.com.

“"The information given in this class should be required for all Windows engineers/administrators.”

“This course holds the key to understanding Windows.”

“Should be required training for anyone responsible for Windows software development, administration, or design.”

INTERACTIVE DVD TUTORIAL
Sit down with the experts who literally wrote the book on Windows internals. Windows Internals COMPLETE consists of 12 hours of interactive training taking you under the hood of the operating system to learn how the kernel components work. As the ultimate compliment, Microsoft Corporation licensed these videos for their corporate training worldwide.

The Sysinternals Video Library (also 12 hours) covers essential Windows troubleshooting topics such as crash dump analysis and memory troubleshooting as well as how to leverage key Sysinternals tools.

“These videos drill into the core of the platform, capture its technical essence and present it in a powerful interactive video format.”—Rob Short, Vice President Core Technologies, Microsoft Corporation

To view video samples or for a detailed outline, visit www.solsem.com or email videos@solsem.com
What do you think of this book?

We want to hear from you!
To participate in a brief online survey, please visit:

microsoft.com/learning/booksurvey

Tell us how well this book meets your needs—what works effectively, and what we can do better. Your feedback will help us continually improve our books and learning resources for you.

Thank you in advance for your input!
To our parents, who guided and inspired us to follow our dreams
Introduction

Windows Internals, Sixth Edition is intended for advanced computer professionals (both developers and system administrators) who want to understand how the core components of the Microsoft Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 operating systems work internally. With this knowledge, developers can better comprehend the rationale behind design choices when building applications specific to the Windows platform. Such knowledge can also help developers debug complex problems. System administrators can benefit from this information as well, because understanding how the operating system works “under the covers” facilitates understanding the performance behavior of the system and makes troubleshooting system problems much easier when things go wrong. After reading this book, you should have a better understanding of how Windows works and why it behaves as it does.
Structure of the Book

For the first time, the book has been divided in two parts. This was done to get the information out more quickly since it takes considerable time to update the book for each release of Windows.

Part 1 begins with two chapters that define key concepts, introduce the tools used in the book, and describe the overall system architecture and components. The next two chapters present key underlying system and management mechanisms. Part 1 wraps up by covering three core components of the operating system: processes, threads, and jobs; security; and networking.

Part 2 covers the remaining core subsystems: I/O, storage, memory management, the cache manager, and file systems. Part 2 concludes with a description of the startup and shutdown processes and a description of crash-dump analysis.
History of the Book

This is the sixth edition of a book that was originally called Inside Windows NT (Microsoft Press, 1992), written by Helen Custer (prior to the initial release of Microsoft Windows NT 3.1). Inside Windows NT was the first book ever published about Windows NT and provided key insights into the architecture and design of the system. Inside Windows NT, Second Edition (Microsoft Press, 1998) was written by David Solomon. It updated the original book to cover Windows NT 4.0 and had a greatly increased level of technical depth.

Inside Windows 2000, Third Edition (Microsoft Press, 2000) was authored by David Solomon and Mark Russinovich. It added many new topics, such as startup and shutdown, service internals, registry internals, file-system drivers, and networking. It also covered kernel changes in Windows 2000, such as the Windows Driver Model (WDM), Plug and Play, power management, Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), encryption, the job object, and Terminal Services.

Windows Internals, Fourth Edition was the Windows XP and Windows Server 2003 update and added more content focused on helping IT professionals make use of their knowledge of Windows internals, such as using key tools from Windows Sysinternals (www.microsoft.com/technet/sysinternals) and analyzing crash dumps. Windows Internals, Fifth Edition was the update for Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008. New content included the image loader, user-mode debugging facility, and Hyper-V.
Sixth Edition Changes

This latest edition has been updated to cover the kernel changes made in Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2. Hands-on experiments have been updated to reflect changes in tools.
Hands-on Experiments

Even without access to the Windows source code, you can glean much about Windows internals from tools such as the kernel debugger and tools from Sysinternals and Winsider Seminars & Solutions. When a tool can be used to expose or demonstrate some aspect of the internal behavior of Windows, the steps for trying the tool yourself are listed in “EXPERIMENT” boxes. These appear throughout the book, and we encourage you to try these as you’re reading—seeing visible proof of how Windows works internally will make much more of an impression on you than just reading about it will.
Topics Not Covered

Windows is a large and complex operating system. This book doesn’t cover everything relevant to Windows internals but instead focuses on the base system components. For example, this book doesn’t describe COM+, the Windows distributed object-oriented programming infrastructure, or the Microsoft .NET Framework, the foundation of managed code applications.

Because this is an internals book and not a user, programming, or system administration book, it doesn’t describe how to use, program, or configure Windows.
A Warning and a Caveat

Because this book describes undocumented behavior of the internal architecture and the operation of the Windows operating system (such as internal kernel structures and functions), this content is subject to change between releases. (External interfaces, such as the Windows API, are not subject to incompatible changes.)

By “subject to change,” we don’t necessarily mean that details described in this book will change between releases, but you can’t count on them not changing. Any software that uses these undocumented interfaces might not work on future releases of Windows. Even worse, software that runs in kernel mode (such as device drivers) and uses these undocumented interfaces might experience a system crash when running on a newer release of Windows.
Acknowledgments

First, thanks to Jamie Hanrahan and Brian Catlin of Azius, LLC for joining us on this project—the book would not have been finished without their help. They did the bulk of the updates on the “Security” and “Networking” chapters and contributed to the update of the “Management Mechanisms” and “Processes and Threads” chapters. Azius provides Windows-internals and device-driver training. See www.azius.com for more information.

We want to recognize Alex Ionescu, who for this edition is a full coauthor. This is a reflection of Alex’s extensive work on the fifth edition, as well as his continuing work on this edition.

Also thanks to Daniel Pearson, who updated the Chapter 14 chapter. His many years of dump analysis experience helped to make the information more practical.

Thanks to Eric Traut and Jon DeVaan for continuing to allow David Solomon access to the Windows source code for his work on this book as well as continued development of his Windows Internals courses.

Three key reviewers were not acknowledged for their review and contributions to the fifth edition: Arun Kishan, Landy Wang, and Aaron Margosis—thanks again to them! And thanks again to Arun and Landy for their detailed review and helpful input for this edition.

This book wouldn't contain the depth of technical detail or the level of accuracy it has without the review, input, and support of key members of the Microsoft Windows development team. Therefore, we want to thank the following people, who provided technical review and input to the book:

- Greg Cottingham
- Joe Hamburg
- Jeff Lambert
- Pavel Lebedinsky
- Joseph East
- Adi Oltean
- Alexey Pakhunov
- Valerie See
- Brad Waters
- Bruce Worthington
- Robin Alexander
- Bernard Ourghanlian

Also thanks to Scott Lee, Tim Shoultz, and Eric Kratzer for their assistance with the Chapter 14 chapter.

For the “Networking” chapter, a special thanks to Gianluigi Nusca and Tom Jolly, who really went beyond the call of duty: Gianluigi for his extraordinary help with the BranchCache material and the amount of suggestions (and many paragraphs of material he wrote), and Tom Jolly not only for his own review and suggestions (which were excellent), but for getting many other developers to assist with the review. Here are all those who reviewed and contributed to the “Networking” chapter:

- Roopesh Battepati
- Molly Brown
- Greg Cottingham
- Dotan Elharrar
- Eric Hanson
- Tom Jolly
- Manoj Kadam
- Greg Kramer
- David Kruse
- Jeff Lambert
- Darene Lewis
- Dan Lovinger
- Gianluigi Nusca
Amos Ortal and Dotan Elharrar were extremely helpful on NAP, and Shiva Kumar Thangapandi helped extensively with EAP.

Thanks to Gerard Murphy for reviewing the shutdown mechanisms in Windows 7 and clarifying Group Policy behaviors.

Thanks to Tristan Brown from the Power Management team at Microsoft for spending a few late hours at the office with Alex going over core parking’s algorithms and behaviors, as well as for the invaluable diagram he provided.

Thanks to Apurva Doshi for sending Alex a detailed document of cache manager changes in Windows 7, which was used to capture some of the new behaviors and changes described in the book.

Thanks to Matthieu Suiche for his kernel symbol file database, which allowed Alex to discover new and removed fields from core kernel data structures and led to the investigations to discover the underlying functionality changes.

Thanks to Cenk Ergan, Michel Fortin, and Mehmet Iyigun for their review and input on the Superfetch details.

The detailed checking Christophe Nasarre, overall technical reviewer, performed contributed greatly to the technical accuracy and consistency in the book.

We would like to again thank Ilfak Guilfanov of Hex-Rays (www.hex-rays.com) for the IDA Pro Advanced and Hex-Rays licenses they granted to Alex so that he could speed up his reverse engineering of the Windows kernel.

Finally, the authors would like to thank the great staff at Microsoft Press behind turning this book into a reality. Devon Musgrave served double duty as acquisitions editor and developmental editor, while Carol Dillingham oversaw the title as its project editor. Editorial and production manager Curtis Philips, copy editor John Pierce, proofreader Andrea Fox, and indexer Jan Wright also contributed to the
quality of this book.

Last but not least, thanks to Ben Ryan, publisher of Microsoft Press, who continues to believe in the importance of continuing to provide this level of detail about Windows to their readers!
Errata & Book Support

We’ve made every effort to ensure the accuracy of this book and its companion content. Any errors that have been reported since this book was published are listed on our Microsoft Press site at oreilly.com: http://go.microsoft.com/FWLink/?Linkid=258649

If you find an error that is not already listed, you can report it to us through the same page.

If you need additional support, email Microsoft Press Book Support at mspinput@microsoft.com.

Please note that product support for Microsoft software is not offered through the addresses above.
We Want to Hear from You

At Microsoft Press, your satisfaction is our top priority, and your feedback our most valuable asset. Please tell us what you think of this book at:
http://www.microsoft.com/learning/booksurvey

The survey is short, and we read every one of your comments and ideas. Thanks in advance for your input!
Stay in Touch

Let’s keep the conversation going! We’re on Twitter: http://twitter.com/MicrosoftPress.
Chapter 8. I/O System

The Windows I/O system consists of several executive components that together manage hardware devices and provide interfaces to hardware devices for applications and the system. In this chapter, we’ll first list the design goals of the I/O system, which have influenced its implementation. We’ll then cover the components that make up the I/O system, including the I/O manager, Plug and Play (PnP) manager, and power manager. Then we’ll examine the structure and components of the I/O system and the various types of device drivers. We’ll look at the key data structures that describe devices, device drivers, and I/O requests, after which we’ll describe the steps necessary to complete I/O requests as they move through the system. Finally, we’ll present the way device detection, driver installation, and power management work.
I/O System Components

The design goals for the Windows I/O system are to provide an abstraction of devices, both hardware (physical) and software (virtual or logical), to applications with the following features:

- Uniform security and naming across devices to protect shareable resources. (See Chapter 6, “Security,” in Part 1 for a description of the Windows security model.)
- High-performance asynchronous packet-based I/O to allow for the implementation of scalable applications.
- Services that allow drivers to be written in a high-level language and easily ported between different machine architectures.
- Layering and extensibility to allow for the addition of drivers that transparently modify the behavior of other drivers or devices, without requiring any changes to the driver whose behavior or device is modified.
- Dynamic loading and unloading of device drivers so that drivers can be loaded on demand and not consume system resources when unneeded.
- Support for Plug and Play, where the system locates and installs drivers for newly detected hardware, assigns them hardware resources they require, and also allows applications to discover and activate device interfaces.
- Support for power management so that the system or individual devices can enter low power states.
- Support for multiple installable file systems, including FAT, the CD-ROM file system (CDFS), the Universal Disk Format (UDF) file system, and the Windows file system (NTFS). (See Chapter 12, for more specific information on file system types and architecture.)
- Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) support and diagnosability so that drivers can be managed and monitored through WMI applications and scripts. (WMI is described in Chapter 4, “Management Mechanisms,” in Part 1.)

To implement these features the Windows I/O system consists of several executive
components as well as device drivers, which are shown in Figure 8-1.

- The I/O manager is the heart of the I/O system. It connects applications and system components to virtual, logical, and physical devices, and it defines the infrastructure that supports device drivers.

- A device driver typically provides an I/O interface for a particular type of device. A driver is a software module that interprets high-level commands, such as read or write, and issues low-level, device-specific commands, such as writing to control registers. Device drivers receive commands routed to them by the I/O manager that are directed at the devices they manage, and they inform the I/O manager when those commands are complete. Device drivers often use the I/O manager to forward I/O commands to other device drivers that share in the implementation of a device’s interface or control.

- The PnP manager works closely with the I/O manager and a type of device driver called a bus driver to guide the allocation of hardware resources as well as to detect and respond to the arrival and removal of hardware devices. The PnP manager and bus drivers are responsible for loading a device’s driver when the device is detected. When a device is added to a system that doesn’t have an appropriate device driver, the executive Plug and Play component calls on the device installation services of a user-mode PnP manager.

- The power manager also works closely with the I/O manager and the PnP manager to guide the system, as well as individual device drivers, through power-state transitions.

- Windows Management Instrumentation support routines, called the Windows Driver Model (WDM) WMI provider, allow device drivers to indirectly act as providers, using the WDM WMI provider as an intermediary to communicate with the WMI service in user mode. (For more information on WMI, see the section “Windows Management Instrumentation” in Chapter 4 in Part 1.)

- The registry serves as a database that stores a description of basic hardware devices attached to the system as well as driver initialization and configuration settings. (See “The Registry” section in Chapter 4 in Part 1 for more information.)

- INF files, which are designated by the .inf extension, are driver installation files.
INF files are the link between a particular hardware device and the driver that assumes primary control of the device. They are made up of script-like instructions describing the device they correspond to, the source and target locations of driver files, required driver-installation registry modifications, and driver dependency information. Digital signatures that Windows uses to verify that a driver file has passed testing by the Microsoft Windows Hardware Quality Labs (WHQL) are stored in .cat files. Digital signatures are also used to prevent tampering of the driver or its INF file.

- The hardware abstraction layer (HAL) insulates drivers from the specifics of the processor and interrupt controller by providing APIs that hide differences between platforms. In essence, the HAL is the bus driver for all the devices soldered onto the computer’s motherboard that aren’t controlled by other drivers.

Figure 8-1. I/O system components

The I/O Manager

The I/O manager is the core of the I/O system because it defines the orderly
framework, or model, within which I/O requests are delivered to device drivers. The I/O system is packet driven. Most I/O requests are represented by an I/O request packet (IRP), which travels from one I/O system component to another. (As you'll discover in the section Fast I/O, fast I/O is the exception; it doesn’t use IRPs.) The design allows an individual application thread to manage multiple I/O requests concurrently. An IRP is a data structure that contains information completely describing an I/O request. (You’ll find more information about IRPs in the section I/O Request Packets later in the chapter.)

The I/O manager creates an IRP in memory to represent an I/O operation, passing a pointer to the IRP to the correct driver and disposing of the packet when the I/O operation is complete. In contrast, a driver receives an IRP, performs the operation the IRP specifies, and passes the IRP back to the I/O manager, either because the requested I/O operation has been completed, or because it must be passed on to another driver for further processing.

In addition to creating and disposing of IRPs, the I/O manager supplies code that is common to different drivers and that the drivers can call to carry out their I/O processing. By consolidating common tasks in the I/O manager, individual drivers become simpler and more compact. For example, the I/O manager provides a function that allows one driver to call other drivers. It also manages buffers for I/O requests, provides timeout support for drivers, and records which installable file systems are loaded into the operating system. There are close to one hundred different routines in the I/O manager that can be called by device drivers.

The I/O manager also provides flexible I/O services that allow environment subsystems, such as Windows and POSIX, to implement their respective I/O functions. These services include sophisticated services for asynchronous I/O that allow developers to build scalable, high-performance server applications.

The uniform, modular interface that drivers present allows the I/O manager to call any driver without requiring any special knowledge of its structure or internal details. The operating system treats all I/O requests as if they were directed at a file; the driver converts the requests from requests made to a virtual file to hardware-specific requests. Drivers can also call each other (using the I/O manager) to achieve layered, independent processing of an I/O request.

Besides providing the normal open, close, read, and write functions, the Windows
I/O system provides several advanced features, such as asynchronous, direct, buffered, and scatter/gather I/O, which are described in the Types of I/O section later in this chapter.

**Typical I/O Processing**

Most I/O operations don’t involve all the components of the I/O system. A typical I/O request starts with an application executing an I/O-related function (for example, reading data from a device) that is processed by the I/O manager, one or more device drivers, and the HAL.

As just mentioned, in Windows, threads perform I/O on virtual files. A virtual file refers to any source or destination for I/O that is treated as if it were a file (such as files, directories, pipes, and mailslots). The operating system abstracts all I/O requests as operations on a virtual file, because the I/O manager has no knowledge of anything but files, therefore making it the responsibility of the driver to translate file-oriented comments (open, close, read, write) into device-specific commands. This abstraction thereby generalizes an application’s interface to devices. User-mode applications (whether Windows or POSIX) call documented functions, which in turn call internal I/O system functions to read from a file, write to a file, and perform other operations. The I/O manager dynamically directs these virtual file requests to the appropriate device driver. Figure 8-2 illustrates the basic structure of a typical I/O request flow.
In the following sections, we’ll look at these components more closely, covering the various types of device drivers, how they are structured, how they load and initialize, and how they process I/O requests. Then we’ll cover the operation and roles of the PnP manager and the power manager.
Device Drivers

To integrate with the I/O manager and other I/O system components, a device driver must conform to implementation guidelines specific to the type of device it manages and the role it plays in managing the device. In this section, we'll look at the types of device drivers Windows supports as well as the internal structure of a device driver.

Types of Device Drivers

Windows supports a wide range of device driver types and programming environments. Even within a type of device driver, programming environments can differ, depending on the specific type of device for which a driver is intended. The broadest classification of a driver is whether it is a user-mode or kernel-mode driver. Windows supports a couple of types of user-mode drivers:

- Windows subsystem printer drivers translate device-independent graphics requests to printer-specific commands. These commands are then typically forwarded to a kernel-mode port driver such as the universal serial bus (USB) printer port driver (Usbprint.sys).

- User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF) drivers are hardware device drivers that run in user mode. They communicate to the kernel-mode UMDF support library through ALPC. See the User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF) section later in this chapter for more information.

In this chapter, the focus is on kernel-mode device drivers. There are many types of kernel-mode drivers, which can be divided into the following basic categories:

- File system drivers accept I/O requests to files and satisfy the requests by issuing their own, more explicit, requests to mass storage or network device drivers.

- Plug and Play drivers work with hardware and integrate with the Windows power manager and PnP manager. They include drivers for mass storage devices, video adapters, input devices, and network adapters.

- Non–Plug and Play drivers, which also include kernel extensions, are drivers or modules that extend the functionality of the system. They do not typically
integrate with the PnP or power managers because they typically do not manage an actual piece of hardware. Examples include network API and protocol drivers. Process Monitor’s driver, described in Chapter 4 in Part 1, is also an example.

Within the category of kernel-mode drivers are further classifications based on the driver model that the driver adheres to and its role in servicing device requests.

**WDM Drivers**

WDM drivers are device drivers that adhere to the Windows Driver Model (WDM). WDM includes support for Windows power management, Plug and Play, and WMI, and most Plug and Play drivers adhere to WDM. There are three types of WDM drivers:

- **Bus drivers** manage a logical or physical bus. Examples of buses include PCMCIA, PCI, USB, and IEEE 1394. A bus driver is responsible for detecting and informing the PnP manager of devices attached to the bus it controls as well as managing the power setting of the bus.

- **Function drivers** manage a particular type of device. Bus drivers present devices to function drivers via the PnP manager. The function driver is the driver that exports the operational interface of the device to the operating system. In general, it’s the driver with the most knowledge about the operation of the device.

- **Filter drivers** logically layer either above or below function drivers (these are called function filters) or above the bus driver (these are called bus filters), augmenting or changing the behavior of a device or another driver. For example, a keyboard capture utility could be implemented with a keyboard filter driver that layers above the keyboard function driver.

In WDM, no one driver is responsible for controlling all aspects of a particular device. The bus driver is responsible for detecting bus membership changes (device addition or removal), assisting the PnP manager in enumerating the devices on the bus, accessing bus-specific configuration registers, and, in some cases, controlling power to devices on the bus. The function driver is generally the only driver that accesses the device’s hardware.
Layered Drivers

Support for an individual piece of hardware is often divided among several drivers, each providing a part of the functionality required to make the device work properly. In addition to WDM bus drivers, function drivers, and filter drivers, hardware support might be split between the following components:

- Class drivers implement the I/O processing for a particular class of devices, such as disk, keyboard, or CD-ROM, where the hardware interfaces have been standardized, so one driver can serve devices from a wide variety of manufacturers.

- Miniclass drivers implement I/O processing that is vendor-defined for a particular class of devices. For example, although there is a standardized battery class driver written by Microsoft, both uninterruptible power supplies (UPS) and laptop batteries have highly specific interfaces that differ wildly between manufacturers, such that a miniclass is required from the vendor. Miniclass drivers are essentially kernel-mode DLLs and do not do IRP processing directly — the class driver calls into them, and they import functions from the class driver.

- Port drivers implement the processing of an I/O request specific to a type of I/O port, such as SATA, and are implemented as kernel-mode libraries of functions rather than actual device drivers. Port drivers are almost always written by Microsoft because the interfaces are typically standardized in such a way that different vendors can still share the same port driver. However, in certain cases, third parties may need to write their own for specialized hardware. In some cases, the concept of “I/O port” extends to cover logical ports as well. For example, NDIS is the network “port” driver, and Dxgport/Videoprt are the DirectX/video “port” drivers.

- Miniport drivers map a generic I/O request to a type of port into an adapter type, such as a specific network adapter. Miniport drivers are actual device drivers that import the functions supplied by a port driver. Miniport drivers are written by third parties, and they provide the interface for the port driver. Like miniclass drivers, they are kernel-mode DLLs and do not do IRP processing directly.
A simplified example for illustrative purposes will help demonstrate how device drivers work at a high level. A file system driver accepts a request to write data to a certain location within a particular file. It translates the request into a request to write a certain number of bytes to the disk at a particular (that is, the logical) location. It then passes this request (via the I/O manager) to a simple disk driver. The disk driver, in turn, translates the request into a physical location on the disk and communicates with the disk to write the data. This layering is illustrated in Figure 8-3.

![Layering of a file system driver and a disk driver](image)

This figure illustrates the division of labor between two layered drivers. The I/O manager receives a write request that is relative to the beginning of a particular file. The I/O manager passes the request to the file system driver, which translates the write operation from a file-relative operation to a starting location (a sector
boundary on the disk) and a number of bytes to write. The file system driver calls the I/O manager to pass the request to the disk driver, which translates the request to a physical disk location and transfers the data.

Because all drivers—both device drivers and file system drivers—present the same framework to the operating system, another driver can easily be inserted into the hierarchy without altering the existing drivers or the I/O system. For example, several disks can be made to seem like a very large single disk by adding a driver. This logical, volume manager driver is located between the file system and the disk drivers, as shown in the conceptual, simplified architectural diagram presented in Figure 8-4. (For the actual storage driver stack diagram, see Figure 9-3 in Chapter 9). Volume manager drivers are described in more detail in Chapter 9.
EXPERIMENT: VIEWING THE LOADED DRIVER LIST

You can see a list of registered drivers by executing the Msinfo32.exe utility from the Run dialog box of the Start menu. Select the System Drivers entry under Software Environment to see the list of drivers configured on the system. Those that are loaded have the text “Yes” in the Started column, as shown here:
You can also view the list of loaded kernel-mode drivers with Process Explorer from Windows Sysinternals (http://www.microsoft.com/technet/sysinternals). Run Process Explorer, select the System process, and select DLLs from the Lower Pane View menu entry in the View menu:

```
lkd> lm kv
start    end        module name
82007000 823c0000   nt         (pdb symbols)
c:\programming\symbols\ntkrpamp.pdb|37D328E3BAE5460F8E662756ED80951D2\ntkrpamp.pdb
```

Process Explorer lists the loaded drivers, their names, version information (including company and description), and load address (assuming you have configured Process Explorer to display the corresponding columns).

Finally, if you're looking at a crash dump (or live system) with the kernel debugger, you can get a similar display with the kernel debugger `lm kv` command:

```
lkd> lm kv
start    end        module name
82007000 823c0000   nt         (pdb symbols)
c:\programming\symbols\ntkrpamp.pdb|37D328E3BAE5460F8E662756ED80951D2\ntkrpamp.pdb
```
Structure of a Driver

The I/O system drives the execution of device drivers. Device drivers consist of a set of routines that are called to process the various stages of an I/O request. Figure 8-5 illustrates the key driver-function routines.
An initialization routine The I/O manager executes a driver’s initialization routine, which is set by the WDK to GS_driverEntry, when it loads the driver into the operating system. GS_driverEntry initializes the compiler’s protection against stack-overflow errors (called a cookie) and then calls DriverEntry, which is what the driver writer must implement. The routine fills in system data structures to register the rest of the driver’s routines with the I/O manager and performs any global driver initialization that’s necessary.

An add-device routine A driver that supports Plug and Play implements an add-device routine. The PnP manager sends a notification to the driver via this routine whenever a device for which the driver is responsible is detected. In this routine, a driver typically creates a device object (described later in this chapter) to represent the device.

A set of dispatch routines Dispatch routines are the main entry points that a device driver provides. Some examples are open, close, read, and write and any other capabilities the device, file system, or network supports. When called on to perform an I/O operation, the I/O manager generates an IRP and calls a driver through one of the driver’s dispatch routines.

A start I/O routine A driver can use a start I/O routine to initiate a data transfer to or from a device. This routine is defined only in drivers that rely on the I/O manager to queue their incoming I/O requests. The I/O manager
serializes IRPs for a driver by ensuring that the driver processes only one IRP at a time. Drivers can process multiple IRPs concurrently, but serialization is usually required for most devices because they cannot concurrently handle multiple I/O requests.

- **An interrupt service routine (ISR)** When a device interrupts, the kernel’s interrupt dispatcher transfers control to this routine. In the Windows I/O model, ISRs run at device interrupt request level (DIRQL), so they perform as little work as possible to avoid blocking lower IRQL interrupts. (See Chapter 3, “System Mechanisms,” in Part 1 for more information on IRQLs.) An ISR usually queues a deferred procedure call (DPC), which runs at a lower IRQL (DPC/dispatch level), to execute the remainder of interrupt processing. (Only drivers for interrupt-driven devices have ISRs; a file system driver, for example, doesn’t have one.)

- **An interrupt-serving DPC routine** A DPC routine performs most of the work involved in handling a device interrupt after the ISR executes. The DPC routine executes at a lower IRQL (DPC/dispatch level) than that of the ISR, which runs at device level, to avoid blocking other interrupts. A DPC routine initiates I/O completion and starts the next queued I/O operation on a device.

Although the following routines aren’t shown in Figure 8-5, they’re found in many types of device drivers:

- **One or more I/O completion routines** A layered driver might have I/O completion routines that will notify it when a lower-level driver finishes processing an IRP. For example, the I/O manager calls a file system driver’s I/O completion routine after a device driver finishes transferring data to or from a file. The completion routine notifies the file system driver about the operation's success, failure, or cancellation, and it allows the file system driver to perform cleanup operations.

- **A cancel I/O routine** If an I/O operation can be canceled, a driver can define one or more cancel I/O routines. When the driver receives an IRP for an I/O request that can be canceled, it assigns a cancel routine to the IRP, and as the IRP goes through various stages of processing, this routine can change, or outright disappear, if the current operation is not cancellable. If a thread that issues an I/O request exits before the request is completed or cancels the
operation (with the CancelIo Windows function, for example), the I/O manager executes the IRP’s cancel routine if one is assigned to it. A cancel routine is responsible for performing whatever steps are necessary to release any resources acquired during the processing that has already taken place for the IRP as well as for completing the IRP with a canceled status.

- **Fast dispatch routines** Drivers that make use of the cache manager in Windows (see Chapter 11, for more information on the cache manager), such as file system drivers, typically provide these routines to allow the kernel to bypass typical I/O processing when accessing the driver. For example, operations such as reading or writing can be quickly performed by accessing the cached data directly, instead of taking the I/O manager’s usual path that generates discrete I/O operations. Fast dispatch routines are also used as a mechanism for callbacks from the memory manager and cache manager to file system drivers. For instance, when creating a section, the memory manager calls back into the file system driver to acquire the file exclusively.

- **An unload routine** An unload routine releases any system resources a driver is using so that the I/O manager can remove the driver from memory. Any resources acquired in the initialization routine (DriverEntry) are usually released in the unload routine. A driver can be loaded and unloaded while the system is running if the driver supports it, but the unload routine will be called only after all file handles to the device are closed.

- **A system shutdown notification routine** This routine allows driver cleanup on system shutdown.

- **Error-logging routines** When unexpected errors occur (for example, when a disk block goes bad), a driver’s error-logging routines note the occurrence and notify the I/O manager. The I/O manager writes this information to an error log file.

**NOTE**

Most kernel-mode device drivers are written in C. Starting with the Windows Driver Kit 8.0, drivers can also be safely written in C++ due to specific support for kernel-mode C++ in the new compilers. Use of assembly language is highly discouraged because of the complexity it introduces and its effect of making a driver difficult to port between hardware architectures such as the x86, x64, and IA64.
Driver Objects and Device Objects

When a thread opens a handle to a file object (described in the I/O Processing section later in this chapter), the I/O manager must determine from the file object’s name which driver it should call to process the request. Furthermore, the I/O manager must be able to locate this information the next time a thread uses the same file handle. The following system objects fill this need:

- A driver object represents an individual driver in the system. The I/O manager obtains the address of each of the driver’s dispatch routines (entry points) from the driver object.

- A device object represents a physical or logical device on the system and describes its characteristics, such as the alignment it requires for buffers and the location of its device queue to hold incoming IRPs. It is the target for all I/O operations because this object is what the handle communicates with.

The I/O manager creates a driver object when a driver is loaded into the system, and it then calls the driver’s initialization routine (DriverEntry), which fills in the object attributes with the driver’s entry points.

At any time after loading, a driver creates device objects to represent logical or physical devices, or even a logical interface or endpoint to the driver, by calling IoCreateDevice or IoCreateDeviceSecure. However, most Plug and Play drivers create devices with their add-device routine when the PnP manager informs them of the presence of a device for them to manage. Non–Plug and Play drivers, on the other hand, usually create device objects when the I/O manager invokes their initialization routine. The I/O manager unloads a driver when the driver’s last device object has been deleted and no references to the driver remain.

When a driver creates a device object, the driver can optionally assign the device a name. A name places the device object in the object manager namespace, and a driver can either explicitly define a name or let the I/O manager autogenerate one. (The object manager namespace is described in Chapter 3 in Part 1.) By convention, device objects are placed in the \Device directory in the namespace, which is inaccessible by applications using the Windows API.

NOTE
Some drivers place device objects in directories other than \Device. For example, the IDE driver creates the device objects that represent IDE ports and channels in the \Device\Ide directory. See Chapter 9 for a description of storage architecture, including the way storage drivers use device objects.

If a driver needs to make it possible for applications to open the device object, it must create a symbolic link in the \Global?? directory to the device object’s name in the \Device directory. (See Chapter 3 in Part 1 for more information on \??.) Non–Plug and Play and file system drivers typically create a symbolic link with a well-known name (for example, \Device\Hardware2). Because well-known names don’t work well in an environment in which hardware appears and disappears dynamically, PnP drivers expose one or more interfaces by calling the IoRegisterDeviceInterface function, specifying a GUID (globally unique identifier) that represents the type of functionality exposed. GUIDs are 128-bit values that you can generate by using a tool called Uuidgen, which is included with the WDK and the Windows SDK. Given the range of values that 128 bits represents, it’s statistically almost certain that each GUID that Uuidgen creates will be forever and globally unique.

IoRegisterDeviceInterface generates the symbolic link associated with a device instance; however, a driver must call IoSetDeviceInterfaceState to enable the interface to the device before the I/O manager actually creates the link. Drivers usually do this when the PnP manager starts the device by sending the driver a start-device IRP—in this case, IRP_MJ_PNP, IRP_MN_START_DEVICE.

An application wanting to open a device object whose interfaces are represented with a GUID can call Plug and Play setup functions in user space, such as SetupDiEnumDeviceInterfaces, to enumerate the interfaces present for a particular GUID and to obtain the names of the symbolic links it can use to open the device objects. For each device reported by SetupDiEnumDeviceInterfaces, an application executes SetupDiGetDeviceInterfaceDetail to obtain additional information about the device, such as its autogenerated name. After obtaining a device’s name from SetupDiGetDeviceInterfaceDetail, the application can execute the Windows function CreateFile to open the device and obtain a handle.

**EXPERIMENT: LOOKING AT DEVICE OBJECTS**

You can use the WinObj tool from Sysinternals or the !object kernel debugger command to view the device names under \Device in the object manager namespace. The following screen shot shows an I/O manager—
assigned symbolic link that points to a device object in `\Device` with an autogenerated name:

When you run the `!object` kernel debugger command and specify the `\Device` directory, you should see output similar to the following:

```
lkd> !object \Device
Object: Bb611b88 Type: (84d10d40) Directory
   ObjectHeader: Bb611b70 (old version)
   HandleCount: 0  PointerCount: 365
   Directory Object: Bb602470  Name: Device

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hash Address</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>Device</td>
<td>KsecDD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85557a00</td>
<td>Device</td>
<td>Ndis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8b6151b0</td>
<td>SymbolicLink</td>
<td>{941D252A-0BDA-4772-B3CB-30697579BD4A}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86859030</td>
<td>Device</td>
<td>SrvNet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>886723f0</td>
<td>Device</td>
<td>Beep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8b71fb90</td>
<td>SymbolicLink</td>
<td>ScsiPort2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84d17a98</td>
<td>Device</td>
<td>00000032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84d15f00</td>
<td>Device</td>
<td>00000025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84d13030</td>
<td>Device</td>
<td>00000019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>86d44030</td>
<td>Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8d291eb0</td>
<td>SymbolicLink</td>
<td>{E85EEE75-32E3-4A94-8905-52709C29BC}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>886da3c8</td>
<td>Device</td>
<td>Netbios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86862030</td>
<td>Device</td>
<td>0000009c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84d177c8</td>
<td>Device</td>
<td>00000033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84d15c70</td>
<td>Device</td>
<td>00000026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>86de9030</td>
<td>Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84d19320</td>
<td>Device</td>
<td>00000040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88633ca0</td>
<td>Device</td>
<td>NetBT_Tcip_{033C65A4-C1D6-4824-B420-DDAEADDF873E}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8b7dced0</td>
<td>SymbolicLink</td>
<td>Ip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84d17500</td>
<td>Device</td>
<td>00000034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84d159a8</td>
<td>Device</td>
<td>00000027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>86df3380</td>
<td>Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8515ede0</td>
<td>Device</td>
<td>WMIAdminDevice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84d1a040</td>
<td>Device</td>
<td>00000041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8862e040</td>
<td>Device</td>
<td>Video0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```
When you enter the !object command and specify an object manager directory object, the kernel debugger dumps the contents of the directory according to the way the object manager organizes it internally. For fast lookups, a directory stores objects in a hash table based on a hash of the object names, so the output shows the objects stored in each bucket of the directory’s hash table.

As Figure 8-6 illustrates, a device object points back to its driver object, which is how the I/O manager knows which driver routine to call when it receives an I/O request. It uses the device object to find the driver object representing the driver that services the device. It then indexes into the driver object by using the function code supplied in the original request; each function code corresponds to a driver entry point. (The function codes shown in Figure 8-6 are described in the section IRP Stack Locations later in this chapter.)

A driver object often has multiple device objects associated with it. The list of device objects represents the physical or logical devices that the driver controls. For example, each partition of a hard disk has a separate device object that contains partition-specific information. However, the same hard disk driver is used to access all partitions. When a driver is unloaded from the system, the I/O manager uses the queue of device objects to determine which devices will be affected by the removal of the driver.
**EXPERIMENT: DISPLAYING DRIVER AND DEVICE OBJECTS**

You can display driver and device objects with the kernel debugger `!drvobj` and `!devobj` commands, respectively. In the following example, the driver object for the keyboard class driver is examined, and its lone device object viewed:

```
lkd> !drvobj kbdclass
Driver object (86e379a0) is for:
   \Driver\kbdclass
Driver Extension List: (id , addr)

Device Object list:
86e1d488 86eaec28
```

```
lkd> !devobj 86eaec28
Device object (86eaec28) is for:
   KeyboardClass0 \Driver\kbdclass DriverObject 86e379a0
Current Irp 00000000 RefCount 0 Type 0000000b Flags 00002044
DevExt 86eaeece0 DevObjExt 86eaedc0
ExtensionFlags (8x00000000)
   Unknown flags 0x00000800
   AttachedDevice (Upper) 86e15a40 \Driver\ctrl2cap
   AttachedTo (Lower) 86e15020 \Driver\i8042prt
   Device queue is not busy
```

Notice that the `!devobj` command also shows you the addresses and names of any device objects that the object you're viewing is layered over (the AttachedTo line) as well as the device objects layered on top of the object specified (the AttachedDevice line).

Using objects to record information about drivers means that the I/O manager
doesn’t need to know details about individual drivers. The I/O manager merely follows a pointer to locate a driver, thereby providing a layer of portability and allowing new drivers to be loaded easily.

**Opening Devices**

A file object is a kernel-mode data structure that represents a handle to a device. File objects clearly fit the criteria for objects in Windows: they are system resources that two or more user-mode processes can share, they can have names, they are protected by object-based security, and they support synchronization. Shared resources in the I/O system, like those in other components of the Windows executive, are manipulated as objects. (See Chapter 3 in Part 1 for a description of the object manager and Chapter 6 in Part 1 for information on object security.)

File objects provide a memory-based representation of resources that conform to an I/O-centric interface, in which they can be read from or written to. Table 8-1 lists some of the file object’s attributes. For specific field declarations and sizes, see the structure definition for FILE_OBJECT in WDM.h.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>File name</td>
<td>Identifies the physical file that the file object refers to, which was passed in to the CreateFile API.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current byte offset</td>
<td>Identifies the current location in the file (valid only for synchronous I/O).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share modes</td>
<td>Indicate whether other callers can open the file for read, write, or delete operations while the current caller is using it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open mode flags</td>
<td>Indicate whether I/O will be synchronous or asynchronous, cached or noncached, sequential or random, and so on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pointer to device object</td>
<td>Indicates the type of device the file resides on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pointer to the volume parameter block (VPB)</td>
<td>Indicates the volume, or partition, that the file resides on.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8-1. File Object Attributes
Pointer to section object pointers | Indicates a root structure that describes a mapped/cached file. This structure also contains the shared cache map, which identifies which parts of the file are cached (or rather mapped) by the cache manager and where they reside in the cache.

Pointer to private cache map | Used to store per-handle caching information such as the read patterns for this handle or the page priority for the process. See Chapter 10, for more information on page priority.

List of I/O request packets (IRPs) | If thread-agnostic I/O is used (to be described later) and the file object is associated with a completion port (also described later), this is a list of all the I/O operations that are associated with this file object.

I/O completion context | Context information for the current I/O completion port, if one is active.

File object extension | Stores the I/O priority (explained later in this chapter) for the file and whether share-access checks should be performed on the file object, and contains optional file object extensions that store context-specific information.

To maintain some level of opacity toward driver code that uses the file object, as well as to enable extending the file object functionality without enlarging the structure, the file object also contains an extension field, which allows for up to six different kinds of additional attributes. These are described in Table 8-2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extension</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transaction parameters</td>
<td>Contains the transaction parameter block, which contains information about a transacted file operation. Returned by IoGetTransactionParameterBlock.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Device object hint</td>
<td>Identifies the device object of the filter driver with which this file should be associated. Set with IoCreateFileEx or IoCreateFileSpecifyDeviceObjectHint.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/O status block range</td>
<td>Allows applications to lock a user-mode buffer into kernel-mode memory to optimize asynchronous I/Os. See the section on I/O completion port optimizations later in this chapter. Set with SetFileIoOverlappedRange.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generic</td>
<td>Contains filter-driver-specific information, as well as extended create parameters (ECP) that were added by the caller. Set with IoCreateFileEx.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scheduled file I/O</td>
<td>Stores a file's bandwidth reservation information, which is used by the storage system to optimize and guarantee throughput for multimedia applications. See the section on bandwidth reservation later in this chapter. Set with SetFileBandwidthReservation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Symbolic link  Added to the file object upon creation, when a mount point or directory junction is traversed (or a filter explicitly reparses the path). It stores the caller-supplied path, including information about any intermediate junctions, so that if a relative symbolic link is hit, it can walk back through the junctions. See Chapter 12 for more information on NTFS symbolic links, mount points, and directory junctions.

When a caller opens a file or a simple device, the I/O manager returns a handle to a file object. Figure 8-7 illustrates what occurs when a file is opened.

In this example, (1) a C program calls the run-time library function fopen, which in turn (2) calls the Windows CreateFile function. The Windows subsystem DLL (in this case, Kernel32.dll) then (3) calls the native NtCreateFile function in Ntdll.dll. The routine in Ntdll.dll contains the appropriate instruction to cause a transition into kernel mode to the system service dispatcher, which then (4) calls the real NtCreateFile routine in Ntoskrnl.exe. (See Chapter 3 in Part 1 for more information about system service dispatching.) Finally, this routine wraps the parameters and flags in such a way that the I/O manager function IoCreateFile can actually perform the operation.

**NOTE**

File objects represent open instances of files, not files themselves. Unlike UNIX systems, which use vnodes, Windows does not define the representation of a file; Windows file system drivers define their own representations.
Similar to executive objects, files are protected by a security descriptor that contains an access control list (ACL). The I/O manager consults the security subsystem to determine whether a file’s ACL allows the process to access the file in the way its thread is requesting. If it does (5, 6), the object manager grants the access and associates the granted access rights with the file handle that it returns. If this thread or another thread in the process needs to perform additional operations not specified in the original request, the thread must open the same file again with a different request to get another handle, which prompts another security check. (See Chapter 6 in Part 1 for more information about object protection.)

**EXPERIMENT: VIEWING DEVICE HANDLES**

Any process that has an open handle to a device will have a file object in its handle table corresponding to the open instance. You can view these handles with Process Explorer by selecting a process and checking Handles in the Lower Pane View submenu of the View menu. Sort by the Type column and scroll to where you see the handles that represent file objects, which are labeled as File.
In this example, the Csrss process has a handle open to a device created by the kernel security device driver (Ksecdd.sys). You can look at the specific file object in the kernel debugger by first identifying the address of the object. The following command reports information on the highlighted handle (handle value 0xD4) in the preceding screen shot, which is in the Csrss.exe process that has a process ID of 512 (0x200):

```
lkd> !handle d4 f 200
```

*Searching for Process with Cid == 200*

*PROCESS fffffa800bf35b30*

- SessionId: 0  Cid: 0200  Peb: 7ffffffd8000  ParentCid: 0188
- DirBase: 1dba50000  ObjectTable: fffff8a000f28d80  HandleCount: 630.
- Image: csrss.exe

*Handle table at fffff8a000f28d80 with 630 entries in use*

00d4: Object: ffffffa800c9cc9f0  GrantedAccess: 00100001  Entry: fffff8a001409350
Object: ffffffa800c9cc9f0  Type: (fffffa800737a080) File
ObjectHeader: ffffffa800c9cc9c0 (new version)
HandleCount: 1  PointerCount: 1

Because the object is a file object, you can get information about it with the !fileobj command:

```
lkd> !fileobj ffffffa800c9cc9f0
```

*Device Object: 0xfffffa80070da1550 \Driver\KSecDD*

*Vpb is NULL*

*Event signalled*

*Flags: 0x40002*

- Synchronous IO
- Handle Created
- CurrentByteOffset: 0
Because a file object is a memory-based representation of a shareable resource and not the resource itself, it’s different from other executive objects. A file object contains only data that is unique to an object handle, whereas the file itself contains the data or text to be shared. Each time a thread opens a file, a new file object is created with a new set of handle-specific attributes. For example, for files opened synchronously, the current byte offset attribute refers to the location in the file at which the next read or write operation using that handle will occur. Each handle to a file has a private byte offset even though the underlying file is shared. A file object is also unique to a process, except when a process duplicates a file handle to another process (by using the Windows DuplicateHandle function) or when a child process inherits a file handle from a parent process. In these situations, the two processes have separate handles that refer to the same file object.

Although a file handle is unique to a process, the underlying physical resource is not. Therefore, as with any shared resource, threads must synchronize their access to shareable resources such as files, file directories, and devices. If a thread is writing to a file, for example, it should specify exclusive write access when opening the file to prevent other threads from writing to the file at the same time. Alternatively, by using the Windows LockFile function, the thread could lock a portion of the file while writing to it when exclusive access is required.

When a file is opened, the file name includes the name of the device object on which the file resides. For example, the name \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Myfile.dat refers to the file Myfile.dat on the C: volume. The substring \Device\HarddiskVolume1 is the name of the internal Windows device object representing that volume. When opening Myfile.dat, the I/O manager creates a file object and stores a pointer to the HarddiskVolume1 device object in the file object and then returns a file handle to the caller. Thereafter, when the caller uses the file handle, the I/O manager can find the HarddiskVolume1 device object directly. Keep in mind that internal Windows device names can’t be used in Windows applications—instead, the device name must appear in a special directory in the object manager’s namespace, which is \Global\?. This directory contains symbolic links to the real, internal Windows device names. As was described earlier, device drivers are responsible for creating links in this directory so that their devices will be accessible to Windows applications. You can examine or even change these links programmatically with
the Windows QueryDosDevice and DefineDosDevice functions.

EXPERIMENT: VIEWING WINDOWS DEVICE NAME TO WINDOWS DEVICE NAME MAPPINGS

You can examine the symbolic links that define the Windows device namespace with the WinObj utility from Sysinternals. Run WinObj, and click on the \Global?? directory, as shown here:

![WinObj utility screenshot](image)

Notice the symbolic links on the right. Try right-clicking on the device C: and selecting Properties. You should see something like this:
C: is a symbolic link to the internal device named \Device\HarddiskVolume3, or the first volume on the first hard drive in the system. The COM1 entry in WinObj is a symbolic link to \Device\Serial0, and so forth. Try creating your own links with the subst command at a command prompt.
I/O Processing

Now that we’ve covered the structure and types of drivers and the data structures that support them, let’s look at how I/O requests flow through the system. I/O requests pass through several predictable stages of processing. The stages vary depending on whether the request is destined for a device operated by a single-layered driver or for a device reached through a multilayered driver. Processing varies further depending on whether the caller specified synchronous or asynchronous I/O, so we’ll begin our discussion of I/O types with these two and then move on to others.

Types of I/O

Applications have several options for the I/O requests they issue. Furthermore, the I/O manager gives drivers the choice of implementing a shortcut I/O interface that can often mitigate IRP allocation for I/O processing. In this section, we’ll explain these options for I/O requests.

Synchronous and Asynchronous I/O

Most I/O operations that applications issue are synchronous (which is the default); that is, the application thread waits while the device performs the data operation and returns a status code when the I/O is complete. The program can then continue and access the transferred data immediately. When used in their simplest form, the Windows ReadFile and WriteFile functions are executed synchronously. They complete the I/O operation before returning control to the caller.

Asynchronous I/O allows an application to issue multiple I/O requests and continue executing while the device performs the I/O operation. This type of I/O can improve an application’s throughput because it allows the application thread to continue with other work while an I/O operation is in progress. To use asynchronous I/O, you must specify the FILE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED flag when you call the Windows CreateFile function. Of course, after issuing an asynchronous I/O operation, the thread must be careful not to access any data from the I/O operation until the device driver has finished the data operation. The thread must synchronize its execution with the completion of the I/O request by monitoring a handle of a synchronization object (whether that’s an event object, an I/O
completion port, or the file object itself) that will be signaled when the I/O is complete.

Regardless of the type of I/O request, internally I/O operations issued to a driver on behalf of the application are performed asynchronously; that is, once an I/O request has been initiated, the device driver returns to the I/O system. Whether or not the I/O system returns immediately to the caller depends on whether the handle was opened for synchronous or asynchronous I/O. Figure 8-8 illustrates the flow of control when a read operation is initiated. Notice that if a wait is done, which depends on the overlapped flag in the file object, it is done in kernel mode by the NtReadFile function.

You can test the status of a pending asynchronous I/O operation with the Windows HasOverlappedIoCompleted macro. If you’re using I/O completion ports (described in the I/O Completion Ports section later in this chapter), you can use the GetQueuedCompletionStatus(Ex) function(s).

Figure 8-8. Control flow for an I/O operation
**Fast I/O**

Fast I/O is a special mechanism that allows the I/O system to bypass generating an IRP and instead go directly to the driver stack to complete an I/O request. (Fast I/O is described in detail in Chapters Chapter 11 and Chapter 12.) A driver registers its fast I/O entry points by entering them in a structure pointed to by the PFAST_IO_DISPATCH pointer in its driver object.

---

**EXPERIMENT: LOOKING AT A DRIVER’S REGISTERED FAST I/O ROUTINES**

The `!drvobj` kernel debugger command can list the fast I/O routines that a driver registers in its driver object. However, typically only file system drivers have any use for fast I/O routines, although there are exceptions, such as network protocol drivers and bus filter drivers. The following output shows the fast I/O table for the NTFS file system driver object:

```plaintext
lkd> !drvobj \FileSystem\Ntfs 2
Driver object (fffffa8007d9fbe0) is for:
\FileSystem\Ntfs
DriverEntry:   fffff880017d406c     Ntfs!GsDriverEntry
DriverStartIo: 00000000
DriverUnload:  00000000
AddDevice:     00000000

Dispatch routines:
...

Fast I/O routines:
FastIoCheckIfPossible     fffff88001782230     Ntfs!NtfsFastIoCheckIfPossible
FastIoRead                fffff880016efd60     Ntfs!NtfsCopyReadA
FastIoWrite               fffff880016f2a10     Ntfs!NtfsCopyWriteA
FastIoQueryBasicInfo      fffff880016e42e8     Ntfs!NtfsFastQueryBasicInfo
                      ...
ReleaseForModWrite        fffff8800166fee4     Ntfs!NtfsReleaseFileForModWrite
AcquireForCcFlush         fffff8800167133c     Ntfs!NtfsAcquireFileForCcFlush
ReleaseForCcFlush         fffff880016713a0     Ntfs!NtfsReleaseFileForCcFlush
```

The output shows that NTFS has registered its NtfsCopyReadA routine as the fast I/O table’s FastIoRead entry. As the name of this fast I/O entry implies, the I/O manager calls this function when issuing a read I/O request if the file is cached. If the call doesn’t succeed, the standard IRP path is selected.

---

**Mapped File I/O and File Caching**

Mapped file I/O is an important feature of the I/O system, one that the I/O system and the memory manager produce jointly. (See Chapter 10 for details on how mapped files are implemented.) Mapped file I/O refers to the ability to view a file residing on disk as part of a process’s virtual memory. A program can access the file as a large array without buffering data or performing disk I/O. The program accesses memory, and the memory manager uses its paging mechanism to load the
correct page from the disk file. If the application writes to its virtual address space, the memory manager writes the changes back to the file as part of normal paging.

Mapped file I/O is available in user mode through the Windows CreateFileMapping and MapViewOfFile functions. Within the operating system, mapped file I/O is used for important operations such as file caching and image activation (loading and running executable programs). The other major consumer of mapped file I/O is the cache manager. File systems use the cache manager to map file data in virtual memory to provide better response time for I/O-bound programs. As the caller uses the file, the memory manager brings accessed pages into memory. Whereas most caching systems allocate a fixed number of bytes for caching files in memory, the Windows cache grows or shrinks depending on how much memory is available. This size variability is possible because the cache manager relies on the memory manager to automatically expand (or shrink) the size of the cache, using the normal working set mechanisms explained in Chapter 10, in this case applied to the system working set. By taking advantage of the memory manager’s paging system, the cache manager avoids duplicating the work that the memory manager already performs. (The workings of the cache manager are explained in detail in Chapter 11.)

**Scatter/Gather I/O**

Windows also supports a special kind of high-performance I/O that is called scatter/gather, available via the Windows ReadFileScatter and WriteFileGather functions. These functions allow an application to issue a single read or write from more than one buffer in virtual memory to a contiguous area of a file on disk instead of issuing a separate I/O request for each buffer. To use scatter/gather I/O, the file must be opened for noncached I/O, the user buffers being used have to be page-aligned, and the I/Os must be asynchronous (overlapped). Furthermore, if the I/O is directed at a mass storage device, the I/O must be aligned on a device sector boundary and have a length that is a multiple of the sector size.

**I/O Request Packets**

The I/O request packet (IRP) is where the I/O system stores information it needs to process an I/O request. When a thread calls an I/O API, the I/O manager constructs an IRP to represent the operation as it progresses through the I/O
system. If possible, the I/O manager allocates IRPs from one of three per-processor IRP nonpaged look-aside lists: the small-IRP look-aside list stores IRPs with one stack location (IRP stack locations are described shortly), the medium-IRP look-aside list contains IRPs with 4 stack locations (which can also be used for IRPs that require only 2 or 3 stack locations), and the large-IRP look-aside list contains IRPs with more than 4 stack locations—by default, the system stores IRPs with 10 stack locations on the large-IRP look-aside list, but once per minute the system adjusts the number of stack locations allocated and can increase it up to a maximum of 20, based on how many stack locations have been recently required. Additionally, these lists are backed by global look-aside lists as well, allowing efficient cross-CPU IRP flow. If an IRP requires more stack locations than are contained in the IRPs on the large-IRP look-aside list, the I/O manager allocates IRPs from nonpaged pool. After allocating and initializing an IRP, the I/O manager stores a pointer to the caller’s file object in the IRP.

NOTE

If defined, the DWORD registry value HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Session Manager\I/O System\LargeIrpStackLocations specifies how many stack locations are contained in IRPs stored on the large-IRP look-aside list.

Figure 8-9 shows a sample I/O request that demonstrates the relationship between an IRP and the file, device, and driver objects described in the preceding sections. Although this example shows an I/O request to a single-layered device driver, most I/O operations aren’t this direct; they involve one or more layered drivers. (This case will be shown later in this section.)
IRP Stack Locations

An IRP consists of two parts: a fixed header (often referred to as the IRP’s body) and one or more stack locations. The fixed portion contains information such as the type and size of the request, whether the request is synchronous or asynchronous, a pointer to a buffer for buffered I/O, and state information that changes as the request progresses. An IRP stack location contains a function code (consisting of a major code and a minor code), function-specific parameters, and a pointer to the caller’s file object. The major function code identifies which of a driver’s dispatch routines the I/O manager invokes when passing an IRP to a driver. An optional minor function code sometimes serves as a modifier of the major function code. Power and Plug and Play commands always have minor function codes.

Most drivers specify dispatch routines to handle only a subset of possible major function codes, including create (open), read, write, device I/O control, power, Plug
and Play, system control (for WMI commands), cleanup, and close. (See the following experiment for a complete listing of major function codes.) File system drivers are an example of a driver type that often fills in most or all of its dispatch entry points with functions. In contrast, a driver for a simple USB device would probably fill in only the routines needed for open, close, read, write, and sending I/O control codes. The I/O manager sets any dispatch entry points that a driver doesn’t fill to point to its own IopInvalidDeviceRequest, which completes the IRP with an error status indicating that the major function specified in the IRP is invalid for that device.

**EXPERIMENT: LOOKING AT DRIVER DISPATCH ROUTINES**

You can obtain a listing of the functions a driver has defined for its dispatch routines by entering a 7 after the driver object’s name (or address) in the !drvobj kernel debugger command. The following output shows that drivers support 28 IRP types.

```
lkd> !drvobj \Driver\kbdclass 7
Driver object (fffffa800adc2e70) is for:

Driver Extension List: (id , addr)
Device Object list:
fffffa800b04fce0  fffffa800abde560

DriverEntry:   fffff880071c8ecc  kbdclass!GsDriverEntry
DriverStartIo: 00000000
DriverUnload: 00000000
AddDevice:     fffff880071c53b4  kbdclass!KeyboardAddDevice

Dispatch routines:
[00] IRP_MJ_CREATE                      fffff880071bedd4
    kbdclass!KeyboardClassCreate
[01] IRP_MJ_CREATE_NAMED_PIPE           fffff800036abc0c
    nt!IopInvalidDeviceRequest
[02] IRP_MJ_CLOSE                       fffff880071bf17c
    kbdclass!KeyboardClassClose
[03] IRP_MJ_READ                        fffff880071bf804
    kbdclass!KeyboardClassRead

...[19] IRP_MJ_QUERY_QUOTA                 fffff800036abc0c
    nt!IopInvalidDeviceRequest
[1a] IRP_MJ_SET_QUOTA                   fffff800036abc0c
    nt!IopInvalidDeviceRequest
[1b] IRP_MJ_PNP                         fffff880071c0368  kbdclass!KeyboardPnP
```

While active, each IRP is usually queued in an IRP list associated with the thread that requested the I/O. (Otherwise, it is stored in the file object when performing thread-agnostic I/O, which is described earlier in this chapter.) This allows the I/O
system to find and cancel any outstanding IRPs if a thread terminates with I/O requests that have not been completed. Additionally, paging I/O IRPs are also associated with the faulting thread (although they are not cancellable). This allows Windows to use the thread-agnostic I/O optimization — when an APC is not used to complete I/O if the current thread is the initiating thread. This means that page faults occur inline, instead of requiring APC delivery.

**EXPERIMENT: LOOKING AT A THREAD’S OUTSTANDING IRPS**

When you use the `!thread` command, it prints any IRPs associated with the thread. Run the kernel debugger with live debugging, and locate the service control manager process (Services.exe) in the output generated by the `!process` command:

```
lkd> !process 0 0
**** NT ACTIVE PROCESS DUMP ****
... 
PROCESS 8623b840  SessionId: 0  Cid: 0270  Peb: 7ffd6000  ParentCid: 0210
  DirBase: ce21e080  ObjectTable: 964c06a0  HandleCount: 198.
  Image: services.exe
...
```

Then dump the threads for the process by executing the `!process` command on the process object. You should see many threads, with most of them having IRPs reported in the IRP List area of the thread information (note that the debugger will show only the first 17 IRPs for a thread that has more than 17 outstanding I/O requests):

```
lkd> !process 8623b840
PROCESS 8623b840  SessionId: 0  Cid: 0270  Peb: 7ffd6000  ParentCid: 0210
  DirBase: ce21e080  ObjectTable: 964c06a0  HandleCount: 198.
  Image: services.exe
  DeviceMap 8b0087d8
... 
THREAD 86a1d248  Cid 0270.053c  Teb: 7ffdc000  Win32Thread: 00000000
  WAIT: (UserRequest) UserMode Alertable
  86a40ca0  NotificationEvent
  86a40490  NotificationEvent
  IRP List:
    86a81190: (0006,0094) Flags: 00060900  Mdl: 00000000
... 
```

Choose an IRP, and examine it with the `!irp` command:

```
lkd> !irp 86a81190
Irp is active with 1 stacks 1 is current (= 0x86a81200)
No Mdl: No System Buffer: Thread 86a1d248: Irp stack trace.
  cmd  flg cl Device   File     CompletionContext
>[  3, 0]   0  1 86156328 86a4e7a0 00000000-00000000  pending
  \\FileSystem\\Npfs
  Args: 00000800 00000000 00000000 00000000
```

This IRP has a major function of 3, which corresponds to IRP_MJ_READ, which can be found in WDM.h. It has one stack location and is targeted at a device owned by the Npfs driver (the Named Pipe File System driver). (Npfs is described in Chapter 7, “Networking,” in Part 1.)
IRP Buffer Management

When an application or a device driver indirectly creates an IRP by using the NtReadFile, NtWriteFile, or NtDeviceIoControlFile system services (or the Windows API functions corresponding to these services, which are ReadFile, WriteFile, and DeviceIoControl), the I/O manager determines whether it needs to participate in the management of the caller’s input or output buffers. The I/O manager performs three types of buffer management:

- **Buffered I/O** The I/O manager allocates a buffer in nonpaged pool of equal size to the caller’s buffer. For write operations, the I/O manager copies the caller’s buffer data into the allocated buffer when creating the IRP. For read operations, the I/O manager copies data from the allocated buffer to the user’s buffer when the IRP completes and then frees the allocated buffer. The nonpaged pool buffer is pointed to by the IRP’s AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer field.

- **Direct I/O** When the I/O manager creates the IRP, it locks the user’s buffer into memory (that is, makes it nonpaged). When the I/O manager has finished using the IRP, it unlocks the buffer. The I/O manager stores a description of the memory in the form of a memory descriptor list (MDL). An MDL specifies the physical memory occupied by a buffer. (See the WDK for more information on MDLs.) Devices that perform direct memory access (DMA) require only physical descriptions of buffers, so an MDL is sufficient for the operation of such devices. (Devices that support DMA transfer data directly between the device and the computer’s memory by using a DMA controller, not the CPU.) If a driver must access the contents of a buffer, however, it can map the buffer into the system’s address space.

- **Neither I/O** The I/O manager doesn’t perform any buffer management. Instead, buffer management is left to the discretion of the device driver, which can choose to manually perform the steps the I/O manager performs with the other buffer management types.

For each type of buffer management, the I/O manager places applicable references in the IRP to the locations of the input and output buffers. The type of buffer management the I/O manager performs depends on the type of buffer management
a driver requests for each type of operation. A driver registers the type of buffer management it desires for read and write operations in the device object that represents the device. Device I/O control operations (those requested by calling NtDeviceIoControlFile) are specified with driver-defined I/O control codes, and a control code contains bits specifying the buffer management the I/O manager should use when issuing IRPs that contain that code.

Drivers commonly use buffered I/O when callers transfer requests smaller than one page (4 KB on x86 processors) or when the device does not support DMA. They use direct I/O for larger requests on DMA-aware devices. File system drivers commonly use neither I/O because no buffer management overhead is incurred when data can be copied from the file system cache into the caller’s original buffer. The reason that most drivers don’t use neither I/O is that a pointer to a caller’s buffer is valid only while a thread of the caller’s process is executing.

Drivers that use neither I/O to access buffers that might be located in user space must take special care to ensure that buffer addresses are both valid and do not reference kernel-mode memory. Scalar values, however, are perfectly safe to pass, although a few drivers have only a scalar value to pass around. Failure to do so could result in crashes or in security vulnerabilities, where applications have access to kernel-mode memory or can inject code into the kernel. The ProbeForRead and ProbeForWrite functions that the kernel makes available to drivers verify that a buffer resides entirely in the user-mode portion of the address space. To avoid a crash from referencing an invalid user-mode address, drivers can access user-mode buffers from within exception-handling code (called try/except blocks in C) that catch any invalid memory faults and translate them into error codes to return to the application. Additionally, drivers should also capture all input data into a kernel buffer instead of relying on user-mode addresses, since the caller could always modify the data behind the driver’s back, even if the memory address itself is still valid.

I/O Request to a Single-Layered Driver

This section traces a synchronous I/O request to a single-layered kernel-mode device driver. In its most simplified form, handling a synchronous I/O to a single-layered driver consists of seven steps:
1. The I/O request passes through a subsystem DLL.

2. The subsystem DLL calls the I/O manager’s NtWriteFile service.

3. The I/O manager allocates an IRP describing the request and sends it to the driver (a device driver in this case) by calling its own IoCallDriver function.

4. The driver transfers the data in the IRP to the device and starts the I/O operation.

5. The device signals I/O completion by interrupting the CPU.

6. The device driver services the interrupt.

7. The driver calls the I/O manager’s IoCompleteRequest function to inform it that it has finished processing the IRP’s request, and the I/O manager completes the I/O request.

These seven steps are illustrated in Figure 8-10.

![Figure 8-10. Issuing and completing a synchronous I/O request](image)
Now that we’ve seen how an I/O is initiated, let’s take a closer look at interrupt processing and I/O completion.

**Servicing an Interrupt**

After an I/O device completes a data transfer, it interrupts for service, and the Windows kernel, I/O manager, and device driver are called into action. Figure 8-11 illustrates the first phase of the process. (Chapter 3 in Part 1 describes the interrupt dispatching mechanism, including DPCs. We’ve included a brief recap here because DPCs are key to I/O processing on interrupt-driven devices.)

![Figure 8-11. Servicing a device interrupt (phase 1)](image)

When a device interrupt occurs, the processor transfers control to the kernel trap handler, which indexes into its interrupt dispatch table to locate the ISR for the
device. ISRs in Windows typically handle device interrupts in two steps. When an ISR is first invoked, it usually remains at device IRQL only long enough to capture the device status and then stop the device’s interrupt. It then queues a DPC and exits, dismissing the interrupt. Later, when the DPC routine is called at IRQL 2, the device finishes processing the interrupt. When that’s done, the device calls the I/O manager to complete the I/O and dispose of the IRP. It will also start the next I/O request that is waiting in the device queue.

The advantage of using a DPC to perform most of the device servicing is that any blocked interrupt whose IRQL lies between the device IRQL and the DPC/dispatch IRQL (2) is allowed to occur before the lower-priority DPC processing occurs. Intermediate-level interrupts are thus serviced more promptly than they otherwise would be, and this reduces latency on the system. This second phase of an I/O (the DPC processing) is illustrated in Figure 8-12.
Completing an I/O Request

After a device driver’s DPC routine has executed, some work still remains before the I/O request can be considered finished. This third stage of I/O processing is
called I/O completion and is initiated when a driver calls IoCompleteRequest to inform the I/O manager that it has completed processing the request specified in the IRP (and the stack location that it owns). The steps I/O completion entails vary with different I/O operations. For example, all the I/O drivers record the outcome of the operation in an I/O status block, a data structure stored in the IRP and then copied back into a caller-supplied buffer during I/O completion. Similarly, some drivers that perform buffered I/O require the I/O system to return data to the calling thread.

In both cases, the I/O system must copy data that is stored in system memory into the caller’s virtual address space. If the IRP completed synchronously, the caller’s address space is current and directly accessible, but if the IRP completed asynchronously, the I/O manager must delay IRP completion until it can access the caller’s address space. To gain access to the caller’s virtual address space, the I/O manager must transfer the data “in the context of the caller’s thread”—that is, while the caller’s thread is executing (which implies that the caller’s process is the current process and its address space is mapped on the processor). It does so by queuing a special kernel-mode asynchronous procedure call (APC) to the thread. This process is illustrated in Figure 8-13.
As explained in Chapter 3 in Part 1, APCs execute in the context of a particular thread, whereas a DPC executes in arbitrary thread context, meaning that the DPC routine can’t touch the user-mode process address space. Remember too that DPCs have a higher IRQL than APCs.

The next time that the thread begins to execute at low IRQL (below DISPATCH_LEVEL), the pending APC is delivered. The kernel transfers control to the I/O manager’s APC routine, which copies the data (for a read request) and the return status into the original caller’s address space, frees the IRP representing the I/O operation, and either sets the caller’s file handle (and any caller-supplied event) to the signaled state for synchronous I/O or queues an entry to the caller’s I/O completion port. The I/O is now considered complete. The original caller or any other threads that are waiting on the file (or other object) handle are released from their waiting state and readied for execution. Figure 8-14 illustrates the second stage of I/O completion.
Although this is the normal path through which I/O completion occurs, Windows can take a shortcut if the I/O happens to be completed in the same thread that issued the I/O request. In this situation, as long as APC delivery was not disabled (in order to maintain compatibility with legacy versions of Windows, which always used an APC, even in this situation), the phase 2 I/O completion mechanism is called inline.

A final note about I/O completion: the asynchronous I/O functions ReadFileEx and WriteFileEx allow a caller to supply a user-mode APC as a parameter. If the caller does so, the I/O manager queues this APC to the caller’s thread APC queue as the last step of I/O completion. This feature allows a caller to specify a subroutine to be called when an I/O request is completed or canceled. User-mode APC completion routines execute in the context of the requesting thread and are delivered only when the thread enters an alertable wait state (such as calling the Windows SleepEx, WaitForSingleObjectEx, or WaitForMultipleObjectsEx function).

**Synchronization**
Drivers must synchronize their access to global driver data and hardware registers for two reasons:

- The execution of a driver can be preempted by higher-priority threads and time-slice (or quantum) expiration or can be interrupted by higher IRQL interrupts.
- On multiprocessor systems, Windows can run driver code simultaneously on more than one processor.

Without synchronization, corruption could occur—for example, because device driver code running at passive IRQL (0) when a caller initiates an I/O operation can be interrupted by a device interrupt, causing the device driver’s ISR to execute while its own device driver is already running. If the device driver was modifying data that its ISR also modifies, such as device registers, heap storage, or static data, the data can become corrupted when the ISR executes. Figure 8-15 illustrates this problem.

To avoid this situation, a device driver written for Windows must synchronize its access to any data that can be accessed at more than one IRQL. Before attempting to update shared data, the device driver must lock out all other threads (or CPUs, in the case of a multiprocessor system) to prevent them from updating the same data structure.

The Windows kernel provides a special synchronization routine called
KeSynchronizeExecution that device drivers call when they access data that their
ISRs also access. This kernel synchronization routine keeps the ISR from executing
while the shared data is being accessed. A driver can also use
KeAcquireInterruptSpinLock to access an interrupt object’s spinlock directly,
although drivers can generally behave better by relying on
KeSynchronizeExecution for synchronization with an ISR because calling this
function at PASSIVE_LEVEL will synchronize with a KEVENT in the interrupt
object structure instead of raising IRQL.

By now, you should realize that although ISRs require special attention, any data
that a device driver uses is subject to being accessed by the same device driver
running on another processor. Therefore, it’s critical for device driver code to
synchronize its use of any global or shared data (or any accesses to the physical
device itself). If the ISR uses that data, the device driver must use
KeSynchronizeExecution or KeAcquireInterruptSpinLock; otherwise, the device
driver can use standard kernel spinlocks (which are acquired at
DISPATCH_LEVEL (IRQL 2).

I/O Requests to Layered Drivers

The preceding section showed how an I/O request to a simple device controlled by
a single device driver is handled. I/O processing for file-based devices or for
requests to other layered drivers happens in much the same way. The major
difference is, obviously, that one or more additional layers of processing are added
to the model.

Figure 8-16 shows a very simplified, illustrative example of how an asynchronous
I/O request might travel through layered drivers. It uses as an example a disk
controlled by a file system.
Once again, the I/O manager receives the request and creates an I/O request packet to represent it. This time, however, it delivers the packet to a file system driver. The file system driver exercises great control over the I/O operation at that point. Depending on the type of request the caller made, the file system can send the same IRP to the disk driver or it can generate additional IRPs and send them separately to the disk driver.

**EXPERIMENT: VIEWING A DEVICE STACK**

The kernel debugger command !devstack shows you the device stack of layered device objects associated with a specified device object. This example shows the device stack associated with a device object, \device\keyboardclass0, which is owned by the keyboard class driver:
The output highlights the entry associated with KeyboardClass0 with the “>” character in column one. The entries above that line are drivers layered above the keyboard class driver, and those below are layered beneath it. In general, IRPs flow from the top of the stack to the bottom.

The file system is most likely to reuse an IRP if the request it receives translates into a single straightforward request to a device. For example, if an application issues a read request for the first 512 bytes in a file stored on a volume, the NTFS file system would simply call the volume manager driver, asking it to read one sector from the volume, beginning at the file’s starting location.

To accommodate its reuse by multiple drivers in a request to layered drivers, an IRP contains a series of IRP stack locations (not to be confused with the CPU stack used by threads to store function parameters and return addresses). These data areas, one for every driver that will be called, contain the information that each driver needs to execute its part of the request—for example, function code, parameters, and driver context information. As Figure 8-16 illustrates, additional stack locations are filled in as the IRP passes from one driver to the next. You can think of an IRP as being similar to a stack in the way data is added to it and removed from it during its lifetime. However, an IRP isn’t associated with any particular process, and its allocated size doesn’t grow or shrink. The I/O manager allocates an IRP from one of its IRP look-aside lists or nonpaged system memory at the beginning of the I/O operation.

NOTE

Since the number of devices on a given stack is known in advance, the I/O manager allocates one stack location per device driver on the stack. However, there are situations in which an IRP might be directed into a new driver stack, as can happen in scenarios involving the Filter Manager, which allows one filter to redirect an IRP to another filter (going from a local file system to a network file system, for example). The I/O manager exposes an API, IoAdjustStackSizeForRedirection, that enables this functionality by adding the required stack locations because of devices present on the redirected stack.
**EXPERIMENT: EXAMINING IRPS**

In this experiment, you'll find an uncompleted IRP on the system, and you'll determine the IRP type, the device at which it's directed, the driver that manages the device, the thread that issued the IRP, and what process the thread belongs to.

At any point in time, there are at least a few uncompleted IRPs on a system. This occurs because there are many devices to which applications can issue IRPs that a driver will complete only when a particular event occurs, such as data becoming available. One example is a blocking read from a network endpoint. You can see the outstanding IRPs on a system with the `!irpfind` kernel debugger command:

```
lkd> !irpfind

Scanning large pool allocation table for Tag: Irp? (86c16000 : 86d16000)
Searching NonPaged pool (80000000 : ffc00000) for Tag: Irp?

Irp    [ Thread ] irpStack: (Mj,Mn)   DevObj  [Driver]         MDL Process
862d2380 [8666dc68] irpStack: ( c, 2)  84a6f020 [ \FileSystem\Ntfs]
862d2bb0 [864e3d78] irpStack: ( e,20)  86171348 [ \Driver\AFD\] 0x864dbd90
862d4518 [865f7600] irpStack: ( d, 0)  86156328 [ \FileSystem\Npfs]
862d4688 [867133f0] irpStack: ( 3, 0)  86156328 [ \FileSystem\Npfs]
862dd008 [00000000] Irp is complete (CurrentLocation 4 > StackCount 3) 0x00420000
862dee28 [864fc030] irpStack: ( 3, 0)  84ba030 [ \Driver\kbdclass]
```

The entry in bold in the output describes an IRP that is directed at the Kbdclass driver, so it is likely that the IRP was issued by the Windows subsystem raw input thread that reads keyboard input. Examining the IRP with the `!irp` command reveals the following:

```
lkd> !irp 862dee28

Irp is active with 3 stacks 3 is current (= 0x862deee0)

    cmd flg cl Device   File     CompletionContext
[  0, 0]   0  0 00000000 00000000 00000000-00000000
Args: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
[  0, 0]   0  0 00000000 00000000 00000000-00000000
Args: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
> [  3, 0]   0  1 84ba030 864f52f8 00000000-00000000 pending
 \Driver\kbdclass
    Args: 00000078 00000000 00000000 00000000
```

The active stack location is at the bottom. (The debugger shows the active location with a “>” character in column one.) It has a major function of 3, which corresponds to IRP_MJ_READ.

The next step is to see what device object the IRP is targeting by executing the `!devobj` command on the device object address in the active stack location.

```
lkd> !devobj 84ba0f030
Device object (84ba0f030) is for:
    KeyboardClass1 \Driver\kbdclass DriverObject 84b706b8
Current Irp 00000000 RefCount 0 Type 00000000 Flags 00002044
Dacl 8b0538b8 DevExt 84ba0f0e8 DevObjExt 84ba1fc8
ExtensionFlags (0x00000000) Unknown flags 0x00000000
AttachedTo (Lower) 84badaa0 \Driver\TermDD
Device queue is not busy.
```
The device at which the IRP is targeted is KeyboardClass1. The presence of a device object owned by the Termdd driver attached beneath it reveals that it is the device that represents keyboard input from a Terminal Server client, not the physical keyboard.

We can see details about the thread and process that issued the IRP by using the !thread and !process commands:

```
lkd> !thread 864fc030
THREAD 864fc030  Cid 01d4.0234  Teb: 7ffdc9000 Win32Thread: ffac4008
   WAIT: (WrUserRequest) KernelMode Alertable
   8623c620  SynchronizationEvent
   864fc3a8  NotificationTimer
   864fc378  SynchronizationTimer
   864fc360  SynchronizationEvent
IRP List:
   86af0e28: (0006,01d8) Flags: 00060970  Mdl: 00000000
   86503958: (0006,0268) Flags: 00060970  Mdl: 00000000
   862dee28: (0006,01d8) Flags: 00060970  Mdl: 00000000
Not impersonating
DeviceMap                 8b0087d8
Owning Process            0       Image:         <Unknown>
Attached Process          864d2d90       Image:         csrss.exe
Wait Start TickCount      171909         Ticks: 29 (0:00:00:00.452)
Context Switch Count      121222
UserTime                  00:00:00.000
KernelTime                00:00:00.717
Win32 Start Address 0x764d9a30
Stack Init 96f46000 Current 96f45c28 Base 96f46000 Limit 96f43000 Call 0
Priority 15 BasePriority 13 PriorityDecrement 0 IoPriority 2 PagePriority 5
```

Locating the thread in Process Explorer by opening the Properties dialog box for Csrss.exe and going to the Threads tab confirms, through the names of the functions on its stack, the role of the thread as a raw input thread for the Windows subsystem:
After the disk controller’s DMA adapter finishes a data transfer, the disk controller interrupts the host, causing the ISR for the disk controller to run, which requests a DPC callback completing the IRP, as shown in Figure 8-17.

As an alternative to reusing a single IRP, a file system can establish a group of associated IRPs that work in parallel on a single I/O request. For example, if the data to be read from a file is dispersed across the disk, the file system driver might create several IRPs, each of which reads some portion of the request from a different sector. This queuing is illustrated in Figure 8-18.
During I/O completion, results are returned to the caller’s address space.

The file system driver performs any necessary cleanup work.

The volume manager performs any necessary cleanup work.

Device-level interrupt occurs. The disk driver services the interrupt and then queues a DPC to complete the I/O, which will “pop” the second stack location off the IRP stack and call the volume manager.

Figure 8-17. Completing a layered I/O request
The file system driver delivers the associated IRPs to the volume manager, which in turn sends them to the disk device driver, which queues them to the disk device. They are processed one at a time, and the file system driver keeps track of the returned data. When all the associated IRPs complete, the I/O system completes the original IRP and returns to the caller, as shown in Figure 8-19.
NOTE

All Windows file system drivers that manage disk-based file systems are part of a stack of drivers that is at least three layers deep: the file system driver sits at the top, a volume manager in the middle, and a disk driver at the bottom. In addition, any number of filter drivers can be interspersed above and below these drivers. For clarity, the preceding example of layered I/O requests includes only a file system driver and the volume manager driver. See Chapter 9, on storage management, for more information.

Thread Agnostic I/O

In the I/O models described thus far, IRPs are queued to the thread that initiated the I/O and are completed by the I/O manager issuing an APC to that thread so that process-specific and thread-specific context is accessible by completion.
processing. Thread-specific I/O processing is usually sufficient for the performance and scalability needs of most applications, but Windows also includes support for thread agnostic I/O via two mechanisms:

- I/O completion ports, which are described at length later in this chapter
- Locking the user buffer into memory and mapping it into the system address space

With I/O completion ports, the application decides when it wants to check for the completion of I/O, so the thread that happens to have issued an I/O request is not necessarily relevant because any other thread can perform the completion request. As such, instead of completing the IRP inside the specific thread’s context, it can be completed in the context of any thread that has access to the completion port. Likewise, with a locked and kernel-mapped version of the user buffer, there’s no need to be in the same memory address space as the issuing thread because the kernel can access the memory from arbitrary contexts. Applications can enable this mechanism by using SetFileIoOverlappedRange as long as they have the SE_LOCK_MEMORY privilege.

With both completion port I/O and I/O on file buffers set by SetFileIoOverlappedRange, the I/O manager associates the IRPs with the file object to which they have been issued instead of with the issuing thread. The !fileobj extension in WinDbg will show an IRP list for file objects that are used with these mechanisms.

In the next sections, we’ll see how thread agnostic I/O increases the reliability and performance of applications on Windows.

**I/O Cancellation**

While there are many ways in which IRP processing occurs and various methods to complete an I/O request, a great many I/O processing operations actually end in cancellation rather than completion. For example, a device may require removal while IRPs are still active, or the user might cancel a long-running operation to a device—for example, a network operation. Another situation requiring I/O cancellation support is thread and process termination. When a thread exits, the I/Os associated with the thread must be cancelled because the I/O operations are
no longer relevant, and the thread cannot be deleted until the outstanding I/Os have completed.

The Windows I/O manager, working with drivers, must deal with these requests efficiently and reliably to provide a smooth user experience. Drivers manage this need by registering a cancel routine for their cancellable I/O operations (typically, those operations that are still enqueued and not yet in progress), which is invoked by the I/O manager to cancel an I/O operation. When drivers fail to play their role in these scenarios, users may experience unkillable processes, which have disappeared visually but linger and still appear in Task Manager or Process Explorer. (See Chapter 5, “Processes, Threads, and Jobs” in Part 1 for more information on processes and threads.)

**User-Initiated I/O Cancellation**

Most software uses one thread to handle user interface (UI) input and one or more threads to perform work, including I/O. In some cases, when a user wants to abort an operation that was initiated in the UI, an application might need to cancel outstanding I/O operations. Operations that complete quickly might not require cancellation, but for operations that take arbitrary amounts of time—like large data transfers or network operations—Windows provides support for cancelling both synchronous operations and asynchronous operations. A thread can cancel its own outstanding asynchronous I/Os by calling CancelIo. It can cancel all asynchronous I/Os issued to a specific file handle, regardless of by which thread, in the same process with CancelIoEx. CancelIoEx also works on operations associated with I/O completion ports through the thread-agnostic support in Windows that was mentioned earlier because the I/O system keeps track of a completion port’s outstanding I/Os by linking them with the completion port.

For cancelling synchronous I/Os, a thread can call CancelSynchronousIo. CancelSynchronousIo enables even create (open) operations to be cancelled when supported by a device driver, and several drivers in Windows support this functionality, including the drivers that manage network file systems (for example, MUP, DFS, and SMB), which can cancel open operations to network paths. Figures Figure 8-20 and Figure 8-21 show synchronous and asynchronous I/O cancellation. (To a driver, all cancel processing looks the same.)
I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination

The other scenario in which I/Os must be cancelled is when a thread exits, either directly or as the result of its process terminating (which causes the threads of the process to terminate). Because every thread has a list of IRPs associated with it,
the I/O manager can walk this list, look for cancellable IRPs, and cancel them. Unlike CancelIoEx, which does not wait for an IRP to be cancelled before returning, the process manager will not allow thread termination to proceed until all I/Os have been cancelled. As a result, if a driver fails to cancel an IRP, the process and thread object will remain allocated until the system shuts down. Figure 8-22 illustrates the process termination scenario.

**NOTE**

Only IRPs for which a driver sets a cancel routine are cancellable. The process manager waits until all I/Os associated with a thread are either cancelled or completed before deleting the thread.

**EXPERIMENT: DEBUGGING AN UNKILLABLE PROCESS**

In this experiment, we’ll use Notmyfault from Sysinternals (we’ll cover Notmyfault heavily in the “Crash Dump Analysis” section in Chapter 14) to force the unkillable process problem to exhibit itself by causing the Myfault.sys driver (which Notmyfault.exe uses) to indefinitely hold an IRP without having registered a cancel routine for it.

To start, run Notmyfault.exe, select Hang With IRP from the list of options on the Hang tab, and then click the Hang button. The dialog box should look like the following when properly configured.
You shouldn’t see anything happen, and you should be able to click the Cancel button to quit the application. However, you should still see the Notmyfault process in Task Manager or Process Explorer. Attempts to terminate the process will fail because Windows will wait forever for the IRP to complete given that the Myfault driver doesn’t register a cancel routine.

To debug an issue such as this, you can use WinDbg to look at what the thread is currently doing. Open a local kernel debugger session, and start by listing the information about the Notmyfault.exe process with the !process command:

```
  lkd> !process 0 7 notmyfault.exe
  PROCESS 86843ab0  SessionId: 1  Cid: 0594  Peb: 7ffd8000  ParentCid: 05c8
               DirBase: ce21f380  ObjectTable: 9cfb5070  HandleCount:  33.
               Image: NotMyfault.exe
               VadRoot 86658138 Vads 44 Clone 0 Private 210. Modified 5. Locked 0.
               DeviceMap 987545a8
...
  THREAD 868139b8  Cid 0594.0230  Teb: 7ffde000  Win32Thread: 00000000
     WAIT: (Executive) KernelMode Non-Alertable
       86797c64  NotificationEvent
       IRP List:
         86a51228: (0006,0094) Flags: 00060000  Mdl: 00000000
...
  ChildEBP RetAddr  Args to Child
  88ae4b78 81cf23bf 868139b8 86813a40 00000000 nt!KiSwapContext+0x26
  88ae4bbc 81c8fcf8 868139b8 86797c08 86797c64 nt!KiSwapThread+0x44f
  88ae4c14 81e8a356 86797c64 00000000 00000000 nt!KeWaitForSingleObject+0x492
  88ae4c40 81e875a3 86a51228 86797c08 86a51228 nt!IopCancelAlertedRequest+0x6d
  88ae4c64 81e87cbe 00000103 86797c08 00000000 nt!IopSynchronousServiceTail+0x267
```
From the stack trace, you can see that the thread that initiated the I/O realized that the IRP had been cancelled (IopSynchronousServiceTail called IopCancelAlertedRequest) and is now waiting for the cancellation or completion. The next step is to use the same debugger extension command used in the previous experiments, !irp, and attempt to analyze the problem. Copy the IRP pointer, and examine it with !irp:

```bash
lkd> !irp 86a51228
Irp is active with 1 stacks 1 is current (= 0x86a51298)
   No Mdl: No System Buffer: Thread 868139b8: Irp stack trace.
   c   d   f   l   g   c   e   d   f   g   l   f   g   c   d   f   g   c   e   d   f   e
   Device   File     CompletionContext
   [  e, 0]   5  0 86727920 86797c08 00000000-00000000
   \Driver\MYFAULT
   Args: 00000000 00000000 83360020 00000000
```

From this output, it is obvious who the culprit driver is: `\Driver\MYFAULT`, or Myfault.sys. The name of the driver emphasizes that the only way this situation can happen is through a driver problem and not a buggy application. Unfortunately, now that you know which driver caused this issue, there isn’t much you can do—a system reboot is necessary because Windows can never safely assume it is okay to ignore the fact that cancellation hasn’t occurred yet. The IRP could return at any time and cause corruption of system memory. If you encounter this situation in practice, you should check for a newer version of the driver, which might include a fix for the bug.

### I/O Completion Ports

Writing a high-performance server application requires implementing an efficient threading model. Having either too few or too many server threads to process client requests can lead to performance problems. For example, if a server creates a single thread to handle all requests, clients can become starved because the server will be tied up processing one request at a time. A single thread could simultaneously process multiple requests, switching from one to another as I/O operations are started, but this architecture introduces significant complexity and can’t take advantage of systems with more than one logical processor. At the other extreme, a server could create a big pool of threads so that virtually every client request is processed by a dedicated thread. This scenario usually leads to thread-thrashing, in which lots of threads wake up, perform some CPU processing, block while waiting for I/O, and then, after request processing is completed, block again waiting for a new request. If nothing else, having too many threads results in excessive context switching, caused by the scheduler having to divide processor time among multiple active threads.
The goal of a server is to incur as few context switches as possible by having its threads avoid unnecessary blocking, while at the same time maximizing parallelism by using multiple threads. The ideal is for there to be a thread actively servicing a client request on every processor and for those threads not to block when they complete a request if additional requests are waiting. For this optimal process to work correctly, however, the application must have a way to activate another thread when a thread processing a client request blocks on I/O (such as when it reads from a file as part of the processing).

**The IoCompletion Object**

Applications use the IoCompletion executive object, which is exported to the Windows API as a completion port, as the focal point for the completion of I/O associated with multiple file handles. Once a file is associated with a completion port, any asynchronous I/O operations that complete on the file result in a completion packet being queued to the completion port. A thread can wait for any outstanding I/Os to complete on multiple files simply by waiting for a completion packet to be queued to the completion port. The Windows API provides similar functionality with the `WaitForMultipleObjects` API function, but the advantage that completion ports have is that concurrency, or the number of threads that an application has actively servicing client requests, is controlled with the aid of the system.

When an application creates a completion port, it specifies a concurrency value. This value indicates the maximum number of threads associated with the port that should be running at any given time. As stated earlier, the ideal is to have one thread active at any given time for every processor in the system. Windows uses the concurrency value associated with a port to control how many threads an application has active. If the number of active threads associated with a port equals the concurrency value, a thread that is waiting on the completion port won’t be allowed to run. Instead, it is expected that one of the active threads will finish processing its current request and check to see whether another packet is waiting at the port. If one is, the thread simply grabs the packet and goes off to process it. When this happens, there is no context switch, and the CPUs are utilized nearly to their full capacity.

**Using Completion Ports**
Figure 8-23 shows a high-level illustration of completion port operation. A completion port is created with a call to the Windows API function CreateIoCompletionPort. Threads that block on a completion port become associated with the port and are awakened in last in, first out (LIFO) order so that the thread that blocked most recently is the one that is given the next packet. Threads that block for long periods of time can have their stacks swapped out to disk, so if there are more threads associated with a port than there is work to process, the in-memory footprints of threads blocked the longest are minimized.

A server application will usually receive client requests via network endpoints that are identified by file handles. Examples include Windows Sockets 2 (Winsock2) sockets or named pipes. As the server creates its communications endpoints, it associates them with a completion port and its threads wait for incoming requests by calling GetQueuedCompletionStatus on the port. When a thread is given a packet from the completion port, it will go off and start processing the request, becoming an active thread. A thread will block many times during its processing, such as when it needs to read or write data to a file on disk or when it synchronizes with other threads. Windows detects this activity and recognizes that the completion port has one less active thread. Therefore, when a thread becomes inactive because it blocks, a thread waiting on the completion port will be awakened if there is a packet in the queue.
Microsoft’s guidelines are to set the concurrency value roughly equal to the number of processors in a system. Keep in mind that it’s possible for the number of active threads for a completion port to exceed the concurrency limit. Consider a case in which the limit is specified as 1. A client request comes in, and a thread is dispatched to process the request, becoming active. A second request arrives, but a second thread waiting on the port isn’t allowed to proceed because the concurrency limit has been reached. Then the first thread blocks waiting for a file I/O, so it becomes inactive. The second thread is then released, and while it’s still active, the first thread’s file I/O is completed, making it active again. At that point—and until one of the threads blocks—the concurrency value is 2, which is higher than the limit of 1. Most of the time, the count of active threads will remain at or just above the concurrency limit.

The completion port API also makes it possible for a server application to queue privately defined completion packets to a completion port by using the PostQueuedCompletionStatus function. A server typically uses this function to inform its threads of external events, such as the need to shut down gracefully.

Applications can use thread agnostic I/O, described earlier, with I/O completion
ports to avoid associating threads with their own I/Os and associating them with a completion port object instead. In addition to the other scalability benefits of I/O completion ports, their use can minimize context switches. Standard I/O completions must be executed by the thread that initiated the I/O, but when an I/O associated with an I/O completion port completes, the I/O manager uses any waiting thread to perform the completion operation.

I/O Completion Port Operation

Windows applications create completion ports by calling the Windows API CreateIoCompletionPort and specifying a NULL completion port handle. This results in the execution of the NtCreateIoCompletion system service. The executive’s IoCompletion object contains a kernel synchronization object called a kernel queue. Thus, the system service creates a completion port object and initializes a queue object in the port’s allocated memory. (A pointer to the port also points to the queue object because the queue is at the start of the port memory.) A kernel queue object has a concurrency value that is specified when a thread initializes it, and in this case the value that is used is the one that was passed to CreateIoCompletionPort. KeInitializeQueue is the function that NtCreateIoCompletion calls to initialize a port’s queue object.

When an application calls CreateIoCompletionPort to associate a file handle with a port, the NtSetInformationFile system service is executed with the file handle as the primary parameter. The information class that is set is FileCompletionInformation, and the completion port’s handle and the CompletionKey parameter from CreateIoCompletionPort are the data values. NtSetInformationFile dereferences the file handle to obtain the file object and allocates a completion context data structure.

Finally, NtSetInformationFile sets the CompletionContext field in the file object to point at the context structure. When an asynchronous I/O operation completes on a file object, the I/O manager checks to see whether the CompletionContext field in the file object is non-NULL. If it is, the I/O manager allocates a completion packet and queues it to the completion port by calling KeInsertQueue with the port as the queue on which to insert the packet. (Remember that the completion port object and queue object have the same address.)
When a server thread invokes `GetQueuedCompletionStatus`, the system service `NtRemoveIoCompletion` is executed. After validating parameters and translating the completion port handle to a pointer to the port, `NtRemoveIoCompletion` calls `IoRemoveIoCompletion`, which eventually calls `KeRemoveQueueEx`. For high-performance scenarios, it’s possible that multiple I/Os may have been completed, and although the thread will not block, it will still call into the kernel each time to get one item. The `GetQueuedCompletionStatus` or `GetQueuedCompletionStatusEx` API allows applications to retrieve more than one I/O completion status at the same time, reducing the number of user-to-kernel roundtrips and maintaining peak efficiency. Internally, this is implemented through the `NtRemoveIoCompletionEx` function, which calls `IoRemoveIoCompletion` with a count of queued items, which is passed on to `KeRemoveQueueEx`.

As you can see, `KeRemoveQueueEx` and `KeInsertQueue` are the engines behind completion ports. They are the functions that determine whether a thread waiting for an I/O completion packet should be activated. Internally, a queue object maintains a count of the current number of active threads and the maximum number of active threads. If the current number equals or exceeds the maximum when a thread calls `KeRemoveQueueEx`, the thread will be put (in LIFO order) onto a list of threads waiting for a turn to process a completion packet. The list of threads hangs off the queue object. A thread’s control block data structure (`KTHREAD`) has a pointer in it that references the queue object of a queue that it’s associated with; if the pointer is NULL, the thread isn’t associated with a queue.

Windows keeps track of threads that become inactive because they block on something other than the completion port by relying on the queue pointer in a thread’s control block. The scheduler routines that possibly result in a thread blocking (such as `KeWaitForSingleObject`, `KeDelayExecution-Thread`, and so on) check the thread’s queue pointer. If the pointer isn’t NULL, the functions call `KiActivateWaiterQueue`, a queue-related function that decrements the count of active threads associated with the queue. If the resultant number is less than the maximum and at least one completion packet is in the queue, the thread at the front of the queue’s thread list is awakened and given the oldest packet. Conversely, whenever a thread that is associated with a queue wakes up after blocking, the scheduler executes the function `KiUnwaitThread`, which increments the queue’s active count.
Finally, the PostQueuedCompletionStatus Windows API function results in the execution of the NtSetIoCompletion system service. This function simply inserts the specified packet onto the completion port’s queue by using KeInsertQueue.

**Figure 8-24** shows an example of a completion port object in operation. Even though two threads are ready to process completion packets, the concurrency value of 1 allows only one thread associated with the completion port to be active, and so the two threads are blocked on the completion port.

![Figure 8-24. I/O completion port operation](image)

Finally, the exact notification model of the I/O completion port can be fine-tuned through the SetFileCompletionNotificationModes API, which allows application developers to take advantage of additional, specific improvements that usually require code changes but can offer even more throughput. Three notification-mode optimizations are supported, which are listed in **Table 8-3**. Note that these modes are per file handle and permanent.

Table 8-3. I/O Completion Port Notification Modes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notification Mode</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skip completion port on success</td>
<td>If the following three conditions are true, the I/O manager does not queue a completion entry to the port when it would ordinarily do so. First, a completion port must be associated with the file handle; second, the file must be opened for asynchronous I/O; third, the request must return success immediately without returning ERROR_PENDI...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The I/O manager does not set the event for the file object if a request returns with a success code or the error returned is ERROR_PENDING and the function that is called is not a synchronous function. If an explicit event is provided for the request, it is still signaled.

The I/O manager does not set the explicit event provided for the request if a request takes the fast I/O path and returns with a success code or the error returned is ERROR_PENDING and the function that is called is not a synchronous function.

### I/O Prioritization

Without I/O priority, background activities like search indexing, virus scanning, and disk defragmenting can severely impact the responsiveness of foreground operations. A user launching an application or opening a document while another process is performing disk I/O, for example, experiences delays as the foreground task waits for disk access. The same interference also affects the streaming playback of multimedia content like music from a disk.

Windows includes two types of I/O prioritization to help foreground I/O operations get preference: priority on individual I/O operations and I/O bandwidth reservations.

### I/O Priorities

The Windows I/O manager internally includes support for five I/O priorities, as shown in Table 8-4, but only three of the priorities are used. (Future versions of Windows may support High and Low.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I/O Priority</th>
<th>Usage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Critical</td>
<td>Memory manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Not used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>Normal application I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Not used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Scheduled tasks, Superfetch, defragmenting,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>content indexing, background activities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I/O has a default priority of Normal, and the memory manager uses Critical when
it wants to write dirty memory data out to disk under low-memory situations to make room in RAM for other data and code. The Windows Task Scheduler sets the I/O priority for tasks that have the default task priority to Very Low. The priority specified by applications that perform background processing is Very Low. All of the Windows background operations, including Windows Defender scanning and desktop search indexing, use Very Low I/O priority.

**Prioritization Strategies**

Internally, these five I/O priorities are divided into two I/O prioritization modes, called strategies. These are the hierarchy prioritization and the idle prioritization strategies. Hierarchy prioritization deals with all the I/O priorities except Very Low. It implements the following strategy:

- All critical-priority I/O must be processed before any high-priority I/O.
- All high-priority I/O must be processed before any normal-priority I/O.
- All normal-priority I/O must be processed before any low-priority I/O.
- All low-priority I/O is processed after any higher-priority I/O.

As each application generates I/Os, IRPs are put on different I/O queues based on their priority, and the hierarchy strategy decides the ordering of the operations.

The idle prioritization strategy, on the other hand, uses a separate queue for non-idle priority I/O. Because the system processes all hierarchy prioritized I/O before idle I/O, it’s possible for the I/Os in this queue to be starved, as long as there’s even a single non-idle I/O on the system in the hierarchy priority strategy queue.

To avoid this situation, as well as to control backoff (the sending rate of I/O transfers), the idle strategy uses a timer to monitor the queue and guarantee that at least one I/O is processed per unit of time (typically, half a second). Data written using non-idle I/O priority also causes the cache manager to write modifications to disk immediately instead of doing it later and to bypass its read-ahead logic for read operations that would otherwise preemptively read from the file being accessed. The prioritization strategy also waits for 50 milliseconds after the completion of the last non-idle I/O in order to issue the next idle I/O. Otherwise, idle I/Os would occur in the middle of non-idle streams, causing costly seeks.

Combining these strategies into a virtual global I/O queue for demonstration
purposes, a snapshot of this queue might look similar to Figure 8-25. Note that within each queue, the ordering is first-in, first-out (FIFO). The order in the figure is shown only as an example.

User-mode applications can set I/O priority on three different objects. SetPriorityClass and SetThreadPriority set the priority for all the I/Os that either the entire process or specific threads will generate (the priority is stored in the IRP of each request). SetFileInformationByHandle can set the priority for a specific file object (the priority is stored in the file object). Drivers can also set I/O priority directly on an IRP by using the IoSetIoPriorityHint API.

NOTE
The I/O priority field in the IRP and/or file object is a hint. There is no guarantee that the I/O priority will be respected or even supported by the different drivers that are part of the storage stack.

The two prioritization strategies are implemented by two different types of drivers. The hierarchy strategy is implemented by the storage port drivers, which are responsible for all I/Os on a specific port, such as ATA, SCSI, or USB. Only the ATA port driver (%SystemRoot%\System32\Ataport.sys) and USB port driver (%SystemRoot%\System32\Usbstor.sys) implement this strategy, while the SCSI and storage port drivers (%SystemRoot%\System32\Scsiport.sys and %SystemRoot%\System32\Stor port.sys) do not.

NOTE
All port drivers check specifically for Critical priority I/Os and move them ahead of their queues, even if they do not support the full hierarchy mechanism. This mechanism is in place to support critical memory manager paging I/Os to ensure system reliability.

This means that consumer mass storage devices such as IDE or SATA hard drives
and USB flash disks will take advantage of I/O prioritization, while devices based on SCSI, Fibre Channel, and iSCSI will not.

On the other hand, it is the system storage class device driver (%SystemRoot%\System32\Class pnp.sys) that enforces the idle strategy, so it automatically applies to I/Os directed at all storage devices, including SCSI drives. This separation ensures that idle I/Os will be subject to backoff algorithms to ensure a reliable system during operation under high idle I/O usage and so that applications that use them can make forward progress. Placing support for this strategy in the Microsoft-provided class driver avoids performance problems that would have been caused by lack of support for it in legacy third-party port drivers.

**Figure 8-26** displays a simplified view of the storage stack and where each strategy is implemented. See Chapter 9 for more information on the storage stack.

---

**I/O Priority Inversion Avoidance (I/O Priority Inheritance)**

To avoid I/O priority inversion (in which a high-I/O-priority thread can be starved by a low-I/O-priority thread), the executive resource (ERESOURCE) locking functionality utilizes several strategies. The ERESOURCE was picked for the implementation of I/O priority inheritance particularly because of its heavy use in file system and storage drivers, where most I/O priority inversion issues can appear.

If an ERESOURCE is being acquired by a thread with low I/O priority, and there are currently waiters on the ERESOURCE with normal or higher priority, the current thread is temporarily boosted to normal I/O priority by using the PsBoostThreadIo API, which increments the IoBoostCount in the ETHREAD
structure.

It then calls the IoBoostThreadIoPriority API, which enumerates all the IRPs queued to the target thread (recall that each thread has a list of pending IRPs) and checks which ones have a lower priority than the target priority (normal in this case), thus identifying pending idle I/O priority IRPs. In turn, the device object responsible for each of those IRPs is identified, and the I/O manager checks whether a priority callback has been registered, which driver developers can do through the IoRegisterPriorityCallback API and by setting the DO_PRIORITY_CALLBACK_ENABLED flag on their device object. Depending on whether the IRP was a paging I/O, this mechanism is called the threaded boost or the paging boost.

Finally, if no matching IRPs were found, but the thread has at least some pending IRPs, all are boosted regardless of device object or priority, which is called blanket boosting.

**I/O Priority Boosts and Bumps**

A few other subtle modifications to normal I/O paths are used by Windows to avoid starvation, inversion, or otherwise unwanted scenarios when I/O priority is being used. Typically, these modifications are done by boosting I/O priority when needed. The following scenarios exhibit this behavior.

- When a driver is being called with an IRP targeted to a particular file object, Windows makes sure that if the request comes from kernel mode, the IRP uses normal priority even if the file object has a lower I/O priority hint. This is called the kernel bump.

- When reads or writes to the paging file are occurring (through IoPageRead and IoPageWrite), Windows checks whether the request comes from kernel mode and is not being performed on behalf of Superfetch (which always uses idle I/O). In this case, the IRP uses normal priority even if the current thread has a lower I/O priority. This is called the paging bump.

The following experiment will show you an example of Very Low I/O priority and how you can use Process Monitor to look at I/O priorities on different requests.

---

**EXPERIMENT: VERY LOW VS. NORMAL I/O THROUGHPUT**
You can use the IO Priority sample application (included in the book’s utilities) to look at the throughput difference between two threads with different I/O priorities. Launch IoPriority.exe, make sure Thread 1 is checked to use Low priority, and then click the Start IO button. You should notice a significant difference in speed between the two threads, as shown in the following screen.

You should also notice that Thread 1’s throughput remains fairly constant, around 2 KB/s. This can easily be explained by the fact that IO Priority performs its I/Os at 2 KB/s, which means that the idle prioritization strategy is kicking in and guaranteeing at least one I/O each half-second. Otherwise, Thread 2 would starve any I/O that Thread 1 is attempting to make.

Note that if both threads run at low priority and the system is relatively idle, their throughput will be roughly equal to the throughput of a single normal I/O priority in the example. This is because low priority I/Os are not artificially throttled or otherwise hindered if there isn’t any competition from higher priority I/O.

You can also use Process Monitor to trace IO Priority’s I/Os and look at their I/O priority hint. Launch Process Monitor, configure a filter for IoPriority.exe, and repeat the experiment. In this application, Thread 1 writes to File_1, and Thread 2 writes to File_2. Scroll down until you see a write to File_1, and you should see output similar to that shown next.

You can see that I/Os directed at File_1 have a priority of Very Low. By looking at the Time Of Day column, you’ll also notice that the I/Os are spaced 0.5 second from each other—another sign of the idle strategy in action.

Finally, by using Process Explorer, you can identify Thread 1 in the IoPriority process by looking at the I/O priority for each of its threads on the Threads tab of its process Properties dialog box. You can also see that the priority for the thread is lower than the default of 8 (normal), which indicates that the thread is probably running in background priority mode. The following screen shot shows what you should expect to see.
Note that if IO Priority sets the priority on File_1 instead of on the issuing thread, both threads would look the same. Only Process Monitor could show you the difference in I/O priorities.

**EXPERIMENT: PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF I/O PRIORITY BOOSTING/BUMPING**

The kernel exposes several internal variables that can be queried through the undocumented SystemLowPriorityIoInformation system class available in NtQuerySystemInformation. However, even without writing or relying on such an application, you can use the local kernel debugger for viewing these numbers on your system. The following variables are available:

- IoLowPriorityReadOperationCount and IoLowPriorityWriteOperationCount
- IoKernelIssuedIoBoostedCount
- IoPagingReadLowPriorityCount and IoPagingWriteLowPriorityCount
- IoPagingReadLowPriorityBumpedCount and IoPagingWriteHighPriorityBumpedCount
- IoBoostedThreadedIrpCount and IoBoostedPagingIrpCount
- IoBlanketBoostCount

You can use the dd memory-dumping command in the kernel debugger to see the values of these variables.

**Bandwidth Reservation (Scheduled File I/O)**

Windows I/O bandwidth reservation support is useful for applications that desire consistent I/O throughput. Using the SetFileBandwidthReservation call, a media player application asks the I/O system to guarantee it the ability to read data from a
device at a specified rate. If the device can deliver data at the requested rate and existing reservations allow it, the I/O system gives the application guidance as to how fast it should issue I/Os and how large the I/Os should be.

The I/O system won’t service other I/Os unless it can satisfy the requirements of applications that have made reservations on the target storage device. Figure 8-27 shows a conceptual timeline of I/Os issued on the same file. The shaded regions are the only ones that will be available to other applications. If I/O bandwidth is already taken, new I/Os will have to wait until the next cycle.

![Figure 8-27. Effect of I/O requests during bandwidth reservation](image)

Like the hierarchy prioritization strategy, bandwidth reservation is implemented at the port driver level, which means it is available only for IDE, SATA, or USB-based mass-storage devices.

## Container Notifications

Container notifications are specific classes of events that drivers can register for through an asynchronous callback mechanism by using the IoRegisterContainerNotification API and selecting the notification class that interests them. Thus far, one class is implemented in Windows, which is the IoSessionStateNotification class. This class allows drivers to have their registered callback invoked whenever a change in the state of a given session is registered. The following changes are supported:

- A session is created or terminated
- A user connects to or disconnects from a session
- A user logs on to or logs off from a session

By specifying a device object that belongs to a specific session, the driver callback will be active only for that session, while by specifying a global device object (or no device object at all), the driver will receive notifications for all events on a
This feature is particularly useful for devices that participate in the Plug and Play device redirection functionality that is provided through Terminal Services, which allows a remote device to be visible on the connecting host’s Plug and Play manager bus as well (such as audio or printer device redirection). Once the user disconnects from a session with audio playback, for example, the device driver needs a notification in order to stop redirecting the source audio stream.

**Driver Verifier**

Driver Verifier is a mechanism that can be used to help find and isolate common bugs in device drivers or other kernel-mode system code. Microsoft uses Driver Verifier to check its own device drivers as well as all device drivers that vendors submit for Windows Hardware Quality Labs (WHQL) testing. Doing so ensures that the drivers submitted are compatible with Windows and free from common driver errors. (Although not described in this book, there is also a corresponding Application Verifier tool that has resulted in quality improvements for user-mode code in Windows.)

Also, although Driver Verifier serves primarily as a tool to help device driver developers discover bugs in their code, it is also a powerful tool for system administrators experiencing crashes. Chapter 14 describes its role in crash analysis troubleshooting.

Driver Verifier consists of support in several system components: the memory manager, I/O manager, and HAL all have driver verification options that can be enabled. These options are configured using the Driver Verifier Manager (%SystemRoot%\System32\Verifier.exe). When you run Driver Verifier with no command-line arguments, it presents a wizard-style interface, as shown in Figure 8-28.
You can also enable and disable Driver Verifier, as well as display current settings, by using its command-line interface. From a command prompt, type `verifier /?` to see the switches.

Even when you don’t select any options, Driver Verifier monitors drivers selected for verification, looking for a number of illegal and boundary operations, including calling kernel-memory pool functions at invalid IRQL, double-freeing memory, allocating synchronization objects from NonPagedPoolSession memory, referencing a freed object, delaying shutdown for longer than 20 minutes, and requesting a zero-size memory allocation.

What follows is a description of the I/O-related verification options (shown in Figure 8-29). The options related to memory management are described in Chapter 10, along with how the memory manager redirects a driver’s operating system calls to special verifier versions.
These options have the following effects:

- **I/O Verification** When this option is selected, the I/O manager allocates IRPs for verified drivers from a special pool and their usage is tracked. In addition, the Verifier crashes the system when an IRP is completed that contains an invalid status or when an invalid device object is passed to the I/O manager. This option also monitors all IRPs to ensure that drivers mark them correctly when completing them asynchronously, that they manage device-stack locations correctly, and that they delete device objects only once. In addition, the Verifier randomly stresses drivers by sending them fake power management and WMI IRPs, changing the order in which devices are enumerated, and adjusting the status of PnP and power IRPs when they complete to test for drivers that return incorrect status from their dispatch routines. Finally, Verifier also detects incorrect re-initialization of remove locks while they are still being held due to pending device removal.

- **DMA Checking** DMA (direct access memory) is a hardware-supported mechanism that allows devices to transfer data to or from physical memory without involving the CPU. The I/O manager provides a number of functions that drivers use to initiate and control DMA operations, and this option enables checks for correct use of the functions and buffers that the I/O manager
supplies for DMA operations.

- **Force Pending I/O Requests** For many devices, asynchronous I/Os complete immediately, so drivers may not be coded to properly handle the occasional asynchronous I/O. When this option is enabled, the I/O manager will randomly return STATUS_PENDING in response to a driver’s calls to IoCallDriver, which simulates the asynchronous completion of an I/O.

- **IRP Logging** This option monitors a driver’s use of IRPs and makes a record of IRP usage, which is stored as WMI information. You can then use the Dc2wmiparser.exe utility in the WDK to convert these WMI records to a text file. Note that only 20 IRPs for each device will be recorded—each subsequent IRP will overwrite the entry added least recently. After a reboot, this information is discarded, so Dc2wmiparser.exe should be run if the contents of the trace are to be analyzed later.
Kernel-Mode Driver Framework (KMDF)

We’ve already discussed some details about the Windows Driver Foundation (WDF) in Chapter 2, “System Architecture,” in Part 1. In this section, we’ll take a deeper look at the components and functionality provided by the kernel-mode part of the framework, KMDF. Note that this section will only briefly touch on some of the core architecture of KMDF. For a much more complete overview on the subject, please refer to http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/hardware/gg463370.aspx.

Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver

First, let’s take a look at which kinds of drivers or devices are supported by KMDF. In general, any WDM-conformant driver should be supported by KMDF, as long as it performs standard I/O processing and IRP manipulation. KMDF is not suitable for drivers that don’t use the Windows kernel API directly but instead perform library calls into existing port and class drivers. These types of drivers cannot use KMDF because they only provide callbacks for the actual WDM drivers that do the I/O processing. Additionally, if a driver provides its own dispatch functions instead of relying on a port or class driver, IEEE 1394 and ISA, PCI, PCMCIA, and SD Client (for Secure Digital storage devices) drivers can also make use of KMDF.

Although KMDF provides an abstraction on top of WDM, the basic driver structure shown earlier also generally applies to KMDF drivers. At their core, KMDF drivers must have the following functions:

- **An initialization routine** Just like any other driver, a KMDF driver has a DriverEntry function that initializes the driver. KMDF drivers will initiate the framework at this point and perform any configuration and initialization steps that are part of the driver or part of describing the driver to the framework. For non–Plug and Play drivers, this is where the first device object should be created.

- **An add-device routine** KMDF driver operation is based on events and callbacks (described shortly), and the EvtDriverDeviceAdd callback is the single most important one for PnP devices because it receives notifications
when the PnP manager in the kernel enumerates one of the driver’s devices.

- **One or more EvtIo* routines** Just like a WDM driver’s dispatch routines, these callback routines handle specific types of I/O requests from a particular device queue. A driver typically creates one or more queues in which KMDF places I/O requests for the driver’s devices. These queues can be configured by request type and dispatching type.

The simplest KMDF driver might need to have only an initialization and add-device routine because the framework will provide the default, generic functionality that’s required for most types of I/O processing, including power and Plug and Play events. In the KMDF model, events refer to run-time states to which a driver can respond or during which a driver can participate. These events are not related to the synchronization primitives (synchronization is discussed in Chapter 3 in Part 1), but are internal to the framework.

For events that are critical to a driver’s operation, or which need specialized processing, the driver registers a given callback routine to handle this event. In other cases, a driver can allow KMDF to perform a default, generic action instead. For example, during an eject event (EvtDeviceEject), a driver can choose to support ejection and supply a callback or to fall back to the default KMDF code that will tell the user that the device is not ejectable. Not all events have a default behavior, however, and callbacks must be provided by the driver. One notable example is the EvtDriverDeviceAdd event that is at the core of any Plug and Play driver.

---

**EXPERIMENT: DISPLAYING KMDF DRIVERS**

The Wdfkd.dll extension that ships with the Debugging Tools for Windows package provides many commands that can be used to debug and analyze KMDF drivers and devices (instead of using the built-in WDM-style debugging extension that may not offer the same kind of WDF-specific information). You can display installed KMDF drivers with the !wdfkd.wdfldr debugger command. In the following example, the output from a typical Windows computer is shown, displaying the built-in drivers that are installed.

```plaintext
lkd> !wdfkd.wdfldr
LoadedModuleNameList 0xfffff880010682d8
----------------------------------
LIBRARY_MODULE  fffffa8002776120
Version       v1.9 build(7600)
Service       \Registry\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Wdf01000
ImageName     Wdf01000.sys
ImageAddress  0xfffff88000c0000
ImageSize     0xa4000
```
### Associated Clients: 16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ImageName</th>
<th>Version</th>
<th>WdfGlobals</th>
<th>FxGlobals</th>
<th>ImageAddress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>peauth.sys</td>
<td>v1.7(6001)</td>
<td>0xfffffa8004754210</td>
<td>0xfffffa80047540c0</td>
<td>0x000a6000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scfilter.sys</td>
<td>v1.5(6000)</td>
<td>0xfffffa8002ef34e0</td>
<td>0xfffffa8002ef3390</td>
<td>0x0000e000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WinUSB.sys</td>
<td>v1.9(7600)</td>
<td>0xfffffa8002eefd20</td>
<td>0xfffffa8002eefbd0</td>
<td>0x00011000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>monitor.sys</td>
<td>v1.9(7600)</td>
<td>0xfffffa8004854a10</td>
<td>0xfffffa80048548c0</td>
<td>0x0000e000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vmswitch.sys</td>
<td>v1.5(6000)</td>
<td>0xfffffa8002de5d60</td>
<td>0xfffffa8002de5c10</td>
<td>0x00068000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vmbus.sys</td>
<td>v1.5(6000)</td>
<td>0xfffffa8002d7f0700</td>
<td>0xfffffa8002d7fba0</td>
<td>0x0003f000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vld.sys</td>
<td>v1.5(6000)</td>
<td>0xfffffa8002d7f0700</td>
<td>0xfffffa8002d7fba0</td>
<td>0x0003f000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>umbus.sys</td>
<td>v1.9(7600)</td>
<td>0xfffffa8002e57d0</td>
<td>0xfffffa8002e57d20</td>
<td>0x00012000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>storvsp.sys</td>
<td>v1.5(6000)</td>
<td>0xfffffa8002e48b0</td>
<td>0xfffffa8002e48c0</td>
<td>0x00023000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CompositeBus.sys</td>
<td>v1.9(7600)</td>
<td>0xfffffa8002d9160</td>
<td>0xfffffa8002d9010</td>
<td>0x00010000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDAudBus.sys</td>
<td>v1.7(6001)</td>
<td>0xfffffa8002e57f0</td>
<td>0xfffffa8002e56a0</td>
<td>0x00024000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intelpmm.sys</td>
<td>v1.9(7600)</td>
<td>0xfffffa8002c518f0</td>
<td>0xfffffa8002c517a0</td>
<td>0x00024000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cdrom.sys</td>
<td>v1.9(7600)</td>
<td>0xfffffa8002bf7a0</td>
<td>0xfffffa8002bf80f0</td>
<td>0x00016000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vmstorfl.sys</td>
<td>v1.5(6000)</td>
<td>0xfffffa8002b2cdd0</td>
<td>0xfffffa8002b2cc0</td>
<td>0x00010000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vdrvroot.sys</td>
<td>v1.9(7600)</td>
<td>0xfffffa80027887c0</td>
<td>0xfffffa8002788670</td>
<td>0x0000d000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>misisadrv.sys</td>
<td>v1.9(7600)</td>
<td>0xfffffa80029c5430</td>
<td>0xfffffa80029c52e0</td>
<td>0x0000a000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

----------------------------------

Total: 1 library loaded

---

**KMDF Data Model**
The KMDF data model is object-based, much like the model for the kernel, but it does not make use of the object manager. Instead, KMDF manages its own objects internally, exposing them as handles to drivers and keeping the actual data structures opaque. For each object type, the framework provides routines to perform operations on the object, such as WdfDeviceCreate, which creates a device. Additionally, objects can have specific data fields or members that can be accessed by Get/Set (used for modifications that should never fail) or Assign/Retrieve APIs (used for modifications that can fail). For example, the WdfInterruptGetInfo function returns information on a given interrupt object (WDFINTERRUPT).

Also unlike the implementation of kernel objects, which all refer to distinct and isolated object types, KMDF objects are all part of a hierarchy—most object types are bound to a parent. The root object is the WDFDRIVER structure, which describes the actual driver. The structure and meaning is analogous to the DRIVER_OBJECT structure provided by the I/O manager, and all other KMDF structures are children of it. The next most important object is WDFDEVICE, which refers to a given instance of a detected device on the system, which must have been created with WdfDeviceCreate. Again, this is analogous to the DEVICE_OBJECT structure that’s used in the WDM model and by the I/O manager. Table 8-5 lists the object types supported by KMDF.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Object Type</th>
<th>WDFCHILDLIST</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Child List</td>
<td>WDFCHILDLIST</td>
<td>List of child WDFDEVICE objects associated with the device. Only used by bus drivers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collection</td>
<td>WDFCOLLECTION</td>
<td>List of objects of a similar type, such as a group of WDFDEVICE objects being filtered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deferred Procedure Call</td>
<td>WDFDPC</td>
<td>Instance of a DPC object (see Chapter 3 in Part 1 for more information on DPCs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Device</td>
<td>WDFDEVICE</td>
<td>Instance of a device.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMA Common Buffer</td>
<td>WDFCOMMONBUFFER</td>
<td>Region of memory that a device and driver can access for direct memory access (DMA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMA Enabler</td>
<td>Enables DMA on a given channel for a driver.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMA Transaction</td>
<td>Instance of a DMA transaction.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>WDFDRIVER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Root object for the driver; represents the driver, its parameters, and its</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>callbacks, among other items.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>File</td>
<td>WDFFILEOBJECT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Instance of a file object that can be used as a channel for communication</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>between an application and the driver.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generic Object</td>
<td>WDOBJECT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Allows driver-defined custom data to be wrapped inside the framework's</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>object data model as an object.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interrupt</td>
<td>WDFINTERRUPT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Instance of an interrupt that the driver must handle.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/O Queue</td>
<td>WDFQUEUE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Represents a given I/O queue.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/O Request</td>
<td>WDFREQUEST</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Represents a given request on a WDFQUEUE.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/O Target</td>
<td>WDFIOTARGET</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Represents the device stack being targeted by a given WDFREQUEST.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Look-Aside List</td>
<td>WDFLOOKASIDE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Describes an executive look-aside list.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memory</td>
<td>WDFMEMORY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Describes a region of paged or nonpaged pool.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registry Key</td>
<td>WDFKEY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Describes a registry key.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource List</td>
<td>WDFCMRESLIST</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identifies the hardware resources assigned to a WDFDEVICE.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource Range List</td>
<td>WDFIORESLIST</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identifies a given possible hardware resource range for a WDFDEVICE.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource Requirements List</td>
<td>WDFIORESREQLIST</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contains an array of WDFIORESLIST objects describing all possible resource</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ranges for a WDFDEVICE.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spinlock</td>
<td>WDFSPINLOCK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Describes a spinlock (see Chapter 3 in Part 1 for more information).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>String</td>
<td>WDFSTRING</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Describes a Unicode string structure.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timer</td>
<td>WDFTIMER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Describes an executive timer (see Chapter 3 in Part)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For each of these objects, other KMDF objects can be attached as children—some objects have only one or two valid parents, while other objects can be attached to any parent. For example, a WDFINTERRUPT object must be associated with a given WDFDEVICE, but a WDFSPINLOCK or WDFSTRING can have any object as a parent, allowing fine-grained control over their validity and usage and reducing global state variables. Figure 8-30 shows the entire KMDF object hierarchy.

Note that the associations mentioned earlier and shown in the figure are not necessarily immediate. The parent must simply be on the hierarchy chain, meaning one of the ancestor nodes must be of this type. This relationship is useful to implement because object hierarchies affect not only the objects’ locality but also their lifetime. Each time a child object is created, a reference count is added to it by its link to its parent. Therefore, when a parent object is destroyed, all the child objects are also destroyed, which is why associating objects such as WDFSTRING or WDFMEMORY with a given object, instead of the default WDFDRIVER object, can automatically free up memory and state information when the parent object is destroyed.

Closely related to the concept hierarchy is KMDF’s notion of object context. Because KMDF objects are opaque, as discussed, and are associated with a parent...
Object contexts allow all KMDF objects to contain such information, and they additionally allow multiple object context areas, which permit multiple layers of code inside the same driver to interact with the same object in different ways. In the WDM model, the device extension data structure allows such information to be associated with a given device, but with KMDF even a spinlock or string can contain context areas. This extensibility allows each library or layer of code responsible for processing an I/O to interact independently of other code, based on the context area that it works with, and allows a mechanism similar to inheritance.

Finally, KMDF objects are also associated with a set of attributes that are shown in Table 8-6. These attributes are usually configured to their defaults, but the values can be overridden by the driver when creating the object by specifying a WDF_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES structure (similar to the object manager’s
OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES structure that’s used when creating a kernel object).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ContextSizeOverride</td>
<td>Size of the object context area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ContextTypeInfo</td>
<td>Type of the object context area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EvtCleanupCallback</td>
<td>Callback to notify the driver of the object’s cleanup before deletion (references may still exist).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EvtDestroyCallback</td>
<td>Callback to notify the driver of the object’s imminent deletion (reference count will be 0).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ExecutionLevel</td>
<td>Describes the maximum IRQL at which the callbacks may be invoked by KMDF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ParentObject</td>
<td>Identifies the parent of this object.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>Size of the object.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SynchronizationScope</td>
<td>Specifies whether callbacks should be synchronized with the parent, a queue or device, or nothing.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KMDF I/O Model**

The KMDF I/O model follows the WDM mechanisms discussed earlier in the chapter. In fact, one can even think of the framework itself as a WDM driver, since it uses kernel APIs and WDM behavior to abstract KMDF and make it functional. Under KMDF, the framework driver sets its own WDM-style IRP dispatch routines and takes control over all IRPs sent to the driver. After being handled by one of three KMDF I/O handlers (which we’ll describe shortly), it then packages these requests in the appropriate KMDF objects, inserts them in the appropriate queues if required, and performs driver callback if the driver is interested in those events. **Figure 8-31** describes the flow of I/O in the framework.

Based on the IRP processing discussed for WDM drivers earlier, KMDF performs one of the following three actions:

- Sends the IRP to the I/O handler, which processes standard device operations
- Sends the IRP to the PnP and power handler that processes these kinds of events and notifies other drivers if the state has changed

- Sends the IRP to the WMI handler, which handles tracing and logging.

These components will then notify the driver of any events it registered for, potentially forward the request to another handler for further processing, and then complete the request based on an internal handler action or as the result of a driver call. If KMDF has finished processing the IRP but the request itself has still not been fully processed, KMDF will take one of the following actions:

- For bus drivers and function drivers, complete the IRP with STATUS_INVALID_DEVICE_REQUEST

- For filter drivers, forward the request to the next lower driver

**Figure 8-31. KMDF I/O flow and IRP processing**

I/O processing by KMDF is based on the mechanism of queues (WDFQUEUE, not the KQUEUE object discussed in the earlier section on I/O completion and in Chapter 3 in Part 1). KMDF queues are highly scalable containers of I/O requests
(packaged as WDFREQUEST objects) and provide a rich feature set beyond merely sorting the pending I/Os for a given device. For example, queues also track currently active requests and support I/O cancellation, I/O concurrency (the ability to perform and complete more than one I/O request at a time), and I/O synchronization (as noted in the list of object attributes in Table 8-6). A typical KMDF driver creates at least one queue (if not more) and associates one or more events with each queue, as well as some of the following options:

- The callbacks registered with the events associated with this queue.
- The power management state for the queue. KMDF supports both power-managed and nonpower-managed queues. For the former, the I/O handler will handle waking up the device when required (and when possible), arm the idle timer when the device has no I/Os queued up, and call the driver’s I/O cancellation routines when the system is switching away from a working state.
- The dispatch method for the queue. KMDF can deliver I/Os from a queue either in a sequential, parallel, or manual mode. Sequential I/Os are delivered one at a time (KMDF waits for the driver to complete the previous request), while parallel I/Os are delivered to the driver as soon as possible. In manual mode, the driver must manually retrieve I/Os from the queue.
- Whether or not the queue can accept zero-length buffers, such as incoming requests that don’t actually contain any data.

**NOTE**

The dispatch method affects solely the number of requests that are allowed to be active inside a driver’s queue at one time. It does not determine whether the event callbacks themselves will be called concurrently or serially. That behavior is determined through the synchronization scope object attribute described earlier. Therefore, it is possible for a parallel queue to have concurrency disabled but still have multiple incoming requests.

Based on the mechanism of queues, the KMDF I/O handler can perform several possible tasks upon receiving either a create, close, cleanup, write, read, or device control (IOCTL) request:

- For create requests, the driver can request to be immediately notified through EvtDeviceFileCreate, or it can create a nonmanual queue to receive create requests. It must then register an EvtIoDefault callback to receive the...
notifications. Finally, if none of these methods are used, KMDF will simply complete the request with a success code, meaning that by default, applications will be able to open handles to KMDF drivers that don’t supply their own code.

- For cleanup and close requests, the driver will be immediately notified through EvtFileCleanup and EvtFileClose callbacks, if registered. Otherwise, the framework will simply complete with a success code.

- Finally, Figure 8-32 illustrates the flow of an I/O request to a KMDF driver for the most common driver operations (read, write, and I/O control codes).
Figure 8-32. Handling read, write, and IOCTL I/O requests by KMDF
User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)

Although this chapter focuses on kernel-mode drivers, Windows includes a growing number of drivers that actually run in user mode, as previously described, using the User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF) that is part of the WDF. Before finishing our discussion on drivers, we’ll take a quick look at the architecture of UMDF and what it offers. Once again, for a much more complete overview on the subject, please refer to http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/hardware/gg463370.aspx.

UMDF is designed specifically to support what are called protocol device classes, which refers to devices that all use the same standardized, generic protocol and offer specialized functionality on top of it. These protocols currently include IEEE 1394 (FireWire), USB, Bluetooth, and TCP/IP. Any device running on top of these buses (or connected to a network) is a potential candidate for UMDF—examples include portable music players, PDAs, cell phones, cameras and webcams, and so on. Two other large users of UMDF are SideShow-compatible devices (auxiliary displays) and the Windows Portable Device (WPD) Framework, which supports USB removable storage (USB bulk transfer devices). Finally, as with KMDF, it’s possible to implement software-only drivers, such as for a virtual device, in UMDF.

To make porting code easier from kernel mode to user mode, and to keep a consistent architecture, UMDF uses the same conceptual driver programming model as KMDF, but it uses different components, interfaces, and data structures. For example, KMDF includes objects unique to kernel mode, while UMDF includes some objects unique to user mode. Objects and functionality that can’t be accessed through UMDF include direct handling of interrupts, DMA, nonpaged pool, and strict timing requirements. Furthermore, a UMDF driver can’t be on any kernel driver stack or be a client of another driver or the kernel itself.

Unlike KMDF drivers, which run as driver objects representing a .sys image file, UMDF drivers run in a driver host process, similar to a service-hosting process. The host process contains the driver itself (which is implemented as an in-process COM component), the user-mode driver framework (implemented as a DLL containing COM-like components for each UMDF object), and a run-time environment (responsible for I/O dispatching, driver loading, device-stack
management, communication with the kernel, and a thread pool).

Just like in the kernel, each UMDF driver runs as part of a stack, which can contain multiple drivers that are responsible for managing a device. Naturally, since user-mode code can’t access the kernel address space, UMDF also includes some components that allow this access to occur through a specialized interface to the kernel. This is implemented by a kernel-mode side of UMDF that uses ALPC (see Chapter 3 in Part 1 for more information on advanced local procedure call) to talk to the run-time environment in the user-mode driver host processes. Figure 8-33 displays the architecture of the UMDF driver model.

Figure 8-33 shows two different device stacks that manage two different hardware devices, each with a UMDF driver running inside its own driver host process. From the diagram, you can see that the following components take part in the architecture:

- **Applications** Applications are the clients of the drivers. These are standard Windows applications that use the same APIs to perform I/Os as they would with a KMDF-managed or a WDM-managed device. Applications don’t know that they’re talking to a UMDF-based device, and the calls are still sent to the kernel’s I/O manager.

- **Windows kernel (I/O manager)** Based on the application I/O APIs, the I/O
manager builds the IRPs for the operations, just like for any other standard device.

- **Reflector** The reflector is what makes UMDF “tick.” It is a standard WDM filter driver that sits at the top of the device stack of each device that is being managed by a UMDF driver. The reflector is responsible for managing the communication between the kernel and the user-mode driver host process. IRPs related to power management, Plug and Play, and standard I/O are redirected to the host process through ALPC. This lets the UMDF driver respond to the I/Os and perform work, as well as be involved in the Plug and Play model, by providing enumeration, installation, and management of its devices. The reflector is also responsible for keeping an eye on the driver host processes by making sure that they remain responsive to requests within an adequate time to prevent drivers and applications from hanging.

- **Driver manager** The driver manager is responsible for starting and quitting the driver host processes, based on which UMDF-managed devices are present, and also for managing information on them. It is also responsible for responding to messages coming from the reflector and applying them to the appropriate host process (such as reacting to device installation). The driver manager runs as a standard Windows service and is configured for automatic startup as soon as the first UMDF driver for a device is installed. Only one instance of the driver manager runs for all driver host processes, and it must always be running to allow UMDF drivers to work.

- **Host process** The host process provides the address space and run-time environment for the actual driver. Although it runs in the local service account, it is not actually a Windows service and is not managed by the SCM—only by the driver manager. The host process is also responsible for providing the user-mode device stack for the actual hardware, which is visible to all applications on the system. In the current UMDF release, each device instance has its own device stack, which runs in a separate host process. In the future, multiple instances may share the same host process. Host processes are child processes of the driver manager.

- **Kernel-mode drivers** If specific kernel support for a device that is managed by a UMDF driver is needed, it is also possible to write a companion kernel-
mode driver that fills that role. In this way, it is possible for a device to be managed both by a UMDF and a KMDF (or WDM) driver.

You can easily see UMDF in action on your system by inserting a USB flash drive with some content on it. Run Process Explorer, and you should see a WUDFHost.exe process that corresponds to a driver host process. Switch to DLL view and scroll down until you see DLLs similar to the ones shown in Figure 8-34.

![Figure 8-34. DLL in UMDF host process](image)

You can identify three main components, which match the architectural overview described earlier:

- **WUDFx.dll**, the framework itself
- **WUDFPlatform.dll**, the run-time environment
- **WpdRapi2.dll**, the COM component representing the WPD driver, exposing contents of USB storage devices to Windows shell and media applications
The Plug and Play (PnP) Manager

The PnP manager is the primary component involved in supporting the ability of Windows to recognize and adapt to changing hardware configurations. A user doesn’t need to understand the intricacies of hardware or manual configuration to install and remove devices. For example, it’s the PnP manager that enables a running Windows laptop that is placed on a docking station to automatically detect additional devices located in the docking station and make them available to the user.

Plug and Play support requires cooperation at the hardware, device driver, and operating system levels. Industry standards for the enumeration and identification of devices attached to buses are the foundation of Windows Plug and Play support. For example, the USB standard defines the way that devices on a USB bus identify themselves. With this foundation in place, Windows Plug and Play support provides the following capabilities:

- The PnP manager automatically recognizes installed devices, a process that includes enumerating devices attached to the system during a boot and detecting the addition and removal of devices as the system executes.

- Hardware resource allocation is a role the PnP manager fills by gathering the hardware resource requirements (interrupts, I/O memory, I/O registers, or bus-specific resources) of the devices attached to a system and, in a process called resource arbitration, optimally assigning resources so that each device meets the requirements necessary for its operation. Because hardware devices can be added to the system after boot-time resource assignment, the PnP manager must also be able to reassign resources to accommodate the needs of dynamically added devices.

- Loading appropriate drivers is another responsibility of the PnP manager. The PnP manager determines, based on the identification of a device, whether a driver capable of managing the device is installed on the system, and if one is, it instructs the I/O manager to load it. If a suitable driver isn’t installed, the kernel-mode PnP manager communicates with the user-mode PnP manager to install the device, possibly requesting the user’s assistance in locating a suitable set of drivers.
The PnP manager also implements application and driver mechanisms for the detection of hardware configuration changes. Applications or drivers sometimes require a specific hardware device to function, so Windows includes a means for them to request notification of the presence, addition, or removal of devices.

It also provides a place for storage device state, and it participates in system setup, upgrade, migration, and offline image management.

In addition, it supports network connected devices, such as network projectors and printers, by allowing specialized bus drivers to detect the network as a bus and create device nodes for the devices running on it.

**Level of Plug and Play Support**

Windows aims to provide full support for Plug and Play, but the level of support possible depends on the attached devices and installed drivers. If a single device or driver doesn't support Plug and Play, the extent of Plug and Play support for the system can be compromised. In addition, a driver that doesn't support Plug and Play might prevent other devices from being usable by the system. Table 8-7 shows the outcome of various combinations of devices and drivers that can and can't support Plug and Play.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Driver</th>
<th>Type of Device</th>
<th>Plug and Play</th>
<th>Non–Plug and Play</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non–Plug and Play</td>
<td>Non–Plug and Play</td>
<td>Possible partial Plug and Play</td>
<td>No Plug and Play</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plug and Play</td>
<td>Full Plug and Play</td>
<td>No Plug and Play</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A device that isn’t Plug and Play–compatible is one that doesn’t support automatic detection, such as a legacy ISA sound card. Because the operating system doesn’t know where the hardware physically lies, certain operations—such as laptop undocking, sleep, and hibernation—are disallowed. However, if a Plug and Play driver is manually installed for the device, the driver can at least implement PnP manager–directed resource assignment for the device.

Drivers that aren’t Plug and Play–compatible include legacy drivers, such as those
that ran on Windows NT 4. Although these drivers might continue to function on later versions of Windows, the PnP manager can’t reconfigure the resources assigned to such devices in the event that resource reallocation is necessary to accommodate the needs of a dynamically added device. For example, a device might be able to use I/O memory ranges A and B, and during the boot the PnP manager assigns it range A. If a device that can use only A is attached to the system later, the PnP manager can’t direct the first device’s driver to reconfigure itself to use range B. This prevents the second device from obtaining required resources, which results in the device being unavailable for use by the system.

Legacy drivers also impair a machine’s ability to sleep or hibernate. (See the section The Power Manager later in this chapter for more details.)

**Driver Support for Plug and Play**

To support Plug and Play, a driver must implement a Plug and Play dispatch routine, a power management dispatch routine (described in the section The Power Manager later in this chapter), and an add-device routine. Bus drivers must support different types of Plug and Play requests than function or filter drivers do, however. For example, when the PnP manager is guiding device enumeration during the system boot (described in detail later in this chapter), it asks bus drivers for a description of the devices that they find on their respective buses. The description includes data that uniquely identifies each device as well as the resource requirements of the devices. The PnP manager takes this information and loads any function or filter drivers that have been installed for the detected devices. It then calls the add-device routine of each driver for every installed device the drivers are responsible for.

Function and filter drivers prepare to begin managing their devices in their add-device routines, but they don’t actually communicate with the device hardware. Instead, they wait for the PnP manager to send a start-device command for the device to their Plug and Play dispatch routine. Prior to sending the start-device command the PnP manager performs resource arbitration to decide what resources to assign the device. The start-device command includes the resource assignment that the PnP manager determines during resource arbitration. When a driver receives a start-device command, it can configure its device to use the specified resources. If an application tries to open a device that hasn’t finished starting, it
receives an error indicating that the device does not exist.

After a device has started, the PnP manager can send the driver additional Plug and Play commands, including ones related to a device’s removal from the system or to resource reassignment. For example, when the user invokes the remove/eject device utility, shown in Figure 8-35 (accessible by right-clicking on the USB connector icon in the taskbar and selecting Eject USB Mass Storage Device), to tell Windows to eject a USB flash drive, the PnP manager sends a query-remove notification to any applications that have registered for Plug and Play notifications for the device. Applications typically register for notification on their handles, which they close during a query-remove notification. If no applications veto the query-remove request, the PnP manager sends a query-remove command to the driver that owns the device being ejected. At that point, the driver has a chance to deny the removal or to ensure that any pending I/O operations involving the device have completed and to begin rejecting further I/O requests aimed at the device. If the driver agrees to the remove request and no open handles to the device remain, the PnP manager next sends a remove command to the driver to request that the driver discontinue accessing the device and release any resources the driver has allocated on behalf of the device.

![Open Devices and Printers](image)

Figure 8-35. Remove/eject utility

When the PnP manager needs to reassign a device’s resources, it first asks the driver whether it can temporarily suspend further activity on the device by sending the driver a query-stop command. The driver either agrees to the request, if doing so wouldn't cause data loss or corruption, or denies the request. As with a query-remove command, if the driver agrees to the request, the driver completes pending I/O operations and won't initiate further I/O requests for the device that can’t be aborted and subsequently restarted. The driver typically queues new I/O requests so that the resource reshuffling is transparent to applications currently accessing the device. The PnP manager then sends the driver a stop command. At that point, the PnP manager can direct the driver to assign different resources to the device.
and once again send the driver a start-device command for the device.

The various Plug and Play commands essentially guide a device through an assortment of operational states, forming a well-defined state-transition table, which is shown in simplified form in Figure 8-36. (Several possible transitions and Plug and Play commands have been omitted for clarity. Also, the state diagram depicted is that implemented by function drivers. Bus drivers implement a more complex state diagram.) A state shown in the figure that we haven’t discussed is the one that results from the PnP manager’s surprise-remove command. This command results when either a user removes a device without warning, as when the user ejects a PCMCIA card without using the remove/eject utility, or the device fails. The surprise-remove command tells the driver to immediately cease all interaction with the device because the device is no longer attached to the system and to cancel any pending I/O requests.

![Figure 8-36. Device Plug and Play state transitions](image)

**Driver Loading, Initialization, and Installation**

Driver loading and initialization on Windows consists of two types of loading: explicit loading and enumeration-based loading. Explicit loading is guided by the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services branch of the registry, as described in the section “Service Applications” in Chapter 4 in Part 1. Enumeration-based loading results when the PnP manager dynamically loads drivers for the devices.
that a bus driver reports during bus enumeration.

**The Start Value**

In Chapter 4 in Part 1, we explained that every driver and Windows service has a registry key under the Services branch of the current control set. The key includes values that specify the type of the image (for example, Windows service, driver, and file system), the path to the driver or service’s image file, and values that control the driver or service’s load ordering. There are two main differences between explicit device driver loading and Windows service loading:

- Only device drivers can specify Start values of boot-start (0) or system-start (1).
- Device drivers can use the Group and Tag values to control the order of loading within a phase of the boot, but unlike services, they can't specify DependOnGroup or DependOnService values.

Chapter 13, describes the phases of the boot process and explains that a driver Start value of 0 means that the operating system loader loads the driver. A Start value of 1 means that the I/O manager loads the driver after the executive subsystems have finished initializing. The I/O manager calls driver initialization routines in the order that the drivers load within a boot phase. Like Windows services, drivers use the Group value in their registry key to specify which group they belong to; the registry value

```
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\ServiceGroupOrder\List
```
determines the order that groups are loaded within a boot phase.

A driver can further refine its load order by including a Tag value to control its order within a group. The I/O manager sorts the drivers within each group according to the Tag values defined in the drivers’ registry keys. Drivers without a tag go to the end of the list in their group. You might assume that the I/O manager initializes drivers with lower-number tags before it initializes drivers with higher-number tags, but such isn’t necessarily the case. The registry key

```
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\GroupOrderList
```
defines tag precedence within a group; with this key, Microsoft and device driver developers can take liberties with redefining the integer number system.

Here are the guidelines by which drivers set their Start value:

- Non–Plug and Play drivers set their Start value to reflect the boot phase they
want to load in.

- Drivers, including both Plug and Play and non–Plug and Play drivers, that must be loaded by the boot loader during the system boot specify a Start value of boot-start (0). Examples include system bus drivers and the boot file system driver.

- A driver that isn’t required for booting the system and that detects a device that a system bus driver can’t enumerate specifies a Start value of system-start (1). An example is the serial port driver, which informs the PnP manager of the presence of standard PC serial ports that were detected by Setup and recorded in the registry.

- A non–Plug and Play driver or file system driver that doesn’t have to be present when the system boots specifies a Start value of auto-start (2). An example is the Multiple Universal Naming Convention (UNC) Provider (MUP) driver, which provides support for UNC-based path names to remote resources (for example, \REMOVETEOMPUTERNAME\SHARE).

- Plug and Play drivers that aren’t required to boot the system specify a Start value of demand-start (3). Examples include network adapter drivers.

The only purpose that the Start values for Plug and Play drivers and drivers for enumerable devices have is to ensure that the operating system loader loads the driver—if the driver is required for the system to boot successfully. Beyond that, the PnP manager’s device enumeration process, described next, determines the load order for Plug and Play drivers.

**Device Enumeration**

The PnP manager begins device enumeration with a virtual bus driver called Root, which represents the entire computer system and acts as the bus driver for non–Plug and Play drivers and for the HAL. The HAL acts as a bus driver that enumerates devices directly attached to the motherboard as well as system components such as batteries. Instead of actually enumerating, the HAL relies on the hardware description the Setup process recorded in the registry to detect the primary bus (a PCI bus in most cases) and devices such as batteries and fans.

The primary bus driver enumerates the devices on its bus, possibly finding other buses, for which the PnP manager initializes drivers. Those drivers in turn can
detect other devices, including other subsidiary buses. This recursive process of enumeration, driver loading (if the driver isn't already loaded), and further enumeration proceeds until all the devices on the system have been detected and configured.

As the bus drivers report detected devices to the PnP manager, the PnP manager creates an internal tree called the device tree that represents the relationships between devices. Nodes in the tree are called devnodes, and a devnode contains information about the device objects that represent the device as well as other Plug and Play–related information stored in the devnode by the PnP manager. Figure 8-37 shows an example of a simplified device tree. This system is ACPI-compliant, so an ACPI-compliant HAL serves as the primary bus enumerator. A PCI bus serves as the system's primary bus, which USB, ISA, and SCSI buses are connected to.

![Device Tree Diagram](image)

Figure 8-37. Example device tree

The Device Manager utility, which is accessible from the Computer Management snap-in in the Programs/Administrative Tools folder of the Start menu (and also from the Device Manager link of the System utility in Control Panel), shows a
simple list of devices present on a system in its default configuration. You can also select the Devices By Connection option from the Device Manager’s View menu to see the devices as they relate to the device tree. Figure 8-38 shows an example of the Device Manager’s Devices By Connection view.

![Device Manager showing the device tree](image)

Figure 8-38. Device Manager showing the device tree

Taking device enumeration into account, the load and initialization order of drivers is as follows:

1. The I/O manager invokes the driver entry routine of each boot-start driver. If a boot driver has child devices, the I/O manager enumerates those devices, reporting their presence to the PnP manager. The child devices are configured and started if their drivers are boot-start drivers. If a device has a
driver that isn’t a boot-start driver, the PnP manager creates a devnode for the device but doesn’t start it or load its driver.

2. After the boot-start drivers are initialized, the PnP manager walks the device tree, loading the drivers for devnodes that weren’t loaded in step 1 and starting their devices. As each device starts, the PnP manager enumerates related child devices, if a device has any, starting those devices’ drivers and performing enumeration of their children as required. The PnP manager loads the drivers for detected devices in this step regardless of the driver’s Start value. (The one exception is if the Start value is set to disabled.) At the end of this step, all Plug and Play devices have their drivers loaded and are started, except devices that aren’t enumerable and the children of those devices.

3. The PnP manager loads any drivers with a Start value of system-start that aren’t yet loaded. Those drivers detect and report their nonenumerable devices. The PnP manager loads drivers for those devices until all enumerated devices are configured and started.

4. The service control manager loads drivers marked as auto-start.

The device tree serves to guide both the PnP manager and the power manager as they issue Plug and Play and power IRPs to devices. In general, IRPs flow from the top of a devnode to the bottom, and in some cases a driver in one devnode creates new IRPs to send to other devnodes, always moving toward the root. The flow of Plug and Play and power IRPs is further described later in this chapter.

**EXPERIMENT: DUMPING THE DEVICE TREE**

A more detailed way to view the device tree than using Device Manager is to use the `!devnode` kernel debugger command. Specifying 0 1 as command options dumps the internal device tree devnode structures, indenting entries to show their hierarchical relationships, as shown here:

```
lkd> !devnode 0 1
Dumping IopRootDeviceNode (= 0x85161a98)
DevNode 0x85161a98 for PDO 0x84d10390
  InstancePath is "HTREE\ROOT\0"
  State = DeviceNodeStarted (0x308)
  Previous State = DeviceNodeEnumerateCompletion (0x30d)
DevNode 0x8515bea8 for PDO 0x8515b030
  InstancePath is "Root\ACPI_HAL\0000"
  State = DeviceNodeStarted (0x308)
  Previous State = DeviceNodeEnumerateCompletion (0x30d)
```
DevNode 0x84d1c5b0 for PDO 0x84d1c738
InstancePath is "ACPI_HAL\PNP0C08\0"
ServiceName is "ACPI"
State = DeviceNodeStarted (0x308)
Previous State = DeviceNodeEnumerateCompletion (0x30d)
DevNode 0x85ebf1b0 for PDO 0x85ec0210
InstancePath is "ACPI\GenuineIntel\-_x86_Family_6_Model_15\_0"
ServiceName is "intelppm"
State = DeviceNodeStarted (0x308)
Previous State = DeviceNodeEnumerateCompletion (0x30d)
DevNode 0x85ed6970 for PDO 0x8515e618
InstancePath is "ACPI\GenuineIntel\-_x86_Family_6_Model_15\_1"
ServiceName is "intelppm"
State = DeviceNodeStarted (0x308)
Previous State = DeviceNodeEnumerateCompletion (0x30d)
DevNode 0x85ed75c8 for PDO 0x85ed79e8
InstancePath is "ACPI\ThermalZone\THM_"
State = DeviceNodeStarted (0x308)
Previous State = DeviceNodeEnumerateCompletion (0x30d)
DevNode 0x85ed6cd8 for PDO 0x85ed6858
InstancePath is "ACPI\pnp0c14\0"
ServiceName is "WmiAcpi"
State = DeviceNodeStarted (0x308)
Previous State = DeviceNodeEnumerateCompletion (0x30d)
DevNode 0x85ed7008 for PDO 0x85ed6730
InstancePath is "ACPI\ACPI0003\2\daba3ff\2"
ServiceName is "CmBatt"
State = DeviceNodeStarted (0x308)
Previous State = DeviceNodeEnumerateCompletion (0x30d)
DevNode 0x85ed7e60 for PDO 0x84d2e030
InstancePath is "ACPI\PNP0C0A\1"
ServiceName is "CmBatt"

Information shown for each devnode includes the InstancePath, which is the name of the device’s enumeration registry key stored under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum, and the ServiceName, which corresponds to the device’s driver registry key under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. To see the resources, such as interrupts, ports, and memory, assigned to each devnode, specify 0 3 as the command options for the !devnode command.

A record of all the devices detected since the system was installed is recorded under the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum registry key. Subkeys are in the form <Enumerator>\<Device ID>\<Instance ID>, where the enumerator is a bus driver, the device ID is a unique identifier for a type of device, and the instance ID uniquely identifies different instances of the same hardware.

**Device Stacks**

As the devnodes are created by the PnP manager, driver objects and device objects are created to manage and logically represent the linkage between the devnodes. This linkage is called a device stack, and it can be thought of as an ordered list of device object/driver pairs. Each device stack has a bottom and top, and Figure 8-39
shows that a device stack is made up of at least two, and sometimes more, device objects:

- A physical device object (PDO) that the PnP manager instructs a bus driver to create when the bus driver reports the presence of a device on its bus during enumeration. The PDO represents the physical interface to the device and is always on the bottom of the device stack.

- One or more optional filter device objects (FiDOs) that layer between the PDO and the functional device object (FDO; described later in this list) and that are created by bus filter drivers.

- One or more optional FiDOs that layer between the PDO and the FDO (and that layer above any FiDOs created by bus filter drivers) that are created by lower-level filter drivers.

- One (and only one) functional device object (FDO) that is created by the driver, which is called a function driver, that the PnP manager loads to manage a detected device. An FDO represents the logical interface to a device. A function driver can also act as a bus driver if devices are attached to the device represented by the FDO. The function driver often creates an interface (described earlier) to the FDO's corresponding PDO so that applications and other drivers can open the device and interact with it. Sometimes function drivers are divided into a separate class/port driver and miniport driver that work together to manage I/O for the FDO.

- One or more optional FiDOs that layer above the FDO and that are created by upper-level filter drivers.
Device stacks are built from the bottom up and rely on the I/O manager’s layering functionality, so IRPs flow from the top of a device stack toward the bottom. However, any level in the device stack can choose to complete an IRP. For example, the function driver can handle a read request without passing the IRP to the bus driver. Only when the function driver requires the help of a bus driver to perform bus-specific processing does the IRP flow all the way to the bottom and then into the device stack containing the bus driver.

**Device Stack Driver Loading**

So far, we’ve avoided answering two important questions: “How does the PnP manager determine what function driver to load for a particular device?” and “How do filter drivers register their presence so that they are loaded at appropriate times in the creation of a device stack?”

The answer to both these questions lies in the registry. When a bus driver performs device enumeration, it reports device identifiers for the devices it detects back to the PnP manager. The identifiers are bus-specific; for a USB bus, an identifier consists of a vendor ID (VID) for the hardware vendor that made the device and a product ID (PID) that the vendor assigned to the device. (See the WDK for more information on device ID formats.) Together these IDs form what Plug and Play
calls a device ID. The PnP manager also queries the bus driver for an instance ID to help it distinguish different instances of the same hardware. The instance ID can describe either a bus-relative location (for example, the USB port) or a globally unique descriptor (for example, a serial number).

The device ID and instance ID are combined to form a device instance ID (DIID), which the PnP manager uses to locate the device’s key in the enumeration branch of the registry (HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum). Figure 8-40 presents an example of a keyboard’s enumeration subkey. The device’s key contains descriptive data and includes values named Service and ClassGUID (which are obtained from a driver’s INF file) that help the PnP manager locate the device’s drivers.

![Registry Editor](image)

Figure 8-40. Keyboard enumeration key

To deal with multifunction devices (such as all-in-one printers or cell phones with integrated camera and music player functionalities), Windows also supports a container ID property that can be associated with a devnode. The container ID is a globally unique identifier (GUID) that is unique to a single instance of a physical device and shared between all the function devnodes that belong to it, as shown in Figure 8-41.
Figure 8-41. All-in-one printer with a unique ID as seen by the PnP manager.

The container ID is a property that, similar to the instance ID, is reported back by the bus driver of the corresponding hardware. Then, when the device is being enumerated, all devnodes associated with the same PDO share the container ID. Because Windows already supports many buses out of the box—such as PnP-X, Bluetooth, and USB—most device drivers can simply return the bus-specific ID, from which Windows will generate the corresponding container ID. For other kinds of devices or buses, the driver can generate its own unique ID through software.

Finally, when device drivers do not supply a container ID, Windows can make educated guesses by querying the topology for the bus, when that’s available, through mechanisms such as ACPI. By understanding whether a certain device is a child of another, and whether it is removable, hot-pluggable, or user-reachable (as opposed to an internal motherboard component), Windows is able to assign container IDs to device nodes that reflect multifunction devices correctly.

The final end-user benefit of grouping devices by container IDs is visible in the Devices And Printers UI present in modern versions of Windows. This feature is able to display the scanner, printer, and faxing components of an all-in-one printer as a single graphical element instead of as three distinct devices. For example, in Figure 8-42, the HP PSC 1500 series is identified as a single device.
EXPERIMENT: VIEWING DETAILED DEVNODE INFORMATION IN DEVICE MANAGER

The Device Manager applet that you can access from the Hardware link of the System Control Panel application shows detailed information about a device node on its Details tab. The tab allows you to view an assortment of fields, including the devnode’s device instance ID, hardware ID, service name, filters, and power capabilities.

The following screen shows the selection combo box of the Details tab expanded to reveal the types of information you can access:
Using the ClassGUID value, the PnP manager locates the device’s class key under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Class. The keyboard class key is shown in Figure 8-43. The enumeration key and class key supply the PnP manager with the information it needs to load the drivers necessary for the device’s devnode. Drivers are loaded in the following order:

1. Any lower-level filter drivers specified in the LowerFilters value of the device’s enumeration key.
2. Any lower-level filter drivers specified in the LowerFilters value of the device’s class key.
3. The function driver specified by the Service value in the device’s enumeration key. This value is interpreted as the driver’s key under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services.
4. Any upper-level filter drivers specified in the UpperFilters value of the device’s enumeration key.
5. Any upper-level filter drivers specified in the UpperFilters value of the device’s class key.
In all cases, drivers are referenced by the name of their key under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services.

**NOTE**

The WDK refers to a device’s enumeration key as its hardware key and to the class key as the software key.

The keyboard device shown in Figure 8-40 and Figure 8-43 has no lower-level filter drivers. The function driver is the i8042prt driver, and there are two upper-level filter drivers specified in the keyboard's class key: kbdclass and vmkbd2.

**Driver Installation**

If the PnP manager encounters a device for which no driver is installed, it relies on the user-mode PnP manager to guide the installation process. If the device is detected during the system boot, a devnode is defined for the device, but the loading process is postponed until the user-mode PnP manager starts. (The user-mode PnP manager is implemented in %SystemRoot%\System32\Umpnpmgr.dll and runs in a service hosting process (Svchost.exe).)
The components involved in a driver’s installation are shown in Figure 8-44. Dark-shaded objects in the figure correspond to components generally supplied by the system, whereas lighter-shaded objects are those included in a driver’s installation files. First, a bus driver informs the PnP manager of a device it enumerates using a DIID (1). The PnP manager checks the registry for the presence of a corresponding function driver, and when it doesn’t find one, it informs the user-mode PnP manager (2) of the new device by its DIID. The user-mode PnP manager first tries to perform an automatic install without user intervention. If the installation process involves the posting of dialog boxes that require user interaction and the currently logged-on user has administrator privileges, (3) the user-mode PnP manager launches the Rundll32.exe application (the same application that hosts Control Panel utilities) to execute the Hardware Installation Wizard (%SystemRoot%\System32\Newdev.dll). If the currently logged-on user doesn’t have administrator privileges (or if no user is logged on) and the installation of the device requires user interaction, the user-mode PnP manager defers the installation until a privileged user logs on. The Hardware Installation Wizard uses Setupapi.dll and CfgMgr32.dll (configuration manager) API functions to locate INF files that correspond to drivers that are compatible with the detected device. This process might involve having the user insert installation media containing a vendor’s INF files, or the wizard might locate a suitable INF file in the driver store (%SystemRoot%\System32\DriverStore) that contains drivers that ship with Windows or others that are downloaded through Windows Update. Installation is performed in two steps. In the first, the third-party driver developer imports the driver package into the driver store, and in the second step, the system performs the actual installation, which is always done through the %SystemRoot%\System32\Drvinst.exe process.
To find drivers for the new device, the installation process gets a list of hardware IDs and compatible IDs from the bus driver. These IDs describe all the various ways the hardware might be identified in a driver installation file (.inf). The lists are ordered so that the most specific description of the hardware is listed first. If matches are found in multiple INFs, more precise matches are preferred over less precise matches, digitally signed INFs are preferred over unsigned ones, and newer signed INFs are preferred over older signed ones. If a match is found based on a compatible ID, the Hardware Installation Wizard can choose to prompt for media in case a more up-to-date driver came with the hardware.

The INF file locates the function driver’s files and contains commands that fill in the driver’s enumeration and class keys, and the INF file might direct the Hardware Installation Wizard to (4) launch class or device coinstaller DLLs that perform class-specific or device-specific installation steps, such as displaying configuration dialog boxes that let the user specify settings for a device.

**EXPERIMENT: LOOKING AT A DRIVER’S INF FILE**

When a driver or other software that has an INF file is installed, the system copies its INF file to the %SystemRoot%\Inf directory. One file that will always be there is Keyboard.inf because it’s the INF file for the keyboard class driver. View its contents by opening it in Notepad and you should see something like
If you search the file for “.sys”, you’ll come across the entry that directs the user-mode PnP manager to install the i8042prt.sys and kbdclass.sys drivers:

```
...[STANDARD_CopyFiles]
i8042prt.sys,,,0x100
kbdclass.sys,,,0x100
...
```

Before actually installing a driver, the user-mode PnP manager checks the system’s driver-signing policy. If the settings specify that the system should block or warn of the installation of unsigned drivers, the user-mode PnP manager checks the driver’s INF file for an entry that locates a catalog (a file that ends with the .cat extension) containing the driver’s digital signature.

Microsoft’s WHQL tests the drivers included with Windows and those submitted by hardware vendors. When a driver passes the WHQL tests, it is “signed” by Microsoft. This means that WHQL obtains a hash, or unique value representing the driver’s files, including its image file, and then cryptographically signs it with Microsoft’s private driver-signing key. The signed hash is stored in a catalog file and included on the Windows installation media or returned to the vendor that submitted the driver for inclusion with its driver.

**EXPERIMENT: VIEWING CATALOG FILES**

When you install a component such as a driver that includes a catalog file, Windows copies the catalog file to a directory under %SystemRoot%/System32/Catroot. Navigate to that directory in Explorer and you find the subdirectory that contains .cat files. Nt5.cat and Nt5ph.cat store the signatures and page hashes for Windows system files, for example.

If you open one of the catalog files, a dialog box appears with two pages. The page labeled General shows information about the signature on the catalog file, and the Security Catalog page has the hashes of the
components that are signed with the catalog file. This screen shot of a catalog file for NVIDIA video drivers shows the hash for the video adapter’s kernel miniport driver. Other hashes in the catalog are associated with the various support DLLs that ship with the driver.

As it is installing a driver, the user-mode PnP manager extracts the driver’s signature from its catalog file, decrypts the signature using the public half of Microsoft’s driver-signing private/public key pair, and compares the resulting hash with a hash of the driver file it’s about to install. If the hashes match, the driver is verified as having passed WHQL testing. If a driver fails the signature verification, the user-mode PnP manager acts according to the settings of the system driver-signing policy, either failing the installation attempt, warning the user that the driver is unsigned, or silently installing the driver.

**NOTE**

Drivers installed using setup programs that manually configure the registry and copy driver files to a system and driver files that are dynamically loaded by applications aren’t checked for signatures by the PnP manager’s signing policy. Instead, they are checked by the Kernel Mode Code Signing policy described in Chapter 3 in Part 1. Only drivers installed using INF files are validated against the PnP manager’s driver-signing policy.

After a driver is installed, the kernel-mode PnP manager (step 5 in Figure 8-44) starts the driver and calls its add-device routine to inform the driver of the presence
of the device it was loaded for. The construction of the device stack then continues as described earlier.

**NOTE**

The user-mode PnP manager also checks to see whether the driver it’s about to install is on the protected driver list maintained by Windows Update and, if so, blocks the installation with a warning to the user. Drivers that are known to have incompatibilities or bugs are added to the list and blocked from installation.
The Power Manager

Just as Windows Plug and Play features require support from a system’s hardware, its power-management capabilities require hardware that complies with the Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI) specification (available at http://www.acpi.info).

The ACPI standard defines various power levels for a system and for devices. The six system power states are described in Table 8-8. They are referred to as S0 (fully on or working) through S5 (fully off). Each state has the following characteristics:

- **Power consumption** The amount of power the computer consumes
- **Software resumption** The software state from which the computer resumes when moving to a “more on” state
- **Hardware latency** The length of time it takes to return the computer to the fully on state

States S1 through S4 are sleeping states, in which the computer appears to be off because of reduced power consumption. However, the computer retains enough information, either in memory or on disk, to move to S0. For states S1 through S3, enough power is required to preserve the contents of the computer’s memory so that when the transition is made to S0 (when the user or a device wakes up the computer), the power manager continues executing where it left off before the suspend.

Table 8-8. System PowerState Definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Power Consumption</th>
<th>Software Resumption</th>
<th>Hardware Latency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S0 (fully on)</td>
<td>Maximum</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S1 (sleeping)</td>
<td>Less than S0, more than S2</td>
<td>System resumes where it left off (returns to S0)</td>
<td>Less than 2 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2 (sleeping)</td>
<td>Less than S1, more than S3</td>
<td>System resumes where it left off (returns to S0)</td>
<td>2 or more seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Behavior</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3 (sleeping)</td>
<td>Less than S2; processor is off</td>
<td>System resumes where it left off (returns to S0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4 (hibernating)</td>
<td>Trickle current to power button and wake circuitry</td>
<td>System restarts from saved hibernation file and resumes where it left off prior to hibernation (returns to S0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S5 (fully off)</td>
<td>Trickle current to power button</td>
<td>System boot</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When the system moves to S4, the power manager saves the compressed contents of memory to a hibernation file named Hiberfil.sys, which is large enough to hold the uncompressed contents of memory, in the root directory of the system volume. (Compression is used to minimize disk I/O and to improve hibernation and resume-from-hibernation performance.) After it finishes saving memory, the power manager shuts off the computer. When a user subsequently turns on the computer, a normal boot process occurs, except that Bootmgr checks for and detects a valid memory image stored in the hibernation file. If the hibernation file contains saved system state, Bootmgr launches Winresume, which reads the contents of the file into memory, and then resumes execution at the point in memory that is recorded in the hibernation file.

On systems with hybrid sleep enabled (by default, only desktop computers), a user request to put the computer to sleep will actually be a combination of both the S3 state and the S4 state: while the computer is put to sleep, an emergency hibernation file will also be written to disk. Unlike typical hibernation files, which contain almost all active memory, the emergency hibernation file includes only data that could not be paged in at a later time, making the suspend operation faster than a typical hibernation (because less data is written to disk). Drivers will then be notified that an S4 transition is occurring, allowing them to configure themselves and save state just as if an actual hibernation request had been initiated. After this point, the system is put in the normal sleep state just like during a standard sleep transition. However, if the power goes out, the system is now essentially in an S4 state—the user can power on the machine, and Windows will resume from the emergency hibernation file.

The computer never directly transitions between states S1 and S4; instead, it must move to state S0 first. As illustrated in Figure 8-45, when the system is moving from any of states S1 through S5 to state S0, it's said to be waking, and when it’s
transitioning from state S0 to any of states S1 through S5, it’s said to be sleeping.

![System power-state transitions](image)

Although the system can be in one of six power states, ACPI defines devices as being in one of four power states, D0 through D3. State D0 is fully on, and state D3 is fully off. The ACPI standard leaves it to individual drivers and devices to define the meanings of states D1 and D2, except that state D1 must consume an amount of power less than or equal to that consumed in state D0, and when the device is in state D2, it must consume power less than or equal to that consumed in D1. Microsoft, in conjunction with the major hardware OEMs, has defined a series of power management reference specifications that specify the device power states that are required for all devices in a particular class (for the major device classes: display, network, SCSI, and so on). For some devices, there’s no intermediate power state between fully on and fully off, which results in these states being undefined.

**Power Manager Operation**

Power management policy in Windows is split between the power manager and the individual device drivers. The power manager is the owner of the system power policy. This ownership means that the power manager decides which system power state is appropriate at any given point, and when a sleep, hibernation, or shutdown is required, the power manager instructs the power-capable devices in the system to perform appropriate system power-state transitions. The power manager decides when a system power-state transition is necessary by considering a number of factors:

- System activity level
- System battery level
- Shutdown, hibernate, or sleep requests from applications
- User actions, such as pressing the power button
- Control Panel power settings

When the PnP manager performs device enumeration, part of the information it receives about a device is its power-management capabilities. A driver reports whether or not its devices support device states D1 and D2 and, optionally, the latencies, or times required, to move from states D1 through D3 to D0. To help the power manager determine when to make system power-state transitions, bus drivers also return a table that implements a mapping between each of the system power states (S0 through S5) and the device power states that a device supports.

The table lists the lowest possible device power state for each system state and directly reflects the state of various power planes when the machine sleeps or hibernates. For example, a bus that supports all four device power states might return the mapping table shown in Table 8-9. Most device drivers turn their devices completely off (D3) when leaving S0 to minimize power consumption when the machine isn’t in use. Some devices, however, such as network adapter cards, support the ability to wake up the system from a sleeping state. This ability, along with the lowest device power state in which the capability is present, is also reported during device enumeration.

### Table 8-9. Example System-to-Device Power Mappings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System Power State</th>
<th>Device Power State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S0 (fully on)</td>
<td>D0 (fully on)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S1 (sleeping)</td>
<td>D1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2 (sleeping)</td>
<td>D2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3 (sleeping)</td>
<td>D2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4 (hibernating)</td>
<td>D3 (fully off)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S5 (fully off)</td>
<td>D3 (fully off)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Driver Power Operation**

When the power manager decides to make a transition between system power states, it sends power commands to a driver’s power dispatch routine. More than one driver can be responsible for managing a device, but only one of the drivers is designated as the device power-policy owner. This driver determines, based on the system state, a device’s power state. For example, if the system transitions between state S0 and S1, a driver might decide to move a device’s power state from D0 to D1.

Instead of directly informing the other drivers that share the management of the device of its decision, the device power-policy owner asks the power manager, via the PoRequestPowerIrp function, to tell the other drivers by issuing a device power command to their power dispatch routines. This behavior allows the power manager to control the number of power commands that are active on a system at any given time. For example, some devices in the system might require a significant amount of current to power up. The power manager ensures that such devices aren’t powered up simultaneously.

---

**EXPERIMENT: VIEWING A DRIVER’S POWER MAPPINGS**

You can see a driver’s system power state to driver power state mappings with Device Manager. Open the Properties dialog box for a device, and choose the Power Data entry in the drop-down list on the Details tab to see the mappings.

The dialog box also displays the current power state of the device, the device-specific power capabilities that it provides, and the power states from which it is able to wake the system.
Many power commands have corresponding query commands. For example, when the system is moving to a sleep state, the power manager will first ask the devices on the system whether the transition is acceptable. A device that is busy performing time-critical operations or interacting with device hardware might reject the command, which results in the system maintaining its current system power-state setting.

**EXPERIMENT: VIEWING THE SYSTEM POWER CAPABILITIES AND POLICY**

You can view a computer’s system power capabilities by using the `!pocaps` kernel debugger command. Here’s the output of the command when run on an ACPI-compliant laptop:

```
!pocaps
PopCapabilities @ 0x82114d80
Misc Supported Features: PwrButton SlpButton Lid S3 S4 S5 HiberFile FullWake VideoDim
Processor Features:       Thermal
Disk Features:            SpinDown
Battery Features:         BatteriesPresent
  Battery 0 - Capacity:        0 Granularity:        0
  Battery 1 - Capacity:        0 Granularity:        0
  Battery 2 - Capacity:        0 Granularity:        0
Wake Caps
  Ac OnLine Wake:         Sx
  Soft Lid Wake:          Sx
  RTC Wake:               S4
  Min Device Wake:        Sx
  Default Wake:           Sx
```

The Misc Supported Features line reports that, in addition to S0 (fully on), the system supports system power states S1, S3, S4, and S5 (it doesn’t implement S2) and has a valid hibernation file to which it can save system memory when it hibernates (state S4).

The Power Options page, shown here (available by selecting Power Options in Control Panel), lets you configure various aspects of the system’s power policy. The exact properties you can configure depend on...
the system's power capabilities, which we just examined.

By changing any of the preconfigured plan settings, you can set the idle detection timeouts that control when the system turns off the monitor, spins down hard disks, goes to standby mode (moves to system power state S1), and hibernates (moves the system to power state S4). In addition, selecting the Change Plan Settings option lets you specify the power-related behavior of the system when you press the power or sleep buttons or close a laptop's lid.

The settings you configure by clicking the Change Advanced Power Settings link directly affect values in the system's power policy, which you can display with the `!policy` debugger command. Here's the output of the command on the same system:

```
!policy
SYSTEM_POWER_POLICY (R.1) @ 0x82107994
  PowerButton: Sleep Flags: 00000000 Event: 00000000
  SleepButton: Sleep Flags: 00000000 Event: 00000000
  LidClose: Sleep Flags: 00000000 Event: 00000000
  Idle: Sleep Flags: 00000000 Event: 00000000
  OverThrottled: None Flags: 00000000 Event: 00000000
  IdleTimeout: 384 IdleSensitivity: 90%
  MinSleep: S3 MaxSleep: S3
  LidOpenWake: S0 FastSleep: S0
```
WinLogonFlags: 1  S4Timeout: fd20
VideoTimeout: 300  VideoDim: 0
SpinTimeout: 258  OptForPower: 0
FanTolerance: 0%  ForcedThrottle: 0%
SpinTimeout: 258  OptForPower: 0
MinThrottle: 0%  DynamicThrottle: None

The first lines of the display correspond to the button behaviors specified on the Advanced Settings tab of Power Options, and on this system both the power and the sleep buttons put the computer in a sleep state, just as closing the lid does.

The timeout values shown at the end of the output are expressed in seconds and displayed in hexadecimal notation. The values reported here directly correspond to the settings you can see configured on the Power Options page. (The laptop is on battery.) For example, the video timeout is 300, meaning the monitor turns off after 300 seconds, or 5 minutes, and the hard disk spin-down timeout is 0x258, which corresponds to 600 seconds, or 10 minutes.

**Driver and Application Control of Device Power**

Besides responding to power manager commands related to system power-state transitions, a driver can unilaterally control the device power state of its devices. In some cases, a driver might want to reduce the power consumption of a device it controls when the device is left inactive for a period of time. Examples include monitors that support a dimmed mode and disks that support spin-down. A driver can either detect an idle device itself or use facilities provided by the power manager. If the device uses the power manager, it registers the device with the power manager by calling the `PoRegisterDeviceForIdleDetection` function.

This function informs the power manager of the timeout values to use to detect a device as idle and of the device power state that the power manager should apply when it detects the device as being idle. The driver specifies two timeouts: one to use when the user has configured the computer to conserve energy and the other to use when the user has configured the computer for optimum performance. After calling `PoRegisterDeviceForIdleDetection`, the driver must inform the power manager, by calling the `PoSetDeviceBusy` or `PoSetDeviceBusyEx` functions, whenever the device is active, and then register for idle detection again to disable and re-enable it as needed. The `PoStartDeviceBusy` and `PoEndDeviceBusy` APIs are available in newer versions of Windows as well, which simplify the programming logic required to achieve the behavior that’s desired.

Although a device has control over its own power state, it does not have the ability
to manipulate the system power state or to prevent system power transitions from occurring. For example, if a badly designed driver doesn’t support any low-power states, it can choose to remain on or turn itself completely off without hindering the system’s overall ability to enter a low-power state—this is because the power manager only notifies the driver of a transition and doesn’t ask for consent.

Although drivers and the kernel are chiefly responsible for power management, applications are also allowed to provide their input. User-mode processes can register for a variety of power notifications, such as when the battery is low or critically low, when the laptop has switched from DC (battery) to AC (adapter/charger) power, or when the system is initiating a power transition. Just like drivers, however, applications cannot veto these operations, and they can have up to two seconds to clean up any state necessary before a sleep transition.

**Power Availability Requests**

Even though applications and drivers cannot veto sleep transitions that are already initiated, certain scenarios demand a mechanism for disabling the ability to initiate sleep transitions when a user is interacting with the system in certain ways. For example, if the user is currently watching a movie and the machine would normally go idle (based on a lack of mouse or keyboard input after 15 minutes), the media player application should have the capability to temporarily disable idle transitions as long as the movie is playing. You can probably imagine other power-saving measures that the system would normally undertake, such as turning off or even just dimming the screen, that would also limit your enjoyment of visual media. In legacy versions of Windows, SetThreadExecutionState was a user-mode API capable of controlling system and display idle transitions by informing the power manager that a user was still present on the machine, but this API did not provide any sort of diagnostic capabilities, nor did it allow sufficient granularity for defining the availability request. Also, drivers were not able to issue their own requests, and even user applications had to correctly manage their threading model, because these requests were at the thread level, not at the process or system level.

Windows now supports power request objects, which are implemented by the kernel and are bona-fide object manager–defined objects. You can use the WinObj utility that was introduced in Chapter 3 in Part 1 and see the PowerRequest object
type in the \ObjectTypes directory, or use the !object kernel debugger command on the \ObjectTypes\PowerRequest object type, to validate this. Power availability requests are generated by user-mode applications through the PowerCreateRequest API and then enabled or disabled with the PowerSetRequest and PowerClearRequest APIs, respectively. In the kernel, drivers use PoCreatePowerRequest, PoSetPowerRequest, and PoClearPowerRequest. Because no handles are used, PoDeletePowerRequest is implemented to remove the reference on the object (while user mode can simply use CloseHandle).

There are three kinds of requests that can be used through the Power Request API: a system request, a display request, and an “away-mode” request. The first type requests that the system not automatically go to sleep due to the idle timer (although the user can still close the lid to enter sleep, for example), while the second does the same for the display. “Away-mode” is a modification to the normal sleep (S3 state) behavior of Windows, which is used to keep the computer in full powered-on mode but with the display and sound card turned off, making it appear to the user as though the machine is really sleeping. This behavior is normally used only by specialized set-top boxes or media center devices when media delivery must continue even though the user has pressed a physical sleep button, for example. In the future, Windows may support other requests as well.

**EXPERIMENT: VIEWING A POWER AVAILABILITY REQUEST IN THE DEBUGGER**

Because power availability requests are objects managed by the object manager, applications have handles open to them when calling the PowerCreateRequest API, and Process Explorer is able to find these handles by using the Search DLL/Handle functionality that was introduced in previous chapters.

You can search for “PowerRequest” and find certain services and applications on your machine that have made availability requests. (Drivers will not show up because the kernel API does not use handles.) For example, the Print Spooler (Spoolsvc.exe) and Windows Media Player Network Sharing Service (Wmpntwk.exe) are two Windows services that have availability request objects.

By launching the Poavlts.exe test utility from the Book Tools and searching with Process Explorer, you will also find that it too has a handle open. Use the handle lower-pane view to obtain the kernel address of the object, in this case 0x8544ABF8.
You can then use local kernel debugging to dump the power request object as shown next. Unfortunately, the underlying kernel data structure is not present in the symbol files, so only a hex dump is possible. Nevertheless, the layout of the object is easy to understand: a doubly linked list (the first two pointers), some flags, and then a pointer to the actual request information that the test application supplied, which is highlighted in bold.

kd> dc 8544ABF8
855d01a8  819586c0 85448ea0 00000001 00000007  ......D........
855d01b8  00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000  ................
855d01c8  b13e9b50

By using the same dump command on the pointer, the power request’s diagnostic reason is visible: “Computation in progress.”

kd> dc b13e9b50
b13e9b50  00000001 8556b030 00000000 00000044  ....0.V.....D...
b13e9b60  00000001 00000014 00000000 80080001  ................
b13e9b70  00000000 006f0043 0870006d 00740075  ....C.o.m.p.u.t.
b13e9b80  00740061 006f0072 00720067 00730065  a.t.i.o.n. .i.n.
b13e9b90  00700020 006f0072 00720067 00730065  .p.r.o.g.r.e.s

You can also use the dl (dump list) command on the first pointer in the object’s dump to dump a list of all the power requests on the system, which are linked by the PopPowerRequestObjectList symbol in the kernel. This will let you see power requests that Process Explorer cannot locate, such as those created by drivers.

EXPERIMENT: VIEWING POWER AVAILABILITY REQUESTS WITH POWERCFG

As you saw, dumping power availability requests requires quite a bit of kernel spelunking. Thankfully, the Powercfg utility provides much of the same capabilities in an easier-to-use command-line version. Here’s the output of the utility while browsing a Windows laptop’s share from another machine, while at the same time playing an MP3 file and launching the Poavlst.exe application:

C:\Users\Administrator>powercfg -requests
DISPLAY:
Note the same “Computation in progress” string, as well as the fact that the SMB driver and the audio driver are also requesting power availability and have indicated their reason for doing so. Windows Media Player, on the other hand, continues to use the legacy API, so no information about the reason is available.

**Processor Power Management (PPM)**

So far, this section has only described the power manager’s control over device (D) and system (S) states, but another important state management must also be performed on a modern operating system: that of the processor (P and C states). Windows implements a processor power manager (PPM) that is responsible for controlling both C states (the idle states of the processor) and P states (the package states of the processor) and for interacting with ACPI firmware as well as a vendor-supplied power management driver, as needed (Intelppm.sys for Intel CPUs, for example). Which states are chosen is usually determined by a combination of internal algorithms and settings that ship in the Windows registry, most of which are tunable by OEMs and administrators. We will show all these tunable policy values later in this section.

Although the exact specifics of PPM are outside the scope of this book and are often hardware-specific, it is worth going into detail about one particular technology that is unique to Windows: core parking. At its essence, core parking is a load-based engine running inside the PPM that makes two sets of decisions:

- Which particular P states should be entered for a given processor, and how power should be managed across a power domain. A domain is the set of functional units associated with a given processor core (including the core itself), which are all sharing the same clock generator crystal with the same divider, and thus the same frequency. This could be an entire package, half a
package, or even just one SMT core with multiple logical processors.

- Which particular cores should be made unavailable to the scheduler engine (see Chapter 5 in Part 1 for more information on scheduling) in order to reduce attempts to make those selected cores busy again. These selected cores are called parked cores. Note that hard affinity settings will still force the scheduler to pick one of these “unavailable” cores, as described later.

NOTE
In its current implementation, core parking does not rebalance interrupts or shift software timers away from parked cores, but it may do so in the future.

To summarize, core parking aggressively puts processors in their deepest idle (C) states (not necessarily P states) and tries to keep them that way.

Core Parking Policies
Because the power requirements and usage models of desktop machines vary from those of server machines, core parking implements two internal policies for managing processor cores. The first policy, called core parking override, is used by default on client systems. This policy has lower idle thresholds for when to begin parking (that is, it parks more aggressively) and, most importantly, always leaves one thread in an SMT package unparked—in other words, it is responsible for essentially disabling the Hyper-Threading feature found on Intel CPUs until load warrants it. This effect is shown in Figure 8-46: CPU 1 and CPU 3 are parked because they correspond to the second thread of CPU 0’s and CPU 2’s SMT sets.

The second core parking policy is the default behavior, which is to say that it does not make any special considerations for SMT cores. This policy is also paired with less aggressive threshold parameters that are more suitable for server workloads, in which load is usually low during the majority of the time but all processors should be readily available when peaks are hit.

Additionally, the engine is tuned to avoid coalescing processing too much to a single node or subset of nodes. Although consolidating work has energy benefits because less power is distributed or wasted across the system, it now adds significant contention to the memory controller(s), which on a distributed NUMA system would have been less busy because of the scheduler's ideal node and
process-seed selection algorithms. (See Chapter 5 in Part 1 for more information.) Therefore, core parking has to walk an interesting tightrope between reducing power, increasing cache and memory access effectiveness, and reducing contention on node-local resources. An example of this balancing act is that the core parking engine will always keep at least one core available per NUMA node to keep the scheduler’s spreading efforts useful and to help support applications that specifically partition their workloads across nodes through NUMA-aware thread affinity and memory allocation.

![Figure 8-46. Resource Monitor showing core parking effects on SMT systems](https://example.com/resource-monitor.png)

**Utility Function**

Decisions taken by the PPM engine as to whether to modify the power state of a
core, as well as which cores to park or unpark, are gated by one primal metric: utility. The utility of a processor represents, in the engine’s view, the load of a given core and is computed by multiplying the average frequency of a core (expressed as a percentage of its maximum) by the busy period of the core (expressed as a percentage of non-idle time). Because two percentages are being multiplied, the maximum utility is 10,000, and almost all the engine’s calculations are done by comparing utility (actually, as we show later, a value derived from utility) with some threshold or average.

**NOTE**

On modern processors, the average frequency is obtained by invoking the feedback handler associated with the current power domain, which is managed by the vendor-supplied power management driver (such as Intelppm.sys). If a feedback mechanism is not available, the current domain’s frequency is used instead.

Because the utility of a processor can, obviously, change rapidly over time, the engine builds a history of the utilities of each core, as well as a core’s average frequency. It also keeps a running sum of the utilities added up over time, such that the final averaged utility is calculated as the running sum divided by the number of history entries.

**EXPERIMENT: VIEWING UTILITY AND FREQUENCY INFORMATION**

As with most other PPM-related information, the KPRCB stores information on the current utility as well as the utility history. Furthermore, a few debugger extensions are also available to easily visualize PPM utility information.

When you run the `!ppm` kernel debugger command, you should see output similar to the following, which shows information for LP 0:

```
lkd> !ppm
Processor 0

    Idle States (3)
      0: C1 - intelppm
      1: C2 - intelppm
      2: C3 - intelppm
Last Used Idle State: 2

    Current Frequency: 100%
    HardwareFeedback: 55%
    Maximum Policy: 100%
    Platform Cap: 100%
    Minimum Policy: 5%
    Minimum Performance: 44%
```
Minimum Throttle:  5%

Utility:  5400

Highlighted in bold are the three values that were described earlier. The utility of this processor is 5400, and it is currently running at 100 percent of its maximum frequency. The hardware feedback is the average frequency from the feedback handler described previously, which the Intelppm.sys vendor-supplied PPM driver has calculated as 55 percent on this processor.

You can also look at the PPM information for other processors while in a remote debugging session by using the ~ (tilde) command to switch processors. When using the local kernel debugger, you have to dump the KPRCB structure manually and list the .PowerState substructure, as shown in the following output. In this example, the PPM state for LP 1 is dumped.

```
lkd> !running -i

System Processors:  (0000000f)
  Idle Processors:  (0000000a)

 Prcbs  Current (pri) Next (pri)  Idle
 0   8376cd20  87f0b030 (12)  83776380 .................
 1   8b404120  8b409800 ( 0)  8b409800 .................
 2   8b43a120  86e6ed48 (11)  8b43f800 .................
 3   8b470120  8b475800 ( 0)  8b475800 .................
```

```
lkd> dt nt!_KPRCB 8b404120   PowerState.
+0x33a0 PowerState :
      +0x000 IdleStates : 0x877ff890 PPMIDLE_STATES
      +0x008 IdleTimeLast : 0xed
      +0x010 IdleTimeTotal : 0xadae7baa
...
```

### EXPERIMENT: VIEWING UTILITY AND FREQUENCY HISTORY

If the current core parking policy enables history tracking (which is normally disabled on client systems), you can also see the utility function over time, as well as the frequency. To do so, a different kernel extension has to used, !ppmstate.

Here’s the output of !ppmstate on a server system with core parking enabled:

```
lkd> !ppmstate

                 PrCB.PowerState - 0x837700c0
                 IdleStates:   0x877fe1b0
                 IdleTimeLast: 0.000.006us (0x860 )
                 IdleTimeTotal: 11:35.968.474us (0x6bc4ae5f )
                 IdleAccounting: 0x874d9000
                 Hypervisor State: 0x0
                 LastPerfCheck: 13:20.311.497us (0x7becdf55)
                 PerfDomain: 0x874d9ef5
                 PerfConstraint: 0x874d9f50
                 Utility: 0xf6c
```
When parking and unparking cores, the engine also uses a secondary metric called generic utility. Generic utility is the sum of all the utility functions across all the processors involved in the core parking algorithm. This value is used to gauge the overall activity level of the system and is later converted into a percentage (this will be described later in the algorithm section). Thus, because administrators and users set power policies on a systemwide basis and not on a processor basis (while core parking works at the processor level), generic utility is needed to convert the per-processor utility function into a systemwide representation of utility.

Algorithm Overrides

Since core parking is decoupled from the scheduler (which is what developers have some control over), there are a few scenarios in which the scheduler’s goals must override those of the core parking engine. The first scenario is forced affinitization. When discussing the scheduler’s algorithms in Chapter 5 in Part 1, we noted that the scheduler will sometimes forcefully pick a parked core if it is the ideal processor of a thread and when no unparked cores are available. When this happens, the core parking engine is made aware because the affinity count in the KPRCB’s power state is incremented. Over time, the engine builds a weighted history (as configured by policy) of cores that are repeatedly targeted by hard-affinitized policy and, past a certain threshold, also configured by policy, will cause the engine to react appropriately (this will be described in the algorithm outlined later in this section).
A second override occurs whenever a core is parked (which means that a low, or zero, utility function is expected), yet the calculated utility is past the configured threshold. This override is not controllable through scheduling—in fact, it means that software timer expirations, DPCs, interrupts, and other similar scenarios have caused a parked core to run code outside the scheduler’s purview. When such a situation is detected, the engine reacts differently, as described by the algorithm. Additionally, a history of such “overutilization” is kept, weighted according to the current policy, and it too will cause changes in the algorithm if it reaches a certain policy-configurable threshold.

Look back at Figure 8-46, which showed the Resource Monitor, and notice how CPU 1 and 3, even though parked, still had accumulated some CPU time. Depending on the current policy, one or more of those CPUs could have been considered overutilized.

**Increase/Decrease Actions**

Whenever the PPM engine is in a situation in which it must increase or decrease the amount of parked cores, or increase or decrease a given core’s performance state, it can apply one of three different actions:

- **Ideal** In the ideal model, the engine tries to achieve a performance (frequency) midpoint between the decrease and increase thresholds when choosing a performance state (PERFSTATE_POLICY_CHANGE_IDEAL). When parking or unparking cores, it modifies the parked state of as many cores as needed until the generic utility distribution across unparked cores reaches a value that is just below or above the increase or decrease threshold, respectively (CORE_PARKING_POLICY_CHANGE_IDEAL).

- **Step** In the step model, the engine increases or decreases performance (frequency) by one frequency step (if specific frequency steps are exposed through ACPI) or by 5 percent as needed (PERFSTATE_POLICY_CHANGE_STEP). When parking or unparking cores, it always picks just one more core to park or unpark (CORE_PARKING_POLICY_CHANGE_STEP).

- **Rocket** In the rocket model, the engine sets the core to its maximum or minimum performance (frequency) state.
(PERFSTATE_POLICY_CHANGE_ROCKET). When parking, it parks all cores (except one per node, or whatever the current policy specifies), and when unparking, it unparks all cores (CORE_PARKING_POLICY_CHANGE_ROCKET).

Later in this section, when we look at the actual core parking algorithm, we’ll see when these increase and decrease actions are taken.

### Thresholds and Policy Settings

Ultimately, what determines whether performance states will be pushed up or down and whether cores will be parked or unparked depends on the thresholds and policy settings that have been set in the registry, configured in particular for each processor vendor and type as well as across client and server systems, AC versus DC power, and different power plans (for example, High Performance, Balanced, or Low Power). Core parking uses the policy settings and thresholds shown in Table 8-10 through Table 8-14.

**Table 8-10. Processor Performance Policies (GUID_PROCESSOR_PERF)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy GUID</th>
<th>Policy Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INCREASE/DECREASE_THRESHOLD</td>
<td>Specifies the busy threshold that must be met before changing the processor’s performance state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCREASE/DECREASE_POLICY</td>
<td>Specifies the algorithm used to select a new performance state when the ideal performance state does not match the current performance state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCREASE/DECREASE_TIME</td>
<td>Specifies the minimum number of performance check intervals since the last performance state change before the performance state can be changed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIME_CHECK</td>
<td>Specifies the amount of time that must expire before processor performance states and parked cores may be reevaluated (in milliseconds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOOST_POLICY</td>
<td>Specifies how much processors may opportunistically increase frequency above maximum when allowed by current operating conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALLOW_THROTTLING</td>
<td>Allows processors to use throttle states (T states) in addition to performance states.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
HISTORY

Specifies the number of processor-performance time-check intervals to use when calculating the average utility

Table 8-11. Idle State Management Policies (GUID_PROCESSOR_IDLE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy GUID</th>
<th>Policy Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALLOW_SCALING</td>
<td>Specifies whether the idle state promotion and demotion values should be scaled based on the current performance state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISABLE</td>
<td>Specifies whether idle states should be disabled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIME_CHECK</td>
<td>Specifies the time that must elapse since the last idle state promotion or demotion before idle states may be promoted or demoted again (in microseconds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOTE/PROMOTE_THRESHOLD</td>
<td>Specifies the busy threshold that must be met before changing the idle state of the processor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8-12. Core Parking Policies (GUID_PROCESSOR_CORE_PARKING)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy GUID</th>
<th>Policy Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INCREASE/DECREASE_THRESHOLD</td>
<td>Specifies the busy threshold that must be met before changing the number of cores that are unparked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCREASE/DECREASE_POLICY</td>
<td>Specifies the algorithm used to select the number of cores to park or unpark when required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAX/MIN_CORES</td>
<td>Specifies the number of unparked cores allowed (in a percentage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCREASE/DECREASE_TIME</td>
<td>Specifies the minimum number of performance-check intervals that must elapse before more cores can be parked or unparked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORE_OVERRIDE</td>
<td>Ensures that at least one processor remains unparked per core</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERF_STATE</td>
<td>Specifies what performance state a processor enters when parked</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8-13. Affinity History Policies
(GUID_PROCESSOR_CORE_PARKING_AFFINITY_HISTORY)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy GUID</th>
<th>Policy Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DECREASE_FACTOR</td>
<td>Specifies the factor by which to decrease affinity history on each core after the current performance check</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THRESHOLD</td>
<td>Specifies the threshold above which a core is considered to have had significant affinitized work scheduled to it while parked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEIGHTING</td>
<td>Specifies the weighting given to each occurrence where affinitized work was scheduled to a parked core</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8-14. Overutilization Policies

(GUID_PROCESSOR_CORE_PARKING_OVER_UTILIZATION)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy GUID</th>
<th>Policy Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HISTORY_DECREASE_FACTOR</td>
<td>Specifies the factor by which to decrease the overutilization history on each core after the current performance check</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HISTORY_THRESHOLD</td>
<td>Specifies the threshold above which a core is considered to have been recently overutilized while parked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEIGHTING</td>
<td>Specifies the weighting given to each occurrence when a parked core is found to be overutilized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THRESHOLD</td>
<td>Specifies the busy threshold that must be met before a parked core is considered overutilized</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EXPERIMENT: VIEWING CURRENT CORE PARKING POLICY

When the `!popolicy` experiment was used in an earlier part of this chapter, it showed you only the system power policy, not the entire policy, which also covers PPM. By using the `dt` command with the correct structure type, you are also able to see the PPM policy, which covers the policy GUIDs that were shown in the preceding tables. Because the system power policy starts at offset 4, simply subtract 4 from the pointer returned by `!popolicy`.

```
lkd> !popolicy
SYSTEM_POWER_POLICY (R.1) @ 0x8377a6c4

lkd> dt nt!_POP_POWER_SETTING_VALUES 8377a6c0
...  
+0x10c AllowThrottling : 0 ''
+0x10d PerfHistoryCount : 0x20 ''
+0x110 PerfTimeCheck : 0xf
+0x114 PerfIncreaseTime : 1
```
Another way to see a more limited set of the current policy is to use the !ppmperfpolicy extension, which displays a few of the core policy settings:

```
lkd> !ppmperfpolicy
    MaxPerf: 100%
    MinPerf: 5%
    TimeCheck: 15 ms
    IncreaseTime: 1 time check period(s)
    DecreaseTime: 1 time check period(s)
    IncreaseThreshold: 30%
    DecreaseThreshold: 10%
    IncreasePolicy: 2
    DecreasePolicy: 1
    HistoryCount: 1
    BoostPolicy: 100
```

**Performance Check**

The algorithm that powers the PPM engine is called the performance check. It is executed by the PpmCheckStart timer callback, which runs periodically based on the current policy’s performance-check interval. The callback acquires the policy lock and sets the initial phase to PpmCheckPhaseInitiate. It calls PpmCheckRun, which runs the algorithm illustrated in the following diagram.
The steps shown in the diagram line up with the PPM_CHECK_PHASE enumeration described in Table 8-15.

### Table 8-15. PPM Check Phases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase Name</th>
<th>Phase Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PpmCheckPhaseInitiate</td>
<td>Notifies the vendor-supplied processor power driver that the core parking engine is about to start its performance check</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### PpmCheckPhaseRecordUtility
Runs on each processor to calculate the utility function for each core

### PpmCheckPhaseCalculateCoreParkingMask
Using the utility function, current core parking status, affinitization, and overutilization history, organizes all the cores in different sets that are used to determine the best cores to unpark or park. It then performs the unparking of cores.

### PpmCheckPhaseReportUnparkedCores
Runs on each unparked processor to notify the scheduler that the core has been unparked.

### PpmCheckPhaseSelectProcessorState
Computes the new performance state (target frequency) for each processor based on its parking state and utility.

### PpmCheckPhaseSelectDomainState
Selects the best performance state for all the processors in a given domain based on the constraints, and switches to the new processor performance state.

### PpmCheckPhaseCommitDomainState
Calls the vendor-supplied processor power driver to commit the new processor performance states.

### PpmCheckPhaseReportParkedCores
Runs on each parked processor to notify the scheduler that the core has been unparked. Any ongoing or queued thread activity is moved off the core.

### PpmCheckPhaseEnd
Releases the policy lock and switches the phase to the not-running phase.

### PpmCheckPhaseNotRunning
Indicates that the performance check is not running.

Some of the steps in Table 8-15 require a bit more discussion than just a single line. Here are extended details.

**Step 2: Recording utility** PpmCheckRecordAllUtility enumerates all processors that are part of the core parking engine’s current registered set and determines which ones it will query for utility remotely (that is, from the current core running the check algorithm) or whether it will force a targeted DPC to query utility locally. This determination is made by calling PpmPerfRecordUtility and hinges on the idleness of the core and its current utility value. Because these numbers end up multiplied together, the busier a core becomes (higher utility), the greater the inaccuracy of not having precise frequency measurements becomes, the latter being
a side effect of running the check on a remote instead of a local core.

Additionally, while running locally, the function can also check whether the CPU was throttled outside the PPM’s purview, usually indicating broken firmware or drivers (or the existence of a power management strategy that is outside the OS’s view and/or control).

Other than those checks, recording the utility is ultimately about computing the value described earlier in the Utility Function section and keeping track of its history, if the policy enables it.

**Step 4: Choosing which cores to unpark** The work in this step is done by two functions. The first, PpmPerfCalculateCoreParkingMask, computes how many cores should be unparked and builds a variety of sets that can be used to prioritize unparking:

- **Overutilized cores** Those whose utility is higher than the policy threshold, as described in the Algorithm Overrides section.

- **Previously overutilized cores** Cores that were overutilized during the previous performance check, as described in the Algorithm Overrides section.

- **Affinitized cores** Cores that have been forcefully chosen by the scheduler because of affinitization overrides, also described in the Algorithm Overrides section.

- **Unparked cores** Cores that are already unparked.

- **Highly utilized unparked cores** Unparked cores with a high utility function.

The function then computes the generic utility (described in the Utility Function section) and determines whether the generic utility percentage (defined as the generic utility divided by the sum of busy frequencies across all cores) is above or below the thresholds specified in the policy. Based on which threshold is crossed, if any, the policy-defined increase/decrease action (described in the Increase/Decrease Actions section earlier) is performed, which results in a count of cores to unpark.

This number, the generic utility, and the sets described earlier are sent to PpmPerfChooseCoresToUnpark, which is responsible for picking which processors should be unparked based on how to spread the generic utility. The algorithm first
checks whether the target count is already covered by the already unparked cores, and if so, exits. Otherwise, it keeps unparking cores until the overutilized group is enough to handle the remaining unpark requests. In other words, overutilized cores always become unparked, and the algorithm must pick which other, nonoverutilized cores, should also be unparked.

To do so, it runs the following elimination round in the specified order. Each step is taken only if it results in a nonzero intersection (if other candidates exist):

- Remove any processors that are not already overutilized
- Remove any processors that are not already highly utilized
- Remove any processors that are not already unparked
- Remove any processors that were not previously overutilized
- Remove any processors that do not have forced affinitized threads

In the most optimistic scenario, this results in a set of overutilized, highly utilized, previously overutilized, and forced-affinitized processors. In other words, this set contains the processors least likely to benefit from parking in the first place. From this set, the core parking engine picks the lowest processor number and then enters a new round of elimination until the conditions specified earlier match.

At the end of the algorithm, after all overutilized cores and noneliminated cores have been unparked, the generic utility is balanced (distributed equally) across all the newly unparked processors.

**Step 5: Selecting processor state** PpmPerfSelectProcessorStates enumerates each processor that’s part of this run and calls PpmPerfSelectProcessorState for each one. In this case, the algorithm can run remotely (without requiring a local DPC callback on the core) because all the data is available from the KPRCB. The purpose of this function is to decide which processor state makes the most sense for the given processor, based on its expected utility function.

The first check is to verify whether this processor has been selected for parking in step 3. If it was selected, the target power state for parked cores, based on policy, is selected. Three possibilities exist:

- **Lightest** The parked processor is targeted to run at 100 percent of its frequency.
- **Deepest** The parked processor is targeted to run at 1 percent of its frequency.
- **No Preference** The parked processor will be treated just like any other processor and continue the regular algorithm.

Assuming that the algorithm does continue, the next step is to compute the busyness of the processor. Since the utility function is equal to the busyness percentage multiplied by the average frequency, this means that the busyness of the processor is its utility divided by its average frequency. This busyness is then compared with the increase and/or decrease thresholds specified by policy, and one of the three possible actions are taken (ideal, step, or rocket, described earlier in Increase/Decrease Actions).

The domain performance handler callback (owned by the vendor-supplied processor driver) is then called with the new target frequencies and with whether throttling was allowed by the policy.

**Step 6: Selecting domain state** As shown in the previous illustration, this step is also composed of a few substeps. The first, done remotely, is performed by PpmPerfSelectDomainStates, which picks the domain masters and calls PpmPerfSelectDomainState to run on them. This function iterates over all the processors in the domain and picks the one with the highest performance state (the highest desired frequency). It then sets this as the desired frequency for the entire domain.

Now that each domain master has selected its domain state, control returns to PpmPerfSelectDomainStates, which queues a local DPC for all of the domain masters that is implemented by PpmPerfApplyDomainState. This is the second step. This function takes into consideration the valid P states (and T states, if throttling is enabled by policy) and trims any states outside the current processor constraints, which include percentage caps and thermal caps. When it has picked the best target frequency (and consulted with the domain performance handler callback), it queues a DPC to all the processors in each domain to apply the selected performance state to each core.

In this third step, implemented by the PpmPerfApplyProcessorState DPC routine, the domain’s performance handler callback is called to switch states. Finally, PpmScaleIdleStateValues is called. If idle scaling is enabled by policy, this function
scales the processor’s C states (idle states) according to the promotion/demotion percentages specified in the policy.

---

**EXPERIMENT: VIEWING CURRENT PPM CHECK INFORMATION**

The kernel debugger includes an extension, `!ppmcheck`, which you can use to check whether core parking is enabled and which cores are currently parked, as well as the internal performance checking algorithm state. Here’s a sample output of the extension:

```
!ppmcheck

PpmCheckArmed: TRUE
PpmCheckStartDpc: 0x8377aa58
PpmCheckDpc: 0x8377aa78
PpmCheckTimer: 0x8377aa30
PpmCheckMakeupCount: -
PpmCheckLastExecutionTime: -
PpmCheckTime: 08:40.738.783us (0x50a26d3d)
PpmCheckPhase: 9
PpmCheckRegistered: 0x8376b408
{[0000000F]}
PpmPerfStatesRegistered: 0x8376b390
{[0000000F]}
CoreParkingEnabled: TRUE
CoreParkingMask: 0x8376b35c
{[0000000A]}
```

You can also see the complete PPM information for a given processor by looking at the PRCB’s PowerState field and further drilling down into the Domain and PerfConstraint members. This will show you the selected domain performance state, the constraints (thermal and frequency caps), and other accounting information. You can use `dt ntl!_KPRCB @$prcb PowerState` to see this information for the current PRCB:

```
+0x33a0 PowerState :
 +0x000 IdleStates : 0x877fe1b0 PPMIDLE_STATES
 +0x008 IdleTimeLast : 0xa6
 +0x010 IdleTimeTotal : 0x97789fc9
 +0x018 IdleTimeEntry : 0
 +0x020 IdleAccounting : 0x874d9c50
 +0x024 Hypervisor : 0 (ProcHypervisorNone)
 +0x028 PerfHistoryTotal : 0
 +0x02c ThermalConstraint : 0x64 'd'
 +0x02d PerfHistoryCount : 0x1 ''
 +0x02e PerfHistorySlot : 0 ''
 +0x02f Reserved : 0 ''
 +0x030 LastSysTime : 0xfa86
 +0x034 WmiDispatchPtr : 0x837c5464
 +0x038 WmiInterfaceEnabled : 0n1
 +0x040 FFHThrottleStateInfo : PPMFFH_THROTTLE_STATE_INFO
 +0x060 PerfActionDpc : _KDPC
 +0x080 PerfActionMask : 0n0
 +0x088 IdleCheck : PROCIDLE_SNAP
 +0x098 PerfCheck : PROCIDLE_SNAP
 +0x0a8 Domain : 0x874d9c50 PROCPERF_DOMAIN
 +0x0ac PerfConstraint : 0x874d9cc8 PROCPERF.Constraint
 +0x0b0 Load : (null)
 +0x0b4 PerfHistory : (null)
 +0x0b8 Utility : 0xba8
```
+0x0bc OverUtilizedHistory : 0
+0x0c0 AffinityCount : 0
+0x0c4 AffinityHistory : 0

lkd> dt 0x874d9c50 PROC_PERF_DOMAIN
nt!PROC_PERF_DOMAIN
+0x000 Link : LISTENTRY [ 0x8376b39c - 0x8376b39c ]
+0x008 Master : 0x8b470120 _KPRCB
+0x00c Members : KAFFINITY_EX
+0x018 FeedbackHandler : 0x93d19d08 unsigned char +0
+0x01c GetFFHThrottleState : 0x93d1804e void +0
+0x020 BoostPolicyHandler : 0x93d18104 void +0
+0x024 PerfSelectionHandler : 0x93d19bee unsigned long +0
+0x028 PerfHandler : 0x93d19d40 void +0
+0x02c Processors : 0x874d9cc8 PROC_PERF_CONSTRAINT
+0x030 PerfChangeTime : 0xa90c1ed
+0x038 ProcessorCount : 4
+0x03c PreviousFrequencyMhz : 0x532
+0x040 CurrentFrequencyMhz : 0xa65
+0x044 PreviousFrequency : 0x31
+0x048 CurrentFrequency : 0x64
+0x04c CurrentPerfContext : 0
+0x050 DesiredFrequency : 0x64
+0x054 MaxFrequency : 0xa65
+0x058 MinPerfPercent : 0x2c
+0x05c MinThrottlePercent : 5
+0x060 MaxPercent : 0x64
+0x064 MinPercent : 5
+0x068 ConstrainedMaxPercent : 0x64
+0x06c ConstrainedMinPercent : 0x2c
+0x070 Coordination : 0x1 '
+0x074 PerfChangeIntervalCount : 0n0

lkd> dt 0x874d9cc8 PROC_PERF_CONSTRAINT
ntdll!PROC_PERF_CONSTRAINT
+0x000 Prcb : 0x8376cd20 _KPRCB
+0x004 PerfContext : 0x877febe0
+0x008 PercentageCap : 0x64
+0x00c ThermalCap : 0x64
+0x010 TargetFrequency : 0x36
+0x014 AccumulatedFullFrequency : 0x46c3df
+0x018 AccumulatedZeroFrequency : 0xd51828
+0x01c FrequencyHistoryTotal : 0
+0x020 AverageFrequency : 0x36
Conclusion

The I/O system defines the model of I/O processing on Windows and performs functions that are common to or required by more than one driver. Its chief responsibility is to create IRPs representing I/O requests and to shepherd the packets through various drivers, returning results to the caller when an I/O is complete. The I/O manager locates various drivers and devices by using I/O system objects, including driver and device objects. Internally, the Windows I/O system operates asynchronously to achieve high performance and provides both synchronous and asynchronous I/O capabilities to user-mode applications.

Device drivers include not only traditional hardware device drivers but also file system, network, and layered filter drivers. All drivers have a common structure and communicate with one another and the I/O manager by using common mechanisms. The I/O system interfaces allow drivers to be written in a high-level language to lessen development time and to enhance their portability. Because drivers present a common structure to the operating system, they can be layered one on top of another to achieve modularity and reduce duplication between drivers. Also, all Windows device drivers should be designed to work correctly on multiprocessor systems.

Finally, the role of the PnP manager is to work with device drivers to dynamically detect hardware devices and to build an internal device tree that guides hardware device enumeration and driver installation. The power manager works with device drivers to move devices into low-power states when applicable to conserve energy and prolong battery life.

Three more upcoming chapters will cover additional topics related to the I/O system: storage management, file systems (including details on the NTFS file system), and the cache manager.
Chapter 9. Storage Management

Storage management defines the way that an operating system interfaces with nonvolatile storage devices and media. The term storage encompasses many different devices, including optical media, USB flash drives, floppy disks, hard disks, solid state disks (SSDs), network storage such as iSCSI, storage area networks (SANs), and virtual storage such as VHDs (virtual hard disks). Windows provides specialized support for each of these classes of storage media. Because our focus in this book is on the kernel components of Windows, in this chapter we’ll concentrate on just the fundamentals of the hard disk storage subsystem in Windows, which includes support for external disks and flash drives. Significant portions of the support Windows provides for removable media and remote storage (offline archiving) are implemented in user mode.

In this chapter, we’ll examine how kernel-mode device drivers interface file system drivers to disk media, discuss how disks are partitioned, describe the way volume managers abstract and manage volumes, and present the implementation of multipartition disk-management features in Windows, including replicating and dividing file system data across physical disks for reliability and for performance enhancement. We’ll also describe how file system drivers mount volumes they are responsible for managing, and we’ll conclude by discussing drive encryption technology in Windows and support for automatic backups and recovery.
Storage Terminology

To fully understand the rest of this chapter, you need to be familiar with some basic terminology:

- Disks are physical storage devices such as a hard disk, CD-ROM, DVD, Blu-ray, solid state disk (SSD), or flash.

- A disk is divided into sectors, which are addressable blocks of fixed size. Sector sizes are determined by hardware. Most hard disk sectors are 512 bytes (but are moving to 4,096 bytes), and CD-ROM sectors are typically 2,048 bytes. For more information on moving to 4,096-byte sectors, see http://support.microsoft.com/kb/2510009.

- Partitions are collections of contiguous sectors on a disk. A partition table or other disk-management database stores a partition's starting sector, size, and other characteristics and is located on the same disk as the partition.

- Simple volumes are objects that represent sectors from a single partition that file system drivers manage as a single unit.

- Multipartition volumes are objects that represent sectors from multiple partitions and that file system drivers manage as a single unit. Multipartition volumes offer performance, reliability, and sizing features that simple volumes do not.
Disk Devices

From the perspective of Windows, a disk is a device that provides addressable long-term storage for blocks of data, which are accessed using file system drivers. In other words, each byte on the disk does not have its own address, but each block does have an address. These blocks are known as sectors and are the basic unit of storage and transfer to and from the device (in other words, all transfers must be a multiple of the sector size). Whether the device is implemented using rotating magnetic media (hard disk or floppy disk) or solid state memory (flash disk or thumb drive) is irrelevant.

Windows supports a wide variety of interconnect mechanisms for attaching a disk to a system, including SCSI, SAS (Serial Attached SCSI), SATA (Serial Advanced Technology Attachment), USB, SD/MMC, and iSCSI.

Rotating Magnetic Disks

The typical disk drive (often referred to as a hard disk) is built using one or more rigid rotating platters covered in a magnetic material. An arm containing a head moves back and forth across the surface of the platter reading and writing bits that are stored magnetically.

Disk Sector Format

While the disk interconnect mechanisms have been evolving since IBM introduced hard disks in 1956 and have become faster and more intelligent, the underlying disk format has changed very little, except for annual increases in areal density (the number of bits per square inch). Since the inception of disk drives, the data portion of a disk sector has typically been 512 bytes.

Disk storage areal density has increased from 2,000 bits per square inch in 1956 to over 650 billion bits per square inch in 2011, with most of that gain coming in the last 15 years. Disk manufacturers are reaching the physical limits of current magnetic disk technology, so they are changing the format of the disks: increasing the sector size from 512 bytes to 4,096 bytes, and changing the size of the error correcting code (ECC) from 50 bytes to 100 bytes. This new disk format is known as the advanced format. The size of the advanced format sector was chosen...
because it matches the x86 page size and the NTFS cluster size. The advanced format provides about 10 percent greater capacity by reducing the amount of overhead per sector (everything except the data area is overhead) and through better error correcting capabilities. (A single 100-byte ECC is better than eight 50-byte ECCs). The downside to advanced format disks is potentially wasted space for small files, but as you’ll see in Chapter 12, NTFS has a mechanism for efficiently storing small files.

Advanced format disks provide an emulation mechanism (known as 512e) for legacy operating systems that understand only 512-byte sectors. With 512e, the host does not know that the disk supports 4,096-byte sectors; it continues to read and write 512-byte sectors (called logical blocks). The disk’s controller will translate a logical block number into the correct physical sector. For example, if the host issues a read request for logical block number 6, then the disk controller will read physical sector number 0 into its internal buffer and return only the 512-byte portion corresponding to logical block 6 to the host, as shown in Figure 9-1.

![Figure 9-1. Advanced format sector with 512e](image)

Writes are a little more complicated in that they require the disk’s controller to perform a read-modify-write operation, as shown in Figure 9-2.

1. The host writes logical block 6 to the controller.
2. The controller maps logical block 6 to physical sector 0 and reads the entire sector into the controller’s memory.
3. The controller copies logical block 6 into its position within the copy of the physical sector in the controller’s memory.
4. The controller writes the 4,096-byte physical sector from memory back to the disk.

Obviously, there is a performance penalty associated with using 512e, but
advanced format disks will still work with legacy operating systems.

Windows supports native 4,096-byte advance format sectors, so there is no additional read-modify-write overhead. As you will see in Chapter 12, NTFS was written to support sectors of more than 512 bytes and by default issues disk I/Os using a 4,096-byte cluster. The Windows cache manager (see Chapter 11) will attempt to reduce the penalty of applications assuming 512-byte sectors; however, applications should be upgraded to query the size of a disk’s sectors (by issuing an IOCTL_STORAGE_QUERY_PROPERTY I/O request and examining the returned BytesPerPhysicalSector value) and not assume 512-byte sectors when performing sector I/O. It is very important that partitioning tools understand the size of a disk’s physical sectors and align partitions to physical sector boundaries because partitions must be an integral number of physical sectors.

**Solid State Disks**

Recently, the cost of manufacturing flash memory has decreased to the point where manufacturers are building storage subsystems with a disk-type interface, calling the device a solid state disk (SSD) or flash disk. As far as Windows is concerned, an SSD is a disk, but there are some important differences between a rotating disk and an SSD that Windows has to support. Before getting into the details of how Windows supports SSDs, let’s look at how an SSD is implemented.

Flash memory in some respects is very similar to a computer’s RAM (random access memory), except that flash memory does not lose its contents when the power is removed, which means that flash memory is nonvolatile. The most common types of flash memory are NOR and NAND. NOR flash memory is operationally the closest to RAM in that each byte is individually addressable,
while NAND flash memory is organized into blocks, like a disk. Typically, NOR-type flash memory is used to hold the BIOS on your computer’s motherboard, and NAND-type flash memory is used in SSDs.

The most important difference between flash memory and RAM is that RAM can be read and written an almost infinite number of times, while flash memory can be overwritten something less than 100,000 times. (Depending on the type of flash memory, it may be as few as 1,000 times). In effect, flash memory wears out, so flash memory should be treated more like media with a limited lifetime (such as a floppy disk) than RAM or a magnetic disk. Another major difference between flash memory and RAM is that flash memory cannot be updated in place; a block must be erased before it can be written (even for NOR-type flash memory). Flash memory is significantly faster than magnetic disks (usually by a factor of 100,000, or so; access time: 50 nanoseconds versus 5 milliseconds), but it is slower than RAM (usually by a factor of 50). From a practical perspective, memory access time is not the whole story because flash memory is not on the system memory bus. Instead, it sits behind a disk-type controller interface on an I/O bus, so in reality the difference between flash and magnetic disks may be on the order of only 1,000 times faster, and in some workloads a rotating magnetic disk can outperform a low-end SSD.

**NAND-Type Flash Memory**

NAND-type flash memory is most commonly used in SSDs, so that is what we will examine in detail. NAND-type flash comes in two types:

- **Single-level cell (SLC)** stores 1 bit per internal cell, has a higher number of program/erase cycles (on the order of 100,000), and is significantly faster than multilevel cell (MLC), but it is much more expensive than MLC.

- **Multilevel cell (MLC)** stores multiple bits per internal cell and is significantly cheaper than SLC. MLC needs more ECC bits than SLC, has fewer erase cycles (~5,000), and consumes more power than SLC.

NAND-type flash is typically organized into 4,096-byte pages (which may be exposed as eight 512-byte sectors or a single 4,096-byte sector), which are the smallest readable or writable units, and the pages are grouped into blocks of 64 to 1,024 pages, with thousands of blocks per chip. As with a magnetic disk, there is
overhead on each page, with ECC, page health, and spare bits. The block is the smallest erasable unit, so to change a single sector within a page requires that the entire block be erased and then rewritten. (Flash cells can be written only after they have been erased.) This means that writing a sector to an empty block is very fast, but if there is not an available empty block, the controller has to perform the following actions:

1. Read the entire block into the controller’s internal RAM.
2. Erase the block in the flash memory.
3. Update the block in RAM with the contents of the new sector.
4. Write the entire block to the flash memory.

Notice that what started as a write to a sector (512 bytes) became a write of an entire block. For this example, if we assume 128 pages in a block and a completely full block, then the write would take 1,023 times longer (the block contains 1,024 sectors) than the write of a single sector to an empty block. This example is a worst case and is decidedly not the norm, but it illustrates an important aspect of SSDs: as more and more of the SSD’s memory is consumed, it will have to rewrite substantially more data than a single sector. In effect, SSDs slow down as they fill up. This has important implications that are addressed in the next section, File Deletion and the Trim Command.

As a block wears out, eventually it will fail to erase. Also, the more a block is erased and rewritten, the slower it becomes (a result of the physics behind how flash memory is implemented). This means that an SSD will only get slower as you use it—even on an empty block. For example, on a 1-GB USB MLC flash disk with 128 pages per block (giving us 2,048 blocks), erasing and writing one block per second would wear out all the blocks in 23.7 days (assuming a maximum of 1,000 erase cycles per block, which is typical for the cheaper flash disks). Erasing and writing the same block once per second will wear out that block in only 16.6 minutes! SSDs typically have spare blocks held in reserve (often 20 percent of the SSD’s capacity) so that if a block wears out, the data is moved to a spare block. Clearly, flash memory cannot be used the same way as RAM or a magnetic disk.

The flash memory controller implements a technique called wear-leveling to spread the wear (erasers) across the SSD. Wear-leveling depends on the fact that most of
the data that you write to a disk is static; that is, it does not change often (it is usually read frequently, but that doesn’t cause wear). Of course, there is also dynamic data (such as log files) that changes frequently. There are many different types of wear-leveling algorithms, but describing them is beyond the scope of this book. The important concept to understand about wear-leveling is that the controller will move data around within the flash memory in an attempt to spread writes across all the flash memory, thus prolonging the overall life of the SSD. An implication of wear-leveling is that more blocks are subjected to more frequent program/erase cycles in an attempt to extend the overall life of the flash memory, but when the drive fails (as they all do), then more blocks will fail at the same time. Keep in mind that the SSD industry is moving toward the point where SSDs will advertise their health more explicitly, and at the point of impending write failure they will become read-only drives.

**File Deletion and the Trim Command**

The file system keeps track of which areas of a disk are currently in use for each file, and when a file is deleted it does not zero all the areas on the disk that contained the file—if it did, then deleting a large file would take longer than deleting a small file, and file undelete utilities would not work. Instead, the file system driver will mark those areas of the disk as available in its data structures (usually referred to as metadata; see Chapter 12 for more information). This is not a problem for magnetic disks because they read and write sectors natively, but SSDs do not read and write sectors natively (recall that the size of the writable unit, the page, is much smaller than the size of the erasable unit, the block).

SSDs have to manage the contents of pages and blocks when updating a sector. This becomes a huge problem because the SSD does not know that the contents of a page are free unless it has been erased. The SSD would continue to preserve “deleted” data when updating a sector or during wear-leveling, reducing the amount of free space available to the SSD controller. The end result would be that the speed of the SSD would degrade up to the point at which all sectors have been accessed (at least once), and the only way to speed it up again would be to erase the entire drive. This is exactly the behavior that existed in early SSDs.

The solution to this problem was the introduction of the trim command to the SSD’s controller. The file system detects that the SSD supports the trim command
by sending the I/O request IOCTL_STORAGE_QUERY_PROPERTY with the
property ID StorageDeviceTrimProperty down the storage stack (covered later in
this chapter). When a file is deleted or truncated on a disk that supports the trim
command, the file system sends the list of sectors that the file occupied to the disk
driver, using the I/O request
IOCTL_STORAGE_MANAGE_DATA_SET_ATTRIBUTES with the action
parameter DeviceDsmAction_Trim. When the disk driver receives this I/O request,
it sends a trim command to the SSD, notifying the SSD that those sectors are now
free and may be erased and repurposed at the SSD’s convenience. This lets the
SSD reclaim those sectors during an update or wear-leveling operation, thereby
improving the performance of the SSD. Note that the trim command cannot be
queued internally within the SSD’s controller and executes synchronously, which
may manifest as a noticeable pause when a large file is being deleted.

While Windows does support SSDs, Microsoft recommends that they be backed
up frequently if they are being used for important data. A standard disk
defragmenter should never be used on an SSD because it will wear out the flash
very quickly. The Windows defragmenter will not attempt to defragment an SSD.
(Defragmenting an SSD isn’t generally useful because file fragmentation does not
slow down access to a file on an SSD in the same way that it does on a magnetic
disk.) As we’ll see in Chapter 12, NTFS was not designed with short-lived (flash
memory) disks in mind, and it frequently issues lots of small writes to its
transaction log, which is important for increasing reliability but causes additional
wear to the flash memory. Using an SSD as your C: drive may drastically increase
the speed of your system, but understand that the SSD will wear out before a
magnetic disk would.

NOTE

High-end magnetic disks can outperform low-end SSDs in some cases because many low-end SSDs
perform poorly for small, random writes, which is a characteristic of the typical Windows workload.
Disk Drivers

The device drivers involved in managing a particular storage device are collectively known as a storage stack. Figure 9-3 shows each type of driver that might be present in a stack and includes a brief description of its purpose. This chapter describes the behavior of device drivers below the file system layer in the stack. (The file system driver operation is described in Chapter 12.)

Winload

As you saw in Chapter 4, “Management Mechanisms,” in Part 1, Winload is the Windows operating system file that conducts the first portion of the Windows boot process. Although Winload isn’t technically part of the storage stack, it is involved with storage management because it includes support for accessing disk devices before the Windows I/O system is operational. Winload resides on the boot volume; the boot-sector code on the system volume executes Bootmgr. Bootmgr
reads the Boot Configuration Database (BCD) from the system volume or EFI firmware and presents the computer’s boot choices to the user. Bootmgr translates the name of the BCD boot entry that a user selects to the appropriate boot partition and then runs Winload to load the Windows system files (starting with the registry, Ntoskrnl.exe and its dependencies, and the boot drivers) into memory to continue the boot process. In all cases, Winload uses the computer firmware to read the disk containing the system volume.

**Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers**

During initialization, the Windows I/O manager starts the disk storage drivers. Storage drivers in Windows follow a class/port/miniport architecture, in which Microsoft supplies a storage class driver that implements functionality common to all storage devices and a storage port driver that implements class-specific functionality common to a particular bus—such as SATA (Serial Advanced Technology Attachment), SAS (Serial Attached SCSI), or Fibre Channel—and OEMs supply miniport drivers that plug into the port driver to interface Windows to a particular controller implementation.

In the disk storage driver architecture, only class drivers conform to the standard Windows device driver interfaces. Miniport drivers use a port driver interface instead of the device driver interface, and the port driver simply implements a collection of device driver support routines that interface miniport drivers to Windows. This approach simplifies the role of miniport driver developers and, because Microsoft supplies operating system–specific port drivers, allows driver developers to focus on hardware-specific driver logic. Windows includes Disk (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Disk.sys), a class driver that implements functionality common to all disks. Windows also provides a handful of disk port drivers. For example, %SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Scsiport.sys is the legacy port driver for disks on SCSI buses (Scsiport is now deprecated and should no longer be used), and %SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Ataport.sys is a port driver for IDE-based systems. Most newer drivers use the %SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Storport.sys port driver as a replacement for Scsiport.sys. Storport.sys is designed to realize the high performance capabilities of hardware RAID and Fibre Channel adapters. The Storport model is similar to Scsiport, making it easy for vendors to migrate existing Scsiport miniport drivers to
Storport. Miniport drivers that developers write to use Storport take advantage of several of Storport’s performance enhancing features, including support for the parallel execution of I/O initiation and completion on multiprocessor systems, a more controllable I/O request-queue architecture, and execution of more code at lower IRQL to minimize the duration of hardware interrupt masking. Storport also includes support for dynamic redirection of interrupts and DPCs to the best (most local) NUMA node (often referred to as NUMA I/O) on systems that support it. Both the Scsiport.sys and Ataport.sys drivers implement a version of the disk scheduling algorithm known as C-LOOK. The drivers place disk I/O requests in lists sorted by the first sector (also known as the logical block address, or LBA) at which an I/O request is directed. They use the KeInsertByKeyDeviceQueue and KeRemoveByKeyDeviceQueue functions (documented in the Windows Driver Kit) representing I/O requests as items and using a request’s starting sector as the key required by the functions. When servicing requests, the drivers proceed through the list from lowest sector to highest. When they reach the end of the list the drivers start back at the beginning, since new requests might have been inserted in the meantime. If disk requests are spread throughout a disk this approach results in the disk head continuously moving from near the outermost cylinders of the disk toward the innermost cylinders. Storport.sys does not implement disk scheduling because it is commonly used for managing I/Os directed at storage arrays where there is no clearly defined notion of a disk start and end.

Windows ships with several miniport drivers. On systems that have at least one ATAPI-based IDE device, %SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Atapi.sys, %SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Pciidex.sys, and %SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Pciide.sys together provide miniport functionality. Most Windows installations include one or more of the drivers mentioned.

iSCSI Drivers

The development of iSCSI as a disk transport protocol integrates the SCSI protocol with TCP/IP networking so that computers can communicate with block-storage devices, including disks, over IP networks. Storage area networking (SAN) is usually architected on Fibre Channel networking, but administrators can leverage iSCSI to create relatively inexpensive SANs from networking technology such as
Gigabit Ethernet to provide scalability, disaster protection, efficient backup, and data protection. Windows support for iSCSI comes in the form of the Microsoft iSCSI Software Initiator, which is available on all editions of Windows.

The Microsoft iSCSI Software Initiator includes several components:

- **Initiator** This optional component, which consists of the Storport port driver and the iSCSI miniport driver (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Msiscsi.sys), uses the TCP/IP driver to implement software iSCSI over standard Ethernet adapters and TCP/IP offloaded network adapters.

- **Initiator service** This service, implemented in %SystemRoot%\System32\Iscsicli.exe, manages the discovery and security of all iSCSI initiators as well as session initiation and termination. iSCSI device discovery functionality is implemented in %SystemRoot%\System32\Iscsium.dll. An important goal of the iSCSI service is to provide a common discovery/management infrastructure irrespective of the protocol driver being used, which could be the Microsoft software initiator driver or an HBA driver (host bus adapter; iSCSI protocol handling offloaded to hardware, which is generally Storport miniports). In this context, iSCSI also provides Win32 and WMI interfaces for management and configuration. The iSCSI initiator service supports four discovery mechanisms:

  — **iSNS (Internet Storage Name Service)** The addresses of the iSNS servers that the iSCSI initiator service will use are statically configured using the iscsicli AddiSNSServer command.

  — **SendTargets** The SendTarget portals are statically configured using the iscsicli AddTargetPortal command.

  — **Host Bus Adapter Discovery** iSCSI HBAs that conform to the iSCSI initiator service interfaces can participate in target discovery by means of an interface between the HBA and the iSCSI initiator service.

  — **Manually Configured Targets** iSCSI targets can be manually configured using the iscsicli AddTarget command or with the iSCSI Control Panel applet.

- **Management applications** These include Iscsicli.exe, a command-line tool for managing iSCSI device connections and security, and the corresponding Control Panel application.
Some vendors produce iSCSI adapters that offload the iSCSI protocol to hardware. The initiator service works with these adapters, which must support the iSNS protocol (RFC 4171), so that all iSCSI devices, including those discovered by the initiator service and those discovered by iSCSI hardware, are recognized and managed through standard Windows interfaces.

**Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers**

Most disk devices have one path—or series of adapters, cables, and switches—between them and a computer. Servers requiring high levels of availability use multipathing solutions, where more than one set of connection hardware exists between the computer and a disk so that if a path fails, the system can still access the disk via an alternate path. Without support from the operating system or disk drivers, however, a disk with two paths, for example, appears as two different disks. Windows includes multipath I/O support to manage multipath disks as a single disk. This support relies on built-in or third-party drivers called device-specific modules (DSMs) to manage details of the path management—for example, load balancing policies that choose which path to use for routing requests and error detection mechanisms to inform Windows when a path fails. Built into Windows is a DSM (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Msdsms.sys) that works with all storage arrays that conform to the industry standard (T10 SPC4 specification) definition of asymmetric logical unit arrays (ALUA). Storage array vendors must write their own DSM if the modules are not ALUA-compliant. Support for writing a DSM is now part of the Windows Driver Kit. MPIO support is available as an optional feature for Windows Server 2008/R2, which must be installed via Server Manager. MPIO is not available on client editions of Windows.

In a Windows MPIO storage stack, shown in Figure 9-4, the disk driver includes functionality for MPIO devices, which in older versions of Windows was a separate driver (Mpdev.sys). Disk.sys is responsible for claiming ownership of device objects representing multipath disks—so that it can ensure that only one device object is created to represent those disks—and for locating the appropriate DSM to manage the paths to the device. The Multipath Bus Driver (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Mpio.sys) manages connections between the computer and the device, including power management for the device. Disk.sys informs Mpio.sys of the presence of the devices for it to manage. The port driver
(and the miniport drivers beneath it) for a multipath disk is not MPIO-aware and does not participate in anything related to handling multiple paths. There are a total of three disk device stacks, two representing the physical paths (children of the adapter device stacks) and one representing the disk (child of the MPIO adapter device stack). When the latter receives a request, it uses the DSM to determine which path to forward that request to. The DSM makes the selection based on policy, and the request is sent to the corresponding disk device stack, which in turn forwards it to the device via the corresponding adapter.

The system crash dump and hibernation mechanisms operate in a very restricted environment (very little operating system and device driver support). Drivers operating in this environment have some knowledge of MPIO, but there are limits as to what can be supported. For example, if one path to a disk is down, Windows can failover only to another disk that is controlled by the same miniport driver.
MPIO configuration management is provided through MPClaim (%SystemRoot%\System32\Mpclaim.exe) and a disk properties tab in Explorer.

**EXPERIMENT: WATCHING PHYSICAL DISK I/O**

Diskmon from Windows Sysinternals ([www.microsoft.com/technet/sysinternals](http://www.microsoft.com/technet/sysinternals)) uses the disk class driver’s Event Tracing for Windows (or ETW, which is described in Chapter 3, “System Mechanisms,” in Part 1) instrumentation to monitor I/O activity to physical disks and display it in a window. Diskmon updates once a second with new data. For each operation, Diskmon shows the time, duration, target disk number, type and offset, and length, as you can see in the screen shown here.

![Disk Monitor - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com](image)

**Disk Device Objects**

The Windows disk class driver creates device objects that represent disks. Device objects that represent disks have names of the form \Device\HarddiskX\DRX; the number that identifies the disk replaces both Xs. To maintain compatibility with applications that use older naming conventions, the disk class driver creates symbolic links with Windows NT 4–formatted names that refer to the device objects the driver created. For example, the volume manager driver creates the link \Device\Harddisk0\Partition0 to refer to \Device\Harddisk0\DR0, and \Device\Harddisk0\Partition1 to refer to the first partition device object of the first disk. For backward compatibility with applications that expect legacy names, the disk class driver also creates the same symbolic links in Windows that represent physical drives that it would have created on Windows NT 4 systems. Thus, for example, the link \GLOBAL??\PhysicalDrive0 references \Device\Harddisk0\DR0. **Figure 9-5** shows the WinObj utility from Sysinternals displaying the contents of a Harddisk directory for a basic disk. You can see the physical disk and partition device objects in the pane at the right.
As you saw in Chapter 3 in Part 1, the Windows API is unaware of the Windows object manager namespace. Windows reserves two groups of namespace subdirectories to use, one of which is the \Global?? subdirectory. (The other group is the collection of per-session \BaseNamedObjects subdirectories, which are covered in Chapter 3.) In this subdirectory, Windows makes available device objects that Windows applications interact with—including COM and parallel ports—as well as disks. Because disk objects actually reside in other subdirectories, Windows uses symbolic links to connect names under \Global?? to objects located elsewhere in the namespace. For each physical disk on a system, the I/O manager creates a \Global??\PhysicalDriveX link that points to \Device\HarddiskX\DRX. (Numbers, starting from 0, replace X.) Windows applications that directly interact with the sectors on a disk open the disk by calling the Windows CreateFile function and specifying the name \\PhysicalDriveX (in which X is the disk number) as a parameter. (Note that directly accessing a mounted disk’s sectors requires administrator privileges.) The Windows application layer converts the name to \Global??\PhysicalDriveX before handing the name to the Windows
Partition Manager

The partition manager, %SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Partmgr.sys, is responsible for discovering, creating, deleting, and managing partitions. To become aware of partitions, the partition manager acts as the function driver for disk device objects created by disk class drivers. The partition manager uses the I/O manager’s IoReadPartitionTableEx function to identify partitions and create device objects that represent them. As miniport drivers present the disks that they identify early in the boot process to the disk class driver, the disk class driver invokes the IoReadPartitionTableEx function for each disk. This function invokes sector-level disk I/O that the class, port, and miniport drivers provide to read a disk’s MBR (Master Boot Record) or GPT (GUID Partition Table; described later in this chapter), constructs an internal representation of the disk’s partitioning, and returns a PDRIVE_LAYOUT_INFORMATION_EX structure. The partition manager driver creates device objects to represent each primary partition (including logical drives within extended partitions) that the driver obtains from IoReadPartitionTableEx. These names have the form \Device\HarddiskVolumeY, where Y represents the partition number.

The partition manager is also responsible for ensuring that all disks and partitions have a unique ID (a signature for MBR and a GUID for GPT). If it encounters two disks with the same ID, it tries to determine (by writing to one disk and reading from the other) whether they are two different disks or the same disk being viewed via two different paths (this can happen if the MPIO software isn’t present or isn’t working correctly). If the two disks are different, the partition manager makes only one available for use by the upper layers of the storage stack, bringing them online and keeping the others offline. Disk-management utilities and storage APIs can force an offline disk online, however the partition manager will change the ID in doing so to prevent conflicts.

By managing disk attributes that are persisted in the registry (such as read-only and offline), the partition manager can perform actions such as hiding partitions from the volume manager, which inhibits the volumes from manifesting on the system. Clustering and Hyper-V use these attributes. The partition manager also redirects
write operations that are sent directly to the disk but fall within a partition space to the corresponding volume manager. The volume manager determines whether to allow the write operation based on whether the volume is dismounted or not.
Volume Management

Windows has the concept of basic and dynamic disks. Windows calls disks that rely exclusively on the MBR-style or GPT partitioning scheme basic disks. Dynamic disks implement a more flexible partitioning scheme than that of basic disks. The fundamental difference between basic and dynamic disks is that dynamic disks support the creation of new multipartition volumes. Recall from the list of terms earlier in the chapter that multipartition volumes provide performance, sizing, and reliability features not supported by simple volumes. Windows manages all disks as basic disks unless you manually create dynamic disks or convert existing basic disks (with enough free space) to dynamic disks. Microsoft recommends that you use basic disks unless you require the multipartition functionality of dynamic disks.

NOTE

Windows does not support multipartition volumes on basic disks. For a number of reasons, including the fact that laptops usually have only one disk and laptop disks typically don’t move easily between computers, Windows uses only basic disks on laptops. In addition, only fixed disks can be dynamic, and disks located on IEEE 1394 or USB buses or on shared cluster server disks are by default basic disks.

Basic Disks

This section describes the two types of partitioning, MBR-style and GPT, that Windows uses to define volumes on basic disks and the volume manager driver that presents the volumes to file system drivers. Windows silently defaults to defining all disks as basic disks.

MBR-Style Partitioning

The standard BIOS implementations that BIOS-based (non-EFI) x86 (and x64) hardware uses dictate one requirement of the partitioning format in Windows—that the first sector of the primary disk contains the Master Boot Record (MBR). When a BIOS-based x86 system boots, the computer’s BIOS reads the MBR and treats part of the MBR’s contents as executable code. The BIOS invokes the MBR code to initiate an operating system boot process after the BIOS performs preliminary configuration of the computer’s hardware. In Microsoft operating
systems such as Windows, the MBR also contains a partition table. A partition table consists of four entries that define the locations of as many as four primary partitions on a disk. The partition table also records a partition’s type. Numerous predefined partition types exist, and a partition’s type specifies which file system the partition includes. For example, partition types exist for FAT32 and NTFS.

A special partition type, an extended partition, contains another MBR with its own partition table. The equivalent of a primary partition in an extended partition is called a logical drive. By using extended partitions, Microsoft’s operating systems overcome the apparent limit of four partitions per disk. In general, the recursion that extended partitions permit can continue indefinitely, which means that no upper limit exists to the number of possible partitions on a disk. The Windows boot process makes evident the distinction between primary and logical drives. The system must mark one primary partition of the primary disk as active (bootable). The Windows code in the MBR loads the code stored in the first sector of the active partition (the system volume) into memory and then transfers control to that code. Because of the role in the boot process played by this first sector in the primary partition, Windows designates the first sector of any partition as the boot sector. As you will see in Chapter 13, every partition formatted with a file system has a boot sector that stores information about the structure of the file system on that partition.

GUID Partition Table Partitioning

As part of an initiative to provide a standardized and extensible firmware platform for operating systems to use during their boot process, Intel designed the Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) specification, originally for the Itanium processor. Intel donated EFI to the Unified EFI Forum, which has continued to evolve UEFI for x86, x64, and ARM CPUs. UEFI includes a mini–operating system environment implemented in firmware (typically flash memory) that operating systems use early in the system boot process to load system diagnostics and their boot code. UEFI defines a partitioning scheme, called the GUID (globally unique identifier) Partition Table (GPT) that addresses some of the shortcomings of MBR-style partitioning. For example, the sector addresses that the GPT structures use are 64 bits wide instead of 32 bits. A 32-bit sector address is sufficient to access only 2 terabytes (TB) of storage, while a GPT allows the addressing of disk sizes into the
foreseeable future. Other advantages of the GPT scheme include the fact that it uses cyclic redundancy checksums (CRC) to ensure the integrity of the partition table, and it maintains a backup copy of the partition table. GPT takes its name from the fact that in addition to storing a 36-byte Unicode partition name for each partition, it assigns each partition a GUID.

Figure 9-6 shows a sample GPT partition layout. As in MBR-style partitioning, the first sector of a GPT disk is an MBR (protective MBR) that serves to protect the GPT partitioning in case the disk is accessed from a non-GPT-aware operating system. However, the second and last sectors of the disk store the GPT headers with the actual partition table following the second sector and preceding the last sector. With its extensible list of partitions, GPT partitioning doesn’t require nested partitions, as MBR partitions do.

![Figure 9-6. Example GPT partition layout](image)

**NOTE**

Because Windows doesn’t support the creation of multipartition volumes on basic disks, a new basic disk partition is the equivalent of a volume. For this reason, the Disk Management MMC snap-in uses the term partition when you create a volume on a basic disk.

**Basic Disk Volume Manager**

The volume manager driver (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Volmgr.sys) creates disk device objects that represent volumes on basic disks and plays an integral role in managing all basic disk volumes, including simple volumes. For
each volume, the volume manager creates a device object of the form Device\HarddiskVolumeX, in which X is a number (starting from 1) that identifies the volume.

The volume manager is actually a bus driver because it’s responsible for enumerating basic disks to detect the presence of basic volumes and report them to the Windows Plug and Play (PnP) manager. To implement this enumeration, the volume manager leverages the PnP manager, with the aid of the partition manager (Partmgr.sys) driver to determine what basic disk partitions exist. The partition manager registers with the PnP manager so that Windows can inform the partition manager whenever the disk class driver creates a partition device object. The partition manager informs the volume manager about new partition objects through a private interface and creates filter device objects that the partition manager then attaches to the partition objects. The existence of the filter objects prompts Windows to inform the partition manager whenever a partition device object is deleted so that the partition manager can update the volume manager. The disk class driver deletes a partition device object when a partition in the Disk Management MMC snap-in is deleted. As the volume manager becomes aware of partitions, it uses the basic disk configuration information to determine the correspondence of partitions to volumes and creates a volume device object when it has been informed of the presence of all the partitions in a volume’s description.

Windows volume drive-letter assignment, a process described shortly, creates drive-letter symbolic links under the \Global?? object manager directory that point to the volume device objects that the volume manager creates. When the system or an application accesses a volume for the first time, Windows performs a mount operation that gives file system drivers the opportunity to recognize and claim ownership for volumes formatted with a file system type they manage. (Mount operations are described in the section Volume Mounting later in this chapter.)

Dynamic Disks

As we’ve stated, dynamic disks are the disk format in Windows necessary for creating multipartition volumes such as mirrors, striped arrays, and RAID-5 arrays (described later in the chapter). Dynamic disks are partitioned using Logical Disk Manager (LDM) partitioning. LDM is part of the Virtual Disk Service (VDS)
subsystem in Windows, which consists of user-mode and device driver components and oversees dynamic disks. A major difference between LDM’s partitioning and MBR-style and GPT partitioning is that LDM maintains one unified database that stores partitioning information for all the dynamic disks on a system—including multipartition-volume configuration.

The LDM Database

The LDM database resides in a 1-MB reserved space at the end of each dynamic disk. The need for this space is the reason Windows requires free space at the end of a basic disk before you can convert it to a dynamic disk. The LDM database consists of four regions, which Figure 9-7 shows: a header sector that LDM calls the Private Header, a table of contents area, a database records area, and a transactional log area. (The fifth region shown in Figure 9-7 is simply a copy of the Private Header.) The Private Header sector resides 1 MB before the end of a dynamic disk and anchors the database. As you spend time with Windows, you’ll quickly notice that it uses GUIDs to identify just about everything, and disks are no exception. A GUID (globally unique identifier) is a 128-bit value that various components in Windows use to uniquely identify objects. LDM assigns each dynamic disk a GUID, and the Private Header sector notes the GUID of the dynamic disk on which it resides—hence the Private Header’s designation as information that is private to the disk. The Private Header also stores the name of the disk group, which is the name of the computer concatenated with Dg0 (for example, Daryl-Dg0 if the computer’s name is Daryl), and a pointer to the beginning of the database table of contents. For reliability, LDM keeps a copy of the Private Header in the disk’s last sector.

The database table of contents is 16 sectors in size and contains information regarding the database’s layout. LDM begins the database record area immediately following the table of contents with a sector that serves as the database record header. This sector stores information about the database record area, including the number of records it contains, the name and GUID of the disk group the database relates to, and a sequence number identifier that LDM uses for the next entry it creates in the database. Sectors following the database record header contain 128-byte fixed-size records that store entries that describe the disk group’s partitions and volumes.
A database entry can be one of four types: partition, disk, component, and volume. LDM uses the database entry types to identify three levels that describe volumes. LDM connects entries with internal object identifiers. At the lowest level, partition entries describe soft partitions (hard partitions are described later in this chapter), which are contiguous regions on a disk; identifiers stored in a partition entry link the entry to a component and disk entry. A disk entry represents a dynamic disk that is part of the disk group and includes the disk’s GUID. A component entry serves as a connector between one or more partition entries and the volume entry each partition is associated with. A volume entry stores the GUID of the volume, the volume’s total size and state, and a drive-letter hint. Disk entries that are larger than a database record span multiple records; partition, component, and volume entries rarely span multiple records.

LDM requires three entries to describe a simple volume: a partition, component, and volume entry. The following listing shows the contents of a simple LDM database that defines one 200-MB volume that consists of one partition:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disk Entry</th>
<th>Volume Entry</th>
<th>Component Entry</th>
<th>Partition Entry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name: Disk1</td>
<td>Name: Volume1</td>
<td>Name: Volume1-01</td>
<td>Name: Disk1-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUID: XXX-XX...</td>
<td>ID: 0x408</td>
<td>ID: 0x409</td>
<td>ID: 0x407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disk ID: 0x404</td>
<td>State: ACTIVE</td>
<td>Parent ID: 0x408</td>
<td>Parent ID: 0x409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size: 200MB</td>
<td>GUID: XXX-XX...</td>
<td>Disk ID: 0x404</td>
<td>Start: 300MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drive Hint: H:</td>
<td>Size: 200MB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The partition entry describes the area on a disk that the system assigned to the volume, the component entry connects the partition entry with the volume entry, and the volume entry contains the GUID that Windows uses internally to identify the volume. Multipartition volumes require more than three entries. For example, a striped volume (which is described later in the chapter) consists of at least two partition entries, a component entry, and a volume entry. The only volume type that has more than one component entry is a mirror; mirrors have two component
entries, each of which represents one half of the mirror. LDM uses two component entries for mirrors so that when you break a mirror, LDM can split it at the component level, creating two volumes with one component entry each.

The final area of the LDM database is the transactional log area, which consists of a few sectors for storing backup database information as the information is modified. This setup safeguards the database in case of a crash or power failure because LDM can use the log to return the database to a consistent state.

**EXPERIMENT: USING LDMDUMP TO VIEW THE LDM DATABASE**

You can use LDMDump from Sysinternals to view detailed information about the contents of the LDM database. LDMDump takes a disk number as a command-line argument, and its output is usually more than a few screens in size, so you should pipe its output to a file for viewing in a text editor—for example, ldmdump /d0 > disk.txt. The following example shows excerpts of LDMDump output. The LDM database header displays first, followed by the LDM database records that describe a 12-GB disk with three 4-GB dynamic volumes. The volume’s database entry is listed as Volume1. At the end of the output, LDMDump lists the soft partitions and definitions of volumes it locates in the database.

```plaintext
C:\>ldmdump /d0
Logical Disk Manager Configuration Dump v1.03
Copyright (C) 2000-2002 Mark Russinovich

PRIVATE HEAD:
Signature : PRIVHEAD
Version : 2.12
Disk Id : b5f4a801-758d-11dd-b7f0-000c297f0108
Host Id : 1b77da20-c717-11d0-a5be-00a0c91db73c
Disk Group Id : b5f4a7fd-758d-11dd-b7f0-000c297f0108
Disk Group Name : WIN-SL5V78KD01W-Dg0
Logical disk start : 3F
Logical disk size : 7FF7C1 (4094 MB)
Configuration start: 7FF800
Configuration size : 800 (1 MB)
Number of TOCs : 2
TOC size : 7FD (1022 KB)
Number of Configs : 1
Config size : 5C9 (740 KB)
Number of Logs : 1
Log size : E0 (112 KB)

TOC 1:
Signature : TOCBLOCK
Sequence : 0x1
Config bitmap start: 0x11
Config bitmap size : 0x5C9
Log bitmap start : 0x5DA
Log bitmap size : 0xE0

VBLK DATABASE:
0x000004: [000001] <DiskGroup>
  Name : WIN-SL5V78KD01W-Dg0
  Object Id : 0x0001
```
GUID : b5f4a7fd-758d-11dd-b7f0-000c297f010
0x000006: [000003] <Disk>
 Name : Disk1
 Object Id : 0x0002
 Disk Id : b5f4a7fe-758d-11dd-b7f0-000c297f010

0x000007: [000005] <Disk>
 Name : Disk2
 Object Id : 0x0003
 Disk Id : b5f4a801-758d-11dd-b7f0-000c297f010

0x000008: [000007] <Disk>
 Name : Disk3
 Object Id : 0x0004
 Disk Id : b5f4a804-758d-11dd-b7f0-000c297f010

0x000009: [000009] <Component>
 Name : Volume1-01
 Object Id : 0x0006
 Parent Id : 0x0005

0x00000A: [00000A] <Partition>
 Name : Disk1-01
 Object Id : 0x0007
 Parent Id : 0x3157
 Disk Id : 0x0000
 Start : 0x7C100
 Size : 0x0 (0 MB)
 Volume Off : 0x3 (0 MB)

0x00000B: [00000B] <Partition>
 Name : Disk2-01
 Object Id : 0x0008
 Parent Id : 0x3157
 Disk Id : 0x0000
 Start : 0x7C100
 Size : 0x0 (0 MB)
 Volume Off : 0x7FE80003 (1047808 MB)

0x00000C: [00000C] <Partition>
 Name : Disk3-01
 Object Id : 0x0009
 Parent Id : 0x3157
 Disk Id : 0x0000
 Start : 0x7C100
 Size : 0x0 (0 MB)
 Volume Off : 0xFFD00003 (2095616 MB)

0x00000D: [00000F] <Volume>
 Name : Volume1
 Object Id : 0x0005
 Volume state: ACTIVE
 Size : 0x017FB800 (12279 MB)
 GUID : b5f4a806-758d-11dd-b7f0-c297f0108
 Drive Hint : E:

LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning
When you install Windows on a computer, one of the first things it requires you to do is to create a partition on the system's primary physical disk (specified in the BIOS or UEFI as the disk from which to boot the system). To make enabling BitLocker easier, Windows Setup will create a small (100 MB) unencrypted partition known as the system volume, containing the Boot Manager (Bootmgr), Boot Configuration Database (BCD), and other early boot files. (By default, this volume does not have a drive letter assigned to it, but you can assign one using the Disk Management MMC snap-in, at %SystemRoot%\System32\Diskmgmt.msc, if you want to examine the contents of the volume with Windows Explorer). In addition, Windows Setup requires you to create a partition that serves as the home for the boot volume, onto which the setup program installs the Windows system files and creates the system directory (\Windows). The nomenclature that Microsoft defines for system and boot volumes is somewhat confusing. The system volume is where Windows places boot files, such as the Boot Manager, and the boot volume is where Windows stores the rest of the operating system files, such as Ntoskrnl.exe, the core kernel file.

**NOTE**

If the system has BitLocker enabled, the boot volume will be encrypted, but the system volume is never encrypted.

Although the partitioning data of a dynamic disk resides in the LDM database, LDM implements MBR-style partitioning or GPT partitioning so that the Windows boot code can find the system and boot volumes when the volumes are on dynamic disks. (Winload and the Itanium firmware, for example, know nothing about LDM partitioning.) If a disk contains the system or boot volumes, partitions in the MBR or GPT describe the location of those volumes. Otherwise, one partition encompasses the entire usable area of the disk. LDM marks this partition as type “LDM”. The region encompassed by this place-holding MBR-style or GPT partition is where LDM creates partitions that the LDM database organizes. On MBR-partitioned disks the LDM database resides in hidden sectors at the end of the disk, and on GPT-partitioned disks there exists an LDM metadata partition that contains the LDM database near the beginning of the disk. Another reason LDM creates an MBR or a GPT is so that legacy disk-management
utilities, including those that run under Windows and under other operating systems in dual-boot environments, don’t mistakenly believe a dynamic disk is unpartitioned.

Because LDM partitions aren’t described in the MBR or GPT of a disk, they are called soft partitions; MBR-style and GPT partitions are called hard partitions. Figure 9-8 illustrates this dynamic disk layout on an MBR-style partitioned disk.

![Figure 9-8. Internal dynamic disk organization](image)

**Dynamic Disk Volume Manager**

The Disk Management MMC snap-in DLL (DMDiskManager, located in %SystemRoot%\System32\Dmdskmgr.dll), shown in Figure 9-9, is used to create and change the contents of the LDM database. When you launch the Disk Management MMC snap-in, DMDiskManager loads into memory and reads the LDM database from each disk and returns the information it obtains to the user. If it detects a database from another computer’s disk group, it notes that the volumes on the disk are foreign and lets you import them into the current computer’s database if you want to use them. As you change the configuration of dynamic disks, DMDiskManager updates its in-memory copy of the database. When DMDiskManager commits changes, it passes the updated database to the VolMgrX driver (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Volmgrx.sys). VolMgrX is a kernel-mode DLL that provides dynamic disk functionality for VolMgr, so it controls access to the on-disk database and creates device objects that represent the volumes on dynamic disks. When you exit Disk Management, DMDiskManager stops.
Multipartition Volume Management

VolMgr is responsible for presenting volumes that file system drivers manage and for mapping I/O directed at volumes to the underlying partitions that they’re part of. For simple volumes, this process is straightforward: the volume manager ensures that volume-relative offsets are translated to disk-relative offsets by adding the volume-relative offset to the volume’s starting disk offset.

Multipartition volumes are more complex because the partitions that make up a volume can be located on discontiguous partitions or even on different disks. Some types of multipartition volumes use data redundancy, so they require more involved volume-to-disk–offset translation. Thus, VolMgr uses VolMgrX to process all I/O requests aimed at the multipartition volumes they manage by determining which partitions the I/O ultimately affects.

The following types of multipartition volumes are available in Windows:

- Spanned volumes
- Mirrored volumes
- Striped volumes
- RAID-5 volumes

After describing multipartition-volume partition configuration and logical operation
for each of the multipartition-volume types, we’ll cover the way that the VolMgr
driver handles IRPs that a file system driver sends to multipartition volumes. The
term volume manager is used to represent VolMgr and the VolMgrX extension DLL throughout the explanation of multipartition volumes.

**Spanned Volumes**

A spanned volume is a single logical volume composed of a maximum of 32 free partitions on one or more disks. The Disk Management MMC snap-in combines the partitions into a spanned volume, which can then be formatted for any of the Windows-supported file systems. Figure 9-10 shows a 100-GB spanned volume identified by drive letter D that has been created from the last third of the first disk and the first third of the second. Spanned volumes were called volume sets in Windows NT 4.

A spanned volume is useful for consolidating small areas of free disk space into one larger volume or for creating a single large volume out of two or more small disks. If the spanned volume has been formatted for NTFS, it can be extended to include additional free areas or additional disks without affecting the data already stored on the volume. This extensibility is one of the biggest benefits of describing all data on an NTFS volume as a file. NTFS can dynamically increase the size of a logical volume because the bitmap that records the allocation status of the volume is just another file—the bitmap file. The bitmap file can be extended to include any space added to the volume. Dynamically extending a FAT volume, on the other hand, would require the FAT itself to be extended, which would dislocate everything else on the disk.

A volume manager hides the physical configuration of disks from the file systems
installed on Windows. NTFS, for example, views volume D: in Figure 9-10 as an ordinary 100-GB volume. NTFS consults its bitmap to determine what space in the volume is free for allocation. After translating a byte offset to a cluster offset, it then calls the volume manager to read or write data beginning at a particular cluster offset on the volume. The volume manager views the physical sectors in the spanned volume as numbered sequentially from the first free area on the first disk to the last free area on the last disk. It determines which physical sector on which disk corresponds to the supplied cluster offset.

**Striped Volumes**

A striped volume is a series of up to 32 partitions, one partition per disk, that gets combined into a single logical volume. Striped volumes are also known as RAID level 0 (RAID-0) volumes. Figure 9-11 shows a striped volume consisting of three partitions, one on each of three disks. (A partition in a striped volume need not span an entire disk; the only restriction is that the partitions on each disk be the same size.)

To a file system, this striped volume appears to be a single 450-GB volume, but the volume manager optimizes data storage and retrieval times on the striped volume by distributing the volume’s data among the physical disks. The volume manager accesses the physical sectors of the disks as if they were numbered sequentially in stripes across the disks, as illustrated in Figure 9-12.
Because each stripe unit is a relatively narrow 64 KB (a value chosen to prevent small individual reads and writes from accessing two disks), the data tends to be distributed evenly among the disks. Striping thus increases the probability that multiple pending read and write operations will be bound for different disks. And because data on all three disks can be accessed simultaneously, latency time for disk I/O is often reduced, particularly on heavily loaded systems.

Spanned volumes make managing disk volumes more convenient, and striped volumes spread the I/O load over multiple disks. These two volume-management features don’t provide the ability to recover data if a disk fails, however. For data recovery, the volume manager implements two redundant storage schemes: mirrored volumes and RAID-5 volumes. These features are created with the Windows Disk Management administrative tool.

**Mirrored Volumes**

In a mirrored volume, the contents of a partition on one disk are duplicated in an equal-sized partition on another disk. Mirrored volumes are sometimes referred to as RAID level 1 (RAID-1). A mirrored volume is shown in Figure 9-13.

![Figure 9-13. Mirrored volume](image)

When a program writes to drive C:, the volume manager writes the same data to the same location on the mirror partition. If the first disk or any of the data on its C: partition becomes unreadable because of a hardware or software failure, the volume manager automatically accesses the data from the mirror partition. A mirror volume can be formatted for any of the Windows-supported file systems. The file system drivers remain independent and are not affected by the volume manager’s mirroring activity.

Mirrored volumes can aid in read I/O throughput on heavily loaded systems. When
I/O activity is high, the volume manager balances its read operations between the primary partition and the mirror partition (accounting for the number of unfinished I/O requests pending from each disk). Two read operations can proceed simultaneously and thus theoretically finish in half the time. When a file is modified, both partitions of the mirror set must be written, but disk writes are performed in parallel, so the performance of user-mode programs is generally not affected by the extra disk update.

Mirrored volumes are the only multipartition volume type supported for system and boot volumes. The reason for this is that the Windows boot code, including the MBR code and Winload, don’t have the sophistication required to understand multipartition volumes—mirrored volumes are the exception because the boot code treats them as simple volumes, reading from the half of the mirror marked as the boot or system drive in the MBR-style partition table. Because the boot code doesn’t modify the disk metadata and will read or write to the same half of the mirrored set, it can safely ignore the other half of the mirror; however, the Boot Manager and OS loader will update the file \Boot\BootStat.dat on the system volume. This file is used only to communicate status between the various phases of booting, so, again, it does not need to be written to the other half of the mirror.

### EXPERIMENT: WATCHING MIRRORED VOLUME I/O OPERATIONS

Using the Performance Monitor, you can verify that write operations directed at mirrored volumes copy to both disks that make up the mirror and that read operations, if relatively infrequent, occur primarily from one half of the volume. This experiment requires three hard disks. If you don’t have three disks, you can skip the experiment setup instructions and view the Performance tool screen shot in this experiment that demonstrates the experiment’s results.

Use the Disk Management MMC snap-in to create a mirrored volume. To do this, perform the following steps:

1. Run Disk Management by starting Computer Management, expanding the Storage tree, and clicking Disk Management (or by inserting Disk Management as a snap-in in an MMC console).
2. Right-click on an unallocated space of a drive, and then click New Simple Volume.
3. Follow the instructions in the New Simple Volume Wizard to create a simple volume. (Make sure there’s enough room on another disk for a volume of the same size as the one you’re creating.)
4. Right-click on the new volume, and then click Add Mirror on the context menu.

Once you have a mirrored volume, run the Performance Monitor tool and add counters for the PhysicalDisk performance object for both disk instances that contain a partition belonging to the mirror. Select the Disk Writes/sec counters for each instance. Select a large directory from the third disk (the one that isn’t part of...
the mirrored volume), and copy it to the mirrored volume. The Performance Monitor tool output window should look something like the following screen shot as the copy operation progresses.

![Performance Monitor screenshot](image)

The top two lines, which overlap throughout the timeline, are the Disk Writes/sec counters for each disk. The screen shot reveals that the volume manager (in this case VolMgr) is writing the copied file data to both halves of the volume.

**RAID-5 Volumes**

A RAID-5 volume is a fault tolerant variant of a regular striped volume. RAID-5 volumes implement RAID level 5. They are also known as striped volumes with rotated parity because they are based on the striping approach taken by striped volumes. Fault tolerance is achieved by reserving the equivalent of one disk for storing parity for each stripe. **Figure 9-14** is a visual representation of a RAID-5 volume.

In **Figure 9-14**, the parity for stripe 1 is stored on disk 1. It contains a byte-for-byte logical sum (XOR) of the first stripe units on disks 2 and 3. The parity for stripe 2 is stored on disk 2, and the parity for stripe 3 is stored on disk 3. Rotating the parity across the disks in this way is an I/O optimization technique. Each time data is written to a disk, the parity bytes corresponding to the modified bytes must be recalculated and rewritten. If the parity were always written to the same disk, that disk would be busy continually and could become an I/O bottleneck.
Recovering a failed disk in a RAID-5 volume relies on a simple arithmetic principle: in an equation with n variables, if you know the value of n – 1 of the variables, you can determine the value of the missing variable by subtraction. For example, in the equation \( x + y = z \), where \( z \) represents the parity stripe unit, the volume manager computes \( z - y \) to determine the contents of \( x \); to find \( y \), it computes \( z - x \). The volume manager uses similar logic to recover lost data. If a disk in a RAID-5 volume fails or if data on one disk becomes unreadable, the volume manager reconstructs the missing data by using the XOR operation (bitwise logical addition).

If disk 1 in Figure 9-14 fails, the contents of its stripe units 2 and 5 are calculated by XOR-ing the corresponding stripe units of disk 3 with the parity stripe units on disk 2. The contents of stripes 3 and 6 on disk 1 are similarly determined by XOR-ing the corresponding stripe units of disk 2 with the parity stripe units on disk 3. At least three disks (or, rather, three same-sized partitions on three disks) are required to create a RAID-5 volume.

**The Volume Namespace**

The volume namespace mechanism handles the assignment of drive letters to device objects that represent actual volumes, which lets Windows applications access these drives through familiar means, and also provides mount and dismount functionality.

**The Mount Manager**

The Mount Manager device driver (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Mountmgr.sys) assigns drive letters for dynamic disk volumes and basic disk volumes created after Windows is installed,
CD-ROMs, floppies, and removable devices. Windows stores all drive-letter assignments under HKLM\SYSTEM\MountedDevices. If you look in the registry under that key, you’ll see values with names such as \\
??\Volume{X} (where X is a GUID) and values such as \\DosDevices\C:. Every volume has a volume name entry, but a volume doesn’t necessarily have an assigned drive letter (for example, the system volume). Figure 9-15 shows the contents of an example Mount Manager registry key. Note that the MountedDevices key isn’t included in a control set and so isn’t protected by the last known good boot option. (See the section Last Known Good in Chapter 13 for more information on control sets and the last known good boot option.)

![Registry Editor](image)

**Figure 9-15. Mounted devices listed in the Mount Manager’s registry key**

The data that the registry stores in values for basic disk volume drive letters and volume names is the disk signature and the starting offset of the first partition associated with the volume. The data that the registry stores in values for dynamic disk volumes includes the volume’s VolMgr-internal GUID. When the Mount Manager initializes during the boot process, it registers with the Windows Plug and Play subsystem so that it receives notification whenever a device identifies itself as a volume. When the Mount Manager receives such a notification, it determines the new volume’s GUID or disk signature and uses the GUID or signature as a guide
to look in its internal database, which reflects the contents of the MountedDevices registry key. The Mount Manager then determines whether its internal database contains the drive-letter assignment. If the volume has no entry in the database, the Mount Manager asks VolMgr for a suggested drive-letter assignment and stores that in the database. VolMgr doesn’t return suggestions for simple volumes, but it looks at the drive-letter hint in the volume’s database entry for dynamic volumes.

If no suggested drive-letter assignment exists for a dynamic volume, the Mount Manager uses the first unassigned drive letter (if one exists), defines a new assignment, creates a symbolic link for the assignment (for example, \\Global??\D:), and updates the MountedDevices registry key. If there are no available drive letters, no drive-letter assignment is made. At the same time, the Mount Manager creates a volume symbolic link (that is, \\Global??\Volume\{X\}) that defines a new volume GUID if the volume doesn’t already have one. This GUID is different from the volume GUIDs that VolMgr uses internally.

**Mount Points**

Mount points let you link volumes through directories on NTFS volumes, which makes volumes with no drive-letter assignment accessible. For example, an NTFS directory that you've named C:\Projects could mount another volume (NTFS or FAT) that contains your project directories and files. If your project volume had a file you named \CurrentProject\Description.txt, you could access the file through the path C:\Projects\CurrentProject\Description.txt. What makes mount points possible is reparse point technology. (Reparse points are discussed in more detail in Chapter 12.)

A reparse point is a block of arbitrary data with some fixed header data that Windows associates with an NTFS file or directory. An application or the system defines the format and behavior of a reparse point, including the value of the unique reparse point tag that identifies reparse points belonging to the application or system and specifies the size and meaning of the data portion of a reparse point. (The data portion can be as large as 16 KB.) Any application that implements a reparse point must supply a file system filter driver to watch for reparse-related return codes for file operations that execute on NTFS volumes, and the driver must take appropriate action when it detects the codes. NTFS returns a reparse status code whenever it processes a file operation and encounters a file or directory with
an associated reparse point.

The Windows NTFS file system driver, the I/O manager, and the object manager all partly implement reparse point functionality. The object manager initiates pathname parsing operations by using the I/O manager to interface with file system drivers. Therefore, the object manager must retry operations for which the I/O manager returns a reparse status code. The I/O manager implements pathname modification that mount points and other reparse points might require, and the NTFS file system driver must associate and identify reparse point data with files and directories. You can therefore think of the I/O manager as the reparse point file system filter driver for many Microsoft-defined reparse points.

One common use of reparse points is the symbolic link functionality offered on Windows by NTFS (see Chapter 12 for more information on NTFS symbolic links). If the I/O manager receives a reparse status code from NTFS and the file or directory for which NTFS returned the code isn’t associated with one of a handful of built-in Windows reparse points, no filter driver claimed the reparse point. The I/O manager then returns an error to the object manager that propagates as a “file cannot be accessed by the system” error to the application making the file or directory access.

Mount points are reparse points that store a volume name (\Global\Volume{X}) as the reparse data. When you use the Disk Management MMC snap-in to assign or remove path assignments for volumes, you’re creating mount points. You can also create and display mount points by using the built-in command-line tool Mountvol.exe (%SystemRoot%\System32\Mountvol.exe).

The Mount Manager maintains the Mount Manager remote database on every NTFS volume in which the Mount Manager records any mount points defined for that volume. The database file resides in the directory System Volume Information on the NTFS volume. Mount points move when a disk moves from one system to another and in dual-boot environments—that is, when booting between multiple Windows installations—because of the existence of the Mount Manager remote database. NTFS also keeps track of reparse points in the NTFS metadata file \$Extend\$Reparse. (NTFS doesn’t make any of its metadata files available for viewing by applications.) NTFS stores reparse point information in the metadata file so that Windows can, for example, easily enumerate the mount points (which
are reparse points) defined for a volume when a Windows application, such as Disk Management, requests mount-point definitions.

**Volume Mounting**

Because Windows assigns a drive letter to a volume doesn’t mean that the volume contains data that has been organized in a file system format that Windows recognizes. The volume-recognition process consists of a file system claiming ownership for a partition; the process takes place the first time the kernel, a device driver, or an application accesses a file or directory on a volume. After a file system driver signals its responsibility for a partition, the I/O manager directs all IRPs aimed at the volume to the owning driver. Mount operations in Windows consist of three components: file system driver registration, volume parameter blocks (VPBs), and mount requests.

**NOTE**

The partition manager honors the system SAN policy, which can be set with the Windows DiskPart utility, that specifies whether it should surface disks for visibility to the volume manager. The default policy in Windows Server 2008 Enterprise and Datacenter editions is to not make SAN disks visible, which prevents the system from aggressively mounting their volumes.

The I/O manager oversees the mount process and is aware of available file system drivers because all file system drivers register with the I/O manager when they initialize. The I/O manager provides the IoRegisterFileSystem function to local disk (rather than network) file system drivers for this registration. When a file system driver registers, the I/O manager stores a reference to the driver in a list that the I/O manager uses during mount operations.

Every device object contains a VPB data structure, but the I/O manager treats VPBs as meaningful only for volume device objects. A VPB serves as the link between a volume device object and the device object that a file system driver creates to represent a mounted file system instance for that volume. If a VPB’s file system reference is empty (VPB->DeviceObject == NULL), no file system has mounted the volume. The I/O manager checks a volume device object’s VPB whenever an open API that specifies a file name or a directory name on a volume device object executes.

For example, if the Mount Manager assigns drive letter D to the second volume on
a system, it creates a \Global??\D: symbolic link that resolves to the device object \Device\HarddiskVolume2. A Windows application that attempts to open the \Temp\Test.txt file on the D: drive specifies the name D:\Temp\Test.txt, which the Windows subsystem converts to \Global??\D:\Temp\Test.txt before invoking NtCreateFile, the kernel’s file-open routine. NtCreateFile uses the object manager to parse the name, and the object manager encounters the \Device\HarddiskVolume2 device object with the path \Temp\Test.txt still unresolved. At that point, the I/O manager checks to see whether \Device\HarddiskVolume2’s VPB references a file system. If it doesn’t, the I/O manager asks each registered file system driver via a mount request whether the driver recognizes the format of the volume in question as the driver’s own.

EXPERIMENT: LOOKING AT VPBS

You can look at the contents of a VPB by using the !vpb kernel debugger command. Because the VPB is pointed to by the device object for a volume, you must first locate a volume device object. To do this, you must dump the volume manager’s driver object, locate a device object that represents a volume, and display the device object, which reveals its Vpb field.

```
lkd> !drvobj volmgr
Driver object (84905030) is for:
\Driver\volmgr
Driver Extension List: (id , addr)

Device Object list:
84a64780  849d5b28  84a64518  84a64030
84905e00
```

The !drvobj command lists the addresses of the device objects a driver owns. In this example, there are five device objects. One of them represents the programmatic (control) interface to the device driver, and the rest are volume device objects. Because the objects are listed in reverse order from the way that they were created and the driver creates the control device object first, the first device object listed is that of a volume. Now execute the !devobj kernel debugger command on the volume device object address:

```
lkd> !devobj 84a64780
Device object (84a64780) is for:
HarddiskVolume4 \Driver\volmgr DriverObject 84905030
Current Irp 00000000 RefCount 0 Type 00000007 Flags 00001050
Vpb 84a64228 Dacl 8b1a8674 DevExt 84a64838 DevObjExt 84a64930 Dope 849fd838
DevNode 849d5938
ExtensionFlags (0x00000800) Unknown flags 0x00000800
AttachedDevice (Upper) 84a66020 \Driver\volsnap
Device queue is not busy
```

The !devobj command shows the Vpb field for the volume device object. (The device object shown is named HarddiskVolume4.) Now you’re ready to execute the !vpb command:

```
lkd> !vpb 84a64228
```
The command reveals that the volume device object is mounted by a file system driver that has assigned the volume the name OS. The RealDevice field in the VPB points back to the volume device object, and the DeviceObject field points to the mounted file system device object. You can use !devobj on this address to get more information on the mounted file system, as seen in the following output, which shows that NTFS has mounted the volume:

```
[lkd] !devobj 0x84a6b020
Device object (84a6b020) is for:
  \FileSystem\Ntfs DriverObject 84a02ad0
  Current Irp 00000000 RefCount 0 Type 00000008 Flags 00040000
  DevExt 84a6b0d8 DevObjExt 84a6bc00
  ExtensionFlags (0x00000800)
  Unknown flags 0x00000800
  AttachedDevice (Upper) 84a63ac0 \FileSystem\FltMgr
  Device queue is not busy
```

The convention followed by file system drivers for recognizing volumes mounted with their format is to examine the volume’s boot record (VBR), which is stored in the first sector of the volume. Boot records for Microsoft file systems contain a field that stores a file system format type. File system drivers usually examine this field, and if it indicates a format they manage, they look at other information stored in the boot record. This information usually includes a file system name field and enough data for the file system driver to locate critical metadata files on the volume. NTFS, for example, will recognize a volume only if the MBR partition Type field is NTFS (0x07), the Name field is “NTFS,” and the critical metadata files described by the boot record are consistent.

If a file system driver signals affirmatively, the I/O manager fills in the VPB and passes the open request with the remaining path (that is, \Temp\Test.txt) to the file system driver. The file system driver completes the request by using its file system format to interpret the data that the volume stores. After a mount fills in a volume device object’s VPB, the I/O manager hands subsequent open requests aimed at the volume to the mounted file system driver. If no file system driver claims a volume, Raw—a file system driver built into Ntoskrnl.exe—claims the volume and fails all requests to open files on that partition; however, Raw does allow sector I/O to the partition for applications with administrator privileges, but even an administrator cannot write to sectors of a mounted volume, except for the boot sectors. Figure 9-
16 shows a simplified example (that is, the figure omits the file system driver’s interactions with the Windows cache and memory managers) of the path that I/O directed at a mounted volume follows.

Instead of having every file system driver loaded, regardless of whether they have any volumes to manage, Windows tries to minimize memory usage by using a surrogate driver named File System Recognizer (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Fs_rec.sys) to perform preliminary file system recognition. File System Recognizer knows enough about each file system format that Windows supports to be able to examine a boot record and determine whether it’s associated with a Windows file system driver. When the system boots, File System Recognizer registers as a file system driver, and when the I/O manager calls it during a file system mount operation for a new volume, File System Recognizer loads the appropriate file system driver if the VBR describes a file system that isn’t loaded. After loading a file system driver, File System Recognizer forwards the mount IRP to the file system driver and lets it claim ownership of the volume.

Aside from the boot volume, which a driver mounts while the kernel is initializing, file system drivers mount most volumes when the Chkdsk file system consistency-checking application runs during a boot sequence. The boot-time version of Chkdsk is a native application (as opposed to a Win32 application) named
Autochk.exe (%SystemRoot%\System32\Autochk.exe), and the Session Manager (%SystemRoot%\System32\Smss.exe) runs it because it is specified as a boot-run program in the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\BootExecute value. Autochk accesses each drive letter to see whether the volume associated with the letter requires a consistency check.

One place in which mounting can occur more than once for the same disk is with removable media. Windows file system drivers respond to media changes by querying the disk’s volume identifier. If they see the volume identifier change, the driver dismounts the disk and attempts to remount it.

**Volume I/O Operations**

File system drivers manage data stored on volumes but rely on the volume manager to interact with storage drivers to transfer data to and from the disk or disks on which a volume resides. File system drivers obtain references to the volume manager’s volume objects through the mount process and then send the volume manager requests via the volume objects. Applications can also send the volume manager requests, bypassing file system drivers, when they want to directly manipulate a volume’s data. File-undelete programs are an example of applications that do this.

Whenever a file system driver or an application sends an I/O request to a device object that represents a volume, the Windows I/O manager routes the request (which comes in an IRP—a self-contained package, described in Chapter 8) to the volume manager that created the target device object. Thus, if an application (running with administrator privileges) wants to read the boot sector of the second volume on the system (which is a simple volume in this example), it opens a handle to \\.\HarddiskVolume2 and then calls ReadFile to read 512 bytes starting at offset zero on the device. (Both the starting byte offset and length must be a multiple of the sector size.) The I/O manager sends the application’s request in the form of an IRP to the volume manager that owns the device object, notifying it that the IRP is directed at the HarddiskVolume2 device.

Because volumes are logical conveniences that Windows uses to represent contiguous areas on one or more physical disks, the volume manager must translate offsets that are relative to a volume to offsets that are relative to the beginning of a
disk. If volume 2 consists of one partition that begins 4,096 sectors into the disk, the partition manager would adjust the IRP’s parameters to designate an offset with that value before passing the request to the disk class driver. The disk class driver uses a miniport driver to carry out physical disk I/O, and reads the requested data into an application buffer designated in the IRP.

Some examples of a volume manager’s operations will help clarify its role when it handles requests aimed at multipartition volumes. If a striped volume consists of two partitions, partition 1 and partition 2, the VolMgr device object intercepts file system disk I/O aimed at the device object for the volume, and the VolMgr driver adjusts the request before passing it to the disk class driver. The adjustment that VolMgr makes configures the request to refer to the correct offset of the request’s target stripe on either partition 1 or partition 2. If the I/O spans both partitions of the volume, VolMgr must issue two associated I/O requests, one aimed at each disk. This is shown in Figure 9-17.

In the case of writes to a mirrored volume, VolMgr splits each request so that each half of the mirror receives the write operation. For mirrored reads, VolMgr performs a read from half of a mirror, relying on the other half when a read operation fails.
Virtual Disk Service

A company that makes storage products such as RAID adapters, hard disks, or storage arrays has to implement custom applications for installing and managing their devices. The use of different management applications for different storage devices has obvious drawbacks from the perspective of system administration. These drawbacks include learning multiple interfaces and the inability to use standard Windows storage management tools to manage third-party storage devices.

Windows includes the Virtual Disk Service (or VDS, located at %SystemRoot%\System32\Vds.exe), which provides a unified high-level storage interface so that administrators can manage storage devices from different vendors using the same user interfaces. VDS is shown in Figure 9-18. VDS exports a COM-based API that allows applications to create and format disks and to view and manage hardware RAID adapters. For example, a utility can use the VDS API to query the list of physical disks that map to a RAID logical unit number (LUN). Windows disk-management utilities, including the Disk Management MMC snap-in and the DiskPart and DiskRAID command-line tools, use VDS APIs.
VDS supplies two interfaces, one for software providers and one for hardware providers:

- Software providers implement interfaces to high-level storage abstractions such as disks, disk partitions, and volumes. Examples of operations supported by these interfaces include creating, extending, and deleting volumes; adding or breaking mirrors; and formatting and assigning drive letters. VDS looks for registered software providers in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Vds\SoftwareProviders, which contains subkeys whose names are GUIDs. Within each subkey is a value named ClsId, which specifies the COM class ID, and these are listed in HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\<ClsId>. Windows includes the VDS Dynamic Provider (%SystemRoot%\System32\Vdsdyn.dll) for interfacing to dynamic disks and the VDS Basic Provider (%SystemRoot%\System32\Vdsbas.dll) for interfacing to basic disks.
Hardware vendors implement VDS hardware providers as DLLs that register under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Vds\HardwareProviders and that translate device-independent VDS commands into commands for their hardware. The hardware provider allows for management of a storage subsystem such as a hardware RAID array or an adapter card, and supported operations include creating, extending, deleting, masking, and unmasking LUNs.

When an application initiates a connection to the VDS API and the VDS service isn’t started, the Svchost process hosting the RPC service starts the VDS loader process (%SystemRoot%\System32\Vdsldr.exe), which starts the VDS service process and then exits. When the last connection to the VDS API closes, the VDS service process exits.
Virtual Hard Disk Support

Windows includes extensive built-in support for VHD (Virtual Hard Disk, the Microsoft virtual machine disk format) files. Using disk-management utilities, you can create, delete, and merge VHDs, as well as attach them to the system as though they were physical disks. Windows also includes support for booting Windows installations stored in NTFS volumes within VHDs.

There are three types of VHDs, all of which are supported by the VHD functionality in Windows:

- **Dynamic** The VHD does not necessarily contain all the blocks it is advertising (thinly provisioned) and will be grown as necessary, up to its maximum size. In other words, the amount of space being consumed by the VHD is equal to the amount of data that is being stored in it (plus a small amount of overhead for the VHD container).

- **Fixed** The VHD is of fixed size, cannot grow, and contains all the disk blocks it is advertising (fully provisioned).

- **Differencing** Similar to a dynamic VHD, but contains only the sectors that would have been modified when compared with a parent VHD (which is read-only). The parent VHD may be of any of the three VHD types (including another differencing VHD). Differencing VHDs are generally used for taking a snapshot of the state of a parent VHD. That state can then be recovered by simply deleting the differencing VHD. This is often used in checkpointing virtual machines (VMs) to enable the user to return the VM to a particular state. Note that the differencing VHD must be kept in the same directory as the parent VHD.

When presented to the system, the standard partition manager and volume manager mounting volume recognition and mounting processes take place, making file systems stored in the VHD accessible using Windows file system APIs and utilities.

VHDs can be contained within a VHD, so Windows limits the number of nesting levels of VHDs that it will present to the system as a disk to two, with the maximum number of nesting levels specified by the registry value HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\FsDepends\Parameters\VirtualDiskMa
Mounting VHDs can be prevented by setting the registry value HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\FsDepends\Parameters\VirtualDiskNoLocalMount to 1.

Windows can also boot from a VHD. A bootable VHD may be created from scratch during installation (when booting the Windows installation disk) or from a running system using various tools, including ImageX or Sysinternals’s Disk2VHD. That “system in a VHD” can be run under Virtual PC or Hyper-V (on Windows Server), and Windows Ultimate and Enterprise editions can directly boot from a VHD.

Windows also extends its support of VHDs to all its built-in disk-management utilities. Creating, mounting, and dismounting a VHD can be done while Windows is running using the Disk Management MMC snap-in (%SystemRoot%\System32\Diskmgmt.msc) or the DiskPart (%SystemRoot%\System32\Diskpart.exe) command-line tool. These tools are implemented using Virtual Disk Service (VDS) APIs, which can also be used by third-party utilities for managing and manipulating VHDs.

**Attaching VHDs**

The root enumerated bus driver Vdrvroot (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Vdrvroot.sys) creates a physical device object (PDO) for each nested file system to be mounted. The PnP manager loads the Vhdmp (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Vhdmp.sys) Storport miniport driver as the function driver on the PDO, exposing what to the rest of the system looks like a physical disk. The I/O manager then layers the rest of the storage stack (disk class driver, partition manager, volume manager, and file system driver) on top of the device stack (DevStack) containing Vhdmp. When Vhdmp receives sector read and write requests, it translates those requests into offsets within the VHD file and then forwards the requests to the storage stack where the VHD file is located.

**Nested File Systems**

To support nested file systems, a dependency tree is created to track which file systems have dependencies on other file systems. This is important for several systemwide operations to function properly, such as dismounting a volume
(dependent file systems would have to be dismounted first), system shutdown (similar to volume dismounting), and volume snapshots (dependent volumes need to be flushed before the parent during a FlushAndHold operation). Dependencies are tracked by a file system minifilter driver (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Fsdepends.sys), which sits above the file system driver. Dependencies are tracked by Fsdepends using PnP removal relations, instead of parent-child relationships, because removal relations are more dynamic and are queried at run time rather than set up statically. (This is important because nested drivers can set up additional dependency relationships after a VHD is mounted.)

As far as most Windows components are concerned, a mounted VHD volume is identical to a volume residing on a physical disk, with the limitations that neither paging files, the hibernation file, or the crash dump file can be located on a mounted VHD and VHDs cannot be larger than 2 TB.
BitLocker Drive Encryption

An operating system can enforce its security policies only while it’s active, so you have to take additional measures to protect data when the physical security of a system can be compromised and the data accessed from outside the operating system. Hardware-based mechanisms such as BIOS passwords and encryption are two technologies commonly used to prevent unauthorized access, especially on laptops, which are the computers most likely to be lost or stolen.

While Windows supports the Encrypting File System (EFS), you can’t use EFS to protect access to sensitive areas of the system, such as the registry hive files. For example, if Group Policy allows you to log on to your laptop even when you’re not connected to a domain, then your domain credential verifiers are cached in the registry, so an attacker could use tools to obtain your domain account password hash and use that to try to obtain your password with a password cracker. The password would provide access to your account and EFS files (assuming you didn’t store the EFS key on a smartcard). To make it easy to encrypt the entire boot volume, including all its system files and data, Windows includes a full-volume encryption feature called Windows BitLocker Drive Encryption.

BitLocker operates in two modes:

- **Standard** Protects the fixed disks in a system.
- **BitLocker To Go** Protects removable disks formatted using the FAT file system, including USB flash disks.

In standard mode, BitLocker helps prevent unauthorized access to data on lost or stolen computers by combining two major data-protection procedures:

- Encrypting the entire Windows operating system volume on the hard disk.
- Verifying the integrity of early boot components and boot configuration data.

The most secure implementation of BitLocker leverages the enhanced security capabilities of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) version 1.2. The TPM is a cryptographic coprocessor installed in many newer computers by computer manufacturers. The TPM implements a variety of functions, including public key cryptography. Information on the operation of the TPM can be found at
The TPM works with BitLocker to help protect user data and to ensure that a computer running Windows has not been tampered with while the system was offline. On computers that do not have a TPM version 1.2, BitLocker can still encrypt the Windows operating system volume. However, this implementation requires the user to insert a USB startup flash disk to start the computer or resume from hibernation, and it does not provide the full offline and preboot protection that a TPM-enabled system does.

BitLocker’s architecture provides functionality and management mechanisms in both kernel mode and user mode. At a high level, the main components of BitLocker are:

- The Trusted Platform Module driver (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Tpm.sys), a kernel-mode driver that accesses the TPM chip.

- The TPM Base Services, which include a user-mode service that provides user-mode access to the TPM (%SystemRoot%\System32\Tbssvc.dll), a WMI provider, and an MMC snap-in for configuration (%SystemRoot%\System32\Tpm.msc).

- The BitLocker-related code in the Boot Manager (\Bootmgr, on the system volume) that authenticates access to the disk, handles boot-related unlocking, and allows recovery.

- The BitLocker filter driver (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Fvevol.sys), a kernel-mode filter driver that performs on-the-fly encryption and decryption of the volume.

- The BitLocker WMI provider and management script, which allow configuration and scripting of the BitLocker interface.

In the next sections, we’ll take a look at these various components and the services they provide. Figure 9-19 provides an overview of the BitLocker architecture.
Encryption Keys

BitLocker encrypts the contents of the volume using a full-volume encryption key (FVEK) and cryptography that uses the AES128-CBC (by default) or AES256-CBC algorithm, with a Microsoft-specific extension called a diffuser. In turn, the FVEK is encrypted with a volume master key (VMK) and stored in a special metadata region of the volume. Securing the volume master key is an indirect way of protecting data on the volume: the addition of the volume master key allows the system to be rekeyed easily when keys upstream in the trust chain are lost or compromised. This ability to rekey the system saves the time and expense of decrypting and re-encrypting the entire volume again.

When you configure BitLocker, you have a number of options for how the VMK will be protected, depending on the system’s hardware capabilities. If the system...
has a TPM, you can encrypt the VMK with the TPM, have the system encrypt the VMK using a key stored in the TPM and one stored on a USB flash device, encrypt the VMK using a TPM-stored key and a PIN you enter when the system boots, or encrypt the VMK with a combination of both a PIN and a USB flash device. For systems that don’t have a compatible TPM, BitLocker offers the option of encrypting the VMK using a key stored on an external USB flash device.

In any case you’ll need an unencrypted 100-MB NTFS system volume, the volume where the Boot Manager and BCD are stored, because the MBR and boot-sector code are legacy code, run in 16-bit real mode (as discussed in Chapter 13), and do not have the ability to perform any on-the-fly decryption of the same volume they’re running on. This means that these components must remain on an unencrypted volume so that the BIOS can access them and they can run and locate Bootmgr.

As covered earlier in this chapter, the system volume is created automatically when Windows is installed on a system, regardless of whether or not you are using BitLocker. This places the system volume at the beginning of the disk (the first partition), which keeps the rest of the disk contiguous.

Figure 9-20 and Table 9-1 summarize the various ways in which the VMK can be generated.

Table 9-1. VMK Sources

| Source                  | Identifies                        | Security                                              | User Impact                          |
|------------------------|-----------------------------------|                                                      |                                      |
| TPM only               | What it is                        | Protects against software attacks, but vulnerable to hardware attacks. | None                                  |
| TPM + PIN              | What it is + What you know        | Adds protection against most hardware attacks as well. | User must enter PIN each boot        |
| TPM + USB key          | What it is + What you have        | Fully protects against hardware attacks, but vulnerable to stolen USB key. | User must insert USB key each boot   |
| TPM + USB key + PIN    | What it is + What you have + What you know | Maximum level of protection. | User must enter PIN and insert USB key each boot |
| USB key                | What you have                     | Minimum level of protection for                       | User must insert USB key each boot   |
only systems without TPM, but vulnerable to stolen key.

Finally, BitLocker also provides a simple encryption-based authentication scheme to ensure the integrity of the drive contents. Although AES encryption is currently considered uncrackable through brute-force attacks and is one of the most widely used algorithms in the industry today, it doesn’t provide a way to ensure that modified encrypted data can’t in some way be modified such that it is translated back to plaintext data that an attacker could make use of. For example, by precise manipulation of the encrypted data, a hacker might be able to cause a certain logon function to behave differently and allow all logons.
To protect the system against this type of attack, BitLocker includes a diffuser algorithm called Elephant. The job of the diffuser is to make sure that even a single bit change in the ciphertext (encrypted data) will result in a totally random plaintext data output, ensuring that the modified executable code will most likely arbitrarily crash instead of performing a specific malicious function. Additionally, when combined with code integrity (see Chapter 3 in Part 1 for more information on code integrity), the diffuser will also cause core system files to fail their signature.
checks, rendering the system unbootable.

**Trusted Platform Module (TPM)**

A TPM is a tamper-resistant processor mounted on a motherboard that provides various cryptographic services such as key and random number generation and sealed storage. Support for TPM in Windows reaches beyond supporting BitLocker, however. Through the TPM Base Services (TBS), other applications on the system can also take advantage of compatible hardware TPM chips and use WMI to administer and script access to the TPM. For example, Windows uses a TPM as an additional seed into random number generation, which enhances the overall security of all applications on the system that depend on strong security or hashing algorithms (including mechanisms such as logons).

Although your computer may have a TPM, that does not necessarily mean that Windows will be able to support it. There are two requirements for Windows TPM support:

- The computer must have a TPM version 1.2 or higher.
- The computer must have a Trusted Computing Group (TCG)–compliant BIOS. The BIOS establishes a chain of trust for the preboot environment and must include support for TCG-specific Static Root of Trust Measurement (SRTM).

The easiest way to determine whether your machine contains a compatible TPM is to run the TPM MMC snap-in (%SystemRoot%\System32\Tpm.msc). If Windows detects a compatible TPM, you should see a window similar to the one shown in Figure 9-21. Otherwise, an error message will appear.

As stated earlier, BitLocker can be configured to use the TPM to perform system integrity checks on critical early boot components. At a high level, the TPM collects and stores measurements from multiple early boot components and boot configuration data to create a system identifier (much like a fingerprint) for that computer. It stores each part of this fingerprint as a hash in a 160-bit platform configuration register (PCR). BitLocker uses the hash of these functions to seal the VMK, which is the key that BitLocker uses to protect other keys, including the FVEKs used to encrypt volumes.

If the early boot components are changed or tampered with, such as by changing
the BIOS or MBR, changing an operating system file, or moving the hard disk to a different computer, the TPM prevents BitLocker from unsealing the VMK, and Windows enters a key recovery mode (described later in the chapter). If the PCR values match those used to seal the key, the system is deemed to be tamper free, and it unseals the key, and BitLocker can decrypt the keys used to encrypt the volumes. Once the keys are unsealed, Windows starts and system protection becomes the responsibility of the user and the operating system.

![Figure 9-21. The TPM MMC snap-in after initializing the TPM.](image)

A platform validation profile supported by TPMs consists of at least 16, and as many as 24, PCRs that contain additional information and only reset after a TPM reset (implying a machine reboot). Each PCR is associated with components that run when an operating system starts, as shown in Table 9-2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPM Management on Local Computer</td>
<td>Configure the TPM and its support by the Windows platform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM Management on Local Computer</td>
<td>Overview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Windows computers containing the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) security hardware provide enhanced security features for applications. This snap displays information about the computer's TPM and allows administrators to configure the device. It also allows administrators to view and manage commands understood by the device.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>The TPM is on and ownership has been taken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM Management</td>
<td>Change TPM owner password</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clear the TPM to remove ownership and reset the TPM to factory defaults</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SendRNG: Deleting the TPM causes you to lose all TPM keys and data protected by those keys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM Manufacturer Information</td>
<td>Manufacturer Name: BRCM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manufacturer Version: 2.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Specification Version: 1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Links &amp; Resources</td>
<td>What is TPM initialization?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>When do I run the TPM to start?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>When do I change owner password?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>When do I clear the TPM?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How do I lock and allow TPM commands?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Where can I find out more about TPM commands?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9-2. Platform Configuration Registers
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Core Root of Trust of Measurement (CRTM), BIOS, and platform extensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Platform and motherboard configuration and data (BIOS data and CPU microcode)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Option ROM code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Option ROM configuration and data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Master Boot Record (MBR) code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Master Boot Record (MBR) partition table</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Power-state transition and wake events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Computer manufacturer-specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>First NTFS boot sector (volume boot record)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Remaining NTFS boot sectors (volume boot record)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Boot Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>BitLocker Access Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Defined for use by the static operating system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Defined for use by the static operating system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Defined for use by the static operating system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Defined for use by the static operating system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Used for debugging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Dynamic CRTM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Platform defined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Used by a trusted operating system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Used by a trusted operating system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Used by a trusted operating system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Used by a trusted operating system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Application support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By default, BitLocker uses registers 0, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, and 11 to seal the VMK.
The set of PCRs used by BitLocker is known as the Platform Validation Profile, which can be configured via Group Policy (Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\BitLocker Drive Encryption\Operating System Drives\Configure TPM platform validation profile) and depends on the security requirements of your organization, as shown in Table 9-2. PCR 11 must be selected to enable BitLocker protection.

**NOTE**

If you change anything protected by the PCRs specified in your Platform Validation Profile, your system will not boot without either the recovery key or recovery password. For example, if you need to update the BIOS on your system, suspend BitLocker (using the BitLocker Drive Encryption Control Panel applet) before performing the update.

**BitLocker Boot Process**

The actual measurements stored in the TPM PCRs are generated by the TPM itself, the TPM BIOS, and Windows. When the system boots, the TPM does a self-test, following which the CRTM in the BIOS measures its own hashing and PCR loading code and writes the hash to the first PCR of the TPM. It then hashes the BIOS and stores that measurement in the first PCR as well. The BIOS in turn hashes the next component in the boot sequence, the MBR of the boot drive, and this process continues until the operating system loader is measured. Each subsequent piece of code that runs is responsible for measuring the code that it loads and for storing the measurement in the appropriate PCR in the TPM.

Finally, when the user selects which operating system to boot, the Boot Manager (Bootmgr) reads the encrypted VMK from the volume and asks the TPM to unseal it. As described previously, only if all the measurements are the same as when the VMK was sealed, including the optional PIN (password), will the TPM successfully decrypt the VMK. This process not only guarantees that the machine and system files are identical to the applications or operating systems that are allowed to read the drive, but also verifies the uniqueness of the operating system installation. For example, even another identical Windows operating system installed on the same machine will not get access to the drive because Bootmgr takes an active role in protecting the VMK from being passed to an operating system to which it doesn’t belong (by generating a MAC hash of several system
You can think of this scheme as a verification chain, where each component in the boot sequence describes the next component to the TPM. In effect, the TPM acts like a safe with 12 combination dials, with each dial containing 2,160 numbers. Only if all the PCRs match the original ones given to it when BitLocker was enabled will the TPM divulge its secret. BitLocker therefore protects the encrypted data even when the disk is removed and placed in another system, the system is booted using a different operating system, or the unencrypted files on the boot volume are compromised. Figure 9-22 shows the various steps of the preboot process up until Winload begins loading the operating system.

The administrator may need to temporarily suspend BitLocker protection because a component specified in the Platform Validation Profile needs to be changed (for example, updating BIOS, changing a drive’s partition table, installing another operating system on the same disk, and so on). The BitLocker Drive Encryption Control Panel applet provides a simple mechanism for suspending BitLocker (click Suspend Protection for the volume). When BitLocker is suspended, the contents of the volume are still encrypted, but the volume master key is encrypted with a symmetric clear key, which is written to the volume’s BitLocker metadata. When a volume is mounted, BitLocker automatically looks for a clear key and will be able to decrypt the contents of the volume. When BitLocker protection on a volume is resumed, the clear key is removed from the metadata.
NOTE
Exposing the volume master key even for a brief period of time is a security risk because an attacker could access the volume master key and FVEK when these keys were exposed by the clear key, so do not leave a volume suspended for any longer than absolutely necessary.

BitLocker Key Recovery

For recovery purposes, BitLocker uses a recovery key (stored on a USB device) or a recovery password (numerical password), as shown earlier in Figure 9-20. BitLocker creates the recovery key and recovery password during initialization. A copy of the VMK is encrypted with a 256-bit AES-CCM key that can be computed with the recovery password and a salt stored in the metadata block. The password is a 48-digit number, eight groups of 6 digits, with three properties for checksumming:

- Each group of 6 digits must be divisible by 11. This check can be used to identify groups mistyped by the user.
- Each group of 6 digits must be less than \(216 \times 11\). Each group contains 16 bits of key information. The eight groups, therefore, hold 128 bits of key.
- The sixth digit in each group is a checksum digit.

Inserting the recovery key or typing the recovery password enables an authorized user to regain access to the encrypted volume in the event of an attempted security breach or system failure. Figure 9-23 displays the prompt requesting the user to type the recovery password.
The recovery key or password is also used in cases when parts of the system have changed, resulting in different measurements. One common example of this is when a user has modified the BCD, such as by adding the debug option. Upon reboot, Bootmgr will detect the change and ask the user to validate it by inputting the recovery key. For this reason, it is extremely important not to lose this key, because it isn’t only used for recovery but for validating system changes. Another application of the recovery key is for foreign volumes. Foreign volumes are operating system volumes that were BitLocker-enabled on another computer and have been transferred to a different Windows computer. An administrator can unlock these volumes by entering the recovery password.

**Full-Volume Encryption Driver**

Unlike EFS, which is implemented by the NTFS file system driver and operates at the file level, BitLocker encrypts at the volume level using the full-volume encryption (FVE) driver (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Fvevol.sys), as shown in Figure 9-24.
FVE is a filter driver, so it automatically sees all the I/O requests sent to the volume, encrypting blocks as they’re written and decrypting them as they’re read using the FVEK assigned to the volume when it’s initially configured to use BitLocker. Because the encryption and decryption happen beneath NTFS in the I/O system, the volume appears to NTFS as if it’s unencrypted, and NTFS is not aware that BitLocker is enabled. If you attempt to read data from the volume from outside Windows, however, it appears to be random data.

BitLocker also uses an extra measure to make plaintext attacks in which an attacker knows the contents of a sector and uses that information to try and derive the key used to encrypt it more difficult. By combining the FVEK with the sector number to create the key used to encrypt a particular sector, and passing the encrypted data through the Elephant diffuser, BitLocker ensures that every sector is encrypted with a slightly different key, resulting in different encrypted data for different sectors even if their contents are identical.

BitLocker encrypts every sector (including unallocated sectors) on a volume with the exception of the first sector and three unencrypted metadata blocks containing the encrypted VMK and other data used by BitLocker. The metadata is surfaced in the volume’s System Volume Information directory.

**BitLocker Management**
BitLocker provides a variety of administrative interfaces, each suited to a particular role or task. It provides a WMI interface (and works with the TBS—TPM Base Services—WMI interface) for programmatic access to the BitLocker functionality, a set of group policies that allow administrators to define the behavior across the network or a series of machines, integration with Active Directory, and a command-line management program (%SystemRoot%\System32\Manage-bde.exe).

Developers and system administrators with scripting familiarity can access the Win32_Tpm and Win32_EncryptableVolume interfaces to protect keys, define authentication methods, define which PCR registers are used as part of the BitLocker Platform Validation Profile, and manually initiate encryption or decryption of an entire volume. The Manage-bde.exe program, located in %SystemRoot%\System32, uses these interfaces to allow command-line management of the BitLocker service.

On systems that are joined to a domain, the key for each machine can automatically be backed up as part of a key escrow service, allowing IT administrators to easily recover and gain access to machines that are part of the corporate network. Additionally, various group policies related to BitLocker can be configured. You can access these by using the Local Group Policy Editor, under the Computer Configuration, Administrative Templates, Windows Components, BitLocker Drive Encryption entry. For example, Figure 9-25 displays the option for enabling the Active Directory key backup functionality.

If a TPM chip is present on the system, additional options (such as TPM Key Backup) can be accessed from the Trusted Platform Module Services entry under Windows Components.

To ensure easy access to corporate data, the Data Recovery Agent (DRA) feature has been added to BitLocker. The DRA is most commonly configured via Group Policy and allows a certificate to be specified as a key protector. This allows anyone holding that certificate (or a smartcard containing the certificate) to access (or unlock) a BitLocker-protected volume. See http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd875560(WS.10).aspx for more information on configuring DRA.
BitLocker To Go

USB flash disks have become a popular method for transporting data because of their small size, low cost, and large capacity. However, it is precisely these qualities that make USB flash disks a security threat. Gigabytes of confidential information can be stored on a device the size of an AA battery that is easily lost or stolen. Standard BitLocker only encrypts NTFS volumes, and all USB flash disks use the FAT file system by default. BitLocker To Go (BTG) now brings the security of BitLocker full-volume encryption to disk devices using the FAT file system. BTG-encrypted flash disks can be created only on the Enterprise, Ultimate, or Server editions of Windows. They can be read on any edition—even on older operating systems such as Windows XP and Windows Vista—but can be written only on Windows 7 or Windows Server 2008/R2. To ensure that BTG is used, Group Policy can be used to restrict writing to removable media unless it is protected with BTG.

Like standard BitLocker, BTG encrypts the volume using AES, the decryption key is encrypted with multiple key protectors, and a recovery key can be saved to a file or escrowed through Active Directory. Unlike standard BitLocker, BTG does not make use of the TPM or public key cryptography. One of the key protectors may be either a user-supplied password or a smartcard.
BTG can be enabled in Explorer (right-click on the flash disk, and select Turn On BitLocker) or from the BitLocker Control Panel applet. Once it’s enabled, BTG will create a FAT32 discovery volume containing the files shown in Figure 9-26. The purpose of the discovery volume is to provide the stand-alone BitLockerToGo application and its MUI files (user interface strings in various languages) and metadata to the host operating system.

The encrypted volume is implemented as one or more cover files, named COV 0000. ER to COV 9999. ER, each of which can have a maximum size of 4 GB, as shown in Figures Figure 9-26 and Figure 9-27. Any extra space left on the volume will be filled with padding files to prevent any additional files from being added to the discovery volume.
When the BitLockerToGo application mounts the encrypted virtual volume, the discovery volume will be hidden and is not accessible. The virtual volume may then be accessed like any other disk.
Volume Shadow Copy Service

The Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) is a built-in Windows mechanism that enables the creation of consistent, point-in-time copies of data, known as shadow copies or snapshots. VSS coordinates with applications, file-system services, backup applications, fast-recovery solutions, and storage hardware to produce consistent shadow copies.

Shadow Copies

Shadow copies are created through one of two mechanisms—clone and copy-on-write. The VSS provider (described in more detail later) determines the method to use. (Providers can implement the snapshot as they see fit. For example, certain hardware providers will take a hybrid approach: clone first, and then copy-on-write.)

Clone Shadow Copies

A clone shadow copy, also called a split mirror, is a full duplicate of the original data on a volume, created either by software or hardware mirroring. Software or hardware keeps a clone synchronized with the master copy until the mirror connection is broken in order to create a shadow copy. At that moment, the live volume (also called the original volume) and the shadow volume become independent. The live volume is writable and still accepts changes, but the shadow volume is read-only and stores contents of the live volume at the time it was created.

Copy-on-Write Shadow Copies

A copy-on-write shadow copy, also called a differential copy, is a differential, rather than a full, duplicate of the original data. Similar to a clone copy, differential copies can be created by software or hardware mechanisms. Whenever a change is made to the live data, the block of data being modified is copied to a “differences area” associated with the shadow copy before the change is written to the live data block. Overlaying the modified data on the live data creates a view of the live data at the point in time when the shadow copy was created.
**NOTE**

The in-box VSS provider that ships with Windows supports only copy-on-write shadow copies.

---

**VSS Architecture**

VSS (%SystemRoot%\System32\Vssvc.exe) coordinates VSS writers, VSS providers, and VSS requestors. A VSS writer is a software component that enables shadow-copy-aware applications, such as Microsoft SQL Server, Microsoft Exchange Server, and Active Directory, to receive freeze and thaw notifications to ensure that backup copies of their data files are internally consistent. Implementing a VSS provider allows an ISV or IHV with unique storage schemes to integrate with the shadow copy service. For instance, an IHV with mirrored storage devices might define a shadow copy as the frozen half of a split mirrored volume. VSS requestors are the applications that request the creation of volume shadow copies and include backup utilities and the Windows System Restore feature. Figure 9-28 shows the relationship between the VSS shadow copy service, writers, providers, and requestors.

![Figure 9-28. VSS architecture](image)

**VSS Operation**

Regardless of the specific purpose for the copy and the application making use of VSS, shadow copy creation follows the same steps, shown in Figure 9-29. First, a requestor sends a command to VSS to enumerate writers, gather metadata, and prepare for the copy (1). VSS asks each writer to return information on its restore capabilities and an XML description of its backup components (2). Next, each
writer prepares for the copy in its own appropriate way, which might include completing outstanding transactions and flushing caches. A prepare command is sent to all involved providers as well (3).

At this point, VSS initiates the commit phase of the copy (4). VSS instructs each writer to quiesce its data and temporarily freeze all write I/O requests (read requests are still passed through). VSS then flushes volume file system buffers and requests that the volume file system drivers freeze their I/O by sending them the IOCTL_VOLSNAP_FLUSH_AND_HOLD_WRITES device I/O control command, ensuring that all the file system metadata is written out to disk consistently (5). Once the system is in this state, VSS sends a command telling the provider to perform the actual copy creation (6). VSS allows up to 10 seconds for the creation, after which it aborts the operation if it is not already completed in this interval. After the provider has created the shadow copy, VSS asks the file systems to thaw, or resume write I/O operations, by sending them the IOCTL_VOLSNAP_RELEASE_WRITES command, and it releases the writers from their temporary freeze. All queued write I/O operations then proceed (7).

VSS next queries the writers to confirm that I/O operations were successfully held during the creation to ensure that the created shadow copy is consistent. If the shadow copy is inconsistent as the result of file system damage, the shadow copy is deleted by VSS. In other cases of writer failure, VSS simply notifies the requestor. At this point, the requestor can retry the procedure from (1) or wait for user action. If the copy was created consistently, VSS tells the requestor the location of the copy.

An optional final step is to make the snapshot device(s) writable, such that interested writers such as TxF (transactional NTFS) can perform additional recovery actions on the snapshot device itself. After this recovery step, the snapshot is sealed read-only and handed out to the requestor.

NOTE

VSS also allows the surfacing of shadow copy devices on a different server—called transportable shadow copies.
**Shadow Copy Provider**

The Shadow Copy Provider (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Swprov.dll) implements software-based differential copies with the aid of the Volume Shadow Copy Driver (Volsnap—%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Volsnap.sys). Volsnap is a storage filter driver that resides between file system drivers and volume manager drivers (the drivers that present views of the sectors that represent a volume) so that the I/O system forwards it I/O operations directed at a volume.

When asked by VSS to create a shadow copy, Volsnap queues I/O operations directed at the target volume and creates a differential file in the volume’s System Volume Information directory to store volume data that subsequently changes. Volsnap also creates a virtual volume through which applications can access the shadow copy. For example, if a volume’s name in the object manager namespace is \Device\HarddiskVolume1, the shadow volume would have a name like \Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopyN, where N is a unique ID.

Whenever Volsnap sees a write operation directed at a live volume, it reads a copy of the sectors that will be overwritten into a paging file—a backed memory section that’s associated with the corresponding shadow copy. It services read operations directed at the shadow copy of modified sectors from this memory section, and it services reads to unmodified areas by reading from the live volume. Because the backup utility won’t save the paging file or the contents of the system-managed System Volume Information directory located on every volume (which includes
shadow copy differential files), Volsnap uses the defragmentation API to determine
the location of these files and directories and does not record changes to them.

Figure 9-30 demonstrates the behavior of applications accessing a volume and a
backup application accessing the volume’s shadow volume copy. When an
application writes to a sector after the snapshot time, the Volsnap driver makes a
backup copy, like it has for sectors a, b, and c of volume C: in the figure.
Subsequently, when an application reads from sector c, Volsnap directs the read to
volume C:, but when a backup application reads from sector c, Volsnap reads the
sector from the snapshot. When a read occurs for any unmodified sector, such as
d, Volsnap routes the read to volume C:.

NOTE

Volsnap avoids copy-on-write operations for the paging file, hibernation file, and the difference data stored
in the System Volume Information folder. All other files will get copy-on-write protection.

EXPERIMENT: LOOKING AT MICROSOFT SHADOW COPY PROVIDER FILTER
DEVICE OBJECTS
You can see the Microsoft Shadow Copy Provider driver’s device objects attached to each volume device on a Windows system in a kernel debugger. Every system has at least one volume, and the following command displays the device object of the first volume on a system:

```
1: kd> !devobj \device\harddiskvolume1
Device object (88cfd908) is for:
    HarddiskVolume1 \Driver\volmgr DriverObject 8861a550
    Current Irp 00000000 RefCount 3274 Type 00000007 Flags 00201150
    Vpb 88cfc3f8 Dacl 8bbcf7ec DevExt 88cfd9c0 DevObjExt 88cfdaa8 Dope
        88cfdb38 DevNode 88cfc008
    ExtensionFlags (0x00000800) DOE_DEFAULT_SD_PRESENT
    Characteristics (0000000000)
    AttachedDevice (Upper) 88cfd3b8 \Driver\fvevol
Device queue is not busy.
```

```
1: kd> !devstack 88cfd908
!DevObj   !DrvObj            !DevExt   ObjectName
88d015a0  \Driver\volsnap    88d01658
88cfc478  \Driver\rdyboost   88cfc530
88cfd3b8  \Driver\fvevol     88cfd470
> 88cfd908 \Driver\volmgr     88cfd9c0 HarddiskVolume1
!DevNode 88cfc008 :
    DeviceInst is "STORAGE\Volume\{53ffaec4-5e9c-11e1-a633-8066f66e963}#000000000100000"
    ServiceName is "volsnap"
```

The address of HarddiskVolume1’s device object (88cfd908) is passed to the !devstack command, which displays the device objects layered on top of it.

### Uses in Windows

Several features in Windows make use of VSS, including Backup, System Restore, Previous Versions, and Shadow Copies for Shared Folders. We’ll look at some of these uses and describe why VSS is needed and which VSS functionality is applicable to the applications.

### Backup

A limitation of many backup utilities relates to open files. If an application has a file open for exclusive access, a backup utility can’t gain access to the file’s contents. Even if the backup utility can access an open file, the utility runs the risk of creating an inconsistent backup. Consider an application that updates a file at its beginning and then at its end. A backup utility saving the file during this operation might record an image of the file that reflects the start of the file before the application’s modification and the end after the modification. If the file is later restored the application might deem the entire file corrupt because it might be prepared to handle the case where the beginning has been modified and not the end, but not vice versa. These two problems illustrate why most backup utilities
Instead of opening files to back up on the live volume, the backup utility opens them on the shadow volume. A shadow volume represents a point-in-time view of a volume, so by relying on the shadow copy facility, the backup utility overcomes both the backup problems related to open files.

**Previous Versions and System Restore**

The Windows Previous Versions feature also integrates support for automatically creating volume snapshots, typically one per day, that you can access through Explorer (by opening a Properties dialog box) using the same interface used by Shadow Copies for Shared Folders. This enables you to view, restore, or copy old versions of files and directories that you might have accidentally modified or deleted.

Windows also takes advantage of volume snapshots to unify user and system data-
protection mechanisms and avoid saving redundant backup data. When an application installation or configuration change causes incorrect or undesirable behaviors, you can use System Restore to restore system files and data to their state as it existed when a restore point was created. When you use the System Restore user interface in Windows 7 to go back to a restore point, you’re actually copying earlier versions of modified system files from the snapshot associated with the restore point to the live volume.

**EXPERIMENT: NAVIGATING THROUGH PREVIOUS VERSIONS**

As you saw earlier, each time Windows creates a new system restore point, this results in a shadow copy being taken for that volume. You can use Windows Explorer to navigate through time and see older copies of each drive being shadowed. To see a list of all previous versions of an entire volume, right-click on a partition, such as C:, and select Restore Previous Versions. You will see a dialog box similar to the one shown here.

![Screenshot of Windows Explorer with Restore Previous Versions dialog](image)

Pick any of the versions shown, and then click the Open button. This opens a new Explorer window displaying that volume at the point in time when the snapshot was taken. The path shown will include `localhost\C$\<volume label>` `(<drive>:)` `(<date>, <time>)`, which is how Explorer virtualizes the different shadow copies taken. (C$ is the local hidden default share that Windows networking uses; for more information, see Chapter 7, “Networking,” in Part 1.) Note that Explorer will normally display a path as a friendly name in its address bar. To see the actual path, click once within the address bar.

**NOTE**

If your disk is drastically low on free space, the space consumed by the shadow copy will be reclaimed, in which case you might not have any previous versions.
Internally, each volume shadow copy shown isn’t a complete copy of the drive, so it doesn’t duplicate the entire contents twice, which would double disk space requirements for every single copy. Previous Versions uses the copy-on-write mechanism described earlier to create shadow copies. For example, if the only file that changed between time A and time B, when a volume shadow copy was taken, is New.txt, the shadow copy will contain only New.txt. This allows VSS to be used in client scenarios with minimal visible impact on the user, since entire drive contents are not duplicated and size constraints remain small.

Although shadow copies for previous versions are taken daily (or whenever a Windows Update or software installation is performed, for example), you can manually request a copy to be taken. This can be useful if, for example, you’re about to make major changes to the system or have just copied a set of files you want to save immediately for the purpose of creating a previous version. You can access these settings by right-clicking Computer on the Start Menu or desktop, selecting Properties, and then clicking System Protection. You can also open Control Panel, click System And Maintenance, and then click System. The dialog box shown in Figure 9-31 allows you to select the volumes on which to enable System Restore (which also affects previous versions) and to create an immediate restore point and name it.
EXPERIMENT: MAPPING VOLUME SHADOW DEVICE OBJECTS

Although you can browse previous versions by using Explorer, this doesn't give you a permanent interface through which you can access that view of the drive in an application-independent, persistent way. You can use the Vssadmin utility (%SystemRoot%\System32\Vssadmin.exe) included with Windows to view all the shadow copies taken, and you can then take advantage of symbolic links to map a copy. This experiment will show you how.

1. List all shadow copies available on the system by using the list shadows command:

   vssadmin list shadows

You'll see output that resembles the following. Each entry is either a previous version copy or a shared folder with shadow copies enabled.

vssadmin 1.1 - Volume Shadow Copy Service administrative command-line tool
(C) Copyright 2001-2005 Microsoft Corp.

Contents of shadow copy set ID: {dfe617b7-ef2b-4280-9f4e-ddf94c2ccfac}
  Contained 1 shadow copies at creation time: 8/27/2008 1:59:58 PM
  Shadow Copy ID: {f455a794-6b0c-49e4-9ae5-e54647f1df31}
  Original Volume: (C:\Volume\)
  Shadow Copy Volume: \GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1
  Originating Machine: WIN-SLV78KD01W
  Service Machine: WIN-SLV78KD01W
  Provider: 'Microsoft Software Shadow Copy provider 1.0'
  Type: ClientAccessibleWriters
Attributes: Persistent, Client-accessible, No auto release, Differential, Auto recovered

Contents of shadow copy set ID: {02dad996-e7b0-4d2d-9fb9-7e692be8fe3c}
  Contained 1 shadow copies at creation time: 8/29/2008 1:51:14 AM
  Shadow Copy ID: {79c9ee14-ca1f-4e46-b3f0-0dc98f8eb0d4}
  Original Volume: (C:\??\Volume{f5f9d9c3-7466-11dd-9ba5-806e6f6e6963}\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy2.

Note that each shadow copy set ID displayed in this output matches the CS$ entries shown by Explorer in the previous experiment (although the date and time may be formatted differently), and the tool also displays the shadow copy volume, which corresponds to the shadow copy device objects that you can see with WinObj.

2. You can now use the Mklink.exe utility to create a directory symbolic link (for more information on symbolic links, see Chapter 12), which will let you map a shadow copy into an actual location. Use the /d flag to create a directory link, and specify a folder on your drive to map to the given volume device object. Make sure to append the path with a backslash (\) as shown here:

```
mklink /d c:\old \??\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy2\
```

3. Finally, with the Subst.exe utility, you can map the c:\old directory to a real volume using the command shown here:

```
subst g: c:\old
```

You can now access the old contents of your drive from any application by using the c:\old path, or from any command-prompt utility by using the g:\ path—for example, try dir g: to list the contents of your drive.
Conclusion

In this chapter, we’ve reviewed the on-disk organization, components, and operation of Windows disk storage management. In Chapter 11, we’ll delve into the cache manager, an executive component integral to the operation of file system drivers that mount the volume types presented in this chapter. However, next, we’ll take a close look at an integral component of the Windows kernel: the memory manager.
Chapter 10. Memory Management

In this chapter, you’ll learn how Windows implements virtual memory and how it manages the subset of virtual memory kept in physical memory. We’ll also describe the internal structure and components that make up the memory manager, including key data structures and algorithms. Before examining these mechanisms, we’ll review the basic services provided by the memory manager and key concepts such as reserved memory versus committed memory and shared memory.
Introduction to the Memory Manager

By default, the virtual size of a process on 32-bit Windows is 2 GB. If the image is marked specifically as large address space aware, and the system is booted with a special option (described later in this chapter), a 32-bit process can grow to be 3 GB on 32-bit Windows and to 4 GB on 64-bit Windows. The process virtual address space size on 64-bit Windows is 7,152 GB on IA64 systems and 8,192 GB on x64 systems. (This value could be increased in future releases.)

As you saw in Chapter 2, “System Architecture,” in Part 1 (specifically in Table 2-2), the maximum amount of physical memory currently supported by Windows ranges from 2 GB to 2,048 GB, depending on which version and edition of Windows you are running. Because the virtual address space might be larger or smaller than the physical memory on the machine, the memory manager has two primary tasks:

- Translating, or mapping, a process’s virtual address space into physical memory so that when a thread running in the context of that process reads or writes to the virtual address space, the correct physical address is referenced. (The subset of a process’s virtual address space that is physically resident is called the working set. Working sets are described in more detail later in this chapter.)

- Paging some of the contents of memory to disk when it becomes overcommitted—that is, when running threads or system code try to use more physical memory than is currently available—and bringing the contents back into physical memory when needed.

In addition to providing virtual memory management, the memory manager provides a core set of services on which the various Windows environment subsystems are built. These services include memory mapped files (internally called section objects), copy-on-write memory, and support for applications using large, sparse address spaces. In addition, the memory manager provides a way for a process to allocate and use larger amounts of physical memory than can be mapped into the process virtual address space at one time (for example, on 32-bit systems with more than 3 GB of physical memory). This is explained in the section Address Windowing Extensions later in this chapter.
NOTE
There is a Control Panel applet that provides control over the size, number, and locations of the paging files, and its nomenclature suggests that “virtual memory” is the same thing as the paging file. This is not the case. The paging file is only one aspect of virtual memory. In fact, even if you run with no page file at all, Windows will still be using virtual memory. This distinction is explained in more detail later in this chapter.

Memory Manager Components

The memory manager is part of the Windows executive and therefore exists in the file Ntoskrnl.exe. No parts of the memory manager exist in the HAL. The memory manager consists of the following components:

- A set of executive system services for allocating, deallocating, and managing virtual memory, most of which are exposed through the Windows API or kernel-mode device driver interfaces
- A translation-not-valid and access fault trap handler for resolving hardware-detected memory management exceptions and making virtual pages resident on behalf of a process
- Six key top-level routines, each running in one of six different kernel-mode threads in the System process (see the experiment “Mapping a System Thread to a Device Driver,” which shows how to identify system threads, in Chapter 2 in Part 1):
  - The balance set manager (KeBalanceSetManager, priority 16). It calls an inner routine, the working set manager (MmWorkingSetManager), once per second as well as when free memory falls below a certain threshold. The working set manager drives the overall memory management policies, such as working set trimming, aging, and modified page writing.
  - The process/stack swapper (KeSwapProcessOrStack, priority 23) performs both process and kernel thread stack inswapping and outswapping. The balance set manager and the thread-scheduling code in the kernel awaken this thread when an inswap or outswap operation needs to take place.
  - The modified page writer (MiModifiedPageWriter, priority 17) writes dirty pages on the modified list back to the appropriate paging files. This thread is awakened when the size of the modified list needs to be reduced.
— The mapped page writer (MiMappedPageWriter, priority 17) writes dirty pages in mapped files to disk (or remote storage). It is awakened when the size of the modified list needs to be reduced or if pages for mapped files have been on the modified list for more than 5 minutes. This second modified page writer thread is necessary because it can generate page faults that result in requests for free pages. If there were no free pages and there was only one modified page writer thread, the system could deadlock waiting for free pages.

— The segment dereference thread (MiDereferenceSegmentThread, priority 18) is responsible for cache reduction as well as for page file growth and shrinkage. (For example, if there is no virtual address space for paged pool growth, this thread trims the page cache so that the paged pool used to anchor it can be freed for reuse.)

— The zero page thread (MmZeroPageThread, base priority 0) zeroes out pages on the free list so that a cache of zero pages is available to satisfy future demand-zero page faults. Unlike the other routines described here, this routine is not a top-level thread function but is called by the top-level thread routine Phase1Initialization. MmZeroPageThread never returns to its caller, so in effect the Phase 1 Initialization thread becomes the zero page thread by calling this routine. Memory zeroing in some cases is done by a faster function called MiZeroInParallel. See the note in the section Page List Dynamics later in this chapter.

Each of these components is covered in more detail later in the chapter.

**Internal Synchronization**

Like all other components of the Windows executive, the memory manager is fully reentrant and supports simultaneous execution on multiprocessor systems—that is, it allows two threads to acquire resources in such a way that they don’t corrupt each other’s data. To accomplish the goal of being fully reentrant, the memory manager uses several different internal synchronization mechanisms, such as spinlocks, to control access to its own internal data structures. (Synchronization objects are discussed in Chapter 3, “System Mechanisms,” in Part 1.)

Some of the systemwide resources to which the memory manager must synchronize access include:
- Dynamically allocated portions of the system virtual address space
- System working sets
- Kernel memory pools
- The list of loaded drivers
- The list of paging files
- Physical memory lists
- Image base randomization (ASLR) structures
- Each individual entry in the page frame number (PFN) database

Per-process memory management data structures that require synchronization include the working set lock (held while changes are being made to the working set list) and the address space lock (held whenever the address space is being changed). Both these locks are implemented using pushlocks.

**Examining Memory Usage**

The Memory and Process performance counter objects provide access to most of the details about system and process memory utilization. Throughout the chapter, we’ll include references to specific performance counters that contain information related to the component being described. We’ve included relevant examples and experiments throughout the chapter. One word of caution, however: different utilities use varying and sometimes inconsistent or confusing names when displaying memory information. The following experiment illustrates this point. (We’ll explain the terms used in this example in subsequent sections.)

---

**EXPERIMENT: VIEWING SYSTEM MEMORY INFORMATION**

The Performance tab in the Windows Task Manager, shown in the following screen shot, displays basic system memory information. This information is a subset of the detailed memory information available through the performance counters. It includes data on both physical and virtual memory usage.
The following table shows the meaning of the memory-related values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Manager Value</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Memory bar histogram</td>
<td>Bar/chart line height shows physical memory in use by Windows (not available as a performance counter). The remaining height of the graph is equal to the Available counter in the Physical Memory section, described later in the table. The total height of the graph is equal to the Total counter in that section. This represents the total RAM usable by the operating system, and does not include BIOS shadow pages, device memory, and so on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Memory (MB): Total</td>
<td>Physical memory usable by Windows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Memory (MB): Cached</td>
<td>Sum of the following performance counters in the Memory object: Cache Bytes, Modified Page List Bytes, Standby Cache Core Bytes, Standby Cache Normal Priority Bytes, and Standby Cache Reserve Bytes (all in Memory object)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Memory (MB): Available</td>
<td>Amount of memory that is immediately available for use by the operating system, processes, and drivers. Equal to the combined size of the standby, free, and zero page lists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Memory (MB): Free</td>
<td>Free and zero page list bytes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kernel Memory (MB): Paged</td>
<td>Pool paged bytes. This is the total size of the pool, including both free and allocated regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kernel Memory (MB): Nonpaged</td>
<td>Pool nonpaged bytes. This is the total size of the pool, including both free and allocated regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System: Commit (two numbers shown)</td>
<td>Equal to performance counters Committed Bytes and Commit Limit, respectively</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To see the specific usage of paged and nonpaged pool, use the Poolmon utility, described in the Monitoring Pool Usage section.

The Process Explorer tool from Windows Sysinternals (http://www.microsoft.com/technet/sysinternals) can show considerably more data about physical and virtual memory. On its main screen, click View and then System Information, and then choose the Memory tab. Here is an example display from a 32-bit Windows system:

![System Information](http://www.microsoft.com/technet/sysinternals)

We will explain most of these additional counters in the relevant sections later in this chapter.
Two other Sysinternals tools show extended memory information:

- VMMap shows the usage of virtual memory within a process to an extremely fine level of detail.
- RAMMap shows detailed physical memory usage.

These tools will be featured in experiments found later in this chapter.

Finally, the !vm command in the kernel debugger shows the basic memory management information available through the memory-related performance counters. This command can be useful if you're looking at a crash dump or hung system. Here's an example of its output from a 4-GB Windows client system:

1: kd> !vm

*** Virtual Memory Usage ***

Physical Memory: 851757 ( 3407028 Kb)
Page File: \??\C:\pagefile.sys
  Current: 3407028 Kb Free Space: 3407024 Kb
  Minimum: 3407028 Kb Maximum: 4193280 Kb
Available Pages: 699186 ( 2796744 Kb)
ResAvail Pages: 757454 ( 3029816 Kb)
Locked IO Pages: 0 ( 0 Kb)
Free System PTEs: 370673 ( 1482692 Kb)
Modified Pages: 9799 ( 39196 Kb)
Modified PF Pages: 9798 ( 39192 Kb)
NonPagedPool Usage: 0 ( 0 Kb)
NonPagedPoolNx Usage: 8735 ( 34940 Kb)
NonPagedPool Max: 522368 ( 2089472 Kb)
PagedPool 0 Usage: 17573 ( 70292 Kb)
PagedPool 1 Usage: 2417 ( 9668 Kb)
PagedPool 2 Usage: 0 ( 0 Kb)
PagedPool 3 Usage: 0 ( 0 Kb)
PagedPool 4 Usage: 28 ( 112 Kb)
PagedPool Usage: 20018 ( 80072 Kb)
PagedPool Maximum: 523264 ( 2093056 Kb)
Session Commit: 6218 ( 24872 Kb)
Shared Commit: 18591 ( 74364 Kb)
Special Pool: 0 ( 0 Kb)
Shared Process: 2151 ( 8604 Kb)
PagedPool Commit: 20031 ( 80124 Kb)
Driver Commit: 4531 ( 18124 Kb)
Committed pages: 179178 ( 716712 Kb)
Commit limit: 1702548 ( 6810192 Kb)

Total Private: 66073 ( 264292 Kb)
  0a30 CCC.exe 11078 ( 44312 Kb)
  0548 dwm.exe 6548 ( 26192 Kb)
  091c MOM.exe 6103 ( 24412 Kb)

...
Services Provided by the Memory Manager

The memory manager provides a set of system services to allocate and free virtual memory, share memory between processes, map files into memory, flush virtual pages to disk, retrieve information about a range of virtual pages, change the protection of virtual pages, and lock the virtual pages into memory.

Like other Windows executive services, the memory management services allow their caller to supply a process handle indicating the particular process whose virtual memory is to be manipulated. The caller can thus manipulate either its own memory or (with the proper permissions) the memory of another process. For example, if a process creates a child process, by default it has the right to manipulate the child process’s virtual memory. Thereafter, the parent process can allocate, deallocate, read, and write memory on behalf of the child process by calling virtual memory services and passing a handle to the child process as an argument. This feature is used by subsystems to manage the memory of their client processes. It is also essential for implementing debuggers because debuggers must be able to read and write to the memory of the process being debugged.

Most of these services are exposed through the Windows API. The Windows API has three groups of functions for managing memory in applications: heap functions (Heapxxx and the older interfaces Localxxx and Globalxxx, which internally make use of the Heapxxx APIs), which may be used for allocations smaller than a page; virtual memory functions, which operate with page granularity (Virtualxxx); and memory mapped file functions (CreateFileMapping, CreateFileMappingNuma, MapViewOfFile, MapViewOfFileEx, and MapViewOfFileExNuma). (We’ll describe the heap manager later in this chapter.)

The memory manager also provides a number of services (such as allocating and deallocating physical memory and locking pages in physical memory for direct memory access [DMA] transfers) to other kernel-mode components inside the executive as well as to device drivers. These functions begin with the prefix Mm. In addition, though not strictly part of the memory manager, some executive support routines that begin with Ex are used to allocate and deallocate from the system heaps (paged and nonpaged pool) as well as to manipulate look-aside lists. We’ll touch on these topics later in this chapter in the section Kernel-Mode Heaps.
Large and Small Pages

The virtual address space is divided into units called pages. That is because the hardware memory management unit translates virtual to physical addresses at the granularity of a page. Hence, a page is the smallest unit of protection at the hardware level. (The various page protection options are described in the section Protecting Memory later in the chapter.) The processors on which Windows runs support two page sizes, called small and large. The actual sizes vary based on the processor architecture, and they are listed in Table 10-1.

Table 10-1. Page Sizes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Architecture</th>
<th>Small Page Size</th>
<th>Large Page Size</th>
<th>Small Pages per Large Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>x86</td>
<td>4 KB</td>
<td>4 MB (2 MB if Physical Address Extension (PAE) enabled (PAE is described later in the chapter)</td>
<td>1,024 (512 with PAE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x64</td>
<td>4 KB</td>
<td>2 MB</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA64</td>
<td>8 KB</td>
<td>16 MB</td>
<td>2,048</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE**

IA64 processors support a variety of dynamically configurable page sizes, from 4 KB up to 256 MB. Windows on Itanium uses 8 KB and 16 MB for small and large pages, respectively, as a result of performance tests that confirmed these values as optimal. Additionally, recent x64 processors support a size of 1 GB for large pages, but Windows does not use this feature.

The primary advantage of large pages is speed of address translation for references to other data within the large page. This advantage exists because the first reference to any byte within a large page will cause the hardware’s translation look-aside buffer (TLB, described in a later section) to have in its cache the information necessary to translate references to any other byte within the large page. If small pages are used, more TLB entries are needed for the same range of virtual addresses, thus increasing recycling of entries as new virtual addresses require translation. This, in turn, means having to go back to the page table structures
when references are made to virtual addresses outside the scope of a small page whose translation has been cached. The TLB is a very small cache, and thus large pages make better use of this limited resource.

To take advantage of large pages on systems with more than 2 GB of RAM, Windows maps with large pages the core operating system images (Ntoskrnl.exe and Hal.dll) as well as core operating system data (such as the initial part of nonpaged pool and the data structures that describe the state of each physical memory page). Windows also automatically maps I/O space requests (calls by device drivers to MmMapIoSpace) with large pages if the request is of satisfactory large page length and alignment. In addition, Windows allows applications to map their images, private memory, and page-file-backed sections with large pages. (See the MEM_LARGE_PAGE flag on the VirtualAlloc, VirtualAllocEx, and VirtualAllocExNuma functions.) You can also specify other device drivers to be mapped with large pages by adding a multistring registry value to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management\LargePageDrivers and specifying the names of the drivers as separately null-terminated strings.

Attempts to allocate large pages may fail after the operating system has been running for an extended period, because the physical memory for each large page must occupy a significant number (see Table 10-1) of physically contiguous small pages, and this extent of physical pages must furthermore begin on a large page boundary. (For example, physical pages 0 through 511 could be used as a large page on an x64 system, as could physical pages 512 through 1,023, but pages 10 through 521 could not.) Free physical memory does become fragmented as the system runs. This is not a problem for allocations using small pages but can cause large page allocations to fail.

It is not possible to specify anything but read/write access to large pages. The memory is also always nonpageable, because the page file system does not support large pages. And, because the memory is nonpageable, it is not considered part of the process working set (described later). Nor are large page allocations subject to job-wide limits on virtual memory usage.

There is an unfortunate side effect of large pages. Each page (whether large or small) must be mapped with a single protection that applies to the entire page
(because hardware memory protection is on a per-page basis). If a large page contains, for example, both read-only code and read/write data, the page must be marked as read/write, which means that the code will be writable. This means that device drivers or other kernel-mode code could, as a result of a bug, modify what is supposed to be read-only operating system or driver code without causing a memory access violation. If small pages are used to map the operating system's kernel-mode code, the read-only portions of Ntoskrnl.exe and Hal.dll can be mapped as read-only pages. Using small pages does reduce efficiency of address translation, but if a device driver (or other kernel-mode code) attempts to modify a read-only part of the operating system, the system will crash immediately with the exception information pointing at the offending instruction in the driver. If the write was allowed to occur, the system would likely crash later (in a harder-to-diagnose way) when some other component tried to use the corrupted data.

If you suspect you are experiencing kernel code corruptions, enable Driver Verifier (described later in this chapter), which will disable the use of large pages.

**Reserving and Committing Pages**

Pages in a process virtual address space are free, reserved, committed, or shareable. Committed and shareable pages are pages that, when accessed, ultimately translate to valid pages in physical memory.

Committed pages are also referred to as private pages. This reflects the fact that committed pages cannot be shared with other processes, whereas shareable pages can be (but, of course, might be in use by only one process).

Private pages are allocated through the Windows VirtualAlloc, VirtualAllocEx, and VirtualAllocExNuma functions. These functions allow a thread to reserve address space and then commit portions of the reserved space. The intermediate “reserved” state allows the thread to set aside a range of contiguous virtual addresses for possible future use (such as an array), while consuming negligible system resources, and then commit portions of the reserved space as needed as the application runs. Or, if the size requirements are known in advance, a thread can reserve and commit in the same function call. In either case, the resulting committed pages can then be accessed by the thread. Attempting to access free or reserved memory results in an exception because the page isn't mapped to any
storage that can resolve the reference.

If committed (private) pages have never been accessed before, they are created at the time of first access as zero-initialized pages (or demand zero). Private committed pages may later be automatically written to the paging file by the operating system if required by demand for physical memory. “Private” refers to the fact that these pages are normally inaccessible to any other process.

NOTE

There are functions, such as ReadProcessMemory and WriteProcessMemory, that apparently permit cross-process memory access, but these are implemented by running kernel-mode code in the context of the target process (this is referred to as attaching to the process). They also require that either the security descriptor of the target process grant the accessor the PROCESS_VM_READ or PROCESS_VM_WRITE right, respectively, or that the accessor holds SeDebugPrivilege, which is by default granted only to members of the Administrators group.

Shared pages are usually mapped to a view of a section, which in turn is part or all of a file, but may instead represent a portion of page file space. All shared pages can potentially be shared with other processes. Sections are exposed in the Windows API as file mapping objects.

When a shared page is first accessed by any process, it will be read in from the associated mapped file (unless the section is associated with the paging file, in which case it is created as a zero-initialized page). Later, if it is still resident in physical memory, the second and subsequent processes accessing it can simply use the same page contents that are already in memory. Shared pages might also have been prefetched by the system.

Two upcoming sections of this chapter, Shared Memory and Mapped Files and Section Objects, go into much more detail about shared pages. Pages are written to disk through a mechanism called modified page writing. This occurs as pages are moved from a process’s working set to a systemwide list called the modified page list; from there, they are written to disk (or remote storage). (Working sets and the modified list are explained later in this chapter.) Mapped file pages can also be written back to their original files on disk as a result of an explicit call to FlushViewOfFile or by the mapped page writer as memory demands dictate.

You can decommit private pages and/or release address space with the VirtualFree
or VirtualFreeEx function. The difference between decommittal and release is similar to the difference between reservation and committal—decommitted memory is still reserved, but released memory has been freed; it is neither committed nor reserved.

Using the two-step process of reserving and then committing virtual memory defers committing pages—and, thereby, defers adding to the system “commit charge” described in the next section—until needed, but keeps the convenience of virtual contiguity. Reserving memory is a relatively inexpensive operation because it consumes very little actual memory. All that needs to be updated or constructed is the relatively small internal data structures that represent the state of the process address space. (We’ll explain these data structures, called page tables and virtual address descriptors, or VADs, later in the chapter.)

One extremely common use for reserving a large space and committing portions of it as needed is the user-mode stack for each thread. When a thread is created, a stack is created by reserving a contiguous portion of the process address space. (1 MB is the default; you can override this size with the CreateThread and CreateRemoteThread function calls or change it on an imagewide basis by using the /STACK linker flag.) By default, the initial page in the stack is committed and the next page is marked as a guard page (which isn’t committed) that traps references beyond the end of the committed portion of the stack and expands it.

---

**EXPERIMENT: RESERVED VS. COMMITTED PAGES**

The TestLimit utility (which you can download from the Windows Internals book webpage) can be used to allocate large amounts of either reserved or private committed virtual memory, and the difference can be observed via Process Explorer. First, open two Command Prompt windows. Invoke TestLimit in one of them to create a large amount of reserved memory:

```
C:\temp>testlimit -r 1 -c 800
```

Testlimit v5.2 - test Windows limits
Copyright (C) 2012 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

Process ID: 1544

Reserving private bytes 1 MB at a time ...
Leaked 800 MB of reserved memory (800 MB total leaked). Lasterror: 0
The operation completed successfully.

In the other window, create a similar amount of committed memory:

```
C:\temp>testlimit -m 1 -c 800
```
TestLimit v5.2 - test Windows limits
Copyright (C) 2012 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

Process ID: 2828

Leaking private bytes 1 KB at a time ...
Leaked 800 MB of private memory (800 MB total leaked). Lasterror: 0
The operation completed successfully.

Now run Task Manager, go to the Processes tab, and use the Select Columns command on the View menu to include Memory—Commit Size in the display. Find the two instances of TestLimit in the list. They should appear something like the following figure.

Task Manager shows the committed size, but it has no counters that will reveal the reserved memory in the other TestLimit process.

Finally, invoke Process Explorer. Choose View, Select Columns, select the Process Memory tab, and enable the Private Bytes and Virtual Size counters. Find the two TestLimit processes in the main display:
Notice that the virtual sizes of the two processes are identical, but only one shows a value for Private Bytes comparable to that for Virtual Size. The large difference in the other TestLimit process (process ID 1544) is due to the reserved memory. The same comparison could be made in Performance Monitor by looking at the Process | Virtual Bytes and Process | Private Bytes counters.

**Commit Limit**

On Task Manager’s Performance tab, there are two numbers following the legend Commit. The memory manager keeps track of private committed memory usage on a global basis, termed commitment or commit charge; this is the first of the two numbers, which represents the total of all committed virtual memory in the system.

There is a systemwide limit, called the system commit limit or simply the commit limit, on the amount of committed virtual memory that can exist at any one time. This limit corresponds to the current total size of all paging files, plus the amount of RAM that is usable by the operating system. This is the second of the two numbers displayed as Commit on Task Manager’s Performance tab. The memory manager can increase the commit limit automatically by expanding one or more of the paging files, if they are not already at their configured maximum size.

Commit charge and the system commit limit will be explained in more detail in a later section.

**Locking Memory**

In general, it’s better to let the memory manager decide which pages remain in physical memory. However, there might be special circumstances where it might be necessary for an application or device driver to lock pages in physical memory. Pages can be locked in memory in two ways:

- Windows applications can call the VirtualLock function to lock pages in their process working set. Pages locked using this mechanism remain in memory until explicitly unlocked or until the process that locked them terminates. The number of pages a process can lock can’t exceed its minimum working set size minus eight pages. Therefore, if a process needs to lock more pages, it can increase its working set minimum with the SetProcessWorkingSetSizeEx function (referred to in the section Working Set Management).

- Device drivers can call the kernel-mode functions MmProbeAndLockPages,
MmLockPagableCodeSection, MmLockPagableDataSection, or MmLockPagableSectionByHandle. Pages locked using this mechanism remain in memory until explicitly unlocked. The last three of these APIs enforce no quota on the number of pages that can be locked in memory because the resident available page charge is obtained when the driver first loads; this ensures that it can never cause a system crash due to overlocking. For the first API, quota charges must be obtained or the API will return a failure status.

**Allocation Granularity**

Windows aligns each region of reserved process address space to begin on an integral boundary defined by the value of the system allocation granularity, which can be retrieved from the Windows GetSystemInfo or GetNativeSystemInfo function. This value is 64 KB, a granularity that is used by the memory manager to efficiently allocate metadata (for example, VADs, bitmaps, and so on) to support various process operations. In addition, if support were added for future processors with larger page sizes (for example, up to 64 KB) or virtually indexed caches that require systemwide physical-to-virtual page alignment, the risk of requiring changes to applications that made assumptions about allocation alignment would be reduced.

**NOTE**

Windows kernel-mode code isn’t subject to the same restrictions; it can reserve memory on a single-page granularity (although this is not exposed to device drivers for the reasons detailed earlier). This level of granularity is primarily used to pack TEB allocations more densely, and because this mechanism is internal only, this code can easily be changed if a future platform requires different values. Also, for the purposes of supporting 16-bit and MS-DOS applications on x86 systems only, the memory manager provides the MEM_DOS_LIM flag to the MapViewOfFileEx API, which is used to force the use of single-page granularity.

Finally, when a region of address space is reserved, Windows ensures that the size and base of the region is a multiple of the system page size, whatever that might be. For example, because x86 systems use 4-KB pages, if you tried to reserve a region of memory 18 KB in size, the actual amount reserved on an x86 system would be 20 KB. If you specified a base address of 3 KB for an 18-KB region, the actual amount reserved would be 24 KB. Note that the VAD for the allocation would then also be rounded to 64-KB alignment/length, thus making the remainder of it
inaccessible. (VADs will be described later in this chapter.)

## Shared Memory and Mapped Files

As is true with most modern operating systems, Windows provides a mechanism to share memory among processes and the operating system. Shared memory can be defined as memory that is visible to more than one process or that is present in more than one process virtual address space. For example, if two processes use the same DLL, it would make sense to load the referenced code pages for that DLL into physical memory only once and share those pages between all processes that map the DLL, as illustrated in Figure 10-1.

Each process would still maintain its private memory areas in which to store private data, but the DLL code and unmodified data pages could be shared without harm. As we’ll explain later, this kind of sharing happens automatically because the code pages in executable images (.exe and .dll files, and several other types like screen savers (.scr), which are essentially DLLs under other names) are mapped as execute-only and writable pages are mapped as copy-on-write. (See the section [Copy-on-Write](#) for more information.)

The underlying primitives in the memory manager used to implement shared memory are called section objects, which are exposed as file mapping objects in the Windows API. The internal structure and implementation of section objects are described in the section [Section Objects](#) later in this chapter.

This fundamental primitive in the memory manager is used to map virtual addresses, whether in main memory, in the page file, or in some other file that an application wants to access as if it were in memory. A section can be opened by one process or by many; in other words, section objects don’t necessarily equate to shared memory.
A section object can be connected to an open file on disk (called a mapped file) or to committed memory (to provide shared memory). Sections mapped to committed memory are called page-file-backed sections because the pages are written to the paging file (as opposed to a mapped file) if demands on physical memory require it. (Because Windows can run with no paging file, page-file-backed sections might in fact be “backed” only by physical memory.) As with any other empty page that is made visible to user mode (such as private committed pages), shared committed pages are always zero-filled when they are first accessed to ensure that no sensitive data is ever leaked.

To create a section object, call the Windows CreateFileMapping or CreateFileMappingNuma function, specifying the file handle to map it to (or INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE for a page-file-backed section) and optionally a name and security descriptor. If the section has a name, other processes can open it with OpenFileMapping. Or you can grant access to section objects through either handle inheritance (by specifying that the handle be inheritable when opening or creating the handle) or handle duplication (by using DuplicateHandle). Device drivers can also manipulate section objects with the ZwOpenSection, ZwMapViewOfSection, and ZwUnmapViewOfSection functions.
A section object can refer to files that are much larger than can fit in the address space of a process. (If the paging file backs a section object, sufficient space must exist in the paging file and/or RAM to contain it.) To access a very large section object, a process can map only the portion of the section object that it requires (called a view of the section) by calling the MapViewOfFile, MapViewOfFileEx, or MapViewOfFileExNuma function and then specifying the range to map. Mapping views permits processes to conserve address space because only the views of the section object needed at the time must be mapped into memory.

Windows applications can use mapped files to conveniently perform I/O to files by simply making them appear in their address space. User applications aren’t the only consumers of section objects: the image loader uses section objects to map executable images, DLLs, and device drivers into memory, and the cache manager uses them to access data in cached files. (For information on how the cache manager integrates with the memory manager, see Chapter 11.) The implementation of shared memory sections, both in terms of address translation and the internal data structures, is explained later in this chapter.

**EXPERIMENT: VIEWING MEMORY MAPPED FILES**

You can list the memory mapped files in a process by using Process Explorer from Sysinternals. To view the memory mapped files by using Process Explorer, configure the lower pane to show the DLL view. (Click on View, Lower Pane View, DLLs.) Note that this is more than just a list of DLLs—it represents all memory mapped files in the process address space. Some of these are DLLs, one is the image file (EXE) being run, and additional entries might represent memory mapped data files.

For example, the following display from Process Explorer shows a WinDbg process using several different memory mappings to access the memory dump file being examined. Like most Windows programs, it (or one of the Windows DLLs it is using) is also using memory mapping to access a Windows data file called Locale.nls, which is part of the internationalization support in Windows.
You can also search for memory mapped files by clicking Find, DLL. This can be useful when trying to determine which process(es) are using a DLL or a memory mapped file that you are trying to replace.

**Protecting Memory**

As explained in Chapter 1, “Concepts and Tools,” in Part 1, Windows provides memory protection so that no user process can inadvertently or deliberately corrupt the address space of another process or of the operating system. Windows provides this protection in four primary ways.

First, all systemwide data structures and memory pools used by kernel-mode system components can be accessed only while in kernel mode—user-mode threads can’t access these pages. If they attempt to do so, the hardware generates a fault, which in turn the memory manager reports to the thread as an access violation.

Second, each process has a separate, private address space, protected from being accessed by any thread belonging to another process. Even shared memory is not really an exception to this because each process accesses the shared regions using addresses that are part of its own virtual address space. The only exception is if another process has virtual memory read or write access to the process object (or holds SeDebugPrivilege) and thus can use the ReadProcessMemory or WriteProcessMemory function. Each time a thread references an address, the virtual memory hardware, in concert with the memory manager, intervenes and translates the virtual address into a physical one. By controlling how virtual addresses are translated, Windows can ensure that threads running in one process
don’t inappropriately access a page belonging to another process.

Third, in addition to the implicit protection virtual-to-physical address translation offers, all processors supported by Windows provide some form of hardware-controlled memory protection (such as read/write, read-only, and so on); the exact details of such protection vary according to the processor. For example, code pages in the address space of a process are marked read-only and are thus protected from modification by user threads.

Table 10-2 lists the memory protection options defined in the Windows API. (See the VirtualProtect, VirtualProtectEx, VirtualQuery, and VirtualQueryEx functions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAGE_NOACCESS</td>
<td>Any attempt to read from, write to, or execute code in this region causes an access violation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAGE_READONLY</td>
<td>Any attempt to write to (and on processors with no execute support, execute code in) memory causes an access violation, but reads are permitted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAGE_READWRITE</td>
<td>The page is readable and writable but not executable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAGE_EXECUTE</td>
<td>Any attempt to write to code in memory in this region causes an access violation, but execution (and read operations on all existing processors) is permitted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAGE_EXECUTE_READ[a]</td>
<td>Any attempt to write to memory in this region causes an access violation, but executes and reads are permitted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE[b]</td>
<td>The page is readable, writable, and executable—any attempted access will succeed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAGE_WRITECOPY</td>
<td>Any attempt to write to memory in this region causes the system to give the process a private copy of the page. On processors with no-execute support, attempts to execute code in memory in this region cause an access violation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAGE_EXECUTE_WRITECOPY</td>
<td>Any attempt to write to memory in this region causes the system to give the process a private copy of the page. Reading and executing code in this region is permitted. (No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
copy is made in this case.)

| PAGE_GUARD | Any attempt to read from or write to a guard page raises an EXCEPTION_GUARD_PAGE exception and turns off the guard page status. Guard pages thus act as a one-shot alarm. Note that this flag can be specified with any of the page protections listed in this table except PAGE_NOACCESS. |
| PAGE_NOCACHE | Uses physical memory that is not cached. This is not recommended for general usage. It is useful for device drivers—for example, mapping a video frame buffer with no caching. |
| PAGE_WRITECOMBINE | Enables write-combined memory accesses. When enabled, the processor does not cache memory writes (possibly causing significantly more memory traffic than if memory writes were cached), but it does try to aggregate write requests to optimize performance. For example, if multiple writes are made to the same address, only the most recent write might occur. Separate writes to adjacent addresses may be similarly collapsed into a single large write. This is not typically used for general applications, but it is useful for device drivers—for example, mapping a video frame buffer as write combined. |

[a] No execute protection is supported on processors that have the necessary hardware support (for example, all x64 and IA64 processors) but not in older x86 processors.
[b] No execute protection is supported on processors that have the necessary hardware support (for example, all x64 and IA64 processors) but not in older x86 processors.

And finally, shared memory section objects have standard Windows access control lists (ACLs) that are checked when processes attempt to open them, thus limiting access of shared memory to those processes with the proper rights. Access control also comes into play when a thread creates a section to contain a mapped file. To create the section, the thread must have at least read access to the underlying file object or the operation will fail.

Once a thread has successfully opened a handle to a section, its actions are still subject to the memory manager and the hardware-based page protections described earlier. A thread can change the page-level protection on virtual pages in a section if the change doesn’t violate the permissions in the ACL for that section object. For example, the memory manager allows a thread to change the pages of a read-only
section to have copy-on-write access but not to have read/write access. The copy-on-write access is permitted because it has no effect on other processes sharing the data.

**No Execute Page Protection**

No execute page protection (also referred to as data execution prevention, or DEP) causes an attempt to transfer control to an instruction in a page marked as “no execute” to generate an access fault. This can prevent certain types of malware from exploiting bugs in the system through the execution of code placed in a data page such as the stack. DEP can also catch poorly written programs that don't correctly set permissions on pages from which they intend to execute code. If an attempt is made in kernel mode to execute code in a page marked as no execute, the system will crash with the ATTEMPTED_EXECUTE_OF_NOEXECUTE_MEMORY bugcheck code. (See Chapter 14, for an explanation of these codes.) If this occurs in user mode, a STATUS_ACCESS_VIOLATION (0xc0000005) exception is delivered to the thread attempting the illegal reference. If a process allocates memory that needs to be executable, it must explicitly mark such pages by specifying the PAGE_EXECUTE, PAGE_EXECUTE_READ, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, or PAGE_EXECUTE_WRITECOPY flags on the page granularity memory allocation functions.

On 32-bit x86 systems that support DEP, bit 63 in the page table entry (PTE) is used to mark a page as nonexecutable. Therefore, the DEP feature is available only when the processor is running in Physical Address Extension (PAE) mode, without which page table entries are only 32 bits wide. (See the section Physical Address Extension (PAE) later in this chapter.) Thus, support for hardware DEP on 32-bit systems requires loading the PAE kernel (%SystemRoot%\System32\Ntkrnlpa.exe), even if that system does not require extended physical addressing (for example, physical addresses greater than 4 GB). The operating system loader automatically loads the PAE kernel on 32-bit systems that support hardware DEP. To force the non-PAE kernel to load on a system that supports hardware DEP, the BCD option nx must be set to AlwaysOff, and the pae option must be set to ForceDisable.
On 64-bit versions of Windows, execution protection is always applied to all 64-bit processes and device drivers and can be disabled only by setting the nx BCD option to AlwaysOff. Execution protection for 32-bit programs depends on system configuration settings, described shortly. On 64-bit Windows, execution protection is applied to thread stacks (both user and kernel mode), user-mode pages not specifically marked as executable, kernel paged pool, and kernel session pool (for a description of kernel memory pools, see the section Kernel-Mode Heaps (System Memory Pools)). However, on 32-bit Windows, execution protection is applied only to thread stacks and user-mode pages, not to paged pool and session pool.

The application of execution protection for 32-bit processes depends on the value of the BCD nx option. The settings can be changed by going to the Data Execution Prevention tab under Computer, Properties, Advanced System Settings, Performance Settings. (See Figure 10-2.) When you configure no execute protection in the Performance Options dialog box, the BCD nx option is set to the appropriate value. Table 10-3 lists the variations of the values and how they correspond to the DEP settings tab. The registry lists 32-bit applications that are excluded from execution protection under the key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Layers, with the value name being the full path of the executable and the data set to “DisableNXShowUI”.

On Windows client versions (both 64-bit and 32-bit) execution protection for 32-bit processes is configured by default to apply only to core Windows operating system executables (the nx BCD option is set to OptIn) so as not to break 32-bit applications that might rely on being able to execute code in pages not specifically marked as executable, such as self-extracting or packed applications. On Windows server systems, execution protection for 32-bit applications is configured by default to apply to all 32-bit programs (the nx BCD option is set to OptOut).

**NOTE**

To obtain a complete list of which programs are protected, install the Windows Application Compatibility Toolkit (downloadable from www.microsoft.com) and run the Compatibility Administrator Tool. Click System Database, Applications, and then Windows Components. The pane at the right shows the list of protected executables.
Table 10-3. BCD nx Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BCD nx Value</th>
<th>Option on DEP Settings Tab</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OptIn</td>
<td>Turn on DEP for essential Windows programs and services only</td>
<td>Enables DEP for core Windows system images. Enables 32-bit processes to dynamically configure DEP for their lifetime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OptOut</td>
<td>Turn on DEP for all programs and services except those I select</td>
<td>Enables DEP for all executables except those specified. Enables 32-bit processes to dynamically configure DEP for their lifetime. Enables system compatibility fixes for DEP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AlwaysOn</td>
<td>No dialog box option for this setting</td>
<td>Enables DEP for all components with no ability to exclude certain applications. Disables dynamic configuration for 32-bit processes, and disables system compatibility fixes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AlwaysOff</td>
<td>No dialog box option for this setting</td>
<td>Disables DEP (not recommended). Disables dynamic configuration for 32-bit processes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Even if you force DEP to be enabled, there are still other methods through which applications can disable DEP for their own images. For example, regardless of the execution protection options that are enabled, the image loader (see Chapter 3 in Part 1 for more information about the image loader) will verify the signature of the executable against known copy-protection mechanisms (such as SafeDisc and SecuROM) and disable execution protection to provide compatibility with older copy-protected software such as computer games.

**EXPERIMENT: LOOKING AT DEP PROTECTION ON PROCESSES**

Process Explorer can show you the current DEP status for all the processes on your system, including whether the process is opted in or benefiting from permanent protection. To look at the DEP status for processes, right-click any column in the process tree, choose Select Columns, and then select DEP Status on the Process Image tab. Three values are possible:

- **DEP (permanent)** This means that the process has DEP enabled because it is a “necessary Windows program or service.”
- **DEP** This means that the process opted in to DEP. This may be due to a systemwide policy to opt in all 32-bit processes, an API call such as SetProcessDEPPolicy, or setting the linker flag /NXCOMPAT when the image was built.
- **Nothing** If the column displays no information for this process, DEP is disabled, either because of a systemwide policy or an explicit API call or shim.

The following Process Explorer window shows an example of a system on which DEP is set to OptOut, Turn On DEP For All Programs And Services Except Those That I Select. Note that two processes running in the user's login, a third-party sound-card manager and a USB port monitor, show simply DEP, meaning that DEP can be turned off for them via the dialog box shown in Figure 10-2. The other processes shown are running Windows in-box programs and show DEP (Permanent), indicating that DEP cannot be disabled for them.
Additionally, to provide compatibility with older versions of the Active Template Library (ATL) framework (version 7.1 or earlier), the Windows kernel provides an ATL thunk emulation environment. This environment detects ATL thunk code sequences that have caused the DEP exception and emulates the expected operation. Application developers can request that ATL thunk emulation not be applied by using the latest Microsoft C++ compiler and specifying the /NXCOMPAT flag (which sets the IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_NX_COMPAT flag in the PE header), which tells the system that the executable fully supports DEP. Note that ATL thunk emulation is permanently disabled if the AlwaysOn value is set.

Finally, if the system is in OptIn or OptOut mode and executing a 32-bit process, the SetProcessDEPPolicy function allows a process to dynamically disable DEP or to permanently enable it. (Once enabled through this API, DEP cannot be disabled programmatically for the lifetime of the process.) This function can also be used to dynamically disable ATL thunk emulation in case the image wasn’t compiled with the /NXCOMPAT flag. On 64-bit processes or systems booted with AlwaysOff or AlwaysOn, the function always returns a failure. The GetProcessDEPPolicy function returns the 32-bit per-process DEP policy (it fails on 64-bit systems, where the policy is always the same—enabled), while GetSystemDEPPolicy can be used to return a value corresponding to the policies in Table 10-3.

**Software Data Execution Prevention**

For older processors that do not support hardware no execute protection, Windows supports limited software data execution prevention (DEP). One aspect of software DEP reduces exploits of the exception handling mechanism in Windows. (See Chapter 3 in Part 1 for a description of structured exception handling.) If the program’s image files are built with safe structured exception handling (a feature in the Microsoft Visual C++ compiler that is enabled with the /SAFESEH flag), before an exception is dispatched, the system verifies that the exception handler is registered in the function table (built by the compiler) located within the image file.

The previous mechanism depends on the program’s image files being built with safe structured exception handling. If they are not, software DEP guards against overwrites of the structured exception handling chain on the stack in x86 processes via a mechanism known as Structured Exception Handler Overwrite Protection.
A new symbolic exception registration record is added on the stack when a thread first begins user-mode execution. The normal exception registration chain will lead to this record. When an exception occurs, the exception dispatcher will first walk the list of exception handler registration records to ensure that the chain leads to this symbolic record. If it does not, the exception chain must have been corrupted (either accidentally or deliberately), and the exception dispatcher will simply terminate the process without calling any of the exception handlers described on the stack. Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) contributes to the robustness of this method by making it more difficult for attacking code to know the location of the function pointed to by the symbolic exception registration record, and so to construct a fake symbolic record of its own.

To further validate the SEH handler when /SAFESEH is not present, a mechanism called Image Dispatch Mitigation ensures that the SEH handler is located within the same image section as the function that raised an exception, which is normally the case for most programs (although not necessarily, since some DLLs might have exception handlers that were set up by the main executable, which is why this mitigation is off by default). Finally, Executable Dispatch Mitigation further makes sure that the SEH handler is located within an executable page—a less strong requirement than Image Dispatch Mitigation, but one with fewer compatibility issues.

Two other methods for software DEP that the system implements are stack cookies and pointer encoding. The first relies on the compiler to insert special code at the beginning and end of each potentially exploitable function. The code saves a special numerical value (the cookie) on the stack on entry and validates the cookie’s value before returning to the caller saved on the stack (which would have now been corrupted to point to a piece of malicious code). If the cookie value is mismatched, the application is terminated and not allowed to continue executing. The cookie value is computed for each boot when executing the first user-mode thread, and it is saved in the KUSER_SHARED_DATA structure. The image loader reads this value and initializes it when a process starts executing in user mode. (See Chapter 3 in Part 1 for more information on the shared data section and the image loader.)

The cookie value that is calculated is also saved for use with the
EncodeSystemPointer and DecodeSystemPointer APIs, which implement pointer encoding. When an application or a DLL has static pointers that are dynamically called, it runs the risk of having malicious code overwrite the pointer values with code that the malware controls. By encoding all pointers with the cookie value and then decoding them, when malicious code sets a nonencoded pointer, the application will still attempt to decode the pointer, resulting in a corrupted value and causing the program to crash. The EncodePointer and DecodePointer APIs provide similar protection but with a per-process cookie (created on demand) instead of a per-system cookie.

**NOTE**
The system cookie is a combination of the system time at generation, the stack value of the saved system time, the number of page faults, and the current interrupt time.

**Copy-on-Write**
Copy-on-write page protection is an optimization the memory manager uses to conserve physical memory. When a process maps a copy-on-write view of a section object that contains read/write pages, instead of making a process private copy at the time the view is mapped, the memory manager defers making a copy of the pages until the page is written to. For example, as shown in Figure 10-3, two processes are sharing three pages, each marked copy-on-write, but neither of the two processes has attempted to modify any data on the pages.

![Figure 10-3. The “before” of copy-on-write](image)

If a thread in either process writes to a page, a memory management fault is generated. The memory manager sees that the write is to a copy-on-write page, so instead of reporting the fault as an access violation, it allocates a new read/write
page in physical memory, copies the contents of the original page to the new page, updates the corresponding page-mapping information (explained later in this chapter) in this process to point to the new location, and dismisses the exception, thus causing the instruction that generated the fault to be reexecuted. This time, the write operation succeeds, but as shown in Figure 10-4, the newly copied page is now private to the process that did the writing and isn’t visible to the other process still sharing the copy-on-write page. Each new process that writes to that same shared page will also get its own private copy.

![Figure 10-4. The “after” of copy-on-write](image)

One application of copy-on-write is to implement breakpoint support in debuggers. For example, by default, code pages start out as execute-only. If a programmer sets a breakpoint while debugging a program, however, the debugger must add a breakpoint instruction to the code. It does this by first changing the protection on the page to PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE and then changing the instruction stream. Because the code page is part of a mapped section, the memory manager creates a private copy for the process with the breakpoint set, while other processes continue using the unmodified code page.

Copy-on-write is one example of an evaluation technique known as lazy evaluation that the memory manager uses as often as possible. Lazy-evaluation algorithms avoid performing an expensive operation until absolutely required—if the operation is never required, no time is wasted on it.

To examine the rate of copy-on-write faults, see the performance counter Memory: Write Copies/sec.

**Address Windowing Extensions**

Although the 32-bit version of Windows can support up to 64 GB of physical
memory (as shown in Table 2-2 in Part 1), each 32-bit user process has by default only a 2-GB virtual address space. (This can be configured up to 3 GB when using the increaseuserva BCD option, described in the upcoming section User Address Space Layout.) An application that needs to make more than 2 GB (or 3 GB) of data easily available in a single process could do so via file mapping, remapping a part of its address space into various portions of a large file. However, significant paging would be involved upon each remap.

For higher performance (and also more fine-grained control), Windows provides a set of functions called Address Windowing Extensions (AWE). These functions allow a process to allocate more physical memory than can be represented in its virtual address space. It then can access the physical memory by mapping a portion of its virtual address space into selected portions of the physical memory at various times.

Allocating and using memory via the AWE functions is done in three steps:

1. Allocating the physical memory to be used. The application uses the Windows functions AllocateUserPhysicalPages or AllocateUserPhysicalPagesNuma. (These require the Lock Pages In Memory user right.)

2. Creating one or more regions of virtual address space to act as windows to map views of the physical memory. The application uses the Win32 VirtualAlloc, VirtualAllocEx, or VirtualAllocExNuma function with the MEM_PHYSICAL flag.

3. The preceding steps are, generally speaking, initialization steps. To actually use the memory, the application uses MapUserPhysicalPages or MapUserPhysicalPagesScatter to map a portion of the physical region allocated in step 1 into one of the virtual regions, or windows, allocated in step 2.

Figure 10-5 shows an example. The application has created a 256-MB window in its address space and has allocated 4 GB of physical memory (on a system with more than 4 GB of physical memory). It can then use MapUserPhysicalPages or MapUserPhysicalPagesScatter to access any portion of the physical memory by mapping the desired portion of memory into the 256-MB window. The size of the
application’s virtual address space window determines the amount of physical memory that the application can access with any given mapping. To access another portion of the allocated RAM, the application can simply remap the area.

The AWE functions exist on all editions of Windows and are usable regardless of how much physical memory a system has. However, AWE is most useful on 32-bit systems with more than 2 GB of physical memory because it provides a way for a 32-bit process to access more RAM than its virtual address space would otherwise allow. Another use is for security purposes: because AWE memory is never paged out, the data in AWE memory can never have a copy in the paging file that someone could examine by rebooting into an alternate operating system. (VirtualLock provides the same guarantee for pages in general.)

Finally, there are some restrictions on memory allocated and mapped by the AWE functions:

- Pages can’t be shared between processes.
- The same physical page can’t be mapped to more than one virtual address in the same process.
- Page protection is limited to read/write, read-only, and no access.

Figure 10-5. Using AWE to map physical memory
AWE is less useful on x64 or IA64 Windows systems because these systems support 8 TB or 7 TB (respectively) of virtual address space per process, while allowing a maximum of only 2 TB of RAM. Therefore, AWE is not necessary to allow an application to use more RAM than it has virtual address space; the amount of RAM on the system will always be smaller than the process virtual address space. AWE remains useful, however, for setting up nonpageable regions of a process address space. It provides finer granularity than the file mapping APIs (the system page size, 4 KB or 8 KB, versus 64 KB).

For a description of the page table data structures used to map memory on systems with more than 4 GB of physical memory, see the section Physical Address Extension (PAE).
Kernel-Mode Heaps (System Memory Pools)

At system initialization, the memory manager creates two dynamically sized memory pools, or heaps, that most kernel-mode components use to allocate system memory:

- **Nonpaged pool** Consists of ranges of system virtual addresses that are guaranteed to reside in physical memory at all times and thus can be accessed at any time without incurring a page fault; therefore, they can be accessed from any IRQL. One of the reasons nonpaged pool is required is because of the rule described in Chapter 2 in Part 1: page faults can't be satisfied at DPC/dispatch level or above. Therefore, any code and data that might execute or be accessed at or above DPC/dispatch level must be in nonpageable memory.

- **Paged pool** A region of virtual memory in system space that can be paged into and out of the system. Device drivers that don't need to access the memory from DPC/dispatch level or above can use paged pool. It is accessible from any process context.

Both memory pools are located in the system part of the address space and are mapped in the virtual address space of every process. The executive provides routines to allocate and deallocate from these pools; for information on these routines, see the functions that start with ExAllocatePool and ExFreePool in the WDK documentation.

Systems start with four paged pools (combined to make the overall system paged pool) and one nonpaged pool; more are created, up to a maximum of 64, depending on the number of NUMA nodes on the system. Having more than one paged pool reduces the frequency of system code blocking on simultaneous calls to pool routines. Additionally, the different pools created are mapped across different virtual address ranges that correspond to different NUMA nodes on the system. (The different data structures, such as the large page lookaside lists, to describe pool allocations are also mapped across different NUMA nodes. More information on NUMA optimizations will follow later.)

In addition to the paged and nonpaged pools, there are a few other pools with special attributes or uses. For example, there is a pool region in session space,
which is used for data that is common to all processes in the session. (Sessions are described in Chapter 1 in Part 1.) There is a pool called, quite literally, special pool. Allocations from special pool are surrounded by pages marked as no-access to help isolate problems in code that accesses memory before or after the region of pool it allocated. Special pool is described in Chapter 14.

**Pool Sizes**

Nonpaged pool starts at an initial size based on the amount of physical memory on the system and then grows as needed. For nonpaged pool, the initial size is 3 percent of system RAM. If this is less than 40 MB, the system will instead use 40 MB as long as 10 percent of RAM results in more than 40 MB; otherwise 10 percent of RAM is chosen as a minimum.

Windows dynamically chooses the maximum size of the pools and allows a given pool to grow from its initial size to the maximums shown in Table 10-4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pool Type</th>
<th>Maximum on 32-Bit Systems</th>
<th>Maximum on 64-Bit Systems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nonpaged</td>
<td>75% of physical memory or 2 GB, whichever is smaller</td>
<td>75% of physical memory or 128 GB, whichever is smaller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paged</td>
<td>2 GB</td>
<td>128 GB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Four of these computed sizes are stored in kernel variables, three of which are exposed as performance counters, and one is computed only as a performance counter value. These variables and counters are listed in Table 10-5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kernel Variable</th>
<th>Performance Counter</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MmSizeOfNonPagedPoolInBytes</td>
<td>Memory: Pool Nonpaged Bytes</td>
<td>Size of the initial nonpaged pool. This can be reduced or enlarged automatically by the system if memory demands dictate. The kernel variable will not show these changes, but the performance counter will.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXPERIMENT: DETERMINING THE MAXIMUM POOL SIZES

You can obtain the pool maximums by using either Process Explorer or live kernel debugging (explained in Chapter 1 in Part 1). To view pool maximums with Process Explorer, click on View, System Information, and then click the Memory tab. The pool limits are displayed in the Kernel Memory middle section, as shown here:

![Memory Information](image)

Note that for Process Explorer to retrieve this information, it must have access to the symbols for the kernel running on your system. (For a description of how to configure Process Explorer to use symbols, see the experiment “Viewing Process Details with Process Explorer” in Chapter 1 in Part 1.)

To view the same information by using the kernel debugger, you can use the `!vm` command as shown here:

```
k> !vm
1: kd> !vm
*** Virtual Memory Usage ***
Physical Memory: 851757 (3407028 Kb)
Page File: \??\C:\pagefile.sys
   Current: 3407028 Kb Free Space: 3407024 Kb
```
Minimum: 3407028 Kb Maximum: 4193280 Kb
Available Pages: 699186 ( 2796744 Kb)
ResAvail Pages: 757454 ( 3029816 Kb)
Locked IO Pages: 0 ( 0 Kb)
Free System PTEs: 370673 ( 1482692 Kb)
Modified Pages: 9799 ( 39196 Kb)
Modified PF Pages: 9798 ( 39192 Kb)
NonPagedPool Usage: 0 ( 0 Kb)
NonPagedPoolNx Usage: 8735 ( 34940 Kb)
NonPagedPool Max: 522368 ( 2089472 Kb)
PagedPool 0 Usage: 17573 ( 70292 Kb)
PagedPool 1 Usage: 2417 ( 9668 Kb)
PagedPool 2 Usage: 0 ( 0 Kb)
PagedPool 3 Usage: 0 ( 0 Kb)
PagedPool 4 Usage: 28 ( 112 Kb)
PagedPool Usage: 20018 ( 80072 Kb)
PagedPool Maximum: 523264 ( 2093056 Kb)

..."}

On this 4-GB, 32-bit system, nonpaged and paged pool were far from their maximums.
You can also examine the values of the kernel variables listed in Table 10-5. The following were taken from a 32-bit system:

```
lkd> ? poi(MmMaximumNonPagedPoolInBytes)
Evaluate expression: 2139619328 = 7f880000
```

```
lkd> ? poi(MmSizeOfPagedPoolInBytes)
Evaluate expression: 2143289344 = 7fc00000
```

From this example, you can see that the maximum size of both nonpaged and paged pool is approximately 2 GB, typical values on 32-bit systems with large amounts of RAM. On the system used for this example, current nonpaged pool usage was 35 MB and paged pool usage was 80 MB, so both pools were far from full.

**Monitoring Pool Usage**

The Memory performance counter object has separate counters for the size of nonpaged pool and paged pool (both virtual and physical). In addition, the Poolmon utility (in the WDK) allows you to monitor the detailed usage of nonpaged and paged pool. When you run Poolmon, you should see a display like the one shown in Figure 10-6.
The highlighted lines you might see represent changes to the display. (You can disable the highlighting feature by typing a slash (/) while running Poolmon. Type / again to reenable highlighting.) Type ? while Poolmon is running to bring up its help screen. You can configure which pools you want to monitor (paged, nonpaged, or both) and the sort order. For example, by pressing the P key until only nonpaged allocations are shown, and then the D key to sort by the Diff (differences) column, you can find out what kind of structures are most numerous in nonpaged pool. Also, the command-line options are shown, which allow you to monitor specific tags (or every tag but one tag). For example, the command poolmon –iCM will monitor only CM tags (allocations from the configuration manager, which manages the registry). The columns have the meanings shown in Table 10-6.

Table 10-6. Poolmon Columns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Column</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tag</td>
<td>Four-byte tag given to the pool allocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Pool type (paged or nonpaged pool)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocs</td>
<td>Count of all allocations (The number in parentheses shows the difference in the Allocs column since the last update.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frees</td>
<td>Count of all Frees (The number in parentheses shows the difference in the Frees column since the last update.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diff</td>
<td>Count of Allocs minus Frees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bytes</td>
<td>Total bytes consumed by this tag (The number in parentheses shows the difference in the Bytes column since the last update.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Per Alloc | Size in bytes of a single instance of this tag |

For a description of the meaning of the pool tags used by Windows, see the file \Program Files\Debugging Tools for Windows\Triage\Pooltag.txt. (This file is installed as part of the Debugging Tools for Windows, described in Chapter 1 in Part 1.) Because third-party device driver pool tags are not listed in this file, you can use the –c switch on the 32-bit version of Poolmon that comes with the WDK to generate a local pool tag file (Localtag.txt). This file will contain pool tags used by drivers found on your system, including third-party drivers. (Note that if a device driver binary has been deleted after it was loaded, its pool tags will not be recognized.)

Alternatively, you can search the device drivers on your system for a pool tag by using the Strings.exe tool from Sysinternals. For example, the command

```
strings %SYSTEMROOT%\system32\drivers\*.sys | findstr /i "abcd"
```

will display drivers that contain the string “abcd”. Note that device drivers do not necessarily have to be located in %SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers—they can be in any folder. To list the full path of all loaded drivers, open the Run dialog box from the Start menu, and then type **Msinfo32**. Click Software Environment, and then click System Drivers. As already noted, if a device driver has been loaded and then deleted from the system, it will not be listed here.

An alternative to view pool usage by device driver is to enable the pool tracking feature of Driver Verifier, explained later in this chapter. While this makes the mapping from pool tag to device driver unnecessary, it does require a reboot (to enable Driver Verifier on the desired drivers). After rebooting with pool tracking enabled, you can either run the graphical Driver Verifier Manager (%SystemRoot%\System32\Verifier.exe) or use the Verifier /Log command to send the pool usage information to a file.

Finally, you can view pool usage with the kernel debugger !poolused command. The command !poolused 2 shows nonpaged pool usage sorted by pool tag using the most amount of pool. The command !poolused 4 lists paged pool usage, again
sorted by pool tag using the most amount of pool. The following example shows
the partial output from these two commands:

```
lkd> !poolused 2
   Sorting by NonPaged Pool Consumed
   Pool Used:
                          NonPaged       Paged
   Tag     Allocs  Used    Allocs  Used
   Cont     1669  15801344    0    0    Contiguous physical memory allocations
   for
device drivers
   Int2      414  5760072    0    0    UNKNOWN pooltag 'Int2', please update
   pooltag.txt
   LSwi        1   2623568    0    0    initial work context
   EtwB      117  2327832    10   409600    Etw Buffer , Binary: nt!etw
   Pool        5   1171880    0    0    Pool tables, etc.

lkd> !poolused 4
   Sorting by Paged Pool Consumed
   Pool Used:
                          NonPaged       Paged
   Tag     Allocs  Used    Allocs  Used
   CM25        0    0      3921 16777216    Internal Configuration manager
   allocations ,
   Binary: nt!cm
   MnRe        0    0       720 13508136    UNKNOWN pooltag 'MnRe', please update
   pooltag.txt
   MnSt        0    0      5369 10827440    Mm section object prototype ptes ,
   Binary: nt!mm
   Ntff        9   2232     4210  3738480    FCB_DATA , Binary: ntfs.sys
   ALMs        0    0       212  2450448    ALPC message , Binary: nt!alpc
   VIMm      469   440584     608  1468888    Video memory manager , Binary:
dxgkrnl.sys
```

**EXPERIMENT: TROUBLESHOOTING A POOL LEAK**

In this experiment, you will fix a real paged pool leak on your system so that you can put to use the
techniques described in the previous section to track down the leak. The leak will be generated by the
Notmyfault tool from Sysinternals. When you run Notmyfault.exe, it loads the device driver Myfault.sys and
presents the following dialog box:
1. Click the Leak tab, ensure that Leak/Second is set to 1000 KB, and click the Leak Paged button. This causes Notmyfault to begin sending requests to the Myfault device driver to allocate paged pool. Notmyfault will continue sending requests until you click the Stop Paged button. Note that paged pool is not normally released even when you close a program that has caused it to occur (by interacting with a buggy device driver); the pool is permanently leaked until you reboot the system. However, to make testing easier, the Myfault device driver detects that the process was closed and frees its allocations.

2. While the pool is leaking, first open Task Manager and click on the Performance tab. You should notice Kernel Memory (MB): Paged climbing. You can also check this with Process Explorer’s System Information display. (Click View, System Information, and then the Memory tab.)

3. To determine the pool tag that is leaking, run Poolmon and press the B key to sort by the number of bytes. Press P twice so that Poolmon is showing only paged pool. You should notice the pool tag “Leak” climbing to the top of the list. (Poolmon shows changes to pool allocations by highlighting the lines that change.)

4. Now press the Stop Paged button so that you don’t exhaust paged pool on your system.

5. Using the technique described in the previous section, run Strings (from Sysinternals) to look for driver binaries that contain the pool tag “Leak”:

   ```bash
   Strings %SystemRoot%\system32\drivers\*.sys  |  findstr Leak
   ```

   This should display a match on the file Myfault.sys, thus confirming it as the driver using the “Leak” pool tag.

---

**LookAside Lists**

Windows also provides a fast memory allocation mechanism called lookaside lists. The basic difference between pools and lookaside lists is that while general pool
allocations can vary in size, a lookaside list contains only fixed-sized blocks. Although the general pools are more flexible in terms of what they can supply, lookaside lists are faster because they don’t use any spinlocks.

Executive components and device drivers can create lookaside lists that match the size of frequently allocated data structures by using the ExInitializeNPagedLookasideList and ExInitializePagedLookasideList functions (documented in the WDK). To minimize the overhead of multiprocessor synchronization, several executive subsystems (such as the I/O manager, cache manager, and object manager) create separate lookaside lists for each processor for their frequently accessed data structures. The executive also creates a general per-processor paged and nonpaged lookaside list for small allocations (256 bytes or less).

If a lookaside list is empty (as it is when it’s first created), the system must allocate from paged or nonpaged pool. But if it contains a freed block, the allocation can be satisfied very quickly. (The list grows as blocks are returned to it.) The pool allocation routines automatically tune the number of freed buffers that lookaside lists store according to how often a device driver or executive subsystem allocates from the list—the more frequent the allocations, the more blocks are stored on a list. Lookaside lists are automatically reduced in size if they aren’t being allocated from. (This check happens once per second when the balance set manager system thread wakes up and calls the function ExAdjustLookasideDepth.)

---

**EXPERIMENT: VIEWING THE SYSTEM LOOKASIDE LISTS**

You can display the contents and sizes of the various system lookaside lists with the kernel debugger !lookaside command. The following excerpt is from the output of this command:

```
!lookaside

Lookaside "nt!IopSmallIrpLookasideList" @ 81f47c00 "Irps"
Type    = 0000 NonPagedPool
Current Depth  =   3 Max Depth  =   4
Size     =    148 Max Alloc =   592
AllocateMisses =   930 FreeMisses =   780
TotalAllocates = 13748 TotalFrees = 13601
Hit Rate   =    93% Hlt Rate   =    94%

Lookaside "nt!IopLargeIrpLookasideList" @ 81f47c80 "Irpl"
Type    = 0000 NonPagedPool
Current Depth  =   4 Max Depth  =   4
Size     =    472 Max Alloc = 1888
```
AllocateMisses = 16555  FreeMisses = 15636
TotalAllocates = 59287  TotalFrees = 58372
Hit Rate = 72%  Hit Rate = 73%

Lookaside "nt!OpMdlLookasideList" @ 81f47b80 "Mdl"
  Type = 0000 NonPagedPool
  Current Depth = 4  Max Depth = 4
  Size = 96  Max Alloc = 384
AllocateMisses = 16287  FreeMisses = 15474
TotalAllocates = 72835  TotalFrees = 72026
Hit Rate = 77%  Hit Rate = 78%

Total NonPaged currently allocated for above lists = 0
Total NonPaged potential for above lists = 3280
Total Paged currently allocated for above lists = 744
Total Paged potential for above lists = 1536
Heap Manager

Most applications allocate smaller blocks than the 64-KB minimum allocation granularity possible using page granularity functions such as VirtualAlloc and VirtualAllocExNuma. Allocating such a large area for relatively small allocations is not optimal from a memory usage and performance standpoint. To address this need, Windows provides a component called the heap manager, which manages allocations inside larger memory areas reserved using the page granularity memory allocation functions. The allocation granularity in the heap manager is relatively small: 8 bytes on 32-bit systems, and 16 bytes on 64-bit systems. The heap manager has been designed to optimize memory usage and performance in the case of these smaller allocations.

The heap manager exists in two places: Ntdll.dll and Ntoskrnl.exe. The subsystem APIs (such as the Windows heap APIs) call the functions in Ntdll, and various executive components and device drivers call the functions in Ntoskrnl. Its native interfaces (prefixed with Rtl) are available only for use in internal Windows components or kernel-mode device drivers. The documented Windows API interfaces to the heap (prefixed with Heap) are forwarders to the native functions in Ntdll.dll. In addition, legacy APIs (prefixed with either Local or Global) are provided to support older Windows applications, which also internally call the heap manager, using some of its specialized interfaces to support legacy behavior. The C runtime (CRT) also uses the heap manager when using functions such as malloc, free, and the C++ new operator. The most common Windows heap functions are:

- **HeapCreate or HeapDestroy** Creates or deletes, respectively, a heap. The initial reserved and committed size can be specified at creation.
- **HeapAlloc** Allocates a heap block.
- **HeapFree** Frees a block previously allocated with HeapAlloc.
- **HeapReAlloc** Changes the size of an existing allocation (grows or shrinks an existing block).
- **HeapLock or HeapUnlock** Controls mutual exclusion to the heap operations.
- **HeapWalk** Enumerates the entries and regions in a heap.
Types of Heaps

Each process has at least one heap: the default process heap. The default heap is created at process startup and is never deleted during the process’s lifetime. It defaults to 1 MB in size, but it can be made bigger by specifying a starting size in the image file by using the /HEAP linker flag. This size is just the initial reserve, however—it will expand automatically as needed. (You can also specify the initial committed size in the image file.)

The default heap can be explicitly used by a program or implicitly used by some Windows internal functions. An application can query the default process heap by making a call to the Windows function GetProcessHeap. Processes can also create additional private heaps with the HeapCreate function. When a process no longer needs a private heap, it can recover the virtual address space by calling HeapDestroy. An array with all heaps is maintained in each process, and a thread can query them with the Windows function GetProcessHeaps.

A heap can manage allocations either in large memory regions reserved from the memory manager via VirtualAlloc or from memory mapped file objects mapped in the process address space. The latter approach is rarely used in practice, but it’s suitable for scenarios where the content of the blocks needs to be shared between two processes or between a kernel-mode and a user-mode component. The Win32 GUI subsystem driver (Win32k.sys) uses such a heap for sharing GDI and User objects with user mode. If a heap is built on top of a memory mapped file region, certain constraints apply with respect to the component that can call heap functions. First, the internal heap structures use pointers, and therefore do not allow remapping to different addresses in other processes. Second, the synchronization across multiple processes or between a kernel component and a user process is not supported by the heap functions. Also, in the case of a shared heap between user mode and kernel mode, the user-mode mapping should be read-only to prevent user-mode code from corrupting the heap’s internal structures, which would result in a system crash. The kernel-mode driver is also responsible for not putting any sensitive data in a shared heap to avoid leaking it to user mode.

Heap Manager Structure

As shown in Figure 10-7, the heap manager is structured in two layers: an optional
front-end layer and the core heap. The core heap handles the basic functionality and is mostly common across the user-mode and kernel-mode heap implementations. The core functionality includes the management of blocks inside segments, the management of the segments, policies for extending the heap, committing and decommitting memory, and management of the large blocks.

For user-mode heaps only, an optional front-end heap layer can exist on top of the existing core functionality. The only front-end supported on Windows is the Low Fragmentation Heap (LFH). Only one front-end layer can be used for one heap at one time.

**Heap Synchronization**

The heap manager supports concurrent access from multiple threads by default. However, if a process is single threaded or uses an external mechanism for synchronization, it can tell the heap manager to avoid the overhead of synchronization by specifying HEAP_NO_SERIALIZE either at heap creation or on a per-allocation basis.

A process can also lock the entire heap and prevent other threads from performing heap operations for operations that would require consistent states across multiple heap calls. For instance, enumerating the heap blocks in a heap with the Windows
function HeapWalk requires locking the heap if multiple threads can perform heap operations simultaneously.

If heap synchronization is enabled, there is one lock per heap that protects all internal heap structures. In heavily multithreaded applications (especially when running on multiprocessor systems), the heap lock might become a significant contention point. In that case, performance might be improved by enabling the front-end heap, described in an upcoming section.

The Low Fragmentation Heap

Many applications running in Windows have relatively small heap memory usage (usually less than 1 MB). For this class of applications, the heap manager’s best-fit policy helps keep a low memory footprint for each process. However, this strategy does not scale for large processes and multiprocessor machines. In these cases, memory available for heap usage might be reduced as a result of heap fragmentation. Performance can suffer in scenarios where only certain sizes are often used concurrently from different threads scheduled to run on different processors. This happens because several processors need to modify the same memory location (for example, the head of the look-aside list for that particular size) at the same time, thus causing significant contention for the corresponding cache line.

The LFH avoids fragmentation by managing allocated blocks in predetermined different block-size ranges called buckets. When a process allocates memory from the heap, the LFH chooses the bucket that maps to the smallest block large enough to hold the required size. (The smallest block is 8 bytes.) The first bucket is used for allocations between 1 and 8 bytes, the second for allocations between 9 and 16 bytes, and so on, until the thirty-second bucket, which is used for allocations between 249 and 256 bytes, followed by the thirty-third bucket, which is used for allocations between 257 and 272 bytes, and so on. Finally, the one hundred twenty-eighth bucket, which is the last, is used for allocations between 15,873 and 16,384 bytes. (This is known as a binary buddy system.) Table 10-7 summarizes the different buckets, their granularity, and the range of sizes they map to.

Table 10-7. Buckets
The LFH addresses these issues by using the core heap manager and look-aside lists. The Windows heap manager implements an automatic tuning algorithm that can enable the LFH by default under certain conditions, such as lock contention or the presence of popular size allocations that have shown better performance with the LFH enabled. For large heaps, a significant percentage of allocations is frequently grouped in a relatively small number of buckets of certain sizes. The allocation strategy used by LFH is to optimize the usage for these patterns by efficiently handling same-size blocks.

To address scalability, the LFH expands the frequently accessed internal structures to a number of slots that is two times larger than the current number of processors on the machine. The assignment of threads to these slots is done by an LFH component called the affinity manager. Initially, the LFH starts using the first slot for heap allocations; however, if a contention is detected when accessing some internal data, the LFH switches the current thread to use a different slot. Further contentions will spread threads on more slots. These slots are controlled for each size bucket to improve locality and minimize the overall memory consumption.

Even if the LFH is enabled as a front-end heap, the less frequent allocation sizes may still continue to use the core heap functions to allocate memory, while the most popular allocation classes will be performed from the LFH. The LFH can also be disabled by using the HeapSetInformation API with the HeapCompatibilityInformation class.

### Heap Security Features
As the heap manager has evolved, it has taken an increased role in early detection of heap usage errors and in mitigating effects of potential heap-based exploits. These measures exist to lessen the security effect of potential vulnerabilities in applications. The metadata used by the heap for internal management is packed with a high degree of randomization to make it difficult for an attempted exploit to patch the internal structures to prevent crashes or conceal the attack attempt. These blocks are also subject to an integrity check mechanism on the header to detect simple corruptions such as buffer overruns. Finally, the heap also uses a small degree of randomization of the base address (or handle). By using the HeapSetInformation API with the HeapEnableTerminationOnCorruption class, processes can opt in for an automatic termination in case of detected inconsistencies to avoid executing unknown code.

As an effect of block metadata randomization, using the debugger to simply dump a block header as an area of memory is not that useful. For example, the size of the block and whether it is busy or not are not easy to spot from a regular dump. The same applies to LFH blocks; they have a different type of metadata stored in the header, partially randomized as well. To dump these details, the !heap –i command in the debugger does all the work to retrieve the metadata fields from a block, flagging checksum or free list inconsistencies as well if they exist. The command works for both the LFH and regular heap blocks. The total size of the blocks, the user requested size, the segment owning the block, as well as the header partial checksum are available in the output, as shown in the following sample. Because the randomization algorithm uses the heap granularity, the !heap –i command should be used only in the proper context of the heap containing the block. In the example, the heap handle is 0x001a0000. If the current heap context was different, the decoding of the header would be incorrect. To set the proper context, the same !heap –i command with the heap handle as an argument needs to be executed first.

```
0:000> !heap -i 001a0000
Heap context set to the heap 0x001a0000
0:000> !heap -i 1e2570
Detailed information for block entry 001e2570
  Assumed heap       : 0x001a0000 (Use !heap -i NewHeapHandle to change)
  Header content     : 0x1570F4EC 0x0C0015BE (decoded : 0x07010006 0x0C00000D)
  Owning segment     : 0x001a0000 (offset 0)
  Block flags        : 0x1 (busy )
  Total block size   : 0x6 units (0x30 bytes)
  Requested size     : 0x24 bytes (unused 0xc bytes)
  Previous block size: 0xd units (0x68 bytes)
  Block CRC          : OK - 0x7
```
Heap Debugging Features

The heap manager leverages the 8 bytes used to store internal metadata as a consistency checkpoint, which makes potential heap usage errors more obvious, and also includes several features to help detect bugs by using the following heap functions:

- **Enable tail checking** The end of each block carries a signature that is checked when the block is released. If a buffer overrun destroyed the signature entirely or partially, the heap will report this error.

- **Enable free checking** A free block is filled with a pattern that is checked at various points when the heap manager needs to access the block (such as at removal from the free list to satisfy an allocate request). If the process continued to write to the block after freeing it, the heap manager will detect changes in the pattern and the error will be reported.

- **Parameter checking** This function consists of extensive checking of the parameters passed to the heap functions.

- **Heap validation** The entire heap is validated at each heap call.

- **Heap tagging and stack traces support** This function supports specifying tags for allocation and/or captures user-mode stack traces for the heap calls to help narrow the possible causes of a heap error.

The first three options are enabled by default if the loader detects that a process is started under the control of a debugger. (A debugger can override this behavior and turn off these features.) The heap debugging features can be specified for an executable image by setting various debugging flags in the image header using the Gflags tool. (See the section “Windows Global Flags” in Chapter 3 in Part 1.) Or, heap debugging options can be enabled using the !heap command in the standard Windows debuggers. (See the debugger help for more information.)

Enabling heap debugging options affects all heaps in the process. Also, if any of the heap debugging options are enabled, the LFH will be disabled automatically and the core heap will be used (with the required debugging options enabled). The LFH is also not used for heaps that are not expandable (because of the extra
overhead added to the existing heap structures) or for heaps that do not allow serialization.

**Pageheap**

Because the tail and free checking options described in the preceding sections might be discovering corruptions that occurred well before the problem was detected, an additional heap debugging capability, called pageheap, is provided that directs all or part of the heap calls to a different heap manager. Pageheap is enabled using the Gflags tool (which is part of the Debugging Tools for Windows). When enabled, the heap manager places allocations at the end of pages and reserves the immediately following page. Since reserved pages are not accessible, if a buffer overrun occurs it will cause an access violation, making it easier to detect the offending code. Optionally, pageheap allows placing the blocks at the beginning of the pages, with the preceding page reserved, to detect buffer underrun problems. (This is a rare occurrence.) The pageheap also can protect freed pages against any access to detect references to heap blocks after they have been freed.

Note that using the pageheap can result in running out of address space because of the significant overhead added for small allocations. Also, performance can suffer as a result of the increase of references to demand zero pages, loss of locality, and additional overhead caused by frequent calls to validate heap structures. A process can reduce the impact by specifying that the pageheap be used only for blocks of certain sizes, address ranges, and/or originating DLLs.

For more information on pageheap, see the Debugging Tools for Windows Help file.

**Fault Tolerant Heap**

Corruption of heap metadata has been identified by Microsoft as one of the most common causes of application failures. Windows includes a feature called the fault tolerant heap, or FTH, in an attempt to mitigate these problems and to provide better problem-solving resources to application developers. The fault tolerant heap is implemented in two primary components: the detection component, or FTH server, and the mitigation component, or FTH client.

The detection component is a DLL, Fthsvc.dll, that is loaded by the Windows
Security Center service (Wscsvc.dll, which in turn runs in one of the shared service processes under the local service account). It is notified of application crashes by the Windows Error Reporting service.

When an application crashes in Ntdll.dll, with an error status indicating either an access violation or a heap corruption exception, if it is not already on the FTH service’s list of “watched” applications, the service creates a “ticket” for the application to hold the FTH data. If the application subsequently crashes more than four times in an hour, the FTH service configures the application to use the FTH client in the future.

The FTH client is an application compatibility shim. This mechanism has been used since Windows XP to allow applications that depend on particular behavior of older Windows systems to run on later systems. In this case, the shim mechanism intercepts the calls to the heap routines and redirects them to its own code. The FTH code implements a number of “mitigations” that attempt to allow the application to survive despite various heap-related errors.

For example, to protect against small buffer overrun errors, the FTH adds 8 bytes of padding and an FTH reserved area to each allocation. To address a common scenario in which a block of heap is accessed after it is freed, HeapFree calls are implemented only after a delay: “freed” blocks are put on a list, and only freed when the total size of the blocks on the list exceeds 4 MB. Attempts to free regions that are not actually part of the heap, or not part of the heap identified by the heap handle argument to HeapFree, are simply ignored. In addition, no blocks are actually freed once exit or RtlExitUserProcess has been called.

The FTH server continues to monitor the failure rate of the application after the mitigations have been installed. If the failure rate does not improve, the mitigations are removed.

The activity of the fault tolerant heap can be observed in the Event Viewer. Type eventvwr.msc at a Run prompt, and then navigate in the left pane to Event Viewer, Applications And Services Logs, Microsoft, Windows, Fault-Tolerant-Heap. Click on the Operational log. It may be disabled completely in the registry: in the key HKLM\Software\Microsoft\FTH, set the value Enabled to 0.

The FTH does not normally operate on services, only applications, and it is
disabled on Windows server systems for performance reasons. A system administrator can manually apply the shim to an application or service executable by using the Application Compatibility Toolkit.
Virtual Address Space Layouts

This section describes the components in the user and system address space, followed by the specific layouts on 32-bit and 64-bit systems. This information helps you to understand the limits on process and system virtual memory on both platforms.

Three main types of data are mapped into the virtual address space in Windows: per-process private code and data, sessionwide code and data, and systemwide code and data.

As explained in Chapter 1 in Part 1, each process has a private address space that cannot be accessed by other processes. That is, a virtual address is always evaluated in the context of the current process and cannot refer to an address defined by any other process. Threads within the process can therefore never access virtual addresses outside this private address space. Even shared memory is not an exception to this rule, because shared memory regions are mapped into each participating process, and so are accessed by each process using per-process addresses. Similarly, the cross-process memory functions (ReadProcessMemory and WriteProcessMemory) operate by running kernel-mode code in the context of the target process.

The information that describes the process virtual address space, called page tables, is described in the section on address translation. Each process has its own set of page tables. They are stored in kernel-mode-only accessible pages so that user-mode threads in a process cannot modify their own address space layout.

Session space contains information that is common to each session. (For a description of sessions, see Chapter 2 in Part 1.) A session consists of the processes and other system objects (such as the window station, desktops, and windows) that represent a single user’s logon session. Each session has a session-specific paged pool area used by the kernel-mode portion of the Windows subsystem (Win32k.sys) to allocate session-private GUI data structures. In addition, each session has its own copy of the Windows subsystem process (Csrss.exe) and logon process (Winlogon.exe). The session manager process (Smss.exe) is responsible for creating new sessions, which includes loading a session-private copy of Win32k.sys, creating the session-private object manager namespace, and creating
the session-specific instances of the Csrss and Winlogon processes. To virtualize sessions, all sessionwide data structures are mapped into a region of system space called session space. When a process is created, this range of addresses is mapped to the pages associated with the session that the process belongs to.

Finally, system space contains global operating system code and data structures visible by kernel-mode code regardless of which process is currently executing. System space consists of the following components:

- **System code** Contains the operating system image, HAL, and device drivers used to boot the system.
- **Nonpaged pool** Nonpageable system memory heap.
- **Paged pool** Pageable system memory heap.
- **System cache** Virtual address space used to map files open in the system cache. (See Chapter 11 for detailed information.)
- **System page table entries (PTEs)** Pool of system PTEs used to map system pages such as I/O space, kernel stacks, and memory descriptor lists. You can see how many system PTEs are available by examining the value of the Memory: Free System Page Table Entries counter in Performance Monitor.
- **System working set lists** The working set list data structures that describe the three system working sets (the system cache working set, the paged pool working set, and the system PTEs working set).
- **System mapped views** Used to map Win32k.sys, the loadable kernel-mode part of the Windows subsystem, as well as kernel-mode graphics drivers it uses. (See Chapter 2 in Part 1 for more information on Win32k.sys.)
- **Hyperspace** A special region used to map the process working set list and other per-process data that doesn’t need to be accessible in arbitrary process context. Hyperspace is also used to temporarily map physical pages into the system space. One example of this is invalidating page table entries in page tables of processes other than the current one (such as when a page is removed from the standby list).
- **Crash dump information** Reserved to record information about the state of a system crash.
HAL usage System memory reserved for HAL-specific structures.

Now that we’ve described the basic components of the virtual address space in Windows, let’s examine the specific layout on the x86, IA64, and x64 platforms.

**x86 Address Space Layouts**

By default, each user process on 32-bit versions of Windows has a 2-GB private address space; the operating system takes the remaining 2 GB. However, the system can be configured with the increaseuserva BCD boot option to permit user address spaces up to 3 GB. Two possible address space layouts are shown in Figure 10-8.

The ability for a 32-bit process to grow beyond 2 GB was added to accommodate the need for 32-bit applications to keep more data in memory than could be done with a 2-GB address space. Of course, 64-bit systems provide a much larger address space.
For a process to grow beyond 2 GB of address space, the image file must have the IMAGE_FILE_LARGE_ADDRESS_AWARE flag set in the image header. Otherwise, Windows reserves the additional address space for that process so that the application won’t see virtual addresses greater than 0x7FFFFFFF. Access to the additional virtual memory is opt-in because some applications have assumed that they’d be given at most 2 GB of the address space. Since the high bit of a pointer referencing an address below 2 GB is always zero, these applications would use the high bit in their pointers as a flag for their own data, clearing it, of course, before referencing the data. If they ran with a 3-GB address space, they would inadvertently truncate pointers that have values greater than 2 GB, causing program
errors, including possible data corruption. You set this flag by specifying the linker flag /LARGEADDRESSAWARE when building the executable. This flag has no effect when running the application on a system with a 2-GB user address space. Several system images are marked as large address space aware so that they can take advantage of systems running with large process address spaces. These include:

- **Lsass.exe** The Local Security Authority Subsystem
- **Inetinfo.exe** Internet Information Server
- **Chkdsk.exe** The Check Disk utility
- **Smss.exe** The Session Manager
- **Dllhst3g.exe** A special version of Dllhost.exe (for COM+ applications)
- **Dispdiag.exe** The display diagnostic dump utility
- **Esentutl.exe** The Active Directory Database Utility tool

**EXPERIMENT: CHECKING IF AN APPLICATION IS LARGE ADDRESS AWARE**

You can use the Dumpbin utility from the Windows SDK to check other executables to see if they support large address spaces. Use the /HEADERS flag to display the results. Here's a sample output of Dumpbin on the Session Manager:

```
C:\Program Files\Microsoft SDKs\Windows\v7.1>dumpbin headers
c:\windows\system32\smss.exe
Microsoft (R) COFF PE Dumper Version 10.00.40219.01
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

Dump of file c:\windows\system32\smss.exe
PE signature found
File Type: EXECUTABLE IMAGE

FILE HEADER VALUES
  8664 machine (x64)
  5 number of sections
  4A5BC116 time date stamp Mon Jul 13 16:19:50 2009
  0 file pointer to symbol table
  0 number of symbols
  F0 size of optional header
  22 characteristics
  Executable
  Application can handle large (>2GB) addresses
```
Finally, because memory allocations using VirtualAlloc, VirtualAllocEx, and VirtualAllocExNuma start with low virtual addresses and grow higher by default, unless a process allocates a lot of virtual memory or it has a very fragmented virtual address space, it will never get back very high virtual addresses. Therefore, for testing purposes, you can force memory allocations to start from high addresses by using the MEM_TOP_DOWN flag or by adding a DWORD registry value, HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management\AllocationPreference, and setting it to 0x100000.

**Figure 10-9** shows two screen shots of the TestLimit utility (shown in previous experiments) leaking memory on a 32-bit Windows machine booted with and without the increaseuserva option set to 3 GB.

Note that in the second screen shot, TestLimit was able to leak almost 3 GB, as expected. This is only possible because TestLimit was linked with /LARGEADDRESSAWARE. Had it not been, the results would have been essentially the same as on the system booted without increaseuserva.

![Figure 10-9. TestLimit leaking memory on a 32-bit Windows computer, with and without increaseuserva set to 3 GB](image)

### x86 System Address Space Layout

The 32-bit versions of Windows implement a dynamic system address space layout by using a virtual address allocator (we’ll describe this functionality later in this section). There are still a few specifically reserved areas, as shown in **Figure 10-8**. However, many kernel-mode structures use dynamic address space allocation.
These structures are therefore not necessarily virtually contiguous with themselves. Each can easily exist in several disjointed pieces in various areas of system address space. The uses of system address space that are allocated in this way include:

- Nonpaged pool
- Special pool
- Paged pool
- System page table entries (PTEs)
- System mapped views
- File system cache
- File system structures (metadata)
- Session space

**x86 Session Space**

For systems with multiple sessions, the code and data unique to each session are mapped into system address space but shared by the processes in that session. **Figure 10-10** shows the general layout of session space.

The sizes of the components of session space, just like the rest of kernel system address space, are dynamically configured and resized by the memory manager on demand.

**EXPERIMENT: VIEWING SESSIONS**
You can display which processes are members of which sessions by examining the session ID. This can be viewed with Task Manager, Process Explorer, or the kernel debugger. Using the kernel debugger, you can list the active sessions with the `!session` command as follows:

```
lkd> !session
    Sessions on machine: 3
    Valid Sessions: 0 1 3
    Current Session 1
```

Then you can set the active session using the `!session -s` command and display the address of the session data structures and the processes in that session with the `!sprocess` command:

```
lkd> !session -s 3
    Sessions on machine: 3
    Implicit process is now 84173500
    Using session 3

lkd> !sprocess
    Dumping Session 3

MMSESSION_SPACE 9a83c000
_MMSESSION 9a83cd00
PROCESS 84173500 SessionId: 3 Cid: 0d78 Peb: 7ffde000 ParentCid: 0e80
    DirBase: 3ef53500 ObjectTable: 8588d820 HandleCount: 76.
    Image: csrss.exe

PROCESS 841a6030 SessionId: 3 Cid: 0c6c Peb: 7ffdc000 ParentCid: 0e80
    DirBase: 3ef53520 ObjectTable: 85897208 HandleCount: 94.
    Image: winlogon.exe

PROCESS 841d9cf0 SessionId: 3 Cid: 0d38 Peb: 7ff60000 ParentCid: 0c6c
    DirBase: 3ef53540 ObjectTable: 8589d248 HandleCount: 165.
    Image: LogonUI.exe

```

To view the details of the session, dump the MM_SESSION_SPACE structure using the `dt` command, as follows:

```
lkd> dt nt!MMSESSION_SPACE 9a83c000
    +0x000 ReferenceCount : 0n3
    +0x004 u : <unnamed-tag>
    +0x008 SessionId : 3
    +0x00c ProcessReferenceToSession : 0n4
    +0x010 ProcessList : LISTENTRY [ 0x841735e4 - 0x841d9dd4 ]
    +0x018 LastProcessSwappedOutTime : LARGE_INTEGER 0x0
    +0x020 SessionPageDirectoryIndex : 0x31fa3
    +0x024 NonPagablePages : 0x19
    +0x028 CommittedPages : 0x867
    +0x02c PagedPoolStart : 0x80000000 Void
    +0x030 PagedPoolEnd : 0xffbfffff Void
    +0x034 SessionObject : 0x854e2040 Void
    +0x038 SessionObjectHandle : 0x8000020c Void
    +0x03c ResidentProcessCount : 0n3
    +0x040 SessionPoolAllocationFailures : [4] 0
    +0x050 ImageList : LISTENTRY [ 0x8519bef8 - 0x85296370 ]
    +0x058 LocaleId : 0x409
    +0x05c AttachCount : 0
    +0x060 AttachGate : _KGATE
```
EXPERIMENT: VIEWING SESSION SPACE UTILIZATION

You can view session space memory utilization with the `!vm` command in the kernel debugger. For example, the following output was taken from a 32-bit Windows client system with the default two sessions created at system startup:

```
... lkd> !vm 4
.
. Terminal Server Memory Usage By Session:

  Session ID 0 @ 9a8c7000:
Paged Pool Usage:        2372K
  Commit Usage:            4832K

  Session ID 1 @ 9a881000:
Paged Pool Usage:       14120K
  Commit Usage:           16704K
```

System Page Table Entries

System page table entries (PTEs) are used to dynamically map system pages such as I/O space, kernel stacks, and the mapping for memory descriptor lists. System PTEs aren't an infinite resource. On 32-bit Windows, the number of available system PTEs is such that the system can theoretically describe 2 GB of contiguous system virtual address space. On 64-bit Windows, system PTEs can describe up to 128 GB of contiguous virtual address space.

EXPERIMENT: VIEWING SYSTEM PTE INFORMATION

You can see how many system PTEs are available by examining the value of the Memory: Free System Page Table Entries counter in Performance Monitor or by using the `!sysptes` or `!vm` command in the debugger. You can also dump the MISYSTEM_PTE_TYPE structure associated with the MiSystemPteInfo global variable. This will also show you how many PTE allocation failures occurred on the system—a high count indicates a problem and possibly a system PTE leak.

```
0: kd> !sysptes

System PTE Information
  Total System Ptes 307168
  starting PTE: c0200000
  free blocks: 32  total free: 3856  largest free block: 542
```
Kernel Stack PTE Information
Unable to get syspte index array - skipping bins

starting PTE: c0200000

free blocks: 165  total free: 1503  largest free block: 75

0: kd> ? nt!MiSystemPteInfo
Evaluate expression: -2100014016 = 82d45440

0: kd> dt MISION_PTE_TYPE 82d45440
nt!MISION_PTE_TYPE
+0x000 Bitmap           : RTLBITMAP
+0x008 Flags            : 3
+0x00c HInt             : 0x2271f
+0x010 BasePte          : 0xc0200000 MMPTE
+0x014 FailureCount     : 0x82d45468  -> 0
+0x018Vm               : 0x82d67300 MMSUPPORT
+0x01c TotalSystemPtes  : 0n7136
+0x020 TotalFreeSystemPtes : 0n4113
+0x024 CachedPteCount   : 0n0
+0x028 PteFailures     : 0
+0x02c SpinLock         : 0
+0x02c GlobalMutex      : (null)

If you are seeing lots of system PTE failures, you can enable system PTE tracking by creating a new DWORD value in the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management key called TrackPtes and setting its value to 1. You can then use !sysptes 4 to show a list of allocators, as shown here:

lkd>!sysptes 4
0x1ca2 System PTEs allocated to mapping locked pages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VA</th>
<th>MDL</th>
<th>PageCount</th>
<th>Caller/CallersCaller</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ecbfdee8</td>
<td>f0ed0958</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>netbt!DispatchIoctrls+0x56a/netbt!NbtDispatchDevCtrl+0xcd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f0a8d050</td>
<td>f0ed0510</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>netbt!DispatchIoctrls+0x64e/netbt!NbtDispatchDevCtrl+0xcd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ece5f000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20 nt!MiFindContiguousMemory+0x63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ed447000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ntfs!NtfsInitializeVcb+0x30e/Ntfs!NtfsInitializeDevice+0x95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ee1ce000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ntfs!NtfsInitializeVcb+0x30e/Ntfs!NtfsInitializeDevice+0x95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ed9c4000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ca nt!MiFindContiguousMemory+0x63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eda8e000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ca nt!MiFindContiguousMemory+0x63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>efb23d68</td>
<td>f8067888</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>mrxsmb!BowserMapUsersBuffer+0x28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>efac5af4</td>
<td>f8b15b98</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ndisui+NdisioRead+0x54/nt!NtReadFile+0x566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f0ac688c</td>
<td>f848ff88</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ndisui+NdisioRead+0x54/nt!NtReadFile+0x566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>efad7b7c</td>
<td>f82fc2a8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ndisuo+NdisioRead+0x54/nt!NtReadFile+0x566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ee4d1000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>38 nt!MiFindContiguousMemory+0x63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>efa4ff00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ntfs!NtfsInitializeVcb+0x30e/Ntfs!NtfsInitializeDevice+0x95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>efa53000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ntfs!NtfsInitializeVcb+0x30e/Ntfs!NtfsInitializeDevice+0x95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eea89000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>TDI!DllInitialize+0x4f/nt!MiResolveImageReferences+0x4bc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ee798000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20 VIDEOPT!pVideoPortGetDeviceBase+0x1f1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f0676000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>hal!HalpGrowMapBuffers+0x134/hal!HalpAllocateAdapterEx+0x1ff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**64-Bit Address Space Layouts**

The theoretical 64-bit virtual address space is 16 exabytes (18,446,744,073,709,551,616 bytes, or approximately 18.44 billion billion bytes). Unlike on x86 systems, where the default address space is divided in two parts (half for a process and half for the system), the 64-bit address is divided into a number of different size regions whose components match conceptually the portions of user, system, and session space. The various sizes of these regions, listed in Table 10-8, represent current implementation limits that could easily be extended in future releases. Clearly, 64 bits provides a tremendous leap in terms of address space sizes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>IA64</th>
<th>x64</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Process Address Space</td>
<td>7,152 GB</td>
<td>8,192 GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System PTE Space</td>
<td>128 GB</td>
<td>128 GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System Cache</td>
<td>1 TB</td>
<td>1 TB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paged Pool</td>
<td>128 GB</td>
<td>128 GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonpaged Pool</td>
<td>75% of physical memory</td>
<td>75% of physical memory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Also, on 64-bit Windows, another useful feature of having an image that is large address space aware is that while running on 64-bit Windows (under Wow64), such an image will actually receive all 4 GB of user address space available—after all, if the image can support 3-GB pointers, 4-GB pointers should not be any different, because unlike the switch from 2 GB to 3 GB, there are no additional bits involved. Figure 10-11 shows TestLimit, running as a 32-bit application, reserving address space on a 64-bit Windows machine, followed by the 64-bit version of TestLimit leaking memory on the same machine.
Figure 10-11. 32-bit and 64-bit TestLimit reserving address space on a 64-bit Windows computer

Note that these results depend on the two versions of TestLimit having been linked with the /LARGEADDRESSAWARE option. Had they not been, the results would have been about 2 GB for each. 64-bit applications linked without /LARGEADDRESSAWARE are constrained to the first 2 GB of the process virtual address space, just like 32-bit applications.

The detailed IA64 and x64 address space layouts vary slightly. The IA64 address space layout is shown in Figure 10-12, and the x64 address space layout is shown in Figure 10-13.
Figure 10-12. IA64 address space layout
x64 Virtual Addressing Limitations

As discussed previously, 64 bits of virtual address space allow for a possible maximum of 16 exabytes (EB) of virtual memory, a notable improvement over the 4 GB offered by 32-bit addressing. With such a copious amount of memory, it is obvious that today’s computers, as well as tomorrow’s foreseeable machines, are
not even close to requiring support for that much memory.

Accordingly, to simplify chip architecture and avoid unnecessary overhead, particularly in address translation (to be described later), AMD’s and Intel’s current x64 processors implement only 256 TB of virtual address space. That is, only the low-order 48 bits of a 64-bit virtual address are implemented. However, virtual addresses are still 64 bits wide, occupying 8 bytes in registers or when stored in memory. The high-order 16 bits (bits 48 through 63) must be set to the same value as the highest order implemented bit (bit 47), in a manner similar to sign extension in two’s complement arithmetic. An address that conforms to this rule is said to be a “canonical” address.

Under these rules, the bottom half of the address space thus starts at 0x0000000000000000, as expected, but it ends at 0x00007FFFFFFFFF. The top half of the address space starts at 0xFFF8000000000000 and ends at 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF. Each “canonical” portion is 128 TB. As newer processors implement more of the address bits, the lower half of memory will expand upward, toward 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, while the upper half of memory will expand downward, toward 0x8000000000000000 (a similar split to today’s memory space but with 32 more bits).

**Windows x64 16-TB Limitation**

Windows on x64 has a further limitation: of the 256 TB of virtual address space available on x64 processors, Windows at present allows only the use of a little more than 16 TB. This is split into two 8-TB regions, the user mode, per-process region starting at 0 and working toward higher addresses (ending at 0x00007FFFFFFFFF), and a kernel-mode, systemwide region starting at “all Fs” and working toward lower addresses, ending at 0xFFFFFFFF800000000000 for most purposes. This section describes the origin of this 16-TB limit.

A number of Windows mechanisms have made, and continue to make, assumptions about usable bits in addresses. Pushlocks, fast references, Patchguard DPC contexts, and singly linked lists are common examples of data structures that use bits within a pointer for nonaddressing purposes. Singly linked lists, combined with the lack of a CPU instruction in the original x64 CPUs required to “port” the data structure to 64-bit Windows, are responsible for this memory addressing limit on
Windows for x64.

Here is the SLIST_HEADER, the data structure Windows uses to represent an entry inside a list:

```c
typedef union SLISTHEADER {
    ULONGLONG Alignment;
    struct {
        SLIST_ENTRY Next;
        USHORT Depth;
        USHORT Sequence;
    } DUMMYSTRUCTNAME;
} SLIST_HEADER, *PSLIST_HEADER;
```

Note that this is an 8-byte structure, guaranteed to be aligned as such, composed of three elements: the pointer to the next entry (32 bits, or 4 bytes) and depth and sequence numbers, each 16 bits (or 2 bytes). To create lock-free push and pop operations, the implementation makes use of an instruction present on Pentium processors or higher—CMPXCHG8B (Compare and Exchange 8 bytes), which allows the atomic modification of 8 bytes of data. By using this native CPU instruction, which also supports the LOCK prefix (guaranteeing atomicity on a multiprocessor system), the need for a spinlock to combine two 32-bit accesses is eliminated, and all operations on the list become lock free (increasing speed and scalability).

On 64-bit computers, addresses are 64 bits, so the pointer to the next entry should logically be 64 bits. If the depth and sequence numbers remain within the same parameters, the system must provide a way to modify at minimum 64+32 bits of data—or better yet, 128 bits, in order to increase the entropy of the depth and sequence numbers. However, the first x64 processors did not implement the essential CMPXCHG16B instruction to allow this. The implementation, therefore, was written to pack as much information as possible into only 64 bits, which was the most that could be modified atomically at once. The 64-bit SLIST_HEADER thus looks like this:

```c
struct {  // 8-byte header
    ULONGLONG Depth:16;
    ULONGLONG Sequence:9;
    ULONGLONG NextEntry:39;
} Header8;
```

The first change is the reduction of the space for the sequence number to 9 bits instead of 16 bits, reducing the maximum sequence number the list can achieve.
This leaves only 39 bits for the pointer, still far from 64 bits. However, by forcing the structure to be 16-byte aligned when allocated, 4 more bits can be used because the bottom bits can now always be assumed to be 0. This gives 43 bits for addresses, but there is one more assumption that can be made. Because the implementation of linked lists is used either in kernel mode or user mode but cannot be used across address spaces, the top bit can be ignored, just as on 32-bit machines. The code will assume the address to be kernel mode if called in kernel mode and vice versa. This allows us to address up to 44 bits of memory in the NextEntry pointer and is the defining constraint of the addressing limit in Windows.

Forty-four bits is a much better number than 32. It allows 16 TB of virtual memory to be described and thus splits Windows into two even chunks of 8 TB for user-mode and kernel-mode memory. Nevertheless, this is still 16 times smaller than the CPU’s own limit (48 bits is 256 TB), and even farther still from the maximum that 64 bits can describe. So, with scalability in mind, some other bits do exist in the SLIST_HEADER that define the type of header being dealt with. This means that when the day comes when all x64 CPUs support 128-bit Compare and Exchange, Windows can easily take advantage of it (and to do so before then would mean distributing two different kernel images). Here’s a look at the full 8-byte header:

```c
struct {  // 8-byte header
    ULONGLONG Depth:16;
    ULONGLONG Sequence:9;
    ULONGLONG NextEntry:39;
    ULONGLONG HeaderType:1; // 0: 8-byte; 1: 16-byte
    ULONGLONG Init:1;      // 0: uninitialized; 1: initialized
    ULONGLONG Reserved:59;
    ULONGLONG Region:3;
} Header8;
```

Note how the HeaderType bit is overlaid with the Depth bits and allows the implementation to deal with 16-byte headers whenever support becomes available. For the sake of completeness, here is the definition of the 16-byte header:

```c
struct {  // 16-byte header
    ULONGLONG Depth:16;
    ULONGLONG Sequence:48;
    ULONGLONG HeaderType:1; // 0: 8-byte; 1: 16-byte
    ULONGLONG Init:1;       // 0: uninitialized; 1: initialized
    ULONGLONG Reserved:2;
    ULONGLONG NextEntry:60; // last 4 bits are always 0's
} Header16;
```
Notice how the NextEntry pointer has now become 60 bits, and because the structure is still 16-byte aligned, with the 4 free bits, leads to the full 64 bits being addressable.

Conversely, kernel-mode data structures that do not involve SLISTS are not limited to the 8-TB address space range. System page table entries, hyperspace, and the cache working set all occupy virtual addresses below 0xFFFFF80000000000 because these structures do not use SLISTS.

**Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management**

Thirty-two-bit versions of Windows manage the system address space through an internal kernel virtual allocator mechanism that we’ll describe in this section. Currently, 64-bit versions of Windows have no need to use the allocator for virtual address space management (and thus bypass the cost), because each region is statically defined as shown in Table 10-8 earlier.

When the system initializes, the MiInitializeDynamicVa function sets up the basic dynamic ranges (the ranges currently supported are described in Table 10-9) and sets the available virtual address to all available kernel space. It then initializes the address space ranges for boot loader images, process space (hyperspace), and the HAL through the MiIntializeSystemVaRange function, which is used to set hardcoded address ranges. Later, when nonpaged pool is initialized, this function is used again to reserve the virtual address ranges for it. Finally, whenever a driver loads, the address range is relabeled to a driver image range (instead of a boot loaded range).

After this point, the rest of the system virtual address space can be dynamically requested and released through MiObtainSystemVa (and its analogous MiObtainSessionVa) and MiReturnSystemVa. Operations such as expanding the system cache, the system PTEs, nonpaged pool, paged pool, and/or special pool; mapping memory with large pages; creating the PFN database; and creating a new session all result in dynamic virtual address allocations for a specific range. Each time the kernel virtual address space allocator obtains virtual memory ranges for use by a certain type of virtual address, it updates the MiSystemVaType array, which contains the virtual address type for the newly allocated range. The values
that can appear in MiSystemVaType are shown in Table 10-9.

Table 10-9. System Virtual Address Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Limitable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MiVaSessionSpace (0x1)</td>
<td>Addresses for session space</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiVaProcessSpace (0x2)</td>
<td>Addresses for process address space</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiVaBootLoaded (0x3)</td>
<td>Addresses for images loaded by the boot loader</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiVaPfnDatabase (0x4)</td>
<td>Addresses for the PFN database</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiVaNonPagedPool (0x5)</td>
<td>Addresses for the nonpaged pool</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiVaPagedPool (0x6)</td>
<td>Addresses for the paged pool</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiVaSpecialPool (0x7)</td>
<td>Addresses for the special pool</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiVaSystemCache (0x8)</td>
<td>Addresses for the system cache</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiVaSystemPtes (0x9)</td>
<td>Addresses for system PTEs</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiVaHal (0xA)</td>
<td>Addresses for the HAL</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiVaSessionGlobalSpace (0xB)</td>
<td>Addresses for session global space</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiVaDriverImages (0xC)</td>
<td>Addresses for loaded driver images</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the ability to dynamically reserve virtual address space on demand allows better management of virtual memory, it would be useless without the ability to free this memory. As such, when paged pool or the system cache can be shrunk, or when special pool and large page mappings are freed, the associated virtual address is freed. (Another case is when the boot registry is released.) This allows dynamic management of memory depending on each component’s use. Additionally, components can reclaim memory through MiReclaimSystemVa, which requests virtual addresses associated with the system cache to be flushed out (through the dereference segment thread) if available virtual address space has dropped below 128 MB. (Reclaiming can also be satisfied if initial nonpaged pool has been freed.)

In addition to better proportioning and better management of virtual addresses dedicated to different kernel memory consumers, the dynamic virtual address
allocator also has advantages when it comes to memory footprint reduction. Instead of having to manually preallocate static page table entries and page tables, paging-related structures are allocated on demand. On both 32-bit and 64-bit systems, this reduces boot-time memory usage because unused addresses won’t have their page tables allocated. It also means that on 64-bit systems, the large address space regions that are reserved don’t need to have their page tables mapped in memory, which allows them to have arbitrarily large limits, especially on systems that have little physical RAM to back the resulting paging structures.

**EXPERIMENT: QUERYING SYSTEM VIRTUAL ADDRESS USAGE**

You can look at the current usage and peak usage of each system virtual address type by using the kernel debugger. For each system virtual address type described in Table 10-9, the MiSystemVaTypeCount, MiSystemVaTypeCountFailures, and MiSystemVaTypeCountPeak arrays in the kernel contain the sizes, count failures, and peak sizes for each type. Here’s how you can dump the usage for the system, followed by the peak usage (you can use a similar technique for the failure counts):

```
lkd> dd /c 1 MiSystemVaTypeCount l c
81f4f880 00000000
81f4f884 00000028
81f4f888 00000008
81f4f88c 0000000c
81f4f890 0000000b
81f4f894 0000001a
81f4f898 0000002f
81f4f89c 00000000
81f4f8a0 000001b6
81f4f8a4 00000030
81f4f8a8 00000002
81f4f8ac 00000006
```

```
lkd> dd /c 1 MiSystemVaTypeCountPeak l c
81f4f840 00000000
81f4f844 00000038
81f4f848 00000000
81f4f84c 00000000
81f4f850 0000003d
81f4f854 0000001e
81f4f858 00000032
81f4f85c 00000000
81f4f860 00000238
81f4f864 00000031
81f4f868 00000000
81f4f86c 00000006
```

Theoretically, the different virtual address ranges assigned to components can grow arbitrarily in size as long as enough system virtual address space is available. In practice, on 32-bit systems, the kernel allocator implements the ability to set limits on each virtual address type for the purposes of both reliability and stability. (On
64-bit systems, kernel address space exhaustion is currently not a concern.) Although no limits are imposed by default, system administrators can use the registry to modify these limits for the virtual address types that are currently marked as limitable (see Table 10-9).

If the current request during the MiObtainSystemVa call exceeds the available limit, a failure is marked (see the previous experiment) and a reclaim operation is requested regardless of available memory. This should help alleviate memory load and might allow the virtual address allocation to work during the next attempt. (Recall, however, that reclaiming affects only system cache and nonpaged pool).

**EXPERIMENT: SETTING SYSTEM VIRTUAL ADDRESS LIMITS**

The MiSystemVaTypeCountLimit array contains limitations for system virtual address usage that can be set for each type. Currently, the memory manager allows only certain virtual address types to be limited, and it provides the ability to use an undocumented system call to set limits for the system dynamically during runtime. (These limits can also be set through the registry, as described at http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb870880(VS.85).aspx.) These limits can be set for those types marked in Table 10-9.

You can use the MemLimit utility (http://www.winsider.com/tools/memlimit.html) from Winsider Seminars & Solutions to query and set the different limits for these types, and also to see the current and peak virtual address space usage. Here’s how you can query the current limits with the –q flag:

```
C:\ >memlimit.exe -q
```

```
MemLimit v1.00 - Query and set hard limits on system VA space consumption
Copyright (C) 2008 Alex Ionescu
www.alex-ionescu.com

System Va Consumption:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>Peak</th>
<th>Limit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non Paged Pool</td>
<td>102400 KB</td>
<td>0 KB</td>
<td>0 KB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paged Pool</td>
<td>59392 KB</td>
<td>83968 KB</td>
<td>0 KB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System Cache</td>
<td>534528 KB</td>
<td>536576 KB</td>
<td>0 KB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System PTEs</td>
<td>73728 KB</td>
<td>75776 KB</td>
<td>0 KB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Session Space</td>
<td>75776 KB</td>
<td>90112 KB</td>
<td>0 KB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

As an experiment, use the following command to set a limit of 100 MB for paged pool:

```
memlimit.exe -p 100M
```

And now try running the testlimit –h experiment from Chapter 3 (in Part 1) again, which attempted to create 16 million handles. Instead of reaching the 16 million handle count, the process will fail, because the system will have run out of address space available for paged pool allocations.

**System Virtual Address Space Quotas**

The system virtual address space limits described in the previous section allow for
limiting systemwide virtual address space usage of certain kernel components, but they work only on 32-bit systems when applied to the system as a whole. To address more specific quota requirements that system administrators might have, the memory manager also collaborates with the process manager to enforce either systemwide or user-specific quotas for each process.

The PagedPoolQuota, NonPagedPoolQuota, PagingFileQuota, and WorkingSetPagesQuota values in the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management key can be configured to specify how much memory of each type a given process can use. This information is read at initialization, and the default system quota block is generated and then assigned to all system processes (user processes will get a copy of the default system quota block unless per-user quotas have been configured as explained next).

To enable per-user quotas, subkeys under the registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Session Manager\Quota System can be created, each one representing a given user SID. The values mentioned previously can then be created under this specific SID subkey, enforcing the limits only for the processes created by that user. **Table 10-10** shows how to configure these values, which can be configured at run time or not, and which privileges are required.

**Table 10-10. Process Quota Types**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value Type</th>
<th>Dynamic Type</th>
<th>Privilege</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PagedPoolQuota</td>
<td>Maximum size of paged pool that can be allocated by this process</td>
<td>Size in MB</td>
<td>Only for processes running with the system token</td>
<td>SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NonPagedPoolQuota</td>
<td>Maximum size of nonpaged pool that can be allocated by this process</td>
<td>Size in MB</td>
<td>Only for processes running with the system token</td>
<td>SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### User Address Space Layout

Just as address space in the kernel is dynamic, the user address space is also built dynamically—the addresses of the thread stacks, process heaps, and loaded images (such as DLLs and an application’s executable) are dynamically computed (if the application and its images support it) through a mechanism known as Address Space Layout Randomization, or ASLR.

At the operating system level, user address space is divided into a few well-defined regions of memory, shown in Figure 10-14. The executable and DLLs themselves are present as memory mapped image files, followed by the heap(s) of the process and the stack(s) of its thread(s). Apart from these regions (and some reserved system structures such as the TEBs and PEB), all other memory allocations are run-time dependent and generated. ASLR is involved with the location of all these run-time-dependent regions and, combined with DEP, provides a mechanism for making remote exploitation of a system through memory manipulation harder to achieve. Since Windows code and data are placed at dynamic locations, an attacker cannot typically hardcode a meaningful offset into either a program or a system-supplied DLL.
EXPERIMENT: ANALYZING USER VIRTUAL ADDRESS SPACE

The VMMap utility from Sysinternals can show you a detailed view of the virtual memory being utilized by any process on your machine, divided into categories for each type of allocation, summarized as follows:

- **Image** Displays memory allocations used to map the executable and its dependencies (such as dynamic libraries) and any other memory mapped image (portable executable format) files
- **Private** Displays memory allocations marked as private, such as internal data structures, other than the stack and heap
- **Shareable** Displays memory allocations marked as shareable, typically including shared memory (but not memory mapped files, which are either Image or Mapped File)
- **Mapped File** Displays memory allocations for memory mapped data files
- **Heap** Displays memory allocated for the heap(s) that this process owns
- **Stack** Displays memory allocated for the stack of each thread in this process
- **System** Displays kernel memory allocated for the process (such as the process object)

The following screen shot shows a typical view of Explorer as seen through VMMap.
Depending on the type of memory allocation, VMMap can show additional information, such as file names (for mapped files), heap IDs (for heap allocations), and thread IDs (for stack allocations). Furthermore, each allocation’s cost is shown both in committed memory and working set memory. The size and protection of each allocation is also displayed.

ASLR begins at the image level, with the executable for the process and its dependent DLLs. Any image file that has specified ASLR support in its PE header (IMAGE_DLL_CHARACTERISTICS_DYNAMIC_BASE), typically specified by using the /DYNAMICBASE linker flag in Microsoft Visual Studio, and contains a relocation section will be processed by ASLR. When such an image is found, the system selects an image offset valid globally for the current boot. This offset is selected from a bucket of 256 values, all of which are 64-KB aligned.

**Image Randomization**

For executables, the load offset is calculated by computing a delta value each time an executable is loaded. This value is a pseudo-random 8-bit number from 0x10000 to 0xFE0000, calculated by taking the current processor’s time stamp counter (TSC), shifting it by four places, and then performing a division modulo 254 and adding 1. This number is then multiplied by the allocation granularity of 64 KB discussed earlier. By adding 1, the memory manager ensures that the value can never be 0, so executables will never load at the address in the PE header if ASLR is being used. This delta is then added to the executable’s preferred load
address, creating one of 256 possible locations within 16 MB of the image address in the PE header.

For DLLs, computing the load offset begins with a per-boot, systemwide value called the image bias, which is computed by MiInitializeRelocations and stored in MiImageBias. This value corresponds to the time stamp counter (TSC) of the current CPU when this function was called during the boot cycle, shifted and masked into an 8-bit value, which provides 256 possible values. Unlike executables, this value is computed only once per boot and shared across the system to allow DLLs to remain shared in physical memory and relocated only once. If DLLs were remapped at different locations inside different processes, the code could not be shared. The loader would have to fix up address references differently for each process, thus turning what had been shareable read-only code into process-private data. Each process using a given DLL would have to have its own private copy of the DLL in physical memory.

Once the offset is computed, the memory manager initializes a bitmap called the MiImageBitMap. This bitmap is used to represent ranges from 0x50000000 to 0x78000000 (stored in MiImageBitMapHighVa), and each bit represents one unit of allocation (64 KB, as mentioned earlier). Whenever the memory manager loads a DLL, the appropriate bit is set to mark its location in the system; when the same DLL is loaded again, the memory manager shares its section object with the already relocated information.

As each DLL is loaded, the system scans the bitmap from top to bottom for free bits. The MiImageBias value computed earlier is used as a start index from the top to randomize the load across different boots as suggested. Because the bitmap will be entirely empty when the first DLL (which is always Ntdll.dll) is loaded, its load address can easily be calculated: 0x78000000 – MiImageBias * 0x10000. Each subsequent DLL will then load in a 64-KB chunk below. Because of this, if the address of Ntdll.dll is known, the addresses of other DLLs could easily be computed. To mitigate this possibility, the order in which known DLLs are mapped by the Session Manager during initialization is also randomized when Smss loads.

Finally, if no free space is available in the bitmap (which would mean that most of the region defined for ASLR is in use, the DLL relocation code defaults back to the executable case, loading the DLL at a 64-KB chunk within 16 MB of its preferred
base address.

**Stack Randomization**

The next step in ASLR is to randomize the location of the initial thread’s stack (and, subsequently, of each new thread). This randomization is enabled unless the flag StackRandomizationDisabled was enabled for the process and consists of first selecting one of 32 possible stack locations separated by either 64 KB or 256 KB. This base address is selected by finding the first appropriate free memory region and then choosing the xth available region, where x is once again generated based on the current processor’s TSC shifted and masked into a 5-bit value (which allows for 32 possible locations).

Once this base address has been selected, a new TSC-derived value is calculated, this one 9 bits long. The value is then multiplied by 4 to maintain alignment, which means it can be as large as 2,048 bytes (half a page). It is added to the base address to obtain the final stack base.

**Heap Randomization**

Finally, ASLR randomizes the location of the initial process heap (and subsequent heaps) when created in user mode. The RtlCreateHeap function uses another pseudo-random, TSC-derived value to determine the base address of the heap. This value, 5 bits this time, is multiplied by 64 KB to generate the final base address, starting at 0, giving a possible range of 0x00000000 to 0x001F0000 for the initial heap. Additionally, the range before the heap base address is manually deallocated in an attempt to force an access violation if an attack is doing a brute-force sweep of the entire possible heap address range.

**ASLR in Kernel Address Space**

ASLR is also active in kernel address space. There are 64 possible load addresses for 32-bit drivers and 256 for 64-bit drivers. Relocating user-space images requires a significant amount of work area in kernel space, but if kernel space is tight, ASLR can use the user-mode address space of the System process for this work area.

**Controlling Security Mitigations**

As we’ve seen, ASLR and many of the other security mitigations in Windows are
optional because of their potential compatibility effects: ASLR applies only to images with the IMAGE_DLL_CHARACTERISTICS_DYNAMIC_BASE bit in their image headers, hardware no-execute (data execution protection) can be controlled by a combination of boot options and linker options, and so on. To allow both enterprise customers and individual users more visibility and control of these features, Microsoft publishes the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET). EMET offers centralized control of the mitigations built into Windows and also adds several more mitigations not yet part of the Windows product. Additionally, EMET provides notification capabilities through the Event Log to let administrators know when certain software has experienced access faults because mitigations have been applied. Finally, EMET also enables manual opt-out for certain applications that might exhibit compatibility issues in certain environments, even though they were opted in by the developer.

**EXPERIMENT: LOOKING AT ASLR PROTECTION ON PROCESSES**

You can use Process Explorer from Sysinternals to look over your processes (and, just as important, the DLLs they load) to see if they support ASLR. Note that even if just one DLL loaded by a process does not support ASLR, it can make the process much more vulnerable to attacks.

To look at the ASLR status for processes, right-click on any column in the process tree, choose Select Columns, and then check ASLR Enabled on the Process Image tab. Notice that not all in-box Windows programs and services are running with ASLR enabled, and there is one visible example of a third-party application that does not have ASLR enabled either.

In the example, we have highlighted the Notepad.exe process. In this case, its load address is 0xFE0000. If you were to close all instances of Notepad and then start another, you would find it at a different load address. If you shut down and reboot the system and then try the experiment again, you would find that the ASLR-enabled DLLs are at different load addresses after each boot.
Address Translation

Now that you’ve seen how Windows structures the virtual address space, let’s look at how it maps these address spaces to real physical pages. User applications and system code reference virtual addresses. This section starts with a detailed description of 32-bit x86 address translation (in both non-PAE and PAE modes) and continues with a brief description of the differences on the 64-bit IA64 and x64 platforms. In the next section, we’ll describe what happens when such a translation doesn’t resolve to a physical memory address (paging) and explain how Windows manages physical memory via working sets and the page frame database.

x86 Virtual Address Translation

Using data structures the memory manager creates and maintains called page tables, the CPU translates virtual addresses into physical addresses. Each page of virtual address space is associated with a system-space structure called a page table entry (PTE), which contains the physical address to which the virtual one is mapped. For example, Figure 10-15 shows how three consecutive virtual pages might be mapped to three physically discontiguous pages on an x86 system. There may not even be any PTEs for regions that have been marked as reserved or committed but never accessed, because the page table itself might be allocated only when the first page fault occurs.
The dashed line connecting the virtual pages to the PTEs in Figure 10-15 represents the indirect relationship between virtual pages and physical memory.

**NOTE**

Even kernel-mode code (such as device drivers) cannot reference physical memory addresses directly, but it may do so indirectly by first creating virtual addresses mapped to them. For more information, see the memory descriptor list (MDL) support routines described in the WDK documentation.

As mentioned previously, Windows on x86 can use either of two schemes for address translation: non-PAE and PAE. We'll discuss the non-PAE mode first and cover PAE in the next section. The PAE material does depend on the non-PAE material, so even if you are primarily interested in PAE, you should study this section first. The description of x64 address translation similarly builds on the PAE information.
Non-PAE x86 systems use a two-level page table structure to translate virtual to physical addresses. A 32-bit virtual address mapped by a normal 4-KB page is interpreted as two fields: the virtual page number and the byte within the page, called the byte offset. The virtual page number is further divided into two subfields, called the page directory index and the page table index, as illustrated in Figure 10-16. These two fields are used to locate entries in the page directory and in a page table.

The sizes of these bit fields are dictated by the structures they reference. For example, the byte offset is 12 bits because it denotes a byte within a page, and pages are 4,096 bytes \( (2^{12} = 4,096) \). The other indexes are 10 bits because the structures they index have 1,024 entries \( (2^{10} = 1,024) \).

![Figure 10-16. Components of a 32-bit virtual address on x86 systems](image)

The job of virtual address translation is to convert these virtual addresses into physical addresses—that is, addresses of locations in RAM. The format of a physical address on an x86 non-PAE system is shown in Figure 10-17.

![Figure 10-17. Components of a physical address on x86 non-PAE systems](image)

As you can see, the format is very similar to that of a virtual address. Furthermore, the byte offset value from a virtual address will be the same in the resulting physical address. We can say, then, that address translation involves converting virtual page numbers to physical page numbers (also referred to as page frame numbers, or PFNs). The byte offset does not participate in, and does not change as a result of, address translation. It is simply copied from the virtual address to the
physical address,

**Figure 10-18** shows the relationship of these three values and how they are used to perform address translation.

![Diagram of address translation](image)

**Figure 10-18. Translating a valid virtual address (x86 non-PAE)**

The following basic steps are involved in translating a virtual address:

1. The memory management unit (MMU) uses a privileged CPU register, CR3, to obtain the physical address of the page directory.

2. The page directory index portion of the virtual address is used as an index into the page directory. This locates the page directory entry (PDE) that contains the location of the page table needed to map the virtual address. The PDE in turn contains the physical page number, also called the page frame number, or PFN, of the desired page table, provided the page table is resident — page tables can be paged out or not yet created, and in those cases, the page table is first made resident before proceeding. If a flag in the PDE indicates that it describes a large page, then it simply contains the PFN of the target large page, and the rest of the virtual address is treated as the byte offset within the large page.

3. The page table index is used as an index into the page table to locate the PTE
that describes the virtual page in question.

4. If the PTE’s valid bit is clear, this triggers a page fault (memory management fault). The operating system’s memory management fault handler (pager) locates the page and tries to make it valid; after doing so, this sequence continues at step 5. (See the section Page Fault Handling) If the page cannot or should not be made valid (for example, because of a protection fault), the fault handler generates an access violation or a bug check.

5. When the PTE describes a valid page (whether immediately or after page fault resolution), the desired physical address is constructed from the PFN field of the PTE, followed by the byte offset field from the original virtual address.

Now that you have the overall picture, let’s look at the detailed structure of page directories, page tables, and PTEs.

**Page Directories**

On non-PAE x86 systems, each process has a single page directory, a page the memory manager creates to map the location of all page tables for that process. The physical address of the process page directory is stored in the kernel process (KPROCESS) block, but it is also mapped virtually at address 0xC0300000 on x86 non-PAE systems. (For more detailed information about the KPROCESS and other process data structures, refer to Chapter 5, “Processes, Threads, and Jobs” in Part 1.)

The CPU obtains the location of the page directory from a privileged CPU register called CR3. It contains the page frame number of the page directory. (Since the page directory is itself always page-aligned, the low-order 12 bits of its address are always zero, so there is no need for CR3 to supply these.) Each time a context switch occurs to a thread that is in a different process than that of the currently executing thread, the context switch routine in the kernel loads this register from a field in the KPROCESS block of the new process. Context switches between threads in the same process don’t result in reloading the physical address of the page directory because all threads within the same process share the same process address space and thus use the same page directory and page tables.

The page directory is composed of page directory entries (PDEs), each of which is
The PDEs in the page directory describe the state and location of all the possible page tables for the process. As described later in the chapter, page tables are created on demand, so the page directory for most processes points only to a small set of page tables. (If a page table does not yet exist, the VAD tree is consulted to determine whether an access should materialize it.) The format of a PDE isn’t repeated here because it’s mostly the same as a hardware PTE, which is described shortly.

To describe the full 4-GB virtual address space, 1,024 page tables are required. The process page directory that maps these page tables contains 1,024 PDEs. Therefore, the page directory index needs to be 10 bits wide ($2^{10} = 1,024$).

EXPERIMENT: EXAMINING THE PAGE DIRECTORY AND PDES

You can see the physical address of the currently running process’s page directory by examining the DirBase field in the !process kernel debugger output:

```
lkd> !process -1 0
PROCESS 857b3528 SessionId: 1 Cid: 0f70 Peb: 7ffdf000 ParentCid: 0818
   DirBase: 47c9b000 ObjectTable: b4c56c48 HandleCount: 226.
   Image: windbg.exe
```

You can see the page directory’s virtual address by examining the kernel debugger output for the PTE of a particular virtual address, as shown here:

```
lkd> !pte 10000
   VA 00010004
   PDE at C0300000 PTE at C0000040
   contains 6F06B867 contains 3EF8C847
   pfn 6f06b ---DA--UWEV pfn 3ef8c ---D---UWEV
```

The PTE part of the kernel debugger output is defined in the section Page Tables and Page Table Entries. We will describe this output further in the section on x86 PAE translation.

Because Windows provides a private address space for each process, each process has its own page directory and page tables to map that process’s private address space. However, the page tables that describe system space are shared among all processes (and session space is shared only among processes in a session). To avoid having multiple page tables describing the same virtual memory, when a process is created, the page directory entries that describe system space are initialized to point to the existing system page tables. If the process is part of a session, session space page tables are also shared by pointing the session space page directory entries to the existing session page tables.
Page Tables and Page Table Entries

Each page directory entry points to a page table. A page table is a simple array of PTEs. The virtual address's page table index field (as shown in Figure 10-18) indicates which PTE within the page table corresponds to and describes the data page in question. The page table index is 10 bits wide, allowing you to reference up to 1,024 4-byte PTEs. Of course, because x86 provides a 4-GB virtual address space, more than one page table is needed to map the entire address space. To calculate the number of page tables required to map the entire 4-GB virtual address space, divide 4 GB by the virtual memory mapped by a single page table. Recall that each page table on an x86 system maps 4 MB of data pages. Thus, 1,024 page tables (4 GB / 4 MB) are required to map the full 4-GB address space. This corresponds with the 1,024 entries in the page directory.

You can use the !pte command in the kernel debugger to examine PTEs. (See the experiment EXPERIMENT: Translating Addresses) We’ll discuss valid PTEs here and invalid PTEs in a later section. Valid PTEs have two main fields: the page frame number (PFN) of the physical page containing the data or of the physical address of a page in memory, and some flags that describe the state and protection of the page, as shown in Figure 10-19.

![Figure 10-19. Valid x86 hardware PTEs](image)

As you’ll see later, the bits labeled “Software field” and “Reserved” in Figure 10-19 are ignored by the MMU, whether or not the PTE is valid. These bits are stored and interpreted by the memory manager. Table 10-11 briefly describes the hardware-defined bits in a valid PTE.
On x86 systems, a hardware PTE contains two bits that can be changed by the MMU, the Dirty bit and the Accessed bit. The MMU sets the Accessed bit whenever the page is read or written (provided it is not already set). The MMU sets the Dirty bit whenever a write operation occurs to the page. The operating system is responsible for clearing these bits at the appropriate times; they are never cleared by the MMU.

The x86 MMU uses a Write bit to provide page protection. When this bit is clear, the page is read-only; when it is set, the page is read/write. If a thread attempts to write to a page with the Write bit clear, a memory management exception occurs,
and the memory manager’s access fault handler (described later in the chapter) must determine whether the thread can be allowed to write to the page (for example, if the page was really marked copy-on-write) or whether an access violation should be generated.

**Hardware vs. Software Write Bits in Page Table Entries**

The additional Write bit implemented in software (as mentioned in Table 10-11) is used to force updating of the Dirty bit to be synchronized with updates to Windows memory management data. In a simple implementation, the memory manager would set the hardware Write bit (bit 1) for any writable page, and a write to any such page will cause the MMU to set the Dirty bit in the page table entry. Later, the Dirty bit will tell the memory manager that the contents of that physical page must be written to backing store before the physical page can be used for something else.

In practice, on multiprocessor systems, this can lead to race conditions that are expensive to resolve. The MMUs of the various processors can, at any time, set the Dirty bit of any PTE that has its hardware Write bit set. The memory manager must, at various times, update the process working set list to reflect the state of the Dirty bit in a PTE. The memory manager uses a pushlock to synchronize access to the working set list. But on a multiprocessor system, even while one processor is holding the lock, the Dirty bit might be changed by MMUs of other CPUs. This raises the possibility of missing an update to a Dirty bit.

To avoid this, the Windows memory manager initializes both read-only and writable pages with the hardware Write bit (bit 1) of their PTEs set to 0 and records the true writable state of the page in the software Write bit (bit 11). On the first write access to such a page, the processor will raise a memory management exception because the hardware Write bit is clear, just as it would be for a true read-only page. In this case, though, the memory manager learns that the page actually is writable (via the software Write bit), acquires the working set pushlock, sets the Dirty bit and the hardware Write bit in the PTE, updates the working set list to note that the page has been changed, releases the working set pushlock, and dismisses the exception. The hardware write operation then proceeds as usual, but the setting of the Dirty bit is made to happen with the working set list pushlock held.
On subsequent writes to the page, no exceptions occur because the hardware Write bit is set. The MMU will redundantly set the Dirty bit, but this is benign because the “written-to” state of the page is already recorded in the working set list. Forcing the first write to a page to go through this exception handling may seem to be excessive overhead. However, it happens only once per writable page as long as the page remains valid. Furthermore, the first access to almost any page already goes through memory management exception handling because pages are usually initialized in the invalid state (PTE bit 0 is clear). If the first access to a page is also the first write access to the page, the Dirty bit handling just described will occur within the handling of the first-access page fault, so the additional overhead is small. Finally, on both uniprocessor and multiprocessor systems, this implementation allows flushing of the translation look-aside buffer (described later) without holding a lock for each page being flushed.

**Byte Within Page**

Once the memory manager has determined the physical page number, it must locate the requested data within that page. This is the purpose of the byte offset field. The byte offset from the original virtual address is simply copied to the corresponding field in the physical address. On x86 systems, the byte offset is 12 bits wide, allowing you to reference up to 4,096 bytes of data (the size of a page). Another way to interpret this is that the byte offset from the virtual address is concatenated to the physical page number retrieved from the PTE. This completes the translation of a virtual address to a physical address.

**Translation Look-Aside Buffer**

As you’ve learned so far, each hardware address translation requires two lookups: one to find the right entry in the page directory (which provides the location of the page table) and one to find the right entry in the page table. Because doing two additional memory lookups for every reference to a virtual address would triple the required bandwidth to memory, resulting in poor performance, all CPUs cache address translations so that repeated accesses to the same addresses don’t have to be repeatedly translated. This cache is an array of associative memory called the translation look-aside buffer, or TLB. Associative memory is a vector whose cells can be read simultaneously and compared to a target value. In the case of the TLB,
the vector contains the virtual-to-physical page mappings of the most recently used pages, as shown in Figure 10-20, and the type of page protection, size, attributes, and so on applied to each page. Each entry in the TLB is like a cache entry whose tag holds portions of the virtual address and whose data portion holds a physical page number, protection field, valid bit, and usually a dirty bit indicating the condition of the page to which the cached PTE corresponds. If a PTE’s global bit is set (as is done by Windows for system space pages that are visible to all processes), the TLB entry isn’t invalidated on process context switches.

![Figure 10-20. Accessing the translation look-aside buffer](image)

Virtual addresses that are used frequently are likely to have entries in the TLB, which provides extremely fast virtual-to-physical address translation and, therefore, fast memory access. If a virtual address isn’t in the TLB, it might still be in memory, but multiple memory accesses are needed to find it, which makes the access time slightly slower. If a virtual page has been paged out of memory or if the memory manager changes the PTE, the memory manager is required to explicitly invalidate the TLB entry. If a process accesses it again, a page fault occurs, and the memory manager brings the page back into memory (if needed) and re-creates its PTE entry (which then results in an entry for it in the TLB).

**Physical Address Extension (PAE)**

The Intel x86 Pentium Pro processor introduced a memory-mapping mode called
Physical Address Extension (PAE). With the proper chipset, the PAE mode allows 32-bit operating systems access to up to 64 GB of physical memory on current Intel x86 processors (up from 4 GB without PAE) and up to 1,024 GB of physical memory when running on x64 processors in legacy mode (although Windows currently limits this to 64 GB due to the size of the PFN database required to describe so much memory). When the processor is running in PAE mode, the memory management unit (MMU) divides virtual addresses mapped by normal pages into four fields, as shown in Figure 10-21. The MMU still implements page directories and page tables, but under PAE a third level, the page directory pointer table, exists above them.

One way in which 32-bit applications can take advantage of such large memory configurations is described in the earlier section Address Windowing Extensions. However, even if applications are not using such functions, the memory manager will use all available physical memory for multiple processes’ working sets, file cache, and trimmed private data through the use of the system cache, standby, and modified lists (described in the section Page Frame Number Database).

PAE mode is selected at boot time and cannot be changed without rebooting. As explained in Chapter 2 in Part 1, there is a special version of the 32-bit Windows kernel with support for PAE called Ntkrnlpa.exe. Thirty-two-bit systems that have hardware support for nonexecutable memory (described earlier, in the section No Execute Page Protection) are booted by default using this PAE kernel, because PAE mode is required to implement the no-execute feature. To force the loading of the PAE-enabled kernel, you can set the pae BCD option to ForceEnable.

Note that the PAE kernel is installed on the disk on all 32-bit Windows systems, even systems with small memory and without hardware no-execute support. This is to allow testing of PAE-related code, even on small memory systems, and to avoid the need for reinstalling Windows should more RAM be added later. Another BCD option relevant to PAE is nolowmem, which discards memory below 4 GB (assuming you have at least 5 GB of physical memory) and relocates device drivers above this range. This guarantees that drivers will be presented with physical addresses greater than 32 bits, which makes any possible driver sign extension bugs easier to find.
To understand PAE, it is useful to understand the derivation of the sizes of the various structures and bit fields. Recall that the goal of PAE is to allow addressing of more than 4 GB of RAM. The 4-GB limit for RAM addresses without PAE comes from the 12-bit byte offset and the 20-bit page frame number fields of physical addresses: $12 + 20 = 32$ bits of physical address, and $2^{32}$ bytes = 4 GB. (Note that this is due to a limit of the physical address format and the number of bits allocated for the PFN within a page table entry. The fact that virtual addresses are 32 bits wide on x86, with or without PAE, does not limit the physical address space.)

Under PAE, thePFN is expanded to 24 bits. Combined with the 12-bit byte offset, this allows addressing of $2^{24} + 12$ bytes, or 64 GB, of memory.

To provide the 24-bit PFN, PAE expands the PFN fields of page table and page directory entries from 20 to 24 bits. To allow room for this expansion, the page table and page directory entries are 8 bytes wide instead of 4. (This would seem to expand the PFN field of the PTE and PDE by 32 bits rather than just 4, but in x86 processors, PFNs are limited to 24 bits. This does leave a large number of bits in the PDE unused—or, rather, available for future expansion.)
Since both page tables and page directories have to fit in one page, these tables can then have only 512 entries instead of 1,024. So the corresponding index fields of the virtual address are accordingly reduced from 10 to 9 bits.

This then leaves the two high-order bits of the virtual address unaccounted for. So PAE expands the number of page directories from one to four and adds a third-level address translation table, called the page directory pointer table, or PDPT. This table contains only four entries, 8 bytes each, which provide the PFNs of the four page directories. The two high-order bits of the virtual address are used to index into the PDPT and are called the page directory pointer index.

As before, CR3 provides the location of the top-level table, but that is now the PDPT rather than the page directory. The PDPT must be aligned on a 32-byte boundary and must furthermore reside in the first 4 GB of RAM (because CR3 on x86 is only a 32-bit register, even with PAE enabled).

Note that PAE mode can address more memory than the standard translation mode not directly because of the extra level of translation, but because the physical address format has been expanded. The extra level of translation is required to allow processing of all 32 bits of a virtual address.

---

**EXPERIMENT: TRANSLATING ADDRESSES**

To clarify how address translation works, this experiment shows a real example of translating a virtual address on an x86 PAE system, using the available tools in the kernel debugger to examine the PDPT, page directories, page tables, and PTEs. (It is common for Windows on today’s x86 processors, even with less than 4 GB of RAM, to run in PAE mode because PAE mode is required to enable no-execute memory access protection.) In this example, we’ll work with a process that has virtual address 0x30004, currently mapped to a valid physical address. In later examples, you’ll see how to follow address translation for invalid addresses with the kernel debugger.

First let’s convert 0x30004 to binary and break it into the three fields that are used to translate an address. In binary, 0x30004 is 11.0000.0100. Breaking it into the component fields yields the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>31</th>
<th>30</th>
<th>29</th>
<th>21</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>000000.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.0100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To start the translation process, the CPU needs the physical address of the process’s page directory pointer table, found in the CR3 register while a thread in that process is running. You can display this address by looking at the DirBase field in the output of the !process command, as shown here:

```
lkd> !process -1 0
```
The DirBase field shows that the page directory pointer table is at physical address 0xced25440. As shown in the preceding illustration, the page directory pointer table index field in our example virtual address is 0. Therefore, the PDPT entry that contains the physical address of the relevant page directory is the first entry in the PDPT, at physical address 0xced25440.

As under x86 non-PAE systems, the kernel debugger !pte command displays the PDE and PTE that describe a virtual address, as shown here:

```
lkd> !pte 30004
VA 00030004
PDE at C0600000 contains 000000002EBF3867
    pf 2ebf3    ---DA--UWEV
PTE at C0000180 contains 800000005AF4D025
    pf 5af4d    ----A--UR-V
```

The debugger does not show the page directory pointer table, but it is easy to display given its physical address:

```
lkd> !dq ced25440 L 4
#ced25440 00000000`2e8ff801 00000000`2c9d8801
#ced25450 00000000`2e6b1801 00000000`2e73a801
```

Here we have used the debugger extension command !dq. This is similar to the dq command (display as quadwords—“quadwords” being a name for a 64-bit field; this came from the day when “words” were often 16 bits), but it lets us examine memory by physical rather than virtual address. Since we know that the PDPT is only four entries long, we added the L 4 length argument to keep the output uncluttered.

As illustrated previously, the PDPT index (the two most significant bits) from our example virtual address equal 0, so the PDPT entry we want is the first displayed quadword. PDPT entries have a format similar to PD entries and PT entries, so we can see by inspection that this one contains a PFN of 0x2e8ff, for a physical address of 2e8ff000. That’s the physical address of the page directory.

The !pte output shows the PDE address as a virtual address, not physical. On x86 systems with PAE, the first process page directory starts at virtual address 0xC0600000. The page directory index field of our example virtual address is 0, so we’re looking at the first PDE in the page directory. Therefore, in this case, the PDE address is the same as the page directory address.

As with non-PAE, the page directory entry provides the PFN of the needed page table; in this example, the PFN is 0x2ebf3. So the page table starts at physical address 0x2ebf3000. To this the MMU will add the page table index field (0x30) from the virtual address, multiplied by 8 (the size of a PTE in bytes; this would be 4 on a non-PAE system). The resulting physical address of the PTE is then 0x2ebf3180.

The debugger shows that this PTE is at virtual address 0xC0000180. Notice that the byte offset portion (0x180) is the same as that from the physical address, as is always the case in address translation. Because the memory manager maps page tables starting at 0xC0000000, adding 0x180 to 0xC0000000 yields the virtual address shown in the kernel debugger output: 0xC0000180. The debugger shows that the PFN field of the PTE is 0x5af4d.

Finally, we can consider the byte offset from the original address. As described previously, the MMU will concatenate the byte offset to the PFN from the PTE, giving a physical address of 0x5af4d004. This is the physical address that corresponds to the original virtual address of 0x30004—at the moment.

The flags bits from the PTE are interpreted to the right of the PFN number. For example, the PTE that
describes the page being referenced has flags of --A--UR-V. Here, A stands for accessed (the page has been read), U for user-mode accessible (as opposed to kernel-mode accessible only), R for read-only page (rather than writable), and V for valid (the PTE represents a valid page in physical memory).

To confirm our calculation of the physical address, we can look at the memory in question via both its virtual and its physical addresses. First, using the debugger’s dd command (display dwords) on the virtual address, we see the following:

```
lkd> dd 30004
00030004 00000020 00000001 00000320 000000dc
00030014 00000000 00000020 00000000 00000014
00030024 00000001 00000007 00000034 0000017c
00030034 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00030044 00000000 00000000 00000002 1a26ef4e
00030054 00000298 00000044 000002e0 00000260
00030064 00000000 f33271ba 00000540 0000004a
00030074 0000058c 0000031e 00000000 2d59495b
```

And with the !dd command on the physical address just computed, we see the same contents:

```
lkd> !dd 5af4d004
#5af4d004 00000020 00000001 00000320 000000dc
#5af4d014 00000000 00000020 00000000 00000014
#5af4d024 00000001 00000007 00000034 0000017c
#5af4d034 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
#5af4d044 00000000 00000000 00000002 1a26ef4e
#5af4d054 00000298 00000044 000002e0 00000260
#5af4d064 00000000 f33271ba 00000540 0000004a
#5af4d074 0000058c 0000031e 00000000 2d59495b
```

We could similarly compare the displays from the virtual and physical addresses of the PTE and PDE.

**x64 Virtual Address Translation**

Address translation on x64 is similar to x86 PAE, but with a fourth level added. Each process has a top-level extended page directory (called the page map level 4 table) that contains the physical locations of 512 third-level structures, called page parent directories. The page parent directory is analogous to the x86 PAE page directory pointer table, but there are 512 of them instead of just 1, and each page parent directory is an entire page, containing 512 entries instead of just 4. Like the PDPT, the page parent directory’s entries contain the physical locations of second-level page directories, each of which in turn contains 512 entries providing the locations of the individual page tables. Finally, the page tables (each of which contain 512 page table entries) contain the physical locations of the pages in memory. (All of the “physical locations” in the preceding description are stored in these structures as page frame numbers, or PFNs.)

Current implementations of the x64 architecture limit virtual addresses to 48 bits.
The components that make up this 48-bit virtual address are shown in Figure 10-22. The connections between these structures are shown in Figure 10-23. Finally, the format of an x64 hardware page table entry is shown in Figure 10-24.
IA64 Virtual Address Translation

The virtual address space for IA64 is divided into eight regions by the hardware. Each region can have its own set of page tables. Windows uses five of the regions, three of which have page tables. Table 10-12 lists the regions and how they are used.

Table 10-12. The IA64 Regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>User code and data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Session space code and data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Unused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Unused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kseg3, which is a cached, 1-to-1 mapping of physical memory. No page tables are needed for this region because the necessary TLB inserts are done directly by the memory manager.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Kseg4, which is a noncached, 1-to-1 mapping for physical memory. This is used only in a few places for accessing I/O locations such as the I/O port range. There are no page tables needed for this region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Unused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Kernel code and data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Address translation by 64-bit Windows on the IA64 platform uses a three-level page table scheme. Each process has a page directory pointer structure that contains 1,024 pointers to page directories. Each page directory contains 1,024 pointers to page tables, which in turn point to physical pages. Figure 10-25 shows the format of an IA64 hardware PTE.
Figure 10-25. IA64 page table entry
Page Fault Handling

Earlier, you saw how address translations are resolved when the PTE is valid. When the PTE valid bit is clear, this indicates that the desired page is for some reason not currently accessible to the process. This section describes the types of invalid PTEs and how references to them are resolved.

NOTE

Only the 32-bit x86 PTE formats are detailed in this section. PTEs for 64-bit systems contain similar information, but their detailed layout is not presented.

A reference to an invalid page is called a page fault. The kernel trap handler (introduced in the section “Trap Dispatching” in Chapter 3 in Part 1) dispatches this kind of fault to the memory manager fault handler (MmAccessFault) to resolve. This routine runs in the context of the thread that incurred the fault and is responsible for attempting to resolve the fault (if possible) or raise an appropriate exception. These faults can be caused by a variety of conditions, as listed in Table 10-13.

Table 10-13. Reasons for Access Faults

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for Fault</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accessing a page that isn’t resident in memory but is on disk in a page file or a mapped file</td>
<td>Allocate a physical page, and read the desired page from disk and into the relevant working set</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accessing a page that is on the standby or modified list</td>
<td>Transition the page to the relevant process, session, or system working set</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accessing a page that isn’t committed (for example, reserved address space or address space that isn’t allocated)</td>
<td>Access violation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accessing a page from user mode that can be accessed only in kernel mode</td>
<td>Access violation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writing to a page that is read-only</td>
<td>Access violation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accessing a demand-zero page</td>
<td>Add a zero-filled page to the relevant working set</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writing to a guard page</td>
<td>Guard-page violation (if a reference to a user-mode stack, perform automatic stack expansion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writing to a copy-on-write page</td>
<td>Make process-private (or session-private) copy of page, and replace original in process, session, or system working set</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writing to a page that is valid but hasn't been written to the current backing store copy</td>
<td>Set Dirty bit in PTE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executing code in a page that is marked as no execute</td>
<td>Access violation (supported only on hardware platforms that support no execute protection)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following section describes the four basic kinds of invalid PTEs that are processed by the access fault handler. Following that is an explanation of a special case of invalid PTEs, prototype PTEs, which are used to implement shareable pages.

**Invalid PTEs**

If the valid bit of a PTE encountered during address translation is zero, the PTE represents an invalid page—one that will raise a memory management exception, or page fault, upon reference. The MMU ignores the remaining bits of the PTE, so the operating system can use these bits to store information about the page that will assist in resolving the page fault.

The following list details the four kinds of invalid PTEs and their structure. These are often referred to as software PTEs because they are interpreted by the memory manager rather than the MMU. Some of the flags are the same as those for a hardware PTE as described in Table 10-11, and some of the bit fields have either the same or similar meanings to corresponding fields in the hardware PTE.

- **Page file** The desired page resides within a paging file. As illustrated in Figure 10-26, 4 bits in the PTE indicate in which of 16 possible page files the page resides, and 20 bits (in x86 non-PAE; more in other modes) provide the page number within the file. The pager initiates an in-page operation to bring the page into memory and make it valid. The page file offset is always non-zero and never all 1s (that is, the very first and last pages in the page file are not used for paging) in order to allow for other formats, described next.
- **Demand zero** This PTE format is the same as the page file PTE shown in the previous entry, but the page file offset is zero. The desired page must be satisfied with a page of zeros. The pager looks at the zero page list. If the list is empty, the pager takes a page from the free list and zeroes it. If the free list is also empty, it takes a page from one of the standby lists and zeroes it.

- **Virtual address descriptor** This PTE format is the same as the page file PTE shown previously, but in this case the page file offset field is all 1s. This indicates a page whose definition and backing store, if any, can be found in the process’s virtual address descriptor (VAD) tree. This format is used for pages that are backed by sections in mapped files. The pager finds the VAD that defines the virtual address range encompassing the virtual page and initiates an in-page operation from the mapped file referenced by the VAD. (VADs are described in more detail in a later section.)

- **Transition** The desired page is in memory on either the standby, modified, or modified-no-write list or not on any list. As shown in Figure 10-27, the PTE contains the page frame number of the page. The pager will remove the page from the list (if it is on one) and add it to the process working set.
Unknown The PTE is zero, or the page table doesn’t yet exist (the page directory entry that would provide the physical address of the page table contains zero). In both cases, the memory manager pager must examine the virtual address descriptors (VADs) to determine whether this virtual address has been committed. If so, page tables are built to represent the newly committed address space. (See the discussion of VADs later in the chapter.) If not (if the page is reserved or hasn’t been defined at all), the page fault is reported as an access violation exception.

Prototype PTEs

If a page can be shared between two processes, the memory manager uses a software structure called prototype page table entries (prototype PTEs) to map these potentially shared pages. For page-file-backed sections, an array of prototype PTEs is created when a section object is first created; for mapped files, portions of the array are created on demand as each view is mapped. These prototype PTEs are part of the segment structure, described at the end of this chapter.

When a process first references a page mapped to a view of a section object (recall that the VADs are created only when the view is mapped), the memory manager uses the information in the prototype PTE to fill in the real PTE used for address translation in the process page table. When a shared page is made valid, both the process PTE and the prototype PTE point to the physical page containing the data. To track the number of process PTEs that reference a valid shared page, a counter in its PFN database entry is incremented. Thus, the memory manager can determine when a shared page is no longer referenced by any page table and thus can be made invalid and moved to a transition list or written out to disk.

When a shareable page is invalidated, the PTE in the process page table is filled in with a special PTE that points to the prototype PTE entry that describes the page, as shown in Figure 10-28.

![Figure 10-28. Structure of an invalid PTE that points to the prototype PTE](image-url)
Thus, when the page is later accessed, the memory manager can locate the prototype PTE using the information encoded in this PTE, which in turn describes the page being referenced. A shared page can be in one of six different states as described by the prototype PTE entry:

- **Active/valid** The page is in physical memory as a result of another process that accessed it.
- **Transition** The desired page is in memory on the standby or modified list (or not on any list).
- **Modified-no-write** The desired page is in memory and on the modified-no-write list. (See Table 10-19.)
- **Demand zero** The desired page should be satisfied with a page of zeros.
- **Page file** The desired page resides within a page file.
- **Mapped file** The desired page resides within a mapped file.

Although the format of these prototype PTE entries is the same as that of the real PTE entries described earlier, these prototype PTEs aren’t used for address translation—they are a layer between the page table and the page frame number database and never appear directly in page tables.

By having all the accessors of a potentially shared page point to a prototype PTE to resolve faults, the memory manager can manage shared pages without needing to update the page tables of each process sharing the page. For example, a shared code or data page might be paged out to disk at some point. When the memory manager retrieves the page from disk, it needs only to update the prototype PTE to point to the page’s new physical location—the PTEs in each of the processes sharing the page remain the same (with the valid bit clear and still pointing to the prototype PTE). Later, as processes reference the page, the real PTE will get updated.

**Figure 10-29** illustrates two virtual pages in a mapped view. One is valid, and the other is invalid. As shown, the first page is valid and is pointed to by the process PTE and the prototype PTE. The second page is in the paging file—the prototype PTE contains its exact location. The process PTE (and any other processes with that page mapped) points to this prototype PTE.
In-Paging I/O

In-paging I/O occurs when a read operation must be issued to a file (paging or mapped) to satisfy a page fault. Also, because page tables are pageable, the processing of a page fault can incur additional I/O if necessary when the system is loading the page table page that contains the PTE or the prototype PTE that describes the original page being referenced.

The in-page I/O operation is synchronous—that is, the thread waits on an event until the I/O completes—and isn’t interruptible by asynchronous procedure call (APC) delivery. The pager uses a special modifier in the I/O request function to indicate paging I/O. Upon completion of paging I/O, the I/O system triggers an event, which wakes up the pager and allows it to continue in-page processing.

While the paging I/O operation is in progress, the faulting thread doesn’t own any critical memory management synchronization objects. Other threads within the process are allowed to issue virtual memory functions and handle page faults while the paging I/O takes place. But a number of interesting conditions that the pager must recognize when the I/O completes are exposed:

- Another thread in the same process or a different process could have faulted the same page (called a collided page fault and described in the next section).
- The page could have been deleted (and remapped) from the virtual address space.
- The protection on the page could have changed.
- The fault could have been for a prototype PTE, and the page that maps the prototype PTE could be out of the working set.

The pager handles these conditions by saving enough state on the thread’s kernel stack before the paging I/O request such that when the request is complete, it can detect these conditions and, if necessary, dismiss the page fault without making the page valid. When and if the faulting instruction is reissued, the pager is again invoked and the PTE is reevaluated in its new state.

**Collided Page Faults**

The case when another thread in the same process or a different process faults a page that is currently being in-paged is known as a collided page fault. The pager detects and handles collided page faults optimally because they are common occurrences in multithreaded systems. If another thread or process faults the same page, the pager detects the collided page fault, noticing that the page is in transition and that a read is in progress. (This information is in the PFN database entry.) In this case, the pager may issue a wait operation on the event specified in the PFN database entry, or it can choose to issue a parallel I/O to protect the file systems from deadlocks (the first I/O to complete “wins,” and the others are discarded). This event was initialized by the thread that first issued the I/O needed to resolve the fault.

When the I/O operation completes, all threads waiting on the event have their wait satisfied. The first thread to acquire the PFN database lock is responsible for performing the in-page completion operations. These operations consist of checking I/O status to ensure that the I/O operation completed successfully, clearing the read-in-progress bit in the PFN database, and updating the PTE.

When subsequent threads acquire the PFN database lock to complete the collided page fault, the pager recognizes that the initial updating has been performed because the read-in-progress bit is clear and checks the in-page error flag in the PFN database element to ensure that the in-page I/O completed successfully. If the in-page error flag is set, the PTE isn’t updated and an in-page error exception is raised in the faulting thread.
Clustered Page Faults

The memory manager prefetches large clusters of pages to satisfy page faults and populate the system cache. The prefetch operations read data directly into the system’s page cache instead of into a working set in virtual memory, so the prefetched data does not consume virtual address space, and the size of the fetch operation is not limited to the amount of virtual address space that is available. (Also, no expensive TLB-flushing Inter-Processor Interrupt is needed if the page will be repurposed.) The prefetched pages are put on the standby list and marked as in transition in the PTE. If a prefetched page is subsequently referenced, the memory manager adds it to the working set. However, if it is never referenced, no system resources are required to release it. If any pages in the prefetched cluster are already in memory, the memory manager does not read them again. Instead, it uses a dummy page to represent them so that an efficient single large I/O can still be issued, as Figure 10-30 shows.

![Figure 10-30. Usage of dummy page during virtual address to physical address mapping in an MDL](image)

In the figure, the file offsets and virtual addresses that correspond to pages A, Y, Z, and B are logically contiguous, although the physical pages themselves are not necessarily contiguous. Pages A and B are nonresident, so the memory manager must read them. Pages Y and Z are already resident in memory, so it is not necessary to read them. (In fact, they might already have been modified since they were last read in from their backing store, in which case it would be a serious error to overwrite their contents.) However, reading pages A and B in a single operation is more efficient than performing one read for page A and a second read for page
B. Therefore, the memory manager issues a single read request that comprises all four pages (A, Y, Z, and B) from the backing store. Such a read request includes as many pages as make sense to read, based on the amount of available memory, the current system usage, and so on.

When the memory manager builds the memory descriptor list (MDL) that describes the request, it supplies valid pointers to pages A and B. However, the entries for pages Y and Z point to a single systemwide dummy page X. The memory manager can fill the dummy page X with the potentially stale data from the backing store because it does not make X visible. However, if a component accesses the Y and Z offsets in the MDL, it sees the dummy page X instead of Y and Z.

The memory manager can represent any number of discarded pages as a single dummy page, and that page can be embedded multiple times in the same MDL or even in multiple concurrent MDLs that are being used for different drivers. Consequently, the contents of the locations that represent the discarded pages can change at any time.

**Page Files**

Page files are used to store modified pages that are still in use by some process but have had to be written to disk (because they were unmapped or memory pressure resulted in a trim). Page file space is reserved when the pages are initially committed, but the actual optimally clustered page file locations cannot be chosen until pages are written out to disk.

When the system boots, the Session Manager process (described in Chapter 13) reads the list of page files to open by examining the registry value `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management\PagingFiles`. This multistring registry value contains the name, minimum size, and maximum size of each paging file. Windows supports up to 16 paging files. On x86 systems running the normal kernel, each page file can be a maximum of 4,095 MB. On x86 systems running the PAE kernel and x64 systems, each page file can be 16 terabytes (TB) while the maximum is 32 TB on IA64 systems. Once open, the page files can’t be deleted while the system is running because the System process (described in Chapter 2 in Part 1) maintains an open
handle to each page file. The fact that the paging files are open explains why the built-in defragmentation tool cannot defragment the paging file while the system is up. To defragment your paging file, use the freeware Pagedefrag tool from Sysinternals. It uses the same approach as other third-party defragmentation tools—it runs its defragmentation process early in the boot process before the page files are opened by the Session Manager.

Because the page file contains parts of process and kernel virtual memory, for security reasons the system can be configured to clear the page file at system shutdown. To enable this, set the registry value HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management\ClearPageFileAtShutdown to 1. Otherwise, after shutdown, the page file will contain whatever data happened to have been paged out while the system was up. This data could then be accessed by someone who gained physical access to the machine.

If the minimum and maximum paging file sizes are both zero, this indicates a system-managed paging file, which causes the system to choose the page file size as follows:

- Minimum size: set to the amount of RAM or 1 GB, whichever is larger.
- Maximum size: set to 3 * RAM or 4 GB, whichever is larger.

As you can see, by default the initial page file size is proportional to the amount of RAM. This policy is based on the assumption that machines with more RAM are more likely to be running workloads that commit large amounts of virtual memory.

EXPERIMENT: VIEWING PAGE FILES

To view the list of page files, look in the registry at HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management\PagingFiles. This entry contains the paging file configuration settings modified through the Advanced System Settings dialog box. Open Control Panel, click System And Security, and then System. This is the System Properties dialog box, also reachable by right-clicking on Computer in Explorer and selecting Properties. From there, click Advanced System Settings, then Settings in the Performance area. In the Performance Options dialog box, click the Advanced tab, and then click Change in the Virtual Memory area.

To add a new page file, Control Panel uses the (internal only) NtCreatePagingFile system service defined in Ntdll.dll. Page files are always created as noncompressed files, even if the directory they are in is compressed. To keep new page files from
being deleted, a handle is duplicated into the System process so that even after the creating process closes the handle to the new page file, a handle is nevertheless always open to it.

**Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit**

We are now in a position to more thoroughly discuss the concepts of commit charge and the system commit limit.

Whenever virtual address space is created, for example by a VirtualAlloc (for committed memory) or MapViewOfFile call, the system must ensure that there is room to store it, either in RAM or in backing store, before successfully completing the create request. For mapped memory (other than sections mapped to the page file), the file associated with the mapping object referenced by the MapViewOfFile call provides the required backing store.

All other virtual allocations rely for storage on system-managed shared resources: RAM and the paging file(s). The purpose of the system commit limit and commit charge is to track all uses of these resources to ensure that they are never overcommitted—that is, that there is never more virtual address space defined than there is space to store its contents, either in RAM or in backing store (on disk).

**NOTE**

This section makes frequent references to paging files. It is possible, though not generally recommended, to run Windows without any paging files. Every reference to paging files here may be considered to be qualified by “if one or more paging files exist.”

Conceptually, the system commit limit represents the total virtual address space that can be created in addition to virtual allocations that are associated with their own backing store—that is, in addition to sections mapped to files. Its numeric value is simply the amount of RAM available to Windows plus the current sizes of any page files. If a page file is expanded, or new page files are created, the commit limit increases accordingly. If no page files exist, the system commit limit is simply the total amount of RAM available to Windows.

Commit charge is the systemwide total of all “committed” memory allocations that must be kept in either RAM or in a paging file. From the name, it should be apparent that one contributor to commit charge is process-private committed
virtual address space. However, there are many other contributors, some of them not so obvious.

Windows also maintains a per-process counter called the process page file quota. Many of the allocations that contribute to commit charge contribute to the process page file quota as well. This represents each process’s private contribution to the system commit charge. Note, however, that this does not represent current page file usage. It represents the potential or maximum page file usage, should all of these allocations have to be stored there.

The following types of memory allocations contribute to the system commit charge and, in many cases, to the process page file quota. (Some of these will be described in detail in later sections of this chapter.)

- Private committed memory is memory allocated with the VirtualAlloc call with the COMMIT option. This is the most common type of contributor to the commit charge. These allocations are also charged to the process page file quota.

- Page-file-backed mapped memory is memory allocated with a MapViewOfFile call that references a section object, which in turn is not associated with a file. The system uses a portion of the page file as the backing store instead. These allocations are not charged to the process page file quota.

- Copy-on-write regions of mapped memory, even if it is associated with ordinary mapped files. The mapped file provides backing store for its own unmodified content, but should a page in the copy-on-write region be modified, it can no longer use the original mapped file for backing store. It must be kept in RAM or in a paging file. These allocations are not charged to the process page file quota.

- Nonpaged and paged pool and other allocations in system space that are not backed by explicitly associated files. Note that even the currently free regions of the system memory pools contribute to commit charge. The nonpageable regions are counted in the commit charge, even though they will never be written to the page file because they permanently reduce the amount of RAM available for private pageable data. These allocations are not charged to the process page file quota.
- Kernel stacks.
- Page tables, most of which are themselves pageable, and they are not backed by mapped files. Even if not pageable, they occupy RAM. Therefore, the space required for them contributes to commit charge.
- Space for page tables that are not yet actually allocated. As we’ll see later, where large areas of virtual space have been defined but not yet referenced (for example, private committed virtual space), the system need not actually create page tables to describe it. But the space for these as-yet-nonexistent page tables is charged to commit charge to ensure that the page tables can be created when they are needed.
- Allocations of physical memory made via the Address Windowing Extension (AWE) APIs.

For many of these items, the commit charge may represent the potential use of storage rather than the actual. For example, a page of private committed memory does not actually occupy either a physical page of RAM or the equivalent page file space until it’s been referenced at least once. Until then, it is a demand-zero page (described later). But commit charge accounts for such pages when the virtual space is first created. This ensures that when the page is later referenced, actual physical storage space will be available for it.

A region of a file mapped as copy-on-write has a similar requirement. Until the process writes to the region, all pages in it are backed by the mapped file. But the process may write to any of the pages in the region at any time, and when that happens, those pages are thereafter treated as private to the process. Their backing store is, thereafter, the page file. Charging the system commit for them when the region is first created ensures that there will be private storage for them later, if and when the write accesses occur.

A particularly interesting case occurs when reserving private memory and later committing it. When the reserved region is created with VirtualAlloc, system commit charge is not charged for the actual virtual region. It is, however, charged for any new page table pages that will be required to describe the region, even though these might not yet exist. If the region or a part of it is later committed, system commit is charged to account for the size of the region (as is the process
To put it another way, when the system successfully completes (for example) a VirtualAlloc or MapViewOfFile call, it makes a “commitment” that the needed storage will be available when needed, even if it wasn’t needed at that moment. Thus, a later memory reference to the allocated region can never fail for lack of storage space. (It could fail for other reasons, such as page protection, the region being deallocated, and so on.) The commit charge mechanism allows the system to keep this commitment.

The commit charge appears in the Performance Monitor counters as Memory: Committed Bytes. It is also the first of the two numbers displayed on Task Manager’s Performance tab with the legend Commit (the second being the commit limit), and it is displayed by Process Explorer’s System Information Memory tab as Commit Charge—Current.

The process page file quota appears in the performance counters as Process: Page File Bytes. The same data appears in the Process: Private Bytes performance counter. (Neither term exactly describes the true meaning of the counter.)

If the commit charge ever reaches the commit limit, the memory manager will attempt to increase the commit limit by expanding one or more page files. If that is not possible, subsequent attempts to allocate virtual memory that uses commit charge will fail until some existing committed memory is freed. The performance counters listed in Table 10-14 allow you to examine private committed memory usage on a systemwide, per-process, or per-page-file, basis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance Counter</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Memory: Committed Bytes</td>
<td>Number of bytes of virtual (not reserved) memory that has been committed. This number doesn't necessarily represent page file usage because it includes private committed pages in physical memory that have never been paged out. Rather, it represents the charged amount that must be backed by page file space and/or RAM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memory: Commit Limit</td>
<td>Number of bytes of virtual memory that can be committed without having to extend the paging files; if the paging files can be extended, this limit is soft.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Process: Page File Quota  
The process’s contribution to Memory: Committed Bytes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process:</th>
<th>Same as Process: Page File Quota</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private Bytes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Set—Private</td>
<td>The subset of Process: Page File Quota that is currently in RAM and can be referenced without a page fault. Also a subset of Process: Working Set.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Set</td>
<td>The subset of Process: Virtual Bytes that is currently in RAM and can be referenced without a page fault.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virtual Bytes</td>
<td>The total virtual memory allocation of the process, including mapped regions, private committed regions, and private reserved regions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paging File: % Usage</td>
<td>Percentage of the page file space that is currently in use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paging File: % Usage Peak</td>
<td>The highest observed value of Paging File: % Usage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Commit Charge and Page File Size**

The counters in *Table 10-14* can assist you in choosing a custom page file size. The default policy based on the amount of RAM works acceptably for most machines, but depending on the workload it can result in a page file that’s unnecessarily large, or not large enough.

To determine how much page file space your system really needs based on the mix of applications that have run since the system booted, examine the peak commit charge in the Memory tab of Process Explorer’s System Information display. This number represents the peak amount of page file space since the system booted that would have been needed if the system had to page out the majority of private committed virtual memory (which rarely happens).

If the page file on your system is too big, the system will not use it any more or less—in other words, increasing the size of the page file does not change system performance, it simply means the system can have more committed virtual memory. If the page file is too small for the mix of applications you are running, you might get the “system running low on virtual memory” error message. In this case, first check to see whether a process has a memory leak by examining the
process private bytes count. If no process appears to have a leak, check the system paged pool size—if a device driver is leaking paged pool, this might also explain the error. (See the EXPERIMENT: Troubleshooting a Pool Leak experiment in the Kernel-Mode Heaps (System Memory Pools) section for how to troubleshoot a pool leak.)

EXPERIMENT: VIEWING PAGE FILE USAGE WITH TASK MANAGER

You can also view committed memory usage with Task Manager by clicking its Performance tab. You’ll see the following counters related to page files:

![Windows Task Manager Performance tab](image)

The system commit total is displayed in the lower-right System area as two numbers. The first number represents potential page file usage, not actual page file usage. It is how much page file space would be used if all of the private committed virtual memory in the system had to be paged out all at once. The second number displayed is the commit limit, which displays the maximum virtual memory usage that the system can support before running out of virtual memory (it includes virtual memory backed in physical memory as well as by the paging files). The commit limit is essentially the size of RAM plus the current size of the paging files. It therefore does not account for possible page file expansion.

Process Explorer’s System Information display shows an additional item of information about system commit usage, namely the percentage of the peak as compared to the limit and the current usage as compared to the limit:
### System Information

<p>|                | Current | Limit | Peak | Peak/Current | Free | Modified | ModifiedWrite | Standby | Priority 0 | Priority 1 | Priority 2 | Priority 3 | Priority 4 | Priority 5 | Priority 6 | Priority 7 |
|----------------|---------|-------|------|-------------|------|----------|---------------|---------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Committed (Ki) | 1,102,889 | 35,249,396 | 1,160,275 | 7.14% | 6.79%  | 0         | 0             | 462,152 | 0           | 185,408    | 20,016     | 8,172      | 10,864     | 11,640     | 15,512     | 13,740     |
| Committed (Ki) | 1,102,889 | 35,249,396 | 1,160,275 | 7.14% | 6.79%  | 0         | 0             | 462,152 | 0           | 185,408    | 20,016     | 8,172      | 10,864     | 11,640     | 15,512     | 13,740     |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Physical Memory (Ki)</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Available</th>
<th>Cache WS</th>
<th>Current WS</th>
<th>Driver WS</th>
<th>Paging</th>
<th>Page Fault Delta</th>
<th>Page Read Delta</th>
<th>Paging File Write Delta</th>
<th>Mapped File Write Delta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8,125,620</td>
<td>7,145,404</td>
<td>14,620</td>
<td>1,056</td>
<td>7,436</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Kernel Memory (Ki)**

- Page WS: 106,300
- Page Virtual: 114,104
- Page Limit: no symbols
- Nonpaged: 27,952
- Nonpaged Limit: no symbols

**Paging List (Ki)**

- Zeroded: 6,683,332
- Free: 0
- Modified: 77,716
- ModifiedWrite: 0
- Standby: 462,152

**Priority Levels**

- Priority 0
- Priority 1
- Priority 2
- Priority 3
- Priority 4
- Priority 5
- Priority 6
- Priority 7
Stacks

Whenever a thread runs, it must have access to a temporary storage location in which to store function parameters, local variables, and the return address after a function call. This part of memory is called a stack. On Windows, the memory manager provides two stacks for each thread, the user stack and the kernel stack, as well as per-processor stacks called DPC stacks. We have already described how the stack can be used to generate stack traces and how exceptions and interrupts store structures on the stack, and we have also talked about how system calls, traps, and interrupts cause the thread to switch from a user stack to its kernel stack. Now, we’ll look at some extra services the memory manager provides to efficiently use stack space.

User Stacks

When a thread is created, the memory manager automatically reserves a predetermined amount of virtual memory, which by default is 1 MB. This amount can be configured in the call to the CreateThread or CreateRemoteThread function or when compiling the application, by using the STACK:reserve switch in the Microsoft CC++ compiler, which will store the information in the image header. Although 1 MB is reserved, only the first page of the stack will be committed (unless the PE header of the image specifies otherwise), along with a guard page. When a thread’s stack grows large enough to touch the guard page, an exception will occur, causing an attempt to allocate another guard. Through this mechanism, a user stack doesn’t immediately consume all 1 MB of committed memory but instead grows with demand. (However, it will never shrink back.)

EXPERIMENT: CREATING THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF THREADS

With only 2 GB of user address space available to each 32-bit process, the relatively large memory that is reserved for each thread’s stack allows for an easy calculation of the maximum number of threads that a process can support: a little less than 2,048, for a total of nearly 2 GB of memory (unless the increaseuserva BCD option is used and the image is large address space aware). By forcing each new thread to use the smallest possible stack reservation size, 64 KB, the limit can grow to about 30,400 threads, which you can test for yourself by using the TestLimit utility from Sysinternals. Here is some sample output:

C:\>testlimit -t
Testlimit - tests Windows limits
By Mark Russinovich
Creating threads ...
Created 30399 threads. Lasterror: 8

If you attempt this experiment on a 64-bit Windows installation (with 8 TB of user address space available), you would expect to see potentially hundreds of thousands of threads created (as long as sufficient memory were available). Interestingly, however, TestLimit will actually create fewer threads than on a 32-bit machine, which has to do with the fact that Testlimit.exe is a 32-bit application and thus runs under the Wow64 environment. (See Chapter 3 in Part 1 for more information on Wow64.) Each thread will therefore have not only its 32-bit Wow64 stack but also its 64-bit stack, thus consuming more than twice the memory, while still keeping only 2 GB of address space. To properly test the thread-creation limit on 64-bit Windows, use the Testlimit64.exe binary instead.

Note that you will need to terminate TestLimit with Process Explorer or Task Manager—using Ctrl+C to break the application will not function because this operation itself creates a new thread, which will not be possible once memory is exhausted.

Kernel Stacks

Although user stack sizes are typically 1 MB, the amount of memory dedicated to the kernel stack is significantly smaller: 12 KB on x86 and 16 KB on x64, followed by another guard PTE (for a total of 16 or 20 KB of virtual address space). Code running in the kernel is expected to have less recursion than user code, as well as contain more efficient variable use and keep stack buffer sizes low. Because kernel stacks live in system address space (which is shared by all processes), their memory usage has a bigger impact of the system.

Although kernel code is usually not recursive, interactions between graphics system calls handled by Win32k.sys and its subsequent callbacks into user mode can cause recursive re-entries in the kernel on the same kernel stack. As such, Windows provides a mechanism for dynamically expanding and shrinking the kernel stack from its initial size of 16 KB. As each additional graphics call is performed from the same thread, another 16-KB kernel stack is allocated (anywhere in system address space; the memory manager provides the ability to jump stacks when nearing the guard page). Whenever each call returns to the caller (unwinding), the memory manager frees the additional kernel stack that had been allocated, as shown in Figure 10-31.

This mechanism allows reliable support for recursive system calls, as well as efficient use of system address space, and is also provided for use by driver developers when performing recursive callouts through the
KeExpandKernelStackAndCallout API, as necessary.

![Kernel stack jumping](image)

**EXPERIMENT: VIEWING KERNEL STACK USAGE**

You can use the MemInfo tool from Winsider Seminars & Solutions to display the physical memory currently being occupied by kernel stacks. The –u flag displays physical memory usage for each component, as shown here:

```
C:\>MemInfo.exe -u | findstr /i "Kernel Stack"
Kernel Stack: 980 (3920 kb)
```

Note the kernel stack after repeating the previous TestLimit experiment:

```
C:\>MemInfo.exe -u | findstr /i "Kernel Stack"
Kernel Stack: 92169 (368676 kb)
```

Running TestLimit a few more times would easily exhaust physical memory on a 32-bit system, and this limitation results in one of the primary limits on systemwide 32-bit thread count.

**DPC Stack**

Finally, Windows keeps a per-processor DPC stack available for use by the system whenever DPCs are executing, an approach that isolates the DPC code from the current thread’s kernel stack (which is unrelated to the DPC’s actual operation because DPCs run in arbitrary thread context). The DPC stack is also configured as the initial stack for handling the SYSENTER or SYSCALL instruction during a system call. The CPU is responsible for switching the stack when SYSENTER or SYSCALL is executed, based on one of the model-specific registers (MSRs), but Windows does not want to reprogram the MSR for every context switch, because that is an expensive operation. Windows therefore configures the per-processor DPC stack pointer in the MSR.
Virtual Address Descriptors

The memory manager uses a demand-paging algorithm to know when to load pages into memory, waiting until a thread references an address and incurs a page fault before retrieving the page from disk. Like copy-on-write, demand paging is a form of lazy evaluation—waiting to perform a task until it is required.

The memory manager uses lazy evaluation not only to bring pages into memory but also to construct the page tables required to describe new pages. For example, when a thread commits a large region of virtual memory with VirtualAlloc or VirtualAllocExNuma, the memory manager could immediately construct the page tables required to access the entire range of allocated memory. But what if some of that range is never accessed? Creating page tables for the entire range would be a wasted effort. Instead, the memory manager waits to create a page table until a thread incurs a page fault, and then it creates a page table for that page. This method significantly improves performance for processes that reserve and/or commit a lot of memory but access it sparsely.

The virtual address space that would be occupied by such as-yet-nonexistent page tables is charged to the process page file quota and to the system commit charge. This ensures that space will be available for them should they be actually created. With the lazy-evaluation algorithm, allocating even large blocks of memory is a fast operation. When a thread allocates memory, the memory manager must respond with a range of addresses for the thread to use. To do this, the memory manager maintains another set of data structures to keep track of which virtual addresses have been reserved in the process’s address space and which have not. These data structures are known as virtual address descriptors (VADs). VADs are allocated in nonpaged pool.

Process VADs

For each process, the memory manager maintains a set of VADs that describes the status of the process’s address space. VADs are organized into a self-balancing AVL tree (named after its inventors, Adelson-Velskii and Landis) that optimally balances the tree. This results in, on average, the fewest number of comparisons when searching for a VAD corresponding with a virtual address. There is one
virtual address descriptor for each virtually contiguous range of not-free virtual addresses that all have the same characteristics (reserved versus committed versus mapped, memory access protection, and so on). A diagram of a VAD tree is shown in Figure 10-32.

![Figure 10-32. Virtual address descriptors](image)

When a process reserves address space or maps a view of a section, the memory manager creates a VAD to store any information supplied by the allocation request, such as the range of addresses being reserved, whether the range will be shared or private, whether a child process can inherit the contents of the range, and the page protection applied to pages in the range.

When a thread first accesses an address, the memory manager must create a PTE for the page containing the address. To do so, it finds the VAD whose address range contains the accessed address and uses the information it finds to fill in the PTE. If the address falls outside the range covered by the VAD or in a range of addresses that are reserved but not committed, the memory manager knows that the thread didn’t allocate the memory before attempting to use it and therefore generates an access violation.

**EXPERIMENT: VIEWING VIRTUAL ADDRESS DESCRIPTORS**

You can use the kernel debugger’s !vad command to view the VADs for a given process. First find the address of the root of the VAD tree with the !process command. Then specify that address to the !vad command, as shown in the following example of the VAD tree for a process running Notepad.exe:

```
lkd> !process 0 1 notepad.exe
```
Rotate VADs

A video card driver must typically copy data from the user-mode graphics application to various other system memory, including the video card memory and the AGP port’s memory, both of which have different caching attributes as well as addresses. In order to quickly allow these different views of memory to be mapped into a process, and to support the different cache attributes, the memory manager implements rotate VADs, which allow video drivers to transfer data directly by using the GPU and to rotate unneeded memory in and out of the process view pages on demand. Figure 10-33 shows an example of how the same virtual address can rotate between video RAM and virtual memory.

![Figure 10-33. Rotate virtual address descriptors](image-url)
NUMA

Each new release of Windows provides new enhancements to the memory manager to better make use of Non Uniform Memory Architecture (NUMA) machines, such as large server systems (but also Intel i7 and AMD Opteron SMP workstations). The NUMA support in the memory manager adds intelligent knowledge of node information such as location, topology, and access costs to allow applications and drivers to take advantage of NUMA capabilities, while abstracting the underlying hardware details.

When the memory manager is initializing, it calls the MiComputeNumaCosts function to perform various page and cache operations on different nodes and then computes the time it took for those operations to complete. Based on this information, it builds a node graph of access costs (the distance between a node and any other node on the system). When the system requires pages for a given operation, it consults the graph to choose the most optimal node (that is, the closest). If no memory is available on that node, it chooses the next closest node, and so on.

Although the memory manager ensures that, whenever possible, memory allocations come from the ideal processor’s node (the ideal node) of the thread making the allocation, it also provides functions that allow applications to choose their own node, such as the VirtualAllocExNuma, CreateFileMappingNuma, MapViewOfFileExNuma, and AllocateUserPhysicalPagesNuma APIs.

The ideal node isn’t used only when applications allocate memory but also during kernel operation and page faults. For example, when a thread is running on a nonideal processor and takes a page fault, the memory manager won’t use the current node but will instead allocate memory from the thread’s ideal node. Although this might result in slower access time while the thread is still running on this CPU, overall memory access will be optimized as the thread migrates back to its ideal node. In any case, if the ideal node is out of resources, the closest node to the ideal node is chosen and not a random other node. Just like user-mode applications, however, drivers can specify their own node when using APIs such as MmAllocatePagesforMdlEx or MmAllocateContiguousMemorySpecifyCacheNode.
Various memory manager pools and data structures are also optimized to take advantage of NUMA nodes. The memory manager tries to evenly use physical memory from all the nodes on the system to hold the nonpaged pool. When a nonpaged pool allocation is made, the memory manager looks at the ideal node and uses it as an index to choose a virtual memory address range inside nonpaged pool that corresponds to physical memory belonging to this node. In addition, per-NUMA node pool freelists are created to efficiently leverage these types of memory configurations. Apart from nonpaged pool, the system cache and system PTEs are also similarly allocated across all nodes, as well as the memory manager’s look-aside lists.

Finally, when the system needs to zero pages, it does so in parallel across different NUMA nodes by creating threads with NUMA affinities that correspond to the nodes in which the physical memory is located. The logical prefetcher and Superfetch (described later) also use the ideal node of the target process when prefetching, while soft page faults cause pages to migrate to the ideal node of the faulting thread.
Section Objects

As you’ll remember from the section on shared memory earlier in the chapter, the section object, which the Windows subsystem calls a file mapping object, represents a block of memory that two or more processes can share. A section object can be mapped to the paging file or to another file on disk.

The executive uses sections to load executable images into memory, and the cache manager uses them to access data in a cached file. (See Chapter 11 for more information on how the cache manager uses section objects.) You can also use section objects to map a file into a process address space. The file can then be accessed as a large array by mapping different views of the section object and reading or writing to memory rather than to the file (an activity called mapped file I/O). When the program accesses an invalid page (one not in physical memory), a page fault occurs and the memory manager automatically brings the page into memory from the mapped file (or page file). If the application modifies the page, the memory manager writes the changes back to the file during its normal paging operations (or the application can flush a view by using the Windows FlushViewOfFile function).

Section objects, like other objects, are allocated and deallocated by the object manager. The object manager creates and initializes an object header, which it uses to manage the objects; the memory manager defines the body of the section object. The memory manager also implements services that user-mode threads can call to retrieve and change the attributes stored in the body of section objects. The structure of a section object is shown in Figure 10-34.

![Figure 10-34. A section object](image)
Table 10-15 summarizes the unique attributes stored in section objects.

Table 10-15. Section Object Body Attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maximum size</td>
<td>The largest size to which the section can grow in bytes; if mapping a file, the maximum size is the size of the file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page protection</td>
<td>Page-based memory protection assigned to all pages in the section when it is created.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paging file/Mapped file</td>
<td>Indicates whether the section is created empty (backed by the paging file—as explained earlier, page-file-backed sections use page-file resources only when the pages need to be written out to disk) or loaded with a file (backed by the mapped file).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Based/Not based</td>
<td>Indicates whether a section is a based section, which must appear at the same virtual address for all processes sharing it, or a nonbased section, which can appear at different virtual addresses for different processes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EXPERIMENT: VIEWING SECTION OBJECTS**

With the Object Viewer (Winobj.exe from Sysinternals), you can see the list of sections that have names. You can list the open handles to section objects with any of the tools described in the “Object Manager” section in Chapter 3 in Part 1 that list the open handle table. (As explained in Chapter 3, these names are stored in the object manager directory \Sessions\x\BaseNamed-Objects, where x is the appropriate Session directory. Unnamed section objects are not visible.

As mentioned earlier, you can use Process Explorer from Sysinternals to see files mapped by a process. Select DLLs from the Lower Pane View entry of the View menu, and enable the Mapping Type column in the DLL section of View | Select Columns. Files marked as “Data” in the Mapping column are mapped files (rather than DLLs and other files the image loader loads as modules). We saw this example earlier:
The data structures maintained by the memory manager that describe mapped sections are shown in Figure 10-35. These structures ensure that data read from mapped files is consistent, regardless of the type of access (open file, mapped file, and so on).

For each open file (represented by a file object), there is a single section object pointers structure. This structure is the key to maintaining data consistency for all types of file access as well as to providing caching for files. The section object pointers structure points to one or two control areas. One control area is used to map the file when it is accessed as a data file, and one is used to map the file when it is run as an executable image.

A control area in turn points to subsection structures that describe the mapping information for each section of the file (read-only, read/write, copy-on-write, and so on). The control area also points to a segment structure allocated in paged pool, which in turn points to the prototype PTEs used to map to the actual pages mapped by the section object. As described earlier in the chapter, process page tables point to these prototype PTEs, which in turn map the pages being referenced.

Figure 10-35. Internal section structures
Although Windows ensures that any process that accesses (reads or writes) a file will always see the same, consistent data, there is one case in which two copies of pages of a file can reside in physical memory (but even in this case, all accessors get the latest copy and data consistency is maintained). This duplication can happen when an image file has been accessed as a data file (having been read or written) and then run as an executable image (for example, when an image is linked and then run—the linker had the file open for data access, and then when the image was run, the image loader mapped it as an executable). Internally, the following actions occur:

1. If the executable file was created using the file mapping APIs (or the cache manager), a data control area is created to represent the data pages in the image file being read or written.

2. When the image is run and the section object is created to map the image as an executable, the memory manager finds that the section object pointers for the image file point to a data control area and flushes the section. This step is necessary to ensure that any modified pages have been written to disk before accessing the image through the image control area.

3. The memory manager then creates a control area for the image file.

4. As the image begins execution, its (read-only) pages are faulted in from the image file (or copied directly over from the data file if the corresponding data page is resident).

Because the pages mapped by the data control area might still be resident (on the standby list), this is the one case in which two copies of the same data are in two different pages in memory. However, this duplication doesn't result in a data consistency issue because, as mentioned, the data control area has already been flushed to disk, so the pages read from the image are up to date (and these pages are never written back to disk).

---

**EXPERIMENT: VIEWING CONTROL AREAS**

To find the address of the control area structures for a file, you must first get the address of the file object in question. You can obtain this address through the kernel debugger by dumping the process handle table with the !handle command and noting the object address of a file object. Although the kernel debugger !file command displays the basic information in a file object, it doesn't display the pointer to the section object pointers structure. Then, using the dt command, format the file object to get the address of the section.
object pointers structure. This structure consists of three pointers: a pointer to the data control area, a pointer to the shared cache map (explained in Chapter 11), and a pointer to the image control area. From the section object pointers structure, you can obtain the address of a control area for the file (if one exists) and feed that address into the !ca command.

For example, if you open a PowerPoint file and display the handle table for that process using !handle, you will find an open handle to the PowerPoint file as shown here. (For information on using !handle, see the “Object Manager” section in Chapter 3 in Part 1.)

```
lkd> !handle 1 f 86f57d90 File
0324: Object: 865d2768 GrantedAccess: 00102009 Entry: c848e648
Object: 865d2768 Type: (8475a2c0) File
ObjectHeader: 865d2750 (old version)
   HandleCount: 1  PointerCount: 1
   Directory Object: 00000000  Name:
   \Users\Administrator\Documents\Downloads\SVR-T331_WH07 (1).pptx {HarddiskVolume3}
```

Taking the file object address (865d2768) and formatting it with dt results in this:

```
lkd> dt nt!_FILE_OBJECT 865d2768
+0x000 Type : 5
+0x002 Size : 128
+0x004 DeviceObject : 0x84a62320 DEVICEOBJECT
+0x008 Vpb : 0x84a60590 VPB
+0x00c FsContext : 0x8c9e4390
+0x010 FsContext2 : 0xbf910c80
+0x014 SectionObjectPointer : 0x86c45584 SECTION_OBJECT_POINTERS
```

Then taking the address of the section object pointers structure (0x86c45584) and formatting it with dt results in this:

```
lkd> dt 0x86c45584 nt!SECTION_OBJECT_POINTERS
+0x000 DataSectionObject : 0x863d3b00
+0x004 SharedCacheMap : 0x86f10ec0
+0x008 ImageSectionObject : (null)
```

Finally, use !ca to display the control area using the address:

```
lkd> !ca 0x863d3b00
ControlArea @ 863d3b00
   Segment b1de9d48 Flink 00000000 Blink 8731f80c
   Section Ref 1 Pfn Ref 48 Mapped Views 2
   User Ref 0 WaitForDel 0 Flush Count 0
   File Object 86cf6188 ModWriteCount 0 System Views 2
   WritableRefs 0
   Flags (c080) File WasPurged Accessed
```

No name for file

```
lkd> !ca b1de9d48
ControlArea 863d3b00 ExtendInfo 00000000
Total Ptes 100
Segment Size 100000 Committed 0
Flags (c0000) ProtectionMask
```
Another technique is to display the list of all control areas with the `!memusage` command. The following excerpt is from the output of this command:

```
lkd> !memusage
loading PFN database
Compiling memory usage data (99% Complete).
  Zeroed: 2654 (10616 kb)
  Free:  584 (2336 kb)
  Standby: 402938 (1611752 kb)
  Modified: 12732 (50928 kb)
  ModifiedNoWrite: 3 (12 kb)
  Active/Valid: 431478 (1725912 kb)
  Bad: 0 (0 kb)
  Unknown: 0 (0 kb)
  TOTAL: 851575 (3406300 kb)
```

The Control column points to the control area structure that describes the mapped file. You can display control areas, segments, and subsections with the kernel debugger `!ca` command. For example, to dump the control area for the mapped file Winword.exe in this example, type the `!ca` command followed by the Control number, as shown here:

```
lkd> !ca 883a2e58
ControlArea  @ 883a2e58
```
ControlArea 883a2e58 BasedAddress 2f510000
Total Ptes 57
Segment Size 57000 Committed 0
Image Commit 1 Image Info ee613c80
ProtoPtes ee6139c8
Flags (20000) ProtectionMask

Subsection 1 @ 883a2ea0
ControlArea 883a2e58 Starting Sector 0 Number Of Sectors 2
Base Pte ee6139c8 Ptes In Subsect 1 Unused Ptes 0
Flags 2 Sector Offset 0 Protection 1

Subsection 2 @ 883a2ec0
ControlArea 883a2e58 Starting Sector 2 Number Of Sectors a
Base Pte ee6139d0 Ptes In Subsect 2 Unused Ptes 0
Flags 6 Sector Offset 0 Protection 3

Subsection 3 @ 883a2ee0
ControlArea 883a2e58 Starting Sector c Number Of Sectors 1
Base Pte ee6139e0 Ptes In Subsect 1 Unused Ptes 0
Flags a Sector Offset 0 Protection 5

Subsection 4 @ 883a2f00
ControlArea 883a2e58 Starting Sector d Number Of Sectors 28b
Base Pte ee6139e8 Ptes In Subsect 52 Unused Ptes 0
Flags 2 Sector Offset 0 Protection 1

Subsection 5 @ 883a2f20
ControlArea 883a2e58 Starting Sector 298 Number Of Sectors 1
Base Pte ee613c78 Ptes In Subsect 1 Unused Ptes 0
Flags 2 Sector Offset 0 Protection 1
Driver Verifier

As introduced in Chapter 8, Driver Verifier is a mechanism that can be used to help find and isolate commonly found bugs in device driver or other kernel-mode system code. This section describes the memory management–related verification options Driver Verifier provides (the options related to device drivers are described in Chapter 8).

The verification settings are stored in the registry under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management. The value VerifyDriverLevel contains a bitmask that represents the verification types enabled. The VerifyDrivers value contains the names of the drivers to validate. (These values won't exist in the registry until you select drivers to verify in the Driver Verifier Manager.) If you choose to verify all drivers, VerifyDrivers is set to an asterisk (*) character. Depending on the settings you have made, you might need to reboot the system for the selected verification to occur.

Early in the boot process, the memory manager reads the Driver Verifier registry values to determine which drivers to verify and which Driver Verifier options you enabled. (Note that if you boot in safe mode, any Driver Verifier settings are ignored.) Subsequently, if you've selected at least one driver for verification, the kernel checks the name of every device driver it loads into memory against the list of drivers you've selected for verification. For every device driver that appears in both places, the kernel invokes the VfLoadDriver function, which calls other internal Vf* functions to replace the driver’s references to a number of kernel functions with references to Driver Verifier–equivalent versions of those functions. For example, ExAllocatePool is replaced with a call to VerifierAllocatePool. The windowing system driver (Win32k.sys) also makes similar changes to use Driver Verifier–equivalent functions.

Now that we’ve reviewed how Driver Verifier is set up, we’ll examine the six memory-related verification options that can be applied to device drivers: Special Pool, Pool Tracking, Force IRQL Checking, Low Resources Simulation, Miscellaneous Checks, and Automatic Checks

**Special Pool** The Special Pool option causes the pool allocation routines to
bracket pool allocations with an invalid page so that references before or after the allocation will result in a kernel-mode access violation, thus crashing the system with the finger pointed at the buggy driver. Special pool also causes some additional validation checks to be performed when a driver allocates or frees memory.

When special pool is enabled, the pool allocation routines allocate a region of kernel memory for Driver Verifier to use. Driver Verifier redirects memory allocation requests that drivers under verification make to the special pool area rather than to the standard kernel-mode memory pools. When a device driver allocates memory from special pool, Driver Verifier rounds up the allocation to an even-page boundary. Because Driver Verifier brackets the allocated page with invalid pages, if a device driver attempts to read or write past the end of the buffer, the driver will access an invalid page, and the memory manager will raise a kernel-mode access violation.

Figure 10-36 shows an example of the special pool buffer that Driver Verifier allocates to a device driver when Driver Verifier checks for overrun errors.

![Figure 10-36. Layout of special pool allocations](image)

By default, Driver Verifier performs overrun detection. It does this by placing the buffer that the device driver uses at the end of the allocated page and fills the beginning of the page with a random pattern. Although the Driver Verifier Manager doesn't let you specify underrun detection, you can set this type of detection manually by adding the DWORD registry value HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management\PoolTagOverruns and setting it to 0 (or by running the Gflags utility.
and selecting the Verify Start option instead of the default option, Verify End). When Windows enforces underrun detection, Driver Verifier allocates the driver’s buffer at the beginning of the page rather than at the end.

The overrun-detection configuration includes some measure of underrun detection as well. When the driver frees its buffer to return the memory to Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier ensures that the pattern preceding the buffer hasn’t changed. If the pattern is modified, the device driver has underrun the buffer and written to memory outside the buffer.

Special pool allocations also check to ensure that the processor IRQL at the time of an allocation and deallocation is legal. This check catches an error that some device drivers make: allocating pageable memory from an IRQL at DPC/dispatch level or above.

You can also configure special pool manually by adding the DWORD registry value HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management\PoolTag, which represents the allocation tags the system uses for special pool. Thus, even if Driver Verifier isn’t configured to verify a particular device driver, if the tag the driver associates with the memory it allocates matches what is specified in the PoolTag registry value, the pool allocation routines will allocate the memory from special pool. If you set the value of PoolTag to 0x0000002a or to the wildcard (*), all memory that drivers allocate is from special pool, provided there’s enough virtual and physical memory. (The drivers will revert to allocating from regular pool if there aren’t enough free pages—bounding exists, but each allocation uses two pages.)

**Pool Tracking** If pool tracking is enabled, the memory manager checks at driver unload time whether the driver freed all the memory allocations it made. If it didn’t, it crashes the system, indicating the buggy driver. Driver Verifier also shows general pool statistics on the Driver Verifier Manager’s Pool Tracking tab. You can also use the !verifier kernel debugger command. This command shows more information than Driver Verifier and is useful to driver writers.

Pool tracking and special pool cover not only explicit allocation calls, such as ExAllocatePoolWithTag, but also calls to other kernel APIs that implicitly allocate pool: IoAllocateMdl, IoAllocateIrp, and other IRP allocation calls; various Rtl string APIs; and IoSetCompletionRoutineEx.
Another driver verified function enabled by the Pool Tracking option has to do with pool quota charges. The call ExAllocatePoolWithQuotaTag charges the current process’s pool quota for the number of bytes allocated. If such a call is made from a deferred procedure call (DPC) routine, the process that is charged is unpredictable because DPC routines may execute in the context of any process. The Pool Tracking option checks for calls to this routine from DPC routine context.

Driver Verifier can also perform locked memory page tracking, which additionally checks for pages that have been left locked after an I/O operation and generates the DRIVER_LEFT_LOCKED_PAGES_IN_PROCESS instead of the PROCESS_HAS_LOCKED_PAGES crash code—the former indicates the driver responsible for the error as well as the function responsible for the locking of the pages.

**Force IRQL Checking** One of the most common device driver bugs occurs when a driver accesses pageable data or code when the processor on which the device driver is executing is at an elevated IRQL. As explained in Chapter 3 in Part 1, the memory manager can’t service a page fault when the IRQL is DPC/dispatch level or above. The system often doesn't detect instances of a device driver accessing pageable data when the processor is executing at a high IRQL level because the pageable data being accessed happens to be physically resident at the time. At other times, however, the data might be paged out, which results in a system crash with the stop code IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL (that is, the IRQL wasn’t less than or equal to the level required for the operation attempted—in this case, accessing pageable memory).

Although testing device drivers for this kind of bug is usually difficult, Driver Verifier makes it easy. If you select the Force IRQL Checking option, Driver Verifier forces all kernel-mode pageable code and data out of the system working set whenever a device driver under verification raises the IRQL. The internal function that does this is MiTrimAllSystemPagableMemory. With this setting enabled, whenever a device driver under verification accesses pageable memory when the IRQL is elevated, the system instantly detects the violation, and the resulting system crash identifies the faulty driver.

Another common driver crash that results from incorrect IRQL usage occurs when
synchronization objects are part of data structures that are paged and then waited on. Synchronization objects should never be paged because the dispatcher needs to access them at an elevated IRQL, which would cause a crash. Driver Verifier checks whether any of the following structures are present in pageable memory: KTIMER, KMUTEX, KSPIN_LOCK, KEVENT, KSEMAPHORE, ERESOURCE, FAST_MUTEX.

**Low Resources Simulation** Enabling Low Resources Simulation causes Driver Verifier to randomly fail memory allocations that verified device drivers perform. In the past, developers wrote many device drivers under the assumption that kernel memory would always be available and that if memory ran out, the device driver didn’t have to worry about it because the system would crash anyway. However, because low-memory conditions can occur temporarily, it’s important that device drivers properly handle allocation failures that indicate kernel memory is exhausted.

The driver calls that will be injected with random failures include the ExAllocatePool*, MmProbeAndLockPages, MmMapLockedPagesSpecifyCache, MmMapIoSpace, MmAllocateContiguousMemory, MmAllocatePagesForMdl, IoAllocateIrp, IoAllocateMdl, IoAllocateWorkItem, IoAllocateErrorLogEntry, IOSetCompletionRoutineEx, and various Rtl string APIs that allocate pool. Additionally, you can specify the probability that allocation will fail (6 percent by default), which applications should be subject to the simulation (all are by default), which pool tags should be affected (all are by default), and what delay should be used before fault injection starts (the default is 7 minutes after the system boots, which is enough time to get past the critical initialization period in which a low-memory condition might prevent a device driver from loading).

After the delay period, Driver Verifier starts randomly failing allocation calls for device drivers it is verifying. If a driver doesn’t correctly handle allocation failures, this will likely show up as a system crash.

**Miscellaneous Checks** Some of the checks that Driver Verifier calls “miscellaneous” allow Driver Verifier to detect the freeing of certain system structures in the pool that are still active. For example, Driver Verifier will check for:

- Active work items in freed memory (a driver calls ExFreePool to free a pool
block in which one or more work items queued with IoQueueWorkItem are present).

- Active resources in freed memory (a driver calls ExFreePool before calling ExDeleteResource to destroy an ERESOURCE object).

- Active look-aside lists in freed memory (a driver calls ExFreePool before calling ExDeleteNPagedLookasideList or ExDeletePagedLookasideList to delete the look-aside list).

Finally, when verification is enabled, Driver Verifier also performs certain automatic checks that cannot be individually enabled or disabled. These include:

- Calling MmProbeAndLockPages or MmProbeAndLockProcessPages on a memory descriptor list (MDL) having incorrect flags. For example, it is incorrect to call MmProbeAndLockPages for an MDL setup by calling MmBuildMdlForNonPagedPool.

- Calling MmMapLockedPages on an MDL having incorrect flags. For example, it is incorrect to call MmMapLockedPages for an MDL that is already mapped to a system address. Another example of incorrect driver behavior is calling MmMapLockedPages for an MDL that was not locked.

- Calling MmUnlockPages or MmUnmapLockedPages on a partial MDL (created by using IoBuildPartialMdl).

- Calling MmUnmapLockedPages on an MDL that is not mapped to a system address.

- Allocating synchronization objects such as events or mutexes from NonPagedPoolSession memory.

Driver Verifier is a valuable addition to the arsenal of verification and debugging tools available to device driver writers. Many device drivers that first ran with Driver Verifier had bugs that Driver Verifier was able to expose. Thus, Driver Verifier has resulted in an overall improvement in the quality of all kernel-mode code running in Windows.
Page Frame Number Database

In several previous sections, we’ve concentrated on the virtual view of a Windows process—page tables, PTEs, and VADs. In the remainder of this chapter, we’ll explain how Windows manages physical memory, starting with how Windows keeps track of physical memory. Whereas working sets describe the resident pages owned by a process or the system, the page frame number (PFN) database describes the state of each page in physical memory. The page states are listed in Table 10-16.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active (also called Valid)</td>
<td>The page is part of a working set (either a process working set, a session working set, or a system working set), or it’s not in any working set (for example, nonpaged kernel page) and a valid PTE usually points to it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>A temporary state for a page that isn’t owned by a working set and isn’t on any paging list. A page is in this state when an I/O to the page is in progress. The PTE is encoded so that collided page faults can be recognized and handled properly. (Note that this use of the term “transition” differs from the use of the word in the section on invalid PTEs; an invalid transition PTE refers to a page on the standby or modified list.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standby</td>
<td>The page previously belonged to a working set but was removed (or was prefetched/clustered directly into the standby list). The page wasn’t modified since it was last written to disk. The PTE still refers to the physical page but is marked invalid and in transition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modified</td>
<td>The page previously belonged to a working set but was removed. However, the page was modified while it was in use and its current contents haven’t yet been written to disk or remote storage. The PTE still refers to the physical page but is marked invalid and in transition. It must be written to the backing store before the physical page can be reused.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modified no-write</td>
<td>Same as a modified page, except that the page has been marked so that the memory manager’s modified page writer won’t write it to disk. The cache manager marks pages as modified no-write at the request of file system drivers. For example, NTFS uses this state for pages containing file system metadata so that it can first ensure that transaction log entries are flushed to disk before the pages they are protecting are written to disk. (NTFS transaction logging is explained in Chapter 12.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The PFN database consists of an array of structures that represent each physical page of memory on the system. The PFN database and its relationship to page tables are shown in Figure 10-37. As this figure shows, valid PTEs usually point to entries in the PFN database, and the PFN database entries (for nonprototype PFNs) point back to the page table that is using them (if it is being used by a page table). For prototype PFNs, they point back to the prototype PTE.
Of the page states listed in Table 10-16, six are organized into linked lists so that the memory manager can quickly locate pages of a specific type. (Active/valid pages, transition pages, and overloaded “bad” pages aren’t in any systemwide page list.) Additionally, the standby state is actually associated with eight different lists ordered by priority (we’ll talk about page priority later in this section). Figure 10-38 shows an example of how these entries are linked together.
In the next section, you’ll find out how these linked lists are used to satisfy page faults and how pages move to and from the various lists.

**EXPERIMENT: VIEWING THE PFN DATABASE**

You can use the MemInfo tool from Winsider Seminars & Solutions to dump the size of the various paging lists by using the –s flag. The following is the output from this command:

```plaintext
C:\>MemInfo.exe -s

MemInfo v2.10 - Show PFN database information
Copyright (C) 2007-2009 Alex Ionescu
www.alex-ionescu.com

Initializing PFN Database... Done

PFN Database List Statistics
    Zeroed: 487 (1948 kb)
    Free: 0 (0 kb)
    Standby: 379745 (1518980 kb)
    Modified: 1052 (4208 kb)
    ModifiedNoWrite: 0 (0 kb)
```
Active/Valid: 142703 (570812 kb)
Transition: 184 (736 kb)
   Bad: 0 (0 kb)
   Unknown: 2 (8 kb)
   TOTAL: 524173 (2096692 kb)

Using the kernel debugger !memusage command, you can obtain similar information, although this will take considerably longer and will require booting into debugging mode.

**Page List Dynamics**

Figure 10-39 shows a state diagram for page frame transitions. For simplicity, the modified-no-write list isn’t shown.

Page frames move between the paging lists in the following ways:

- When the memory manager needs a zero-initialized page to service a demand-zero page fault (a reference to a page that is defined to be all zeros or to a user-mode committed private page that has never been accessed), it first attempts to get one from the zero page list. If the list is empty, it gets one from the free page list and zeroes the page. If the free list is empty, it goes to the standby list and zeroes that page.

One reason zero-initialized pages are required is to meet various security requirements, such as the Common Criteria. Most Common Criteria profiles specify that user-mode processes must be given initialized page frames to prevent them from reading a previous process’s memory contents. Therefore, the memory manager gives user-mode processes zeroed page frames unless the page is being read in from a backing store. If that’s the case, the memory manager prefers to use non-zeroed page frames, initializing them with the data off the disk or remote storage.
The zero page list is populated from the free list by a system thread called the zero page thread (thread 0 in the System process). The zero page thread waits on a gate object to signal it to go to work. When the free list has eight or more pages, this gate is signaled. However, the zero page thread will run only if at least one processor has no other threads running, because the zero page thread runs at priority 0 and the lowest priority that a user thread can be set to is 1.

**NOTE**

Because the zero page thread actually waits on an event dispatcher object, it receives a priority boost (see the section “Priority Boosts” in Chapter 5 in Part 1), which results in it executing at priority 1 for at least part of the time. This is a bug in the current implementation.

**NOTE**

When memory needs to be zeroed as a result of a physical page allocation by a driver that calls MmAllocatePagesForMdl or MmAllocatePagesForMdlEx, by a Windows application that calls AllocateUserPhysicalPages or AllocateUserPhysicalPagesNuma, or when an application allocates large
pages, the memory manager zeroes the memory by using a higher performing function called MiZeroInParallel that maps larger regions than the zero page thread, which only zeroes a page at a time. In addition, on multiprocessor systems, the memory manager creates additional system threads to perform the zeroing in parallel (and in a NUMA-optimized fashion on NUMA platforms).

- When the memory manager doesn’t require a zero-initialized page, it goes first to the free list. If that’s empty, it goes to the zeroed list. If the zeroed list is empty, it goes to the standby lists. Before the memory manager can use a page frame from the standby lists, it must first backtrack and remove the reference from the invalid PTE (or prototype PTE) that still points to the page frame. Because entries in the PFN database contain pointers back to the previous user’s page table page (or to a page of prototype PTE pool for shared pages), the memory manager can quickly find the PTE and make the appropriate change.

- When a process has to give up a page out of its working set (either because it referenced a new page and its working set was full or the memory manager trimmed its working set), the page goes to the standby lists if the page was clean (not modified) or to the modified list if the page was modified while it was resident.

- When a process exits, all the private pages go to the free list. Also, when the last reference to a page-file-backed section is closed, and the section has no remaining mapped views, these pages also go to the free list.

**EXPERIMENT: THE FREE AND ZERO PAGE LISTS**

You can observe the release of private pages at process exit with Process Explorer’s System Information display. Begin by creating a process with a large number of private pages in its working set. We did this in an earlier experiment with the TestLimit utility:

```
C:\temp>testlimit -d 1 -c 800
Testlimit v5.1 - test Windows limits
Copyright (C) 2012 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - wwwwww.sysinternals.com
Leaking private bytes 1 MB at a time ... 
Leaked 800 MB of private memory (800 MB total leaked). Lasterror: 0
The operation completed successfully.
```

The –d option causes TestLimit to not only allocate the memory as private committed, but to “touch” it—that is, to access it. This causes physical memory to be allocated and assigned to the process to realize the area of private committed virtual memory. If there is sufficient available RAM on the system, the entire 800
MB should be in RAM for the process.

This process will now wait until you cause it to exit or terminate (perhaps by using Ctrl+C in its command window). Open Process Explorer and select View, System Information. Observe the Free and Zeroed list sizes.

Now terminate or exit the TestLimit process. You may see the free page list briefly increase in size:

We say “may” because the zero page thread is awakened as soon as there are only eight pages on the zero list, and it acts very quickly. Notice that in this example, we freed 800 MB of private memory but only about 138 MB appear here on the free list. Process Explorer updates this display only once per second, and it is likely that the rest of the pages were already zeroed and moved to the zeroed page list before it happened to “catch” this state.

If you are able to see the temporary increase in the free list, you will then see it drop to zero, and a corresponding increase will occur in the zeroed page list. If not, you will simply see the increase in the zeroed list.

**EXPERIMENT: THE MODIFIED AND STANDBY PAGE LISTS**

The movement of pages from process working set to the modified page list and then to the standby page list can also be observed with the Sysinternals tools VMMap and RAMMap and the live kernel debugger.

The first step is to open RAMMap and observe the state of the quiet system:
This is an x86 system with about 3.4 GB of RAM usable by Windows. The columns in this display represent the various page states shown in Figure 10-39. (A few of the columns not important to this discussion have been narrowed for ease of reference.)

The system has about 1.2 GB of RAM free (sum of the free and zeroed page lists). About 1,700 MB is on the standby list (hence part of “available,” but likely containing data recently lost from processes or being used by Superfetch). About 448 MB is “active,” being mapped directly to virtual addresses via valid page table entries.

Each row further breaks down into page state by usage or origin (process private, mapped file, and so on). For example, at the moment, of the active 448 MB, about 138 MB is due to process private allocations.

Now, as in the previous experiment, use the TestLimit utility to create a process with a large number of pages in its working set. Again we will use the –d option to cause TestLimit to write to each page, but this time we will use it without a limit, so as to create as many private modified pages as possible:

C:\Users\user1>testlimit -d

TestLimit v5.21 - test Windows limits
Copyright (C) 2012 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

Process ID: 1000

Leaking private bytes with touch (MB) ...
Leaked 2017 MB of private memory (2017 MB total leaked). Lasterror: 8
Not enough storage is available to process this command.

TestLimit has now created 2,017 allocations of 1 MB each.

In RAMMap, use the File, Refresh command to update the display (because of the cost of gathering its information, RAMMap does not update continuously).
You will see that over 2 GB are now active and in the Process Private row. This is due to the memory allocated and accessed by the TestLimit process. Note also that the standby, zeroed, and free lists are now much smaller. Most of the RAM allocated to TestLimit came from these lists.

Next, in RAMMap, check the process's physical page allocations. Change to the Physical Pages tab, and set the filter at the bottom to the column Process and the value Testlimit.exe. This display shows all the physical pages that are part of the process working set.

We would like to identify a physical page involved in the allocation of virtual address space done by TestLimit’s –d option. RAMMap does not give an indication about which virtual allocations are associated with RAMMap’s VirtualAlloc calls. However, we can get a good hint of this through the VMMap tool. Using VMMap on the same process, we find the following:
In the lower part of the display, we find hundreds of allocations of process private data, each 1 MB in size and with 1 MB committed. These match the size of the allocations done by TestLimit. The first of these is highlighted in the preceding screenshot. Note the starting virtual address, 0x580000.

Now go back to RAMMap’s physical memory display. Arrange the columns to make the Virtual Address column easily visible, click on it to sort by that value, and you can find that virtual address:

This shows that the virtual page starting at 0x01340000 is currently mapped to physical address 0x97D78000.
TestLimit's --d option writes the program's own name to the first bytes of each allocation. We can demonstrate this with the 'dc (display characters using physical address) command in the local kernel debugger:

```
!dc 0x97d78000
#97d78000 74736554 696d694c 00000074 00000000 TestLimit.......  #97d78010 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 .................  #97d78020 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 ................. ...
```

For the final leg of the experiment, we will demonstrate that this data remains intact (for a while, anyway) after the process working set is reduced and this page is moved to the modified and then the standby page list.

In VMMMap, having selected the TestLimit process, use the View, Empty Working Set command to reduce the process's working set to the bare minimum. VMMMap's display should now look like this:

![VMMMap empty working set](image)

Notice that the Working Set bar graph is practically empty. In the middle section, the process shows a total working set of only 9 MB, and almost all of it is in page tables, with a tiny 32 KB total paged in of image files and private data. Now return to RAMMap. On the Use Counts tab, you will find that active pages have been reduced tremendously, with a large number of pages on the modified list and a significant number on the standby list:
RAMMap’s Processes tab confirms that the TestLimit process contributed most of those pages to those lists:

Still in RAMMap, show the Physical Pages tab. Sort by Physical Address, and find the page previously examined (in this case, physical address 0xc09fa000). RAMMap will almost certainly show that it is on the standby or modified list.
Note that the page is still associated with the TestLimit process and with its virtual address.

Finally, we can again use the kernel debugger to verify the page has not been overwritten:

```
lkd> !dc 0x97d78000
#97d78000 74736554 696d694c 00000074 00000000 TestLimit........
#97d78010 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 ................
#97d78020 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 ................
...
```

We can also use the local kernel debugger to show the page frame number, or PFN, entry for the page. (The PFN database is described earlier in the chapter.)

```
lkd> !pf 97d78
PFN 00097D78 at address 84E9B920
flink 000A0604 blink / share count 000A05C1 pteaddress C0002C00
reference count 0000 Cached color 0 Priority 5
restore pte 00000080 containing page 097D60 Modified M
```

Note that the page is still associated with the TestLimit process and with its virtual address.

### Page Priority

Every physical page in the system has a page priority value assigned to it by the memory manager. The page priority is a number in the range 0 to 7. Its main purpose is to determine the order in which pages are consumed from the standby list. The memory manager divides the standby list into eight sublists that each store pages of a particular priority. When the memory manager wants to take a page from the standby list, it takes pages from low-priority lists first, as shown in Figure 10-40.
Each thread and process in the system is also assigned a page priority. A page’s priority usually reflects the page priority of the thread that first causes its allocation. (If the page is shared, it reflects the highest page priority among the sharing threads.) A thread inherits its page-priority value from the process to which it belongs. The memory manager uses low priorities for pages it reads from disk speculatively when anticipating a process’s memory accesses.

By default, processes have a page-priority value of 5, but functions allow applications and the system to change process and thread page-priority values. You can look at the memory priority of a thread with Process Explorer (per-page priority can be displayed by looking at the PFN entries, as you’ll see in an experiment later in the chapter). Figure 10-41 shows Process Explorer’s Threads tab displaying information about Winlogon’s main thread. Although the thread priority itself is high, the memory priority is still the standard 5.
The real power of memory priorities is realized only when the relative priorities of pages are understood at a high level, which is the role of Superfetch, covered at the end of this chapter.

**EXPERIMENT: VIEWING THE PRIORitized STANdBY LISTS**

You can use the MemInfo tool from Winsider Seminars & Solutions to dump the size of each standby paging list by using the `-c` flag. MemInfo will also display the number of repurposed pages for each standby list—this corresponds to the number of pages in each list that had to be reused to satisfy a memory allocation, and thus thrown out of the standby page lists. The following is the relevant output from the following command.

```bash
C:\Windows\system32>meminfo -c
MemInfo v2.10 - Show PFN database information
Copyright (C) 2007-2009 Alex Ionescu
www.alex-ionescu.com

Initializing PFN Database... Done

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Standby</th>
<th>Repurposed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - Idle</td>
<td>0 ( 0 KB)</td>
<td>0 ( 0 KB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - Very Low</td>
<td>41352 (165408 KB)</td>
<td>0 ( 0 KB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - Low</td>
<td>7201 ( 28804 KB)</td>
<td>0 ( 0 KB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - Background</td>
<td>2043 ( 8172 KB)</td>
<td>0 ( 0 KB)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```
You can add the –i flag to MemInfo to continuously display the state of the standby page lists and repurpose counts, which is useful for tracking memory usage as well as the following experiment.

Additionally, the System Information panel in Process Explorer (choose View, System Information) can also be used to display the live state of the prioritized standby lists, as shown in this screenshot:

On the recently started x64 system used in this experiment (see the previous MemInfo output), there is no data cached at priority 0, about 165 MB at priority 1, and about 29 MB at priority 2. Your system probably has some data in those priorities as well.

The following shows what happens when we use the TestLimit tool from Sysinternals to commit and touch 1 GB of memory. Here is the command you use (to leak and touch memory in 20 chunks of 50 MB):

```
testlimit -d 50 -c 20
```

Here is the output of MemInfo just before the run:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Standby</th>
<th>Repurposed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - Idle</td>
<td>0 ( 0 KB)</td>
<td>2554 ( 10216 KB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - Very Low</td>
<td>92915 ( 371660 KB)</td>
<td>141352 ( 565408 KB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - Low</td>
<td>35783 ( 143132 KB)</td>
<td>0 ( 0 KB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - Background</td>
<td>50666 ( 202664 KB)</td>
<td>0 ( 0 KB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 - Background</td>
<td>15236 ( 60944 KB)</td>
<td>0 ( 0 KB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - Normal</td>
<td>34852 ( 136788 KB)</td>
<td>0 ( 0 KB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - Superfetch</td>
<td>2912 ( 11648 KB)</td>
<td>0 ( 0 KB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 - Superfetch</td>
<td>5876 ( 23504 KB)</td>
<td>0 ( 0 KB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>237585 ( 950340 KB)</td>
<td>143906 ( 575624 KB)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

And here is the output after the allocations are done but the TestLimit process still exists:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Standby</th>
<th>Repurposed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - Idle</td>
<td>0 ( 0 KB)</td>
<td>2554 ( 10216 KB)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Modified Page Writer

The memory manager employs two system threads to write pages back to disk and move those pages back to the standby lists (based on their priority). One system thread writes out modified pages (MiModifiedPageWriter) to the paging file, and a second one writes modified pages to mapped files (MiMappedPageWriter). Two threads are required to avoid creating a deadlock, which would occur if the writing of mapped file pages caused a page fault that in turn required a free page when no free pages were available (thus requiring the modified page writer to create more free pages). By having the modified page writer perform mapped file paging I/Os from a second system thread, that thread can wait without blocking regular page file I/O.

Both threads run at priority 17, and after initialization they wait for separate objects to trigger their operation. The mapped page writer waits on an event, MmMappedPageWriterEvent. It can be signaled in the following cases:

- During a page list operation (MiInsertPageInLockedList or MiInsertPageInList). These routines signal this event if the number of file-system-destined pages on the modified page list has reached more than 800 and the number of available pages has fallen below 1,024, or if the number of available pages is less than 256.

- In an attempt to obtain free pages (MiObtainFreePages).

- By the memory manager’s working set manager (MmWorkingSetManager), which runs as part of the kernel’s balance set manager (once every second). The working set manager signals this event if the number of file-system-destined pages on the modified page list has reached more than 800.

- Upon a request to flush all modified pages (MmFlushAllPages).
Upon a request to flush all file-system-destined modified pages (MmFlushAllFilesystemPages). Note that in most cases, writing modified mapped pages to their backing store files does not occur if the number of mapped pages on the modified page list is less than the maximum “write cluster” size, which is 16 pages. This check is not made in MmFlushAllFilesystemPages or MmFlushAllPages.

The mapped page writer also waits on an array of MiMappedPageListHeadEvent events associated with the 16 mapped page lists. Each time a mapped page is dirtied, it is inserted into one of these 16 mapped page lists based on a bucket number (MiCurrentMappedPageBucket). This bucket number is updated by the working set manager whenever the system considers that mapped pages have gotten old enough, which is currently 100 seconds (the MiWriteGapCounter variable controls this and is incremented whenever the working set manager runs). The reason for these additional events is to reduce data loss in the case of a system crash or power failure by eventually writing out modified mapped pages even if the modified list hasn't reached its threshold of 800 pages.

The modified page writer waits on a single gate object (MmModifiedPageWriterGate), which can be signaled in the following scenarios:

- A request to flush all pages has been received.
- The number of available pages (MmAvailablePages) drops below 128 pages.
- The total size of the zeroed and free page lists has dropped below 20,000 pages, and the number of modified pages destined for the paging file is greater than the smaller of one-sixteenths of the available pages or 64 MB (16,384 pages).
- When a working set is being trimmed to accommodate additional pages, if the number of pages available is less than 15,000.
- During a page list operation (MiInsertPageInLockedList or MiInsertPageInList). These routines signal this gate if the number of page-file-destined pages on the modified page list has reached more than 800 and the number of available pages has fallen below 1,024, or if the number of available pages is less than 256.

Additionally, the modified page writer waits on an event (MiRescanPageFilesEvent) and an internal event in the paging file header.
(MmPagingFileHeader), which allows the system to manually request flushing out data to the paging file when needed.

When invoked, the mapped page writer attempts to write as many pages as possible to disk with a single I/O request. It accomplishes this by examining the original PTE field of the PFN database elements for pages on the modified page list to locate pages in contiguous locations on the disk. Once a list is created, the pages are removed from the modified list, an I/O request is issued, and, at successful completion of the I/O request, the pages are placed at the tail of the standby list corresponding to their priority.

Pages that are in the process of being written can be referenced by another thread. When this happens, the reference count and the share count in the PFN entry that represents the physical page are incremented to indicate that another process is using the page. When the I/O operation completes, the modified page writer notices that the reference count is no longer 0 and doesn’t place the page on any standby list.

**PFN Data Structures**

Although PFN database entries are of fixed length, they can be in several different states, depending on the state of the page. Thus, individual fields have different meanings depending on the state. Figure 10-42 shows the formats of PFN entries for different states.
Several fields are the same for several PFN types, but others are specific to a given type of PFN. The following fields appear in more than one PFN type:

- **PTE address** Virtual address of the PTE that points to this page. Also, since PTE addresses will always be aligned on a 4-byte boundary (8 bytes on 64-bit systems), the two low-order bits are used as a locking mechanism to serialize access to the PFN entry.

- **Reference count** The number of references to this page. The reference count is incremented when a page is first added to a working set and/or when the page is locked in memory for I/O (for example, by a device driver). The reference count is decremented when the share count becomes 0 or when pages are unlocked from memory. When the share count becomes 0, the page is no longer owned by a working set. Then, if the reference count is also zero, the PFN database entry that describes the page is updated to add the page to the free, standby, or modified list.

- **Type** The type of page represented by this PFN. (Types include active/valid, standby, modified, modified-no-write, free, zeroed, bad, and transition.)
- **Flags** The information contained in the flags field is shown in Table 10-17.

- **Priority** The priority associated with this PFN, which will determine on which standby list it will be placed.

- **Original PTE contents** All PFN database entries contain the original contents of the PTE that pointed to the page (which could be a prototype PTE). Saving the contents of the PTE allows it to be restored when the physical page is no longer resident. PFN entries for AWE allocations are exceptions; they store the AWE reference count in this field instead.

- **PFN of PTE** Physical page number of the page table page containing the PTE that points to this page.

- **Color** Besides being linked together on a list, PFN database entries use an additional field to link physical pages by “color,” which is the page’s NUMA node number.

- **Flags** A second flags field is used to encode additional information on the PTE. These flags are described in Table 10-18.

Table 10-17. Flags Within PFN Database Entries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flag</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Write in progress</td>
<td>Indicates that a page write operation is in progress. The first DWORD contains the address of the event object that will be signaled when the I/O is complete.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modified state</td>
<td>Indicates whether the page was modified. (If the page was modified, its contents must be saved to disk before removing it from memory.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read in progress</td>
<td>Indicates that an in-page operation is in progress for the page. The first DWORD contains the address of the event object that will be signaled when the I/O is complete.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rom</td>
<td>Indicates that this page comes from the computer’s firmware or another piece of read-only memory such as a device register.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-page error</td>
<td>Indicates that an I/O error occurred during the in-page operation on this page. (In this case, the first field in the PFN contains the error code.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kernel stack</td>
<td>Indicates that this page is being used to contain a kernel stack. In this case, the PFN entry contains the owner of the stack and the next stack PFN for this thread.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removal</td>
<td>Indicates that the page is the target of a remove (due to ECC/scrubbing or hot memory removal).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Parity error
Indicates that the physical page contains parity or error correction control errors.

Table 10-18. Secondary Flags Within PFN Database Entries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flag</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PFN image verified</td>
<td>The code signature for this PFN (contained in the cryptographic signature catalog for the image being backed by this PFN) has been verified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWE allocation</td>
<td>This PFN backs an AWE allocation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prototype PTE</td>
<td>Indicates that the PTE referenced by the PFN entry is a prototype PTE. (For example, this page is shareable.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The remaining fields are specific to the type of PFN. For example, the first PFN in Figure 10-42 represents a page that is active and part of a working set. The share count field represents the number of PTEs that refer to this page. (Pages marked read-only, copy-on-write, or shared read/write can be shared by multiple processes.) For page table pages, this field is the number of valid and transition PTEs in the page table. As long as the share count is greater than 0, the page isn’t eligible for removal from memory.

The working set index field is an index into the process working set list (or the system or session working set list, or zero if not in any working set) where the virtual address that maps this physical page resides. If the page is a private page, the working set index field refers directly to the entry in the working set list because the page is mapped only at a single virtual address. In the case of a shared page, the working set index is a hint that is guaranteed to be correct only for the first process that made the page valid. (Other processes will try to use the same index where possible.) The process that initially sets this field is guaranteed to refer to the proper index and doesn’t need to add a working set list hash entry referenced by the virtual address into its working set hash tree. This guarantee reduces the size of the working set hash tree and makes searches faster for these particular direct entries.

The second PFN in Figure 10-42 is for a page on either the standby or the
modified list. In this case, the forward and backward link fields link the elements of the list together within the list. This linking allows pages to be easily manipulated to satisfy page faults. When a page is on one of the lists, the share count is by definition 0 (because no working set is using the page) and therefore can be overlaid with the backward link. The reference count is also 0 if the page is on one of the lists. If it is nonzero (because an I/O could be in progress for this page—for example, when the page is being written to disk), it is first removed from the list.

The third PFN in Figure 10-42 is for a page that belongs to a kernel stack. As mentioned earlier, kernel stacks in Windows are dynamically allocated, expanded, and freed whenever a callback to user mode is performed and/or returns, or when a driver performs a callback and requests stack expansion. For these PFNs, the memory manager must keep track of the thread actually associated with the kernel stack, or if it is free it keeps a link to the next free look-aside stack.

The fourth PFN in Figure 10-42 is for a page that has an I/O in progress (for example, a page read). While the I/O is in progress, the first field points to an event object that will be signaled when the I/O completes. If an in-page error occurs, this field contains the Windows error status code representing the I/O error. This PFN type is used to resolve collided page faults.

In addition to the PFN database, the system variables in Table 10-19 describe the overall state of physical memory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MmNumberOfPhysicalPages</td>
<td>Total number of physical pages available on the system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MmAvailablePages</td>
<td>Total number of available pages on the system—the sum of the pages on the zeroed, free, and standby lists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mm ResidentAvailablePages</td>
<td>Total number of physical pages that would be available if every process was trimmed to its minimum working set size and all modified pages were flushed to disk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EXPERIMENT: VIEWING PFN ENTRIES
You can examine individual PFN entries with the kernel debugger `!PFN` command. You need to supply the PFN as an argument. (For example, `!PFN 1` shows the first entry, `!PFN 2` shows the second, and so on.) In the following example, the PTE for virtual address 0x50000 is displayed, followed by the PFN that contains the page directory, and then the actual page:

```
> !pte 50000
VA 00050000
PDE at 00000000C0600000 PTE at 00000000C0000280
contains 00000002C9F7867 contains 00000002D6C1867
PFN 2C9F7 ---DA--UWEV pfn 2D6C1 ---DA--UW-V
```

```
> !PFN 2C9F7
PFN 0002C9F7 at address 834E1704
flink 00000026 blink share count 00000091 pteaddress C0600000
reference count 0001 Cached color 0 Priority 5
restore pte 00000080 containing page 02BAA5 Active M Modified
```

```
> !PFN 2D6C1
PFN 0002D6C1 at address 834F7D1C
flink 00000791 blink share count 00000001 pteaddress C0000280
reference count 0001 Cached color 0 Priority 5
restore pte 00000080 containing page 02C9F7 Active M Modified
```

You can also use the MemInfo tool to obtain information about a PFN. MemInfo can sometimes give you more information than the debugger’s output, and it does not require being booted into debugging mode. Here’s MemInfo’s output for those same two PFNs:

```
C:\> meminfo -p 2C9F7

PFN: 2C9F7
PFN List: Active and Valid
PFN Type: Page Table
PFN Priority: 5
Page Directory: 0x866168C8
Physical Address: 0x2C9F7000

C:\> meminfo -p 2D6C1

PFN: 2D6C1
PFN List: Active and Valid
PFN Type: Process Private
PFN Priority: 5
EPROCESS: 0x866168C8 [windbg.exe]
Physical Address: 0x206C1000
```

MemInfo correctly recognized that the first PFN was a page table and that the second PFN belongs to WinDbg, which was the active process when the `!pte 50000` command was used in the debugger.
Physical Memory Limits

Now that you’ve learned how Windows keeps track of physical memory, we’ll describe how much of it Windows can actually support. Because most systems access more code and data than can fit in physical memory as they run, physical memory is in essence a window into the code and data used over time. The amount of memory can therefore affect performance, because when data or code that a process or the operating system needs is not present, the memory manager must bring it in from disk or remote storage.

Besides affecting performance, the amount of physical memory impacts other resource limits. For example, the amount of nonpaged pool, operating system buffers backed by physical memory, is obviously constrained by physical memory. Physical memory also contributes to the system virtual memory limit, which is the sum of roughly the size of physical memory plus the current configured size of any paging files. Physical memory also can indirectly limit the maximum number of processes.

Windows support for physical memory is dictated by hardware limitations, licensing, operating system data structures, and driver compatibility. Table 10-20 lists the currently supported amounts of physical memory across the various editions of Windows along with the limiting factors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Version</th>
<th>32-Bit Limit</th>
<th>64-Bit Limit</th>
<th>Limiting Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ultimate, Enterprise, and Professional</td>
<td>4 GB</td>
<td>192 GB</td>
<td>Licensing on 64-bit; licensing, hardware support, and driver compatibility on 32-bit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Premium</td>
<td>4 GB</td>
<td>16 GB</td>
<td>Licensing on 64-bit; licensing, hardware support, and driver compatibility on 32-bit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Basic</td>
<td>4 GB</td>
<td>8 GB</td>
<td>Licensing on 64-bit; licensing, hardware support, and driver compatibility on 32-bit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Starter</td>
<td>2 GB</td>
<td>2 GB</td>
<td>Licensing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Server Datacenter, Enterprise,</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2 TB</td>
<td>Testing and available systems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The maximum 2-TB physical memory limit doesn’t come from any implementation or hardware limitation, but because Microsoft will support only configurations it can test. As of this writing, the largest tested and supported memory configuration was 2 TB.

### Windows Client Memory Limits

64-bit Windows client editions support different amounts of memory as a differentiating feature, with the low end being 2 GB for Starter Edition, increasing to 192 GB for the Ultimate, Enterprise, and Professional editions. All 32-bit Windows client editions, however, support a maximum of 4 GB of physical memory, which is the highest physical address accessible with the standard x86 memory management mode.

Although client SKUs support PAE addressing modes on x86 systems in order to provide hardware no-execute protection (which would also enable access to more than 4 GB of physical memory), testing revealed that systems would crash, hang, or become unbootable because some device drivers, commonly those for video and audio devices found typically on clients but not servers, were not programmed to expect physical addresses larger than 4 GB. As a result, the drivers truncated such addresses, resulting in memory corruptions and corruption side effects. Server systems commonly have more generic devices, with simpler and more stable drivers, and therefore had not generally revealed these problems. The problematic client driver ecosystem led to the decision for client editions to ignore physical memory that resides above 4 GB, even though they can theoretically address it. Driver developers are encouraged to test their systems with the nolowmem BCD option, which will force the kernel to use physical addresses above 4 GB only if sufficient memory exists on the system to allow it. This will immediately lead to the detection of such issues in faulty drivers.
32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits

While 4 GB is the licensed limit for 32-bit client editions, the effective limit is actually lower and dependent on the system’s chipset and connected devices. The reason is that the physical address map includes not only RAM but device memory, and x86 and x64 systems typically map all device memory below the 4 GB address boundary to remain compatible with 32-bit operating systems that don’t know how to handle addresses larger than 4 GB. Newer chipsets do support PAE-based device remapping, but client editions of Windows do not support this feature for the driver compatibility problems explained earlier (otherwise, drivers would receive 64-bit pointers to their device memory).

If a system has 4 GB of RAM and devices such as video, audio, and network adapters that implement windows into their device memory that sum to 500 MB, 500 MB of the 4 GB of RAM will reside above the 4 GB address boundary, as seen in Figure 10-43.

The result is that if you have a system with 3 GB or more of memory and you are running a 32-bit Windows client, you may not be getting the benefit of all of the RAM. You can see how much RAM Windows has detected as being installed in the System Properties dialog box, but to see how much memory is actually available to Windows, you need to look at Task Manager’s Performance page or the Msinfo32 and Winver utilities. On one particular 4-GB laptop, when booted with 32-bit Windows, the amount of physical memory available is 3.5 GB, as seen in the Msinfo32 utility:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Installed Physical Memory (RAM)</th>
<th>4.00 GB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Physical Memory</td>
<td>3.50 GB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
You can see the physical memory layout with the MemInfo tool from Winsider Seminars & Solutions. Figure 10-44 shows the output of MemInfo when run on a 32-bit system, using the –r switch to dump physical memory ranges:

Note the gap in the memory address range from page 9F0000 to page 100000, and another gap from DFE6D000 to FFFFFFFF (4 GB). When the system is booted with 64-bit Windows, on the other hand, all 4 GB show up as available (see Figure 10-45), and you can see how Windows uses the remaining 500 MB of RAM that are above the 4-GB boundary.

You can use Device Manager on your machine to see what is occupying the various reserved memory regions that can’t be used by Windows (and that will
show up as holes in MemInfo’s output). To check Device Manager, run Devmgmt.msc, select Resources By Connection on the View menu, and then expand the Memory node. On the laptop computer used for the output shown in Figure 10-46, the primary consumer of mapped device memory is, unsurprisingly, the video card, which consumes 256 MB in the range E0000000-EFFFFFFF.

![Figure 10-46. Hardware-reserved memory ranges on a 32-bit Windows system](image)

Other miscellaneous devices account for most of the rest, and the PCI bus reserves additional ranges for devices as part of the conservative estimation the firmware uses during boot.

The consumption of memory addresses below 4 GB can be drastic on high-end gaming systems with large video cards. For example, on a test machine with 8 GB of RAM and two 1-GB video cards, only 2.2 GB of the memory was accessible by 32-bit Windows. A large memory hole from 8FEF0000 to FFFFFFFF is visible in the MemInfo output from the system on which 64-bit Windows is installed, shown in Figure 10-47.

![Figure 10-47. Memory ranges on a 64-bit Windows system](image)

Device Manager revealed that 512 MB of the more than 2-GB gap is for the video cards (256 MB each) and that the PCI bus driver had reserved more either for dynamic mappings or alignment requirements, or perhaps because the devices claimed larger areas than they actually needed. Finally, even systems with as little as 2 GB can be prevented from having all their memory usable under 32-bit
Windows because of chipsets that aggressively reserve memory regions for devices.
Working Sets

Now that we’ve looked at how Windows keeps track of physical memory, and how much memory it can support, we’ll explain how Windows keeps a subset of virtual addresses in physical memory.

As you’ll recall, the term used to describe a subset of virtual pages resident in physical memory is called a working set. There are three kinds of working sets:

- Process working sets contain the pages referenced by threads within a single process.

- System working sets contains the resident subset of the pageable system code (for example, Ntoskrnl.exe and drivers),paged pool, and the system cache.

- Each session has a working set that contains the resident subset of the kernel-mode session-specific data structures allocated by the kernel-mode part of the Windows subsystem (Win32k.sys), session paged pool, session mapped views, and other session-space device drivers.

Before examining the details of each type of working set, let’s look at the overall policy for deciding which pages are brought into physical memory and how long they remain. After that, we’ll explore the various types of working sets.

Demand Paging

The Windows memory manager uses a demand-paging algorithm with clustering to load pages into memory. When a thread receives a page fault, the memory manager loads into memory the faulted page plus a small number of pages preceding and/or following it. This strategy attempts to minimize the number of paging I/Os a thread will incur. Because programs, especially large ones, tend to execute in small regions of their address space at any given time, loading clusters of virtual pages reduces the number of disk reads. For page faults that reference data pages in images, the cluster size is three pages. For all other page faults, the cluster size is seven pages.

However, a demand-paging policy can result in a process incurring many page faults when its threads first begin executing or when they resume execution at a later point. To optimize the startup of a process (and the system), Windows has an
intelligent prefetch engine called the logical prefetcher, described in the next section. Further optimization and prefetching is performed by another component, called Superfetch, that we’ll describe later in the chapter.

Logical Prefetcher

During a typical system boot or application startup, the order of faults is such that some pages are brought in from one part of a file, then perhaps from a distant part of the same file, then from a different file, perhaps from a directory, and then again from the first file. This jumping around slows down each access considerably and, thus, analysis shows that disk seek times are a dominant factor in slowing boot and application startup times. By prefetching batches of pages all at once, a more sensible ordering of access, without excessive backtracking, can be achieved, thus improving the overall time for system and application startup. The pages that are needed can be known in advance because of the high correlation in accesses across boots or application starts.

The prefetcher tries to speed the boot process and application startup by monitoring the data and code accessed by boot and application startups and using that information at the beginning of a subsequent boot or application startup to read in the code and data. When the prefetcher is active, the memory manager notifies the prefetcher code in the kernel of page faults, both those that require that data be read from disk (hard faults) and those that simply require data already in memory be added to a process’s working set (soft faults). The prefetcher monitors the first 10 seconds of application startup. For boot, the prefetcher by default traces from system start through the 30 seconds following the start of the user’s shell (typically Explorer) or, failing that, up through 60 seconds following Windows service initialization or through 120 seconds, whichever comes first.

The trace assembled in the kernel notes faults taken on the NTFS master file table (MFT) metadata file (if the application accesses files or directories on NTFS volumes), on referenced files, and on referenced directories. With the trace assembled, the kernel prefetcher code waits for requests from the prefetcher component of the Superfetch service (%SystemRoot%\System32\Sysmain.dll), running in a copy of Svchost. The Superfetch service is responsible for both the logical prefetching component in the kernel and for the Superfetch component that
we’ll talk about later. The prefetcher signals the event
\KernelObjects\PrefetchTracesReady to inform the Superfetch service that it can
now query trace data.

**NOTE**

You can enable or disable prefetching of the boot or application startups by editing the DWORD registry
value HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory
Management\PrefetchParameters\EnablePrefetcher. Set it to 0 to disable prefetching altogether, 1 to enable
prefetching of only applications, 2 for prefetching of boot only, and 3 for both boot and applications.

The Superfetch service (which hosts the logical prefetcher, although it is a
completely separate component from the actual Superfetch functionality) performs
a call to the internal NtQuerySystemInformation system call requesting the trace
data. The logical prefetcher post-processes the trace data, combining it with
previously collected data, and writes it to a file in the %SystemRoot%\Prefetch
cfolder, which is shown in Figure 10-48. The file’s name is the name of the
application to which the trace applies followed by a dash and the hexadecimal
representation of a hash of the file’s path. The file has a .pf extension; an example
would be NOTEPAD.EXE-AF43252301.PF.

There are two exceptions to the file name rule. The first is for images that host
other components, including the Microsoft Management Console
(%SystemRoot%\System32\Mmc.exe), the Service Hosting Process
(%SystemRoot%\System32\Svchost.exe), the Run DLL Component
(%SystemRoot%\System32\Rundll32.exe), and Dllhost
(%SystemRoot%\System32\Dllhost.exe). Because add-on components are
specified on the command line for these applications, the prefetcher includes the
command line in the generated hash. Thus, invocations of these applications with
different components on the command line will result in different traces.

The other exception to the file name rule is the file that stores the boot’s trace,
which is always named NTOSBOOT-B00DFAAD.PF. (If read as a word,
“boodfaad” sounds similar to the English words boot fast.) Only after the
prefetcher has finished the boot trace (the time of which was defined earlier) does
it collect page fault information for specific applications.
A prefetch file’s contents serve as a record of files and directories accessed during the boot or an application startup, and you can use the Strings utility from Sysinternals to see the record. The following command lists all the files and directories referenced during the last boot:

```
C:\Windows\Prefetch>Strings -n 5 ntosboot-b00dfaad.pf
```

```
Strings v2.4
Copyright (C) 1999-2007 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

4NTOSBOOT
\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1$MFT
\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\DRIVERS\TUNNEL.SYS
\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\DRIVERS\TUNMP.SYS
\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\DRIVERS\I8042PRT.SYS
\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\DRIVERS\KBDCLASS.SYS
\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\DRIVERS\VMMOUSE.SYS
\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\DRIVERS\MOUCLASS.SYS
\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\DRIVERS\PARPORT.SYS
...
```

When the system boots or an application starts, the prefetcher is called to give it an
opportunity to perform prefetching. The prefetcher looks in the prefetch directory to see if a trace file exists for the prefetch scenario in question. If it does, the prefetcher calls NTFS to prefetch any MFT metadata file references, reads in the contents of each of the directories referenced, and finally opens each file referenced. It then calls the memory manager function MmPrefetchPages to read in any data and code specified in the trace that’s not already in memory. The memory manager initiates all the reads asynchronously and then waits for them to complete before letting an application’s startup continue.

**EXPERIMENT: WATCHING PREFETCH FILE READS AND WRITES**

If you capture a trace of application startup with Process Monitor from Sysinternals on a client edition of Windows (Windows Server editions disable prefetching by default), you can see the prefetcher check for and read the application’s prefetch file (if it exists), and roughly 10 seconds after the application started, see the prefetcher write out a new copy of the file. Here is a capture of Notepad startup with an Include filter set to “prefetch” so that Process Monitor shows only accesses to the %SystemRoot%\Prefetch directory:

![Process Monitor capture of Notepad startup with Include filter set to “prefetch”](image)

Lines 1 through 4 show the Notepad prefetch file being read in the context of the Notepad process during its startup. Lines 5 through 11, which have time stamps 10 seconds later than the first three lines, show the Superfetch service, which is running in the context of a Svchost process, write out the updated prefetch file.

To minimize seeking even further, every three days or so, during system idle periods, the Superfetch service organizes a list of files and directories in the order that they are referenced during a boot or application start and stores the list in a file named %SystemRoot%\Prefetch\Layout.ini, shown in Figure 10-49. This list also includes frequently accessed files tracked by Superfetch.
Then it launches the system defragmenter with a command-line option that tells the defragmenter to defragment based on the contents of the file instead of performing a full defrag. The defragmenter finds a contiguous area on each volume large enough to hold all the listed files and directories that reside on that volume and then moves them in their entirety into the area so that they are stored one after the other. Thus, future prefetch operations will even be more efficient because all the data read in is now stored physically on the disk in the order it will be read. Because the files defragmented for prefetching usually number only in the hundreds, this defragmentation is much faster than full volume defragmentations. (See Chapter 12 for more information on defragmentation.)

**Placement Policy**

When a thread receives a page fault, the memory manager must also determine where in physical memory to put the virtual page. The set of rules it uses to determine the best position is called a placement policy. Windows considers the size of CPU memory caches when choosing page frames to minimize unnecessary thrashing of the cache.

If physical memory is full when a page fault occurs, a replacement policy is used to determine which virtual page must be removed from memory to make room for the new page. Common replacement policies include least recently used (LRU) and
first in, first out (FIFO). The LRU algorithm (also known as the clock algorithm, as implemented in most versions of UNIX) requires the virtual memory system to track when a page in memory is used. When a new page frame is required, the page that hasn’t been used for the greatest amount of time is removed from the working set. The FIFO algorithm is somewhat simpler; it removes the page that has been in physical memory for the greatest amount of time, regardless of how often it’s been used.

Replacement policies can be further characterized as either global or local. A global replacement policy allows a page fault to be satisfied by any page frame, whether or not that frame is owned by another process. For example, a global replacement policy using the FIFO algorithm would locate the page that has been in memory the longest and would free it to satisfy a page fault; a local replacement policy would limit its search for the oldest page to the set of pages already owned by the process that incurred the page fault. Global replacement policies make processes vulnerable to the behavior of other processes—an ill-behaved application can undermine the entire operating system by inducing excessive paging activity in all processes.

Windows implements a combination of local and global replacement policy. When a working set reaches its limit and/or needs to be trimmed because of demands for physical memory, the memory manager removes pages from working sets until it has determined there are enough free pages.

**Working Set Management**

Every process starts with a default working set minimum of 50 pages and a working set maximum of 345 pages. Although it has little effect, you can change the process working set limits with the Windows SetProcessWorkingSetSize function, though you must have the “increase scheduling priority” user right to do this. However, unless you have configured the process to use hard working set limits, these limits are ignored, in that the memory manager will permit a process to grow beyond its maximum if it is paging heavily and there is ample memory (and conversely, the memory manager will shrink a process below its working set minimum if it is not paging and there is a high demand for physical memory on the system). Hard working set limits can be set using the SetProcessWorkingSetSizeEx
function along with the QUOTA_LIMITS_HARDWS_MIN_ENABLE flag, but it is almost always better to let the system manage your working set instead of setting your own hard working set minimums.

The maximum working set size can’t exceed the systemwide maximum calculated at system initialization time and stored in the kernel variable MiMaximumWorkingSet, which is a hard upper limit based on the working set maximums listed in Table 10-21.

Table 10-21. Upper Limit for Working Set Maximums

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Windows Version</th>
<th>Working Set Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>x86</td>
<td>2,047.9 MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x86 versions of Windows booted with increaseuserva</td>
<td>2,047.9 MB+ user virtual address increase (MB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA64</td>
<td>7,152 GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x64</td>
<td>8,192 GB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When a page fault occurs, the process’s working set limits and the amount of free memory on the system are examined. If conditions permit, the memory manager allows a process to grow to its working set maximum (or beyond if the process does not have a hard working set limit and there are enough free pages available). However, if memory is tight, Windows replaces rather than adds pages in a working set when a fault occurs.

Although Windows attempts to keep memory available by writing modified pages to disk, when modified pages are being generated at a very high rate, more memory is required in order to meet memory demands. Therefore, when physical memory runs low, the working set manager, a routine that runs in the context of the balance set manager system thread (described in the next section), initiates automatic working set trimming to increase the amount of free memory available in the system. (With the Windows SetProcessWorkingSetSizeEx function mentioned earlier, you can also initiate working set trimming of your own process—for example, after process initialization.)

The working set manager examines available memory and decides which, if any,
working sets need to be trimmed. If there is ample memory, the working set manager calculates how many pages could be removed from working sets if needed. If trimming is needed, it looks at working sets that are above their minimum setting. It also dynamically adjusts the rate at which it examines working sets as well as arranges the list of processes that are candidates to be trimmed into an optimal order. For example, processes with many pages that have not been accessed recently are examined first; larger processes that have been idle longer are considered before smaller processes that are running more often; the process running the foreground application is considered last; and so on.

When it finds processes using more than their minimums, the working set manager looks for pages to remove from their working sets, making the pages available for other uses. If the amount of free memory is still too low, the working set manager continues removing pages from processes’ working sets until it achieves a minimum number of free pages on the system.

The working set manager tries to remove pages that haven’t been accessed recently. It does this by checking the accessed bit in the hardware PTE to see whether the page has been accessed. If the bit is clear, the page is aged, that is, a count is incremented indicating that the page hasn’t been referenced since the last working set trim scan. Later, the age of pages is used to locate candidate pages to remove from the working set.

If the hardware PTE accessed bit is set, the working set manager clears it and goes on to examine the next page in the working set. In this way, if the accessed bit is clear the next time the working set manager examines the page, it knows that the page hasn’t been accessed since the last time it was examined. This scan for pages to remove continues through the working set list until either the number of desired pages has been removed or the scan has returned to the starting point. (The next time the working set is trimmed, the scan picks up where it left off last.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXPERIMENT: VIEWING PROCESS WORKING SET SIZES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>You can use Performance Monitor to examine process working set sizes by looking at the performance counters shown in the following table.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Counter</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Process: Working Set</td>
<td>Current size of the selected process’s working set in bytes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Process: Working Set Peak | Peak size of the selected process’s working set in bytes
---|---
Process: Page Faults/sec | Number of page faults for the process that occur each second

Several other process viewer utilities (such as Task Manager and Process Explorer) also display the process working set size.

You can also get the total of all the process working sets by selecting the _Total process in the instance box in Performance Monitor. This process isn’t real—it’s simply a total of the process-specific counters for all processes currently running on the system. The total you see is larger than the actual RAM being used, however, because the size of each process working set includes pages being shared by other processes. Thus, if two or more processes share a page, the page is counted in each process’s working set.

**EXPERIMENT: WORKING SET VS. VIRTUAL SIZE**

Earlier in this chapter, we used the TestLimit utility to create two processes, one with a large amount of memory that was merely reserved, and the other in which the memory was private committed, and examined the difference between them with Process Explorer. Now we will create a third TestLimit process, one that not only commits the memory but also accesses it, thus bringing it into its working set:

```
C:\temp>testlimit -d 1 -c 800
```

TestLimit v5.2 - test Windows limits
Copyright (C) 2012 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

Process ID: 700

Leaking private bytes 1 MB at a time...
Leaked 800 MB of private memory (800 MB total leaked). Lasterror: 0
The operation completed successfully.

Now, invoke Process Explorer. Under View, Select Columns, choose the Process Memory tab and enable the Private Bytes, Virtual Size, Working Set Size, WS Shareable Bytes, and WS Private Bytes counters. Then find the three instances of TestLimit as shown in the display.

The new TestLimit process is the third one shown, PID 700. It is the only one of the three that actually referenced the memory allocated, so it is the only one with a working set that reflects the size of the test allocation.

Note that this result is possible only on a system with enough RAM to allow the process to grow to such a
size. Even on this system, not quite all of the private bytes (822,064 K) are in the WS Private portion of the working set. A small number of the private pages have either been pushed out of the process working set due to replacement or have not been paged in yet.

**EXPERIMENT: VIEWING THE WORKING SET LIST IN THE DEBUGGER**

You can view the individual entries in the working set by using the kernel debugger `!wsle` command. The following example shows a partial output of the working set list of WinDbg.

```
lkd> !wsle 7
Working Set @ c0002000
  FirstFree 209c FirstDynamic 6
  LastEntry 242e NextSlot 6 LastInitialized 24b9
  NonDirect 0 HashTable 0 HashTableSize 0
```

Reading the WSLE data
................................................................

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Virtual Address</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Locked</th>
<th>ReferenceCount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>c0600203</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c0601203</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c0602203</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c0603203</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c0604213</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c0802203</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2865201</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1a6d201</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3f4201</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>707ed101</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d27201</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d28201</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>772f5101</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d2a201</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d2b201</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d2c201</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>779c3101</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c0002201</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>779f3101</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff01109</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff02109</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff03009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff04009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff05009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff06009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff07009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff08009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff09009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff0a009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff0b009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff0c009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff0d009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff0e009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff0f009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff10009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff11009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff12009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff13009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff14009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff15009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff16009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff17009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff18009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff19009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff1a009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff1b009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff1c009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff1d009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff1e009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff1f009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff20009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff21009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff22009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff23009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff24009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff25009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff26009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff27009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff28009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff29009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff2a009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff2b009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff2c009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff2d009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff2e009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff2f009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff30009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff31009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff32009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff33009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff34009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff35009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff36009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff37009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff38009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff39009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff3a009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff3b009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff3c009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff3d009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff3e009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff3f009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff40009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff41009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff42009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff43009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff44009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7ff45009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notice that some entries in the working set list are page table pages (the ones with addresses greater than 0xC0000000), some are from system DLLs (the ones in the 0x7nnnnnnn range), and some are from the code of Windbg.exe itself.
Balance Set Manager and Swapper

Working set expansion and trimming take place in the context of a system thread called the balance set manager (routine KeBalanceSetManager). The balance set manager is created during system initialization. Although the balance set manager is technically part of the kernel, it calls the memory manager’s working set manager (MmWorkingSetManager) to perform working set analysis and adjustment.

The balance set manager waits for two different event objects: an event that is signaled when a periodic timer set to fire once per second expires and an internal working set manager event that the memory manager signals at various points when it determines that working sets need to be adjusted. For example, if the system is experiencing a high page fault rate or the free list is too small, the memory manager wakes up the balance set manager so that it will call the working set manager to begin trimming working sets. When memory is more plentiful, the working set manager will permit faulting processes to gradually increase the size of their working sets by faulting pages back into memory, but the working sets will grow only as needed.

When the balance set manager wakes up as the result of its 1-second timer expiring, it takes the following five steps:

1. It queues a DPC associated to a 1-second timer. The DPC routine is the KiScanReadyQueues routine, which looks for threads that might warrant having their priority boosted because they are CPU starved. (See the section “Priority Boosts for CPU Starvation” in Chapter 5 in Part 1.)

2. Every fourth time the balance set manager wakes up because its 1-second timer has expired, it signals an event that wakes up another system thread called the swapper (KiSwapperThread) (routine KeSwapProcessOrStack).

3. The balance set manager then checks the look-aside lists and adjusts their depths if necessary (to improve access time and to reduce pool usage and pool fragmentation).

4. It adjusts IRP credits to optimize the usage of the per-processor look-aside lists used in IRP completion. This allows better scalability when certain processors are under heavy I/O load.
5. It calls the memory manager’s working set manager. (The working set manager has its own internal counters that regulate when to perform working set trimming and how aggressively to trim.)

The swapper is also awakened by the scheduling code in the kernel if a thread that needs to run has its kernel stack swapped out or if the process has been swapped out. The swapper looks for threads that have been in a wait state for 15 seconds (or 3 seconds on a system with less than 12 MB of RAM). If it finds one, it puts the thread’s kernel stack in transition (moving the pages to the modified or standby lists) so as to reclaim its physical memory, operating on the principle that if a thread’s been waiting that long, it’s going to be waiting even longer. When the last thread in a process has its kernel stack removed from memory, the process is marked to be entirely outswapped. That’s why, for example, processes that have been idle for a long time (such as Winlogon is after you log on) can have a zero working set size.

**System Working Sets**

Just as processes have working sets that manage pageable portions of the process address space, the pageable code and data in the system address space is managed using three global working sets, collectively known as the system working sets:

- The system cache working set (MmSystemCacheWs) contains pages that are resident in the system cache.
- The paged pool working set (MmPagedPoolWs) contains pages that are resident in the paged pool.
- The system PTEs working set (MmSystemPtesWs) contains pageable code and data from loaded drivers and the kernel image, as well as pages from sections that have been mapped into the system space.

You can examine the sizes of these working sets or the sizes of the components that contribute to them with the performance counters or system variables shown in Table 10-22. Keep in mind that the performance counter values are in bytes, whereas the system variables are measured in terms of pages.

(You can also examine the paging activity in the system cache working set by examining the Memory: Cache Faults/sec performance counter, which describes
page faults that occur in the system cache working set (both hard and soft). MmSystemCacheWs.PageFaultCount is the system variable that contains the value for this counter.

Table 10-22. System Working Set Performance Counters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance Counter (in Bytes)</th>
<th>System Variable (in Pages)</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Memory: Cache Bytes, also Memory: System Cache Resident Bytes</td>
<td>MmSystemCacheWs. WorkingSetSize</td>
<td>Physical memory consumed by the file system cache.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memory: Cache Bytes Peak Memory: System Driver Resident Bytes</td>
<td>MmSystemCacheWs.Peak MmSystemDriverPage</td>
<td>Peak system working set size. Physical memory consumed by pageable device driver code.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memory: Pool Paged Resident Bytes</td>
<td>MmPagedPoolWs. WorkingSetSize</td>
<td>Physical memory consumed by paged pool.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Memory Notification Events**

Windows provides a way for user-mode processes and kernel-mode drivers to be notified when physical memory, paged pool, nonpaged pool, and commit charge are low and/or plentiful. This information can be used to determine memory usage as appropriate. For example, if available memory is low, the application can reduce memory consumption. If available paged pool is high, the driver can allocate more memory. Finally, the memory manager also provides an event that permits notification when corrupted pages have been detected.

User-mode processes can be notified only of low or high memory conditions. An application can call the CreateMemoryResourceNotification function, specifying whether low or high memory notification is desired. The returned handle can be provided to any of the wait functions. When memory is low (or high), the wait completes, thus notifying the thread of the condition. Alternatively, the QueryMemoryResourceNotification can be used to query the system memory condition at any time without blocking the calling thread.

Drivers, on the other hand, use the specific event name that the memory manager
has set up in the \KernelObjects directory, since notification is implemented by the memory manager signaling one of the globally named event objects it defines, shown in Table 10-23.

Table 10-23. Memory Manager Notification Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HighCommitCondition</td>
<td>This event is set when the commit charge is near the maximum commit limit. In other words, memory usage is very high, very little space is available in physical memory or paging files, and the operating system cannot increase the size of its paging files.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighMemoryCondition</td>
<td>This event is set whenever the amount of free physical memory exceeds the defined amount.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighNonPagedPoolCondition</td>
<td>This event is set whenever the amount of nonpaged pool exceeds the defined amount.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighPagedPoolCondition</td>
<td>This event is set whenever the amount of paged pool exceeds the defined amount.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowCommitCondition</td>
<td>This event is set when the commit charge is low, relative to the current commit limit. In other words, memory usage is low and a lot of space is available in physical memory or paging files.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowMemoryCondition</td>
<td>This event is set whenever the amount of free physical memory falls below the defined amount.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowNonPagedPoolCondition</td>
<td>This event is set whenever the amount of free nonpaged pool falls below the defined amount.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowPagedPoolCondition</td>
<td>This event is set whenever the amount of free paged pool falls below the defined amount.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MaximumCommitCondition</td>
<td>This event is set when the commit charge is near the maximum commit limit. In other words, memory usage is very high, very little space is available in physical memory or paging files, and the operating system cannot increase the size or number of paging files.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MemoryErrors</td>
<td>A bad page (non-zeroed zero page) has been detected.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When a given memory condition is detected, the appropriate event is signaled, thus waking up any waiting threads.
NOTE

The high and low memory values can be overridden by adding a DWORD registry value, LowMemoryThreshold or HighMemoryThreshold, under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Session Manager\Memory Management that specifies the number of megabytes to use as the low or high threshold. The system can also be configured to crash the system when a bad page is detected, instead of signaling a memory error event, by setting the PageValidationAction DWORD registry value in the same key.

EXPERIMENT: VIEWING THE MEMORY RESOURCE NOTIFICATION EVENTS

To see the memory resource notification events, run Winobj from Sysinternals and click on the KernelObjects folder. You will see both the low and high memory condition events shown in the right pane:

![Image of Winobj with KernelObjects folder open showing LowMemoryCondition event]

If you double-click either event, you can see how many handles and/or references have been made to the objects.

To see whether any processes in the system have requested memory resource notification, search the handle table for references to “LowMemoryCondition” or “HighMemoryCondition.” You can do this by using Process Explorer’s Find menu and choosing the Handle capability or by using WinDbg. (For a description of the handle table, see the section “Object Manager” in Chapter 3 in Part 1.)
Proactive Memory Management (Superfetch)

Traditional memory management in operating systems has focused on the demand-paging model we’ve shown until now, with some advances in clustering and prefetching so that disk I/Os can be optimized at the time of the demand-page fault. Client versions of Windows, however, include a significant improvement in the management of physical memory with the implementation of Superfetch, a memory management scheme that enhances the least-recently accessed approach with historical file access information and proactive memory management.

The standby list management of previous Windows versions has had two limitations. First, the prioritization of pages relies only on the recent past behavior of processes and does not anticipate their future memory requirements. Second, the data used for prioritization is limited to the list of pages owned by a process at any given point in time. These shortcomings can result in scenarios in which the computer is left unattended for a brief period of time, during which a memory-intensive system application runs (doing work such as an antivirus scan or a disk defragmentation) and then causes subsequent interactive application use (or launch) to be sluggish. The same situation can happen when a user purposely runs a data and/or memory intensive application and then returns to use other programs, which appear to be significantly less responsive.

This decline in performance occurs because the memory-intensive application forces the code and data that active applications had cached in memory to be overwritten by the memory-intensive activities—applications perform sluggishly as they have to request their data and code from disk. Client versions of Windows take a big step toward resolving these limitations with Superfetch.

Components

Superfetch is composed of several components in the system that work hand in hand to proactively manage memory and limit the impact on user activity when Superfetch is performing its work. These components include:

- **Tracer** The tracer mechanisms are part of a kernel component (Pf) that allows Superfetch to query detailed page usage, session, and process information at any time. Superfetch also makes use of the FileInfo driver
(\%SystemRoot\%\System32\Drivers\FileInfo.sys) to track file usage.

- **Trace collector and processor** This collector works with the tracing components to provide a raw log based on the tracing data that has been acquired. This tracing data is kept in memory and handed off to the processor. The processor then hands the log entries in the trace to the agents, which maintain history files (described next) in memory and persist them to disk when the service stops (such as during a reboot).

- **Agents** Superfetch keeps file page access information in history files, which keep track of virtual offsets. Agents group pages by attributes, such as:
  - Page access while the user was active
  - Page access by a foreground process
  - Hard fault while the user was active
  - Page access during an application launch
  - Page access upon the user returning after a long idle period

- **Scenario manager** This component, also called the context agent, manages the three Superfetch scenario plans: hibernation, standby, and fast-user switching. The kernel-mode part of the scenario manager provides APIs for initiating and terminating scenarios, managing current scenario state, and associating tracing information with these scenarios.

- **Rebalancer** Based on the information provided by the Superfetch agents, as well as the current state of the system (such as the state of the prioritized page lists), the rebalancer, a specialized agent that is located in the Superfetch user-mode service, queries the PFN database and reprioritizes it based on the associated score of each page, thus building the prioritized standby lists. The rebalancer can also issue commands to the memory manager that modify the working sets of processes on the system, and it is the only agent that actually takes action on the system—other agents merely filter information for the rebalancer to use in its decisions. Other than reprioritization, the rebalancer also initiates prefetching through the prefetcher thread, which makes use of FileInfo and kernel services to preload memory with useful pages.

Finally, all these components make use of facilities inside the memory manager
that allow querying detailed information about the state of each page in the PFN database, the current page counts for each page list and prioritized list, and more. Figure 10-50 displays an architectural diagram of Superfetch’s multiple components. Superfetch components also make use of prioritized I/O (see Chapter 8 for more information on I/O priority) to minimize user impact.

**Figure 10-50.** Superfetch architectural diagram

**Tracing and Logging**

Superfetch makes most of its decisions based on information that has been integrated, parsed, and post-processed from raw traces and logs, making these two
components among the most critical. Tracing is similar to ETW in some ways because it makes use of certain triggers in code throughout the system to generate events, but it also works in conjunction with facilities already provided by the system, such as power manager notification, process callbacks, and file system filtering. The tracer also makes use of traditional page aging mechanisms that exist in the memory manager, as well as newer working set aging and access tracking implemented for Superfetch.

Superfetch always keeps a trace running and continuously queries trace data from the system, which tracks page usage and access through the memory manager’s access bit tracking and working set aging. To track file-related information, which is as critical as page usage because it allows prioritization of file data in the cache, Superfetch leverages existing filtering functionality with the addition of the FileInfo driver. (See Chapter 8 for more information on filter drivers.) This driver sits on the file system device stack and monitors access and changes to files at the stream level (for more information on NTFS data streams, see Chapter 12), which provides it with fine-grained understanding of file access. The main job of the FileInfo driver is to associate streams (identified by a unique key, currently implemented as the FsContext field of the respective file object) with file names so that the user-mode Superfetch service can identify the specific file stream and offset with which a page in the standby list belonging to a memory mapped section is associated. It also provides the interface for prefetching file data transparently, without interfering with locked files and other file system state. The rest of the driver ensures that the information stays consistent by tracking deletions, renaming operations, truncations, and the reuse of file keys by implementing sequence numbers.

At any time during tracing, the rebalancer might be invoked to repopulate pages differently. These decisions are made by analyzing information such as the distribution of memory within working sets, the zero page list, the modified page list and the standby page lists, the number of faults, the state of PTE access bits, the per-page usage traces, current virtual address consumption, and working set size.

A given trace can be either a page access trace, in which the tracer keeps track (by using the access bit) of which pages were accessed by the process (both file page and private memory), or a name logging trace, which monitors the file-name-to-
file-key-mapping updates (which allow Superfetch to map a page associated with a file object) to the actual file on disk.

Although a Superfetch trace only keeps track of page accesses, the Superfetch service processes this trace in user mode and goes much deeper, adding its own richer information such as where the page was loaded from (such as resident memory or a hard page fault), whether this was the initial access to that page, and what the rate of page access actually is. Additional information, such as the system state, is also kept, as well as information about in which recent scenarios each traced page was last referenced. The generated trace information is kept in memory through a logger into data structures, which identify, in the case of page access traces, a virtual-address-to-working-set pair or, in the case of a name logging trace, a file-to-offset pair. Superfetch can thus keep track of which range of virtual addresses for a given process have page-related events and which range of offsets for a given file have similar events.

**Scenarios**

One aspect of Superfetch that is distinct from its primary page repriorization and prefetching mechanisms (covered in more detail in the next section) is its support for scenarios, which are specific actions on the machine for which Superfetch strives to improve the user experience. These scenarios are standby and hibernation as well as fast user switching. Each of these scenarios has different goals, but all are centered around the main purpose of minimizing or removing hard faults.

- For hibernation, the goal is to intelligently decide which pages are saved in the hibernation file other than the existing working set pages. The goal is to minimize the amount of time that it takes for the system to become responsive after a resume.

- For standby, the goal is to completely remove hard faults after resume. Because a typical system can resume in less than 2 seconds, but can take 5 seconds to spin-up the hard drive after a long sleep, a single hard fault could cause such a delay in the resume cycle. Superfetch prioritizes pages needed after a standby to remove this chance.

- For fast user switching, the goal is to keep an accurate priority and understanding of each user’s memory, so that switching to another user will
cause the user’s session to be immediately usable, and not require a large amount of lag time to allow pages to be faulted in.

Scenarios are hardcoded, and Superfetch manages them through the NtSetSystemInformation and NtQuerySystemInformation APIs that control system state. For Superfetch purposes, a special information class, SystemSuperfetchInformation, is used to control the kernel-mode components and to generate requests such as starting, ending, and querying a scenario or associating one or more traces with a scenario.

Each scenario is defined by a plan file, which contains, at minimum, a list of pages associated with the scenario. Page priority values are also assigned according to certain rules we’ll describe next. When a scenario starts, the scenario manager is responsible for responding to the event by generating the list of pages that should be brought into memory and at which priority.

**Page Priority and Rebalancing**

We’ve already seen that the memory manager implements a system of page priorities to define from which standby list pages will be repurposed for a given operation and in which list a given page will be inserted. This mechanism provides benefits when processes and threads can have associated priorities—such that a defragmenter process doesn’t pollute the standby page list and/or steal pages from an interactive, foreground process—but its real power is unleashed through Superfetch’s page prioritization schemes and rebalancing, which don’t require manual application input or hardcoded knowledge of process importance.

Superfetch assigns page priority based on an internal score it keeps for each page, part of which is based on frequency-based usage. This usage counts how many times a page was used in given relative time intervals, such as an hour, a day, or a week. Time of use is also kept track of, which records for how long a given page has not been accessed. Finally, data such as where this page comes from (which list) and other access patterns are used to compute this final score, which is then translated into a priority number, which can be anywhere from 1 to 6 (7 is used for another purpose described later). Going down each level, the lower standby page list priorities are repurposed first, as shown in the Experiment **EXPERIMENT: Viewing the Prioritized Standby Lists**. Priority 5 is typically used for normal
applications, while priority 1 is meant for background applications that third-party developers can mark as such. Finally, priority 6 is used to keep a certain number of high-importance pages as far away as possible from repurposing. The other priorities are a result of the score associated with each page.

Because Superfetch “learns” a user’s system, it can start from scratch with no existing historical data and slowly build up an understanding of the different page usage accesses associated with the user. However, this would result in a significant learning curve whenever a new application, user, or service pack was installed. Instead, by using an internal tool, Microsoft has the ability to pretrain Superfetch to capture Superfetch data and then turn it into prebuilt traces. Before Windows shipped, the Superfetch team traced common usages and patterns that all users will probably encounter, such as clicking the Start menu, opening Control Panel, or using the File Open/Save dialog box. This trace data was then saved to history files (which ship as resources in Sysmain.dll) and is used to prepopulate the special priority 7 list, which is where the most critical data is placed and which is very rarely repurposed. Pages at priority 7 are file pages kept in memory even after the process has exited and even across reboots (by being repopulated at the next boot). Finally, pages with priority 7 are static, in that they are never reprioritized, and Superfetch will never dynamically load pages at priority 7 other than the static pretrained set.

The prioritized list is loaded into memory (or prepopulated) by the rebalancer, but the actual act of rebalancing is actually handled by both Superfetch and the memory manager. As shown earlier, the prioritized standby page list mechanism is internal to the memory manager, and decisions as to which pages to throw out first and which to protect are innate, based on the priority number. The rebalancer actually does its job not by manually rebalancing memory but by reprioritizing it, which will cause the operation of the memory manager to perform the needed tasks. The rebalancer is also responsible for reading the actual pages from disk, if needed, so that they are present in memory (prefetching). It then assigns the priority that is mapped by each agent to the score for each page, and the memory manager will then ensure that the page is treated according to its importance.

The rebalancer can also take action without relying on other agents; for example, if it notices that the distribution of pages across paging lists is suboptimal or that the
number of repurposed pages across different priority levels is detrimental. The rebalancer also has the ability to cause working set trimming if needed, which might be required for creating an appropriate budget of pages that will be used for Superfetch prepopulated cache data. The rebalancer will typically take low-utility pages—such as those that are already marked as low priority, pages that are zeroed, and pages with valid contents but not in any working set and have been unused—and build a more useful set of pages in memory, given the budget it has allocated itself.

Once the rebalancer has decided which pages to bring into memory and at which priority level they need to be loaded (as well as which pages can be thrown out), it performs the required disk reads to prefetch them. It also works in conjunction with the I/O manager’s prioritization schemes so that the I/Os are performed with very low priority and do not interfere with the user. It is important to note that the actual memory consumption used by prefetching is all backed by standby pages—as described earlier in the discussion of page dynamics, standby memory is available memory because it can be repurposed as free memory for another allocator at any time. In other words, if Superfetch is prefetching the “wrong data,” there is no real impact to the user, because that memory can be reused when needed and doesn’t actually consume resources.

Finally, the rebalancer also runs periodically to ensure that pages it has marked as high priority have actually been recently used. Because these pages will rarely (sometimes never) be repurposed, it is important not to waste them on data that is rarely accessed but may have appeared to be frequently accessed during a certain time period. If such a situation is detected, the rebalancer runs again to push those pages down in the priority lists.

In addition to the rebalancer, a special agent called the application launch agent is also involved in a different kind of prefetching mechanism, which attempts to predict application launches and builds a Markov chain model that describes the probability of certain application launches given the existence of other application launches within a time segment. These time segments are divided across four different periods—morning, noon, evening, and night; roughly 6 hours each—and are also kept track of separately as weekdays or weekends. For example, if on Saturday and Sunday evening a user typically launches Outlook (to send email)
after having launched Word (to write letters), the application launch agent will probably have prefetched Outlook based on the high probability of it running after Word during weekend evenings.

Because systems today have sufficiently large amounts of memory, on average more than 2 GB (although Superfetch works well on low-memory systems, too), the actual real amount of memory that frequently used processes on a machine need resident for optimal performance ends up being a manageable subset of their entire memory footprint, and Superfetch can often fit all the pages required into RAM. When it can’t, technologies such as ReadyBoost and ReadyDrive can further avoid disk usage.

**Robust Performance**

A final performance enhancing functionality of Superfetch is called robustness, or robust performance. This component, managed by the user-mode Superfetch service, but ultimately implemented in the kernel (Pf routines), watches for specific file I/O access that might harm system performance by populating the standby lists with unneeded data. For example, if a process were to copy a large file across the file system, the standby list would be populated with the file’s contents, even though that file might never be accessed again (or not for a long period of time). This would throw out any other data within that priority (and if this was an interactive and useful program, chances are its priority would’ve been at least 5).

Superfetch responds to two specific kinds of I/O access patterns: sequential file access (going through all the data in a file) and sequential directory access (going through every file in a directory). When Superfetch detects that a certain amount of data (past an internal threshold) has been populated in the standby list as a result of this kind of access, it applies aggressive deprioritization (robustion) to the pages being used to map this file, within the targeted process only (so as not to penalize other applications). These pages, so-called robusted, essentially become reprioritized to priority 2.

Because this component of Superfetch is reactive and not predictive, it does take some time for the robustion to kick in. Superfetch will therefore keep track of this process for the next time it runs. Once Superfetch has determined that it appears that this process always performs this kind of sequential access, Superfetch
remembers it and robusts the file pages as soon as they’re mapped, instead of waiting on the reactive behavior. At this point, the entire process is now considered robusted for future file access.

Just by applying this logic, however, Superfetch could potentially hurt many legitimate applications or user scenarios that perform sequential access in the future. For example, by using the Sysinternals Strings.exe utility, you can look for a string in all executables that are part of a directory. If there are many files, Superfetch would likely perform robustion. Now, next time you run Strings with a different search parameter, it would run just as slowly as it did the first time, even though you’d expect it to run much faster. To prevent this, Superfetch keeps a list of processes that it watches into the future, as well as an internal hardcoded list of exceptions. If a process is detected to later re-access robusted files, robustion is disabled on the process in order to restore expected behavior.

The main point to remember when thinking about robustion, and Superfetch optimizations in general, is that Superfetch constantly monitors usage patterns and updates its understanding of the system, so that it can avoid fetching useless data. Although changes in a user’s daily activities or application startup behavior might cause Superfetch to incorrectly “pollute” the cache with irrelevant data or to throw out data that Superfetch might think is useless, it will quickly adapt to any pattern changes. If the user’s actions are erratic and random, the worst that can happen is that the system behaves in a similar state as if Superfetch was not present at all. If Superfetch is ever in doubt or cannot track data reliably, it quiets itself and doesn’t make changes to a given process or page.

---

**RAM OPTIMIZATION SOFTWARE**

While Superfetch provides valuable and realistic optimization of memory usage for the various scenarios it aims to support, many third-party software manufacturers are involved in the distribution of so-called “RAM Optimization” software, which aims to significantly increase available memory on a user’s system. These memory optimizers typically present a user interface that shows a graph labeled “Available Memory,” and a line typically shows the amount of memory that the optimizer will try to free when it runs. After the optimization job runs, the utility’s available memory counter often goes up, sometimes dramatically, implying that the tool is actually freeing up memory for application use. RAM optimizers work by allocating and then freeing large amounts of virtual memory. The following illustration shows the effect a RAM optimizer has on a system.
The Before bar depicts the process and system working sets, the pages in standby lists, and free memory before optimization. The During bar shows that the RAM optimizer creates a high memory demand, which it does by incurring many page faults in a short time. In response, the memory manager increases the RAM optimizer’s working set. This working-set expansion occurs at the expense of free memory, followed by standby pages and—when available memory becomes low—at the expense of other process working sets. The After bar illustrates how, after the RAM optimizer frees its memory, the memory manager moves all the pages that were assigned to the RAM optimizer to the free page list (which ultimately get zeroed by the zero page thread and moved to the zeroed page list), thus contributing to the free memory value.

Although gaining more free memory might seem like a good thing, gaining free memory in this way is not. As RAM optimizers force the available memory counter up, they force other processes’ data and code out of memory. If you’re running Microsoft Word, for example, the text of open documents and the program code that was part of Word’s working set before the optimization (and was therefore present in physical memory) must be reread from disk as you continue to edit your document. Additionally, by depleting the standby lists, valuable cached data is lost, including much of Superfetch’s cache. The performance degradation can be especially severe on servers, where the trimming of the system working set causes cached file data in physical memory to be thrown out, causing hard faults the next time it is accessed.

**ReadyBoost**

Although RAM today is somewhat easily available and relatively cheap compared to a decade ago, it still doesn’t beat the cost of secondary storage such as hard disk drives. Unfortunately, hard disks today contain many moving parts, are fragile, and, more importantly, relatively slow compared to RAM, especially during seeking, so storing active Superfetch data on the drive would be as bad as paging out a page and hard faulting it inside memory. (Solid state disks offset some of these disadvantages, but they are pricier and still slow compared to RAM.) On the other hand, portable solid state media such as USB flash disk (UFD), CompactFlash cards, and Secure Digital cards provide a useful compromise. (In practice, CompactFlash cards and Secure Digital cards are almost always interfaced through
a USB adapter, so they all appear to the system as USB flash disks.) They are cheaper than RAM and available in larger sizes, but they also have seek times much shorter than hard drives because of the lack of moving parts.

Random disk I/O is especially expensive because disk head seek time plus rotational latency for typical desktop hard drives total about 13 milliseconds—an eternity for today’s 3-GHz processors. Flash memory, however, can service random reads up to 10 times faster than a typical hard disk. Windows therefore includes a feature called ReadyBoost to take advantage of flash memory storage devices by creating an intermediate caching layer on them that logically sits between memory and disks.

ReadyBoost is implemented with the aid of a driver (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Rdyboost.sys) that is responsible for writing the cached data to the NVRAM device. When you insert a USB flash disk into a system, ReadyBoost looks at the device to determine its performance characteristics and stores the results of its test in HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Emdmgmt, as shown in Figure 10-51. (Emd is short for External Memory Device, the working name for ReadyBoost during its development.)

If the new device is between 256 MB and 32 GB in size, has a transfer rate of 2.5 MB per second or higher for random 4-KB reads, and has a transfer rate of 1.75 MB per second or higher for random 512-KB writes, then ReadyBoost will ask if you’d like to dedicate some of the space for disk caching. If you agree, ReadyBoost
creates a file named ReadyBoost.sfcache in the root of the device, which it will use to store cached pages.

After initializing caching, ReadyBoost intercepts all reads and writes to local hard disk volumes (C:\, for example) and copies any data being read or written into the caching file that the service created. There are exceptions such as data that hasn’t been read in a long while, or data that belongs to Volume Snapshot requests. Data stored on the cached drive is compressed and typically achieves a 2:1 compression ratio, so a 4-GB cache file will usually contain 8 GB of data. Each block is encrypted as it is written using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption with a randomly generated per-boot session key in order to guarantee the privacy of the data in the cache if the device is removed from the system.

When ReadyBoost sees random reads that can be satisfied from the cache, it services them from there, but because hard disks have better sequential read access than flash memory, it lets reads that are part of sequential access patterns go directly to the disk even if the data is in the cache. Likewise, when reading the cache, if large I/Os have to be done, the on-disk cache will be read instead.

One disadvantage of depending on flash media is that the user can remove it at any time, which means the system can never solely store critical data on the media (as we’ve seen, writes always go to the secondary storage first). A related technology, ReadyDrive, covered in the next section, offers additional benefits and solves this problem.

**ReadyDrive**

ReadyDrive is a Windows feature that takes advantage of hybrid hard disk drives (H-HDDs). An H-HDD is a disk with embedded nonvolatile flash memory (also known as NVRAM). Typical H-HDDs include between 50 MB and 512 MB of cache, but the Windows cache limit is 2 TB.

Under ReadyDrive, the drive’s flash memory does not simply act as an automatic, transparent cache, as does the RAM cache common on most hard drives. Instead, Windows uses ATA-8 commands to define the disk data to be held in the flash memory. For example, Windows will save boot data to the cache when the system shuts down, allowing for faster restarting. It also stores portions of hibernation file data in the cache when the system hibernates so that the subsequent resume is
faster. Because the cache is enabled even when the disk is spun down, Windows can use the flash memory as a disk-write cache, which avoids spinning up the disk when the system is running on battery power. Keeping the disk spindle turned off can save much of the power consumed by the disk drive under normal usage.

Another consumer of ReadyDrive is Superfetch, since it offers the same advantages as ReadyBoost with some enhanced functionality, such as not requiring an external flash device and having the ability to work persistently. Because the cache is on the actual physical hard drive (which typically a user cannot remove while the computer is running), the hard drive controller typically doesn’t have to worry about the data disappearing and can avoid making writes to the actual disk, using solely the cache.

**Unified Caching**

For simplicity, we have described the conceptual functionality of Superfetch, ReadyBoost, and ReadyDrive independently. Their storage allocation and content tracking functions, however, are implemented in unified code in the operating system and are integrated with each other. This unified caching mechanism is often referred to as the Store Manager, although the Store Manager is really only one component.

Unified caching was developed to take advantage of the characteristics of the various types of storage hardware that might exist on a system. For example, Superfetch can use either the flash memory of a hybrid hard disk drive (if available) or a USB flash disk (if available) instead of using system RAM. Since an H-HDD’s flash memory can be better expected to be preserved across system shutdown and bootstrap cycles, it would be preferable for cache data that could help optimize boot times, while system RAM might be a better choice for other data. (In addition to optimizing boot times, a hybrid hard disk drive’s NVRAM, if present, is generally preferred as a cache location to a UFD. A UFD may be unplugged at any time, hence disappearing; thus cache on a UFD must always be handled as write-through to the actual hard drive. The NVRAM in an H-HDD can be allowed to work in write-back mode because it is not going to disappear unless the hard drive itself also disappears.)

The overall architecture of the unified caching mechanism is shown in Figure 10-
The fundamental component that implements caching is called a “store.” Each store implements the functions of adding data to the backing storage (which may be in system RAM or in NVRAM), reading data from it, or removing data from it. All data in a store is managed in terms of store pages (often called simply pages). The size of a store page is the system’s physical and virtual memory page size (4 KB, or 8KB on Itanium platforms), regardless of the “block size” (sometimes called “sector size”) presented by the underlying storage device. This allows store pages to be mapped and moved efficiently between the store, system RAM, and page files (which have always been organized in blocks of the same size). The recent move toward “advanced format” hard drives, which export a block size of 4 KB, is a good fit for this approach. Store pages within a store are identified by “store keys,” whose interpretation is up to the individual store.

When writing to a store, the store is responsible for buffering data so that the I/O to the actual storage device uses large buffers. This improves performance, as
NVRAm devices as well as physical hard drives perform poorly with small random writes. The store may also perform compression and encryption before writing to the storage device.

The Store Manager component manages all of the stores and their contents. It is implemented as a component of the Superfetch service in Sysmain.dll, a set of executive services (SmXxx, such as SmPageRead) within Ntoskrnl.exe, and a filter driver in the disk storage stack, Storemgr.sys. Logically, it operates at the level just above all of the stores. Only the Store Manager communicates with stores; all other components interact with the Store Manager. Requests to the Store Manager look much like requests from the Store Manager to a store: requests to store data, retrieve data, or remove data from a store. Requests to the Store Manager to store data, however, include a parameter indicating which stores are to be written to.

The Store Manager keeps track of which stores contain each cached page. If a cached page is in one or more stores, requests to retrieve that page are routed by the Store Manager to one store or another according to which stores are the fastest or the least busy.

The Store Manager categorizes stores in the following ways. First, a store may reside in system RAM or in some form of nonvolatile RAM (either a UFD or the NVRAM of an H-HDD). Second, NVRAM stores are further divided into “virtual” and “physical” portions, while a store in system RAM acts only as a virtual store.

Virtual stores contain only page-file-backed information, including process-private memory and page-file-backed sections. Physical caches contain pages from disk, with the exception that physical caches never contain pages from page files. A store in system RAM can, however, contain pages from page files.

Physical caches are further divided into “static” and “volatile” (or “dynamic”) regions. The contents of the static region are completely determined by the user-mode Store Manager service. The Store Manager uses logs of historical access to data to populate the static region. The volatile or dynamic region of each store, on the other hand, populates itself based on read and write requests that pass through the disk storage stack, much in the manner of the automatic RAM cache on a traditional hard drive. Stores that implement a dynamic region are responsible for reporting to the Store Manager any such automatically cached (and dropped)
This section has provided a brief description of the organization and operation of the unified caching mechanism. As of this writing, there are no Performance Monitor counters or other means in the operating system to measure the mechanism’s operation, other than the counters under the Cache object, which long predate the Store Manager.

**Process Reflection**

There are often cases where a process exhibits problematic behavior, but because it’s still providing service, suspending it to generate a full memory dump or interactively debug it is undesirable. The length of time a process is suspended to generate a dump can be minimized by taking a minidump, which captures thread registers and stacks along with pages of memory referenced by registers, but that dump type has a very limited amount of information, which many times is sufficient for diagnosing crashes but not for troubleshooting general problems. With process reflection, the target process is suspended only long enough to generate a minidump and create a suspended cloned copy of the target, and then the larger dump that captures all of a process’s valid user-mode memory can be generated from the clone while the target is allowed to continue executing.

Several Windows Diagnostic Infrastructure (WDI) components make use of process reflection to capture minimally intrusive memory dumps of processes their heuristics identify as exhibiting suspicious behavior. For example, the Memory Leak Diagnoser component of Windows Resource Exhaustion Detection and Resolution (also known as RADAR), generates a reflected memory dump of a process that appears to be leaking private virtual memory so that it can be sent to Microsoft via Windows Error Reporting (WER) for analysis. WDI’s hung process detection heuristic does the same for processes that appear to be deadlocked with one another. Because these components use heuristics, they can’t be certain the processes are faulty and therefore can’t suspend them for long periods of time or terminate them.

Process reflection’s implementation is driven by the RtlCreateProcessReflection function in Ntdll.dll. Its first step is to create a shared memory section, populate it with parameters, and map it into the current and target processes. It then creates
two event objects and duplicates them into the target process so that the current process and target process can synchronize their operations. Next, it injects a thread into the target process via a call to RtlpCreateUserThreadEx. The thread is directed to begin execution in Ntdll’s RtlpProcessReflectionStartup function. Because Ntdll.dll is mapped at the same address, randomly generated at boot, into every process’s address space, the current process can simply pass the address of the function it obtains from its own Ntdll.dll mapping. If the caller of RtlCreateProcessReflection specified that it wants a handle to the cloned process, RtlCreateProcessReflection waits for the remote thread to terminate, otherwise it returns to the caller.

The injected thread in the target process allocates an additional event object that it will use to synchronize with the cloned process once it’s created. Then it calls RtlCloneUserProcess, passing parameters it obtains from the memory mapping it shares with the initiating process. If the RtlCreateProcessReflection option that specifies the creation of the clone when the process is not executing in the loader, performing heap operations, modifying the process environment block (PEB), or modifying fiber-local storage is present, then RtlCreateProcessReflection acquires the associated locks before continuing. This can be useful for debugging because the memory dump’s copy of the data structures will be in a consistent state.

RtlCloneUserProcess finishes by calling RtlpCreateUserProcess, the user-mode function responsible for general process creation, passing flags that indicate the new process should be a clone of the current one, and RtlpCreateUserProcess in turn calls ZwCreateUserProcess to request the kernel to create the process.

When creating a cloned process, ZwCreateUserProcess executes most of the same code paths as when it creates a new process, with the exception that PspAllocateProcess, which it calls to create the process object and initial thread, calls MmInitializeProcessAddressSpace with a flag specifying that the address should be a copy-on-write copy of the target process instead of an initial process address space. The memory manager uses the same support it provides for the Services for Unix Applications fork API to efficiently clone the address space. Once the target process continues execution, any changes it makes to its address space are seen only by it, not the clone, which enables the clone’s address space to represent a consistent point-in-time view of the target process.
The clone’s execution begins at the point just after the return from RtlpCreateUserProcess. If the clone’s creation is successful, its thread receives the STATUS_PROCESS_CLONED return code, whereas the cloning thread receives STATUS_SUCCESS. The cloned process then synchronizes with the target and, as its final act, calls a function optionally passed to RtlCreateProcessReflection, which must be implemented in Ntdll.dll. RADAR, for instance, specifies RtlDetectHeapLeaks, which performs heuristic analysis of the process heaps and reports the results back to the thread that called RtlCreateProcessReflection. If no function was specified, the thread suspends itself or terminates, depending on the flags passed to RtlCreateProcessReflection.

When RADAR and WDI use process reflection, they call RtlCreateProcessReflection, asking for the function to return a handle to the cloned process and for the clone to suspend itself after it has initialized. Then they generate a minidump of the target process, which suspends the target for the duration of the dump generation, and next they generate a more comprehensive dump of the cloned process. After they finish generating the dump of the clone, they terminate the clone. The target process can execute during the time window between the minidump’s completion and the creation of the clone, but for most scenarios any inconsistencies do not interfere with troubleshooting. The Procdump utility from Sysinternals also follows these steps when you specify the –r switch to have it create a reflected dump of a target process.

**EXPERIMENT: USING PREFLECT TO OBSERVE THE BEHAVIOR OF PROCESS REFLECTION**

You can use the Preflect utility, which you can download from the Windows Internals book webpage, to see the effects of process reflection. First, launch Notepad.exe and obtain its process ID in a process management utility like Process Explorer or Task Manager. Next, open a command prompt and execute Preflect with the process ID as the command-line argument. This creates a cloned copy using process reflection. In Process Explorer, you will see two instances of Notepad: the one you launched and the cloned child instance that’s highlighted in gray (gray indicates that all the process’s threads are suspended):

Open the process properties for each instance, switch to the Performance page, and put them side by side for comparison:
The two instances are easily distinguishable because the target process has been executing and therefore has a significantly higher cycle count and larger working set, and the clone has no references to any kernel or window manager objects, as evidenced by its zero kernel handle, GDI handle, and USER handle counts. Further, if you look at the Threads tab and have configured the Process Explorer symbol options to obtain operating system symbols, you’ll see that the target process’s thread began executing in Notepad.exe code, whereas the clone’s thread is the one injected by the target to execute RtlpProcessReflectionStartup.
Conclusion

In this chapter, we’ve examined how the Windows memory manager implements virtual memory management. As with most modern operating systems, each process is given access to a private address space, protecting one process’s memory from another’s but allowing processes to share memory efficiently and securely. Advanced capabilities, such as the inclusion of mapped files and the ability to sparsely allocate memory, are also available. The Windows environment subsystem makes most of the memory manager’s capabilities available to applications through the Windows API.

The next chapter covers a component tightly integrated with the memory manager, the cache manager.
Chapter 11. Cache Manager

The cache manager is a set of kernel-mode functions and system threads that cooperate with the memory manager to provide data caching for all Windows file system drivers (both local and network). In this chapter, we’ll explain how the cache manager, including its key internal data structures and functions, works; how it is sized at system initialization time; how it interacts with other elements of the operating system; and how you can observe its activity through performance counters. We’ll also describe the five flags on the Windows CreateFile function that affect file caching.

NOTE

None of the cache manager’s internal functions are outlined in this chapter beyond the depth required to explain how the cache manager works. The programming interfaces to the cache manager are documented in the Windows Driver Kit (WDK). For more information about the WDK, see http://www.microsoft.com/whdc/devtools/wdk/default.mspx.
Key Features of the Cache Manager

The cache manager has several key features:

- Supports all file system types (both local and network), thus removing the need for each file system to implement its own cache management code.
- Uses the memory manager to control which parts of which files are in physical memory (trading off demands for physical memory between user processes and the operating system).
- Caches data on a virtual block basis (offsets within a file)—in contrast to many caching systems, which cache on a logical block basis (offsets within a disk volume)—allowing for intelligent read-ahead and high-speed access to the cache without involving file system drivers (This method of caching, called fast I/O, is described later in this chapter.)
- Supports “hints” passed by applications at file open time (such as random versus sequential access, temporary file creation, and so on).
- Supports recoverable file systems (for example, those that use transaction logging) to recover data after a system failure.

Although we’ll talk more throughout this chapter about how these features are used in the cache manager, in this section we’ll introduce you to the concepts behind these features.

Single, Centralized System Cache

Some operating systems rely on each individual file system to cache data, a practice that results either in duplicated caching and memory management code in the operating system or in limitations on the kinds of data that can be cached. In contrast, Windows offers a centralized caching facility that caches all externally stored data, whether on local hard disks, floppy disks, network file servers, or CD-ROMs. Any data can be cached, whether it’s user data streams (the contents of a file and the ongoing read and write activity to that file) or file system metadata (such as directory and file headers). As you’ll discover in this chapter, the method Windows uses to access the cache depends on the type of data being cached.
The Memory Manager

One unusual aspect of the cache manager is that it never knows how much cached data is actually in physical memory. This statement might sound strange because the purpose of a cache is to keep a subset of frequently accessed data in physical memory as a way to improve I/O performance. The reason the cache manager doesn’t know how much data is in physical memory is that it accesses data by mapping views of files into system virtual address spaces, using standard section objects (file mapping objects in Windows API terminology). (Section objects are the basic primitive of the memory manager and are explained in detail in Chapter 10.) As addresses in these mapped views are accessed, the memory manager pages in blocks that aren’t in physical memory. And when memory demands dictate, the memory manager unmaps these pages out of the cache and, if the data has changed, pages the data back to the files.

By caching on the basis of a virtual address space using mapped files, the cache manager avoids generating read or write I/O request packets (IRPs) to access the data for files it’s caching. Instead, it simply copies data to or from the virtual addresses where the portion of the cached file is mapped and relies on the memory manager to fault in (or out) the data into (or out of) memory as needed. This process allows the memory manager to make global trade-offs on how much memory to give to the system cache versus how much to give to user processes. (The cache manager also initiates I/O, such as lazy writing, which is described later in this chapter; however, it calls the memory manager to write the pages.) Also, as you’ll learn in the next section, this design makes it possible for processes that open cached files to see the same data as do processes that are mapping the same files into their user address spaces.

Cache Coherency

One important function of a cache manager is to ensure that any process accessing cached data will get the most recent version of that data. A problem can arise when one process opens a file (and hence the file is cached) while another process maps the file into its address space directly (using the Windows MapViewOfFile function). This potential problem doesn’t occur under Windows because both the cache manager and the user applications that map files into their address spaces use
the same memory management file mapping services. Because the memory manager guarantees that it has only one representation of each unique mapped file (regardless of the number of section objects or mapped views), it maps all views of a file (even if they overlap) to a single set of pages in physical memory, as shown in Figure 11-1. (For more information on how the memory manager works with mapped files, see Chapter 10.)

So, for example, if Process 1 has a view (View 1) of the file mapped into its user address space, and Process 2 is accessing the same view via the system cache, Process 2 will see any changes that Process 1 makes as they’re made, not as they’re flushed. The memory manager won’t flush all user-mapped pages—only those that it knows have been written to (because they have the modified bit set). Therefore, any process accessing a file under Windows always sees the most up-to-date version of that file, even if some processes have the file open through the I/O
system and others have the file mapped into their address space using the Windows file mapping functions.

**NOTE**

Cache coherency in this case refers to coherency between user-mapped data and cached I/O and not between noncached and cached hardware access and I/Os, which are almost guaranteed to be incoherent. Also, cache coherency is somewhat more difficult for network redirectors than for local file systems because network redirectors must implement additional flushing and purge operations to ensure cache coherency when accessing network data. See Chapter 12, for a description of opportunistic locking, the Windows distributed cache coherency mechanism.

---

**Virtual Block Caching**

The Windows cache manager uses a method known as virtual block caching, in which the cache manager keeps track of which parts of which files are in the cache. The cache manager is able to monitor these file portions by mapping 256-KB views of files into system virtual address spaces, using special system cache routines located in the memory manager. This approach has the following key benefits:

- It opens up the possibility of doing intelligent read-ahead; because the cache tracks which parts of which files are in the cache, it can predict where the caller might be going next.

- It allows the I/O system to bypass going to the file system for requests for data that is already in the cache (fast I/O). Because the cache manager knows which parts of which files are in the cache, it can return the address of cached data to satisfy an I/O request without having to call the file system.

Details of how intelligent read-ahead and fast I/O work are provided later in this chapter.

**Stream-Based Caching**

The cache manager is also designed to do stream caching, as opposed to file caching. A stream is a sequence of bytes within a file. Some file systems, such as NTFS, allow a file to contain more than one stream; the cache manager accommodates such file systems by caching each stream independently. NTFS can exploit this feature by organizing its master file table (described in Chapter 12) into
streams and by caching these streams as well. In fact, although the cache manager might be said to cache files, it actually caches streams (all files have at least one stream of data) identified by both a file name and, if more than one stream exists in the file, a stream name.

NOTE
Internally, the cache manager is not aware of file or stream names but uses pointers to these objects.

Recoverable File System Support
Recoverable file systems such as NTFS are designed to reconstruct the disk volume structure after a system failure. This capability means that I/O operations in progress at the time of a system failure must be either entirely completed or entirely backed out from the disk when the system is restarted. Half-completed I/O operations can corrupt a disk volume and even render an entire volume inaccessible. To avoid this problem, a recoverable file system maintains a log file in which it records every update it intends to make to the file system structure (the file system’s metadata) before it writes the change to the volume. If the system fails, interrupting volume modifications in progress, the recoverable file system uses information stored in the log to reissue the volume updates.

NOTE
The term metadata applies only to changes in the file system structure: file and directory creation, renaming, and deletion.

To guarantee a successful volume recovery, every log file record documenting a volume update must be completely written to disk before the update itself is applied to the volume. Because disk writes are cached, the cache manager and the file system must coordinate metadata updates by ensuring that the log file is flushed ahead of metadata updates. Overall, the following actions occur in sequence:

1. The file system writes a log file record documenting the metadata update it intends to make.

2. The file system calls the cache manager to flush the log file record to disk.
3. The file system writes the volume update to the cache—that is, it modifies its cached metadata.

4. The cache manager flushes the altered metadata to disk, updating the volume structure. (Actually, log file records are batched before being flushed to disk, as are volume modifications.)

When a file system writes data to the cache, it can supply a logical sequence number (LSN) that identifies the record in its log file, which corresponds to the cache update. The cache manager keeps track of these numbers, recording the lowest and highest LSNs (representing the oldest and newest log file records) associated with each page in the cache. In addition, data streams that are protected by transaction log records are marked as “no write” by NTFS so that the mapped page writer won’t inadvertently write out these pages before the corresponding log records are written. (When the mapped page writer sees a page marked this way, it moves the page to a special list that the cache manager then flushes at the appropriate time, such as when lazy writer activity takes place.)

When it prepares to flush a group of dirty pages to disk, the cache manager determines the highest LSN associated with the pages to be flushed and reports that number to the file system. The file system can then call the cache manager back, directing it to flush log file data up to the point represented by the reported LSN. After the cache manager flushes the log file up to that LSN, it flushes the corresponding volume structure updates to disk, thus ensuring that it records what it’s going to do before actually doing it. These interactions between the file system and the cache manager guarantee the recoverability of the disk volume after a system failure.
Cache Virtual Memory Management

Because the Windows system cache manager caches data on a virtual basis, it uses up regions of system virtual address space (instead of physical memory) and manages them in structures called virtual address control blocks, or VACBs. VACBs define these regions of address space into 256-KB slots called views. When the cache manager initializes during the bootup process, it allocates an initial array of VACBs to describe cached memory. As caching requirements grow and more memory is required, the cache manager allocates more VACB arrays, as needed. It can also shrink virtual address space as other demands put pressure on the system.

At a file's first I/O (read or write) operation, the cache manager maps a 256-KB view of the 256-KB-aligned region of the file that contains the requested data into a free slot in the system cache address space. For example, if 10 bytes starting at an offset of 300,000 bytes were read into a file, the view that would be mapped would begin at offset 262144 (the second 256-KB-aligned region of the file) and extend for 256 KB.

The cache manager maps views of files into slots in the cache’s address space on a round-robin basis, mapping the first requested view into the first 256-KB slot, the second view into the second 256-KB slot, and so forth, as shown in Figure 11-2. In this example, File B was mapped first, File A second, and File C third, so File B’s mapped chunk occupies the first slot in the cache. Notice that only the first 256-KB portion of File B has been mapped, which is due to the fact that only part of the file has been accessed and because although File C is only 100 KB (and thus smaller than one of the views in the system cache), it requires its own 256-KB slot in the cache.

The cache manager guarantees that a view is mapped as long as it’s active (although views can remain mapped after they become inactive). A view is marked active, however, only during a read or write operation to or from the file. Unless a process opens a file by specifying the FILE_FLAG_RANDOM_ACCESS flag in the call to CreateFile, the cache manager unmaps inactive views of a file as it maps new views for the file if it detects that the file is being accessed sequentially. Pages for unmapped views are sent to the standby or modified lists (depending on
whether they have been changed), and because the memory manager exports a special interface for the cache manager, the cache manager can direct the pages to be placed at the end or front of these lists. Pages that correspond to views of files opened with the FILE_FLAG_SEQUENTIAL_SCAN flag are moved to the front of the lists, whereas all others are moved to the end. This scheme encourages the reuse of pages belonging to sequentially read files and specifically prevents a large file copy operation from affecting more than a small part of physical memory. The flag also affects unmapping: the cache manager will aggressively unmap views when this flag is supplied.

If the cache manager needs to map a view of a file and there are no more free slots in the cache, it will unmap the least recently mapped inactive view and use that slot. If no views are available, an I/O error is returned, indicating that insufficient system resources are available to perform the operation. Given that views are marked active only during a read or write operation, however, this scenario is extremely unlikely because thousands of files would have to be accessed simultaneously for this situation to occur.

![Figure 11-2. Files of varying sizes mapped into the system cache](image)

Figure 11-2. Files of varying sizes mapped into the system cache
Cache Size

In the following sections, we’ll explain how Windows computes the size of the system cache, both virtually and physically. As with most calculations related to memory management, the size of the system cache depends on a number of factors.

Cache Virtual Size

On a 32-bit Windows system, the virtual size of the system cache is limited solely by the amount of kernel-mode virtual address space and the SystemCacheLimit registry key that can be optionally configured. (See Chapter 10 for more information on limiting the size of the kernel virtual address space.) This means that the cache size is capped by the 2-GB system address space, but it is typically significantly smaller because the system address space is shared with other resources, including system paged table entries (PTEs), nonpaged and paged pool, and page tables. The maximum virtual cache size is 1,024 GB (1 TB) on 64-bit Windows.

Cache Working Set Size

As mentioned earlier, one of the key differences in the design of the cache manager in Windows from that of other operating systems is the delegation of physical memory management to the global memory manager. Because of this, the existing code that handles working set expansion and trimming, as well as managing the modified and standby lists, is also used to control the size of the system cache, dynamically balancing demands for physical memory between processes and the operating system.

The system cache doesn’t have its own working set but rather shares a single system set that includes cache data, paged pool, pageable Ntoskrnl code, and pageable driver code. As explained in the section System Working Sets in Chapter 10, this single working set is called internally the system cache working set even though the system cache is just one of the components that contribute to it. For the purposes of this book, we’ll refer to this working set simply as the system working set. Also explained in Chapter 10 is the fact that if the LargeSystemCache
registry value is 1, the memory manager favors the system working set over that of processes running on the system.

### EXPERIMENT: LOOKING AT THE CACHE’S WORKING SET

The `!filecache` debugger command dumps information about the physical memory the cache is using, the current and peak working set sizes, the number of valid pages associated with views, and the names of files mapped into views, where applicable, as you can see in the following output. (File system drivers cache metadata, such as directory structures and volume bitmaps, by using unnamed file streams.)

```
!filecache
***** Dump file cache******
  Reading and sorting 999 VACBs ...
  ReadVirtual: 85b77038 not properly sign extended
  ReadVirtual: 85ba7010 not properly sign extended
  Processing 998 active VACBs ...
  File Cache Information
  Current size 30528 kb
  Peak size  65752 kb
  461 Control Areas
  Skipping view @ 91980000 - no VACB, but PTE is a prototype!
  Loading file cache database (100% of 523264 PTEs)
  SkippedPageTableReads = 882
  File cache has 7668 valid pages

  Usage Summary (in Kb):
  Control Valid Standby/Dirty Shared Locked FsContext Name
  85fa5be0  0  4  0  0 add0dbf8  $Directory
  85f971b8  0  8  0  0 ad9bc918  $Directory
  87c489f0  4  4  0  0 93b390f8  $Directory
  87c4a9c0  4  0  0  0 93b38c30  $Directory
  87c451a8  0  4  0  0 93b35780  $Directory
  86a83710  4512  45432  0  0 86a90168    No Name for File
  85f96770  0  8  0  0 ad9c00f8    No Name for File
  85e90998  0  512  0  0 abb83510    No Name for File
  88062008  4  0  0  0 9e6c40f8  $Directory
  87c291e8  44  164  0  0 93b400f8  $Directory
  87c27e10  0  16  0  0 93b4bd08  $Directory
  87b4bc88  236  84  0  0 93b28d08  $Directory
  86ce23a8  12  0  0  0 a2051528  $Directory
  87c2bb20  4  0  0  0 93b3b850  $Directory
  87d51480  0  4  0  0 824f9830  $Directory
  87c8c900  0  4  0  0 825b06d0  utmpx
  87c2aa30  44  216  0  0 93b3fc70  $Directory
  86cc168  12  4088  0  0 9c3c5c50 Microsoft-Windows-GroupPolicy%4Operational.evtx
```

...  

**Cache Physical Size**

While the system working set includes the amount of physical memory that is mapped into views in the cache’s virtual address space, it does not necessarily
reflect the total amount of file data that is cached in physical memory. There can be a discrepancy between the two values because additional file data might be in the memory manager’s standby or modified page lists.

Recall from Chapter 10 that during the course of working set trimming or page replacement the memory manager can move dirty pages from a working set to either the standby list or modified page list, depending on whether the page contains data that needs to be written to the paging file or another file before the page can be reused. If the memory manager didn’t implement these lists, any time a process accessed data previously removed from its working set, the memory manager would have to hard-fault it in from disk. Instead, if the accessed data is present on either of these lists, the memory manager simply soft-faults the page back into the process’s working set. Thus, the lists serve as in-memory caches of data that’s stored in the paging file, executable images, or data files. Thus, the total amount of file data cached on a system includes not only the system working set but the combined sizes of the standby and modified page lists as well.

An example illustrates how the cache manager can cause much more file data than that containable in the system working set to be cached in physical memory.

Consider a system that acts as a dedicated file server. A client application accesses file data from across the network, while a server, such as the file server driver (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Srv2.sys, described in Chapter 12), uses cache manager interfaces to read and write file data on behalf of the client. If the client reads through several thousand files of 1 MB each, the cache manager will have to start reusing views when it runs out of mapping space (and can’t enlarge the VACB mapping area). For each file read thereafter, the cache manager unmaps views and remaps them for new files. When the cache manager unmaps a view, the memory manager doesn’t discard the file data in the cache’s working set that corresponds to the view, it moves the data to the standby list. In the absence of any other demand for physical memory, the standby list can consume almost all the physical memory that remains outside the system working set. In other words, virtually all the server’s physical memory will be used to cache file data, as shown in Figure 11-3.
Because the total amount of file data cached includes the system working set, modified page list, and standby list—the sizes of which are all controlled by the memory manager—it is in a sense the real cache manager. The cache manager subsystem simply provides convenient interfaces for accessing file data through the memory manager. It also plays an important role with its read-ahead and write-behind policies in influencing what data the memory manager keeps present in physical memory, as well as with managing system virtual address views of the space.

To try to accurately reflect the total amount of file data that’s cached on a system, Task Manager shows a value named Cache in its performance view that reflects the combined size of the system working set, standby list, and modified page list. Process Explorer, on the other hand, breaks up these values into Cache WS (system cache working set), Standby, and Modified. Figure 11-4 shows the system information view in Process Explorer and the Cache WS value in the Physical Memory area in the lower left of the figure, as well as the size of the standby and modified lists in the Paging Lists area near the middle of the figure. Note that the Cache value in Task Manager also includes the Paged WS, Kernel WS, and Driver WS values shown in Process Explorer. When these values were chosen, the vast majority of System WS came from the Cache WS. This is no longer the case today, but the anachronism remains in Task Manager.
Figure 11-4. Process Explorer’s System Information dialog box
Cache Data Structures

The cache manager uses the following data structures to keep track of cached files:

- Each 256-KB slot in the system cache is described by a VACB.
- Each separately opened cached file has a private cache map, which contains information used to control read-ahead (discussed later in the chapter).
- Each cached file has a single shared cache map structure, which points to slots in the system cache that contain mapped views of the file.

These structures and their relationships are described in the next sections.

Systemwide Cache Data Structures

As previously described, the cache manager keeps track of the state of the views in the system cache by using an array of data structures called virtual address control block (VACB) arrays that are stored in nonpaged pool. On a 32-bit system, each VACB is 32 bytes in size and a VACB array is 128 KB, resulting in 4,096 VACBs per array. On a 64-bit system, a VACB is 64 bytes, resulting in 2,048 VACBs per array. The cache manager allocates the initial VACB array during system initialization and links it into the systemwide list of VACB arrays called CcVacbArrays. Each VACB represents one 256-KB view in the system cache, as shown in Figure 11-5. The structure of a VACB is shown in Figure 11-6.
Additionally, each VACB array is composed of two kinds of VACB: low priority mapping VACBs and high priority mapping VACBs. The system allocates 64 initial high priority VACBs for each VACB array. High priority VACBs have the distinction of having their views preallocated from system address space. When the memory manager has no views to give to the cache manager at the time of
mapping some data, and if the mapping request is marked as high priority, the cache manager will use one of the preallocated views present in a high priority VACB. It uses these high priority VACBs, for example, for critical file system metadata as well as for purging data from the cache. After high priority VACBs are gone, however, any operation requiring a VACB view will fail with insufficient resources. Typically, the mapping priority is set to the default of low, but by using the PIN_HIGH_PRIORITY flag when pinning (described later) cached data, file systems can request a high priority VACB to be used instead, if one is needed.

As you can see in Figure 11-6, the first field in a VACB is the virtual address of the data in the system cache. The second field is a pointer to the shared cache map structure, which identifies which file is cached. The third field identifies the offset within the file at which the view begins (always based on 256-KB granularity). Given this granularity, the bottom 16 bits of the file offset will always be zero, so those bits are reused to store the number of references to the view—that is, how many active reads or writes are accessing the view. The fourth field links the VACB into a list of least-recently-used (LRU) VACBs when the cache manager frees the VACB; the cache manager first checks this list when allocating a new VACB. Finally, the fifth field links this VACB to the VACB array header representing the array in which the VACB is stored.

During an I/O operation on a file, the file's VACB reference count is incremented, and then it’s decremented when the I/O operation is over. When the reference count is nonzero the VACB is active. For access to file system metadata, the active count represents how many file system drivers have the pages in that view locked into memory.

**EXPERIMENT: LOOKING AT VACBS AND VACB STATISTICS**

The cache manager internally keeps track of various values that are useful to developers and support engineers when debugging crash dumps. All these debugging variables start with the CcDbg prefix, which makes it easy to see the whole list, thanks to the x command:

```
lkd> x nt!*ccdbg*
8194ba84 nt!CcDbgNumberOfCcUnmapInactiveViews = <no type information>
8197c740 nt!CcDbgNumberOfFailedMappingsDueToVacbSpace = <no type information>
8197c730 nt!CcDbgNumberOfFailedBitmapAllocations = <no type information>
8197c73c nt!CcDbgNumberOfFailedHighPriorityMappingsDueToMmResources = <no type information>
...```
Some systems may show differences in variable names due to 32-bit versus 64-bit implementations. The exact variable names are irrelevant in this experiment—focus instead on the methodology that is explained. Using these variables and your knowledge of the VACB array header data structures, you can use the kernel debugger to list all the VACB array headers. The CcVacbArrays variable is an array of pointers to VACB array headers, which you dereference in order to dump the contents of the VACBARRAY_HEADERs.

First, obtain the highest array index:

```bash
lkd> dd nt!CcVacbArraysHighestUsedIndex l 1
8194ba7c  00000000
```

And now you can dereference each index until the maximum index. On this system (and this is the norm), the highest index is 0, which means there’s only one header to dereference:

```bash
lkd> ?? (*((nt!VACBARRAY_HEADER***@@(nt!CcVacbArrays))))[0]
struct VACBARRAY_HEADER * 0x8315b000
   +0x000 VacbArrayIndex   : 0
   +0x004 MappingCount     : 0x5ab
   +0x008 HighestMappedIndex : 0x9a9
   +0x00c Reserved         : 0
```

If there were more, you could change the array index at the end of the command with a higher number, until you reached the highest used index. The output shows that the system has only one VACB array with 1,451 (0x5ab) active VACBs.

Finally, the CcNumberOfFreeVacbs variable stores the number of VACBs on the free VACB list. Dumping this variable on the system used for the experiment results in 2,645 (0xa55):

```bash
lkd> dd nt!CcNumberOfFreeVacbs l 1
8197c768  0000a55
```

As expected, the sum of the free (0x5ab—1,451 decimal) and active VACBs (0xa55—2,645 decimal) on a 32-bit system with one VACB array equals 4,096, the number of VACBs in one VACB array. If the system were to run out of free VACBs, the cache manager would try to allocate a new VACB array. Because of the volatile nature of this experiment, your system may create and/or free additional VACBs between the two steps (dumping the active and then the free VACBs). This might cause your total of free and active VACBs to not match exactly 4,096. Try quickly repeating the experiment a couple of times if this happens, although you may never get stale numbers, especially if there is lots of file system activity on the system.

### Per-File Cache Data Structures

Each open handle to a file has a corresponding file object. (File objects are explained in detail in Chapter 8.) If the file is cached, the file object points to a private cache map structure that contains the location of the last two reads so that the cache manager can perform intelligent read-ahead (described later, in the section Intelligent ReadAhead). In addition, all the private cache maps for open instances of a file are linked together.

Each cached file (as opposed to file object) has a shared cache map structure that describes the state of the cached file, including its size and its valid data length.
(The function of the valid data length field is explained in the section Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing.) The shared cache map also points to the section object (maintained by the memory manager and which describes the file’s mapping into virtual memory), the list of private cache maps associated with that file, and any VACBs that describe currently mapped views of the file in the system cache. (See Chapter 10 for more about section object pointers.) The relationships among these per-file cache data structures are illustrated in Figure 11-7.

When asked to read from a particular file, the cache manager must determine the answers to two questions:

1. Is the file in the cache?
2. If so, which VACB, if any, refers to the requested location?

In other words, the cache manager must find out whether a view of the file at the desired address is mapped into the system cache. If no VACB contains the desired file offset, the requested data isn’t currently mapped into the system cache.

To keep track of which views for a given file are mapped into the system cache, the cache manager maintains an array of pointers to VACBs, which is known as the VACB index array. The first entry in the VACB index array refers to the first 256 KB of the file, the second entry to the second 256 KB, and so on. The diagram in Figure 11-8 shows four different sections from three different files that are currently mapped into the system cache.

When a process accesses a particular file in a given location, the cache manager looks in the appropriate entry in the file’s VACB index array to see whether the requested data has been mapped into the cache. If the array entry is nonzero (and hence contains a pointer to a VACB), the area of the file being referenced is in the cache. The VACB, in turn, points to the location in the system cache where the view of the file is mapped. If the entry is zero, the cache manager must find a free slot in the system cache (and therefore a free VACB) to map the required view.

As a size optimization, the shared cache map contains a VACB index array that is four entries in size. Because each VACB describes 256 KB, the entries in this small, fixed-size index array can point to VACB array entries that together describe a file of up to 1 MB. If a file is larger than 1 MB, a separate VACB index array is allocated from nonpaged pool, based on the size of the file divided by 256 KB and
rounded up in the case of a remainder. The shared cache map then points to this separate structure.

Figure 11-7. Per-file cache data structures

Figure 11-8. VACB index arrays
As a further optimization, the VACB index array allocated from nonpaged pool becomes a sparse multilevel index array if the file is larger than 32 MB, where each index array consists of 128 entries. You can calculate the number of levels required for a file with the following formula:

\[(\text{Number of bits required to represent file size} - 18) / 7\]

Round the result of the equation up to the next whole number. The value 18 in the equation comes from the fact that a VACB represents 256 KB, and 256 KB is \(2^{18}\). The value 7 comes from the fact that each level in the array has 128 entries and \(2^{7}\) is 128. Thus, a file that has a size that is the maximum that can be described with 63 bits (the largest size the cache manager supports) would require only seven levels. The array is sparse because the only branches that the cache manager allocates are ones for which there are active views at the lowest-level index array. Figure 11-9 shows an example of a multilevel VACB array for a sparse file that is large enough to require three levels.
This scheme is required to efficiently handle sparse files that might have extremely large file sizes with only a small fraction of valid data because only enough of the array is allocated to handle the currently mapped views of a file. For example, a 32-GB sparse file for which only 256 KB is mapped into the cache’s virtual address space would require a VACB array with three allocated index arrays because only one branch of the array has a mapping and a 32-GB (235 bytes) file requires a three-level array. If the cache manager didn’t use the multilevel VACB index array optimization for this file, it would have to allocate a VACB index array with 128,000 entries, or the equivalent of 1,000 VACB index arrays.

**EXPERIMENT: LOOKING AT SHARED AND PRIVATE CACHE MAPS**

You can use the kernel debugger’s `dt` command to look at the shared and private cache map data structure.
definitions and examine the structures on a live system. First, execute the `!filecache` command and locate an entry in the VACB output with a file name you recognize. In this example, the file is the System event log:

```
8742a008 120 160 0 0 System.evtx
```

The first address is that of a control area data structure, which the memory manager uses to keep track of an address range. (See Chapter 10 for more information.) The control area stores the pointer to the file object that corresponds to the view in the cache. A file object identifies an instance of an open file. Execute the following command using the address of the control area of the entry you identified to see the control area structure:

```
lkd> !ca 8742a008
ControlArea @ 87cd7248
  Segment      824157e0  Flink      00000000  Blink      00000000
  Section Ref 1  Pfn Ref 1117  Mapped Views 3
  User Ref     0  WaitForDel 0  Flush Count 0
  File Object 87bcab60  ModWriteCount 0  System Views 3
  WritableRefs 0
  Flags (c080) File WasPurged Accessed

\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\System.evtx
...```

Next look at the file object referenced by the control area with this command:

```
lkd> dt nt!FILEOBJECT 87bcab60
+0x000 Type : 0n5
+0x002 Size : 0n128
+0x004 DeviceObject : 0x86a4c4d0 DEVICEOBJECT
+0x008 Vpb : 0x86a0c270 VPB
+0x00c FsContext : 0x93b2a8e0 Void
+0x010 FsContext2 : 0x93b2aa38 Void
+0x014 SectionObjectPointer : 0x87c1b6f0 SECTION_OBJECT_POINTERS
+0x018 PrivateCacheMap : 0x87cd59e8 Void
+0x01c FinalStatus : 0
+0x020 RelatedFileObject : (null)
+0x024 LockOperation : 0''
...```

The private cache map is at offset 0x18:

```
lkd> dt nt!PRIVATECACHE_MAP 0x87cd59e8
+0x000 NodeTypeCode : 0n766
+0x000 Flags : PRIVATECACHE_MAP_FLAGS
+0x000 UlongFlags : 0x1402fe
+0x004 ReadAheadMask : 0xffff
+0x008 FileObject : 0x87bcab60 FILEOBJECT
+0x010 FileOffset1 : LARGEINTEGER 0x1000
+0x018 BeyondLastByte1 : LARGEINTEGER 0x1080
+0x020 FileOffset2 : LARGEINTEGER 0x1000
+0x028 BeyondLastByte2 : LARGEINTEGER 0x1080
...```

Finally, you can locate the shared cache map in the SectionObjectPointer field of the file object and then view its contents:

```
lkd> dt nt!_SECTION_OBJECT_POINTERS 0x87c1b6f0
+0x000 DataSectionObject : 0x87cd7248
```
Alternatively, you can use the `!fileobj` command to look up and display much of this information automatically. For example, using this command on the same file object referenced earlier results in the following output:

```bash
lkd> !fileobj 87bcab60
\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\System.evtx
Device Object: 0x86a4c4d0   \Driver\volmgr
Vpb: 0x86a0c270
Event signalled
Access: Read Write SharedRead
Flags: 0xc3042
    Synchronous IO
    Cache Supported
    Modified
    Size Changed
    Handle Created
    Fast IO Read
FsContext: 0x93b2a8e0  FsContext2: 0x93b2aa38
Private Cache Map: 0x87cd59e8
CurrentByteOffset: 1116180
Cache Data:
    Section Object Pointers: 87c1b6f0
    Shared Cache Map: 87cd58f8  File Offset: 1116180 in VACB number 44
    Vacb: 85ba9d90
Your data is at: 82756180
```
File System Interfaces

The first time a file’s data is accessed for a read or write operation, the file system driver is responsible for determining whether some part of the file is mapped in the system cache. If it’s not, the file system driver must call the CcInitializeCacheMap function to set up the per-file data structures described in the preceding section.

Once a file is set up for cached access, the file system driver calls one of several functions to access the data in the file. There are three primary methods for accessing cached data, each intended for a specific situation:

- The copy method copies user data between cache buffers in system space and a process buffer in user space.
- The mapping and pinning method uses virtual addresses to read and write data directly from and to cache buffers.
- The physical memory access method uses physical addresses to read and write data directly from and to cache buffers.

File system drivers must provide two versions of the file read operation—cached and noncached—to prevent an infinite loop when the memory manager processes a page fault. When the memory manager resolves a page fault by calling the file system to retrieve data from the file (via the device driver, of course), it must specify this noncached read operation by setting the “no cache” flag in the IRP.

Figure 11-10 illustrates the typical interactions between the cache manager, the memory manager, and file system drivers in response to user read or write file I/O. The cache manager is invoked by a file system through the copy interfaces (the CcCopyRead and CcCopyWrite paths). To process a CcFastCopyRead or CcCopyRead read, for example, the cache manager creates a view in the cache to map a portion of the file being read and reads the file data into the user buffer by copying from the view. The copy operation generates page faults as it accesses each previously invalid page in the view, and in response the memory manager initiates noncached I/O into the file system driver to retrieve the data corresponding to the part of the file mapped to the page that faulted.
The next three sections explain these cache access mechanisms, their purpose, and how they’re used.

**Copying to and from the Cache**

Because the system cache is in system space, it is mapped into the address space of every process. As with all system space pages, however, cache pages aren’t accessible from user mode because that would be a potential security hole. (For example, a process might not have the rights to read a file whose data is currently contained in some part of the system cache.) Thus, user application file reads and writes to cached files must be serviced by kernel-mode routines that copy data between the cache’s buffers in system space and the application’s buffers residing in the process address space.

**Caching with the Mapping and Pinning Interfaces**

Just as user applications read and write data in files on a disk, file system drivers need to read and write the data that describes the files themselves (the metadata, or volume structure data). Because the file system drivers run in kernel mode, however, they could, if the cache manager were properly informed, modify data directly in the system cache. To permit this optimization, the cache manager provides functions that permit the file system drivers to find where in virtual memory the file system metadata resides, thus allowing direct modification without
the use of intermediary buffers.

If a file system driver needs to read file system metadata in the cache, it calls the cache manager’s mapping interface to obtain the virtual address of the desired data. The cache manager touches all the requested pages to bring them into memory and then returns control to the file system driver. The file system driver can then access the data directly.

If the file system driver needs to modify cache pages, it calls the cache manager’s pinning services, which keep the pages active in virtual memory so that they cannot be reclaimed. The pages aren’t actually locked into memory (such as when a device driver locks pages for direct memory access transfers). Most of the time, a file system driver will mark its metadata stream “no write”, which instructs the memory manager’s mapped page writer (explained in Chapter 10) to not write the pages to disk until explicitly told to do so. When the file system driver unpins (releases) them, the cache manager releases its resources so that it can lazily flush any changes to disk and release the cache view that the metadata occupied.

The mapping and pinning interfaces solve one thorny problem of implementing a file system: buffer management. Without directly manipulating cached metadata, a file system must predict the maximum number of buffers it will need when updating a volume’s structure. By allowing the file system to access and update its metadata directly in the cache, the cache manager eliminates the need for buffers, simply updating the volume structure in the virtual memory the memory manager provides. The only limitation the file system encounters is the amount of available memory.

**Caching with the Direct Memory Access Interfaces**

In addition to the mapping and pinning interfaces used to access metadata directly in the cache, the cache manager provides a third interface to cached data: direct memory access (DMA). The DMA functions are used to read from or write to cache pages without intervening buffers, such as when a network file system is doing a transfer over the network.

The DMA interface returns to the file system the physical addresses of cached user
data (rather than the virtual addresses, which the mapping and pinning interfaces return), which can then be used to transfer data directly from physical memory to a network device. Although small amounts of data (1 KB to 2 KB) can use the usual buffer-based copying interfaces, for larger transfers the DMA interface can result in significant performance improvements for a network server processing file requests from remote systems. To describe these references to physical memory, a memory descriptor list (MDL) is used. (MDLs are introduced in Chapter 10.)
Fast I/O

Whenever possible, reads and writes to cached files are handled by a high-speed mechanism named fast I/O. Fast I/O is a means of reading or writing a cached file without going through the work of generating an IRP, as described in Chapter 8. With fast I/O, the I/O manager calls the file system driver’s fast I/O routine to see whether I/O can be satisfied directly from the cache manager without generating an IRP.

Because the cache manager is architected on top of the virtual memory subsystem, file system drivers can use the cache manager to access file data simply by copying to or from pages mapped to the actual file being referenced without going through the overhead of generating an IRP.

Fast I/O doesn’t always occur. For example, the first read or write to a file requires setting up the file for caching (mapping the file into the cache and setting up the cache data structures, as explained earlier in the section Cache Data Structures). Also, if the caller specified an asynchronous read or write, fast I/O isn't used because the caller might be stalled during paging I/O operations required to satisfy the buffer copy to or from the system cache and thus not really providing the requested asynchronous I/O operation. But even on a synchronous I/O, the file system driver might decide that it can't process the I/O operation by using the fast I/O mechanism, say, for example, if the file in question has a locked range of bytes (as a result of calls to the Windows LockFile and UnlockFile functions). Because the cache manager doesn’t know what parts of which files are locked, the file system driver must check the validity of the read or write, which requires generating an IRP. The decision tree for fast I/O is shown in Figure 11-11.
These steps are involved in servicing a read or a write with fast I/O:

1. A thread performs a read or write operation.

2. If the file is cached and the I/O is synchronous, the request passes to the fast I/O entry point of the file system driver stack. If the file isn’t cached, the file system driver sets up the file for caching so that the next time, fast I/O can be used to satisfy a read or write request.

3. If the file system driver’s fast I/O routine determines that fast I/O is possible, it calls the cache manager’s read or write routine to access the file data directly in the cache. (If fast I/O isn’t possible, the file system driver returns to the I/O system, which then generates an IRP for the I/O and eventually calls the file system’s regular read routine.)

4. The cache manager translates the supplied file offset into a virtual address in the cache.
5. For reads, the cache manager copies the data from the cache into the buffer of the process requesting it; for writes, it copies the data from the buffer to the cache.

6. One of the following actions occurs:
   - For reads where FILE_FLAG_RANDOM_ACCESS wasn’t specified when the file was opened, the read-ahead information in the caller’s private cache map is updated. Read-ahead may also be queued for files for which the FO_RANDOM_ACCESS flag is not specified.
   - For writes, the dirty bit of any modified page in the cache is set so that the lazy writer will know to flush it to disk.
   - For write-through files, any modifications are flushed to disk.
ReadAhead and WriteBehind

In this section, you’ll see how the cache manager implements reading and writing file data on behalf of file system drivers. Keep in mind that the cache manager is involved in file I/O only when a file is opened without the FILE_FLAG_NO_BUFFERING flag and then read from or written to using the Windows I/O functions (for example, using the Windows ReadFile and WriteFile functions). Mapped files don't go through the cache manager, nor do files opened with the FILE_FLAG_NO_BUFFERING flag set.

NOTE

When an application uses the FILE_FLAG_NO_BUFFERING flag to open a file, its file I/O must start at device-aligned offsets and be of sizes that are a multiple of the alignment size; its input and output buffers must also be device-aligned virtual addresses. For file systems, this usually corresponds to the sector size (512 bytes on NTFS, typically, and 2,048 bytes on CDFS). One of the benefits of the cache manager, apart from the actual caching performance, is the fact that it performs intermediate buffering to allow arbitrarily aligned and sized I/O.

Intelligent ReadAhead

The cache manager uses the principle of spatial locality to perform intelligent read-ahead by predicting what data the calling process is likely to read next based on the data that it is reading currently. Because the system cache is based on virtual addresses, which are contiguous for a particular file, it doesn’t matter whether they’re juxtaposed in physical memory. File read-ahead for logical block caching is more complex and requires tight cooperation between file system drivers and the block cache because that cache system is based on the relative positions of the accessed data on the disk, and, of course, files aren’t necessarily stored contiguously on disk. You can examine read-ahead activity by using the Cache: Read Aheads/sec performance counter or the CcReadAheadIos system variable.

Reading the next block of a file that is being accessed sequentially provides an obvious performance improvement, with the disadvantage that it will cause head seeks. To extend read-ahead benefits to cases of strided data accesses (both forward and backward through a file), the cache manager maintains a history of the last two read requests in the private cache map for the file handle being
accessed, a method known as asynchronous read-ahead with history. If a pattern can be determined from the caller’s apparently random reads, the cache manager extrapolates it. For example, if the caller reads page 4000 and then page 3000, the cache manager assumes that the next page the caller will require is page 2000 and prereads it.

**NOTE**

Although a caller must issue a minimum of three read operations to establish a predictable sequence, only two are stored in the private cache map.

To make read-ahead even more efficient, the Win32 CreateFile function provides a flag indicating forward sequential file access: FILE_FLAG_SEQUENTIAL_SCAN. If this flag is set, the cache manager doesn’t keep a read history for the caller for prediction but instead performs sequential read-ahead. However, as the file is read into the cache’s working set, the cache manager unmaps views of the file that are no longer active and, if they are unmodified, directs the memory manager to place the pages belonging to the unmapped views at the front of the standby list so that they will be quickly reused. It also reads ahead two times as much data (2 MB instead of 1 MB, for example). As the caller continues reading, the cache manager prereads additional blocks of data, always staying about one read (of the size of the current read) ahead of the caller.

The cache manager’s read-ahead is asynchronous because it is performed in a thread separate from the caller’s thread and proceeds concurrently with the caller’s execution. When called to retrieve cached data, the cache manager first accesses the requested virtual page to satisfy the request and then queues an additional I/O request to retrieve additional data to a system worker thread. The worker thread then executes in the background, reading additional data in anticipation of the caller’s next read request. The preread pages are faulted into memory while the program continues executing so that when the caller requests the data it’s already in memory.

For applications that have no predictable read pattern, the FILE_FLAG_RANDOM_ACCESS flag can be specified when the CreateFile function is called. This flag instructs the cache manager not to attempt to predict
where the application is reading next and thus disables read-ahead. The flag also stops the cache manager from aggressively unmapping views of the file as the file is accessed so as to minimize the mapping/unmapping activity for the file when the application revisits portions of the file.

**Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing**

The cache manager implements a write-back cache with lazy write. This means that data written to files is first stored in memory in cache pages and then written to disk later. Thus, write operations are allowed to accumulate for a short time and are then flushed to disk all at once, reducing the overall number of disk I/O operations.

The cache manager must explicitly call the memory manager to flush cache pages because otherwise the memory manager writes memory contents to disk only when demand for physical memory exceeds supply, as is appropriate for volatile data. Cached file data, however, represents nonvolatile disk data. If a process modifies cached data, the user expects the contents to be reflected on disk in a timely manner.

Additionally, the cache manager has the ability to veto the memory manager’s mapped writer thread. Since the modified list (see Chapter 10 for more information) is not sorted in logical block address (LBA) order, the cache manager’s attempts to cluster pages for larger sequential I/Os to the disk are not always successful and actually cause repeated seeks. To combat this effect, the cache manager has the ability to aggressively veto the mapped writer thread and stream out writes in virtual byte offset (VBO) order, which is much closer to the LBA order on disk. Since the cache manager now owns these writes, it can also apply its own scheduling and throttling algorithms to prefer read-ahead over write-behind and impact the system less.

The decision about how often to flush the cache is an important one. If the cache is flushed too frequently, system performance will be slowed by unnecessary I/O. If the cache is flushed too rarely, you risk losing modified file data in the cases of a system failure (a loss especially irritating to users who know that they asked the application to save the changes) and running out of physical memory (because it’s being used by an excess of modified pages).
To balance these concerns, once per second the cache manager’s lazy writer function executes on a system worker thread and queues one-eighth of the dirty pages in the system cache to be written to disk. If the rate at which dirty pages are being produced is greater than the amount the lazy writer had determined it should write, the lazy writer writes an additional number of dirty pages that it calculates are necessary to match that rate. System worker threads from the systemwide critical worker thread pool actually perform the I/O operations. The lazy writer is also aware of when the memory manager’s mapped page writer is already performing a flush. In these cases, it delays its write-back capabilities to the same stream to avoid a situation where two flushers are writing to the same file.

**NOTE**

The cache manager provides a means for file system drivers to track when and how much data has been written to a file. After the lazy writer flushes dirty pages to the disk, the cache manager notifies the file system, instructing it to update its view of the valid data length for the file. (The cache manager and file systems separately track in memory the valid data length for a file.)

**EXPERIMENT: WATCHING THE CACHE MANAGER IN ACTION**

In this experiment, we’ll use Process Monitor to view the underlying file system activity, including cache manager read-ahead and write-behind, when Windows Explorer copies a large file (in this example, a CD-ROM image) from one local directory to another.

First, configure Process Monitor’s filter to include the source and destination file paths, the Explorer.exe and System processes, and the ReadFile and WriteFile operations. In this example, the C:\Users\Administrator\Downloads\dump.dmp file was copied to C:\dump.dmp, so the filter is configured as follows:

You should see a Process Monitor trace like the one shown here after you copy the file:
The first few entries show the initial I/O processing performed by the copy engine and the first cache manager operations. Here are some of the things that you can see:

- The initial 1-MB cached read from Explorer at the first entry. The size of this read depends on an internal matrix calculation based on the file size and can vary from 128 KB to 1 MB. Because this file was large, the copy engine chose 1 MB.

- The 1-MB read is followed by another 1-MB noncached read. Noncached reads typically indicate activity due to page faults or cache manager access. A closer look at the stack trace for these events, which you can see by double-clicking an entry and choosing the Stack tab, reveals that indeed the CcCopyRead cache manager routine, which is called by the NTFS driver’s read routine, causes the memory manager to fault the source data into physical memory.
After this 1-MB page fault I/O, the cache manager's read-ahead mechanism starts reading the file, which includes the System process’s subsequent noncached 1-MB read at the 1-MB offset. Because of the file size and Explorer's read I/O sizes, the cache manager chose 1 MB as the optimal read-ahead size. The stack trace for one of the read-ahead operations, shown next, confirms that one of the cache manager’s worker threads is performing the read-ahead.
After this point, Explorer’s 1-MB reads aren’t followed by page faults, because the read-ahead thread stays ahead of Explorer, prefetching the file data with its 1-MB noncached reads. However, every once in a while, the read-ahead thread is not able to pick up enough data in time, and clustered page faults do occur, which appear as Synchronous Paging I/O.

If you look at the stack for these entries, you’ll see that instead of MmPrefetchForCacheManager, the MmAccessFault/MiIssueHardFault routines are called.
As soon as it starts reading, Explorer also starts performing writes to the destination file. These are sequential, cached 64-KB writes. After about 132 MB of reads, the first \texttt{WriteFile} operation from the \texttt{System} process occurs, shown here:

![Event Properties Stack Trace](image1)

The write operation's stack trace, shown here, indicates that the memory manager's mapped page writer thread was actually responsible for the write:

![Process Monitor Stack Trace](image2)
This occurs because for the first couple of megabytes of data, the cache manager hadn’t started performing write-behind, so the memory manager’s mapped page writer began flushing the modified destination file data. (See Chapter 10 for more information on the mapped page writer.)

To get a clearer view of the cache manager operations, remove Explorer from the Process Monitor’s filter so that only the System process operations are visible, as shown next.

With this view, it’s much easier to see the cache manager’s 1-MB write-behind operations (the maximum write sizes are 1 MB on client versions of Windows and 32 MB on server versions; this experiment was performed on a client system). The stack trace for one of the write-behind operations, shown here, verifies that a cache manager worker thread is performing write-behind:
As an added experiment, try repeating this process with a remote copy instead (from one Windows system to another) and by copying files of varying sizes. You’ll notice some different behaviors by the copy engine and the cache manager, both on the receiving and sending sides.

**Disabling Lazy Writing for a File**

If you create a temporary file by specifying the flag `FILE_ATTRIBUTE_TEMPORARY` in a call to the Windows `CreateFile` function, the lazy writer won’t write dirty pages to the disk unless there is a severe shortage of physical memory or the file is explicitly flushed. This characteristic of the lazy writer improves system performance—the lazy writer doesn’t immediately write data to a disk that might ultimately be discarded. Applications usually delete temporary files soon after closing them.

**Forcing the Cache to Write Through to Disk**

Because some applications can’t tolerate even momentary delays between writing a file and seeing the updates on disk, the cache manager also supports write-through caching on a per–file object basis; changes are written to disk as soon as they’re made. To turn on write-through caching, set the `FILE_FLAG_WRITE_THROUGH` flag in the call to the `CreateFile` function.
Alternatively, a thread can explicitly flush an open file, by using the Windows FlushFileBuffers function, when it reaches a point at which the data needs to be written to disk.

**Flushed Mapped Files**

If the lazy writer must write data to disk from a view that’s also mapped into another process’s address space, the situation becomes a little more complicated, because the cache manager will only know about the pages it has modified. (Pages modified by another process are known only to that process because the modified bit in the page table entries for modified pages is kept in the process private page tables.) To address this situation, the memory manager informs the cache manager when a user maps a file. When such a file is flushed in the cache (for example, as a result of a call to the Windows FlushFileBuffers function), the cache manager writes the dirty pages in the cache and then checks to see whether the file is also mapped by another process. When the cache manager sees that the file is, the cache manager then flushes the entire view of the section to write out pages that the second process might have modified. If a user maps a view of a file that is also open in the cache, when the view is unmapped, the modified pages are marked as dirty so that when the lazy writer thread later flushes the view, those dirty pages will be written to disk. This procedure works as long as the sequence occurs in the following order:

1. A user unmaps the view.
2. A process flushes file buffers.

If this sequence isn’t followed, you can’t predict which pages will be written to disk.

---

**EXPERIMENT: WATCHING CACHE FLUSHES**

You can see the cache manager map views into the system cache and flush pages to disk by running the Performance Monitor and adding the Data Maps/sec and Lazy Write Flushes/sec counters and then copying a large file from one location to another. The generally higher line in the following screen shot shows Data Maps/sec and the other shows Lazy Write Flushes/sec. During the file copy, Lazy Write Flushes/sec significantly increased.
Write Throttling

The file system and cache manager must determine whether a cached write request will affect system performance and then schedule any delayed writes. First the file system asks the cache manager whether a certain number of bytes can be written right now without hurting performance by using the CcCanIWrite function and blocking that write if necessary. For asynchronous I/O, the file system sets up a callback with the cache manager for automatically writing the bytes when writes are again permitted by calling CcDeferWrite. Otherwise, it just blocks and waits on CcCanIWrite to continue. Once it’s notified of an impending write operation, the cache manager determines how many dirty pages are in the cache and how much physical memory is available. If few physical pages are free, the cache manager momentarily blocks the file system thread that’s requesting to write data to the cache. The cache manager’s lazy writer flushes some of the dirty pages to disk and then allows the blocked file system thread to continue. This write throttling prevents system performance from degrading because of a lack of memory when a file system or network server issues a large write operation.

NOTE
The effects of write throttling are volume-aware, such that if a user is copying a large file on, say, a RAID-0
SSD while also transferring a document to a portable USB thumb drive, writes to the USB disk will not cause write throttling to occur on the SSD transfer.

The dirty page threshold is the number of pages that the system cache will allow to be dirty before throttling cached writers. This value is computed at system initialization time and depends on the product type (client or server). Two other values are also computed—the top dirty page threshold and the bottom dirty page threshold. Depending on memory consumption and the rate at which dirty pages are being processed, the lazy writer calls the internal function CcAdjustThrottle, which, on server systems, performs dynamic adjustment of the current threshold based on the calculated top and bottom values. This adjustment is made to preserve the read cache in cases of a heavy write load that will inevitably overrun the cache and become throttled. Table 11-1 lists the algorithms used to calculate the dirty page thresholds.

Table 11-1. Algorithms for Calculating the Dirty Page Thresholds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product Type</th>
<th>Dirty Page Threshold</th>
<th>Top Dirty Page Threshold</th>
<th>Bottom Dirty Page Threshold</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Client</td>
<td>Physical pages / 8</td>
<td>Physical pages / 8</td>
<td>Physical pages / 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Server</td>
<td>Physical pages / 2</td>
<td>Physical pages / 2</td>
<td>Physical pages / 8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Write throttling is also useful for network redirectors transmitting data over slow communication lines. For example, suppose a local process writes a large amount of data to a remote file system over a 9600-baud line. The data isn’t written to the remote disk until the cache manager’s lazy writer flushes the cache. If the redirector has accumulated lots of dirty pages that are flushed to disk at once, the recipient could receive a network timeout before the data transfer completes. By using the CcSetDirtyPageThreshold function, the cache manager allows network redirectors to set a limit on the number of dirty cache pages they can tolerate (for each stream), thus preventing this scenario. By limiting the number of dirty pages, the redirector ensures that a cache flush operation won’t cause a network timeout.

**EXPERIMENT: VIEWING THE WRITE-THROTTLE PARAMETERS**

The !defwrites kernel debugger command dumps the values of the kernel variables the cache manager uses,
including the number of dirty pages in the file cache (CcTotalDirtyPages), when determining whether it should throttle write operations:

```
lkd> !defwrites
*** Cache Write Throttle Analysis ***
    CcTotalDirtyPages:                    39 (     156 Kb)
    CcDirtyPageThreshold:              32753 (  131012 Kb)
    MmAvailablePages:                  81569 (  326276 Kb)
    MmThrottleTop:                       450 (    1800 Kb)
    MmThrottleBottom:                     80 (     320 Kb)
    MmModifiedPageListHead.Total:       4337 (   17348 Kb)

Write throttles not engaged
```

This output shows that the number of dirty pages is far from the number that triggers write throttling (CcDirtyPageThreshold), so the system has not engaged in any write throttling.

### System Threads

As mentioned earlier, the cache manager performs lazy write and read-ahead I/O operations by submitting requests to the common critical system worker thread pool. However, it does limit the use of these threads to one less than the total number of critical system worker threads for small and medium memory systems (two less than the total for large memory systems).

Internally, the cache manager organizes its work requests into four lists (though these are serviced by the same set of executive worker threads):

- The express queue is used for read-ahead operations.
- The regular queue is used for lazy write scans (for dirty data to flush), write-behinds, and lazy closes.
- The fast teardown queue is used when the memory manager is waiting for the data section owned by the cache manager to be freed so that the file can be opened with an image section instead, which causes CcWriteBehind to flush the entire file and tear down the shared cache map.
- The post tick queue is used for the cache manager to internally register for a notification after each “tick” of the lazy writer thread—in other words, at the end of each pass.

To keep track of the work items the worker threads need to perform, the cache manager creates its own internal per-processor look-aside list, a fixed-length list—
one for each processor—of worker queue item structures. (Look-aside lists are discussed in Chapter 10.) The number of worker queue items depends on system size: 32 for small-memory systems, 64 for medium-memory systems, 128 for large-memory client systems, and 256 for large-memory server systems. For cross-processor performance, the cache manager also allocates a global look-aside list at the same sizes as just described.
Conclusion

The cache manager provides a high-speed, intelligent mechanism for reducing disk I/O and increasing overall system throughput. By caching on the basis of virtual blocks, the cache manager can perform intelligent read-ahead. By relying on the global memory manager’s mapped file primitive to access file data, the cache manager can provide the special fast I/O mechanism to reduce the CPU time required for read and write operations and also leave all matters related to physical memory management to the single Windows global memory manager, thus reducing code duplication and increasing efficiency.
Chapter 12. File Systems

In this chapter, we present an overview of the file system formats supported by Windows. We then describe the types of file system drivers and their basic operation, including how they interact with other system components, such as the memory manager and the cache manager. Following that is a description of how to use Process Monitor from Windows Sysinternals (at http://www.microsoft.com/technet/sysinternals) to troubleshoot a wide variety of file system access problems.

In the balance of the chapter, we first describe the Common Log File System (CLFS), a transactional logging virtual file system implemented on the native Windows file system format, NTFS. Then we focus on the on-disk layout of NTFS and its advanced features, such as compression, recoverability, quotas, symbolic links, transactions (which use the services provided by CLFS), and encryption.

To fully understand this chapter, you should be familiar with the terminology introduced in Chapter 9, including the terms volume and partition. You’ll also need to be acquainted with these additional terms:

- Sectors are hardware-addressable blocks on a storage medium. Hard disks usually define a 512-byte sector size, but they are moving to 4,096-byte sectors. (See Chapter 9.) Thus, if the sector size is 512 bytes and the operating system wants to modify the 632nd byte on a disk, it must write a 512-byte block of data to the second sector on the disk.

- File system formats define the way that file data is stored on storage media, and they affect a file system’s features. For example, a format that doesn’t allow user permissions to be associated with files and directories can’t support security. A file system format can also impose limits on the sizes of files and storage devices that the file system supports. Finally, some file system formats efficiently implement support for either large or small files or for large or small disks. NTFS and exFAT are examples of file system formats that offer a different set of features and usage scenarios.

- Clusters are the addressable blocks that many file system formats use. Cluster
size is always a multiple of the sector size, as shown in Figure 12-1. File system formats use clusters to manage disk space more efficiently; a cluster size that is larger than the sector size divides a disk into more manageable blocks. The potential trade-off of a larger cluster size is wasted disk space, or internal fragmentation, that results when file sizes aren’t exact multiples of the cluster size.

- Metadata is data stored on a volume in support of file system format management. It isn’t typically made accessible to applications. Metadata includes the data that defines the placement of files and directories on a volume, for example.
Windows File System Formats

Windows includes support for the following file system formats:

- CDFS
- UDF
- FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32
- exFAT
- NTFS

Each of these formats is best suited for certain environments, as you’ll see in the following sections.

**CDFS**

CDFS (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Cdfs.sys), or CD-ROM file system, is a read-only file system driver that supports a superset of the ISO-9660 format as well as a superset of the Joliet disk format. While the ISO-9660 format is relatively simple and has limitations such as ASCII uppercase names with a maximum length of 32 characters, Joliet is more flexible and supports Unicode names of arbitrary length. If structures for both formats are present on a disk (to offer maximum compatibility), CDFS uses the Joliet format. CDFS has a couple of restrictions:

- A maximum file size of 4 GB
- A maximum of 65,535 directories

CDFS is considered a legacy format because the industry has adopted the Universal Disk Format (UDF) as the standard for optical media.

**UDF**

The Windows UDF file system implementation is OSTA (Optical Storage Technology Association) UDF-compliant. (UDF is a subset of the ISO-13346 format with extensions for formats such as CD-R and DVD-R/RW.) OSTA defined UDF in 1995 as a format to replace the ISO-9660 format for magneto-optical storage media, mainly DVD-ROM. UDF is included in the DVD specification and is more flexible than CDFS. The UDF file system format has the following traits:
- Directory and file names can be 254 ASCII or 127 Unicode characters long.
- Files can be sparse. (Sparse files are defined later in this chapter.)
- File sizes are specified with 64 bits.
- Support for access control lists (ACLs).
- Support for alternate data streams.

The UDF driver supports UDF versions up to 2.60. The UDF format was designed with rewritable media in mind. The Windows UDF driver (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Udfs.sys) provides read-write support for Blu-ray, DVD-RAM, CD-R/RW, and DVD+-R/RW drives when using UDF 2.50 and read-only support when using UDF 2.60. However, Windows does not implement support for certain UDF features such as named streams and access control lists.

**FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32**

Windows supports the FAT file system primarily for compatibility with other operating systems in multiboot systems, and as a format for flash drives or memory cards. The Windows FAT file system driver is implemented in %SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Fastfat.sys.

The name of each FAT format includes a number that indicates the number of bits that the particular format uses to identify clusters on a disk. FAT12’s 12-bit cluster identifier limits a partition to storing a maximum of $2^{12}$ (4,096) clusters. Windows permits cluster sizes from 512 bytes to 8 KB, which limits a FAT12 volume size to 32 MB.

**NOTE**

All FAT file system types reserve the first two clusters and the last 16 clusters of a volume, so the number of usable clusters for a FAT12 volume, for instance, is slightly less than 4,096.

FAT16, with a 16-bit cluster identifier, can address $2^{16}$ (65,536) clusters. On Windows, FAT16 cluster sizes range from 512 bytes (the sector size) to 64 KB (on disks with a 512-byte sector size), which limits FAT16 volume sizes to 4 GB. Disks with a sector size of 4,096 bytes allow for clusters of 256 KB. The cluster size Windows uses depends on the size of a volume. The various sizes are listed in
Table 12-1. If you format a volume that is less than 16 MB as FAT by using the format command or the Disk Management snap-in, Windows uses the FAT12 format instead of FAT16.

Table 12-1. Default FAT16 Cluster Sizes in Windows

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Volume Size</th>
<th>Default Cluster Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;8 MB</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 MB–32 MB</td>
<td>512 bytes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 MB–64 MB</td>
<td>1 KB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64 MB–128 MB</td>
<td>2 KB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128 MB–256 MB</td>
<td>4 KB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>256 MB–512 MB</td>
<td>8 KB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>512 MB–1,024 MB</td>
<td>16 KB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 GB–2 GB</td>
<td>32 KB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 GB–4 GB</td>
<td>64 KB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;16 GB</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A FAT volume is divided into several regions, which are shown in Figure 12-2. The file allocation table, which gives the FAT file system format its name, has one entry for each cluster on a volume. Because the file allocation table is critical to the successful interpretation of a volume’s contents, the FAT format maintains two copies of the table so that if a file system driver or consistency-checking program (such as Chkdsk) can’t access one (because of a bad disk sector, for example), it can read from the other.

Figure 12-2. FAT format organization

Entries in the file allocation table define file-allocation chains (shown in Figure 12-
3) for files and directories, where the links in the chain are indexes to the next cluster of a file’s data. A file’s directory entry stores the starting cluster of the file. The last entry of the file’s allocation chain is the reserved value of 0xFFFF for FAT16 and 0xFFF for FAT12. The FAT entries for unused clusters have a value of 0. You can see in Figure 12-3 that FILE1 is assigned clusters 2, 3, and 4; FILE2 is fragmented and uses clusters 5, 6, and 8; and FILE3 uses only cluster 7. Reading a file from a FAT volume can involve reading large portions of a file allocation table to traverse the file’s allocation chains.

The root directory of FAT12 and FAT16 volumes is preassigned enough space at the start of a volume to store 256 directory entries, which places an upper limit on the number of files and directories that can be stored in the root directory. (There’s no preassigned space or size limit on FAT32 root directories.) A FAT directory entry is 32 bytes and stores a file’s name, size, starting cluster, and time stamp (last-accessed, created, and so on) information. If a file has a name that is Unicode or that doesn’t follow the MS-DOS 8.3 naming convention, additional directory entries are allocated to store the long file name. The supplementary entries precede the file’s main entry. Figure 12-4 shows a sample directory entry for a file named “The quick brown fox.” The system has created a THEQUI~1.FOX 8.3 representation of the name (that is, you don’t see a “.” in the directory entry because it is assumed to come after the eighth character) and used two more directory entries to store the Unicode long file name. Each row in the figure is made up of 16 bytes.
FAT32 uses 32-bit cluster identifiers but reserves the high 4 bits, so in effect it has 28-bit cluster identifiers. Because FAT32 cluster sizes can be as large as 64 KB, FAT32 has a theoretical ability to address 16-terabyte (TB) volumes. Although Windows works with existing FAT32 volumes of larger sizes (created in other operating systems), it limits new FAT32 volumes to a maximum of 32 GB. FAT32’s higher potential cluster numbers let it manage disks more efficiently than FAT16; it can handle up to 128-GB volumes with 512-byte clusters. Table 12-2 shows default cluster sizes for FAT32 volumes.

Table 12-2. Default Cluster Sizes for FAT32 Volumes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partition Size</th>
<th>Default Cluster Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;32 MB</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 MB–64 MB</td>
<td>512 bytes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64 MB–128 MB</td>
<td>1 KB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128 MB–256 MB</td>
<td>2 KB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>256 MB–8 GB</td>
<td>4 KB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 GB–16 GB</td>
<td>8 KB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 GB–32 GB</td>
<td>16 KB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;32 GB</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Besides the higher limit on cluster numbers, other advantages FAT32 has over FAT12 and FAT16 include the fact that the FAT32 root directory isn’t stored at a predefined location on the volume, the root directory doesn’t have an upper limit on its size, and FAT32 stores a second copy of the boot sector for reliability. A limitation FAT32 shares with FAT16 is that the maximum file size is 4 GB because directories store file sizes as 32-bit values.

**exFAT**

Designed by Microsoft, the Extended File Allocation Table file system (exFAT, also called FAT64) is an improvement over the traditional FAT file systems and is specifically designed for flash drives. The main goal of exFAT is to provide some of the advanced functionality offered by NTFS, but without the metadata structure overhead and metadata logging that create write patterns not suited for many flash media devices. (See the description of flash media in Chapter 9). Table 12-3 lists the default cluster sizes for exFAT.

As the FAT64 name implies, the file size limit is increased to $2^{64}$, allowing files up to 16 exabytes. This change is also matched by an increase in the maximum cluster size, which is currently implemented as 32 MB but can be as large as $2^{255}$ sectors. exFAT also adds a bitmap that tracks free clusters, which improves the performance of allocation and deletion operations. Finally, exFAT allows more than 1,000 files in a single directory. These characteristics result in increased scalability and support for large disk sizes.

**Table 12-3. Default Cluster Sizes for exFAT Volumes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Volume Size</th>
<th>Default Cluster Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;7 MB</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 MB–256 MB</td>
<td>4 KB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>256 MB–32 GB</td>
<td>32 KB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 GB–256 TB</td>
<td>128 KB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;256 TB</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additionally, exFAT implements certain features previously available only in
NTFS, such as support for access control lists (ACLs) and transactions (called Transaction-Safe FAT, or TFAT). While the Windows Embedded CE implementation of exFAT includes these features, the version of exFAT in Windows does not.

**NOTE**

ReadyBoost (described in Chapter 10) can work with exFAT-formatted flash drives to support cache files much larger than 4 GB.

## NTFS

As noted at the beginning of the chapter, the NTFS file system is the native file system format of Windows. NTFS uses 64-bit cluster numbers. This capacity gives NTFS the ability to address volumes of up to 16 exaclusters; however, Windows limits the size of an NTFS volume to that addressable with 32-bit clusters, which is slightly less than 256 TB (using 64-KB clusters). Table 12-4 shows the default cluster sizes for NTFS volumes. (You can override the default when you format an NTFS volume.) NTFS also supports $2^{32} - 1$ files per volume. The NTFS format allows for files that are 16 exabytes in size, but the implementation limits the maximum file size to 16 TB.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Volume Size</th>
<th>Default Cluster Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;7 MB</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 MB–16 TB</td>
<td>4 KB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 TB–32 TB</td>
<td>8 KB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 TB–64 TB</td>
<td>16 KB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64 TB–128 TB</td>
<td>32 KB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128 TB–256 TB</td>
<td>64 KB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12-4. Default Cluster Sizes for NTFS Volumes

NTFS includes a number of advanced features, such as file and directory security, alternate data streams, disk quotas, sparse files, file compression, symbolic (soft)
and hard links, support for transactional semantics, junction points, and encryption. One of its most significant features is recoverability. If a system is halted unexpectedly, the metadata of a FAT volume can be left in an inconsistent state, leading to the corruption of large amounts of file and directory data. NTFS logs changes to metadata in a transactional manner so that file system structures can be repaired to a consistent state with no loss of file or directory structure information. (File data can be lost unless the user is using TxF, which is covered later in this chapter.) Additionally, the NTFS driver in Windows also implements self-healing, a mechanism through which it makes most minor repairs to corruption of file system on-disk structures while Windows is running and without requiring a reboot.

We’ll describe NTFS data structures and advanced features in detail later in this chapter.
File System Driver Architecture

File system drivers (FSDs) manage file system formats. Although FSDs run in kernel mode, they differ in a number of ways from standard kernel-mode drivers. Perhaps most significant, they must register as an FSD with the I/O manager and they interact more extensively with the memory manager. For enhanced performance, file system drivers also usually rely on the services of the cache manager. Thus, they use a superset of the exported Ntoskrnl.exe functions that standard drivers use. Just as for standard kernel-mode drivers, you must have the Windows Driver Kit (WDK) to build file system drivers. (See Chapter 1, “Concepts and Tools,” in Part 1 and http://www.microsoft.com/whdc/devtools/wdk for more information on the WDK.)

Windows has two different types of file system drivers:

- Local FSDs manage volumes directly connected to the computer.
- Network FSDs allow users to access data volumes connected to remote computers.

Local FSDs

Local FSDs include Ntfs.sys, Fastfat.sys, Exfat.sys, Udfs.sys, Cdfs.sys, and the RAW FSD (integrated in Ntoskrnl.exe). Figure 12-5 shows a simplified view of how local FSDs interact with the I/O manager and storage device drivers. As we described in the section Volume Mounting in Chapter 9, a local FSD is responsible for registering with the I/O manager. Once the FSD is registered, the I/O manager can call on it to perform volume recognition when applications or the system initially access the volumes. Volume recognition involves an examination of a volume’s boot sector and often, as a consistency check, the file system metadata. If none of the registered file systems recognizes the volume, the system assigns the RAW file system driver to the volume and then displays a dialog box to the user asking if the volume should be formatted. If the user chooses not to format the volume, the RAW file system driver provides access to the volume, but only at the sector level—in other words, the user can only read or write complete sectors.

The goal of file system recognition is to allow the system to have an additional
option for a valid but unrecognized file system other than RAW. To achieve this, the system defines a fixed data structure type (FILE_SYSTEM_RECOGNITION_STRUCTURE) that is written to the first sector on the volume. This data structure, if present, would then be recognized by the operating system, which would then notify the user that the volume contains a valid but unrecognized file system. The system will still load the RAW file system on the volume, but it will not prompt the user to format the volume. A user application or kernel-mode driver might ask for a copy of the FILE_SYSTEM_RECOGNITION_STRUCTURE by using the new file system I/O control code FSCTL_QUERY_FILE_SYSTEM_RECOGNITION.

The first sector of every Windows-supported file system format is reserved as the volume’s boot sector. A boot sector contains enough information so that a local FSD can both identify the volume on which the sector resides as containing a format that the FSD manages and locate any other metadata necessary to identify where metadata is stored on the volume.

When a local FSD recognizes a volume, it creates a device object that represents the mounted file system format. The I/O manager makes a connection through the volume parameter block (VPB) between the volume’s device object (which is created by a storage device driver) and the device object that the FSD created. The VPB’s connection results in the I/O manager redirecting I/O requests targeted at the volume device object to the FSD device object. (See Chapter 9 for more information on VPBs.)

![Figure 12-5. Local FSD](image)
To improve performance, local FSDs usually use the cache manager to cache file system data, including metadata. (For more information, see Chapter 11.) FSDs also integrate with the memory manager so that mapped files are implemented correctly. For example, FSDs must query the memory manager whenever an application attempts to truncate a file in order to verify that no processes have mapped the part of the file beyond the truncation point. (See Chapter 10 for more information on the memory manager.) Windows doesn’t permit file data that is mapped by an application to be deleted either through truncation or file deletion. Local FSDs also support file system dismount operations, which permit the system to disconnect the FSD from the volume object. A dismount occurs whenever an application requires raw access to the on-disk contents of a volume or the media associated with a volume is changed. The first time an application accesses the media after a dismount, the I/O manager reinitiates a volume mount operation for the media.

Remote FSDs

Each remote FSD consists of two components: a client and a server. A client-side remote FSD allows applications to access remote files and directories. The client FSD component accepts I/O requests from applications and translates them into network file system protocol commands (such as SMB) that the FSD sends across the network to a server-side component, which is a remote FSD. A server-side FSD listens for commands coming from a network connection and fulfills them by issuing I/O requests to the local FSD that manages the volume on which the file or directory that the command is intended for resides.

Windows includes a client-side remote FSD named LANMan Redirector (usually referred to as just the redirector) and a server-side remote FSD named LANMan Server (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Srv2.sys). Figure 12-6 shows the relationship between a client accessing files remotely from a server through the redirector and server FSDs. See Chapter 7, “Networking,” in Part 1 for more information on the redirectors and RDBSS.
Windows relies on the Common Internet File System (CIFS) protocol to format messages exchanged between the redirector and the server. CIFS is a version of Microsoft’s Server Message Block (SMB) protocol. (For more information on SMB, go to http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa365233(v=vs.85).aspx.)

Like local FSDs, client-side remote FSDs usually use cache manager services to locally cache file data belonging to remote files and directories, and in such cases both must implement a distributed locking mechanism on the client as well as the server. SMB client-side remote FSDs implement a distributed cache coherency protocol, called oplock (opportunistic locking), so that the data an application sees when it accesses a remote file is the same as the data applications running on other computers that are accessing the same file see. Third-party file systems may choose to use the oplock protocol, or they may implement their own protocol. Although server-side remote FSDs participate in maintaining cache coherency across their clients, they don’t cache data from the local FSDs because local FSDs cache their own data.

**Locking**
It is fundamental that whenever a resource can be shared between multiple, simultaneous accessors, a serialization mechanism must be provided to arbitrate writes to that resource to ensure that only one accessor is writing to the resource at any given time. Without this mechanism, the resource may be corrupted. The locking mechanisms used by all file servers implementing the SMB protocol are the oplock and the lease. Which mechanism is used depends on the capabilities of both the server and the client, with the lease being the preferred mechanism.

**Oplocks** The oplock functionality is implemented in the file system run-time library (FsRtlXxx functions) and may be used by any file system driver. The client of a remote file server uses an oplock to dynamically determine which client-side caching strategy to use to minimize network traffic. An oplock is requested on a file residing on a share, by the file system driver or redirector, on behalf of an application when it attempts to open a file. The granting of an oplock allows the client to cache the file rather than send every read or write to the file server across the network. For example, a client could open a file for exclusive access, allowing the client to cache all reads and writes to the file, and then copy the updates to the file server when the file is closed. In contrast, if the server does not grant an oplock to a client, all reads and writes must be sent to the server.

Once an oplock has been granted, a client may then start caching the file, with the type of oplock determining what type of caching is allowed. An oplock is not necessarily held until a client is finished with the file, and it may be broken at any time if the server receives an operation that is incompatible with the existing granted locks. This implies that the client must be able to quickly react to the break of the oplock and change its caching strategy dynamically.

Prior to SMB 2.1, there were four types of oplocks:

- **Level 1, exclusive access** This lock allows a client to open a file for exclusive access. The client may perform read-ahead buffering and read or write caching.

- **Level 2, shared access** This lock allows multiple, simultaneous readers of a file and no writers. The client may perform read-ahead buffering and read caching of file data and attributes. A write to the file will cause the holders of the lock to be notified that the lock has been broken.

- **Batch, exclusive access** This lock takes its name from the locking used when
processing batch (.bat) files, which are opened and closed to process each line within the file. The client may keep a file open on the server, even though the application has (perhaps temporarily) closed the file. This lock supports read, write, and handle caching.

- **Filter, exclusive access** This lock provides applications and file system filters with a mechanism to give up the lock when other clients try to access the same file, but unlike a Level 2 lock, the file cannot be opened for delete access, and the other client will not receive a sharing violation. This lock supports read and write caching.

In the simplest terms, if multiple client systems are all caching the same file shared by a server, then as long as every application accessing the file (from any client or the server) tries only to read the file, those reads can be satisfied from each system’s local cache. This drastically reduces the network traffic because the contents of the file are not sent to each system from the server. Locking information must still be exchanged between the client systems and the server, but this requires very low network bandwidth. However, if even one of the clients opens the file for read and write access (or exclusive write), then none of the clients can use their local caches and all I/O to the file must go immediately to the server, even if the file is never written. (Lock modes are based upon how the file is opened, not individual I/O requests.)

An example, shown in Figure 12-7, will help illustrate oplock operation. The server automatically grants a Level 1 oplock to the first client to open a server file for access. The redirector on the client caches the file data for both reads and writes in the file cache of the client machine. If a second client opens the file, it too requests a Level 1 oplock. However, because there are now two clients accessing the same file, the server must take steps to present a consistent view of the file's data to both clients. If the first client has written to the file, as is the case in Figure 12-7, the server revokes its oplock and grants neither client an oplock. When the first client’s oplock is revoked, or broken, the client flushes any data it has cached for the file back to the server.
If the first client hadn’t written to the file, the first client’s oplock would have been broken to a Level 2 oplock, which is the same type of oplock the server would grant to the second client. Now both clients can cache reads, but if either writes to the file, the server revokes their oplocks so that noncached operation commences. Once oplocks are broken, they aren’t granted again for the same open instance of a file. However, if a client closes a file and then reopens it, the server reassesses what level of oplock to grant the client based on which other clients have the file open and whether or not at least one of them has written to the file.

**EXPERIMENT: VIEWING THE LIST OF REGISTERED FILE SYSTEMS**

When the I/O manager loads a device driver into memory, it typically names the driver object it creates to represent the driver so that it’s placed in the \Driver object manager directory. The driver objects for any driver the I/O manager loads that have a Type attribute value of SERVICE_FILE_SYSTEM_DRIVER (2) are placed in the \FileSystem directory by the I/O manager. Thus, using a tool such as WinObj (from Sysinternals), you can see the file systems that have registered on a system, as shown in the following screenshot. (Note that some file system drivers also place device objects in the \FileSystem directory.)
Another way to see registered file systems is to run the System Information viewer. Run Msinfo32 from the Start menu’s Run dialog box and select System Drivers under Software Environment. Sort the list of drivers by clicking the Type column, and drivers with a Type attribute of SERVICE_FILE_SYSTEM_DRIVER group together.
Note that just because a driver registers as a file system driver type doesn’t mean that it is a local or remote FSD. For example, Npfs (Named Pipe File System) is a network API driver that supports named pipes but implements a private namespace, and therefore is in some ways like a file system driver. See Chapter 7 in Part 1 for an experiment that reveals the Npfs namespace.

**Leases** Prior to SMB 2.1, the SMB protocol assumed an error-free network connection between the client and the server and did not tolerate network disconnections caused by transient network failures, server reboot, or cluster failovers. When a network disconnect event was received by the client, it orphaned all handles opened to the affected server(s), and all subsequent I/O operations on the orphaned handles were failed. Similarly, the server would release all opened handles and resources associated with the disconnected user session. This behavior resulted in applications losing state and in unnecessary network traffic.

In SMB 2.1, the concept of a lease is introduced as a new type of client caching mechanism, similar to an oplock. The purpose of a lease and an oplock is the same, but a lease provides greater flexibility and much better performance.

- **Read (R), shared access** Allows multiple simultaneous readers of a file, and no writers. This lease allows the client to perform read-ahead buffering and read caching.

- **Read-Handle (RH), shared access** This is similar to the Level 2 oplock, with the added benefit of allowing the client to keep a file open on the server even though the accessor on the client has closed the file. (The cache manager will lazily flush the unwritten data and purge the unmodified cache pages based on memory availability.) This is superior to a Level 2 oplock because the lease does not need to be broken between opens and closes of the file handle. (In this respect, it provides semantics similar to the Batch oplock.) This type of lease is especially useful for files that are repeatedly opened and closed because the cache is not invalidated when the file is closed and refilled when the file is opened again, providing a big improvement in performance for complex I/O intensive applications.

- **Read-Write (RW), exclusive access** This lease allows a client to open a file for exclusive access. This lock allows the client to perform read-ahead buffering and read or write caching.
- **Read-Write-Handle (RWH), exclusive access** This lock allows a client to open a file for exclusive access. This lease supports read, write, and handle caching (similar to the Read-Handle lease).

Another advantage that a lease has over an oplock is that a file may be cached, even when there are multiple handles opened to the file on the client. (This is a common behavior in many applications.) This is implemented through the use of a lease key (implemented using a GUID), which is created by the client and associated with the File Control Block (FCB) for the cached file, allowing all handles to the same file to share the same lease state, which provides caching by file rather than caching by handle. Prior to the introduction of the lease, the oplock was broken whenever a new handle was opened to the file, even from the same client. Figure 12-8 shows the oplock behavior, and Figure 12-9 shows the new lease behavior.

Prior to SMB 2.1, oplocks could only be granted or broken, but leases can also be converted. For example, a Read lease may be converted to a Read-Write lease, which greatly reduces network traffic because the cache for a particular file does not need to be invalidated and refilled, as would be the case with an oplock break (of the Level 2 oplock), followed by the request and grant of a Level 1 oplock.
Figure 12-8. Oplock with multiple handles from the same client
Applications and the system access files in two ways: directly, via file I/O functions (such as ReadFile and WriteFile), and indirectly, by reading or writing a portion of their address space that represents a mapped file section. (See Chapter 10 for more information on mapped files.) Figure 12-10 is a simplified diagram that shows the components involved in these file system operations and the ways in which they interact. As you can see, an FSD can be invoked through several paths:

- From a user or system thread performing explicit file I/O
- From the memory manager’s modified and mapped page writers
- Indirectly from the cache manager’s lazy writer
- Indirectly from the cache manager’s read-ahead thread
- From the memory manager’s page fault handler

The following sections describe the circumstances surrounding each of these scenarios and the steps FSDs typically take in response to each one. You’ll see how much FSDs rely on the memory manager and the cache manager.

**Explicit File I/O**

The most obvious way an application accesses files is by calling Windows I/O functions such as CreateFile, ReadFile, and WriteFile. An application opens a file with CreateFile and then reads, writes, or deletes the file by passing the handle returned from CreateFile to other Windows functions. The CreateFile function, which is implemented in the Kernel32.dll Windows client-side DLL, invokes the native function NtCreateFile, forming a complete root-relative path name for the path that the application passed to it (processing “.” and “..” symbols in the path
name) and prefixing the path with “\??” (for example, \??\C:\Daryl\Todo.txt). The NtCreateFile system service uses ObOpenObjectByName to open the file, which parses the name starting with the object manager root directory and the first component of the path name (“??”). Chapter 3, “System Mechanisms,” in Part 1 includes a thorough description of object manager name resolution and its use of process device maps, but we’ll review the steps it follows here with a focus on volume drive letter lookup.

The first step the object manager takes is to translate \?? to the process’s per-session namespace directory that the DosDevicesDirectory field of the device map structure in the process object references (which was propagated from the first process in the logon session by using the logon session references field in the logon session’s token). Only volume names for network shares and drive letters mapped by the Subst.exe utility are typically stored in the per-session directory, so on those systems when a name (C: in this example) is not present in the per-session directory, the object manager restarts its search in the directory referenced by the GlobalDosDevicesDirectory field of the device map associated with the per-session directory. The GlobalDosDevicesDirectory always points at the \Global?? directory, which is where Windows stores volume drive letters for local volumes. (See the section “Session Namespace” in Chapter 3 in Part 1 for more information.)

The symbolic link for a volume drive letter points to a volume device object under \Device, so when the object manager encounters the volume object, the object manager hands the rest of the path name to the parse function that the I/O manager has registered for device objects, IopParseDevice. (In volumes on dynamic disks, a symbolic link points to an intermediary symbolic link, which points to a volume device object.) Figure 12-11 shows how volume objects are accessed through the object manager namespace. The figure shows how the \GLOBAL??\C: symbolic link points to the \Device\HarddiskVolume1 volume device object.

After locking the caller’s security context and obtaining security information from the caller’s token, IopParseDevice creates an I/O request packet (IRP) of type IRP_MJ_CREATE, creates a file object that stores the name of the file being opened, follows the VPB of the volume device object to find the volume’s mounted file system device object, and uses IoCallDriver to pass the IRP to the file system
driver that owns the file system device object.

When an FSD receives an IRP_MJ_CREATE IRP, it looks up the specified file, performs security validation, and if the file exists and the user has permission to access the file in the way requested, returns a success status code. The object manager creates a handle for the file object in the process’s handle table, and the handle propagates back through the calling chain, finally reaching the application as a return parameter from CreateFile. If the file system fails the create operation, the I/O manager deletes the file object it created for the file.

We’ve skipped over the details of how the FSD locates the file being opened on the volume, but a ReadFile function call operation shares many of the FSD’s interactions with the cache manager and storage driver. Both ReadFile and CreateFile are system calls that map to I/O manager functions, but the NtReadFile system service doesn’t need to perform a name lookup—it calls on the object manager to translate the handle passed from ReadFile into a file object pointer. If the handle indicates that the caller obtained permission to read the file when the file was opened, NtReadFile proceeds to create an IRP of type IRP_MJ_READ and sends it to the FSD for the volume on which the file resides. NtReadFile obtains the FSD’s device object, which is stored in the file object, and calls IoCallDriver, and the I/O manager locates the FSD from the device object and gives the IRP to the FSD.
If the file being read can be cached (that is, the FILE_FLAG_NO_BUFFERING flag wasn’t passed to CreateFile when the file was opened), the FSD checks to see whether caching has already been initiated for the file object. The PrivateCacheMap field in a file object points to a private cache map data structure (which we described in Chapter 11) if caching is initiated for a file object. If the FSD hasn’t initialized caching for the file object (which it does the first time a file object is read from or written to), the PrivateCacheMap field will be null. The FSD calls the cache manager’s CcInitializeCacheMap function to initialize caching, which involves the cache manager creating a private cache map and, if another file object referring to the same file hasn’t initiated caching, a shared cache map and a section object.

After it has verified that caching is enabled for the file, the FSD copies the requested file data from the cache manager’s virtual memory to the buffer that the thread passed to the ReadFile function. The file system performs the copy within a
try/except block so that it catches any faults that are the result of an invalid application buffer. The function the file system uses to perform the copy is the cache manager’s CcCopyRead function. CcCopyRead takes as parameters a file object, file offset, and length.

When the cache manager executes CcCopyRead, it retrieves a pointer to a shared cache map, which is stored in the file object. Recall from Chapter 11 that a shared cache map stores pointers to virtual address control blocks (VACBs), with one VACB entry for each 256-KB block of the file. If the VACB pointer for a portion of a file being read is null, CcCopyRead allocates a VACB, reserving a 256-KB view in the cache manager’s virtual address space, and maps (using MmMapViewInSystemCache) the specified portion of the file into the view. Then CcCopyRead simply copies the file data from the mapped view to the buffer it was passed (the buffer originally passed to ReadFile). If the file data isn’t in physical memory, the copy operation generates page faults, which are serviced by MmAccessFault.

When a page fault occurs, MmAccessFault examines the virtual address that caused the fault and locates the virtual address descriptor (VAD) in the VAD tree of the process that caused the fault. (See Chapter 10 for more information on VAD trees.) In this scenario, the VAD describes the cache manager’s mapped view of the file being read, so MmAccessFault calls MiDispatchFault to handle a page fault on a valid virtual memory address. MiDispatchFault locates the control area (which the VAD points to) and through the control area finds a file object representing the open file. (If the file has been opened more than once, there might be a list of file objects linked through pointers in their private cache maps.)

With the file object in hand, MiDispatchFault calls the I/O manager function IoPageRead to build an IRP (of type IRP_MJ_READ) and sends the IRP to the FSD that owns the device object the file object points to. Thus, the file system is reentered to read the data that it requested via CcCopyRead, but this time the IRP is marked as noncached and paging I/O. These flags signal the FSD that it should retrieve file data directly from disk, and it does so by determining which clusters on disk contain the requested data (the exact mechanism is file-system dependent) and sending IRPs to the volume manager that owns the volume device object on which the file resides. The volume parameter block (VPB) field in the FSD’s
device object points to the volume device object.

The memory manager waits for the FSD to complete the IRP read and then returns control to the cache manager, which continues the copy operation that was interrupted by a page fault. When CcCopyRead completes, the FSD returns control to the thread that called NtReadFile, having copied the requested file data—with the aid of the cache manager and the memory manager—to the thread’s buffer.

The path for WriteFile is similar except that the NtWriteFile system service generates an IRP of type IRP_MJ_WRITE and the FSD calls CcCopyWrite instead of CcCopyRead. CcCopyWrite, like CcCopyRead, ensures that the portions of the file being written are mapped into the cache and then copies to the cache the buffer passed to WriteFile.

If a file’s data is already cached (in the system’s working set), there are several variants on the scenario we’ve just described. If a file’s data is already stored in the cache, CcCopyRead doesn’t incur page faults. Also, under certain conditions, NtReadFile and NtWriteFile call an FSD’s fast I/O entry point instead of immediately building and sending an IRP to the FSD. Some of these conditions follow: the portion of the file being read must reside in the first 4 GB of the file, the file can have no locks, and the portion of the file being read or written must fall within the file’s currently allocated size.

The fast I/O read and write entry points for most FSDs call the cache manager’s CcFastCopyRead and CcFastCopyWrite functions. These variants on the standard copy routines ensure that the file’s data is mapped in the file system cache before performing a copy operation. If this condition isn’t met, CcFastCopyRead and CcFastCopyWrite indicate that fast I/O isn’t possible. When fast I/O isn’t possible, NtReadFile and NtWriteFile fall back on creating an IRP. (See the section Fast I/O in Chapter 11 for a more complete description of fast I/O.)

**Memory Manager’s Modified and Mapped Page Writer**

The memory manager’s modified and mapped page writer threads wake up periodically (and when available memory runs low) to flush modified pages to their backing store on disk. The threads call IoAsynchronousPageWrite to create IRPs of type IRP_MJ_WRITE and write pages to either a paging file or a file that was modified after being mapped. Like the IRPs that MiDispatchFault creates,
these IRPs are flagged as noncached and paging I/O. Thus, an FSD bypasses the file system cache and issues IRPs directly to a storage driver to write the memory to disk.

**Cache Manager’s Lazy Writer**

The cache manager’s lazy writer thread also plays a role in writing modified pages because it periodically flushes views of file sections mapped in the cache that it knows are dirty. The flush operation, which the cache manager performs by calling MmFlushSection, triggers the memory manager to write any modified pages in the portion of the section being flushed to disk. Like the modified and mapped page writers, MmFlushSection uses IoSynchronousPageWrite to send the data to the FSD.

**Cache Manager’s Read-Ahead Thread**

A cache utilizes two artifacts of how programs reference code and data: temporal locality and spatial locality. The underlying concept behind temporal locality is that if a memory location is referenced, it is likely to be referenced again soon. The idea behind spatial locality is that if a memory location is referenced, other nearby locations are also likely to be referenced soon. Thus a cache typically is very good at speeding up access to memory locations that have been accessed in the near past, but it is terrible at speeding up access to areas of memory that have not yet been accessed (it has zero lookahead capability). In an attempt to populate the cache with data that will likely be used soon, the cache manager implements two mechanisms: a read-ahead thread, and Superfetch.

The cache manager includes a thread that is responsible for attempting to read data from files before an application, a driver, or a system thread explicitly requests it. The read-ahead thread uses the history of read operations that were performed on a file, which are stored in a file object’s private cache map, to determine how much data to read. When the thread performs a read-ahead, it simply maps the portion of the file it wants to read into the cache (allocating VACBs as necessary) and touches the mapped data. The page faults caused by the memory accesses invoke the page fault handler, which reads the pages into the system’s working set.

A limitation of the read-ahead thread is that it works only on open files. Superfetch was added to Windows to proactively add files to the cache before they are even
opened. Specifically, the memory manager sends page-usage information to the Superfetch service (%SystemRoot%\System32\Sysmain.dll), and a file system minifilter provides file name resolution data. The Superfetch service attempts to find file-usage patterns—for example, payroll is run every Friday at 12:00, or Outlook is run every morning at 8:00. When these patterns are derived, the information is stored in a database and timers are requested. Just prior to the time the file would most likely be used, a timer fires and wakes up the Superfetch service, which then tells the memory manager to read the file into low-priority memory (using low-priority disk I/O). If the file is then opened, the data is already in memory and there is no need to wait for the data to be read from disk. If the file is not opened, the low-priority memory will be reclaimed by the system.

Memory Manager’s Page Fault Handler

We described how the page fault handler is used in the context of explicit file I/O and cache manager read-ahead, but it is also invoked whenever any application accesses virtual memory that is a view of a mapped file and encounters pages that represent portions of a file that are not yet in memory. The memory manager’s MmAccessFault handler follows the same steps it does when the cache manager generates a page fault from CcCopyRead or CcCopyWrite, sending IRPs via IoPageRead to the file system on which the file is stored.

File System Filter Drivers

A filter driver that layers over a file system driver is called a file system filter driver. (See Chapter 8, for more information on filter drivers.) The ability to see all file system requests and optionally modify or complete them enables a range of applications, including remote file replication services, file encryption, efficient backup, and licensing. Every commercial on-access virus scanner includes a file system filter driver that intercepts IRPs that deliver IRP_MJ_CREATE commands that issue whenever an application opens a file. Before propagating the IRP to the file system driver to which the command is directed, the virus scanner examines the file being opened to ensure that it’s clean of a virus. If the file is clean, the virus scanner passes the IRP on, but if the file is infected the virus scanner communicates with its associated Windows service process to quarantine or clean the file. If the file can’t be cleaned, the driver fails the IRP (typically with an
access-denied error) so that the virus cannot become active.

**Process Monitor**

Process Monitor (Procmon), a system activity monitoring utility from Sysinternals that has been used throughout this book, is an example of a passive filter driver, which is one that does not modify the flow of IRPs between applications and file system drivers. Windows includes the file system Filter Manager (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Fltmgr.sys) as part of a port/miniport model for file system filter drivers. The file system Filter Manager greatly simplifies the development of filter drivers by interfacing a filter miniport driver to the Windows I/O system and providing services for querying file names, attaching to volumes, and interacting with other filters. Process Monitor’s file system monitoring is implemented as a minifilter driver.

Process Monitor works by extracting a file system filter device driver from its executable image (stored as a resource inside Procmon.exe) the first time you run it after a boot, installing the driver in memory, and then deleting the driver image from disk. Through the Process Monitor GUI, you can direct the driver to monitor file system activity on local volumes that have assigned drive letters, network shares, named pipes, and mail slots. When the driver receives a command to start monitoring a volume, it registers filtering callbacks with the Filter Manager, which is attached to the device object that represents a mounted file system on the volume. After an attach operation, the I/O manager redirects an IRP targeted at the underlying device object to the driver owning the attached device, in this case the Filter Manager, which sends the event to registered minifilter drivers, in this case Process Monitor.

When the Process Monitor driver intercepts an IRP, it records information about the IRP’s command, including target file name and other parameters specific to the command (such as read and write lengths and offsets) to a nonpaged kernel buffer. Every 500 milliseconds, the Process Monitor GUI program sends an IRP to Process Monitor’s interface device object, which requests a copy of the buffer containing the latest activity, and then displays the activity in its output window. Process Monitor’s use is described further in the next section, Troubleshooting File System Problems.
**EXPERIMENT: VIEWING PROCESS MONITOR’S FILTER DRIVER**

To see which file system filter drivers are loaded, start an Administrative command prompt, and run the Filter Manager control program (%SystemRoot%\System32\Fltmc.exe). Start Process Monitor (ProcMon.exe) and run Fltmc again. You’ll see that the Process Monitor’s filter driver (PROCMON20) is loaded and has a nonzero value in the Instances column. Now, exit Process Monitor and run Fltmc again. This time, you’ll see that the Process Monitor’s filter driver is still loaded, but now its instance count is zero.
Troubleshooting File System Problems

Chapter 4, “Management Mechanisms,” in Part 1 describes the way that the system and applications store data in the registry. Registry-related problems such as misconfigured security and missing registry values and keys are the source of many system and application failures. The system and applications also use files to store data, and they access executable and DLL image files. Misconfigured NTFS security and missing files or directories are therefore also a common source of system and application failures because the system and applications often make assumptions about what they should be able to access and then misbehave in unexpected ways when the assumptions are violated.

Process Monitor shows all file activity as it occurs, which makes it an ideal tool for troubleshooting file system–related system and application failures. To run Process Monitor the first time on a system, an account must have the Load Driver and Debug privileges. After loading, the driver remains resident, so subsequent executions require only the Debug privilege.

Process Monitor Basic vs. Advanced Modes

When you run Process Monitor, it starts in basic mode, which shows the file system activity most often useful for troubleshooting. When in basic mode, Process Monitor omits certain file system operations from being displayed, including:

- I/O to NTFS metadata files
- I/O to the paging file
- I/O generated by the System process
- I/O generated by the Process Monitor process

While in basic mode, Process Monitor also reports file I/O operations with friendly names rather than with the IRP types used to represent them. For example, both IRP_MJ_WRITE and FASTIO_WRITE operations display as WriteFile, and IRP_MJ_CREATE operations show as Open if they represent an open operation and as Create for the creation of new files.
Windows file system drivers implement support for file change notification, which enables applications to request notifications of file system changes without polling for them. The Windows functions for doing so include ReadDirectoryChangesW and the FindFirstChangeNotification, FindNextChangeNotification pair. When you run Process Monitor on a system that’s idle, you should therefore not see the repeated accesses to files or directories because that activity unnecessarily negatively affects a system’s overall performance.

Run Process Monitor, and after several seconds examine the output log to see whether you can spot polling behavior. Right-click on an output line associated with polling, click Properties on the context menu, and then click the Process tab in the Properties dialog box to view details of the process performing the activity.

### Process Monitor Troubleshooting Techniques

The two basic Process Monitor troubleshooting techniques for file system problems are identical to those for registry-related problems: look in a Process Monitor trace at the last thing an application did before it failed, or compare a Process Monitor trace of a failing application with a trace from a working system. See the section Process Monitor Troubleshooting Techniques in Chapter 4 in Part 1 for more information on these techniques.

Entries in a Process Monitor trace that have values of NAME NOT FOUND, NO SUCH FILE, PATH NOT FOUND, SHARING VIOLATION, and ACCESS DENIED in the Result column are ones that you should investigate. The first three are reported when an application or the system attempts to open a nonexistent file or directory. In many cases, these errors do not indicate a serious problem. When you execute a program from the Start menu’s Run dialog box without specifying its full path, for instance, Windows Explorer will search the directories listed in the system PATH environment variable for the image file until it locates the file or has searched all the listed directories. Each attempt to find the image in a directory that does not contain it results in a Process Monitor output line similar to this:

```
25314  7:44:27.4180943 PM Explorer.EXE 1640 CreateFile
C:\Program Files\Microsoft Windows Performance Toolkit\test.exe NAME NOT FOUND
Desired Access: Read Attributes, Disposition: Open, Options: Open Reparse Point,
Attributes: n/a, ShareMode: Read, Write, Delete, AllocationSize: n/a
```

Access-denied errors are a common source of file system–related application failures, and they occur when an application does not have permission to open the file or directory for the access types it desires. Some applications do not check error codes or perform error recovery, and they fail by crashing or terminating; others often display misleading error messages that mask the root cause of the error.
Buffer-overflow exploits are a serious security concern, but a code result of BUFFER OVERFLOW is simply a file system driver’s way to indicate to an application that the buffer it specified to store requested result data was too small to hold the data. Application developers use this behavior to determine how large a buffer should be because the file system driver also returns the size of the buffer required to store the data. Operations with a buffer overflow result are usually followed by the same operation with a successful result.

Process Monitor has been used extensively within Microsoft and other organizations to solve difficult or nearly impossible-to-diagnose problems.
Common Log File System

Transactional semantics for a database or a journaled file system often require keeping track of changes made to the data and metadata contained in the files or entries. Typically, these changes are stored in data structures called log records through an operation called logging. These log records can then be used to undo (roll back), redo, or validate the changes at a later time, even across system reboots.

Windows provides this kind of logging service through the Common Log File System (CLFS) to support the transactional features built into Windows, including transactional NTFS (TxF) and transactional registry (TxR), and to enable third-party developers to take advantage of similar technology. CLFS provides user-mode and kernel-mode APIs for creating, reading, and writing CLFS log files. The APIs are flexible and extensible, which allows the implementation details and structure of the log records stored in a log file to be defined by a caller. CLFS can be used by a variety of applications, such as databases; for store and forward message queues and replication agents; and for operations such as event logging, compliance logging, or even maintaining undo/redo history in an editor. The CLFS APIs provide a consistent view of a log and allow the sharing of a log between user-mode and kernel-mode components.

Although CLFS calls itself a file system, it actually provides a virtual abstraction layer on top of NTFS by using streams and containers, described later. What CLFS exposes as a single virtual log file could actually be a single physical log file, a single log file divided into multiple physical files, or even different log files each divided into multiple physical files. Later, we’ll describe how NTFS interacts with CLFS to provide transactional support.

Marshalling

Internally, CLFS encapsulates the functionality of the Algorithm for Recovery and Isolation Exploiting Semantics (ARIES), which allows it to provide reliable recovery and replication of operations by using an industry-approved standard. However, CLFS is not limited to supporting ARIES; it is well suited to a variety of logging scenarios. You can find the full ARIES specification at
The primary job of any high-performance transactional log is to allow log clients to accurately repeat history. CLFS does this by marshalling client log records into memory buffers, forcing them to stable storage (a disk volume), and reading records back on request. After a record makes it to stable storage and the storage media is intact, CLFS is able to read the record across system failures.

Both user-mode and kernel-mode clients marshal data buffers into log records that are part of a marshalling area maintained in the client’s address space. When creating a marshalling area, a client must specify the number and size of the log I/O buffers it wants to maintain in its marshaling area. The marshalling runtime implements policy on allocating log I/O buffers, appending them to the log internal queue and flushing them to disk. Clients can override the default marshalling code policy by forcing queue appends and flushes to disk via API calls.

One of the design goals of the CLFS marshalling runtime is to minimize kernel transitions, which it achieves, among other things, through log-space reservation, a requirement for supporting scenarios such as transaction rollbacks. Every time the log marshalling area talks to the CLFS driver (which implies a kernel transition for user-mode clients), the marshalling area tries to negotiate a desired amount of reserved space, usually larger than what is currently required. This means that if the client requires more space in the future, the marshalling area can immediately satisfy the new request without issuing a new kernel transition. Note, however, that if the amount of the reservation cannot be satisfied, the marshalling area will try to get just enough of the reservation to satisfy the user’s request (without extra reserved space), which could potentially lead to additional kernel transitions.

**Log Types**

CLFS supports two types of logs: dedicated logs and multiplexed logs (also called common logs). A dedicated log has a single stream of log records that is used by all the log’s clients. A multiplexed log has several streams: each stream has its own clients and its own memory buffers for marshalling log records, but the records from all those buffers are multiplexed into a single queue and written to a single log on stable storage. Multiplexing allows the I/O operations of several streams to be consolidated. When a log is created or opened, CLFS determines whether the
log is dedicated or multiplexed depending on whether a dedicated log path or a multiplexed log path is specified.

If the request is for a client on a dedicated log (called a physical client), CLFS locates the physical file control block (FCB) object for the file proper and handles the request.

If the request is for a client on a multiplexed log (called a virtual client), CLFS locates the corresponding virtual FCB and context control block (CCB) objects to translate the request into an operation on the physical FCB object. CLFS then handles the operation on the CLFS physical FCB object as just described.

In either case, if the request is a cached read, CLFS uses the cache manager’s services for accessing cached data. (For more information on the cache manager, see Chapter 11.) Just as it does for requests from other file system drivers, the cache manager maps a view of the file and references the view, which might cause the memory manager to issue noncached reads to CLFS against the physical log. For flushes and noncached reads, CLFS finds the target container object through the log metadata and issues IRPs to NTFS directly. Figure 12-12 shows the possible CLFS paths for a request coming from user mode or kernel mode.

Because each stream of a multiplexed log provides its clients with the illusion that their stream is the entire log, CLFS must include metadata in the physical log that identifies which client each data block belongs to. This data is called the owner page and is always exactly one page (4 KB) in size. Each 512 KB of client data results in an owner page to describe it. Since dedicated logs require no tracking of client and data mapping, they don’t include owner pages. Figure 12-13 shows two clients writing log records to a multiplexed log and how the writes are kept together in a unified flush queue that can then be uniformly flushed to physical storage through a single I/O operation.

The flush queue will be emptied in the following conditions:

- The amount of data in the flush queue exceeds a certain threshold. (The default is 40,000 bytes.)
- The CLFS flush API is called.
- A restart area is being written, and the log needs to be flushed beyond the restart area. (For more information on the restart area, see the section Log File
When flushing, CLFS scans the flush queue and determines how many entries need to be flushed. It then issues IRPs to NTFS for the corresponding log files of each of the entries and waits for all the IRPs to complete. If some IRPs fail, CLFS may re-issue IRPs (failures such as low memory condition, lack of quota, and so on are subject to retry) to redo the work and wait again.

Figure 12-12. CLFS request paths
Log Layout

A log file is made up of a base log file (BLF) that contains metadata and up to 1,023 containers that hold the actual data. The base log file is initially 64 KB in size and grows as needed. The log metadata stores information about the log, including the beginning of the log, the container size, the container path, the location from which restart operations should be performed, the log state, the log name, and the log clients. For consistency in case a system failure occurs during a log update, the base log file stores two copies of the log metadata, and when it makes updates it overwrites the older copy. The BLF stores a value, the dump count, that indicates which copy is newer.

A container is the unit of allocation for an active physical log stream. All the containers in a log have the same size, which is a multiple of 512 KB with a 4-GB maximum size. A CLFS client grows or shrinks a log stream by adding or deleting containers from the log file. CLFS implements containers as contiguous files on the volume on which the BLF resides. Figure 12-14 shows the relationship between a base log file and the associated log data stored in containers.
Internally, the CLFS driver places the containers in a container queue to give clients a logical view of a single contiguous physical log stream; in doing so, the CLFS driver maps the physical container identifier to a logical container identifier. Containers are recycled when the tail of the active log migrates beyond the last sector of the container. Recycling a container involves moving it from the tail to the head of the container queue and appropriately updating its logical container identifier.

**Log Sequence Numbers**

When a client writes a record to a stream, CLFS returns a log sequence number (LSN) that identifies the log record for future reference. The LSNs assigned to the records that are written to a particular stream form an increasing sequence. That is, the LSN assigned to a record that is written to a stream is always greater than the LSN assigned to the previous record written to that same stream. Two critical LSNs that the base log file keeps track of are the log start LSN and the restart LSN, which, as described earlier, are stored in the BLF metadata.

An LSN is 64 bits wide and consists of three parts, as shown in Figure 12-15:

- A 32-bit container index that identifies the log container where the log record resides
- A 23-bit block offset that identifies an offset within a container
- A 9-bit record offset that identifies a record within a block
Log Blocks

Because it is possible that a write to a log might fail, which is called a torn write, CLFS uses log blocks to track whether log records are fully committed to storage. CLFS stores log records within log blocks, which correspond to 512-byte sectors, and reads and writes data to a log using log blocks. Each log block includes a 2-byte sector signature at the end of each sector in the block that stores a sequence number and flags, as well as a copy of the most recently committed signatures in a signature array at the end of the block, as shown in Figure 12-16. Only if all the sector signatures in a log block are valid and match the signatures in the array, does CLFS consider the block valid. If a log block is partially written and a system failure occurs, for example, the signatures won’t match, and CLFS considers the log block invalid.

Owner Pages

As mentioned previously, each 512-KB block of data in a multiplexed log (called a region) is correlated with its virtual log through an owner page. Each region consists of 4-KB pages, and each page contains one or more sectors, which contain log blocks. The owner page is the last page of a region, as shown in Figure 12-17. Because the owner page is itself a log block, CLFS can detect torn writes on the owner page, just as for a log record, by using the log block signature array.
An owner page contains two kinds of information:

- For each sector in the region, the virtual log to which the sector belongs as well as the sector’s serial number (starting from 0). There can be at most 1,024 sectors in a region.

- For each virtual log, the minimum and maximum virtual log LSN for the region. These values give the range of valid virtual LSNs for the region.

CLFS can tell by looking at the owner page of a virtual log LSN whether the record specified by the LSN resides in the current region or not. If the record does not reside in the current region, CLFS can decide whether it should search the previous region or the next region by comparing the virtual log LSN with the virtual log LSN range for the region.

When CLFS inserts log blocks into a multiplexed log’s physical FCB flush queue, if it finds that the current log block will overlap the owner page of the current region, it splits the current log block and inserts an owner page log block after the first half of the split log block (as shown in Figure 12-17). In other words, the owner page is written to disk only after the region that it describes becomes full. When a client reopens a multiplexed log file, CLFS scans the regions and rebuilds an in-memory owner page describing the latest region for which it hasn’t written an owner page log block.

Note that when reopening the log file, CLFS doesn’t know exactly where the log end LSN is, so it must find the LSN to avoid losing data or using corrupted data.

For a dedicated log, CLFS reads the log blocks sequentially until an invalid log block is found and then sets the end of the log there. For a multiplexed log, CLFS reads the last owner page (the base log file saves a copy of the last flushed owner page’s LSN when the log metadata is last flushed) and verifies it is indeed valid. CLFS then reads the next region’s owner page repeatedly until an invalid owner
page is found. After that, CLFS scans backward to find the first region with only valid log data blocks. CLFS then assumes the end of the log must fall within the next region. It will scan log block by log block until an invalid log block is found and then set the end of the log there.

**Translating Virtual LSNs to Physical LSNs**

CLFS relies on physical LSNs to identify log blocks within a physical log. However, CLFS combines several virtual logs in a physical log for multiplexed logs and uses virtual LSNs to locate log blocks in a virtual log. Therefore, for a virtual log client, a log block can be addressed both by a physical LSN and by a virtual LSN.

To translate a virtual log LSN to a physical log LSN, CLFS follows these steps:

1. Reads the owner page for the region indicated by the virtual log LSN.
2. Checks the owner page’s virtual LSN region to see whether the virtual LSN is actually in the region or not. Most of the time the log block will be in the region.
3. If the virtual LSN is in the region, CLFS refers to the sector to client mapping in the owner page to find the physical LSN’s block offset. Given a client’s virtual LSN and its size, CLFS can calculate the virtual LSN of the next log block. Applying this rule, CLFS can deterministically calculate the physical LSN of every virtual log block in the region, as shown in Figure 12-18.
4. If the virtual LSN is not in the region, CLFS searches either the previous region or the next region depending on whether the virtual LSN is smaller or larger than the current region’s virtual LSN range.
Management Policies

Each CLFS log can be defined by a set of management policies that are configurable by the client. Table 12-5 lists these policies and their usage.

Table 12-5. CLFS Management Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ClfsMgmtPolicyMaximumSize</td>
<td>Specifies the maximum size of a log.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ClfsMgmtPolicyMinimumSize</td>
<td>Specifies the minimum size of a log.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ClfsMgmtPolicyNewContainerSize</td>
<td>Specifies the size of new containers that are created.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ClfsMgmtPolicyGrowthRate</td>
<td>Specifies how many new containers will be added to the log each time the log grows. Can be specified as either a relative percentage or an absolute number.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ClfsMgmtPolicyLogTail</td>
<td>Specifies how much free space will be requested when a client is notified to move its log tail. Can be specified as either a minimum percentage of free space or a minimum number of containers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ClfsMgmtPolicyAutoShrink</td>
<td>Specifies when the log will shrink based on the percentage of the log that is free.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ClfsMgmtPolicyAutoGrow</td>
<td>Specifies whether the log should grow when fewer than two containers are free.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ClfsMgmtPolicyNewContainerPrefix</td>
<td>Specifies a prefix for the file name of each container, as well as the full path to the directory where the containers are located.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NTFS Design Goals and Features

In the following section, we’ll look at the requirements that drove the design of NTFS. Then, in the subsequent section, we’ll examine the advanced features of NTFS.

High-End File System Requirements

From the start, NTFS was designed to include features required of an enterprise-class file system. To minimize data loss in the face of an unexpected system outage or crash, a file system must ensure that the integrity of its metadata is guaranteed at all times; and to protect sensitive data from unauthorized access, a file system must have an integrated security model. Finally, a file system must allow for software-based data redundancy as a low-cost alternative to hardware-redundant solutions for protecting user data. In this section, you’ll find out how NTFS implements each of these capabilities.

Recoverability

To address the requirement for reliable data storage and data access, NTFS provides file system recovery based on the concept of an atomic transaction. Atomic transactions are a technique for handling modifications to a database so that system failures don’t affect the correctness or integrity of the database. The basic tenet of atomic transactions is that some database operations, called transactions, are all-or-nothing propositions. (A transaction is defined as an I/O operation that alters file system data or changes the volume’s directory structure.) The separate disk updates that make up the transaction must be executed atomically—that is, once the transaction begins to execute, all its disk updates must be completed. If a system failure interrupts the transaction, the part that has been completed must be undone, or rolled back. The rollback operation returns the database to a previously known and consistent state, as if the transaction had never occurred.

NTFS uses atomic transactions to implement its file system recovery feature. If a program initiates an I/O operation that alters the structure of an NTFS volume—that is, changes the directory structure, extends a file, allocates space for a new file, and so on—NTFS treats that operation as an atomic transaction. It guarantees that
the transaction is either completed or, if the system fails while executing the
transaction, rolled back. The details of how NTFS does this are explained in the
section NTFS Recovery Support later in the chapter. In addition, NTFS uses
redundant storage for vital file system information so that if a sector on the disk
goes bad, NTFS can still access the volume’s critical file system data.

**Security**

Security in NTFS is derived directly from the Windows object model. Files and
directories are protected from being accessed by unauthorized users. (For more
information on Windows security, see Chapter 6, “Security,” in Part 1.) An open
file is implemented as a file object with a security descriptor stored on disk in the
hidden $Secure metafile, in a stream named $SDS (Security Descriptor Stream).
Before a process can open a handle to any object, including a file object, the
Windows security system verifies that the process has appropriate authorization to
do so. The security descriptor, combined with the requirement that a user log on to
the system and provide an identifying password, ensures that no process can access
a file unless it is given specific permission to do so by a system administrator or by
the file’s owner. (For more information about security descriptors, see the section
“Security Descriptors and Access Control” in Chapter 6 in Part 1, and for more
details about file objects, see the section Opening Devices in Chapter 8.)

**Data Redundancy and Fault Tolerance**

In addition to recoverability of file system data, some customers require that their
own data not be endangered by a power outage or catastrophic disk failure. The
NTFS recovery capabilities do ensure that the file system on a volume remains
accessible, but they make no guarantees for complete recovery of user files.
Protection for applications that can’t risk losing file data is provided through data
redundancy.

Data redundancy for user files is implemented via the Windows layered driver
model (explained in Chapter 8), which provides fault-tolerant disk support. NTFS
communicates with a volume manager, which in turn communicates with a disk
driver to write data to a disk. A volume manager can mirror, or duplicate, data
from one disk onto another disk so that a redundant copy can always be retrieved.
This support is commonly called RAID level 1. Volume managers also allow data
Advanced Features of NTFS

In addition to NTFS being recoverable, secure, reliable, and efficient for mission-critical systems, it includes the following advanced features that allow it to support a broad range of applications. Some of these features are exposed as APIs for applications to leverage, and others are internal features:

- Multiple data streams
- Unicode-based names
- General indexing facility
- Dynamic bad-cluster remapping
- Hard links
- Symbolic (soft) links and junctions
- Compression and sparse files
- Change logging
- Per-user volume quotas
- Link tracking
- Encryption
- POSIX support
- Defragmentation
- Read-only support and dynamic partitioning

The following sections provide an overview of these features.

Multiple Data Streams

In NTFS, each unit of information associated with a file—including its name, its owner, its time stamps, its contents, and so on—is implemented as a file attribute...
(NTFS object attribute). Each attribute consists of a single stream—that is, a simple sequence of bytes. This generic implementation makes it easy to add more attributes (and therefore more streams) to a file. Because a file’s data is “just another attribute” of the file and because new attributes can be added, NTFS files (and file directories) can contain multiple data streams.

An NTFS file has one default data stream, which has no name. An application can create additional, named data streams and access them by referring to their names. To avoid altering the Windows I/O APIs, which take a string as a file name argument, the name of the data stream is specified by appending a colon (:) to the file name. Because the colon is a reserved character, it can serve as a separator between the file name and the data stream name, as illustrated in this example:

```
myfile.dat:stream2
```

Each stream has a separate allocation size (which defines how much disk space has been reserved for it), actual size (which is how many bytes the caller has used), and valid data length (which is how much of the stream has been initialized). In addition, each stream is given a separate file lock that is used to lock byte ranges and to allow concurrent access.

One component in Windows that uses multiple data streams is the Attachment Execution Service, which is invoked whenever the standard Windows API for saving Internet-based attachments is used by applications such as Internet Explorer or Outlook. Depending on which zone the file was downloaded from (such as the My Computer zone, the Intranet zone, or the Untrusted zone), Windows Explorer might warn the user that the file came from a possibly untrusted location or even completely block access to the file. For example, Figure 12-19 shows the dialog box that’s displayed when executing Process Explorer after it was downloaded from the Sysinternals site.

**NOTE**

If you clear the check box for Always Ask Before Opening This File, the zone identifier data stream will be removed from the file.
Other applications can use the multiple data stream feature as well. A backup utility, for example, might use an extra data stream to store backup-specific time stamps on files. Or an archival utility might implement hierarchical storage in which files that are older than a certain date or that haven’t been accessed for a specified period of time are moved to offline storage. The utility could copy the file to offline storage, set the file’s default data stream to 0, and add a data stream that specifies where the file is stored.

**EXPERIMENT: LOOKING AT STREAMS**

Most Windows applications aren’t designed to work with alternate named streams, but both the echo and more commands are. Thus, a simple way to view streams in action is to create a named stream using echo and then display it using more. The following command sequence creates a file named test with a stream named stream:

```bash
C:\>echo hello > test:stream
C:\>more < test:stream
hello
C:\>
```

If you perform a directory listing, Test’s file size doesn’t reflect the data stored in the alternate stream because NTFS returns the size of only the unnamed data stream for file query operations, including directory listings.

```bash
C:\>dir test
Volume in drive C is WINDOWS
Volume Serial Number is 3991-3040
Directory of C:\

08/01/00  02:37p                    0 test
1 File(s)             0 bytes
```
You can determine what files and directories on your system have alternate data streams with the Streams utility from Sysinternals (see the following output) or by using the /r switch in the dir command.

C:\>streams test

Streams v1.56 - Enumerate alternate NTFS data streams
Copyright (C) 1999-2007 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

C:\\test: :stream:$DATA 8

**Unicode-Based Names**

Like Windows as a whole, NTFS supports 16-bit Unicode 1.0/UTF-16 characters to store names of files, directories, and volumes. (The current version of the Unicode standard, version 6.1, from February 2012, supports up to 4 bytes per character and is not supported in kernel mode.) Unicode allows each character in each of the world’s major languages to be uniquely represented, which aids in moving data easily from one country to another. Unicode is an improvement over the traditional representation of international characters—using a double-byte coding scheme that stores some characters in 8 bits and others in 16 bits, a technique that requires loading various code pages to establish the available characters. Because Unicode has a unique representation for each character, it doesn’t depend on which code page is loaded. Each directory and file name in a path can be as many as 255 characters long and can contain Unicode characters, embedded spaces, and multiple periods.

**General Indexing Facility**

The NTFS architecture is structured to allow indexing of any file attribute on a disk volume using a B-tree structure. (Creating indexes on arbitrary attributes is not exported to users.) This structure enables the file system to efficiently locate files that match certain criteria—for example, all the files in a particular directory. In contrast, the FAT file system indexes file names but doesn’t sort them, making lookups in large directories slow.

Several NTFS features take advantage of general indexing, including consolidated security descriptors, in which the security descriptors of a volume’s files and directories are stored in a single internal stream, have duplicates removed, and are
indexed using an internal security identifier that NTFS defines. The use of indexing by these features is described in the section NTFS On-Disk Structure later in this chapter.

**Dynamic Bad-Cluster Remapping**

Ordinarily, if a program tries to read data from a bad disk sector, the read operation fails and the data in the allocated cluster becomes inaccessible. If the disk is formatted as a fault-tolerant NTFS volume, however, the Windows volume manager dynamically retrieves a good copy of the data that was stored on the bad sector and then sends NTFS a warning that the sector is bad. NTFS will then allocate a new cluster, replacing the cluster in which the bad sector resides, and copies the data to the new cluster. It adds the bad cluster to the list of bad clusters on that volume (stored in the hidden metadata file $BadClus) and no longer uses it. This data recovery and dynamic bad-cluster remapping is an especially useful feature for file servers and fault-tolerant systems or for any application that can’t afford to lose data. If the volume manager isn’t loaded when a sector goes bad (such as early in the boot sequence), NTFS still replaces the cluster and doesn’t reuse it, but it can’t recover the data that was on the bad sector.

**Hard Links**

A hard link allows multiple paths to refer to the same file. (Hard links are not supported on directories.) If you create a hard link named C:\Documents\Spec.doc that refers to the existing file C:\Users\Administrator\Documents\Spec.doc, the two paths link to the same on-disk file, and you can make changes to the file using either path. Processes can create hard links with the Windows CreateHardLink function or the ln POSIX function.

NTFS implements hard links by keeping a reference count on the actual data, where each time a hard link is created for the file, an additional file name reference is made to the data. This means that if you have multiple hard links for a file, you can delete the original file name that referenced the data (C:\Users\Administrator\Documents\Spec.doc in our example), and the other hard links (C:\Documents\Spec.doc) will remain and point to the data. However, because hard links are on-disk local references to data (represented by a file record number), they can exist only within the same volume and can’t span volumes or
computers.

**EXPERIMENT: CREATING A HARD LINK**

There are two ways you can create a hard link: the `fsutil hardlink create` command or the `mklink` utility with the `/H` option. In this experiment we'll use `mklink` because we'll use this utility later to create a symbolic link as well. First, create a file called `test.txt` and add some text to it, as shown here.

```
C:\> echo hello > test.txt
```

Now create a hard link called `hard.txt` as shown here:

```
C:\> mklink hard.txt test.txt /H
Hardlink created for hard.txt <<=====>> test.txt
```

If you list the directory’s contents, you’ll notice that the two files will be identical in every way, with the same creation date, permissions, and file size; only the file names differ.

```
C:\> dir *.txt
Volume in drive C is OS
Volume Serial Number is 38D4-EA71
Directory of C:\
05/12/2012  11:55 PM                 8 hard.txt
05/12/2012  11:55 PM                 8 test.txt
  2 File(s)             16 bytes
 0 Dir(s)  10,646,011,904 bytes free
```

**Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions**

In addition to hard links, NTFS supports another type of file-name aliasing called symbolic links or soft links. Unlike hard links, symbolic links are strings that are interpreted dynamically and can be relative or absolute paths that refer to locations on any storage device, including ones on a different local volume or even a share on a different system. This means that symbolic links don’t actually increase the reference count of the original file, so deleting the original file will result in the loss of the data, and a symbolic link that points to a nonexisting file will be left behind. Finally, unlike hard links, symbolic links can point to directories, not just files, which gives them an added advantage.

For example, if the path `C:\Drivers` is a directory symbolic link that redirects to `%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers`, an application reading `C:\Drivers\Ntfs.sys` actually reads `%SystemRoot%\System\Drivers\Ntfs.sys`. Directory symbolic links are a useful way to lift directories that are deep in a directory tree to a more convenient depth without disturbing the original tree’s structure or contents. The example just cited lifts the Drivers directory to the volume’s root directory, reducing the directory depth of Ntfs.sys from three levels to one when Ntfs.sys is
accessed through the directory symbolic link. File symbolic links work much the same way—you can think of them as shortcuts, except they are actually implemented on the file system instead of being .lnk files managed by Windows Explorer. Just like hard links, symbolic links can be created with the mklink utility (without the /H option) or through the CreateSymbolicLink API.

Because certain legacy applications might not behave securely in the presence of symbolic links, especially across different machines, the creation of symbolic links requires the SeCreateSymbolicLink privilege, which is typically granted only to administrators. The file system also has a behavior option called SymLinkEvaluation that can be configured with the following command:

```
fsutil behavior set SymLinkEvaluation
```

By default, the Windows default symbolic link evaluation policy allows only local-to-local and local-to-remote symbolic links but not the opposite, as shown here:

```
C:\>fsutil behavior query SymLinkEvaluation
Local to local symbolic links are enabled
Local to remote symbolic links are enabled.
Remote to local symbolic links are disabled.
Remote to Remote symbolic links are disabled.
```

Symbolic links are implemented using an NTFS mechanism called reparse points. (Reparse points are discussed further in the section Reparse Points later in this chapter.) A reparse point is a file or directory that has a block of data called reparse data associated with it. Reparse data is user-defined data about the file or directory, such as its state or location that can be read from the reparse point by the application that created the data, a file system filter driver, or the I/O manager. When NTFS encounters a reparse point during a file or directory lookup, it returns the STATUS_REPARSE status code, which signals file system filter drivers that are attached to the volume and the I/O manager to examine the reparse data. Each reparse point type has a unique reparse tag. The reparse tag allows the component responsible for interpreting the reparse point’s reparse data to recognize the reparse point without having to check the reparse data. A reparse tag owner, either a file system filter driver or the I/O manager, can choose one of the following options when it recognizes reparse data:

- The reparse tag owner can manipulate the path name specified in the file I/O operation that crosses the reparse point and let the I/O operation reissue with the altered path name. Junctions (described shortly) take this approach to
redirect a directory lookup, for example.

- The reparse tag owner can remove the reparse point from the file, alter the file in some way, and then reissue the file I/O operation.

There are no Windows functions for creating reparse points. Instead, processes must use the FSCTL_SET_REPARSE_POINT file system control code with the Windows DeviceIoControl function. A process can query a reparse point’s contents with the FSCTL_GET_REPARSE_POINT file system control code. The FILE_ATTRIBUTE_REPARSE_POINT flag is set in a reparse point’s file attributes, so applications can check for reparse points by using the Windows GetFileAttributes function.

Another type of reparse point that NTFS supports is the junction. Junctions are a legacy NTFS concept and work almost identically to directory symbolic links, except they can only be local to a volume. There is no advantage to using a junction instead of a directory symbolic link, except that junctions are compatible with older versions of Windows, while directory symbolic links are not.

### EXPERIMENT: CREATING A SYMBOLIC LINK

This experiment shows you the main difference between a symbolic link and a hard link, even when dealing with files on the same volume. Create a symbolic link called soft.txt as shown here, pointing to the test.txt file created in the previous experiment:

```
C:\mklink soft.txt test.txt
symbolic link created for soft.txt <<====> test.txt
```

If you list the directory’s contents, you’ll notice that the symbolic link doesn’t have a file size and is identified by the <SYMLINK> type. Furthermore, you’ll note that the creation time is that of the symbolic link, not of the target file. The symbolic link can also have security permissions that are different from the permissions on the target file.

```
C:\>dir *.txt
  Volume in drive C is OS
  Volume Serial Number is 38D4-EA71
  Directory of C:\
  05/12/2012  11:55 PM                 8 hard.txt
  05/13/2012  12:28 AM    <SYMLINK>    soft.txt [test.txt]
  05/12/2012  11:55 PM                 8 test.txt
  3 File(s)             16 bytes
  0 Dir(s)  10,636,480,512 bytes free
```

Finally, if you delete the original test.txt file, you can verify that both the hard link and symbolic link still exist but that the symbolic link does not point to a valid file anymore, while the hard link references the file data.
Compression and Sparse Files

NTFS supports compression of file data. Because NTFS performs compression and decompression procedures transparently, applications don’t have to be modified to take advantage of this feature. Directories can also be compressed, which means that any files subsequently created in the directory are compressed.

Applications compress and decompress files by passing DeviceIoControl the FSCTL_SET_COMPRESSION file system control code. They query the compression state of a file or directory with the FSCTL_GET_COMPRESSION file system control code. A file or directory that is compressed has the FILE_ATTRIBUTE_COMPRESSED flag set in its attributes, so applications can also determine a file or directory’s compression state with GetFileAttributes.

A second type of compression is known as sparse files. If a file is marked as sparse, NTFS doesn’t allocate space on a volume for portions of the file that an application designates as empty. NTFS returns 0-filled buffers when an application reads from empty areas of a sparse file. This type of compression can be useful for client/server applications that implement circular-buffer logging, in which the server records information to a file and clients asynchronously read the information. Because the information that the server writes isn’t needed after a client has read it, there’s no need to store the information in the file. By making such a file sparse, the client can specify the portions of the file it reads as empty, freeing up space on the volume. The server can continue to append new information to the file without fear that the file will grow to consume all available space on the volume.

As with compressed files, NTFS manages sparse files transparently. Applications specify a file’s sparseness state by passing the FSCTL_SET_SPARSE file system control code to DeviceIoControl. To set a range of a file to empty, applications use the FSCTL_SET_ZERO_DATA code, and they can ask NTFS for a description of what parts of a file are sparse by using the control code FSCTL_QUERY_ALLOCATED_RANGES. One application of sparse files is the NTFS change journal, described next.

Change Logging

Many types of applications need to monitor volumes for file and directory changes.
For example, an automatic backup program might perform an initial full backup and then incremental backups based on file changes. An obvious way for an application to monitor a volume for changes is for it to scan the volume, recording the state of files and directories, and on a subsequent scan detect differences. This process can adversely affect system performance, however, especially on computers with thousands or tens of thousands of files.

An alternate approach is for an application to register a directory notification by using the FindFirstChangeNotification or ReadDirectoryChangesW Windows function. As an input parameter, the application specifies the name of a directory it wants to monitor, and the function returns whenever the contents of the directory change. Although this approach is more efficient than volume scanning, it requires the application to be running at all times. Using these functions can also require an application to scan directories because FindFirstChangeNotification doesn’t indicate what changed—just that something in the directory has changed. An application can pass a buffer to ReadDirectoryChangesW that the FSD fills in with change records. If the buffer overflows, however, the application must be prepared to fall back on scanning the directory.

NTFS provides a third approach that overcomes the drawbacks of the first two: an application can configure the NTFS change journal facility by using the DeviceIoControl function’s FSCTL_CREATE_USN_JOURNAL file system control code (USN is update sequence number) to have NTFS record information about file and directory changes to an internal file called the change journal. A change journal is usually large enough to virtually guarantee that applications get a chance to process changes without missing any. Applications use the FSCTL_QUERY_USN_JOURNAL file system control code to read records from a change journal, and they can specify that the DeviceIoControl function not complete until new records are available.

**Per-User Volume Quotas**

Systems administrators often need to track or limit user disk space usage on shared storage volumes, so NTFS includes quota-management support. NTFS quota-management support allows for per-user specification of quota enforcement, which is useful for usage tracking and tracking when a user reaches warning and limit thresholds. NTFS can be configured to log an event indicating the occurrence to
the System event log if a user surpasses his warning limit. Similarly, if a user attempts to use more volume storage than her quota limit permits, NTFS can log an event to the System event log and fail the application file I/O that would have caused the quota violation with a “disk full” error code.

NTFS tracks a user’s volume usage by relying on the fact that it tags files and directories with the security ID (SID) of the user who created them. (See Chapter 6 in Part 1 for a definition of SIDs.) The logical sizes of files and directories a user owns count against the user’s administrator-defined quota limit. Thus, a user can’t circumvent his or her quota limit by creating an empty sparse file that is larger than the quota would allow and then fill the file with nonzero data. Similarly, whereas a 50-KB file might compress to 10 KB, the full 50 KB is used for quota accounting.

By default, volumes don’t have quota tracking enabled. You need to use the Quota tab of a volume’s Properties dialog box, shown in Figure 12-20, to enable quotas, to specify default warning and limit thresholds, and to configure the NTFS behavior that occurs when a user hits the warning or limit threshold. The Quota Entries tool, which you can launch from this dialog box, enables an administrator to specify different limits and behavior for each user. Applications that want to interact with NTFS quota management use COM quota interfaces, including IDiskQuotaControl, IDiskQuotaUser, and IDiskQuotaEvents.

![Figure 12-20. Volume Properties dialog box](image-url)
**Link Tracking**

Shell shortcuts allow users to place files in their shell namespace (on their desktop, for example) that link to files located in the file system namespace. The Windows Start menu uses shell shortcuts extensively. Similarly, object linking and embedding (OLE) links allow documents from one application to be transparently embedded in the documents of other applications. The products of the Microsoft Office suite, including PowerPoint, Excel, and Word, use OLE linking.

Although shell and OLE links provide an easy way to connect files with one another and with the shell namespace, they can be difficult to manage if a user moves the source of a shell or OLE link (a link source is the file or directory to which a link points). NTFS in Windows includes support for a service application called distributed link-tracking, which maintains the integrity of shell and OLE links when link targets move. Using the NTFS link-tracking support, if a link target located on an NTFS volume moves to any other NTFS volume within the originating volume’s domain, the link-tracking service can transparently follow the movement and update the link to reflect the change.

NTFS link-tracking support is based on an optional file attribute known as an object ID. An application can assign an object ID to a file by using the FSCTL_CREATE_OR_GET_OBJECT_ID (which assigns an ID if one isn’t already assigned) and FSCTL_SET_OBJECT_ID file system control codes. Object IDs are queried with the FSCTL_CREATE_OR_GET_OBJECT_ID and FSCTL_GET_OBJECT_ID file system control codes. The FSCTL_DELETE_OBJECT_ID file system control code lets applications delete object IDs from files.

**Encryption**

Corporate users often store sensitive information on their computers. Although data stored on company servers is usually safely protected with proper network security settings and physical access control, data stored on laptops can be exposed when a laptop is lost or stolen. NTFS file permissions don’t offer protection because NTFS volumes can be fully accessed without regard to security by using NTFS file-reading software that doesn’t require Windows to be running. Furthermore, NTFS file permissions are rendered useless when an alternate
Windows installation is used to access files from an administrator account. Recall from Chapter 6 in Part 1 that the administrator account has the take-ownership and backup privileges, both of which allow it to access any secured object by overriding the object’s security settings.

NTFS includes a facility called Encrypting File System (EFS), which users can use to encrypt sensitive data. The operation of EFS, as that of file compression, is completely transparent to applications, which means that file data is automatically decrypted when an application running in the account of a user authorized to view the data reads it and is automatically encrypted when an authorized application changes the data.

**NOTE**

NTFS doesn't permit the encryption of files located in the system volume's root directory or in the Windows directory because many files in these locations are required during the boot process and EFS isn't active during the boot process. BitLocker, described in Chapter 9, is a technology much better suited for environments in which this is a requirement because it supports full-volume encryption.

EFS relies on cryptographic services supplied by Windows in user mode, so it consists of both a kernel-mode component that tightly integrates with NTFS as well as user-mode DLLs that communicate with the Local Security Authority Subsystem (LSASS) and cryptographic DLLs.

Files that are encrypted can be accessed only by using the private key of an account’s EFS private/public key pair, and private keys are locked using an account’s password. Thus, EFS-encrypted files on lost or stolen laptops can’t be accessed using any means (other than a brute-force cryptographic attack) without the password of an account that is authorized to view the data.

Applications can use the EncryptFile and DecryptFile Windows API functions to encrypt and decrypt files, and FileEncryptionStatus to retrieve a file or directory’s EFS-related attributes, such as whether the file or directory is encrypted. A file or directory that is encrypted has the FILE_ATTRIBUTE_ENCRYPTED flag set in its attributes, so applications can also determine a file or directory’s encryption state with GetFileAttributes.

**POSIX Support**
As explained in Chapter 2, “System Architecture,” in Part 1, one of the mandates for Windows was to fully support the POSIX 1003.1 standard. In the file system area, the POSIX standard requires support for case-sensitive file and directory names, traversal permissions (where security for each directory of a path is used when determining whether a user has access to a file or directory), a “file-change-time” time stamp (which is different from the MS-DOS “time-last-modified” stamp), and hard links. NTFS implements each of these features.

### Defragmentation

Even though NTFS makes efforts to keep files contiguous when allocating blocks to extend a file, a volume’s files can still become fragmented over time, especially if the file is extended multiple times or when there is limited free space. A file is fragmented if its data occupies discontiguous clusters. For example, Figure 12-21 shows a fragmented file consisting of five fragments. However, like most file systems (including versions of FAT on Windows), NTFS makes no special efforts to keep files contiguous (this is handled by the built-in defragmenter), other than to reserve a region of disk space known as the master file table (MFT) zone for the MFT. (NTFS lets other files allocate from the MFT zone when volume free space runs low.) Keeping an area free for the MFT can help it stay contiguous, but it, too, can become fragmented. (See the section Master File Table later in this chapter for more information on MFTs.)

![Fragmented and contiguous files](image)

Figure 12-21. Fragmented and contiguous files

To facilitate the development of third-party disk defragmentation tools, Windows includes a defragmentation API that such tools can use to move file data so that files occupy contiguous clusters. The API consists of file system controls that let applications obtain a map of a volume’s free and in-use clusters (FSCTL_GET_VOLUME_BITMAP), obtain a map of a file’s cluster usage (FSCTL_GET_RETRIEVAL_POINTERS), and move a file
Windows includes a built-in defragmentation tool that is accessible by using the Disk Defragmenter utility (%SystemRoot%\System32\Dfrgui.exe), shown in Figure 12-22, as well as a command-line interface, %SystemRoot%\System32\Defrag.exe, that you can run interactively or schedule but that does not produce detailed reports or offer control—such as excluding files or directories—over the defragmentation process.

The only limitation imposed by the defragmentation implementation in NTFS is that paging files and NTFS log files cannot be defragmented.

**Dynamic Partitioning**

The NTFS driver allows users to dynamically resize any partition, including the system partition, either shrinking or expanding it (if enough space is available). Expanding a partition is easy if enough space exists on the disk and is performed through the FSCTL_EXPAND_VOLUME file system control code. Shrinking a partition is a more complicated process, because it requires moving any file system data that is currently in the area to be thrown away to the region that will still remain after the shrinking process (a mechanism similar to defragmentation).
Shrinking is implemented by two components: the shrinking engine and the file system driver.

The shrinking engine is implemented in user mode. It communicates with NTFS to determine the maximum number of reclaimable bytes—that is, how much data can be moved from the region that will be resized into the region that will remain. The shrinking engine uses the standard defragmentation mechanism shown earlier, which doesn’t support relocating page file fragments that are in use or any other files that have been marked as unmovable with the FSCTL_MARK_HANDLE file system control code (like the hibernation file). The master file table backup ($MftMirr), the NTFS metadata transaction log ($LogFile), and the volume label file ($Volume) cannot be moved, which limits the minimum size of the shrunk volume and causes wasted space.

The file system driver shrinking code is responsible for ensuring that the volume remains in a consistent state throughout the shrinking process. To do so, it exposes an interface that uses three requests that describe the current operation, which are sent through the FSCTL_SHRINK_VOLUME control code:

- The **ShrinkPrepare** request, which must be issued before any other operation. This request takes the desired size of the new volume in sectors and is used so that the file system can block further allocations outside the new volume boundary. The ShrinkPrepare request doesn't verify whether the volume can actually be shrunk by the specified amount, but it does ensure that the amount is numerically valid and that there aren’t any other shrinking operations ongoing. Note that after a prepare operation, the file handle to the volume becomes associated with the shrink request. If the file handle is closed, the operation is assumed to be aborted.

- The **ShrinkCommit** request, which the shrinking engine issues after a ShrinkPrepare request. In this state, the file system attempts the removal of the requested number of clusters in the most recent prepare request. (If multiple prepare requests have been sent with different sizes, the last one is the determining one.) The ShrinkCommit request assumes that the shrinking engine has completed and will fail if any allocated blocks remain in the area to be shrunk.

- The **ShrinkAbort** request, which can be issued by the shrinking engine or
caused by events such as the closure of the file handle to the volume. This request undoes the ShrinkCommit operation by returning the partition to its original size and allows new allocations outside the shrunk region to occur again. However, defragmentation changes made by the shrinking engine remain.

If a system is rebooted during a shrinking operation, NTFS restores the file system to a consistent state via its metadata recovery mechanism, explained later in the chapter. Because the actual shrink operation isn't executed until all other operations have been completed, the volume retains its original size and only defragmentation operations that had already been flushed out to disk persist.

Finally, shrinking a volume has several effects on the volume shadow copy mechanism (for more information on VSS, see Chapter 9). Recall that the copy-on-write mechanism allows VSS to simply retain parts of the file that were actually modified while still linking to the original file data. For deleted files, this file data will not be associated with visible files but appear as free space instead—free space that will likely be located in the area that is about to be shrunk. The shrinking engine therefore communicates with VSS to engage it in the shrinking process. In summary, the VSS mechanism’s job is to copy deleted file data into its differencing area and to increase the differencing area as required to accommodate additional data. This detail is important because it poses another constraint on the size to which even volumes with ample free space can shrink.
NTFS File System Driver

As described in Chapter 8, in the framework of the Windows I/O system, NTFS and other file systems are loadable device drivers that run in kernel mode. They are invoked indirectly by applications that use Windows or other I/O APIs (such as POSIX). As Figure 12-23 shows, the Windows environment subsystems call Windows system services, which in turn locate the appropriate loaded drivers and call them. (For a description of system service dispatching, see the section “System Service Dispatching” in Chapter 3 in Part 1.)

![Figure 12-23. Components of the Windows I/O system](image)

The layered drivers pass I/O requests to one another by calling the Windows executive’s I/O manager. Relying on the I/O manager as an intermediary allows each driver to maintain independence so that it can be loaded or unloaded without affecting other drivers. In addition, the NTFS driver interacts with the three other Windows executive components, shown in the left side of Figure 12-24, that are closely related to file systems.

The log file service (LFS) is the part of NTFS that provides services for maintaining a log of disk writes. The log file that LFS writes is used to recover an
NTFS-formatted volume in the case of a system failure. (See the section Log File Service later in the chapter.)

The cache manager is the component of the Windows executive that provides systemwide caching services for NTFS and other file system drivers, including network file system drivers (servers and redirectors). All file systems implemented for Windows access cached files by mapping them into system address space and then accessing the virtual memory. The cache manager provides a specialized file system interface to the Windows memory manager for this purpose. When a program tries to access a part of a file that isn’t loaded into the cache (a cache miss), the memory manager calls NTFS to access the disk driver and obtain the file contents from disk. The cache manager optimizes disk I/O by using its lazy writer threads to call the memory manager to flush cache contents to disk as a background activity (asynchronous disk writing). (For a complete description of the cache manager, see Chapter 11.)

NTFS participates in the Windows object model by implementing files as objects. This implementation allows files to be shared and protected by the object manager, the component of Windows that manages all executive-level objects. (The object manager is described in the section “Object Manager” in Chapter 3 in Part 1.)
An application creates and accesses files just as it does other Windows objects: by means of object handles. By the time an I/O request reaches NTFS, the Windows object manager and security system have already verified that the calling process has the authority to access the file object in the way it is attempting to. The security system has compared the caller’s access token to the entries in the access control list for the file object. (See Chapter 6 in Part 1 for more information about access control lists.) The I/O manager has also transformed the file handle into a pointer to a file object. NTFS uses the information in the file object to access the file on disk.

Figure 12-25 shows the data structures that link a file handle to the file system’s on-disk structure.

![Figure 12-25. NTFS data structures](image)

NTFS follows several pointers to get from the file object to the location of the file on disk. As Figure 12-25 shows, a file object, which represents a single call to the open-file system service, points to a stream control block (SCB) for the file attribute that the caller is trying to read or write. In Figure 12-25, a process has
opened both the unnamed data attribute and a named stream (alternate data attribute) for the file. The SCBs represent individual file attributes and contain information about how to find specific attributes within a file. All the SCBs for a file point to a common data structure called a file control block (FCB). The FCB contains a pointer (actually, an index into the MFT, as explained in the section File Record Numbers later in this chapter) to the file’s record in the disk-based master file table (MFT), which is described in detail in the following section.
NTFS On-Disk Structure

This section describes the on-disk structure of an NTFS volume, including how disk space is divided and organized into clusters, how files are organized into directories, how the actual file data and attribute information is stored on disk, and finally, how NTFS data compression works.

Volumes

The structure of NTFS begins with a volume. A volume corresponds to a logical partition on a disk, and it is created when you format a disk or part of a disk for NTFS. You can also create a RAID volume that spans multiple disks by using the Windows Disk Management MMC snap-in or the diskpart (%SystemRoot%\System32\Diskpart.exe) command available from the Windows command prompt.

A disk can have one volume or several. NTFS handles each volume independently of the others. Three sample disk configurations for a 150-GB hard disk are illustrated in Figure 12-26.

A volume consists of a series of files plus any additional unallocated space remaining on the disk partition. In the FAT file system, a volume also contains areas specially formatted for use by the file system. An NTFS volume, however, stores all file system data, such as bitmaps and directories, and even the system bootstrap, as ordinary files.

NOTE

The on-disk format of NTFS volumes on Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 is version 3.1, the same as it has been since Windows XP and Windows Server 2003. The version number of a volume is stored in its $Volume metadata file.
Clusters

The cluster size on an NTFS volume, or the cluster factor, is established when a user formats the volume with either the format command or the Disk Management MMC snap-in. The default cluster factor varies with the size of the volume, but it is an integral number of physical sectors, always a power of 2 (1 sector, 2 sectors, 4 sectors, 8 sectors, and so on). The cluster factor is expressed as the number of bytes in the cluster, such as 512 bytes, 1 KB, 2 KB, and so on.

Internally, NTFS refers only to clusters. (However, NTFS forms low-level volume I/O operations such that clusters are sector-aligned and have a length that is a multiple of the sector size.) NTFS uses the cluster as its unit of allocation to maintain its independence from physical sector sizes. This independence allows NTFS to efficiently support very large disks by using a larger cluster factor or to support newer disks that have a sector size other than 512 bytes. (See Chapter 9 for more information on disks with sectors larger than 512 bytes.) On a larger volume, use of a larger cluster factor can reduce fragmentation and speed allocation, at the cost of wasted disk space. (If the cluster size is 4,096, and a file is only 1,024 bytes, then 3,072 bytes are wasted. See Chapter 9 for more information on default cluster sizes.) Both the format command available from the command prompt and the Format menu option under the All Tasks option on the Action menu in the Disk Management MMC snap-in choose a default cluster factor based on the volume size, but you can override this size.

NTFS refers to physical locations on a disk by means of logical cluster numbers (LCNs). LCNs are simply the numbering of all clusters from the beginning of the volume to the end. To convert an LCN to a physical disk address, NTFS multiplies the LCN by the cluster factor to get the physical byte offset on the volume, as the disk driver interface requires. NTFS refers to the data within a file by means of virtual cluster numbers (VCNs). VCNs number the clusters belonging to a particular file from 0 through m. VCNs aren’t necessarily physically contiguous, however; they can be mapped to any number of LCNs on the volume.

Master File Table

In NTFS, all data stored on a volume is contained in files, including the data
structures used to locate and retrieve files, the bootstrap data, and the bitmap that records the allocation state of the entire volume (the NTFS metadata). Storing everything in files allows the file system to easily locate and maintain the data, and each separate file can be protected by a security descriptor. In addition, if a particular part of the disk goes bad, NTFS can relocate the metadata files to prevent the disk from becoming inaccessible.

The MFT is the heart of the NTFS volume structure. The MFT is implemented as an array of file records. The size of each file record is fixed at 1 KB, regardless of cluster size. (The structure of a file record is described in the File Records section later in this chapter.) Logically, the MFT contains one record for each file on the volume, including a record for the MFT itself. In addition to the MFT, each NTFS volume includes a set of metadata files containing the information that is used to implement the file system structure. Each of these NTFS metadata files has a name that begins with a dollar sign ($), and is hidden. For example, the file name of the MFT is $MFT. The rest of the files on an NTFS volume are normal user files and directories, as shown in Figure 12-27.

Usually, each MFT record corresponds to a different file. If a file has a large number of attributes or becomes highly fragmented, however, more than one record might be needed for a single file. In such cases, the first MFT record, which stores the locations of the others, is called the base file record.
When it first accesses a volume, NTFS must mount it—that is, read metadata from the disk and construct internal data structures so that it can process application file system accesses. To mount the volume, NTFS looks in the volume boot record (VBR) (located at LCN 0), which contains a data structure call the boot parameter block (BPP), to find the physical disk address of the MFT. The MFT’s own file record is the first entry in the table; the second file record points to a file located in the middle of the disk called the MFT mirror (file name $MFTMirr) that contains a copy of the first four rows of the MFT. This partial copy of the MFT is used to locate metadata files if part of the MFT file can’t be read for some reason.

Once NTFS finds the file record for the MFT, it obtains the VCN-to-LCN mapping information in the file record’s data attribute and stores it into memory.
Each run (runs are explained later in this chapter in the section Resident and Nonresident Attributes) has a VCN-to-LCN mapping and a run length because that’s all the information necessary to locate the LCN for any VCN. This mapping information tells NTFS where the runs containing the MFT are located on the disk. NTFS then processes the MFT records for several more metadata files and opens the files. Next, NTFS performs its file system recovery operation (described in the section Recovery later in this chapter), and finally, it opens its remaining metadata files. The volume is now ready for user access.

NOTE

For the sake of clarity, the text and diagrams in this chapter depict a run as including a VCN, an LCN, and a run length. NTFS actually compresses this information on disk into an LCN/next-VCN pair. Given a starting VCN, NTFS can determine the length of a run by subtracting the starting VCN from the next VCN.

As the system runs, NTFS writes to another important metadata file, the log file (file name $LogFile). NTFS uses the log file to record all operations that affect the NTFS volume structure, including file creation or any commands, such as copy, that alter the directory structure. The log file is used to recover an NTFS volume after a system failure and is also described in the Recovery section.

Another entry in the MFT is reserved for the root directory (also known as “\”; for example, C:\). Its file record contains an index of the files and directories stored in the root of the NTFS directory structure. When NTFS is first asked to open a file, it begins its search for the file in the root directory’s file record. After opening a file, NTFS stores the file’s MFT record number so that it can directly access the file’s MFT record when it reads and writes the file later.

NTFS records the allocation state of the volume in the bitmap file (file name $BitMap). The data attribute for the bitmap file contains a bitmap, each of whose bits represents a cluster on the volume, identifying whether the cluster is free or has been allocated to a file.

The security file (file name $Secure) stores the volume-wide security descriptor database. NTFS files and directories have individually settable security descriptors, but to conserve space, NTFS stores the settings in a common file, which allows files and directories that have the same security settings to reference the same security descriptor. In most environments, entire directory trees have the same
security settings, so this optimization provides a significant saving of disk space.

Another system file, the boot file (file name $Boot), stores the Windows bootstrap code if the volume is a system volume. On non-system volumes, there is code that displays an error message on the screen if an attempt is made to boot from that volume. For the system to boot, the bootstrap code must be located at a specific disk address so that the BIOS can find it. During formatting, the format command defines this area as a file by creating a file record for it. All files are in the MFT, and all clusters are either free or allocated to a file—there are no hidden files or clusters in NTFS, although some files (metadata) are not visible to users. The boot file as well as NTFS metadata files can be individually protected by means of the security descriptors that are applied to all Windows objects. Using this “everything on the disk is a file” model also means that the bootstrap can be modified by normal file I/O, although the boot file is protected from editing.

NTFS also maintains a bad-cluster file (file name $BadClus) for recording any bad spots on the disk volume and a file known as the volume file (file name $Volume), which contains the volume name, the version of NTFS for which the volume is formatted, and a number of flag bits that indicate the state and health of the volume, such as a bit that indicates that the volume is corrupt and must be repaired by the Chkdsk utility. (The Chkdsk utility is covered in more detail later in the chapter.) The upper case file (file name $UpCase) includes a translation table between lowercase and uppercase characters. NTFS maintains a file containing an attribute definition table (file name $AttrDef) that defines the attribute types supported on the volume and indicates whether they can be indexed, recovered during a system recovery operation, and so on.

NTFS stores several metadata files in the extensions (directory name $Extend) metadata directory, including the object identifier file (file name $ObjId), the quota file (file name $Quota), the change journal file (file name $UsnJrnl), the reparse point file (file name $Reparse), and the default resource manager directory (directory name $RmMetadata). These files store information related to extended features of NTFS. The object identifier file stores file object IDs, the quota file stores quota limit and behavior information on volumes that have quotas enabled, the change journal file records file and directory changes, and the reparse point file stores information about which files and directories on the volume include reparse
point data.

The default resource manager directory contains directories related to transactional NTFS (TxF) support, including the transaction log directory (directory name $TxfLog), the transaction isolation directory (directory name $Txf), and the transaction repair directory (file name $Repair). The transaction log directory contains the TxF base log file (file name $TxfLog.blf) and any number of log container files, depending on the size of the transaction log, but it always contains at least two: one for the Kernel Transaction Manager (KTM) log stream (file name $TxfLogContainer00000000000000000001), and one for the TxF log stream (file name $TxfLogContainer00000000000000000000). The transaction log directory also contains the TxF old page stream (file name $Tops), which we'll describe later.

---

**EXPERIMENT: VIEWING NTFS INFORMATION**

You can use the built-in Fsutil.exe command-line program to view information about an NTFS volume, including the placement and size of the MFT and MFT zone:

```
C:\> fsutil fsinfo ntfsinfo c:
NTFS Volume Serial Number : 0x9a38d50e38d4ea71
Version : 3.1
Number Sectors : 0x0000000015c82ff0
Total Clusters : 0x0000000002b905fe
Free Clusters : 0x000000000013c332
Total Reserved : 0x0000000000000780
Bytes Per Sector : 512
Bytes Per Cluster : 4096
Bytes Per FileRecord Segment : 1024
Clusters Per FileRecord Segment : 0
Mft Valid Data Length : 0x0000000023db0000
Mft Start Lcn : 0x0000000000000c000
Mft2 Start Lcn : 0x000000000016082ff
Mft Zone Start : 0x0000000002751f60
Mft Zone End : 0x000000000275cd60
RM Identifier: CF7234E7-39E3-11DC-BDCE-00188BDD5F49
```

---

**File Record Numbers**

A file on an NTFS volume is identified by a 64-bit value called a file record number, which consists of a file number and a sequence number. The file number corresponds to the position of the file's file record in the MFT minus 1 (or to the position of the base file record minus 1 if the file has more than one file record). The sequence number, which is incremented each time an MFT file record position
is reused, enables NTFS to perform internal consistency checks. A file record number is illustrated in Figure 12-28.

![Figure 12-28. File record number](image)

**File Records**

Instead of viewing a file as just a repository for textual or binary data, NTFS stores files as a collection of attribute/value pairs, one of which is the data it contains (called the unnamed data attribute). Other attributes that comprise a file include the file name, time stamp information, and possibly additional named data attributes. Figure 12-29 illustrates an MFT record for a small file.

![Figure 12-29. MFT record for a small file](image)

Each file attribute is stored as a separate stream of bytes within a file. Strictly speaking, NTFS doesn’t read and write files—it reads and writes attribute streams. NTFS supplies these attribute operations: create, delete, read (byte range), and write (byte range). The read and write services normally operate on the file’s unnamed data attribute. However, a caller can specify a different data attribute by using the named data stream syntax.

Table 12-6 lists the attributes for files on an NTFS volume. (Not all attributes are present for every file.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Attribute Type Name</th>
<th>Resident?</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volume information</td>
<td>$VOLUME_INFORMATION, $VOLUME_NAME</td>
<td>Always, Always</td>
<td>These attributes are present only in the $Volume metadata file. They store volume version and label information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard information</td>
<td>$STANDARD_INFORMATION</td>
<td>Always</td>
<td>File attributes such as read-only, archive, and so on; time stamps, including when the file was created or last modified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filename</td>
<td>$FILE_NAME</td>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>The file’s name in Unicode 1.0 characters. A file can have multiple filename attributes, as it does when a hard link to a file exists or when a file with a long name has an automatically generated “short name” for access by MS-DOS and 16-bit Windows applications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security descriptor</td>
<td>$SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR</td>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>This attribute is present for backward compatibility with previous versions of NTFS and is rarely used in the current version of NTFS (3.1). NTFS stores almost all security descriptors in the $Secure metadata file, sharing descriptors among files and directories that have the same settings. Previous versions of NTFS stored private security descriptor information with each file and directory. Some files still include a $SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR attribute, such as $Boot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td>$DATA</td>
<td></td>
<td>The contents of the file. In NTFS, a file has one default unnamed data attribute and can have additional named data attributes—that is, a file can have multiple data streams. A directory has no default data attribute but can have optional named data attributes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attribute</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index root, index allocation, and index bitmap</td>
<td>$INDEX_ROOT, $INDEX_ALLOCATION, $BITMAP</td>
<td>Always, Never, Maybe</td>
<td>Three attributes used to implement B-tree data structures used by directories, security, quota, and other metadata files.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attribute list</td>
<td>$ATTRIBUTE_LIST</td>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>A list of the attributes that make up the file and the file record number of the MFT entry where each attribute is located. This attribute is present when a file requires more than one MFT file record.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Object ID</td>
<td>$OBJECT_ID</td>
<td>Always</td>
<td>A 16-byte identifier (GUID) for a file or directory. The link-tracking service assigns object IDs to shell shortcut and OLE link source files. NTFS provides APIs so that files and directories can be opened with their object ID rather than their file name.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reparse information</td>
<td>$REPARSE_POINT</td>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>This attribute stores a file’s reparse point data. NTFS junctions and mount points include this attribute.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended attributes</td>
<td>$EA, $EA_INFORMATION</td>
<td>Maybe, Always</td>
<td>Extended attributes are name/value pairs and aren’t normally used but are provided for backward compatibility with OS/2 applications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged utility stream</td>
<td>$LOGGEDUTILITY_STREAM</td>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>EFS stores data in this attribute ($EFS) that’s used to manage a file’s encryption, such as the encrypted version of the key needed to decrypt the file and a list of users who are authorized to access the file. When a file or directory becomes part of a transaction, TxF also stores transaction data in the $TXF_DATA attribute, such as the file’s unique transaction ID.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12-6 shows attribute names; however, attributes actually correspond to
numeric type codes, which NTFS uses to order the attributes within a file record. The file attributes in an MFT record are ordered by these type codes (numerically in ascending order), with some attribute types appearing more than once—if a file has multiple data attributes, for example, or multiple file names. All possible attribute types (and their names) are listed in the $AttrDef metadata file.

Each attribute in a file record is identified with its attribute type code and has a value and an optional name. An attribute’s value is the byte stream composing the attribute. For example, the value of the $FILE_NAME attribute is the file’s name; the value of the $DATA attribute is whatever bytes the user stored in the file.

Most attributes never have names, although the index-related attributes and the $DATA attribute often do. Names distinguish between multiple attributes of the same type that a file can include. For example, a file that has a named data stream has two $DATA attributes: an unnamed $DATA attribute storing the default unnamed data stream and a named $DATA attribute having the name of the alternate stream and storing the named stream’s data.

**File Names**

Both NTFS and FAT allow each file name in a path to be as many as 255 characters long. File names can contain Unicode characters as well as multiple periods and embedded spaces. However, the FAT file system supplied with MS-DOS is limited to 8 (non-Unicode) characters for its file names, followed by a period and a 3-character extension. Figure 12-30 provides a visual representation of the different file namespaces Windows supports and shows how they intersect.

The POSIX subsystem requires the biggest namespace of all the application execution environments that Windows supports, and therefore the NTFS namespace is equivalent to the POSIX namespace. The POSIX subsystem can create names that aren’t visible to Windows and MS-DOS applications, including names with trailing periods and trailing spaces. Ordinarily, creating a file using the large POSIX namespace isn’t a problem because you would do that only if you intended the POSIX subsystem or POSIX client systems to use that file.
The relationship between 32-bit Windows (Windows) applications and MS-DOS and 16-bit Windows applications is a much closer one, however. The Windows area in Figure 12-30 represents file names that the Windows subsystem can create on an NTFS volume but that MS-DOS and 16-bit Windows applications can't see. This group includes file names longer than the 8.3 format of MS-DOS names, those containing Unicode (international) characters, those with multiple period characters or a beginning period, and those with embedded spaces. When a file is created with such a name, NTFS automatically generates an alternate, MS-DOS-style file name for the file. Windows displays these short names when you use the /x option with the dir command.

The MS-DOS file names are fully functional aliases for the NTFS files and are stored in the same directory as the long file names. The MFT record for a file with an autogenerated MS-DOS file name is shown in Figure 12-31.

The NTFS name and the generated MS-DOS name are stored in the same file record and therefore refer to the same file. The MS-DOS name can be used to open, read from, write to, or copy the file. If a user renames the file using either the long file name or the short file name, the new name replaces both the existing
names. If the new name isn’t a valid MS-DOS name, NTFS generates another MS-DOS name for the file (note that NTFS only generates MS-DOS-style file names for the first file name).

**NOTE**

Hard links are implemented in a similar way. When a hard link to a file is created, NTFS adds another file name attribute to the file's MFT file record. The two situations differ in one regard, however. When a user deletes a file that has multiple names (hard links), the file record and the file remain in place. The file and its record are deleted only when the last file name (hard link) is deleted. If a file has both an NTFS name and an autogenerated MS-DOS name, however, a user can delete the file using either name.

Here’s the algorithm NTFS uses (the algorithm is actually implemented in the kernel function RtlGenerate8dot3Name and is also used by other drivers, such as CDFS, FAT, and third-party file systems) to generate an MS-DOS name from a long file name:

1. Remove from the long name any characters that are illegal in MS-DOS names, including spaces and Unicode characters. Remove preceding and trailing periods. Remove all other embedded periods, except the last one.

2. Truncate the string before the period (if present) to six characters (it may already be six or fewer because this algorithm is applied when any character that is illegal in MS-DOS is present in the name); if it is two or fewer characters, generate and concatenate a four-character hex checksum string. Append the string ~n (where n is a number, starting with 1, that is used to distinguish different files that truncate to the same name). Truncate the string after the period (if present) to three characters.

3. Put the result in uppercase letters. MS-DOS is case-insensitive, and this step guarantees that NTFS won’t generate a new name that differs from the old only in case.

4. If the generated name duplicates an existing name in the directory, increment the ~n string. If n is greater than 4, and a checksum was not concatenated already, truncate the string before the period to two characters and generate and concatenate a four-character hex checksum string.

Table 12-7 shows the long Windows file names from Figure 12-30 and their NTFS-generated MS-DOS versions. The current algorithm and the examples in
Figure 12-30 should give you an idea of what NTFS-generated MS-DOS-style file names look like.

NOTE

Although not generally recommended because it can cause incompatibilities with applications that rely on them, you can disable short name generation by setting HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem\NtfsDisable8dot3NameCreation in the registry to a DWORD value of 1 and restarting the machine.

TUNNELING

NTFS uses the concept of tunneling to allow compatibility with older programs that depend on the file system to cache certain file metadata for a period of time even after the file is gone, such as when it has been deleted or renamed. With tunneling, any new file created with the same name as the original file, and within a certain period of time, will keep some of the same metadata. The idea is to replicate behavior expected by MS-DOS programs when using the safe save programming method, in which modified data is copied to a temporary file, the original file is deleted, and then the temporary file is renamed to the original name. The expected behavior in this case is that the renamed temporary file should appear to be the same as the original file, otherwise the creation time would continuously update itself with each modification (which is how the modified time is used).

NTFS uses tunneling so that when a file name is removed from a directory, its long name and short name, as well as its creation time, are saved into a cache. When a new file is added to a directory, the cache is searched to see whether there is any tunneled data to restore. Because these operations apply to directories, each directory instance has its own cache, which is deleted if the directory is removed. NTFS will use tunneling for the following series of operations if the names used result in the deletion and re-creation of the same file name:

- Delete + Create
- Delete + Rename
- Rename + Create
- Rename + Rename

By default, NTFS keeps the tunneling cache for 15 seconds, although you can modify this timeout by creating a new value called MaximumTunnelEntryAgeInSeconds in the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem registry key. Tunneling can also be completely disabled by creating a new value called MaximumTunnelEntries and setting it to 0; however, this will cause older applications to break if they rely on the compatibility behavior.

You can see tunneling in action with the following simple experiment in the command prompt:

1. Create a file called file1.
2. Wait for more than 15 seconds (the default tunnel cache timeout).
3. Create a file called file2.
4. Perform a dir /TC. Note the creation times.
5. Rename file1 to file.
6. Rename file2 to file1.
7. Perform a dir /TC. Note that the creation times are identical.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Windows Long Name</th>
<th>NTFS-Generated Short Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LongFileName</td>
<td>LONGFI~1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UnicodeName.ΦDΠΛ</td>
<td>UNICOD~1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>File.Name. With.Dots</td>
<td>FILENA~1.DOT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>File.Name2. With.Dots</td>
<td>FILENA~2.DOT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>File.Name5. With.Dots</td>
<td>FIF596~1.DOT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name With Embedded Spaces</td>
<td>NAMEWI~1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.BeginningDot</td>
<td>BEGINN~1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25¢. two characters</td>
<td>255440~1.TWO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>©</td>
<td>6E2D~1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 12-7. NTFS-Generated File Names**

**Resident and Nonresident Attributes**

If a file is small, all its attributes and their values (its data, for example) fit within the file record that describes the file. When the value of an attribute is stored in the MFT (either in the file’s main file record or an extension record located elsewhere within the MFT), the attribute is called a resident attribute. (In Figure 12-31, for example, all attributes are resident.) Several attributes are defined as always being resident so that NTFS can locate nonresident attributes. The standard information and index root attributes are always resident, for example.

Each attribute begins with a standard header containing information about the
attribute, information that NTFS uses to manage the attributes in a generic way. The header, which is always resident, records whether the attribute’s value is resident or nonresident. For resident attributes, the header also contains the offset from the header to the attribute’s value and the length of the attribute’s value, as Figure 12-32 illustrates for the filename attribute.

![Figure 12-32. Resident attribute header and value](image)

When an attribute’s value is stored directly in the MFT, the time it takes NTFS to access the value is greatly reduced. Instead of looking up a file in a table and then reading a succession of allocation units to find the file’s data (as the FAT file system does, for example), NTFS accesses the disk once and retrieves the data immediately.

The attributes for a small directory, as well as for a small file, can be resident in the MFT, as Figure 12-33 shows. For a small directory, the index root attribute contains an index (organized as a B-tree) of file record numbers for the files (and the subdirectories) within the directory.

![Figure 12-33. MFT file record for a small directory](image)

Of course, many files and directories can’t be squeezed into a 1-KB, fixed-size MFT record. If a particular attribute’s value, such as a file’s data attribute, is too large to be contained in an MFT file record, NTFS allocates clusters for the attribute’s value outside the MFT. A contiguous group of clusters is called a run (or an extent). If the attribute’s value later grows (if a user appends data to the file, for
example), NTFS allocates another run for the additional data. Attributes whose values are stored in runs (rather than within the MFT) are called nonresident attributes. The file system decides whether a particular attribute is resident or nonresident; the location of the data is transparent to the process accessing it.

When an attribute is nonresident, as the data attribute for a large file will certainly be, its header contains the information NTFS needs to locate the attribute’s value on the disk. Figure 12-34 shows a nonresident data attribute stored in two runs.

![Figure 12-34. MFT file record for a large file with two data runs](image)

Among the standard attributes, only those that can grow can be nonresident. For files, the attributes that can grow are the data and the attribute list (not shown in Figure 12-34). The standard information and filename attributes are always resident.

A large directory can also have nonresident attributes (or parts of attributes), as Figure 12-35 shows. In this example, the MFT file record doesn’t have enough room to store the B-tree that contains the index of files that are within this large directory. A part of the index is stored in the index root attribute, and the rest of the index is stored in nonresident runs called index allocations. The index root, index allocation, and bitmap attributes are shown here in a simplified form. They are described in more detail in the next section. The standard information and filename attributes are always resident. The header and at least part of the value of the index root attribute are also resident for directories.

![Figure 12-35. MFT file record for a directory with nonresident attributes](image)
When an attribute’s value can’t fit in an MFT file record and separate allocations are needed, NTFS keeps track of the runs by means of VCN-to-LCN mapping pairs. LCNs represent the sequence of clusters on an entire volume from 0 through n. VCNs number the clusters belonging to a particular file from 0 through m. For example, the clusters in the runs of a nonresident data attribute are numbered as shown in Figure 12-36.

If this file had more than two runs, the numbering of the third run would start with VCN 8. As Figure 12-37 shows, the data attribute header contains VCN-to-LCN mappings for the two runs here, which allows NTFS to easily find the allocations on the disk.

Although Figure 12-36 shows just data runs, other attributes can be stored in runs if there isn't enough room in the MFT file record to contain them. And if a particular file has too many attributes to fit in the MFT record, a second MFT record is used to contain the additional attributes (or attribute headers for
nonresident attributes). In this case, an attribute called the attribute list is added. The attribute list attribute contains the name and type code of each of the file’s attributes and the file number of the MFT record where the attribute is located. The attribute list attribute is provided for those cases where all of a file’s attributes will not fit within the file’s file record or when a file grows so large or so fragmented that a single MFT record can’t contain the multitude of VCN-to-LCN mappings needed to find all its runs. Files with more than 200 runs typically require an attribute list. In summary, attribute headers are always contained within file records in the MFT, but an attribute’s value may be located outside the MFT in one or more extents.

Data Compression and Sparse Files

NTFS supports compression on a per-file, per-directory, or per-volume basis using a variant of the LZ77 algorithm, known as LZNT1. (NTFS compression is performed only on user data, not file system metadata.) You can tell whether a volume is compressed by using the Windows GetVolumeInformation function. To retrieve the actual compressed size of a file, use the Windows GetCompressedFileSize function. Finally, to examine or change the compression setting for a file or directory, use the Windows DeviceIoControl function. (See the FSCTL_GET_COMPRESSION and FSCTL_SET_COMPRESSION file system control codes.) Keep in mind that although setting a file’s compression state compresses (or decompresses) the file right away, setting a directory’s or volume’s compression state doesn’t cause any immediate compression or decompression. Instead, setting a directory’s or volume’s compression state sets a default compression state that will be given to all newly created files and subdirectories within that directory or volume (although, if you were to set directory compression using the directory’s property page within Explorer, the contents of the entire directory tree will be compressed immediately).

The following section introduces NTFS compression by examining the simple case of compressing sparse data. The subsequent sections extend the discussion to the compression of ordinary files and sparse files.

Compressing Sparse Data

Sparse data is often large but contains only a small amount of nonzero data relative
to its size. A sparse matrix is one example of sparse data. As described earlier, NTFS uses VCNs, from 0 through m, to enumerate the clusters of a file. Each VCN maps to a corresponding LCN, which identifies the disk location of the cluster. Figure 12-38 illustrates the runs (disk allocations) of a normal, noncompressed file, including its VCNs and the LCNs they map to.

![Figure 12-38. Runs of a noncompressed file](image)

This file is stored in three runs, each of which is 4 clusters long, for a total of 12 clusters. Figure 12-39 shows the MFT record for this file. As described earlier, to save space the MFT record's data attribute, which contains VCN-to-LCN mappings, records only one mapping for each run, rather than one for each cluster. Notice, however, that each VCN from 0 through 11 has a corresponding LCN associated with it. The first entry starts at VCN 0 and covers 4 clusters, the second entry starts at VCN 4 and covers 4 clusters, and so on. This entry format is typical for a noncompressed file.

![Figure 12-39. MFT record for a noncompressed file](image)

When a user selects a file on an NTFS volume for compression, one NTFS compression technique is to remove long strings of zeros from the file. If the file's data is sparse, it typically shrinks to occupy a fraction of the disk space it would otherwise require. On subsequent writes to the file, NTFS allocates space only for runs that contain nonzero data.

Figure 12-40 depicts the runs of a compressed file containing sparse data. Notice that certain ranges of the file’s VCNs (16–31 and 64–127) have no disk allocations.
The MFT record for this compressed file omits blocks of VCNs that contain zeros and therefore have no physical storage allocated to them. The first data entry in Figure 12-41, for example, starts at VCN 0 and covers 16 clusters. The second entry jumps to VCN 32 and covers 16 clusters.

When a program reads data from a compressed file, NTFS checks the MFT record to determine whether a VCN-to-LCN mapping covers the location being read. If the program is reading from an unallocated “hole” in the file, it means that the data in that part of the file consists of zeros, so NTFS returns zeros without further accessing the disk. If a program writes nonzero data to a “hole,” NTFS quietly allocates disk space and then writes the data. This technique is very efficient for sparse file data that contains a lot of zero data.

**Compressing Nonsparse Data**
The preceding example of compressing a sparse file is somewhat contrived. It describes “compression” for a case in which whole sections of a file were filled with zeros but the remaining data in the file wasn’t affected by the compression. The data in most files isn’t sparse, but it can still be compressed by the application of a compression algorithm.

In NTFS, users can specify compression for individual files or for all the files in a directory. (New files created in a directory marked for compression are automatically compressed—existing files must be compressed individually when programatically enabling compression with FSCTL_SET_COMPRESSION.) When it compresses a file, NTFS divides the file’s unprocessed data into compression units 16 clusters long (equal to 8 KB for a 512-byte cluster, for example). Certain sequences of data in a file might not compress much, if at all; so for each compression unit in the file, NTFS determines whether compressing the unit will save at least 1 cluster of storage. If compressing the unit won’t free up at least 1 cluster, NTFS allocates a 16-cluster run and writes the data in that unit to disk without compressing it. If the data in a 16-cluster unit will compress to 15 or fewer clusters, NTFS allocates only the number of clusters needed to contain the compressed data and then writes it to disk. Figure 12-42 illustrates the compression of a file with four runs. The unshaded areas in this figure represent the actual storage locations that the file occupies after compression. The first, second, and fourth runs were compressed; the third run wasn’t. Even with one noncompressed run, compressing this file saved 26 clusters of disk space, or 41 percent.
Although the diagrams in this chapter show contiguous LCNs, a compression unit need not be stored in physically contiguous clusters. Runs that occupy noncontiguous clusters produce slightly more complicated MFT records than the one shown in Figure 12-42.

When it writes data to a compressed file, NTFS ensures that each run begins on a virtual 16-cluster boundary. Thus the starting VCN of each run is a multiple of 16, and the runs are no longer than 16 clusters. NTFS reads and writes at least one compression unit at a time when it accesses compressed files. When it writes compressed data, however, NTFS tries to store compression units in physically contiguous locations so that it can read them all in a single I/O operation. The 16-cluster size of the NTFS compression unit was chosen to reduce internal fragmentation: the larger the compression unit, the less the overall disk space needed to store the data. This 16-cluster compression unit size represents a trade-off between producing smaller compressed files and slowing read operations for programs that randomly access files. The equivalent of 16 clusters must be decompressed for each cache miss. (A cache miss is more likely to occur during random file access.) Figure 12-43 shows the MFT record for the compressed file shown in Figure 12-42.

One difference between this compressed file and the earlier example of a compressed file containing sparse data is that three of the compressed runs in this file are less than 16 clusters long. Reading this information from a file’s MFT file record enables NTFS to know whether data in the file is compressed. Any run
shorter than 16 clusters contains compressed data that NTFS must decompress when it first reads the data into the cache. A run that is exactly 16 clusters long doesn’t contain compressed data and therefore requires no decompression.

If the data in a run has been compressed, NTFS decompresses the data into a scratch buffer and then copies it to the caller’s buffer. NTFS also loads the decompressed data into the cache, which makes subsequent reads from the same run as fast as any other cached read. NTFS writes any updates to the file to the cache, leaving the lazy writer to compress and write the modified data to disk asynchronously. This strategy ensures that writing to a compressed file produces no more significant delay than writing to a noncompressed file would.

NTFS keeps disk allocations for a compressed file contiguous whenever possible. As the LCNs indicate, the first two runs of the compressed file shown in Figure 12-42 are physically contiguous, as are the last two. When two or more runs are contiguous, NTFS performs disk read-ahead, as it does with the data in other files. Because the reading and decompression of contiguous file data take place asynchronously before the program requests the data, subsequent read operations obtain the data directly from the cache, which greatly enhances read performance.

Sparse Files

Sparse files (the NTFS file type, as opposed to files that consist of sparse data, described earlier) are essentially compressed files for which NTFS doesn’t apply compression to the file’s nonsparse data. However, NTFS manages the run data of a sparse file’s MFT record the same way it does for compressed files that consist of sparse and nonsparse data.

The Change Journal File

The change journal file, \$Extend\$UsnJrnl, is a sparse file in which NTFS stores records of changes to files and directories. Applications like the Windows File Replication Service (FRS) and the Windows Search service make use of the journal to respond to file and directory changes as they occur.

The journal stores change entries in the $J$ data stream and the maximum size of the journal in the $Max$ data stream. Entries are versioned and include the following information about a file or directory change:
- The time of the change
- The reason for the change (see Table 12-8)
- The file or directory’s attributes
- The file or directory’s name
- The file or directory’s MFT file record number
- The file record number of the file’s parent directory
- The security ID
- The update sequence number (USN) of the record
- Additional information about the source of the change (a user, the FRS, and so on)

Table 12-8. Change Journal Change Reasons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identifier</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USN_REASON_DATA_OVERWRITE</td>
<td>The data in the file or directory was overwritten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN_REASON_DATA_EXTEND</td>
<td>Data was added to the file or directory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN_REASON_DATA_TRUNCATION</td>
<td>The data in the file or directory was truncated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN_REASON_NAMED_DATA_OVERWRITE</td>
<td>The data in a file’s data stream was overwritten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN_REASON_NAMED_DATA_EXTEND</td>
<td>The data in a file’s data stream was extended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN_REASON_NAMED_DATA_TRUNCATION</td>
<td>The data in a file’s data stream was truncated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN_REASON_FILE_CREATE</td>
<td>A new file or directory was created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN_REASON_FILE_DELETE</td>
<td>A file or directory was deleted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN_REASON_EA_CHANGE</td>
<td>The extended attributes for a file or directory changed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN_REASON_SECURITY_CHANGE</td>
<td>The security descriptor for a file or directory was changed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN_REASON_RENAME_OLD_NAME</td>
<td>A file or directory was renamed; this is the old name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN_REASON_RENAME_NEW_NAME</td>
<td>A file or directory was renamed; this is the new name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN_REASON_INDEXABLE_CHANGE</td>
<td>The indexing state for the file or directory was changed (whether or not the Indexing service will process this file or directory)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN_REASON_BASIC_INFO_CHANGE</td>
<td>The file or directory attributes and/or the time stamps were changed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN_REASON_HARD_LINK_CHANGE</td>
<td>A hard link was added or removed from the file or directory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN_REASON_COMPRESSION_CHANGE</td>
<td>The compression state for the file or directory was changed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN_REASON_ENCRYPTION_CHANGE</td>
<td>The encryption state (EFS) was enabled or disabled for this file or directory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN_REASON_OBJECT_ID_CHANGE</td>
<td>The object ID for this file or directory was changed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN_REASON_REPARSE_POINT_CHANGE</td>
<td>The reparse point for a file or directory was changed, or a new reparse point (such as a symbolic link) was added or deleted from a file or directory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN_REASON_STREAM_CHANGE</td>
<td>A new data stream was added to or removed from a file or renamed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN_REASON_TRANSACTED_CHANGE</td>
<td>This value is added (ORed) to the change reason to indicate that the change was the result of a recent commit of a TxF transaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN_REASON_CLOSE</td>
<td>The handle to a file or directory was closed, indicating that this is the final modification made to the file in this series of operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EXPERIMENT: READING THE CHANGE JOURNAL**

You can use the Usndump.exe command-line program from Winsider Seminars & Solutions ([www.winsiderss.com/tools/usndump/usndump.htm](http://www.winsiderss.com/tools/usndump/usndump.htm)) to dump the contents of the change journal if the current volume has one. You can also create, delete, or query journal information with the built-in Fsutil.exe utility, as shown here:
C:\>fsutil usn queryjournal c:
Usn Journal ID   : 0x01c89ddae1c1b9648
First Usn        : 0x0000000038140000
Next Usn         : 0x000000003a22fa50
Lowest Valid Usn : 0x0000000000000000
Max Usn          : 0x00000000ffffff0000
Maximum Size     : 0x0000000002000000
Allocation Delta : 0x0000000000400000

The output indicates the maximum size of the change journal on the volume and its current state. As a simple experiment to see how NTFS records changes in the journal, create a file called Usn.txt in the current directory, rename it to UsnNew.txt, and then dump the journal with Usndump, as shown here:

C:\>echo hello > Usn.txt
C:\>ren Usn.txt UsnNew.txt
C:\>Usndump.exe
...
File Ref#       : 0x40000000001be9
ParentFile Ref# : 0x3000000000a962
USN             : 0xfc54d8
SecurityId      : 0x00000000
Reason          : 0x00000100 (USN_REASON_FILE_CREATE)
Name (014)      : Usn.txt

File Ref#       : 0x40000000001be9
ParentFile Ref# : 0x3000000000a962
USN             : 0xfc5528
SecurityId      : 0x00000000
Reason          : 0x00000102 (USN_REASON_DATA_EXTEND USN_REASON_FILE_CREATE)
Name (014)      : Usn.txt

File Ref#       : 0x40000000001be9
ParentFile Ref# : 0x3000000000a962
USN             : 0xfc5578
SecurityId      : 0x00000000
Reason          : 0x00000102 (USN_REASON_DATA_EXTEND USN_REASON_FILE_CREATE)
Name (014)      : Usn.txt

File Ref#       : 0x40000000001be9
ParentFile Ref# : 0x3000000000a962
USN             : 0xfc55c8
SecurityId      : 0x00000000
Reason          : 0x00001000 (USN_REASON_RENAME_OLD_NAME)
Name (014)      : Usn.txt

File Ref#       : 0x40000000001be9
ParentFile Ref# : 0x3000000000a962
USN             : 0xfc5618
SecurityId      : 0x00000000
Reason          : 0x00001000 (USN_REASON_RENAME_OLD_NAME)
Name (014)      : Usn.txt

File Ref#       : 0x40000000001be9
ParentFile Ref# : 0x3000000000a962
USN             : 0xfc5668
SecurityId      : 0x00000000
Reason          : 0x00002000 (USN_REASON_RENAME_NEW_NAME)
Name (020)      : UsnNew.txt

File Ref#       : 0x40000000001be9
ParentFile Ref# : 0x3000000000a962
USN             : 0xfc56b8
SecurityId      : 0x00000000
Reason          : 0x00002000 (USN_REASON_RENAME_NEW_NAME)
Name (020)      : UsnNew.txt
The entries reflect the individual modification operations involved in the operations underlying the command-line operations.

The journal is sparse so that it never overflows; when the journal’s on-disk size exceeds the maximum defined for the file, NTFS simply begins zeroing the file data that precedes the window of change information having a size equal to the maximum journal size, as shown in Figure 12-44. To prevent constant resizing when an application is continuously exceeding the journal’s size, NTFS shrinks the journal only when its size is twice an application-defined value over the maximum configured size.

Figure 12-44. Change journal ($UsnJrnl$) space allocation

Indexing

In NTFS, a file directory is simply an index of file names—that is, a collection of file names (along with their file record numbers) organized as a B-tree. To create a directory, NTFS indexes the filename attributes of the files in the directory. The MFT record for the root directory of a volume is shown in Figure 12-45.
Conceptually, an MFT entry for a directory contains in its index root attribute a sorted list of the files in the directory. For large directories, however, the file names are actually stored in 4-KB, fixed-size index buffers (which are the nonresident value of the index allocation attribute) that contain and organize the file names. Index buffers implement a B-tree data structure, which minimizes the number of disk accesses needed to find a particular file, especially for large directories. The index root attribute contains the first level of the B-tree (root subdirectories) and points to index buffers containing the next level (more subdirectories, perhaps, or files).

*Figure 12-45* shows only file names in the index root attribute and the index buffers (file6, for example), but each entry in an index also contains the record number in the MFT where the file is described and time stamp and file size information for the file. NTFS duplicates the time stamps and file size information from the file’s MFT record. This technique, which is used by FAT and NTFS, requires updated information to be written in two places. Even so, it’s a significant speed optimization for directory browsing because it enables the file system to display each file’s time stamps and size without opening every file in the directory.

The index allocation attribute maps the VCNs of the index buffer runs to the LCNs that indicate where the index buffers reside on the disk, and the bitmap attribute keeps track of which VCNs in the index buffers are in use and which are free.
Figure 12-45 shows one file entry per VCN (that is, per cluster), but file name entries are actually packed into each cluster. Each 4-KB index buffer will typically contain about 20 to 30 file name entries (depending on the lengths of the file names within the directory).

The B-tree data structure is a type of balanced tree that is ideal for organizing sorted data stored on a disk because it minimizes the number of disk accesses needed to find an entry. In the MFT, a directory’s index root attribute contains several file names that act as indexes into the second level of the B-tree. Each file name in the index root attribute has an optional pointer associated with it that points to an index buffer. The index buffer it points to contains file names with lexicographic values less than its own. In Figure 12-45, for example, file4 is a first-level entry in the B-tree. It points to an index buffer containing file names that are (lexicographically) less than itself—the file names file0, file1, and file3. Note that the names file1, file3, and so on that are used in this example are not literal file names but names intended to show the relative placement of files that are lexicographically ordered according to the displayed sequence.

Storing the file names in B-trees provides several benefits. Directory lookups are fast because the file names are stored in a sorted order. And when higher-level software enumerates the files in a directory, NTFS returns already-sorted names. Finally, because B-trees tend to grow wide rather than deep, NTFS’s fast lookup times don’t degrade as directories grow.

NTFS also provides general support for indexing data besides file names, and several NTFS features—including object IDs, quota tracking, and consolidated security—use indexing to manage internal data.

The B-tree indexes are a generic capability of NTFS and are used for organizing security descriptors, security IDs, object IDs, disk quota records, and reparse points. Directories are referred to as file name indexes, while other types of indexes are known as view indexes.

**Object IDs**

In addition to storing the object ID assigned to a file or directory in the $OBJECT_ID attribute of its MFT record, NTFS also keeps the correspondence between object IDs and their file record numbers in the $O index of the
The $ObjId metadata file. The index collates entries by object ID (which is a GUID), making it easy for NTFS to quickly locate a file based on its ID. This feature allows applications, using undocumented native API functionality, to open a file or directory using its object ID. Figure 12-46 demonstrates the correspondence of the $ObjId metadata file and $OBJECT_ID attributes in MFT records.

Figure 12-46. $ObjId and $OBJECT_ID relationships

**Quota Tracking**

NTFS stores quota information in the $Quota metadata file, which consists of the named index root attributes $O and $Q. Figure 12-47 shows the organization of these indexes. Just as NTFS assigns each security descriptor a unique internal security ID, NTFS assigns each user a unique user ID. When an administrator defines quota information for a user, NTFS allocates a user ID that corresponds to the user’s SID. In the $O index, NTFS creates an entry that maps an SID to a user ID and sorts the index by SID; in the $Q index, NTFS creates a quota control entry. A quota control entry contains the value of the user’s quota limits, as well as the amount of disk space the user consumes on the volume.
When an application creates a file or directory, NTFS obtains the application user’s SID and looks up the associated user ID in the $O index. NTFS records the user ID in the new file or directory’s $STANDARD_INFORMATION attribute, which counts all disk space allocated to the file or directory against that user’s quota. Then NTFS looks up the quota entry in the $Q index and determines whether the new allocation causes the user to exceed his or her warning or limit threshold. When a new allocation causes the user to exceed a threshold, NTFS takes appropriate steps, such as logging an event to the System event log or not letting the user create the file or directory. As a file or directory changes size, NTFS updates the quota control entry associated with the user ID stored in the $STANDARD_INFORMATION attribute. NTFS uses the NTFS generic B-tree indexing to efficiently correlate user IDs with account SIDs and, given a user ID, to efficiently look up a user’s quota control information.

**Consolidated Security**

NTFS has always supported security, which lets an administrator specify which users can and can’t access individual files and directories. NTFS optimizes disk utilization for security descriptors by using a central metadata file named $Secure to store only one instance of each security descriptor on a volume.

The $Secure file contains two index attributes—$SDH (Security Descriptor Hash) and $SII (Security ID Index)—and a data-stream attribute named $SDS (Security Descriptor Stream), as Figure 12-48 shows. NTFS assigns every unique security
descriptor on a volume an internal NTFS security ID (not to be confused with a Windows SID, which uniquely identifies computers and user accounts) and hashes the security descriptor according to a simple hash algorithm. A hash is a potentially nonunique shorthand representation of a descriptor. Entries in the $SDH index map the security descriptor hashes to the security descriptor’s storage location within the $SDS data attribute, and the $SII index entries map NTFS security IDs to the security descriptor’s location in the $SDS data attribute.

When you apply a security descriptor to a file or directory, NTFS obtains a hash of the descriptor and looks through the $SDH index for a match. NTFS sorts the $SDH index entries according to the hash of their corresponding security descriptor and stores the entries in a B-tree. If NTFS finds a match for the descriptor in the $SDH index, NTFS locates the offset of the entry’s security descriptor from the entry’s offset value and reads the security descriptor from the $SDS attribute. If the hashes match but the security descriptors don’t, NTFS looks for another matching entry in the $SDH index. When NTFS finds a precise match, the file or directory to which you’re applying the security descriptor can reference the existing security descriptor in the $SDS attribute. NTFS makes the reference by reading the NTFS security identifier from the $SDH entry and storing it in the file or directory’s $STANDARD_INFORMATION attribute. The NTFS $STANDARD_INFORMATION attribute, which all files and directories have, stores basic information about a file, including its attributes, time stamp information, and security identifier.
If NTFS doesn’t find in the $SDH index an entry that has a security descriptor that matches the descriptor you’re applying, the descriptor you’re applying is unique to the volume and NTFS assigns the descriptor a new internal security ID. NTFS internal security IDs are 32-bit values, whereas SIDs are typically several times larger, so representing SIDs with NTFS security IDs saves space in the $STANDARD_INFORMATION attribute. NTFS then adds the security descriptor to the end of the $SDS data attribute, and it adds to the $SDH and $SII indexes entries that reference the descriptor’s offset in the $SDS data.

When an application attempts to open a file or directory, NTFS uses the $SII index to look up the file or directory’s security descriptor. NTFS reads the file or directory’s internal security ID from the MFT entry’s $STANDARD_INFORMATION attribute. It then uses the $Secure file’s $SII index to locate the ID’s entry in the $SDS data attribute. The offset into the $SDS attribute lets NTFS read the security descriptor and complete the security check. NTFS stores the 32 most recently accessed security descriptors with their $SII index entries in a cache so that it will access the $Secure file only when the $SII isn’t cached.

NTFS doesn’t delete entries in the $Secure file, even if no file or directory on a volume references the entry. Not deleting these entries doesn’t significantly decrease disk space because most volumes, even those used for long periods, have relatively few unique security descriptors.

NTFS’s use of generic B-tree indexing lets files and directories that have the same security settings efficiently share security descriptors. The $SII index lets NTFS quickly look up a security descriptor in the $Secure file while performing security checks, and the $SDH index lets NTFS quickly determine whether a security descriptor being applied to a file or directory is already stored in the $Secure file and can be shared.

**Reparse Points**

As described earlier in the chapter, a reparse point is a block of up to 16 KB of application-defined reparse data and a 32-bit reparse tag that are stored in the
$REPARSE_POINT attribute of a file or directory. Whenever an application creates or deletes a reparse point, NTFS updates the $Extend$Reparse metadata file, in which NTFS stores entries that identify the file record numbers of files and directories that contain reparse points. Storing the records in a central location enables NTFS to provide interfaces for applications to enumerate all a volume’s reparse points or just specific types of reparse points, such as mount points. (See Chapter 9 for more information on mount points.) The $Extend$Reparse file uses the generic B-tree indexing facility of NTFS by collating the file’s entries (in an index named $R$) by reparse point tags and file record numbers.

**Transaction Support**

By leveraging the Kernel Transaction Manager (KTM) support in the kernel, as well as the facilities provided by the Common Log File System that were described earlier, NTFS implements a transactional model called transactional NTFS or TxF. TxF provides a set of user-mode APIs that applications can use for transacted operations on their files and directories and also a file system control (FSCTL) interface for managing its resource managers.

**NOTE**

Support for TxF was added to the NTFS driver without actually changing the format of the NTFS data structures, which is why the NTFS format version number, 3.1, is the same as it has been since Windows XP and Windows Server 2003. TxF achieves backward compatibility by reusing the attribute type ($LOGGED_UTILITY_STREAM) that was previously used only for EFS support instead of adding a new one.

The overall architecture for TxF, shown in Figure 12-49, uses several components:

- Transacted APIs implemented in the Kernel32.dll library
- A library for reading TxF logs (%SystemRoot\System32\Txfw32.dll)
- A COM component for TxF logging functionality (%SystemRoot\System32\Txflog.dll)
- The transactional NTFS library inside the NTFS driver
- The CLFS infrastructure for reading and writing log records
Isolation

Although transactional file operations are opt-in, just like the transactional registry (TxR) operations described in Chapter 4 in Part 1, TxF has an impact on regular applications that are not transaction-aware because it ensures that the transactional operations are isolated. For example, if an antivirus program is scanning a file that’s currently being modified by another application via a transacted operation, TxF must ensure that the scanner reads the pretransaction data, while applications that access the file within the transaction work with the modified data. This model is called read-committed isolation.

Read-committed isolation involves the concept of transacted writers and transacted readers. The former always view the most up-to-date version of a file, including all changes made by the transaction that is currently associated with the file. At any given time, there can be only one transacted writer for a file, which means that its write access is exclusive. Transacted readers, on the other hand, have access only to the committed version of the file at the time they open the file. They are therefore isolated from changes made by transacted writers. This allows for readers to have a consistent view of a file, even when a transacted writer commits its changes. To see the updated data, the transacted reader must open a new handle to the modified file.

Nontransacted writers, on the other hand, are prevented from opening the file by both transacted writers and transacted readers, so they cannot make changes to the file without being part of the transaction. Nontransacted readers act similarly to
transacted readers in that they see only the file contents that were last committed when the file handle was open. Unlike transacted readers, however, they do not receive read-committed isolation, and as such they always receive the updated view of the latest committed version of a transacted file without having to open a new file handle. This allows nontransaction-aware applications to behave as expected.

To summarize, TxF’s read-committed isolation model has the following characteristics:

- Changes are isolated from transacted readers
- Changes are rolled back (undone) if the associated transaction is rolled back, if the machine crashes, or if the volume is forcibly dismounted.
- Changes are flushed to disk if the associated transaction is committed.

**EXPERIMENT: UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING TRANSACTIONS**

In this experiment we’ll use the Transactdemo.exe tool to create a new file, add some data to it as part of a transaction, and see how nontransacted clients interact with the file while the transaction is active. First, open a Command Prompt window and run Transactdemo.exe:

```
C:\>Transactdemo.exe
Transaction Demo v1.0
by Mark Russinovich
Transaction created: {5CD5E900-9DA8-11DD-8379-005056C00008}
Created C:\TransactionDemo.txt.
Pass TransDemo the GUID listed above to see the transacted file.
Rollback or commit transaction? (r/c):
```

Transactdemo creates C:\TransactionDemo.txt within a transaction that it has not committed. Open a second Command Prompt window, and use the `dir` command to look for the presence of the TransactionDemo.txt file:

```
C:\>dir transactiondemo.txt
Volume in drive C is OS
Volume Serial Number is 0C30-686E
Directory of C:\
File Not Found
```

According to this second command prompt, the file doesn’t even exist. Now simulate a nontransacted writer by trying to add data to the file via the `echo` command:

```
C:\>echo Hello > TransactionDemo.txt
The function attempted to use a name that is reserved for use by another transaction.
```
As expected, nontransacted writers are blocked from modifying the file.

The %SystemRoot%\System32\Ktmutil.exe and %SystemRoot%\System32\Fsutil.exe built-in applications can be very useful for dealing with transactional operations on the file system. For example, you can get a list of all current transactions on the system with the following command:

```
C:\>ktmutil tx list
```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TxGuid</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>{5cd5e900-9da8-11dd-8379-005056c00008}</td>
<td>Demo Transaction?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that the GUID matches what Transactdemo returned. With the GUID, you can now use the Fsutil command to query information about the transaction and to commit it or roll it back. For example, here’s how to list the files part of the transaction and the owner account:

```
C:\>fsutil transaction query all {5cd5e900-9da8-11dd-8379-005056c00008}
dwOutcome:        1
dwIsolationLevel: 0
dwIsolationFlags: 0
dwTimeout:        -1
Owner:            BUILTIN\Administrators
Number of Files:  1
---- \TransactionDemo.txt
```

Although the Transactdemo tool presents you with the option to roll back or commit the current transaction, the Fsutil utility allows commits or rollbacks to any ongoing transaction your account has access to. Go back to the command prompt where you ran Transactdemo and press C to commit the transaction, after which the file becomes a standard nontransacted file.

### Transactional APIs

TxF implements transacted versions of the Windows file I/O APIs, which use the suffix Transacted:

- **Create APIs** CreateDirectoryTransacted, CreateFileTransacted, CreateHardLinkTransacted, CreateSymbolicLinkTransacted
- **Find APIs** FindFirstFileNameTransacted, FindFirstFileTransacted, FindFirstStreamTransacted
- **Query APIs** GetCompressedFileSizeTransacted, GetFileAttributesTransacted, GetFullPathNameTransacted, GetLongPathNameTransacted
- **Delete APIs** DeleteFileTransacted, RemoveDirectoryTransacted
- **Copy and Move/Rename APIs** CopyFileTransacted, MoveFileTransacted
- **Set APIs** SetFileAttributesTransacted

In addition, some APIs automatically participate in transacted operations when the
file handle they are passed is part of a transaction, like one created by the CreateFileTransacted API. Table 12-9 lists Windows APIs that have modified behavior when dealing with a transacted file handle.

Table 12-9. API Behavior Changed by TxF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>API Name</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CloseHandle</td>
<td>Transactions will not be committed until all applications close transacted handles to the file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CreateFileMapping, MapViewOfFile</td>
<td>Modifications to mapped views of a file part of a transaction will be associated with the transaction themselves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FindNextFile, ReadDirectoryChanges, GetInformationByHandle, GetFileSize</td>
<td>If the file handle is part of a transaction, read-isolation rules will be applied to these operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GetVolumeInformation</td>
<td>Function will return FILE_SUPPORTS_TRANSACTIONS if the volume supports TxF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ReadFile, WriteFile</td>
<td>Read and write operations to a transacted file handle will be part of the transaction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SetFileInformationByHandle</td>
<td>Changes to the FileBasicInfo, FileRenameInfo, FileAllocationInfo, FileEndOfFileInfo, and FileDispositionInfo classes will be transacted if the file handle is part of a transaction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SetEndOfFile, SetFileShortName, SetFileName</td>
<td>Changes will be transacted if the file handle is part of a transaction.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Resource Managers

Just like TxR uses a resource manager (RM) to keep track of transactional metadata and log files, TxF uses a default resource manager, one for each volume, to keep track of its transactional state. TxF, however, also supports additional resource managers called secondary resource managers. These resource managers can be defined by application writers and have their metadata located in any directory of the application’s choosing, defining their own transactional work units for undo, backup, restore, and redo operations. TxF uses the default resource manager for transacted APIs, and applications that use transactions with the
Distributed Transaction Coordinator or the .NET Framework’s System.Transaction classes create and manage secondary TxF resource managers with TxF resource manager file system control commands. Applications can create and manage secondary RMs by using file system control codes defined for TxF, such as FSCTL_TXFS_CREATE_SECONDARY_RM, FSCTL_TXFS_START_RM, and FSCTL_TXFS_SHUTDOWN_RM. When a secondary RM is created, it must be made consistent by one or more FSCTL_TXFS_ROLLFORWARD_REDO calls followed by FSCTL_TXFS_ROLLFORWARD_UNDO, which redo and/or undo operations that were stored in the log but never committed (such as in the case of a machine crash). We’ll cover the recovery procedure for resource managers shortly. Both the default resource manager and secondary resource managers contain a number of metadata files and directories that describe their current state:

- The $Txf directory, which is where files are linked when they are deleted or overwritten by transactional operations. If a file is deleted in a transaction, read-isolation rules specify that nontransacted readers should still be able to access the file before the delete operation is actually committed. This isolation is achieved by moving the transaction-deleted file into the $Txf directory. The NTFS driver will then keep track of the isolation by inserting a temporary structure in the SCB of the parent directory where the deleted file was originally located. In this way, the file will continue to show up if the parent is enumerated, and it will store the file record number, allowing the file to be opened. When the transaction is committed, NTFS deletes the temporary structure and deletes the file from the $Txf directory. On the other hand, if the transaction is rolled back, NTFS moves the file back to its original directory.

- The $Tops, or TxF Old Page Stream (TOPS) file, which contains a default data stream and an alternate data stream called $T. The default stream for the TOPS file contains metadata about the resource manager, such as its GUID, its CLFS log policy, and the LSN at which recovery should start. The $T stream contains file data that is partially overwritten by a transactional writer (as opposed to a full overwrite, which would move the file into the $Txf directory). NTFS keeps a structure in memory that keeps track of which parts of a file are being modified under a transaction so that nontransacted readers can still access the noncommitted data by having their reads forwarded to $Tops:$T. When the transaction is committed or aborted, the pages are either moved from the $T
stream into the original file or simply thrown out in the case of an abort.

- The TxF log files, which are CLFS log files storing transaction records. For the default resource manager, these files are part of the $TxfLog directory, but secondary resource managers can store them anywhere. TxF uses a multiplexed base log file called $TxfLog.blf. The file
  \$Extend\$RmMetadata\$TxfLog\$TxfLog contains two streams: the KtmLog stream used for Kernel Transaction Manager metadata records, and the TxfLog stream, which contains the TxF log records. Each stream is stored in CLFS log containers that start with $TxfLogContainer and are followed by a unique, increasing ID, such as 00000000000000000001. As the TxF log grows, more container files are created.

As described earlier, the default resource manager stores its files in the
\$Extend\$RmMetadata directory on each NTFS-formatted volume on the
machine.

---

**EXPERIMENT: QUERYING RESOURCE MANAGER INFORMATION**

You can use the built-in %SystemRoot%\System32\Fsutil.exe command-line program to query information about the default resource manager, as well as to create, start, and stop secondary resource managers and configure their logging policies and behaviors. The following command queries information about the default resource manager, which is identified by the root directory (\):

```
C:\>fsutil resource info \
RM Identifier: CF7234E7-39E3-11DC-BDCE-00188BDD5F49
KTM Log Path for RM: \Device\HarddiskVolume3\$Extend\$RmMetadata\$TxfLog\$TxfLog::KtmLog
Space used by TOPS: 79 Mb
TOPS free space: 100%
RM State: Active
Running transactions: 0
One phase commits: 0
Two phase commits: 1
System initiated rollbacks: 0
Age of oldest transaction: 00:00:00
Logging Mode: Simple
Number of containers: 2
Container size: 10 Mb
Total log capacity: 20 Mb
Total free log space: 14 Mb
Minimum containers: 2
Maximum containers: 20
Log growth increment: 2 container(s)
Auto shrink: Not enabled
```

As mentioned, the fsutil resource command has many options for configuring TxF resource managers,
including the ability to create a secondary resource manager in any directory of your choice. For example, you can use the fsutil resource create c:\rmtest command to create a secondary resource manager in the Rmtest directory, followed by the fsutil resource start c:\rmtest command to initiate it. Note the presence of the $Tops and $TxfLogContainer* files and of the TxfLog and $Txf directories in this folder.

**On-Disk Implementation**

As shown earlier in Table 12-6, TxF uses the $LOGGED_UTILITY_STREAM attribute type to store additional data for files and directories that are or have been part of a transaction. This attribute is called $TXF_DATA and contains important information that allows TxF to keep active offline data for a file part of a transaction. The attribute is permanently stored in the MFT; that is, even after the file is not part of a transaction anymore, the stream remains, for reasons we’ll explain shortly. The major components of the attribute are shown in Figure 12-50.

![Figure 12-50. $TXF_DATA attribute](image)

The first field shown is the file record number of the root of the resource manager responsible for the transaction associated with this file. For the default resource manager, the file record number is 5, which is the file record number for the root directory (\) in the MFT, as shown earlier in Figure 12-27. TxF needs this information when it creates an FCB for the file so that it can link it to the correct resource manager, which in turn needs to create an enlistment for the transaction when a transacted file request is received by NTFS. (For more information on enlistments and transactions, see the KTM section in Chapter 3 in Part 1.)

Another important piece of data stored in the $TXF_DATA attribute is the TxF file ID, or TxID, and this explains why $TXF_DATA attributes are never deleted. Because NTFS writes file names to its records when writing to the transaction log, it needs a way to uniquely identify files in the same directory that may have had the same name. For example, if sample.txt is deleted from a directory in a
transaction and later a new file with the same name is created in the same directory (and as part of the same transaction), TxF needs a way to uniquely identify the two instances of sample.txt. This identification is provided by a 64-bit unique number, the TxID, that TxF increments when a new file (or an instance of a file) becomes part of a transaction. Because they can never be reused, TxIDs are permanent, so the $TXF_DATA attribute will never be removed from a file.

Last but not least, three CLFS LSNs are stored for each file part of a transaction. Whenever a transaction is active, such as during create, rename, or write operations, TxF writes a log record to its CLFS log. Each record is assigned an LSN, and that LSN gets written to the appropriate field in the $TXF_DATA attribute. The first LSN is used to store the log record that identifies the changes to NTFS metadata in relation to this file. For example, if the standard attributes of a file are changed as part of a transacted operation, TxF must update the relevant MFT file record, and the LSN for the log record describing the change is stored. TxF uses the second LSN when the file's data is modified. Finally, TxF uses the third LSN when the file name index for the directory requires a change related to a transaction the file took part in, or when a directory was part of a transaction and received a TxID.

The $TXF_DATA attribute also stores internal flags that describe the state information to TxF and the index of the USN record that was applied to the file on commit. A TxF transaction can span multiple USN records that may have been partly updated by NTFS’s recovery mechanism (described shortly), so the index tells TxF how many more USN records must be applied after a recovery.

**Logging Implementation**

As mentioned earlier, each time a change is made to the disk because of an ongoing transaction, TxF writes a record of the change to its log. TxF uses a variety of log record types to keep track of transactional changes, but regardless of the record type, all TxF log records have a generic header that contains information identifying the type of the record, the action related to the record, the TxID that the record applies to, and the GUID of the KTM transaction that the record is associated with.

A redo record specifies how to reapply a change part of a transaction that’s already
been committed to the volume if the transaction has actually never been flushed from cache to disk. An undo record, on the other hand, specifies how to reverse a change part of a transaction that hasn’t been committed at the time of a rollback. Some records are redo-only, meaning they don’t contain any equivalent undo data, while other records contain both redo and undo information.

Through the TOPS file, TxF maintains two critical pieces of data, the base LSN and the restart LSN. The base LSN determines the LSN of the first valid record in the log, while the restart LSN indicates at which LSN recovery should begin when starting the resource manager. When TxF writes a restart record, it updates these two values, indicating that changes have been made to the volume and flushed out to disk—meaning that the file system is fully consistent up to the new restart LSN. TxF also writes compensating log records, or CLRs. These records store the actions that are being performed during transaction rollback (explained next). They’re primarily used to store the undo-next LSN, which allows the recovery process to avoid repeated undo operations by bypassing undo records that have already been processed, a situation that can happen if the system fails during the recovery phase and has already performed part of the undo pass. Finally, TxF also deals with prepare records, abort records, and commit records, which describe the state of the KTM transactions related to TxF.

**Recovery Implementation**

When a resource manager starts because of an FSCTL_TXFS_START_RM call (or, for the default resource manager, as soon as the volume is mounted), TxF runs the recovery process. It reads the TOPS file to determine the restart LSN, where the recovery process should start, and then reads each record forward through the log (called the redo pass). As each record is being processed, TxF opens the file referenced by the record and compares the LSN in the $TXF_DATA attribute with the LSN in the record. If the LSN stored in the attribute is greater than or equal to the LSN of the log record, the action is not applied because the on-disk copy of the file is as new or newer than that of the log record action. If the LSN is not greater than or equal to the LSN in the record, the log contains information about the file that was never written to the file itself. In this case, TxF applies whichever action was recorded in the log record and updates the LSN in the $TXF_DATA attribute with the LSN from the record.
As TxF is processing its redo pass, it builds its transaction table, which describes the operations that it has completed; if it encounters an abort or commit record along the way, TxF discards the related transactions. By the end of the redo pass, TxF parses the final transaction table and connects to the KTM to see whether the KTM recorded a commit or an abort for the transactions. (KTM stores this information in the KtmLog stream of the TxF multiplexed log, as explained earlier.)

After TxF has finished communicating with the KTM, it looks at any leftover transactions in the transaction table and begins the undo pass. In the undo pass, TxF aborts all the remaining transactions in the transaction table by traversing each transaction’s undo LSN chain and applying the undo action for each log record. At the end of the undo pass, the resource manager is consistent and initialized.

This process is very similar to the log file service’s recovery procedure, which is described later in more detail. You should refer to this description for a complete picture of the standard transactional recovery mechanisms.
NTFS Recovery Support

NTFS recovery support ensures that if a power failure or a system failure occurs, no file system operations (transactions) will be left incomplete and the structure of the disk volume will remain intact without the need to run a disk repair utility. The NTFS Chkdsk utility is used to repair catastrophic disk corruption caused by I/O errors (bad disk sectors, electrical anomalies, or disk failures, for example) or software bugs. But with the NTFS recovery capabilities in place, Chkdsk is rarely needed.

As mentioned earlier (in the section Recoverability), NTFS uses a transaction-processing scheme to implement recoverability. This strategy ensures a full disk recovery that is also extremely fast (on the order of seconds) for even the largest disks. NTFS limits its recovery procedures to file system data to ensure that at the very least the user will never lose a volume because of a corrupted file system; however, unless an application takes specific action (such as flushing cached files to disk), NTFS’s recovery support doesn’t guarantee user data to be fully updated if a crash occurs. This is the job of transactional NTFS (TxF).

The following sections detail the transaction-logging scheme NTFS uses to record modifications to file system data structures and explain how NTFS recovers a volume if the system fails.

Design

NTFS implements the design of a recoverable file system. These file systems ensure volume consistency by using logging techniques (sometimes called journaling) originally developed for transaction processing. If the operating system crashes, the recoverable file system restores consistency by executing a recovery procedure that accesses information that has been stored in a log file. Because the file system has logged its disk writes, the recovery procedure takes only seconds, regardless of the size of the volume (unlike in the FAT file system, where the repair time is related to the volume size). The recovery procedure for a recoverable file system is exact, guaranteeing that the volume will be restored to a consistent state.

A recoverable file system incurs some costs for the safety it provides. Every transaction that alters the volume structure requires that one record be written to
the log file for each of the transaction’s suboperations. This logging overhead is ameliorated by the file system’s batching of log records—writing many records to the log file in a single I/O operation. In addition, the recoverable file system can employ the optimization techniques of a lazy write file system. It can even increase the length of the intervals between cache flushes because the file system metadata can be recovered if the system crashes before the cache changes have been flushed to disk. This gain over the caching performance of lazy write file systems makes up for, and often exceeds, the overhead of the recoverable file system’s logging activity.

Neither careful write nor lazy write file systems guarantee protection of user file data. If the system crashes while an application is writing a file, the file can be lost or corrupted. Worse, the crash can corrupt a lazy write file system, destroying existing files or even rendering an entire volume inaccessible.

The NTFS recoverable file system implements several strategies that improve its reliability over that of the traditional file systems. First, NTFS recoverability guarantees that the volume structure won’t be corrupted, so all files will remain accessible after a system failure. Second, although NTFS doesn’t guarantee protection of user data in the event of a system crash—some changes can be lost from the cache—applications can take advantage of the NTFS write-through and cache-flushing capabilities to ensure that file modifications are recorded on disk at appropriate intervals.

Both cache write-through—forcing write operations to be immediately recorded on disk—and cache flushing—forcing cache contents to be written to disk—are efficient operations. NTFS doesn’t have to do extra disk I/O to flush modifications to several different file system data structures because changes to the data structures are recorded—in a single write operation—in the log file; if a failure occurs and cache contents are lost, the file system modifications can be recovered from the log. Furthermore, unlike the FAT file system, NTFS guarantees that user data will be consistent and available immediately after a write-through operation or a cache flush, even if the system subsequently fails.

**Metadata Logging**

NTFS provides file system recoverability by using the same logging technique used
by TxF, which consists of recording all operations that modify file system metadata to a log file. Unlike TxF, however, NTFS’s built-in file system recovery support doesn’t make use of CLFS but uses an internal logging implementation called the log file service (which is not a background service process as described in Chapter 4 in Part 1). Another difference is that while TxF is used only when callers opt in for transacted operations, NTFS records all metadata changes so that the file system can be made consistent in the face of a system failure.

**Log File Service**

The log file service (LFS) is a series of kernel-mode routines inside the NTFS driver that NTFS uses to access the log file. NTFS passes the LFS a pointer to an open file object, which specifies a log file to be accessed. The LFS either initializes a new log file or calls the Windows cache manager to access the existing log file through the cache, as shown in Figure 12-51. Note that although LFS and CLFS have similar sounding names, they are separate logging implementations used for different purposes, although their operation is similar in many ways.

![Figure 12-51. Log file service (LFS)](image)

The LFS divides the log file into two regions: a restart area and an “infinite” logging area, as shown in Figure 12-52.
NTFS calls the LFS to read and write the restart area. NTFS uses the restart area to store context information such as the location in the logging area at which NTFS will begin to read during recovery after a system failure. The LFS maintains a second copy of the restart data in case the first becomes corrupted or otherwise inaccessible. The remainder of the log file is the logging area, which contains transaction records NTFS writes to recover a volume in the event of a system failure. The LFS makes the log file appear infinite by reusing it circularly (while guaranteeing that it doesn't overwrite information it needs). Just like CLFS, the LFS uses LSNs to identify records written to the log file. As the LFS cycles through the file, it increases the values of the LSNs. NTFS uses 64 bits to represent LSNs, so the number of possible LSNs is so large as to be virtually infinite.

NTFS never reads transactions from or writes transactions to the log file directly. The LFS provides services that NTFS calls to open the log file, write log records, read log records in forward or backward order, flush log records up to a specified LSN, or set the beginning of the log file to a higher LSN. During recovery, NTFS calls the LFS to perform the same actions as described in the TxF recovery section: a redo pass for nonflushed committed changes, followed by an undo pass for noncommitted changes.

Here’s how the system guarantees that the volume can be recovered:

1. NTFS first calls the LFS to record in the (cached) log file any transactions that will modify the volume structure.

2. NTFS modifies the volume (also in the cache).

3. The cache manager prompts the LFS to flush the log file to disk. (The LFS implements the flush by calling the cache manager back, telling it which pages of memory to flush. Refer back to the calling sequence shown in Figure 12-51.)
4. After the cache manager flushes the log file to disk, it flushes the volume changes (the metadata operations themselves) to disk.

These steps ensure that if the file system modifications are ultimately unsuccessful, the corresponding transactions can be retrieved from the log file and can be either redone or undone as part of the file system recovery procedure.

File system recovery begins automatically the first time the volume is used after the system is rebooted. NTFS checks whether the transactions that were recorded in the log file before the crash were applied to the volume, and if they weren’t, it redoes them. NTFS also guarantees that transactions not completely logged before the crash are undone so that they don’t appear on the volume.

**Log Record Types**

The NTFS recovery mechanism uses similar log record types as the TxF recovery mechanism: update records, which correspond to the redo and undo records that TxF uses, and checkpoint records, which are similar to the restart records used by TxF. Figure 12-53 shows three update records in the log file. Each record represents one suboperation of a transaction, creating a new file. The redo entry in each update record tells NTFS how to reapply the suboperation to the volume, and the undo entry tells NTFS how to roll back (undo) the suboperation.

![Figure 12-53. Update records in the log file](image)

After logging a transaction (in this example, by calling the LFS to write the three update records to the log file), NTFS performs the suboperations on the volume itself, in the cache. When it has finished updating the cache, NTFS writes another record to the log file, recording the entire transaction as complete—a suboperation known as committing a transaction. Once a transaction is committed, NTFS guarantees that the entire transaction will appear on the volume, even if the
operating system subsequently fails.

When recovering after a system failure, NTFS reads through the log file and redoes each committed transaction. Although NTFS completed the committed transactions from before the system failure, it doesn’t know whether the cache manager flushed the volume modifications to disk in time. The updates might have been lost from the cache when the system failed. Therefore, NTFS executes the committed transactions again just to be sure that the disk is up to date.

After redoing the committed transactions during a file system recovery, NTFS locates all the transactions in the log file that weren’t committed at failure and rolls back each suboperation that had been logged. In Figure 12-53, NTFS would first undo the T1c suboperation and then follow the backward pointer to T1b and undo that suboperation. It would continue to follow the backward pointers, undoing suboperations, until it reached the first suboperation in the transaction. By following the pointers, NTFS knows how many and which update records it must undo to roll back a transaction.

Redo and undo information can be expressed either physically or logically. As the lowest layer of software maintaining the file system structure, NTFS writes update records with physical descriptions that specify volume updates in terms of particular byte ranges on the disk that are to be changed, moved, and so on, unlike TxF, which uses logical descriptions that express updates in terms of operations such as “delete file A.dat.” NTFS writes update records (usually several) for each of the following transactions:

- Creating a file
- Deleting a file
- Extending a file
- Truncating a file
- Setting file information
- Renaming a file
- Changing the security applied to a file

The redo and undo information in an update record must be carefully designed because although NTFS undoes a transaction, recovers from a system failure, or
even operates normally, it might try to redo a transaction that has already been done or, conversely, to undo a transaction that never occurred or that has already been undone. Similarly, NTFS might try to redo or undo a transaction consisting of several update records, only some of which are complete on disk. The format of the update records must ensure that executing redundant redo or undo operations is idempotent, that is, has a neutral effect. For example, setting a bit that is already set has no effect, but toggling a bit that has already been toggled does. The file system must also handle intermediate volume states correctly.

In addition to update records, NTFS periodically writes a checkpoint record to the log file, as illustrated in Figure 12-54.

![Checkpoint record in the log file](image)

A checkpoint record helps NTFS determine what processing would be needed to recover a volume if a crash were to occur immediately. Using information stored in the checkpoint record, NTFS knows, for example, how far back in the log file it must go to begin its recovery. After writing a checkpoint record, NTFS stores the LSN of the record in the restart area so that it can quickly find its most recently written checkpoint record when it begins file system recovery after a crash occurs—this is similar to the restart LSN used by TxF for the same reason.

Although the LFS presents the log file to NTFS as if it were infinitely large, it isn’t. The generous size of the log file and the frequent writing of checkpoint records (an operation that usually frees up space in the log file) make the possibility of the log file filling up a remote one. Nevertheless, the LFS, just like CLFS, accounts for this possibility by tracking several operational parameters:

- The available log space
- The amount of space needed to write an incoming log record and to undo the write, should that be necessary
The amount of space needed to roll back all active (noncommitted) transactions, should that be necessary

If the log file doesn’t contain enough available space to accommodate the total of the last two items, the LFS returns a “log file full” error, and NTFS raises an exception. The NTFS exception handler rolls back the current transaction and places it in a queue to be restarted later.

To free up space in the log file, NTFS must momentarily prevent further transactions on files. To do so, NTFS blocks file creation and deletion and then requests exclusive access to all system files and shared access to all user files. Gradually, active transactions either are completed successfully or receive the “log file full” exception. NTFS rolls back and queues the transactions that receive the exception.

Once it has blocked transaction activity on files as just described, NTFS calls the cache manager to flush unwritten data to disk, including unwritten log file data. After everything is safely flushed to disk, NTFS no longer needs the data in the log file. It resets the beginning of the log file to the current position, making the log file “empty.” Then it restarts the queued transactions. Beyond the short pause in I/O processing, the “log file full” error has no effect on executing programs.

This scenario is one example of how NTFS uses the log file not only for file system recovery but also for error recovery during normal operation. You’ll find out more about error recovery in the following section.

**Recovery**

NTFS automatically performs a disk recovery the first time a program accesses an NTFS volume after the system has been booted. (If no recovery is needed, the process is trivial.) Recovery depends on two tables NTFS maintains in memory: a transaction table, which behaves just like the one TxF maintains, and a dirty page table, which records which pages in the cache contain modifications to the file system structure that haven’t yet been written to disk. This data must be flushed to disk during recovery.

NTFS writes a checkpoint record to the log file once every 5 seconds. Just before it does, it calls the LFS to store a current copy of the transaction table and of the
dirty page table in the log file. NTFS then records in the checkpoint record the LSNs of the log records containing the copied tables. When recovery begins after a system failure, NTFS calls the LFS to locate the log records containing the most recent checkpoint record and the most recent copies of the transaction and dirty page tables. It then copies the tables to memory.

The log file usually contains more update records following the last checkpoint record. These update records represent volume modifications that occurred after the last checkpoint record was written. NTFS must update the transaction and dirty page tables to include these operations. After updating the tables, NTFS uses the tables and the contents of the log file to update the volume itself.

To perform its volume recovery, NTFS scans the log file three times, loading the file into memory during the first pass to minimize disk I/O. Each pass has a particular purpose:

1. Analysis
2. Redoing transactions
3. Undoing transactions

**Analysis Pass**

During the analysis pass, as shown in Figure 12-55, NTFS scans forward in the log file from the beginning of the last checkpoint operation to find update records and use them to update the transaction and dirty page tables it copied to memory. Notice in the figure that the checkpoint operation stores three records in the log file and that update records might be interspersed among these records. NTFS therefore must start its scan at the beginning of the checkpoint operation.

![Figure 12-55. Analysis pass](image)

Most update records that appear in the log file after the checkpoint operation begins represent a modification to either the transaction table or the dirty page
table. If an update record is a “transaction committed” record, for example, the transaction the record represents must be removed from the transaction table. Similarly, if the update record is a “page update” record that modifies a file system data structure, the dirty page table must be updated to reflect that change.

Once the tables are up to date in memory, NTFS scans the tables to determine the LSN of the oldest update record that logs an operation that hasn’t been carried out on disk. The transaction table contains the LSNs of the noncommitted (incomplete) transactions, and the dirty page table contains the LSNs of records in the cache that haven’t been flushed to disk. The LSN of the oldest update record that NTFS finds in these two tables determines where the redo pass will begin. If the last checkpoint record is older, however, NTFS will start the redo pass there instead.

NOTE

In the TxF recovery model, there is no distinct analysis pass. Instead, as described in the TxF recovery section, TxF performs the equivalent work in the redo pass.

Redo Pass

During the redo pass, as shown in Figure 12-56, NTFS scans forward in the log file from the LSN of the oldest update record, which it found during the analysis pass. It looks for “page update” records, which contain volume modifications that were written before the system failure but that might not have been flushed to disk. NTFS redoes these updates in the cache.

When NTFS reaches the end of the log file, it has updated the cache with the necessary volume modifications, and the cache manager’s lazy writer can begin writing cache contents to disk in the background.
**Undo Pass**

After it completes the redo pass, NTFS begins its undo pass, in which it rolls back any transactions that weren’t committed when the system failed. Figure 12-57 shows two transactions in the log file; transaction 1 was committed before the power failure, but transaction 2 wasn’t. NTFS must undo transaction 2.

![Figure 12-57. Undo pass](image)

Suppose that transaction 2 created a file, an operation that comprises three suboperations, each with its own update record. The update records of a transaction are linked by backward pointers in the log file because they are usually not contiguous.

The NTFS transaction table lists the LSN of the last-logged update record for each noncommitted transaction. In this example, the transaction table identifies LSN 4049 as the last update record logged for transaction 2. As shown from right to left in Figure 12-58, NTFS rolls back transaction 2.

![Figure 12-58. Undoing a transaction](image)

After locating LSN 4049, NTFS finds the undo information and executes it,
clearing bits 3 through 9 in its allocation bitmap. NTFS then follows the backward pointer to LSN 4048, which directs it to remove the new file name from the appropriate file name index. Finally, it follows the last backward pointer and deallocates the MFT file record reserved for the file, as the update record with LSN 4046 specifies. Transaction 2 is now rolled back. If there are other noncommitted transactions to undo, NTFS follows the same procedure to roll them back. Because undoing transactions affects the volume’s file system structure, NTFS must log the undo operations in the log file. After all, the power might fail again during the recovery, and NTFS would have to redo its undo operations!

When the undo pass of the recovery is finished, the volume has been restored to a consistent state. At this point, NTFS is prepared to flush the cache changes to disk to ensure that the volume is up to date. Before doing so, however, it executes a callback that TxF registers for notifications of LFS flushes. Because TxF and NTFS both use write-ahead logging, TxF must flush its log through CLFS before the NTFS log is flushed to ensure consistency of its own metadata. (And similarly, the TOPS file must be flushed before the CLFS-managed log files.) NTFS then writes an “empty” LFS restart area to indicate that the volume is consistent and that no recovery need be done if the system should fail again immediately. Recovery is complete.

NTFS guarantees that recovery will return the volume to some preexisting consistent state, but not necessarily to the state that existed just before the system crash. NTFS can’t make that guarantee because, for performance, it uses a “lazy commit” algorithm, which means that the log file isn’t immediately flushed to disk each time a “transaction committed” record is written. Instead, numerous “transaction committed” records are batched and written together, either when the cache manager calls the LFS to flush the log file to disk or when the LFS writes a checkpoint record (once every 5 seconds) to the log file. Another reason the recovered volume might not be completely up to date is that several parallel transactions might be active when the system crashes and some of their “transaction committed” records might make it to disk whereas others might not. The consistent volume that recovery produces includes all the volume updates whose “transaction committed” records made it to disk and none of the updates whose “transaction committed” records didn’t make it to disk.
NTFS uses the log file to recover a volume after the system fails, but it also takes advantage of an important “freebie” it gets from logging transactions. File systems necessarily contain a lot of code devoted to recovering from file system errors that occur during the course of normal file I/O. Because NTFS logs each transaction that modifies the volume structure, it can use the log file to recover when a file system error occurs and thus can greatly simplify its error handling code. The “log file full” error described earlier is one example of using the log file for error recovery.

Most I/O errors that a program receives aren’t file system errors and therefore can’t be resolved entirely by NTFS. When called to create a file, for example, NTFS might begin by creating a file record in the MFT and then enter the new file’s name in a directory index. When it tries to allocate space for the file in its bitmap, however, it could discover that the disk is full and the create request can’t be completed. In such a case, NTFS uses the information in the log file to undo the part of the operation it has already completed and to deallocate the data structures it reserved for the file. Then it returns a “disk full” error to the caller, which in turn must respond appropriately to the error.

**NTFS Bad-Cluster Recovery**

The volume manager included with Windows (VolMgr) can recover data from a bad sector on a fault-tolerant volume, but if the hard disk doesn’t perform bad-sector remapping or runs out of spare sectors, the volume manager can’t perform bad-sector replacement to replace the bad sector. (See Chapter 9 for more information on the volume manager.) When the file system reads from the sector, the volume manager instead recovers the data and returns the warning to the file system that there is only one copy of the data.

The FAT file system doesn’t respond to this volume manager warning. Moreover, neither FAT nor the volume manager keeps track of the bad sectors, so a user must run the Chkdsk or Format utility to prevent the volume manager from repeatedly recovering data for the file system. Both Chkdsk and Format are less than ideal for removing bad sectors from use. Chkdsk can take a long time to find and remove bad sectors, and Format wipes all the data off the partition it’s formatting.

In the file system equivalent of a volume manager’s bad-sector replacement, NTFS
dynamically replaces the cluster containing a bad sector and keeps track of the bad cluster so that it won’t be reused. (Recall that NTFS maintains portability by addressing logical clusters rather than physical sectors.) NTFS performs these functions when the volume manager can’t perform bad-sector replacement. When a volume manager returns a bad-sector warning or when the hard disk driver returns a bad-sector error, NTFS allocates a new cluster to replace the one containing the bad sector. NTFS copies the data that the volume manager has recovered into the new cluster to reestablish data redundancy.

Figure 12-59 shows an MFT record for a user file with a bad cluster in one of its data runs as it existed before the cluster went bad. When it receives a bad-sector error, NTFS reassigns the cluster containing the sector to its bad-cluster file, $BadClus. This prevents the bad cluster from being allocated to another file. NTFS then allocates a new cluster for the file and changes the file’s VCN-to-LCN mappings to point to the new cluster. This bad-cluster remapping (introduced earlier in this chapter) is illustrated in Figure 12-59. Cluster number 1357, which contains the bad sector, must be replaced by a good cluster.

![Figure 12-59. MFT record for a user file with a bad cluster](image)

Bad-sector errors are undesirable, but when they do occur, the combination of NTFS and the volume manager provides the best possible solution. If the bad sector is on a redundant volume, the volume manager recovers the data and replaces the sector if it can. If it can’t replace the sector, it returns a warning to NTFS, and NTFS replaces the cluster containing the bad sector.

If the volume isn’t configured as a redundant volume, the data in the bad sector can’t be recovered. When the volume is formatted as a FAT volume and the
volume manager can’t recover the data, reading from the bad sector yields indeterminate results. If some of the file system’s control structures reside in the bad sector, an entire file or group of files (or potentially, the whole disk) can be lost. At best, some data in the affected file (often, all the data in the file beyond the bad sector) is lost. Moreover, the FAT file system is likely to reallocate the bad sector to the same or another file on the volume, causing the problem to resurface.

Like the other file systems, NTFS can’t recover data from a bad sector without help from a volume manager. However, NTFS greatly contains the damage a bad sector can cause. If NTFS discovers the bad sector during a read operation, it remaps the cluster the sector is in, as shown in Figure 12-60. If the volume isn’t configured as a redundant volume, NTFS returns a “data read” error to the calling program. Although the data that was in that cluster is lost, the rest of the file—and the file system—remains intact; the calling program can respond appropriately to the data loss, and the bad cluster won’t be reused in future allocations. If NTFS discovers the bad cluster on a write operation rather than a read, NTFS remaps the cluster before writing and thus loses no data and generates no error.

The same recovery procedures are followed if file system data is stored in a sector that goes bad. If the bad sector is on a redundant volume, NTFS replaces the cluster dynamically, using the data recovered by the volume manager. If the volume isn’t redundant, the data can’t be recovered, so NTFS sets a bit in the $Volume metadata file that indicates corruption on the volume. The NTFS Chkdsk utility checks this bit when the system is next rebooted, and if the bit is set, Chkdsk executes, repairing the file system corruption by reconstructing the NTFS metadata.
In rare instances, file system corruption can occur even on a fault-tolerant disk configuration. A double error can destroy both file system data and the means to reconstruct it. If the system crashes while NTFS is writing the mirror copy of an MFT file record—of a file name index or of the log file, for example—the mirror copy of such file system data might not be fully updated. If the system were rebooted and a bad-sector error occurred on the primary disk at exactly the same location as the incomplete write on the disk mirror, NTFS would be unable to recover the correct data from the disk mirror. NTFS implements a special scheme for detecting such corruptions in file system data. If it ever finds an inconsistency, it sets the corruption bit in the volume file, which causes Chkdsk to reconstruct the NTFS metadata when the system is next rebooted. Because file system corruption is rare on a fault-tolerant disk configuration, Chkdsk is seldom needed. It is supplied as a safety precaution rather than as a first-line data recovery strategy.

The use of Chkdsk on NTFS is vastly different from its use on the FAT file system. Before writing anything to disk, FAT sets the volume's dirty bit and then resets the bit after the modification is complete. If any I/O operation is in progress when the
system crashes, the dirty bit is left set and Chkdsk runs when the system is rebooted. On NTFS, Chkdsk runs only when unexpected or unreadable file system data is found and NTFS can’t recover the data from a redundant volume or from redundant file system structures on a single volume. (The system boot sector is duplicated—in the last sector of a volume—as are the parts of the MFT [$MftMirr] required for booting the system and running the NTFS recovery procedure. This redundancy ensures that NTFS will always be able to boot and recover itself.)

Table 12-10 summarizes what happens when a sector goes bad on a disk volume formatted for one of the Windows-supported file systems according to various conditions we’ve described in this section.

Table 12-10. Summary of NTFS Data Recovery Scenarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>With a Disk That Supports Bad-Sector Remapping and Has Spare Sectors</th>
<th>With a Disk That Does Not Perform Bad-Sector Remapping or Has No Spare Sectors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fault-tolerant volume[a].</td>
<td>1. Volume manager recovers the data.</td>
<td>1. Volume manager recovers the data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Volume manager performs bad-sector replacement.</td>
<td>2. Volume manager sends the data and a bad-sector error to the file system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. File system remains unaware of the error.</td>
<td>3. NTFS performs cluster remapping.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-fault-tolerant volume</td>
<td>1. Volume manager can’t recover the data.</td>
<td>1. Volume manager can’t recover the data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Volume manager sends a bad-sector error to the file system.</td>
<td>2. Volume manager sends a bad-sector error to the file system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. NTFS performs cluster remapping. Data is lost.[b]</td>
<td>3. NTFS performs cluster remapping. Data is lost.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[a] A fault-tolerant volume is one of the following: a mirror set (RAID-1) or a RAID-5 set

[b] In a write operation, no data is lost: NTFS remaps the cluster before the write.

If the volume on which the bad sector appears is a fault-tolerant volume—a mirrored (RAID-1) or RAID-5 volume—and if the hard disk is one that supports
bad-sector replacement (and that hasn’t run out of spare sectors), it doesn’t matter which file system you’re using (FAT or NTFS). The volume manager replaces the bad sector without the need for user or file system intervention.

If a bad sector is located on a hard disk that doesn’t support bad sector replacement, the file system is responsible for replacing (remapping) the bad sector or—in the case of NTFS—the cluster in which the bad sector resides. The FAT file system doesn’t provide sector or cluster remapping. The benefits of NTFS cluster remapping are that bad spots in a file can be fixed without harm to the file (or harm to the file system, as the case may be) and that the bad cluster will not be used ever again.

**Self-Healing**

With today’s multiterabyte storage devices, taking a volume offline for a consistency check can result in a service outage of many hours. Recognizing that many disk corruptions are localized to a single file or portion of metadata, NTFS implements a self-healing feature to repair damage while a volume remains online. When NTFS detects corruption, it prevents access to the damaged file or files and creates a system worker thread that performs Chkdsk-like corrections to the corrupted data structures, allowing access to the repaired files when it has finished. Access to other files continues normally during this operation, minimizing service disruption.

You can use the `fsutil repair set` command to view and set a volume’s repair options, which are summarized in **Table 12-11**. The Fsutil utility uses the `FSCTL_SET_REPAIR` file system control code to set these settings, which are saved in the VCB for the volume.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flag</th>
<th>Behavior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SET_REPAIR_ENABLED</td>
<td>Enable self-healing for the volume.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SET_REPAIR_WARN_ABOUT_DATA_LOSS</td>
<td>If the self-healing process is unable to fully recover a file, specifies whether</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In all cases, including when the visual warning is disabled (the default), NTFS will log any self-healing operation it undertook in the System event log.

Apart from periodic automatic self-healing, NTFS also supports manually initiated self-healing cycles through the FSCTL_INITIATE_REPAIR and FSCTL_WAIT_FOR_REPAIR control codes, which can be initiated with the fsutil repair initiate and fsutil repair wait commands. This allows the user to force the repair of a specific file and to wait until repair of that file is complete.

To check the status of the self-healing mechanism, the FSCTL_QUERY_REPAIR control code or the fsutil repair query command can be used, as shown here:

C:\>fsutil repair query c:
Self healing is enabled for volume c: with flags 0x1.
flags: 0x01 - enable general repair
  0x08 - warn about potential data loss
  0x10 - disable general repair and bugcheck once on first corruption
Encrypting File System Security

As covered in Chapter 9, BitLocker encrypts and protects volumes from offline attacks, but once a system is booted BitLocker’s job is done. The Encrypting File System (EFS) protects individual files and directories from other authenticated users on a system. When choosing how to protect your data, it is not an “either/or” choice between BitLocker and EFS; each provides protection from specific—and nonoverlapping—threats. Together BitLocker and EFS provide a “defense in depth” for the data on your system.

The paradigm used by EFS is to encrypt files and directories using symmetric encryption (a single key that is used for encrypting and decrypting the file). The symmetric encryption key is then encrypted using asymmetric encryption (one key for encryption—often referred to as the “public” key—and a different key for decryption—often referred to as the “private” key) for each user who is granted access to the file. The details and theory behind these encryption methods is beyond the scope of this book; however, a good primer is available at http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa380251(v=vs.85).aspx.

EFS works with the Windows Cryptography Next Generation (CNG) APIs, and thus may be configured to use any algorithm supported by (or added to) CNG. By default, EFS will use the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) for symmetric encryption (256-bit key) and the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) public key algorithm for asymmetric encryption (2,048-bit keys).

Users can encrypt files via Windows Explorer by opening a file’s Properties dialog box, clicking Advanced, and then selecting the Encrypt Contents To Secure Data option, as shown in Figure 12-61. (A file may be encrypted or compressed, but not both.) Users can also encrypt files via a command-line utility named Cipher (%SystemRoot%\System32\Cipher.exe) or programmatically using Windows APIs such as EncryptFile and AddUsersToEncryptedFile.

Windows automatically encrypts files that reside in directories that are designated as encrypted directories. When a file is encrypted, EFS generates a random number for the file that EFS calls the file’s File Encryption Key (FEK). EFS uses the FEK to encrypt the file’s contents using symmetric encryption. EFS then encrypts the
FEK using the user’s asymmetric public key and stores the encrypted FEK in the $EFS alternate data stream for the file. The source of the public key may be administratively specified to come from an assigned X.509 certificate or a smartcard or randomly generated (which would then be added to the user’s certificate store, which can be viewed using the Certificate Manager (%SystemRoot%\System32\Certmgr.msc). After EFS completes these steps, the file is secure: other users can’t decrypt the data without the file’s decrypted FEK, and they can’t decrypt the FEK without the private key.

Figure 12-61. Encrypt files by using the Advanced Attributes dialog box

Symmetric encryption algorithms are typically very fast, which makes them suitable for encrypting large amounts of data, such as file data. However, symmetric encryption algorithms have a weakness: you can bypass their security if you obtain the key. If multiple users want to share one encrypted file protected only using symmetric encryption, each user would require access to the file’s FEK. Leaving the FEK unencrypted would obviously be a security problem, but encrypting the FEK once would require all the users to share the same FEK decryption key—another potential security problem.

Keeping the FEK secure is a difficult problem, which EFS addresses with the public key–based half of its encryption architecture. Encrypting a file’s FEK for individual users who access the file lets multiple users share an encrypted file. EFS can encrypt a file’s FEK with each user’s public key and can store each user’s encrypted FEK in the file’s $EFS data stream. Anyone can access a user’s public key, but no one can use a public key to decrypt the data that the public key
encrypted. The only way users can decrypt a file is with their private key, which the operating system must access. A user’s private key decrypts the user’s encrypted copy of a file’s FEK. Public key–based algorithms are usually slow, but EFS uses these algorithms only to encrypt FEKs. Splitting key management between a publicly available key and a private key makes key management a little easier than symmetric encryption algorithms do and solves the dilemma of keeping the FEK secure.

Several components work together to make EFS work, as the diagram of EFS architecture in Figure 12-62 shows. EFS support is merged into the NTFS driver. Whenever NTFS encounters an encrypted file, NTFS executes EFS functions that it contains. The EFS functions encrypt and decrypt file data as applications access encrypted files. Although EFS stores an FEK with a file’s data, users’ public keys encrypt the FEK. To encrypt or decrypt file data, EFS must decrypt the file’s FEK with the aid of CNG key management services that reside in user mode.
The Local Security Authority Subsystem (LSASS; %SystemRoot%\System32\Lsass.exe) manages logon sessions but also hosts the EFS service. For example, when EFS needs to decrypt an FEK to decrypt file data a user wants to access, NTFS sends a request to the EFS service inside LSASS.

**Encrypting a File for the First Time**

The NTFS driver calls its EFS helper functions when it encounters an encrypted file. A file’s attributes record that the file is encrypted in the same way that a file records that it is compressed (discussed earlier in this chapter). NTFS has specific interfaces for converting a file from nonencrypted to encrypted form, but user-mode components primarily drive the process. As described earlier, Windows lets you encrypt a file in two ways: by using the cipher command-line utility or by checking the Encrypt Contents To Secure Data check box in the Advanced Attributes dialog box for a file in Windows Explorer. Both Windows Explorer and the cipher command rely on the EncryptFile Windows API that Advapi32.dll (Advanced Windows APIs DLL) exports.

EFS stores only one block of information in an encrypted file, and that block contains an entry for each user sharing the file. These entries are called key entries, and EFS stores them in the data decryption field (DDF) portion of the file’s EFS data. A collection of multiple key entries is called a key ring because, as mentioned earlier, EFS lets multiple users share encrypted files.

*Figure 12-63* shows a file’s EFS information format and key entry format. EFS stores enough information in the first part of a key entry to precisely describe a user’s public key. This data includes the user’s security ID (SID) (note that the SID is not guaranteed to be present), the container name in which the key is stored, the cryptographic provider name, and the asymmetric key pair certificate hash. Only the asymmetric key pair certificate hash is used by the decryption process. The second part of the key entry contains an encrypted version of the FEK. EFS uses the CNG to encrypt the FEK with the selected asymmetric encryption algorithm and the user’s public key.
EFS stores information about recovery key entries in a file’s data recovery field (DRF). The format of DRF entries is identical to the format of DDF entries. The DRF’s purpose is to let designated accounts, or recovery agents, decrypt a user’s file when administrative authority must have access to the user’s data. For example, suppose a company employee forgot his or her logon password. An administrator can reset the user’s password, but without recovery agents, no one can recover the user’s encrypted data.

Recovery agents are defined with the Encrypted Data Recovery Agents security policy of the local computer or domain. This policy is available from the Local Security Policy MMC snap-in, as shown in Figure 12-64. When you use the Add Recovery Agent Wizard (by right-clicking Encrypting File System and then clicking Add Data Recovery Agent), you can add recovery agents and specify which private/public key pairs (designated by their certificates) the recovery agents use for EFS recovery. Lsasrv interprets the recovery policy when it initializes and when it receives notification that the recovery policy has changed. EFS creates a DRF key entry for each recovery agent by using the cryptographic provider registered for EFS recovery.
In the final step in creating EFS information for a file, Lsasrv calculates a checksum for the DDF and DRF by using the MD5 hash facility of Base Cryptographic Provider 1.0. Lsasrv stores the checksum’s result in the EFS information header. EFS references this checksum during decryption to ensure that the contents of a file’s EFS information haven’t become corrupted or been tampered with.

**Encrypting File Data**

When a user encrypts an existing file, the following process occurs:

1. The EFS service opens the file for exclusive access.
2. All data streams in the file are copied to a plaintext temporary file in the system’s temporary directory.
3. An FEK is randomly generated and used to encrypt the file by using DESX or 3DES, depending on the effective security policy.
4. A DDF is created to contain the FEK encrypted by using the user’s public key. EFS automatically obtains the user’s public key from the user’s X.509 version 3 file encryption certificate.
5. If a recovery agent has been designated through Group Policy, a DRF is created to contain the FEK encrypted by using RSA and the recovery agent’s public key.

EFS automatically obtains the recovery agent’s public key for file recovery from the recovery agent’s X.509 version 3 certificate, which is stored in the
EFS recovery policy. If there are multiple recovery agents, a copy of the FEK is encrypted by using each agent’s public key, and a DRF is created to store each encrypted FEK.

NOTE
The file recovery property in the certificate is an example of an enhanced key usage (EPUK) field. An EPUK extension and extended property specify and limit the valid uses of a certificate. File Recovery is one of the EPUK fields defined by Microsoft as part of the Microsoft public key infrastructure (PKI).

6. EFS writes the encrypted data, along with the DDF and the DRF, back to the file. Because symmetric encryption does not add additional data, file size increase is minimal after encryption. The metadata, consisting primarily of encrypted FEKs, is usually less than 1 KB. File size in bytes before and after encryption is normally reported to be the same.

7. The plaintext temporary file is deleted.

When a user saves a file to a folder that has been configured for encryption, the process is similar except that no temporary file is created.

The Decryption Process

When an application accesses an encrypted file, decryption proceeds as follows:

1. NTFS recognizes that the file is encrypted and sends a request to the EFS driver.

2. The EFS driver retrieves the DDF and passes it to the EFS service.

3. The EFS service retrieves the user’s private key from the user’s profile and uses it to decrypt the DDF and obtain the FEK.

4. The EFS service passes the FEK back to the EFS driver.

5. The EFS driver uses the FEK to decrypt sections of the file as needed for the application.

NOTE
When an application opens a file, only those sections of the file that the application is using are decrypted because EFS uses cipher block chaining. The behavior is different if the user removes the
6. The EFS driver returns the decrypted data to NTFS, which then sends the data to the requesting application.

**Backing Up Encrypted Files**

An important aspect of any file encryption facility’s design is that file data is never available in unencrypted form except to applications that access the file via the encryption facility. This restriction particularly affects backup utilities, in which archival media store files. EFS addresses this problem by providing a facility for backup utilities so that the utilities can back up and restore files in their encrypted states. Thus, backup utilities don’t have to be able to decrypt file data, nor do they need to encrypt file data in their backup procedures.

Backup utilities use the EFS API functions OpenEncryptedFileRaw, ReadEncryptedFileRaw, WriteEncryptedFileRaw, and CloseEncryptedFileRaw in Windows to access a file’s encrypted contents. After a backup utility opens a file for raw access during a backup operation, the utility calls ReadEncryptedFileRaw to obtain the file data.

**EXPERIMENT: VIEWING EFS INFORMATION**

EFS has a handful of other API functions that applications can use to manipulate encrypted files. For example, applications use the AddUsersToEncryptedFile API function to give additional users access to an encrypted file and RemoveUsersFromEncryptedFile to revoke users’ access to an encrypted file. Applications use the QueryUsersOnEncryptedFile function to obtain information about a file’s associated DDF and DRF key fields. QueryUsersOnEncryptedFile returns the SID, certificate hash value, and display information that each DDF and DRF key field contains. The following output is from the EFSDump utility, from Sysinternals, when an encrypted file is specified as a command-line argument:

```
C:\>efsdump test.txt
EFS Information Dumper v1.02
Copyright (C) 1999 Mark Russinovich
Systems Internals - http://www.sysinternals.com

test.txt:
DDF Entry:
    DARYL\Mark:
        CN=Mark,L=EFS,OU=EFS File Encryption Certificate
DRF Entry:
    Unknown user:
        EFS Data Recovery
```

You can see that the file test.txt has one DDF entry for user Mark and one DRF entry for the EFS Data
Recovery agent, which is the only recovery agent currently registered on the system.

**Copying Encrypted Files**

When an encrypted file is copied, the system does not decrypt the file and re-encrypt it at its destination; it just copies the encrypted data and the EFS alternate data streams to the specified destination. However, if the destination does not support alternate data streams—if it is not an NTFS volume (such as a FAT volume) or is a network share (even if the network share is an NTFS volume)—the copy cannot proceed normally because the alternate data streams would be lost. If the copy is done with Explorer, a dialog box informs the user that the destination volume does not support encryption and asks the user whether the file should be copied to the destination unencrypted. If the user agrees, the file will be decrypted and copied to the specified destination. If the copy is done from a command prompt, the copy command will fail and return the error message “The specified file could not be encrypted”.
Conclusion

Windows supports a wide variety of file system formats accessible to both the local system and remote clients. The file system filter driver architecture provides a clean way to extend and augment file system access, and NTFS provides a reliable, secure, scalable file system format for local file system storage. In the next chapter, we’ll look at startup and shutdown in Windows.
Chapter 13. Startup and Shutdown

In this chapter, we’ll describe the steps required to boot Windows and the options that can affect system startup. Understanding the details of the boot process will help you diagnose problems that can arise during a boot. Then we’ll explain the kinds of things that can go wrong during the boot process and how to resolve them. Finally, we’ll explain what occurs on an orderly system shutdown.
Boot Process

In describing the Windows boot process, we’ll start with the installation of Windows and proceed through the execution of boot support files. Device drivers are a crucial part of the boot process, so we’ll explain the way that they control the point in the boot process at which they load and initialize. Then we’ll describe how the executive subsystems initialize and how the kernel launches the user-mode portion of Windows by starting the Session Manager process (Smss.exe), which starts the initial two sessions (session 0 and session 1). Along the way, we’ll highlight the points at which various on-screen messages appear to help you correlate the internal process with what you see when you watch Windows boot.

The early phases of the boot process differ significantly on systems with a BIOS (basic input output system) versus systems with an EFI (Extensible Firmware Interface). EFI is a newer standard that does away with much of the legacy 16-bit code that BIOS systems use and allows the loading of preboot programs and drivers to support the operating system loading phase. The next sections describe the portions of the boot process specific to BIOS-based systems and are followed with a section describing the EFI-specific portions of the boot process.

To support these different firmware implementations (as well as EFI 2.0, which is known as Unified EFI, or UEFI), Windows provides a boot architecture that abstracts many of the differences away from users and developers in order to provide a consistent environment and experience regardless of the type of firmware used on the installed system.

BIOS Preboot

The Windows boot process doesn’t begin when you power on your computer or press the reset button. It begins when you install Windows on your computer. At some point during the execution of the Windows Setup program, the system’s primary hard disk is prepared with code that takes part in the boot process. Before we get into what this code does, let’s look at how and where Windows places the code on a disk. Since the early days of MS-DOS, a standard has existed on x86 systems for the way physical hard disks are divided into volumes.

Microsoft operating systems split hard disks into discrete areas known as partitions
and use file systems (such as FAT and NTFS) to format each partition into a volume. A hard disk can contain up to four primary partitions. Because this apportioning scheme would limit a disk to four volumes, a special partition type, called an extended partition, further allocates up to four additional partitions within each extended partition. Extended partitions can contain extended partitions, which can contain extended partitions, and so on, making the number of volumes an operating system can place on a disk effectively infinite. Figure 13-1 shows an example of a hard disk layout, and Table 13-1 summarizes the files involved in the BIOS boot process. (You can learn more about Windows partitioning in Chapter 9.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Processor Execution</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Master Boot Record (MBR)</td>
<td>16-bit real mode</td>
<td>Reads and loads the volume boot record (VBR)</td>
<td>Per storage device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boot sector (also called volume boot record)</td>
<td>16-bit real mode</td>
<td>Understands the file system on the partition and locates Bootmgr by name, loading it into memory</td>
<td>Per active (bootable) partition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bootmgr</td>
<td>16-bit real mode and 32-bit without paging</td>
<td>Reads the Boot Configuration Database (BCD), presents boot menu, and allows execution of preboot programs such as the Memory Test application (Memtest.exe). If a 64-bit installation is booted, switches to 64-bit long mode before loading Winload.</td>
<td>Per system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winload.exe</td>
<td>32-bit protected mode with paging, 64-bit protected mode if booting a Win64 installation</td>
<td>Loads Ntoskrnl.exe and its dependencies (Bootvid.dll on 32-bit systems, Hal.dll, Kdcom.dll, Ci.dll, Clfs.sys, Pshed.dll) and boot-start device drivers.</td>
<td>Per Windows installation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winresume.exe</td>
<td>32-bit protected</td>
<td>If resuming after a hibernation state, resumes from the hibernation file (Hiberfil.sys) instead of typical</td>
<td>Per Windows</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
mode, 64-bit protected mode if resuming a Win64 installation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Memtest.exe</th>
<th>32-bit protected mode</th>
<th>If selected from the Boot Manager, starts up and provides a graphical interface for scanning memory and detecting damaged RAM.</th>
<th>Per system Windows installation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ntoskrnl.exe</td>
<td>Protected mode with paging</td>
<td>Initializes executive subsystems and boot and system-start device drivers, prepares the system for running native applications, and runs Smss.exe.</td>
<td>Per Windows installation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hal.dll</td>
<td>Protected mode with paging</td>
<td>Kernel-mode DLL that interfaces Ntoskrnl and drivers to the hardware. It also acts as a driver for the motherboard itself, supporting soldered components that are not otherwise managed by another driver.</td>
<td>Per Windows installation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smss.exe</td>
<td>Native application</td>
<td>Initial instance starts a copy of itself to initialize each session. The session 0 instance loads the Windows subsystem driver (Win32k.sys) and starts the Windows subsystem process (Csrss.exe) and Windows initialization process (Wininit.exe). All other per-session instances start a Csrss and Winlogon process.</td>
<td>Per Windows installation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wininit.exe</td>
<td>Windows application</td>
<td>Starts the service control manager (SCM), the Local Security Authority process (LSASS), and the local session manager (LSM). Initializes the rest of the registry and performs user-mode initialization tasks.</td>
<td>Per Windows installation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winlogon.exe</td>
<td>Windows application</td>
<td>Coordinates logon and user security, launches LogonUI.</td>
<td>Per Windows installation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logonui.exe</td>
<td>Windows application</td>
<td>Presents interactive logon dialog box.</td>
<td>Per Windows installation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services.exe</td>
<td>Windows application</td>
<td>Loads and initializes auto-start device drivers and Windows services.</td>
<td>Per Windows installation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Physical disks are addressed in units known as sectors. A hard disk sector on a BIOS PC is typically 512 bytes (but moving to 4,096 bytes; see Chapter 9 for more information). Utilities that prepare hard disks for the definition of volumes, such as the Windows Setup program, write a sector of data called a Master Boot Record (MBR) to the first sector on a hard disk. (MBR partitioning is described in Chapter 9.) The MBR includes a fixed amount of space that contains executable instructions (called boot code) and a table (called a partition table) with four entries that define the locations of the primary partitions on the disk. When a BIOS-based computer boots, the first code it executes is called the BIOS, which is encoded into the computer’s flash memory. The BIOS selects a boot device, reads that device’s MBR into memory, and transfers control to the code in the MBR.

The MBRs written by Microsoft partitioning tools, such as the one integrated into Windows Setup and the Disk Management MMC snap-in, go through a similar process of reading and transferring control. First, an MBR’s code scans the primary partition table until it locates a partition containing a flag (Active) that signals the partition is bootable. When the MBR finds at least one such flag, it reads the first sector from the flagged partition into memory and transfers control to code within the partition. This type of partition is called a system partition, and the first sector
of such a partition is called a boot sector or volume boot record (VBR). The volume defined for this partition is called the system volume.

Operating systems generally write boot sectors to disk without a user’s involvement. For example, when Windows Setup writes the MBR to a hard disk, it also writes the file system boot code (part of the boot sector) to a 100-MB bootable partition of the disk, marked as hidden to prevent accidental modification after the operating system has loaded. This is the system volume described earlier.

Before writing to a partition’s boot sector, Windows Setup ensures that the boot partition (the boot partition is the partition on which Windows is installed, which is typically not the same as the system partition, where the boot files are located) is formatted with NTFS, the only supported file system that Windows can boot from when installed on a fixed disk, or formats the boot partition (and any other partition) with NTFS. Note that the format of the system partition can be any format that Windows supports (such as FAT32). If partitions are already formatted appropriately, you can instruct Setup to skip this step. After Setup formats the system partition, Setup copies the Boot Manager program (Bootmgr) that Windows uses to the system partition (the system volume).

Another of Setup’s roles is to prepare the Boot Configuration Database (BCD), which on BIOS systems is stored in the \Boot\BCD file on the root directory of the system volume. This file contains options for starting the version of Windows that Setup installs and any preexisting Windows installations. If the BCD already exists, the Setup program simply adds new entries relevant to the new installation. For more information on the BCD, see Chapter 3, “System Mechanisms,” in Part 1.

The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

Setup must know the partition format before it writes a boot sector because the contents of the boot sector vary depending on the format. For a partition that is in NTFS format, Windows writes NTFS-capable code. The role of the boot-sector code is to give Windows information about the structure and format of a volume and to read in the Bootmgr file from the root directory of the volume. Thus, the boot-sector code contains just enough read-only file system code to accomplish this task. After the boot-sector code loads Bootmgr into memory, it transfers control to Bootmgr’s entry point. If the boot-sector code can’t find Bootmgr in the volume’s
root directory, it displays the error message “BOOTMGR is missing”.

Bootmgr is actually a concatenation of a .com file (Startup.com) and an .exe file (Bootmgr.exe), so it begins its existence while a system is executing in an x86 operating mode called real mode, associated with .com files. In real mode, no virtual-to-physical translation of memory addresses occurs, which means that programs that use the memory addresses interpret them as physical addresses and that only the first 1 MB of the computer’s physical memory is accessible. Simple MS-DOS programs execute in a real-mode environment. However, the first action Bootmgr takes is to switch the system to protected mode. Still no virtual-to-physical translation occurs at this point in the boot process, but a full 32 bits of memory becomes accessible. After the system is in protected mode, Bootmgr can access all of physical memory. After creating enough page tables to make memory below 16 MB accessible with paging turned on, Bootmgr enables paging. Protected mode with paging enabled is the mode in which Windows executes in normal operation.

After Bootmgr enables protected mode, it is fully operational. However, it still relies on functions supplied by BIOS to access IDE-based system and boot disks as well as the display. Bootmgr’s BIOS-interfacing functions briefly switch the processor back to real mode so that services provided by the BIOS can be executed. Bootmgr next reads the BCD file from the \Boot directory using built-in file system code. Like the boot sector’s code, Bootmgr contains a lightweight NTFS file system library (Bootmgr also supports other file systems, such as FAT, El Torito CDFS, and UDFS, as well as WIM and VHD files); unlike the boot sector’s code, Bootmgr’s file system code can also read subdirectories.

### NOTE

Bootmgr and other boot applications can still write to preallocated files on NTFS volumes, because only the data needs to be written, instead of performing all the complex allocation work that is typically required on an NTFS volume. This is how these applications can write to bootsect.dat, for example.

Bootmgr next clears the screen. If Windows enabled the BCD setting to inform Bootmgr of a hibernation resume, this shortcuts the boot process by launching Winresume.exe, which will read the contents of the hibernation file into memory and transfer control to code in the kernel that resumes a hibernated system. That
code is responsible for restarting drivers that were active when the system was shut down. Hiberfil.sys is only valid if the last computer shutdown was hibernation, since the hibernation file is invalidated after a resume, to avoid multiple resumes from the same point. (See the section The Power Manager in Chapter 8, for information on hibernation.)

If there is more than one boot-selection entry in the BCD, Bootmgr presents the user with the boot-selection menu (if there is only one entry, Bootmgr bypasses the menu and proceeds to launch Winload.exe). Selection entries in the BCD direct Bootmgr to the partition on which the Windows system directory (typically \Windows) of the selected installation resides. If Windows was upgraded from an older version, this partition might be the same as the system partition, or, on a clean install, it will always be the 100-MB hidden partition described earlier.

Entries in the BCD can include optional arguments that Bootmgr, Winload, and other components involved in the boot process interpret. Table 13-2 contains a list of these options and their effects for Bootmgr, Table 13-3 shows a list of BCD options for boot applications, and Table 13-4 shows BCD options for the Windows boot loader.

The Bcdedit.exe tool provides a convenient interface for setting a number of the switches. Some options that are included in the BCD are stored as command-line switches (“/DEBUG”, for example) to the registry value HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SystemStartOptions; otherwise, they are stored only in the BCD binary format in the BCD hive.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Table 13-2. BCD Options for the Windows Boot Manager (Bootmgr)</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BCD Element</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bcdfilepath</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>displaybootmenu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>keyringaddress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>noerrordisplay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCD Element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>avoidlowmemory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>badmemoryaccess</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>badmemorylist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>baudrate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bootdebug</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13-3. BCD Options for Boot Applications
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Variable</strong></th>
<th><strong>Type</strong></th>
<th><strong>Description</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bootems</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Used to cause Windows to enable Emergency Management Services (EMS) for boot applications, which reports boot information and accepts system management commands through a serial port.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>busparams</td>
<td>String</td>
<td>If a physical PCI debugging device is used to provide FireWire or serial debugging, specifies the PCI bus, function, and device number for the device.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>channel</td>
<td>Channel between 0 and 62</td>
<td>Used in conjunction with <code>{debugtype, 1394}</code> to specify the IEEE 1394 channel through which kernel debugging communications will flow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>configaccesspolicy</td>
<td>Default, DisallowMmConfig</td>
<td>Configures whether the system uses memory mapped I/O to access the PCI manufacturer’s configuration space or falls back to using the HAL’s I/O port access routines. Can sometimes be helpful in solving platform device problems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>debugaddress</td>
<td>Hardware address</td>
<td>Specifies the hardware address of the serial (COM) port used for debugging.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>debugport</td>
<td>COM port number</td>
<td>Specifies an override for the default serial port (usually COM2 on systems with at least two serial ports) to which a remote kernel debugger host is connected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>debugstart</td>
<td>Active, AutoEnable, Disable</td>
<td>Specifies settings for the debugger when kernel debugging is enabled. AutoEnable enables the debugger when a breakpoint or kernel exception, including kernel crashes, occurs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>debugtype</td>
<td>Serial, 1394, USB</td>
<td>Specifies whether kernel debugging will be communicated through a serial, FireWire (IEEE 1394), or USB 2.0 port. (The default is serial.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>emsbaudrate</td>
<td>Baud rate in bps</td>
<td>Specifies the baud rate to use for EMS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>emsport</td>
<td>COM port number</td>
<td>Specifies the serial (COM) port to use for EMS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>extendedinput</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Enables boot applications to leverage BIOS support for extended console input.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>firstmegabytepolicy</td>
<td>UseNone, UseAll, UsePrivate</td>
<td>Specifies how the low 1 MB of physical memory is consumed by the HAL to mitigate corruptions by the BIOS during power transitions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parameter</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fontpath</td>
<td>String</td>
<td>Specifies the path of the OEM font that should be used by the boot application.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>graphicsmodedisabled</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Disables graphics mode for boot applications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>graphicsresolution</td>
<td>Resolution</td>
<td>Sets the graphics resolution for boot applications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>initialconsoleinput</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Specifies an initial character that the system inserts into the PC/AT keyboard input buffer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>integrityservices</td>
<td>Default, Disable, Enable</td>
<td>Enables or disables code integrity services, which are used by Kernel Mode Code Signing. Default is Enabled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>locale</td>
<td>Localization string</td>
<td>Sets the locale for the boot application (such as EN-US).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>noumex</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Disables user-mode exceptions when kernel debugging is enabled. If you experience system hangs (freezes) when booting in debugging mode, try enabling this option.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>novesa</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Disables the usage of VESA display modes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>recoveryenabled</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Enables the recovery sequence, if any. Used by fresh installations of Windows to present the Windows PE-based Startup And Recovery interface.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>recoverysequence</td>
<td>List</td>
<td>Defines the recovery sequence (described above).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relocatophysical</td>
<td>Physical address</td>
<td>Relocates an automatically selected NUMA node’s physical memory to the specified physical address.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>targetname</td>
<td>String</td>
<td>Defines the target name for the USB debugger when used with USB2 debugging {debugtype, usb}.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>testsigning</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Enables testsigning mode, which allows driver developers to load locally signed 64-bit drivers. This option results in a watermarked desktop.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>traditionalksegmappings</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Determines whether the kernel will honor the traditional KSEG0 mapping that was originally required for MIPS support. With KSEG0 mappings, the bottom 24 bits of the kernel’s initial virtual address space will map to the same physical address (that is, 0x80800000 virtual is 0x800000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Disabling this requirement allows more low memory to be available, which can help with some hardware.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BCD Element</th>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>truncatememory</td>
<td>Address in bytes</td>
<td>Disregards physical memory above the specified physical address.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 13-4. BCD Options for the Windows Boot Loader (Winload)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCD Element</td>
<td>Values</td>
<td>Meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>advancedoptions</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>If false, executes the default behavior of launching the command boot entry when the boot fails; otherwise, displays an error and offers the user the advanced boot option menu with the boot entry. This is equivalent to pressing F8.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bootlog</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Causes Windows to write a log of the boot to the file %SystemRoot%\NTbtlog.txt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bootstatuspolicy</td>
<td>DisplayAllFailures, IgnoreAllFailures, IgnoreShutdownFailures, IgnoreBootFailures</td>
<td>Overrides the system’s default behavior of offering the troubleshooting boot menu if the system did not complete boot or shutdown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bootux</td>
<td>Disabled, Basic, Standard</td>
<td>Defines the boot graphics user experience that the user will see. Disabled means that no graphics will be seen during boot time (only a black screen), while Basic will display only a progress bar during load. Standard displays the usual Windows logo animation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clustermodeaddressing</td>
<td>Number of processors</td>
<td>Defines the maximum number of processors to include in an Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controller (APIC) cluster.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>configflags</td>
<td>Flags</td>
<td>Specifies processor-specific configuration flags.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dbgtransport</td>
<td>Transport image name</td>
<td>Overrides using one of the default kernel debugging transports (Kdcom.dll, Kd1394, Kdusb.dll) and instead uses the given file, permitting specialized debugging transports to be used that are not typically supported by Windows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>debug</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Enables kernel-mode debugging.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>detecthal</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Enables the dynamic detection of the HAL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>driverloadfailurepolicy</td>
<td>Fatal, UseErrorControl</td>
<td>Describes the loader behavior to use when a boot driver load failure occurs. Fatal will prevent booting, while UseErrorControl causes the system to honor a driver’s default error behavior, specified in its service key.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ems</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Instructs the kernel to use EMS as well. (If only bootems is used, only the boot loader will use EMS.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>evstore</td>
<td>String</td>
<td>Stores the location of a boot preloaded hive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exportascd</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>If this option is set, the kernel will treat the ramdisk file as an ISO image and not a Windows Installation Media or System Deployment Image (SDI) file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>groupaware</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Forces the system to use groups other than zero when associating the group seed to new processes. Used only on 64-bit Windows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>groupsize</td>
<td>Integer</td>
<td>Forces the maximum number of logical processors that can be part of a group (maximum of 64). Can be used to force groups on a system that would normally not require them to exist on a system that would normally not require them to exist. Must be a power of 2, and is used only on 64-bit Windows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hal</td>
<td>HAL image name</td>
<td>Overrides the default file name for the HAL image (hal.dll). This option can be useful when booting a combination of a checked HAL and checked kernel (requires specifying the kernel element as well).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>halbreakpoint</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Causes the HAL to stop at a breakpoint early in HAL initialization. The first thing the Windows kernel does when it initializes is to initialize the HAL, so this breakpoint is the earliest one possible (unless boot debugging is used). If the switch is used without the /DEBUG switch, the system will elicit a blue screen with a STOP code of 0x00000078 (PHASE0 EXCEPTION).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hypervisorbaudrate</td>
<td>Baud rate in bps</td>
<td>If using serial hypervisor debugging, specifies the baud rate to use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hypervisorchannel</td>
<td>Channel number from 0 to 62</td>
<td>If using FireWire (IEEE 1394) hypervisor debugging, specifies the channel number to use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hypervisordebug</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Enables debugging the hypervisor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hypervisordebugport</td>
<td>COM port number</td>
<td>If using serial hypervisor debugging, specifies the COM port number.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hypervisordebugtype</td>
<td>Serial, 1394</td>
<td>Specifies which hardware port to use for hypervisor debugging.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hypervisordisableslat</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Forces the hypervisor to ignore the presence of the Second Layer Address Translation (SLAT) feature if supported by the processor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hypervisorlaunchtype</td>
<td>Off, Auto</td>
<td>Enables loading of the hypervisor on a Hyper-V system or forces it to be disabled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hypervisorpath</td>
<td>Hypervisor binary image name</td>
<td>Specifies the path of the hypervisor binary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hypervisoruselargetlb</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Enables the hypervisor to use a larger amount of virtual memory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>increaseuserva</td>
<td>Size in MB</td>
<td>Increases the size of the user process address space for virtual memory-intensive applications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kernel</td>
<td>Kernel image name</td>
<td>Overrides the default file name for the kernel image (Ntoskrnl.exe). This option can be useful when booting a combination of HAL and checked kernel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lastknowngood</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Boots the last known good configuration, instead of the current control set.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>loadoptions</td>
<td>Extra command-line parameters</td>
<td>This option is used to add other command-line parameters defined by BCD elements. These parameters could be configured to define the operation of other components that might not be able to use the BCD (such as legacy components).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maxgroup</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Maximizes the number of processor groups that are created during processor topology configuration. See Chapter 3 in Part 1 for information about group selection and its relationship to NUMA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maxproc</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Forces the maximum number of supported processors that Windows will report to drivers and applications to accommodate additional CPUs via dynamic processor support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>msi</td>
<td>Default, ForceDisable</td>
<td>Allows disabling support for message signaled interrupts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nocrashautoreboot</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Disables the automatic reboot after a system crash (blue screen).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nointegritychecks</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Disables integrity checks performed by Windows when loading drivers. Automatically removed at the next reboot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nolowmem</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Requires that PAE be enabled and that the system have more than 4 GB of physical memory. If these conditions are met, the system won't use the first 4 GB of physical memory. Instead, it will load all applications and allocate all memory pools from above the specified boundary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>numproc</td>
<td>Number of processors</td>
<td>Specifies the number of CPUs that can be used on a multiprocessor system. Example: /NUMPROC=2 on a four-way system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nx</td>
<td>OptIn, OptOut,</td>
<td>This option is available only on 32-bit versions of Windows when running on processors that support no-execute memory. PAE (explained further in the pae entry) is also enabled if the system supports no-execute protection. No-execute protection is always enabled on 64-bit versions of Windows on x64 processors. See Chapter 9 for a description of this behavior.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>onecpu</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Causes Windows to use only one CPU on a multiprocessor system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>optionedit</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Enables the options editor in the Boot Manager. With this option enabled, Boot Manager allows the user to interactively set on-demand command-line options and switches for the current boot. This is equivalent to pressing F10.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>osdevice</td>
<td>GUID</td>
<td>Specifies the device on which the operating system is installed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pae</td>
<td>Default, ForceEnable, ForceDisable</td>
<td>Default allows the boot loader to determine whether the system supports PAE and loads the PAE kernel. ForceEnable forces the loader to load the PAE version of the Windows kernel, even if the system is not supporting x86 PAEs and has more than 4 GB of physical memory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pcixpress</td>
<td>Default, ForceDisable</td>
<td>Can be used to disable support for PCI Express buses. If set to ForceDisable, this prevents the system from using PCI Express buses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>perfmem</td>
<td>Size in MB</td>
<td>Size of the buffer to allocate for performance data logging. This option acts similarly to the removememory element, since it prevents Windows from seeing the size specified as available memory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>quietboot</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Instructs Windows not to initialize the VGA video driver responsible for presenting bitmapped graphics during the boot process. This option is used to display boot progress information, so disabling it will disable the ability of Windows to show this information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ramdiskimagelength</td>
<td>Length in bytes</td>
<td>Size of the ramdisk specified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ramdiskimageoffset</td>
<td>Offset in bytes</td>
<td>If the ramdisk contains other data (such as a header) in addition to the file system, instructs the boot loader where to start reading the ramdisk file from.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ramdisksdipath</td>
<td>Image file name</td>
<td>Specifies the name of the SDI ramdisk to load.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ramdisktftpblocksize</td>
<td>Block size</td>
<td>If loading a WIM ramdisk from a network Trivial FTP (TFTP) server, specifies the block size to use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ramdisktftpclientport</td>
<td>Port number</td>
<td>If loading a WIM ramdisk from a network TFTP server, specifies the port number to use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ramdisktftpwindowsize</td>
<td>Window size</td>
<td>If loading a WIM ramdisk from a network TFTP server, specifies the window size to use.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
removememory | Size in bytes | Specifies an amount of memory Windows won't use.
---|---|---
restrictapiccluster | Cluster number | Defines the largest APIC cluster number to be used by.
resumeobject | Object GUID | Describes which application to use for resuming from typically Winresume.exe.
safeboot | Minimal, Network, DsRepair | Specifies options for a safe-mode boot. Minimal corre mode without networking, Network to safe mode with networking, DsRepair to safe mode with Directory Services R (Safe mode is described later in this chapter.)
safebootalternateshell | Boolean | Tells Windows to use the program specified by the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot value as the graphical shell rather than the default, which is Explorer. This option is referred to as Safe Mode With Prompt in the alternate boot menu.
sos | Boolean | Causes Windows to list the device drivers marked to load and then to display the system version number (including build number), amount of physical memory, and number of processors.
stampdisks | Boolean | Specifies that Winload will write an MBR disk signature to a disk when booting Windows PE (Preinstallation Environment) can be required in deployment environments in order to map from operating system–enumerated hard disks to BIOS–enumerated hard disks to know which disk should be the system disk.
systemroot | String | Specifies the path, relative to osdevice, in which the operating system is installed.
targetname | Name | For USB 2.0 debugging, assigns a name to the machine being debugged.
tpmbootentropy | Default, ForceDisable, ForceEnable | Forces a specific TPM Boot Entropy policy to be selected and passed on to the kernel. TPM Boot Entropy seeds the kernel's random number generator (RNG) with data obtained from the TPM (if present).
usefirmwarepcisettings | Boolean | Stops Windows from dynamically assigning IO/IRQ resources to PCI devices and leaves the devices configured by the BIOS.
uselegacyapicmode | Boolean | Forces usage of basic APIC functionality even though the chip reports extended APIC functionality as present. Used in cases of hardware errata and/or incompatibility.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>usephysicaldestination</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Forces the use of the APIC in physical destination mode.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>useplatformclock</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Forces usage of the platforms’s clock source as the system’s performance counter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vga</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Forces Windows to use the VGA display driver instead of a third-party high-performance driver.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>winpe</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Used by Windows PE, this option causes the configuration manager to load the registry SYSTEM hive as a volatile hive such made to it in memory are not saved back to the hive image.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x2apicpolicy</td>
<td>Disabled, Enabled, Default</td>
<td>Specifies whether extended APIC functionality should be used if the chipset supports it. Disabled is equivalent to setting uselegacyapicmode, while Enabled forces ACPI functionality even if errata are detected. Default uses the chipset’s report (unless errata are present).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xsavepolicy</td>
<td>Integer</td>
<td>For the given XSAVE policy to be loaded from the Resource Driver (Hwpolicy.sys).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xsaveaddfeature0-7</td>
<td>Integer</td>
<td>Used while testing support for XSAVE on modern Intel processors, it allows for faking that certain processor features are present, even if fact, they are not. This helps increase the size of the CONTEXT structure and confirms that applications work correctly with extended features that might appear in the future. No actual extended functionality will be present, however.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xsaveremovefeature</td>
<td>Integer</td>
<td>Forces the entered XSAVE feature not to be reported even though the processor supports it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xsaveprocessorsmask</td>
<td>Integer</td>
<td>Bitmask of which processors the XSAVE policy should apply to.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xsavedisable</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Turns off support for the XSAVE functionality even if the processor supports it.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If the user doesn’t select an entry from the selection menu within the timeout period the BCD specifies, Bootmgr chooses the default selection specified in the BCD (if there is only one entry, it immediately chooses this one). Once the boot selection has been made, Bootmgr loads the boot loader associated with that entry, which will be Winload.exe for Windows installations.

Winload.exe also contains code that queries the system’s ACPI BIOS to retrieve basic device and configuration information. This information includes the following:
- The time and date information stored in the system’s CMOS (nonvolatile memory)
- The number, size, and type of disk drives on the system
- Legacy device information, such as buses (for example, ISA, PCI, EISA, Micro Channel Architecture [MCA]), mice, parallel ports, and video adapters are not queried and instead faked out

This information is gathered into internal data structures that will be stored under the HKLM\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION registry key later in the boot. This is mostly a legacy key as CMOS settings and BIOS-detected disk drive configuration settings, as well as legacy buses, are no longer supported by Windows, and this information is mainly stored for compatibility reasons. Today, it is the Plug and Play manager database that stores the true information on hardware.

Next, Winload begins loading the files from the boot volume needed to start the kernel initialization. The boot volume is the volume that corresponds to the partition on which the system directory (usually \Windows) of the installation being booted is located. The steps Winload follows here include:

1. Loads the appropriate kernel and HAL images (Ntoskrnl.exe and Hal.dll by default) as well as any of their dependencies. If Winload fails to load either of these files, it prints the message “Windows could not start because the following file was missing or corrupt”, followed by the name of the file.
2. Reads in the VGA font file (by default, vgaoem.fon). If this file fails, the same error message as described in step 1 will be shown.
3. Reads in the NLS (National Language System) files used for internationalization. By default, these are l_intl.nls, c_1252.nls, and c_437.nls.
4. Reads in the SYSTEM registry hive, \Windows\System32\Config\System, so that it can determine which device drivers need to be loaded to accomplish the boot. (A hive is a file that contains a registry subtree. You’ll find more details about the registry in Chapter 4, “Management Mechanisms,” in Part 1.)
5. Scans the in-memory SYSTEM registry hive and locates all the boot device
drivers. Boot device drivers are drivers necessary to boot the system. These drivers are indicated in the registry by a start value of SERVICE_BOOT_START (0). Every device driver has a registry subkey under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. For example, Services has a subkey named fvevol for the BitLocker driver, which you can see in Figure 13-2. (For a detailed description of the Services registry entries, see the section “Services” in Chapter 4 in Part 1.)

6. Adds the file system driver that’s responsible for implementing the code for the type of partition (NTFS) on which the installation directory resides to the list of boot drivers to load. Winload must load this driver at this time; if it didn’t, the kernel would require the drivers to load themselves, a requirement that would introduce a circular dependency.

7. Loads the boot drivers, which should only be drivers that, like the file system driver for the boot volume, would introduce a circular dependency if the kernel was required to load them. To indicate the progress of the loading, Winload updates a progress bar displayed below the text “Starting Windows”. If the sos option is specified in the BCD, Winload doesn’t display the progress bar but instead displays the file names of each boot driver. Keep in mind that the drivers are loaded but not initialized at this time—they initialize later in the boot sequence.

8. Prepares CPU registers for the execution of Ntoskrnl.exe.

For steps 1 and 8, Winload also implements part of the Kernel Mode Code Signing (KMCS) infrastructure, which was described in Chapter 3 in Part 1, by enforcing that all boot drivers are signed on 64-bit Windows. Additionally, the system will
crash if the signature of the early boot files is incorrect.

This action is the end of Winload’s role in the boot process. At this point, Winload calls the main function in Ntoskrnl.exe (KiSystemStartup) to perform the rest of the system initialization.

The UEFI Boot Process

A UEFI-compliant system has firmware that runs boot loader code that’s been programmed into the system’s nonvolatile RAM (NVRAM) by Windows Setup. The boot code reads the BCD’s contents, which are also stored in NVRAM. The Bcdedit.exe tool mentioned earlier also has the ability to abstract the firmware’s NVRAM variables in the BCD, allowing for full transparency of this mechanism.

The UEFI standard defines the ability to prompt the user with an EFI Boot Manager that can be used to select an operating system or additional applications to load. However, to provide a consistent user interface between BIOS systems and UEFI systems, Windows sets a 2-second timeout for selecting the EFI Boot Manager, after which the EFI-version of Bootmgr (Bootmgfw.efi) loads instead. Hardware detection occurs next, where the boot loader uses UEFI interfaces to determine the number and type of the following devices:

- Network adapters
- Video adapters
- Keyboards
- Disk controllers
- Storage devices

On UEFI systems, all operations and programs execute in the native CPU mode with paging enabled and no part of the Windows boot process executes in 16-bit mode. Note that although EFI is supported on both 32-bit and 64-bit systems, Windows provides support for EFI only on 64-bit platforms.

Just as Bootmgr does on x86 and x64 systems, the EFI Boot Manager presents a menu of boot selections with an optional timeout. Once a boot selection is made, the loader navigates to the subdirectory on the EFI System partition corresponding to the selection and loads the EFI version of the Windows boot loader.
(Winload.efi).

The UEFI specification requires that the system have a partition designated as the EFI System partition that is formatted with the FAT file system and is between 100 MB and 1 GB in size or up to 1 percent of the size of the disk, and each Windows installation has a subdirectory on the EFI System partition under EFI\Microsoft.

Note that thanks to the unified boot process and model present in Windows, the components in Table 13-1 apply almost identically to UEFI systems, except that those ending in .exe end in .efi, and they use EFI APIs and services instead of BIOS interrupts. Another difference is that to avoid limitations of the MBR partition format (including a maximum of four partitions per disk), UEFI systems use the GPT (GUID Partition Table) format, which uses GUIDs to identify different partitions and their roles on the system.

**NOTE**

Although the EFI standard has been available since early 2001, and UEFI since 2005, very few computer manufacturers have started using this technology because of backward compatibility concerns and the difficulty of moving from an entrenched 20-year-old technology to a new one. Two notable exceptions are Itanium machines and Apple’s Intel Macintosh computers.

**Booting from iSCSI**

Internet SCSI (iSCSI) devices are a kind of network-attached storage, in that remote physical disks are connected to an iSCSI Host Bus Adapter (HBA) or through Ethernet. These devices, however, are different from traditional network-attached storage (NAS) because they provide block-level access to disks, unlike the logical-based access over a network file system that NAS employs. Therefore, an iSCSI-connected disk appears as any other disk drive, both to the boot loader as well as to the OS, as long as the Microsoft iSCSI Initiator is used to provide access over an Ethernet connection. By using iSCSI-enabled disks instead of local storage, companies can save on space, power consumption, and cooling.

Although Windows has traditionally supported booting only from locally connected disks, or network booting through PXE, modern versions of Windows are also capable of natively booting from iSCSI devices through a mechanism called iSCSI Boot. The boot loader (Winload.exe) contains a minimalistic network
stack conforming to the Universal Network Device Interface (UNDI) standard, which allows compatible NIC ROMs to respond to Interrupt 13h (the legacy BIOS disk I/O interrupt) and convert the requests to network I/O. On EFI systems, the network interface driver provided by the manufacturer is used instead, and EFI Device APIs are used instead of interrupts.

Finally, to know the location, path, and authentication information for the remote disk, the boot loader also reads an iSCSI Boot Firmware Table (iBFT) that must be present in physical memory (typically exposed through ACPI). Additionally, Windows Setup also has the capability of reading this table to determine bootable iSCSI devices and allow direct installation on such a device, such that no imaging is required. Combined with the Microsoft iSCSI Initiator, this is all that’s required for Windows to boot from iSCSI, as shown in Figure 13-3.

![Figure 13-3. iSCSI boot architecture](image)

**Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems**

When Winload calls Ntoskrnl, it passes a data structure called the loader parameter block that contains the system and boot partition paths, a pointer to the memory tables Winload generated to describe the physical memory on the system, a physical hardware tree that is later used to build the volatile HARDWARE registry hive, an in-memory copy of the SYSTEM registry hive, and a pointer to the list of boot drivers Winload loaded, as well as various other information related to the boot processing performed until this point.

**EXPERIMENT: LOADER PARAMETER BLOCK**
While booting, the kernel keeps a pointer to the loader parameter block in the KeLoaderBlock variable. The kernel discards the parameter block after the first boot phase, so the only way to see the contents of the structure is to attach a kernel debugger before booting and break at the initial kernel debugger breakpoint. If you are able to do so, you can use the dt command to dump the block, as shown:

```
0: kd> dt poi(nt!KeLoaderBlock) nt!LOADERPARAMETER_BLOCK
+0x000 OsMajorVersion : 6
+0x004 OsMinorVersion : 1
+0x008 Size : 0x88
+0x00c Reserved : 0
+0x010 LoadOrderListHead : LISTENTRY [ 0x8085b4c8 - 0x80869c70 ]
+0x018 MemoryDescriptorListHead : LISTENTRY [ 0x80a00000 - 0x80a00de8 ]
+0x020 BootDriverListHead : LISTENTRY [ 0x80860d10 - 0x80865eb0 ]
+0x028 KernelStack : 0x88e7c000
+0x02c Prcb : 0
+0x030 Process : 0
+0x034 Thread : 0x88e64800
+0x038 RegistryLength : 0x2940000
+0x03c RegistryBase : 0x80ad5000 Void
+0x040 ConfigurationRoot : 0x8082a5f0 CONFIGURATIONCOMPONENT_DATA
+0x044 ArcBootDeviceName : 0x8082a5f0 "multi(0)disk(0)rdisk(0)partition(4)"
+0x048 ArcHalDeviceName : 0x8082a5f0 "multi(0)disk(0)rdisk(0)partition(4)"
+0x04c NtBootPathName : 0x8082d828 "\Windows"
+0x050 NtHalPathName : 0x8082d9a0 "multi(0)disk(0)rdisk(0)partition(4)"
+0x054 LoadOptions : 0x8080e1f0 "NOEXECUTE=ALWAYSON DEBUGPORT=COM1 BAUDRATE=115200"
+0x058 NlsData : 0x808691e0 NLSDATA_BLOCK
+0x05c ArcDiskInformation : 0x80821408 ARCDISK_INFORMATION
+0x060 OemFontFile : 0x80828282 Void
+0x064 Extension : 0x80829d98 LOADERPARAMETER_EXTENSION
+0x068 u : <unnamed-tag>
+0x074 FirmwareInformation : FIRMWAREINFORMATIONLOADERBLOCK
```

Additionally, the !loadermemorylist command can be used on the MemoryDescriptorListHead field to dump the physical memory ranges:

```
0: kd> !loadermemorylist 0x80a00000
Base  Length  Type
  1  00000000  HALCachedMemory
  2  00000004  HALCachedMemory
...
  4a32  00000023  NlsData
  4a55  00000026  BootDriver
  4a57  00000026  BootDriver
  4a91  0000016f  Free
  4c00  0001b3f0  Free
  1ff0  00000001  FirmwarePermanent
  1ff1  00000002  FirmwarePermanent
  1ff3  00000001  FirmwarePermanent
  1ff4  0000000b  FirmwarePermanent
  1fff  00000001  FirmwarePermanent
  fd00  00000000  FirmwarePermanent
 fec0  00000001  FirmwarePermanent
 fee0  00000001  FirmwarePermanent
 ffc0  00000400  FirmwarePermanent
```

Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Memory Type</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Ntoskrnl then begins phase 0, the first of its two-phase initialization process (phase 1 is the second). Most executive subsystems have an initialization function that takes a parameter that identifies which phase is executing.

During phase 0, interrupts are disabled. The purpose of this phase is to build the rudimentary structures required to allow the services needed in phase 1 to be invoked. Ntoskrnl’s main function calls KiSystemStartup, which in turn calls HalInitializeProcessor and KiInitializeKernel for each CPU. KiInitializeKernel, if running on the boot CPU, performs systemwide kernel initialization, such as initializing internal lists and other data structures that all CPUs share. It also checks whether virtualization was specified as a BCD option (hypervisorlaunchtype), and whether the CPU supports hardware virtualization technology. The first instance of KiInitializeKernel then calls the function responsible for orchestrating phase 0, InitBootProcessor, while subsequent processors only call HalInitSystem.

InitBootProcessor starts by initializing the pool look-aside pointers for the initial CPU and by checking for and honoring the BCD burnmemory boot option, where it discards the amount of physical memory the value specifies. It then performs enough initialization of the NLS files that were loaded by Winload (described earlier) to allow Unicode to ANSI and OEM translation to work. Next, it continues by calling the HAL function HalInitSystem, which gives the HAL a chance to gain system control before Windows performs significant further initialization. One responsibility of HalInitSystem is to prepare the system interrupt controller of each CPU for interrupts and to configure the interval clock timer interrupt, which is used for CPU time accounting. (See the section “Quantum Accounting” in Chapter 5, “Processes, Threads, and Jobs,” in Part 1 for more on CPU time accounting.)

When HalInitSystem returns control, InitBootProcessor proceeds by computing the
reciprocal for timer expiration. Reciprocals are used for optimizing divisions on most modern processors. They can perform multiplications faster, and because Windows must divide the current 64-bit time value in order to find out which timers need to expire, this static calculation reduces interrupt latency when the clock interval fires. InitBootProcessor then continues by setting up the system root path and searching the kernel image for the location of the crash message strings it displays on blue screens, caching their location to avoid looking up the strings during a crash, which could be dangerous and unreliable. Next, InitBootProcessor initializes the quota functionality part of the process manager and reads the control vector. This data structure contains more than 150 kernel-tuning options that are part of the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control registry key, including information such as the licensing data and version information for the installation.

InitBootProcessor is now ready to call the phase 0 initialization routines for the executive, Driver Verifier, and the memory manager. These components perform the following initialization steps:

1. The executive initializes various internal locks, resources, lists, and variables and validates that the product suite type in the registry is valid, discouraging casual modification of the registry in order to “upgrade” to an SKU of Windows that was not actually purchased. This is only one of the many such checks in the kernel.

2. Driver Verifier, if enabled, initializes various settings and behaviors based on the current state of the system (such as whether safe mode is enabled) and verification options. It also picks which drivers to target for tests that target randomly chosen drivers.

3. The memory manager constructs page tables and internal data structures that are necessary to provide basic memory services. It also builds and reserves an area for the system file cache and creates memory areas for the paged and nonpaged pools (described in Chapter 10). The other executive subsystems, the kernel, and device drivers use these two memory pools for allocating their data structures.

Next, InitBootProcessor calls HalInitializeBios to set up the BIOS emulation code part of the HAL. This code is used both on real BIOS systems as well as on EFI systems to allow access (or to emulate access) to 16-bit real mode interrupts and
memory, which are used mainly by Bootvid to display the early VGA boot screen and bugcheck screen. After the function returns, the kernel initializes the Bootvid library and displays early boot status messages by calling InbvEnableBootDriver and InbvDriverInitialize.

At this point, InitBootProcessor enumerates the boot-start drivers that were loaded by Winload and calls DbgLoadImageSymbols to inform the kernel debugger (if attached) to load symbols for each of these drivers. If the host debugger has configured the break on symbol load option, this will be the earliest point for a kernel debugger to gain control of the system. InitBootProcessor now calls HvlInitSystem, which attempts to connect to the hypervisor in case Windows might be running inside a Hyper-V host system’s child partition. When the function returns, it calls HeadlessInit to initialize the serial console if the machine was configured for Emergency Management Services (EMS).

Next, InitBootProcessor builds the versioning information that will be used later in the boot process, such as the build number, service pack version, and beta version status. Then it copies the NLS tables that Winload previously loaded into paged pool, re-initializes them, and creates the kernel stack trace database if the global flags specify creating one. (For more information on the global flags, see Chapter 3 in Part 1.)

Finally, InitBootProcessor calls the object manager, security reference monitor, process manager, user-mode debugging framework, and the Plug and Play manager. These components perform the following initialization steps:

1. During the object manager initialization, the objects that are necessary to construct the object manager namespace are defined so that other subsystems can insert objects into it. A handle table is created so that resource tracking can begin.

2. The security reference monitor initializes the token type object and then uses the object to create and prepare the first local system account token for assignment to the initial process. (See Chapter 6, “Security,” in Part 1 for a description of the local system account.)

3. The process manager performs most of its initialization in phase 0, defining the process and thread object types and setting up lists to track active
processes and threads. The process manager also creates a process object for the initial process and names it Idle. As its last step, the process manager creates the System process and a system thread to execute the routine Phase1Initialization. This thread doesn’t start running right away because interrupts are still disabled.

4. The user-mode debugging framework creates the definition of the debug object type that is used for attaching a debugger to a process and receiving debugger events. For more information on user-mode debugging, see Chapter 3 in Part 1.

5. The Plug and Play manager’s phase 0 initialization then takes place, which involves simply initializing an executive resource used to synchronize access to bus resources.

When control returns to KiInitializeKernel, the last step is to allocate the DPC stack for the current processor and the I/O privilege map save area (on x86 systems only), after which control proceeds to the Idle loop, which then causes the system thread created in step 3 of the previous process description to begin executing phase 1. (Secondary processors wait to begin their initialization until step 8 of phase 1, described in the following list.)

Phase 1 consists of the following steps:

1. Phase1InitializationDiscard, which, as the name implies, discards the code that is part of the INIT section of the kernel image in order to preserve memory.

2. The initialization thread sets its priority to 31, the highest possible, in order to prevent preemption.

3. The NUMA/group topology relationships are created, in which the system tries to come up with the most optimized mapping between logical processors and processor groups, taking into account NUMA localities and distances, unless overridden by the relevant BCD settings.

4. HalInitSystem prepares the system to accept interrupts from devices and to enable interrupts.

5. The boot video driver is called, which in turn displays the Windows startup
screen, which by default consists of a black screen and a progress bar. If the quietboot boot option was used, this step will not occur.

6. The kernel builds various strings and version information, which are displayed on the boot screen through Bootvid if the sos boot option was enabled. This includes the full version information, number of processors supported, and amount of memory supported.

7. The power manager’s initialization is called.

8. The system time is initialized (by calling HalQueryRealTimeClock) and then stored as the time the system booted.

9. On a multiprocessor system, the remaining processors are initialized by KeStartAllProcessors and HalAllProcessorsStarted. The number of processors that will be initialized and supported depends on a combination of the actual physical count, the licensing information for the installed SKU of Windows, boot options such as numproc and onecpu, and whether dynamic partitioning is enabled (server systems only). After all the available processors have initialized, the affinity of the system process is updated to include all processors.

10. The object manager creates the namespace root directory (\), \ObjectTypes directory, and the DOS device name mapping directory (\Global??). It then creates the \DosDevices symbolic link that points at the Windows subsystem device name mapping directory.

11. The executive is called to create the executive object types, including semaphore, mutex, event, and timer.

12. The I/O manager is called to create the I/O manager object types, including device, driver, controller, adapter, and file objects.

13. The kernel debugger library finalizes initialization of debugging settings and parameters if the debugger has not been triggered prior to this point.

14. The transaction manager also creates its object types, such as the enlistment, resource manager, and transaction manager types.

15. The kernel initializes scheduler (dispatcher) data structures and the system service dispatch table.
16. The user-mode debugging library (Dbgk) data structures are initialized.

17. If Driver Verifier is enabled and, depending on verification options, pool verification is enabled, object handle tracing is started for the system process.

18. The security reference monitor creates the \Security directory in the object manager namespace and initializes auditing data structures if auditing is enabled.

19. The \SystemRoot symbolic link is created.

20. The memory manager is called to create the \Device\PhysicalMemory section object and the memory manager’s system worker threads (which are explained in Chapter 10).

21. NLS tables are mapped into system space so that they can be easily mapped by user-mode processes.

22. Ntdll.dll is mapped into the system address space.

23. The cache manager initializes the file system cache data structures and creates its worker threads.

24. The configuration manager creates the \Registry key object in the object manager namespace and opens the in-memory SYSTEM hive as a proper hive file. It then copies the initial hardware tree data passed by Winload into the volatile HARDWARE hive.

25. The high-resolution boot graphics library initializes, unless it has been disabled through the BCD or the system is booting headless.

26. The errata manager initializes and scans the registry for errata information, as well as the INF (driver installation file, described in Chapter 8) database containing errata for various drivers.

27. Superfetch and the prefetcher are initialized.

28. The Store Manager is initialized.

29. The current time zone information is initialized.

30. Global file system driver data structures are initialized.

31. Phase 1 of debugger-transport-specific information is performed by calling the KdDebuggerInitialize1 routine in the registered transport, such as
32. The Plug and Play manager calls the Plug and Play BIOS.

33. The advanced local procedure call (ALPC) subsystem initializes the ALPC port type and ALPC waitable port type objects. The older LPC objects are set as aliases.

34. If the system was booted with boot logging (with the BCD bootlog option), the boot log file is initialized. If the system was booted in safe mode, a string is displayed on the boot screen with the current safe mode boot type.

35. The executive is called to execute its second initialization phase, where it configures part of the Windows licensing functionality in the kernel, such as validating the registry settings that hold license data. Also, if persistent data from boot applications is present (such as memory diagnostic results or resume from hibernation information), the relevant log files and information are written to disk or to the registry.

36. The MiniNT/WinPE registry keys are created if this is such a boot, and the NLS object directory is created in the namespace, which will be used later to host the section objects for the various memory-mapped NLS files.

37. The power manager is called to initialize again. This time it sets up support for power requests, the ALPC channel for brightness notifications, and profile callback support.

38. The I/O manager initialization now takes place. This stage is a complex phase of system startup that accounts for most of the boot time.

The I/O manager first initializes various internal structures and creates the driver and device object types. It then calls the Plug and Play manager, power manager, and HAL to begin the various stages of dynamic device enumeration and initialization. (Because this process is complex and specific to the I/O system, we cover the details in Chapter 8.) Then the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) subsystem is initialized, which provides WMI support for device drivers. (See the section “Windows Management Instrumentation” in Chapter 4 in Part 1 for more information.) This also initializes Event Tracing for Windows (ETW). Next, all the boot-start drivers are called to perform their driver-specific initialization, and then the system-
start device drivers are loaded and initialized. (Details on the processing of the driver load control information on the registry are also covered in Chapter 8.) Finally, the Windows subsystem device names are created as symbolic links in the object manager’s namespace.

39. The transaction manager sets up the Windows software trace preprocessor (WPP) and ETW and initializes with WMI. (ETW and WMI are described in Chapter 4 in Part 1.)

40. Now that boot-start and system-start drivers are loaded, the errata manager loads the INF database with the driver errata and begins parsing it, which includes applying registry PCI configuration workarounds.

41. If the computer is booting in safe mode, this fact is recorded in the registry.

42. Unless explicitly disabled in the registry, paging of kernel-mode code (in Ntoskrnl and drivers) is enabled.

43. The configuration manager makes sure that all processors on an SMP system are identical in terms of the features that they support; otherwise, it crashes the system.

44. On 32-bit systems, VDM (Virtual Dos Machine) support is initialized, which includes determining whether the processor supports Virtual Machine Extensions (VME).

45. The process manager is called to set up rate limiting for jobs, initialize the static environment for protected processes, and look up the various system-defined entry points in the user-mode system library (Ntdll.dll).

46. The power manager is called to finalize its initialization.

47. The rest of the licensing information for the system is initialized, including caching the current policy settings stored in the registry.

48. The security reference monitor is called to create the Command Server Thread that communicates with LSASS. (See the section “Security System Components” in Chapter 6 in Part 1 for more on how security is enforced in Windows.)

49. The Session Manager (Smss) process (introduced in Chapter 2, “System Architecture,” in Part 1) is started. Smss is responsible for creating the user-
mode environment that provides the visible interface to Windows—its initialization steps are covered in the next section.

50. The TPM boot entropy values are queried. These values can be queried only once per boot, and normally, the TPM system driver should have queried them by now, but if this driver had not been running for some reason (perhaps the user disabled it), the unqueried values would still be available. Therefore, the kernel manually queries them too to avoid this situation, and in normal scenarios, the kernel’s own query should fail.

51. All the memory used up by the loader parameter block and all its references is now freed.

As a final step before considering the executive and kernel initialization complete, the phase 1 initialization thread waits for the handle to the Session Manager process with a timeout value of 5 seconds. If the Session Manager process exits before the 5 seconds elapse, the system crashes with a SESSION5_INITIALIZATION_FAILED stop code.

If the 5-second wait times out (that is, if 5 seconds elapse), the Session Manager is assumed to have started successfully, and the phase 1 initialization function calls the memory manager’s zero page thread function (explained in Chapter 10). Thus, this system thread becomes the zero page thread for the remainder of the life of the system.

Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

Smss is like any other user-mode process except for two differences. First, Windows considers Smss a trusted part of the operating system. Second, Smss is a native application. Because it’s a trusted operating system component, Smss can perform actions few other processes can perform, such as creating security tokens. Because it’s a native application, Smss doesn’t use Windows APIs—it uses only core executive APIs known collectively as the Windows native API. Smss doesn’t use the Win32 APIs because the Windows subsystem isn’t executing when Smss launches. In fact, one of Smss’s first tasks is to start the Windows subsystem.

Smss then calls the configuration manager executive subsystem to finish initializing the registry, fleshing the registry out to include all its keys. The configuration
manager is programmed to know where the core registry hives are stored on disk (excluding hives corresponding to user profiles), and it records the paths to the hives it loads in the \HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\hivelist key.

The main thread of Smss performs the following initialization steps:

1. Marks itself as a critical process and its main thread as a critical thread. As discussed in Chapter 5 in Part 1, this will cause the kernel to crash the system if Smss quits unexpectedly. Smss also enables the automatic affinity update mode to support dynamic processor addition. (See Chapter 5 in Part 1 for more information.)

2. Creates protected prefixes for the mailslot and named pipe file system drivers, creating privileged paths for administrators and service accounts to communicate through those paths. See Chapter 7, “Networking,” in Part 1 for more information.

3. Calls SmpInit, which tunes the maximum concurrency level for Smss, meaning the maximum number of parallel sessions that will be created by spawning copies of Smss into other sessions. This is at least four and at most the number of active CPUs.

4. SmpInit then creates an ALPC port object (\SmApiPort) to receive client requests (such as to load a new subsystem or create a session).

5. SmpInit calls SmpLoadDataFromRegistry, which starts by setting up the default environment variables for the system, and sets the SAFEBOOT variable if the system was booted in safe mode.

6. SmpLoadDataFromRegistry calls SmpInitializeDosDevices to define the symbolic links for MS-DOS device names (such as COM1 and LPT1).

7. SmpLoadDataFromRegistry creates the \Sessions directory in the object manager’s namespace (for multiple sessions).

8. SmpLoadDataFromRegistry runs any programs defined in \HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\BootExecute with SmpExecuteCommand. Typically, this value contains one command to run Autochk (the boot-time version of Chkdsk).

9. SmpLoadDataFromRegistry calls SmpProcessFileRenames to perform
delayed file rename and delete operations as directed by HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\PendingFileRenameOperations and HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\PendingFileRenameOperations2.

10. SmpLoadDataFromRegistry calls SmpCreatePagingFiles to create additional paging files. Paging file configuration is stored under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management\PagingFiles.

11. SmpLoadDataFromRegistry initializes the registry by calling the native function NtInitializeRegistry. The configuration manager builds the rest of the registry by loading the registry hives for the HKLM\SAM, HKLM\SECURITY, and HKLM\SOFTWARE keys. Although HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\hivelist locates the hive files on disk, the configuration manager is coded to look for them in \Windows\System32\Config.

12. SmpLoadDataFromRegistry calls SmpCreateDynamicEnvironmentVariables to add system environment variables that are defined in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Session Manager\Environment, as well as processor-specific environment variables such as NUMBER_PROCESSORS, PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE, and PROCESSOR_LEVEL.

13. SmpLoadDataFromRegistry runs any programs defined in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\SetupExecute with SmpExecuteCommand. Typically, this value is set only if Windows is being booted as part of the second stage of installation and Setupcl.exe is the default value.

14. SmpLoadDataFromRegistry calls SmpConfigureSharedSessionData to initialize the list of subsystems that will be started in each session (both immediately and deferred) as well as the Session 0 initialization command (which, by default, is to launch the Wininit.exe process). The initialization command can be overridden by creating a string value called S0InitialCommand in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session
Manager and setting it as the path to another program.

15. SmpLoadDataFromRegistry calls SmpInitializeKnownDlls to open known DLLs, and creates section objects for them in the \KnownDlls directory of the object manager namespace. The list of DLLs considered known is located in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\KnownDLLs, and the path to the directory in which the DLLs are located is stored in the DllDirectory value of the key. On 64-bit systems, 32-bit DLLs used as part of Wow64 are stored in the DllDirectory32 value.

16. Finally, SmpLoadDataFromRegistry calls SmpTranslateSystemPartitionInformation to convert the SystemPartition value stored in HKLM\SYSTEM\Setup, which is stored in native NT object manager path format, to a volume drive letter stored in the BootDir value. Among other components, Windows Update uses this registry key to figure out what the system volume is.

17. At this point, SmpLoadDataFromRegistry returns to SmpInit, which returns to the main thread entry point. Smss then creates the number of initial sessions that were defined (typically, only one, session 0, but you can change this number through the NumberOfInitialSessions registry value in the Smss registry key mentioned earlier) by calling SmpCreateInitialSession, which creates an Smss process for each user session. This function’s main job is to call SmpStartCsr to start Csrss in each session.

18. As part of Csrss’s initialization, it loads the kernel-mode part of the Windows subsystem (Win32k.sys). The initialization code in Win32k.sys uses the video driver to switch the screen to the resolution defined by the default profile, so this is the point at which the screen changes from the VGA mode the boot video driver uses to the default resolution chosen for the system.

19. Meanwhile, each spawned Smss in a different user session starts the other subsystem processes, such as Psxss if the Subsystem for Unix-based Applications feature was installed. (See Chapter 3 in Part 1 for more information on subsystem processes.)

20. The first Smss from session 0 executes the Session 0 initialization command (described in step 14), by default launching the Windows initialization
process (Wininit). Other Smss instances start the interactive logon manager process (Winlogon), which, unlike Wininit, is hardcoded. The startup steps of Wininit and Winlogon are described shortly.

**PENDING FILE RENAME OPERATIONS**

The fact that executable images and DLLs are memory-mapped when they are used makes it impossible to update core system files after Windows has finished booting (unless hotpatching technology is used, which is only for Microsoft patches to the operating system). The MoveFileEx Windows API has an option to specify that a file move be delayed until the next boot. Service packs and hotfixes that must update in-use memory-mapped files install replacement files onto a system in temporary locations and use the MoveFileEx API to have them replace otherwise in-use files. When used with that option, MoveFileEx simply records commands in the PendingFileRenameOperations and PendingFileRenameOperations2 keys under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager. These registry values are of type MULTI_SZ, where each operation is specified in pairs of file names: the first file name is the source location, and the second is the target location. Delete operations use an empty string as their target path. You can use the Pendmoves utility from Windows Sysinternals (http://www.microsoft.com/technet/sysinternals) to view registered delayed rename and delete commands.

After performing these initialization steps, the main thread in Smss waits forever on the process handle of Winlogon, while the other ALPC threads wait for messages to create new sessions or subsystems. If either Wininit or Csrss terminate unexpectedly, the kernel crashes the system because these processes are marked as critical. If Winlogon terminates unexpectedly, the session associated with it is logged off.

Wininit then performs its startup steps, such as creating the initial window station and desktop objects. It also configures the Session 0 window hook, which is used by the Interactive Services Detection service (UIODetect.exe) to provide backward compatibility with interactive services. (See Chapter 4 in Part 1 for more information on services.) Wininit then creates the service control manager (SCM) process (%SystemRoot%\System32\Services.exe), which loads all services and device drivers marked for auto-start, and the Local Security Authority subsystem (LSASS) process (%SystemRoot%\System32\Lsass.exe). Finally, it loads the local session manager (%SystemRoot%\System32\Lsm.exe). On session 1 and beyond, Winlogon runs instead and loads the registered credential providers for the system (by default, the Microsoft credential provider supports password-based and smartcard-based logons) into a child process called LogonUI (%SystemRoot%\System32\Logonui.exe), which is responsible for displaying the
logon interface. (For more details on the startup sequence for Wininit, Winlogon, and LSASS, see the section “Winlogon Initialization” in Chapter 6 in Part 1.)

After the SCM initializes the auto-start services and drivers and a user has successfully logged on at the console, the SCM deems the boot successful. The registry’s last known good control set (as indicated by HKLM\SYSTEM\Select\LastKnownGood) is updated to match \CurrentControlSet.

NOTE

Because noninteractive servers might never have an interactive logon, they might not get LastKnownGood updated to reflect the control set used for a successful boot. You can override the definition of a successful boot by setting HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\ReportBootOk to 0, writing a custom boot verification program that calls the NotifyBootConfigStatus Windows API when a boot is successful, and entering the path to the verification program in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\BootVerificationProgram.

After launching the SCM, Winlogon waits for an interactive logon notification from the credential provider. When it receives a logon and validates the logon (a process for which you can find more information in the section “User Logon Steps” in Chapter 6 in Part 1), Winlogon loads the registry hive from the profile of the user logging on and maps it to HKCU. It then sets the user’s environment variables that are stored in HKCU\Environment and notifies the Winlogon notification packages registered in HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify that a logon has occurred.

Winlogon next starts the shell by launching the executable or executables specified in HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\WinLogon\Userinit (with multiple executables separated by commas) that by default points at \Windows\System32\Userinit.exe. Userinit.exe performs the following steps:

1. Processes the user scripts specified in HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System\Scripts and the machine logon scripts in HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System\Scripts. (Because machine scripts run after user scripts, they can override user settings.)
2. If Group Policy specifies a user profile quota, starts
   %SystemRoot%\System32\Proquota.exe to enforce the quota for the current
   user.

3. Launches the comma-separated shell or shells specified in
   HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell. If
   that value doesn’t exist, Userinit.exe launches the shell or shells specified in
   HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows
   NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell, which is by default Explorer.exe.

Winlogon then notifies registered network providers that a user has logged on. The
Microsoft network provider, Multiple Provider Router
(%SystemRoot%\System32\Mpr.dll), restores the user’s persistent drive letter and
printer mappings stored in HKCU\Network and HKCU\Printers, respectively.
Figure 13-4 shows the process tree as seen in Process Monitor after a logon (using
its boot logging capability). Note the Smss processes that are dimmed (meaning
that they have since exited). These refer to the spawned copies that initialized each
session.
ReadyBoot

Windows uses the standard logical boot-time prefetcher (described in Chapter 10) if the system has less than 700 MB of memory, but if the system has 700 MB or more of RAM, it uses an in-RAM cache to optimize the boot process. The size of the cache depends on the total RAM available, but it is large enough to create a reasonable cache and yet allow the system the memory it needs to boot smoothly.

After every boot, the ReadyBoost service (see Chapter 10 for information on ReadyBoost) uses idle CPU time to calculate a boot-time caching plan for the next boot. It analyzes file trace information from the five previous boots and identifies which files were accessed and where they are located on disk. It stores the processed traces in %SystemRoot%\Prefetch\Readyboost as .fx files and saves the caching plan under
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Rdyboost\Parameters in REG_BINARY values named for internal disk volumes they refer to.

The cache is implemented by the same device driver that implements ReadyBoost caching (Ecache.sys), but the cache’s population is guided by the boot plan previously stored in the registry. Although the boot cache is compressed like the ReadyBoost cache, another difference between ReadyBoost and ReadyBoot cache management is that while in ReadyBoot mode, the cache is not encrypted. The ReadyBoost service deletes the cache 50 seconds after the service starts, or if other memory demands warrant it, and records the cache’s statistics in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Ecache\Parameters\ReadyBootStats, as shown in Figure 13-5.

![Figure 13-5. ReadyBoot statistics](image)

### Images That Start Automatically

In addition to the Userinit and Shell registry values in Winlogon’s key, there are many other registry locations and directories that default system components check and process for automatic process startup during the boot and logon processes. The Msconfig utility (%SystemRoot%\System32\Msconfig.exe) displays the images configured by several of the locations. The Autoruns tool, which you can download from Sysinternals and that is shown in Figure 13-6, examines more locations than Msconfig and displays more information about the images configured to automatically run. By default, Autoruns shows only the locations that are
configured to automatically execute at least one image, but selecting the Include Empty Locations entry on the Options menu causes Autoruns to show all the locations it inspects. The Options menu also has selections to direct Autoruns to hide Microsoft entries, but you should always combine this option with Verify Image Signatures; otherwise, you risk hiding malicious programs that include false information about their company name information.

Figure 13-6. The Autoruns tool available from Sysinternals

**EXPERIMENT: AUTORUNS**

Many users are unaware of how many programs execute as part of their logon. Original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) often configure their systems with add-on utilities that execute in the background using registry values or file system directories processed for automatic execution and so are not normally visible. See what programs are configured to start automatically on your computer by running the Autoruns utility from Sysinternals. Compare the list shown in Autoruns with that shown in Msconfig and identify any differences. Then ensure that you understand the purpose of each program.
Troubleshooting Boot and Startup Problems

This section presents approaches to solving problems that can occur during the Windows startup process as a result of hard disk corruption, file corruption, missing files, and third-party driver bugs. First we describe three Windows boot-problem recovery modes: last known good, safe mode, and Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE). Then we present common boot problems, their causes, and approaches to solving them. The solutions refer to last known good, safe mode, WinRE, and other tools that ship with Windows.

Last Known Good

Last known good (LKG) is a useful mechanism for getting a system that crashes during the boot process back to a bootable state. Because the system’s configuration settings are stored in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control and driver and service configuration is stored in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services, changes to these parts of the registry can render a system unbootable. For example, if you install a device driver that has a bug that crashes the system during the boot, you can press the F8 key during the boot and select last known good from the resulting menu. The system marks the control set that it was using to boot the system as failed by setting the Failed value of HKLM\SYSTEM\Select and then changes HKLM\SYSTEM\Select\Current to the value stored in HKLM\SYSTEM\Select\LastKnownGood. It also updates the symbolic link HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet to point at the LastKnownGood control set. Because the new driver’s key is not present in the Services subkey of the LastKnownGood control set, the system will boot successfully.

Safe Mode

Perhaps the most common reason Windows systems become unbootable is that a device driver crashes the machine during the boot sequence. Because software or hardware configurations can change over time, latent bugs can surface in drivers at any time. Windows offers a way for an administrator to attack the problem: booting in safe mode. Safe mode is a boot configuration that consists of the
minimal set of device drivers and services. By relying on only the drivers and services that are necessary for booting, Windows avoids loading third-party and other nonessential drivers that might crash.

When Windows boots, you press the F8 key to enter a special boot menu that contains the safe-mode boot options. You typically choose from three safe-mode variations: Safe Mode, Safe Mode With Networking, and Safe Mode With Command Prompt. Standard safe mode includes the minimum number of device drivers and services necessary to boot successfully. Networking-enabled safe mode adds network drivers and services to the drivers and services that standard safe mode includes. Finally, safe mode with command prompt is identical to standard safe mode except that Windows runs the Command Prompt application (Cmd.exe) instead of Windows Explorer as the shell when the system enables GUI mode.

Windows includes a fourth safe mode—Directory Services Restore mode—which is different from the standard and networking-enabled safe modes. You use Directory Services Restore mode to boot the system into a mode where the Active Directory service of a domain controller is offline and unopened. This allows you to perform repair operations on the database or restore it from backup media. All drivers and services, with the exception of the Active Directory service, load during a Directory Services Restore mode boot. In cases where you can’t log on to a system because of Active Directory database corruption, this mode enables you to repair the corruption.

**Driver Loading in Safe Mode**

How does Windows know which device drivers and services are part of standard and networking-enabled safe mode? The answer lies in the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot registry key. This key contains the Minimal and Network subkeys. Each subkey contains more subkeys that specify the names of device drivers or services or of groups of drivers. For example, the vga.sys subkey identifies the VGA display device driver that the startup configuration includes. The VGA display driver provides basic graphics services for any PC-compatible display adapter. The system uses this driver as the safe-mode display driver in lieu of a driver that might take advantage of an adapter’s advanced hardware features but that might also prevent the system from booting. Each subkey under the SafeBoot key has a default value that describes
what the subkey identifies; the vga.sys subkey’s default value is “Driver”.

The Boot file system subkey has as its default value “Driver Group”. When developers design a device driver’s installation script (.inf file), they can specify that the device driver belongs to a driver group. The driver groups that a system defines are listed in the List value of the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\ServiceGroupOrder key. A developer specifies a driver as a member of a group to indicate to Windows at what point during the boot process the driver should start. The ServiceGroupOrder key’s primary purpose is to define the order in which driver groups load; some driver types must load either before or after other driver types. The Group value beneath a driver’s configuration registry key associates the driver with a group.

Driver and service configuration keys reside beneath HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. If you look under this key, you’ll find the VgaSave key for the VGA display device driver, which you can see in the registry is a member of the Video Save group. Any file system drivers that Windows requires for access to the Windows system drive are automatically loaded as if part of the Boot file system group. Other file system drivers are part of the File system group, which the standard and networking-enabled safe-mode configurations also include.

When you boot into a safe-mode configuration, the boot loader (Winload) passes an associated switch to the kernel (Ntoskrnl.exe) as a command-line parameter, along with any switches you’ve specified in the BCD for the installation you’re booting. If you boot into any safe mode, Winload sets the safeboot BCD option with a value describing the type of safe mode you select. For standard safe mode, Winload sets minimal, and for networking-enabled safe mode, it adds network. Winload adds minimal and sets safebootalternateshell for safe mode with command prompt and dsrepair for Directory Services Restore mode.

The Windows kernel scans boot parameters in search of the safe-mode switches early during the boot, during the InitSafeBoot function, and sets the internal variable InitSafeBootMode to a value that reflects the switches the kernel finds. The kernel writes the InitSafeBootMode value to the registry value HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Option\OptionValue so that user-mode components, such as the SCM, can determine what boot mode the
system is in. In addition, if the system is booting in safe mode with command prompt, the kernel sets the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Option\UseAlternateShell value to 1. The kernel records the parameters that Winload passes to it in the value HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SystemStartOptions.

When the I/O manager kernel subsystem loads device drivers that HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services specifies, the I/O manager executes the function IopLoadDriver. When the Plug and Play manager detects a new device and wants to dynamically load the device driver for the detected device, the Plug and Play manager executes the function PipCallDriverAddDevice. Both these functions call the function IopSafebootDriverLoad before they load the driver in question. IopSafebootDriverLoad checks the value of InitSafeBootMode and determines whether the driver should load. For example, if the system boots in standard safe mode, IopSafebootDriverLoad looks for the driver’s group, if the driver has one, under the Minimal subkey. If IopSafebootDriverLoad finds the driver’s group listed, IopSafebootDriverLoad indicates to its caller that the driver can load. Otherwise, IopSafebootDriverLoad looks for the driver’s name under the Minimal subkey. If the driver’s name is listed as a subkey, the driver can load. If IopSafebootDriverLoad can't find the driver group or driver name subkeys, the driver will not be loaded. If the system boots in networking-enabled safe mode, IopSafebootDriverLoad performs the searches on the Network subkey. If the system doesn’t boot in safe mode, IopSafebootDriverLoad lets all drivers load.

NOTE

An exception exists regarding the drivers that safe mode excludes from a boot: Winload, rather than the kernel, loads any drivers with a Start value of 0 in their registry key, which specifies loading the drivers at boot time. Winload doesn’t check the SafeBoot registry key because it assumes that any driver with a Start value of 0 is required for the system to boot successfully. Because Winload doesn’t check the SafeBoot registry key to identify which drivers to load, Winload loads all boot-start drivers (and later Ntoskrnl starts them).

Safe-Mode-Aware User Programs

When the service control manager (SCM) user-mode component (which Services.exe implements) initializes during the boot process, the SCM checks the value of
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Option\OptionValue to determine whether the system is performing a safe-mode boot. If so, the SCM mirrors the actions of IopSafebootDriverLoad. Although the SCM processes the services listed under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services, it loads only services that the appropriate safe-mode subkey specifies by name. You can find more information on the SCM initialization process in the section “Services” in Chapter 4 in Part 1.

Userinit, the component that initializes a user’s environment when the user logs on (%SystemRoot%\System32\Userinit.exe), is another user-mode component that needs to know whether the system is booting in safe mode. It checks the value of HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Option\UseAlternateShell. If this value is set, Userinit runs the program specified as the user’s shell in the value HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\AlternateShell rather than executing Explorer.exe. Windows writes the program name Cmd.exe to the AlternateShell value during installation, making the Windows command prompt the default shell for safe mode with command prompt. Even though the command prompt is the shell, you can type Explorer.exe at the command prompt to start Windows Explorer, and you can run any other GUI program from the command prompt as well.

How does an application determine whether the system is booting in safe mode? By calling the Windows GetSystemMetrics(SM_CLEANBOOT) function. Batch scripts that need to perform certain operations when the system boots in safe mode look for the SAFEBOOT_OPTION environment variable because the system defines this environment variable only when booting in safe mode.

**Boot Logging in Safe Mode**

When you direct the system to boot into safe mode, Winload hands the string specified by the bootlog option to the Windows kernel as a parameter, together with the parameter that requests safe mode. When the kernel initializes, it checks for the presence of the bootlog parameter whether or not any safe-mode parameter is present. If the kernel detects a boot log string, the kernel records the action the kernel takes on every device driver it considers for loading. For example, if IopSafebootDriverLoad tells the I/O manager not to load a driver, the I/O manager calls IopBootLog to record that the driver wasn’t loaded. Likewise, after
IopLoadDriver successfully loads a driver that is part of the safe-mode configuration. IopLoadDriver calls IopBootLog to record that the driver loaded. You can examine boot logs to see which device drivers are part of a boot configuration.

Because the kernel wants to avoid modifying the disk until Chkdsk executes, late in the boot process, IopBootLog can’t simply dump messages into a log file. Instead, IopBootLog records messages in the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\BootLog registry value. As the first user-mode component to load during a boot, the Session Manager (%SystemRoot%\System32\Smss.exe) executes Chkdsk to ensure the system drives’ consistency and then completes registry initialization by executing the NtInitializeRegistry system call. The kernel takes this action as a cue that it can safely open a log file on the disk, which it does, invoking the function IopCopyBootLogRegistryToFile. This function creates the file Ntbtlog.txt in the Windows system directory (%SystemRoot%) and copies the contents of the BootLog registry value to the file. IopCopyBootLogRegistryToFile also sets a flag for IopBootLog that lets IopBootLog know that writing directly to the log file, rather than recording messages in the registry, is now OK. The following output shows the partial contents of a sample boot log:

```
Microsoft (R) Windows (R) Version 6.1 (Build 7601)
10 4 2012 09:04:53.375
Loaded driver \SystemRoot\system32\ntkrnlpa.exe
Loaded driver \SystemRoot\system32\hal.dll
Loaded driver \SystemRoot\system32\kdcom.dll
Loaded driver \SystemRoot\system32\mcupdate_GenuineIntel.dll
Loaded driver \SystemRoot\system32\PSHED.dll
Loaded driver \SystemRoot\system32\BOOTVID.dll
Loaded driver \SystemRoot\system32\CLFS.SYS
Loaded driver \SystemRoot\system32\CI.dll
Loaded driver \SystemRoot\system32\drivers\Wdf01000.sys
Loaded driver \SystemRoot\system32\drivers\WDFLDR.SYS
Loaded driver \SystemRoot\system32\drivers\acpi.sys
Loaded driver \SystemRoot\system32\drivers\WMILIB.SYS
Loaded driver \SystemRoot\system32\drivers\msisadrv.sys
Loaded driver \SystemRoot\system32\drivers\pci.sys
Loaded driver \SystemRoot\system32\drivers\volmgr.sys
Loaded driver \SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\compbatt.sys
Loaded driver \SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\BATTC.SYS
Loaded driver \SystemRoot\system32\drivers\mountmgr.sys
Loaded driver \SystemRoot\system32\drivers\intelide.sys
Loaded driver \SystemRoot\system32\drivers\PCIIDEX.SYS
Loaded driver \SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\pciide.sys
Loaded driver \SystemRoot\system32\drivers\volmgrx.sys
Loaded driver \SystemRoot\system32\drivers\atapi.sys
```
Loaded driver \SystemRoot\system32\drivers\ataport.SYS
Loaded driver \SystemRoot\system32\drivers\fltmgr.sys
Loaded driver \SystemRoot\system32\drivers\fileinfo.sys
... Did not load driver @battery.inf,%acpi\acpi0003.devicedesc%;Microsoft AC Adapter
Did not load driver @battery.inf,%acpi\pnp0c0a.devicedesc%;Microsoft ACPI-Compliant Control Method Battery
Did not load driver @oem46.inf,%nvidia_g71.dev_0297.1%;NVIDIA GeForce Go 7950 GTX
Did not load driver @oem5.inf,%nic_mpciex%;Intel(R) PRO/Wireless 3945ABG Network Connection
... Did not load driver @netb57vx.inf,%bcm5750a1clnahkd%;Broadcom NetXtreme 57xx Gigabit Controller
Did not load driver@sdbus.inf,%pci\cc_080501.devicedesc%;SDA Standard Compliant SD Host Controller
...
Windows installation from a complete backup, not just a system restore point, which might not contain all damaged files and lost data.

- **Windows Memory Diagnostic Tool** Performs memory diagnostic tests that check for signs of faulty RAM. Faulty RAM can be the reason for random kernel and application crashes and erratic system behavior.

- **Command Prompt** For cases where troubleshooting or repair requires manual intervention (such as copying files from another drive or manipulating the BCD), you can use the command prompt to have a full Windows shell that can launch almost any Windows program (as long as the required dependencies can be satisfied)—unlike the Recovery Console on earlier versions of Windows, which only supported a limited set of specialized commands.

When you boot a system from the Windows CD or boot disks, Windows Setup gives you the choice of installing Windows or repairing an existing installation. If you choose to repair an installation, the system displays a dialog box called System Recovery Options, shown in Figure 13-7.

![System Recovery Options](image)

Figure 13-7. The System Recovery Options dialog box

Newer versions of Windows also install WinRE to a recovery partition on a clean system installation. On these systems, you can access WinRE by using the F8 option to access advanced boot options during Bootmgr execution. If you see an option Repair Your Computer, your machine has a local hard disk copy. If for some reason yours does not, you can follow the instructions at the Microsoft WinRE blog ([http://blogs.msdn.com/winre](http://blogs.msdn.com/winre)) to install WinRE on the hard disk yourself from your Windows installation media and Windows Automated
Installation Kit (AIK).

If you select the first option, WinRE will then display the dialog box in Figure 13-8, which has the various recovery options. Choosing the second option, on the other hand, is equivalent to the System Image Recovery option shown in Figure 13-8.

![Figure 13-8. The Advanced System Recovery Options dialog box](image)

Additionally, if your system failed to boot as the result of damaged files or for any other reason that Winload can understand, it instructs Bootmgr to automatically start WinRE at the next reboot cycle. Instead of the dialog box shown in Figure 13-8, the recovery environment will automatically launch the Startup Repair tool, shown in Figure 13-9.
At the end of the scan and repair cycle, the tool will automatically attempt to fix any damage found, including replacing system files from the installation media. You can click the details link to see information about the damage that was fixed. For example, in Figure 13-10, the Startup Repair tool fixed a damaged boot sector.

If the Startup Repair tool cannot automatically fix the damage, or if you cancel the operation, you'll get a chance to try other methods and the System Recovery Options dialog box will be displayed.
**BOOT STATUS FILE**

Windows uses a boot status file (%SystemRoot%\Bootstat.dat) to record the fact that it has progressed through various stages of the system life cycle, including boot and shutdown. This allows the Boot Manager, Windows loader, and the Startup Repair tool to detect abnormal shutdown or a failure to shut down cleanly and offer the user recovery and diagnostic boot options, like Last Known Good and Safe Mode. This binary file contains information through which the system reports the success of the following phases of the system life cycle:

- Boot (the definition of a successful boot is the same as the one used for determining Last Known Good status, which was described earlier)
- Shutdown
- Resume from hibernate or suspend

The boot status file also indicates whether a problem was detected the last time the user attempted to boot the operating system and the recovery options shown, indicating that the user has been made aware of the problem and taken action. Runtime Library APIs (Rtl) in Ntdll.dll contain the private interfaces that Windows uses to read from and write to the file. Like the BCD, it cannot be edited by users.

---

**Solving Common Boot Problems**

This section describes problems that can occur during the boot process, describing their symptoms, what caused them, and approaches to solving them. To help you locate a problem that you might encounter, they are organized according to the place in the boot at which they occur. Note that for most of these problems, you should be able to simply boot into the Windows Recovery Environment and allow the Startup Repair tool to scan your system and perform any automated repair tasks.

**MBR Corruption**

- **Symptoms** A system that has Master Boot Record (MBR) corruption will execute the BIOS power-on self test (POST), display BIOS version information or OEM branding, switch to a black screen, and then hang. Depending on the type of corruption the MBR has experienced, you might see one of the following messages: “Invalid partition table”, “Error loading operating system”, or “Missing operating system”.

- **Cause** The MBR can become corrupt because of hard-disk errors, disk corruption as a result of a driver bug while Windows is running, or intentional scrambling as a result of a virus.
- **Resolution** Boot into the Windows Recovery Environment, choose the Command Prompt option, and then execute the `bootrec /fixmbr` command. This command replaces the executable code in the MBR.

**Boot Sector Corruption**

- **Symptoms** Boot sector corruption can look like MBR corruption, where the system hangs after BIOS POST at a black screen, or you might see the messages “A disk read error occurred”, “BOOTMGR is missing”, or “BOOTMGR is compressed” displayed on a black screen.

- **Cause** The boot sector can become corrupt because of hard-disk errors, disk corruption as a result of a driver bug while Windows is running, or intentional scrambling as a result of a virus.

- **Resolution** Boot into the Windows Recovery Environment, choose the Command Prompt option, and then execute the `bootrec /fixboot` command. This command rewrites the boot sector of the volume that you specify. You should execute the command on both the system and boot volumes if they are different.

**BCD Misconfiguration**

- **Symptom** After BIOS POST, you’ll see a message that begins “Windows could not start because of a computer disk hardware configuration problem”, “Could not read from selected boot disk”, or “Check boot path and disk hardware”.

- **Cause** The BCD has been deleted, become corrupt, or no longer references the boot volume because the addition of a partition has changed the name of the volume.

- **Resolution** Boot into the Windows Recovery Environment, choose the Command Prompt option, and then execute the `bootrec /scanos` and `bootrec /rebuildbcd` commands. These commands will scan each volume looking for Windows installations. When they discover an installation, they will ask you whether they should add it to the BCD as a boot option and what name should be displayed for the installation in the boot menu. For other kinds of BCD-related damage, you can also use `Bcdedit.exe` to perform tasks such as building a new BCD from scratch or cloning an existing good copy.
System File Corruption

- **Symptoms** There are several ways the corruption of system files—which include executables, drivers, or DLLs—can manifest. One way is with a message on a black screen after BIOS POST that says, “Windows could not start because the following file is missing or corrupt”, followed by the name of a file and a request to reinstall the file. Another way is with a blue screen crash during the boot with the text, “STOP: 0xC0000135 {Unable to Locate Component}”.

- **Causes** The volume on which a system file is located is corrupt or one or more system files have been deleted or become corrupt.

- **Resolution** Boot into the Windows Recovery Environment, choose the Command Prompt option, and then execute the chkdsk command. Chkdsk will attempt to repair volume corruption. If Chkdsk does not report any problems, obtain a backup copy of the system file in question. One place to check is in the %SystemRoot%\winsxs\Backup directory, in which Windows places copies of many system files for access by Windows Resource Protection. (See the Windows Resource Protection sidebar.) If you cannot find a copy of the file there, see if you can locate a copy from another system in the network. Note that the backup file must be from the same service pack or hotfix as the file that you are replacing.

In some cases, multiple system files are deleted or become corrupt, so the repair process can involve multiple reboots and boot failures as you repair the files one by one. If you believe the system file corruption to be extensive, you should consider restoring the system from a backup image, such as one generated by Windows Backup and Restore or from a system restore point.

When you run Backup and Restore (located in the Maintenance folder on the Start menu), you can generate a System Image Recovery image, which includes all the files on the system and boot volumes, plus a floppy disk on which it stores information about the system’s disks and volumes. To restore a system from such an image, boot from the Windows setup media and select the appropriate option when prompted (or use the recovery environment shown earlier).

If you do not have a backup from which to restore, a last resort is to execute a
Windows repair install: boot from the Windows setup media, and follow the wizard as if you were going to perform a new installation. The wizard will ask you whether you want to perform a repair or fresh install. When you tell it that you want to repair, Setup reinstalls all system files, leaving your application data and registry settings intact.

**WINDOWS RESOURCE PROTECTION**

To preserve the integrity of the many components involved in the boot process, as well as other critical Windows files, libraries, and applications, Windows implements a technology called Windows Resource Protection (WRP). WRP is implemented through access control lists (ACLs) that protect critical system files on the machine. It is also exposed through an API (located in %SystemRoot%\System32\Sfc.dll and %SystemRoot%\System32\Sfc_os.dll) that can be accessed by the Sfc.exe utility to manually check a file for corruption and restore it.

WRP will also protect entire critical folders if required, even locking down the folder so that it is inaccessible by administrators (without modifying the access control list on the folder). The only supported way to modify WRP-protected files is through the Windows Modules Installer service, which can run under the TrustedInstaller account. This service is used for the installation of patches, service packs, hotfixes, and Windows Update. This account has access to the various protected files and is trusted by the system (as its name implies) to modify critical files and replace them. WRP also protects critical registry keys, and it may even lock entire registry trees if all the values and subkeys are considered to be critical.

WRP sets the ACL on protected files, directories, or registry keys such that only the TrustedInstaller account is able to modify or delete these files. Application developers can use the SfcIsFileProtected or SfcIsKeyProtected APIs to check whether a file or registry key is locked down.

For backward compatibility, certain installers are considered well-known—an application compatibility shim exists that will suppress the “access denied” error that certain installers would receive while attempting to modify WRP-protected resources. Instead, the installer receives a fake “success” code, but the modification isn’t made. This virtualization is similar to the User Access Control (UAC) virtualization technology discussed in Chapter 6 in Part 1, but it applies to write operations as well. It applies if the following are true:

- The application is a legacy application, meaning that it does not contain a manifest file compatible with the requestedExecutionLevel value set.
- The application is trying to modify a WRP-protected resource (the file or registry key contains the TrustedInstaller SID).
- The application is being run under an administrator account (always true on systems with UAC enabled because of automatic installer program detection).

WRP copies files that are needed to restart Windows to the cache directory located at %SystemRoot%\winsxs\Backup. Critical files that are not needed to restart Windows are not copied to the cache directory. The size of the cache directory and the list of files copied to the cache cannot be modified. To recover a file from the cache directory, you can use the System File Checker (Sfc.exe) tool, which can scan your system for modified protected files and restore them from a good copy.
System Hive Corruption

- **Symptoms** If the System registry hive (which is discussed along with hive files in the section “The Registry” in Chapter 4 in Part 1) is missing or corrupted, Winload will display the message “Windows could not start because the following file is missing or corrupt: \WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\CONFIG\SYSTEM”, on a black screen after the BIOS POST.

- **Causes** The System registry hive, which contains configuration information necessary for the system to boot, has become corrupt or has been deleted.

- **Resolution** Boot into the Windows Recovery Environment, choose the Command Prompt option, and then execute the chkdsk command. If the problem is not corrected, obtain a backup of the System registry hive. Windows makes copies of the registry hives every 12 hours (keeping the immediately previous copy with a .OLD extension) in a folder called %SystemRoot%\System32\Config\RegBack, so copy the file named System to %SystemRoot%\System32\Config.

If System Restore is enabled (System Restore is discussed in Chapter 12), you can often obtain a more recent backup of the registry hives, including the System hive, from the most recent restore point. You can choose System Restore from the Windows Recovery Environment to restore your registry from the last restore point.

Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang

- **Symptoms** Problems that occur after the Windows splash screen displays, the desktop appears, or you log on fall into this category and can appear as a blue screen crash or a hang, where the entire system is frozen or the mouse cursor tracks the mouse but the system is otherwise unresponsive.

- **Causes** These problems are almost always a result of a bug in a device driver, but they can sometimes be the result of corruption of a registry hive other than the System hive.

- **Resolution** You can take several steps to try and correct the problem. The first thing you should try is the last known good configuration. Last known good
(LKG), which is described earlier in this chapter and in the “Services” section of Chapter 4 in Part 1, consists of the registry control set that was last used to boot the system successfully. Because a control set includes core system configuration and the device driver and services registration database, using a version that does not reflect changes or newly installed drivers or services might avoid the source of the problem. You access last known good by pressing the F8 key early in the boot process to access the same menu from which you can boot into safe mode.

As stated earlier in the chapter, when you boot into LKG, the system saves the control set that you are avoiding and labels it as the failed control set. You can leverage the failed control set in cases where LKG makes a system bootable to determine what was causing the system to fail to boot by exporting the contents of the current control set of the successful boot and the failed control set to .reg files. You do this by using Regedit’s export functionality, which you access under the File menu:

1. Run Regedit, and select HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet.
2. Select Export from the File menu, and save to a file named good.reg.
3. Open HKLM\SYSTEM\Select, read the value of Failed, and select the subkey named HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlXXX, where XXX is the value of Failed.
4. Export the contents of the control set to bad.reg.
5. Use WordPad (which is found under Accessories on the Start menu) to globally replace all instances of CurrentControlSet in good.reg with ControlSet.
6. Use WordPad to change all instances of ControlXXX (replacing XXX with the value of the Failed control set) in bad.reg with ControlSet.
7. Run Windiff from the Support Tools, and compare the two files.

The differences between a failed control set and a good one can be numerous, so you should focus your examination on changes beneath the Control subkey as well as under the Parameters subkeys of drivers and services registered in the Services subkey. Ignore changes made to Enum subkeys of driver registry keys in the
Services branch of the control set.

If the problem you’re experiencing is caused by a driver or service that was present on the system since before the last successful boot, LKG will not make the system bootable. Similarly, if a problematic configuration setting changed outside the control set or was made before the last successful boot, LKG will not help. In those cases, the next option to try is safe mode (described earlier in this section). If the system boots successfully in safe mode and you know what particular driver was causing the normal boot to fail, you can disable the driver by using the Device Manager (accessible from the System Control Panel item). To do so, select the driver in question and choose Disable from the Action menu. If you recently updated the driver, and believe that the update introduced a bug, you can choose to roll back the driver to its previous version instead, also with the Device Manager. To restore a driver to its previous version, double-click on the device to open its Properties dialog box and click Roll Back Driver on the Driver tab.

On systems with System Restore enabled, an option when LKG fails is to roll back all system state (as defined by System Restore) to a previous point in time. Safe mode detects the existence of restore points, and when they are present it will ask you whether you want to log on to the installation to perform a manual diagnosis and repair or launch the System Restore Wizard. Using System Restore to make a system bootable again is attractive when you know the cause of a problem and want the repair to be automatic or when you don’t know the cause but do not want to invest time to determine the cause.

If System Restore is not an option or you want to determine the cause of a crash during the normal boot and the system boots successfully in safe mode, attempt to obtain a boot log from the unsuccessful boot by pressing F8 to access the special boot menu and choosing the boot logging option. As described earlier in this chapter, Session Manager (%SystemRoot%\System32\Smss.exe) saves a log of the boot that includes a record of device drivers that the system loaded and chose not to load to %SystemRoot%\ntbtlog.txt, so you’ll obtain a boot log if the crash or hang occurs after Session Manager initializes. When you reboot into safe mode, the system appends new entries to the existing boot log. Extract the portions of the log file that refer to the failed attempt and safe-mode boots into separate files. Strip out lines that contain the text “Did not load driver”, and then compare them with a
text comparison tool such as Windiff. One by one, disable the drivers that loaded during the normal boot but not in the safe-mode boot until the system boots successfully again. (Then reenable the drivers that were not responsible for the problem.)

If you cannot obtain a boot log from the normal boot (for instance, because the system is crashing before Session Manager initializes), if the system also crashes during the safe-mode boot, or if a comparison of boot logs from the normal and safe-mode boots do not reveal any significant differences (for example, when the driver that’s crashing the normal boot starts after Session Manager initializes), the next tool to try is Driver Verifier combined with crash dump analysis. (See Chapter 14, for more information on both these topics.)
Shutdown

If someone is logged on and a process initiates a shutdown by calling the Windows ExitWindowsEx function, a message is sent to that session’s Csrss instructing it to perform the shutdown. Csrss in turn impersonates the caller and sends an RPC message to Winlogon, telling it to perform a system shutdown. Winlogon then impersonates the currently logged-on user (who might or might not have the same security context as the user who initiated the system shutdown) and calls ExitWindowsEx with some special internal flags. Again this call causes a message to be sent to the Csrss process inside that session, requesting a system shutdown.

This time, Csrss sees that the request is from Winlogon and loops through all the processes in the logon session of the interactive user (again, not the user who requested a shutdown) in reverse order of their shutdown level. A process can specify a shutdown level, which indicates to the system when it wants to exit with respect to other processes, by calling SetProcessShutdownParameters. Valid shutdown levels are in the range 0 through 1023, and the default level is 640. Explorer, for example, sets its shutdown level to 2 and Task Manager specifies 1.

For each process that owns a top-level window, Csrss sends the WM_QUERYENDSESSION message to each thread in the process that has a Windows message loop. If the thread returns TRUE, the system shutdown can proceed. Csrss then sends the WM_ENDSESSION Windows message to the thread to request it to exit. Csrss waits the number of seconds defined in HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\HungAppTimeout for the thread to exit. (The default is 5,000 milliseconds.)

If the thread doesn’t exit before the timeout, Csrss fades out the screen and displays the hung-program screen shown in Figure 13-11. (You can disable this screen by creating the registry value HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\AutoEndTasks and setting it to 1.) This screen indicates which programs are currently running and, if available, their current state. Windows indicates which program isn’t shutting down in a timely manner and gives the user a choice of either killing the process or aborting the shutdown. (There is no timeout on this screen, which means that a shutdown request could wait forever at this point.) Additionally, third-party applications can add their own specific information regarding state—for example, a
virtualization product could display the number of actively running virtual machines.

![Figure 13-11. Hung program screen]

**EXPERIMENT: WITNESSING THE HUNGAPPTIMEOUT**

You can see the use of the HungAppTimeout registry value by running Notepad, entering text into its editor, and then logging off. After the amount of time specified by the HungAppTimeout registry value has expired, Csrss.exe presents a prompt that asks you whether or not you want to end the Notepad process, which has not exited because it’s waiting for you to tell it whether or not to save the entered text to a file. If you click the Cancel button, Csrss.exe aborts the shutdown.

As a second experiment, if you try shutting down again (with Notepad’s query dialog box still open), Notepad will display its own message box to inform you that shutdown cannot cleanly proceed. However, this dialog box is merely an informational message to help users—Csrss.exe will still consider that Notepad is “hung” and display the user interface to terminate unresponsive processes.

![Notepad dialog box]

If the thread does exit before the timeout, Csrss continues sending the WM_QUERYENDSESSION/WM_ENDSESSION message pairs to the other
threads in the process that own windows. Once all the threads that own windows in
the process have exited, Csrss terminates the process and goes on to the next
process in the interactive session.

If Csrss finds a console application, it invokes the console control handler by
sending the CTRL_LOGOFF_EVENT event. (Only service processes receive the
CTRL_SHUTDOWN_EVENT event on shutdown.) If the handler returns FALSE, Csrss kills the process. If the handler returns TRUE or doesn’t respond by the
number of seconds defined by HKCU\Control
Panel\Desktop\WaitToKillAppTimeout (the default is 20,000 milliseconds), Csrss
displays the hung-program screen shown in Figure 13-11.

Next, Winlogon calls ExitWindowsEx to have Csrss terminate any COM processes
that are part of the interactive user’s session.

At this point, all the processes in the interactive user’s session have been
terminated. Wininit next calls ExitWindowsEx, which this time executes within the
system process context. This causes Wininit to send a message to the Csrss part of
session 0, where the services live. Csrss then looks at all the processes belonging to
the system context and performs and sends the
WM_QUERYENDSESSION/WM_ENDSESSION messages to GUI threads (as
before). Instead of sending CTRL_LOGOFF_EVENT, however, it sends CTRL_
SHUTDOWN_EVENT to console applications that have registered control
handlers. Note that the SCM is a console program that does register a control
handler. When it receives the shutdown request, it in turn sends the service
shutdown control message to all services that registered for shutdown notification.
For more details on service shutdown (such as the shutdown timeout Csrss uses for
the SCM), see the “Services” section in Chapter 4 in Part 1.

Although Csrss performs the same timeouts as when it was terminating the user
processes, it doesn’t display any dialog boxes and doesn’t kill any processes. (The
registry values for the system process timeouts are taken from the default user
profile.) These timeouts simply allow system processes a chance to clean up and
exit before the system shuts down. Therefore, many system processes are in fact
still running when the system shuts down, such as Smss, Wininit, Services, and
LSASS.

Once Csrss has finished its pass notifying system processes that the system is
shutting down, Winlogon finishes the shutdown process by calling the executive subsystem function NtShutdownSystem. This function calls the function PoSetSystemPowerState to orchestrate the shutdown of drivers and the rest of the executive subsystems (Plug and Play manager, power manager, executive, I/O manager, configuration manager, and memory manager).

For example, PoSetSystemPowerState calls the I/O manager to send shutdown I/O packets to all device drivers that have requested shutdown notification. This action gives device drivers a chance to perform any special processing their device might require before Windows exits. The stacks of worker threads are swapped in, the configuration manager flushes any modified registry data to disk, and the memory manager writes all modified pages containing file data back to their respective files. If the option to clear the paging file at shutdown is enabled, the memory manager clears the paging file at this time. The I/O manager is called a second time to inform the file system drivers that the system is shutting down. System shutdown ends in the power manager. The action the power manager takes depends on whether the user specified a shutdown, a reboot, or a power down.
Conclusion

In this chapter, we’ve examined the detailed steps involved in starting and shutting down Windows (both normally and in error cases). We’ve examined the overall structure of Windows and the core system mechanisms that get the system going, keep it running, and eventually shut it down. The final chapter of this book explains how to deal with an unusual type of shutdown: system crashes.
Chapter 14. Crash Dump Analysis

Almost every Windows user has heard of, if not experienced, the infamous “blue screen of death.” This ominous term refers to the blue screen that is displayed when Windows crashes, or stops executing, because of a catastrophic fault or an internal condition that prevents the system from continuing to run.

In this chapter, we’ll cover the basic problems that cause Windows to crash, describe the information presented on the blue screen, and explain the various configuration options available to create a crash dump, a record of system memory at the time of a crash that can help you figure out which component caused the crash and why. This section is not intended to provide detailed troubleshooting information on how to analyze a Windows system crash. This section will also show you how to analyze a crash dump to identify a faulty driver or component. The effort required to perform basic crash dump analysis is minimal and takes a few minutes. Even if an analysis ascertains the problematic driver for only one out of every five or ten crash dumps, it’s still worth doing: one successful analysis can avoid future data loss, system downtime, and frustration.
Why Does Windows Crash?

Windows crashes (stops execution and displays the blue screen) for many possible reasons. A common source is a reference to a memory address that causes an access violation, either a write operation to read-only memory or a read operation on an address that is not mapped. Another common cause is an unexpected exception or trap. Crashes also occur when a kernel subsystem (such as the memory manager or power manager) or a driver (such as a USB or display driver) detect inconsistencies in their operation.

When a kernel-mode device driver or subsystem causes an illegal exception, Windows faces a difficult dilemma. It has detected that a part of the operating system with the ability to access any hardware device and any valid memory has done something it wasn’t supposed to do.

But why does that mean Windows has to crash? Couldn’t it just ignore the exception and let the device driver or subsystem continue as if nothing had happened? The possibility exists that the error was isolated and that the component will somehow recover. But what’s more likely is that the detected exception resulted from deeper problems—for example, from a general corruption of memory or from a hardware device that’s not functioning properly. Permitting the system to continue operating would probably result in more exceptions, and data stored on disk or other peripherals could become corrupt—a risk that’s too high to take. So Windows adopts a fail fast policy in attempting to prevent the corruption in RAM from spreading to disk.
The Blue Screen

Regardless of the reason for a system crash, the function that actually performs the crash is KeBugCheckEx, documented in the Windows Driver Kit (WDK). This function takes a stop code (sometimes called a bugcheck code) and four parameters that are interpreted on a per-stop code basis. After KeBugCheckEx masks out all interrupts on all processors of the system, it switches the display into a low-resolution VGA graphics mode (one implemented by all Windows-supported video cards), paints a blue background, and then displays the stop code, followed by some text suggesting what the user can do. Finally, KeBugCheckEx calls any registered device driver bugcheck callbacks (registered by calling the KeRegisterBugCheckCallback function), allowing drivers an opportunity to stop their devices. It then calls registered reason callbacks (registered with KeRegisterBugCheckReasonCallback), which allow drivers to append data to the crash dump or write crash dump information to alternate devices.

The first line in the Technical information section in the sample Windows blue screen shown in Figure 14-1 lists the stop code and the four additional parameters passed to KeBugCheckEx. A text line near the top of the screen provides the text equivalent of the stop code’s numeric identifier. According to the example in Figure 14-1, the stop code 0x000000D1 is a DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL crash. When a parameter contains an address of a piece of operating system or device driver code (as in Figure 14-1), Windows displays the base address of the module the address falls in, the date stamp, and the file name of the device driver. This information alone might help you pinpoint the faulty component.
Although there are more than 300 unique stop codes, most are rarely, if ever, seen on production systems. Instead, just a few common stop codes represent the majority of Windows system crashes. Also, the meaning of the four additional parameters depends on the stop code (and not all stop codes have extended parameter information). Nevertheless, looking up the stop code and the meaning of the parameters (if applicable) might at least assist you in diagnosing the component that is failing (or the hardware device that is causing the crash).

You can find stop code information in the section “Bug Checks (Blue Screens)” in the Debugging Tools for Windows help file. (For information on the Debugging Tools for Windows, see Chapter 1, “Concepts and Tools,” in Part 1.) You can also search Microsoft’s Knowledge Base (http://support.microsoft.com) for the stop code and the name of the suspect hardware or driver. You might find information about a workaround, an update, or a service pack that fixes the problem you’re having. The Bugcodes.h file in the WDK contains a complete list of the 300 or so stop codes, with some additional details on the reasons for some of them. Last but not least, these stop codes are listed and documented at http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/hardware/hh406232(v=vs.85).aspx.
Causes of Windows Crashes

Based on data collected from the release of Windows 7 through the release of Windows 7 SP1, the top 20 stop codes account for 91 percent of crashes and can be grouped into the following categories:

- **Page fault** A page fault on memory backed by data in a paging file or a memory-mapped file occurs at an IRQL of DPC/dispatch level or above, which would require the memory manager to have to wait for an I/O operation to occur. The kernel cannot wait or reschedule threads at an IRQL of DPC/dispatch level or higher. (See Chapter 3, “System Mechanisms,” in Part 1 for details on IRQLs.) The common stop codes are:
  - 0xA - IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL
  - 0xD1 - DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL

- **Power management** A device driver or an operating system function running in kernel mode is in an inconsistent or invalid power state. Most frequently, some component has failed to complete a power management I/O request operation within the default period of 10 minutes. The common stop code is:
  - 0x9F - DRIVER_POWER_STATE_FAILURE

- **Exceptions and traps** A device driver or an operating system function running in kernel mode incurs an unexpected exception or trap. The common stop codes are:
  - 0x1E - KMODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED
  - 0x3B - SYSTEM_SERVICE_EXCEPTION
  - 0x7E - SYSTEM_THREAD_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED
  - 0x7F - UNEXPECTED_KERNEL_MODE_TRAP
  - 0x8E - KERNEL_MODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED with P1 != 0xC0000005 STATUS_ACCESS_VIOLATION

- **Access violations** A device driver or an operating system function running in kernel mode incurs a memory access violation, which is caused either by attempting to write to a read-only page or by attempting to read an address that isn’t currently mapped and therefore is not a valid memory location. The common
stop codes are:

- 0x50 - PAGE_FAULT_IN_NONPAGED_AREA
- 0x8E - KERNEL_MODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED with P1 = 0xC0000005 STATUS_ACCESS_VIOLATION

- **Display** The display device driver detects that it can no longer control the graphics processing unit. This indicates that an attempt to reset the display driver failed. The common stop code is:
  - 0x116 - VIDEO_TDR_FAILURE

- **Pool** The kernel pool manager detects a corrupt pool header or an improper pool reference. The common stop codes are:
  - 0x19 - BAD_POOL_HEADER
  - 0xC2 - BAD_POOL_CALLER
  - 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL

- **Memory management** The kernel memory manager detects a corruption of memory management data structures or an improper memory management request. The common stop codes are:
  - 0x1A - MEMORY_MANAGEMENT
  - 0x4E - PFN_LIST_CORRUPT

- **Hardware** A hardware error, such as a machine check or a nonmaskable interrupt (NMI), occurs. This category also includes disk failures when the memory manager is attempting to read data to satisfy page faults. The common stop codes are:
  - 0x7A - KERNEL_DATA_INPAGE_ERROR
  - 0x124 - WHEA_UNCORRECTABLE_ERROR

- **USB** An unrecoverable error occurs in a universal serial bus operation. The common stop code is:
  - 0xFE - BUGCODE_USB_DRIVER

- **Critical object** A fatal error occurs in a critical object without which Windows cannot continue to run. The common stop code is:
- **0xF4 - CRITICAL_OBJECT_TERMINATION**

- **NTFS file system** A fatal error is detected by the NTFS file system. The common stop code is:

- **0x24 - NTFS_FILE_SYSTEM**

**Figure 14-2** shows the distribution of these categories for Windows 7 and Windows 7 SP1 in May 2012:

Figure 14-2. Distribution of top 20 stop codes by category for Windows 7 and Windows 7 SP1 in May 2012.
Troubleshooting Crashes

You often begin seeing blue screens after you install a new software product or piece of hardware. If you’ve just added a driver, rebooted, and gotten a blue screen early in system initialization, you can reset the machine, press the F8 key when instructed, and then select Last Known Good Configuration. Enabling last known good causes Windows to revert to a copy of the registry’s device driver registration key (HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services) from the last successful boot (before you installed the driver). From the perspective of last known good, a successful boot is one in which all services and drivers have finished loading and at least one logon has succeeded. (Last known good is further described in Chapter 13.)

During the reboot after a crash, the Boot Manager (Bootmgr) will automatically detect that Windows did not shut down properly and display a Windows Error Recovery message similar to the one shown in Figure 14-3. This screen gives you the option to attempt booting into safe mode so that you can disable or uninstall the software component that might be broken.

![Figure 14-3. An example of a Windows Error Recovery message](image-url)
If you keep getting blue screens, an obvious approach is to uninstall the components you added just before the first blue screen appeared. If some time has passed since you added something new or you added several things at about the same time, you need to note the names of the device drivers referenced in any of the parameters. If you recognize any of the names as being related to something you just added (such as Storport.sys if you installed a new SCSI drive), you’ve possibly found your culprit.

Many device drivers have cryptic names, but one approach you can take to figure out which application or hardware device is associated with a name is to find out the name of the service in the registry associated with a device driver by searching for the name of the device driver under the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services key. This branch of the registry is where Windows stores registration information for every device driver in the system. If you find a match, look for values named DisplayName and Description. Some drivers fill in these values to describe the device driver’s purpose. For example, you might find the string “Virus Scanner” in the DisplayName value, which can implicate the antivirus software you have running. The list of drivers can be displayed in the System Information tool (from the Start menu, select All Programs, Accessories, System Tools, System Information). In System Information, expand Software Environment, and then select System Drivers. Process Explorer also lists the currently loaded drivers, including their version numbers and load addresses, in the DLL view of the System process. Another option is to open the Properties dialog box for the driver file and examine the information on the Details tab, which often contains the description and company information for the driver. Keep in mind that the registry information and file description are provided by the driver manufacturer, and there is nothing to guarantee their accuracy.

More often than not, however, the stop code and the four associated parameters aren’t enough information to troubleshoot a system crash. For example, you might need to examine the kernel-mode call stack to pinpoint the driver or system component that triggered the crash. Also, because the default behavior on Windows systems is to automatically reboot after a system crash, it’s unlikely that you would have time to record the information displayed on the blue screen. That is why, by
default, Windows attempts to record information about the system crash to the disk for later analysis, which takes us to our next topic, crash dump files.
Crash Dump Files

By default, all Windows systems are configured to attempt to record information about the state of the system when the system crashes. You can see these settings by opening the System Properties tool in Control Panel (under System, Advanced System Settings), clicking the Advanced tab, and then clicking the Settings button under Startup And Recovery. The default settings for a Windows system are shown in Figure 14-4.

![Figure 14-4. Crash dump settings](image)

Three levels of information can be recorded on a system crash:

- **Complete memory dump** A complete memory dump contains all physical memory accessible by Windows at the time of the crash. This type of dump requires that a page file be at least the size of physical memory plus 1 MB for the header. Device drivers can add up to 256 MB for secondary crash dump data, so to be safe, it's recommended to increase the size of the page file by an additional 256 MB. Because it can require an inordinately large page file on large memory systems, this type of dump file is the least common setting. If the system has more than 2 GB of RAM, this option will be disabled in the UI, but
you can manually enable it by running the following command from an elevated command prompt:

```
wmic recoveros set DebugInfoType=1
```

When using Wmic.exe to enable a complete dump, the WMI Win32 Provider sets the CrashDumpEnabled value to 1 in the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\CrashControl registry key. At initialization time, Windows will check whether the page-file size is large enough for a complete dump and automatically switch to creating a small memory dump if not.

- **Kernel memory dump** A kernel memory dump contains only the kernel-mode pages allocated by the operating system and device drivers that are present in physical memory at the time of the crash. This type of dump doesn’t contain pages belonging to user processes. Because only kernel-mode code can directly cause Windows to crash, however, it’s unlikely that user process pages are necessary to debug a crash. In addition, all data structures relevant for crash dump analysis—including the list of running processes, the kernel-mode stack of the current thread, and list of loaded drivers—are stored in nonpaged memory that saves in a kernel memory dump. There is no way to predict the size of a kernel memory dump because its size depends on the amount of kernel-mode memory allocated by the operating system and drivers present on the machine. This is the default setting for both Windows client and server systems.

- **Small memory dump** A small memory dump, which is typically between 128 KB and 1 MB in size and is also called a minidump or triage dump, contains the stop code and parameters, the list of loaded device drivers, the data structures that describe the current process and thread (called the EPROCESS and ETHREAD—described in Chapter 5, “Processes, Threads, and Jobs,” in Part 1), the kernel stack for the thread that caused the crash, and additional memory considered potentially relevant by crash dump heuristics, such as the pages referenced by processor registers that contain memory addresses and secondary dump data added by drivers.
Device drivers can register a secondary dump data callback routine by calling KeRegisterBugCheckReasonCallback. The kernel invokes these callbacks after a crash and a callback routine can add additional data to a crash dump file, such as device hardware memory or device information for easier debugging. Up to 256 MB can be added systemwide by all drivers, depending on the space required to store the dump and the size of the file into which the dump is written, and each callback can add at most one-eighth of the available additional space. Once the additional space is consumed, drivers subsequently called are not offered the chance to add data.

The debugger indicates that it has limited information available to it when it loads a minidump, and basic commands like `!process`, which lists active processes, don’t have the data they need. Here is an example of `!process` executed on a minidump:

```
Microsoft (R) Windows Debugger Version 6.12.0002.633 AMD64
Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

Loading Dump File [C:\Windows\Minidump\100911-22965-01.dmp]
Mini Kernel Dump File: Only registers and stack trace are available
...
0: kd> !process 0 0
**** NT ACTIVE PROCESS DUMP ****
GetProcAddress: unable to read from fffff800030c5000
Error in reading nt!_EPROCESS at 0000000000000000
```

A kernel memory dump includes more information, but switching to a different process’s address space mappings won’t work because required data isn’t in the dump file. Here is an example of the debugger loading a kernel memory dump, followed by an attempt to switch process address spaces:

```
Microsoft (R) Windows Debugger Version 6.12.0002.633 AMD64
Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

Loading Dump File [C:\Windows\MEMORY.DMP]
Kernel Summary Dump File: Only kernel address space is available
...
0: kd> !process 0 0 explorer.exe
PROCESS fffffffa8009b47540 ...

0: kd> .process fffffffa8009b47540
Process fffffffa8009b47540 has invalid page directories
```

While a complete memory dump is a superset of the other options, it has the drawback that its size tracks the amount of physical memory on a system and can therefore become unwieldy. Because user-mode code and data are not used during the analysis of most crashes (because crashes originate as a result of problems in kernel memory, and system data structures reside in kernel memory), much of the data stored in a complete memory dump is not relevant to crash analysis and therefore contributes wastefully to the size of a dump file. A final disadvantage is
that the paging file must be at least as large as the amount of physical memory on
the system plus 1 MB for the dump header, plus up to an additional 256 MB for
secondary crash dump data. Because the size of the paging files required, in
general, inversely tracks the amount of physical memory present, this requirement
can force the paging file to be unnecessarily large. You should therefore consider
the advantages offered by the small and kernel memory dump options.

An advantage of a minidump is its small size, which makes it convenient for
exchange via e-mail, for example. In addition, each crash generates a file in the
directory %SystemRoot%\Minidump with a unique file name consisting of the
date, the number of milliseconds that have elapsed since the system was started,
and a sequence number (for example, 040712-24835-01.dmp). If there’s a conflict,
the system will attempt to create additional unique file names by calling the
Windows GetTickCount function to return an updated system tick count, and it
will also increment the sequence number. By default, Windows saves the last 50
minidumps. The number of minidumps saved is configurable by modifying the
MinidumpsCount value under the
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\CrashControl registry key.

A disadvantage of minidumps is that to analyze them, you must have access to the
exact images used on the system that generated the dump at the time of analysis.
(At a minimum, a copy of the matching Ntoskrnl.exe is needed to perform the
most basic analysis.) This can be problematic if you want to analyze a dump on a
system different from the system that generated the dump. However, the Microsoft
symbol server contains images (and symbols) for all recent Windows versions, so
you can set the symbol path in the debugger to point to the symbol server, and the
debugger will automatically download the needed images. (Of course, the
Microsoft symbol server won’t have images for third-party drivers you have
installed.)

A more significant disadvantage is that the limited amount of data stored in the
dump can hamper effective analysis. You can also get the advantages of minidumps
even when you configure a system to generate kernel or complete crash dumps by
opening the larger crash with WinDbg and using the .dump /m command to extract
a minidump. Note that a minidump is automatically created even if the system is
set for full or kernel dumps.
NOTE
You can use the .dump command from within LiveKd to generate a memory image of a live system that you can analyze offline without stopping the system. This approach is useful when a system is exhibiting a problem but is still delivering services, and you want to troubleshoot the problem without interrupting service. To prevent creating crash images that aren’t necessarily fully consistent because the contents of different regions of memory reflect different points in time, LiveKd supports the –m flag. The mirror dump option produces a consistent snapshot of kernel-mode memory by leveraging the memory manager’s memory mirroring APIs, which give a point-in-time view of the system. For information about using LiveKd with Hyper-V guests, refer to the “Dumping Hyper-V Guests Using LiveKd” experiment later in the chapter.

The kernel memory dump option offers a practical middle ground. Because it contains all of kernel-mode-owned physical memory, it has the same level of analysis-related data as a complete memory dump, but it omits the usually irrelevant user-mode data and code, and therefore can be significantly smaller. As an example, on a system running a 64-bit version of Windows with 4 GB of RAM, a kernel memory dump was 294 MB in size.

When you configure kernel memory dumps, the system checks whether the paging file is large enough, as described earlier. Some general recommendations follow in Table 14-1, but these are only estimated sizes because there is no way to predict the size of a kernel memory dump. The reason you can’t predict the size of a kernel memory dump is that its size depends on the amount of kernel-mode memory in use by the operating system and drivers present on the machine at the time of the crash.

Therefore, it is possible that at the time of the crash, the paging file is too small to hold a kernel dump, in which case the system will switch to generating a minidump. If you want to see the size of a kernel dump on your system, force a manual crash either by configuring the option to allow you to initiate a manual system crash from the console or by using the Notmyfault tool. (Both Notmyfault and initiating a crash are described later in the chapter.) When you reboot, you can check to make sure that a kernel dump was generated and check its size to gauge how large to make your paging file. To be conservative, on 32-bit systems you can choose a page file size of 2 GB plus up to 256 MB, because 2 GB is the maximum kernel-mode address space available (unless you are booting with the increaseuserva boot option, in which case this can be as low as 1 GB). If you do
not have enough space on the boot volume for saving the Memory.dmp file, you can choose a location on any other local hard disk through the dialog box shown earlier in Figure 14-4.

Table 14-1. Default Minimum Paging File Sizes for Kernel Dumps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System Memory Size</th>
<th>Minimum Page File Size for Kernel Dumps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 4 GB</td>
<td>200 MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 8 GB</td>
<td>400 MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;= 8 GB</td>
<td>800 MB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To limit the amount of disk space that is taken up by crash dumps, Windows needs to determine whether it should maintain a copy of the last kernel or complete dump. After reporting the kernel fault (described later), Windows uses the following algorithm to decide if it should keep the Memory.dmp file. If the system is a server, Windows will always store the dump file. On a Windows client system, only domain-joined machines will store a crash dump by default. For a non-domain-joined machine, Windows will maintain a copy of the crash dump only if there is more than 25 GB of free disk space on the destination volume—that is, the volume where the system is configured to write the Memory.dmp file. If the system, due to disk space constraints, is unable to keep a copy of the crash dump file, an event is written to the System event log indicating that the dump file was deleted, as shown in Figure 14-5. This behavior can be overridden by creating the DWORD registry value HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\CrashControl\AlwaysKeepMemoryD and setting it to 1, in which case Windows will always keep a crash dump, regardless of the amount of free disk space.
EXPERIMENT: VIEWING DUMP FILE INFORMATION

Each crash dump file contains a dump header that describes the stop code and its parameters, the type of system the crash occurred on (including version information), and a list of pointers to important kernel-mode structures required during analysis. The dump header also contains the type of crash dump that was written and any information specific to that type of dump. The .dumpdebug debugger command can be used to display the dump header of a crash dump file. For example, the following output is from a crash of a system that was configured for a kernel (or summary) dump:

```
0: kd> .dumpdebug
----- 64 bit Kernel Summary Dump Analysis

DUMP_HEADER64:
MajorVersion          0000000f
MinorVersion          00001db1
KdSecondaryVersion   00000000
DirectoryTableBase   00000001`ad6a2000
PfnDataBase           fffffa80`00000000
PsLoadedModuleList    fffff800`02a47670
PsActiveProcessHead   fffff800`02a29350
MachineImageType      00008664
NumberProcessors      00000002
BugCheckCode          000000d1
BugCheckParameter1    fffff8a0`027475c0
BugCheckParameter2    00000000`00000002
BugCheckParameter3    00000000`00000000
BugCheckParameter4    fffff880`0343a361
KdDebuggerDataBlock   fffff800`02a29350
SecondaryDataState    00000000
ProductType           00000000
```
Crash Dump Generation

When the system boots, it checks the crash dump options configured by reading the `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\CrashControl` registry key. If a dump is configured, it makes a copy of the disk miniport driver used to write to the volume in memory and gives it the same name as the miniport with the word “dump_” prefixed. The system also queries the DumpFilters value for any filter drivers that are required for writing to the volume, an example being `Dumpfve.sys`, the BitLocker Drive Encryption Crashdump Filter driver. (See Chapter 9, for more details on BitLocker Drive Encryption.) It also collects information related to the components involved with writing a crash dump—including the name of the disk miniport driver, the I/O manager structures that are necessary to write the dump, and the map of where the paging file is on disk—and saves two copies of the data in dump-context structures.

When the system crashes, the crash dump driver (%SystemRoot%\System32\Drivers\Crashdmp.sys) verifies the integrity of the two dump-context structures obtained at boot by performing a memory comparison. If there’s not a match, it does not write a crash dump, because doing so would likely
fail or corrupt the disk. Upon a successful verification match, Crashdmp.sys, with support from the disk miniport driver and any required filter drivers, writes the dump information directly to the sectors on disk occupied by the paging file, bypassing the file system driver and storage driver stack (which might be corrupted or even have caused the crash).

NOTE

Because the page file is opened early during system startup for crash dump use, most crashes that are caused by bugs in system-start driver initialization result in a dump file. Crashes in early Windows boot components such as the HAL or the initialization of boot drivers occur too early for the system to have a page file, so using another computer to debug the startup process is the only way to perform crash analysis in those cases. (See the EXPERIMENT: Attaching a Kernel Debugger experiment later in the chapter.)

During the boot process, the Session Manager (Smss.exe) checks the registry value HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management\ExistingPageFiles for a list of existing page files from the previous boot. (See Chapter 10, for more information on page files.) It then cycles through the list, calling the function SmpCheckForCrashDump on each file present, looking to see whether it contains crash dump data. It checks by searching the header at the top of each paging file for the signature PAGEDUMP or PAGEDU64 on 32-bit or 64-bit systems, respectively. (A match indicates that the paging file contains crash dump information.) If crash dump data is present, the Session Manager then reads a set of crash parameters from the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\CrashControl registry key, one of which contains the name of the target dump file (typically %SystemRoot%\Memory.dmp, unless configured otherwise).

Smss.exe then checks whether the target dump file is on a different volume than the paging file. If so, it checks whether the target volume has enough free disk space (the size required for the crash dump is stored in the dump header of the page file) before truncating the paging file to the size of the crash data and renaming it to a temporary dump file name. (A new page file will be created later when the Session Manager calls the NtCreatePagingFile function.) The temporary dump file name takes the format DUMPxxxx.tmp, where xxxx is the current low-word value of the system’s tick count. (The system will attempt 100 times to find a nonconflicting value.) After renaming the page file, the system removes both the
hidden and system attributes from the file and sets the appropriate security descriptors to secure the crash dump.

Next the Session Manager creates the volatile registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\CrashControl\MachineCrash and stores the temporary dump file name in the value DumpFile. It then writes a DWORD to the TempDestination value indicating whether the dump file location is only a temporary destination. If the paging file is on the same volume as the destination dump file, a temporary dump file isn’t used, because the paging file is truncated and directly renamed to the target dump file name. In this case, the DumpFile value will be that of the target dump file and TempDestination will be 0. Later in the boot, Wininit checks for the presence of the MachineCrash key, and if it exists, Wininit launches WerFault (described in the next section), which reads the TempDestination and DumpFile values. If the TempDestination value is set to 1, which indicates a temporary file was used, WerFault moves the temporary file to its target location and secures the target file by allowing only the System account and the local Administrators group access. WerFault then writes the final dump file name to the FinalDumpFileLocation value in the MachineCrash key. These steps are shown in Figure 14-6.

To provide more control over where the dump file data is written to, for example on systems that boot from a SAN or systems with insufficient disk space on the volume where the paging file is configured, Windows also supports the use of a
A dedicated dump file that is configured in the DedicatedDumpFile and DumpFileSize values under the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\CrashControl registry key. When a dedicated dump file is specified, the crash dump driver creates the dump file of the specified size and writes the crash data there instead of to the paging file. If no DumpFileSize value is given, Windows creates a dedicated dump file using the largest file size that would be required to store a complete dump. Windows calculates the required size as the size of the total number of physical pages of memory present in the system plus the size required for the dump header (one page on 32-bit systems, and two pages on 64-bit), plus the maximum value for secondary crash dump data, which is 256 MB. If a full or kernel dump is configured but there is not enough space on the target volume to create the dedicated dump file of the required size, the system falls back to writing a minidump.
Windows Error Reporting

As mentioned in Chapter 3 in Part 1, Windows includes a facility called Windows Error Reporting (WER), which facilitates the automatic submission of process and system failures (such as crashes and/or hangs) to Microsoft (or an internal error reporting server) for analysis. This feature is enabled by default, but it can be modified by changing WER’s behavior since WER takes the additional step of determining whether the system is configured to send a crash dump to Microsoft (or a private server, explained further in the Online Crash Analysis section later in the chapter) for analysis on a reboot following a crash. The main Problem Reporting Settings page, which you access from the Control Panel’s Action Center applet by following the Change Action Center Settings link, is shown in Figure 14-7. This page allows you to configure the system’s error reporting settings.

![Figure 14-7. Problem reporting configuration page](image)

As mentioned earlier, if Wininit.exe finds the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\CrashControl\MachineCrash key, it executes WerFault.exe with the –k –c flags (the k flag indicates kernel error reporting, and the c flag indicates that the full or kernel dump should be converted to a minidump) to have WerFault.exe check for the kernel-mode crash dump file.
WerFault takes the following steps in preparing to send a crash dump report to the Microsoft Online Crash Analysis (OCA) site (or, if configured, an internal error reporting server):

1. If the type of dump generated was not a minidump, it extracts a minidump from the dump file and stores it in the default location of %SystemRoot%\Minidump, unless otherwise configured through the MinidumpDir value in the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\CrashControl key.

2. It writes the name of the minidump files to HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\KernelFaults\Queue.

3. It adds a command to execute WerFault.exe (%SystemRoot%\System32\WerFault.exe) with the –k –qr flags (the qr flag specifies to use queued reporting mode and that WerFault should be restarted) to HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce so that WerFault is executed during the first user’s logon to the system for purposes of actually sending the error report.
Online Crash Analysis

When the WerFault utility executes during logon, as a result of having configured itself to start, it launches itself again using the –k –q flags (the q flag on its own specifies queued reporting mode) and terminates the previous instance. It does this to prevent the Windows shell from waiting on WerFault by returning control to RunOnce as quickly as possible. The newly launched WerFault.exe checks the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\KernelFaults\Queue key to look for queued reports that may have been added in the previous dump conversion phase. It also checks whether there are previously unsent crash reports from previous sessions. If there are, WerFault.exe generates two XML-formatted files:

- The first contains a basic description of the system, including the operating system version, a list of drivers installed on the machine, and the list of devices present in the system.
- The second contains metadata used by the OCA service, including the event type that triggered WER and additional configuration information such as the system manufacturer.

If configured to ask for user input (which is the default), it then presents the dialog box shown in Figure 14-8, which prompts the user whether he or she wants to check online for a solution to the problem. If the user chooses to check for a solution, and unless overridden by Group Policy, WerFault sends a copy of the two XML files and the minidump to https://oca.microsoft.com, which forwards the data to a server farm for automated analysis, described in the next section.
The server farm's automated analysis uses the same analysis engine that the Microsoft kernel debuggers use when you load a crash dump file into them (described shortly). The analysis generates a bucket ID, which is a signature that identifies a particular crash type. The server farm queries a database using the bucket ID to see whether a resolution has been found for the crash, and it sends a URL back to WerFault that refers it to the WER website (https://wer.microsoft.com). Any solutions are made available on the main Action Center page of Control Panel under System And Security. When browsing for solutions, the Action Center contains an Internet browser frame to open the page on the WER website that reports the preliminary crash analysis. If a resolution is available, the page instructs the user where to obtain a hotfix, service pack, or third-party driver update.
Basic Crash Dump Analysis

If OCA fails to identify a resolution or you are unable to submit the crash to OCA, an alternative is analyzing crashes yourself. As mentioned earlier, WinDbg and Kd both execute the same analysis engine used by OCA when you load a crash dump file, and the basic analysis can sometimes pinpoint the problem. As a result, you might be fortunate and have the crash dump solved by the automatic analysis. If not, there are some straightforward techniques to try to solve the crash.

This section explains how to perform basic crash analysis steps, followed by tips on leveraging Driver Verifier (which is introduced in Chapter 8) to catch buggy drivers when they corrupt the system so that a crash dump analysis pinpoints them.

NOTE

OCA’s automated analysis may occasionally identify a highly likely cause of a crash but not be able to inform you of the suspected driver. This happens because it only reports the cause for crashes that have their bucket ID entry populated in the OCA database, and entries are created only when Microsoft crash-analysis engineers have verified the cause. If there’s no bucket ID entry, OCA reports that the crash was caused by “unknown driver.”

Notmyfault

You can use the Notmyfault utility from Windows Sysinternals (http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963901) to generate the crashes described here. Notmyfault consists of an executable named Notmyfault.exe and a driver named Myfault.sys. When you run the Notmyfault executable, it loads the driver and presents the dialog box shown in Figure 14-9, which allows you to crash or hang the system in various ways or to cause the driver to leak paged or nonpaged pool. The crash types offered represent the ones most commonly seen by Microsoft’s Customer Service and Support group. Selecting an option and clicking the Crash, Hang, Leak Paged, or Leak Nonpaged button causes the executable to tell the driver, by using the DeviceIoControl Windows API, which type of bug to trigger.

NOTE

You should execute Notmyfault crashes on a test system or on a virtual machine because there is a small
risk that memory it corrupts will be written to disk and result in file or disk corruption.

NOTE
The names of the Notmyfault executable and driver highlight the fact that user mode cannot directly cause the system to crash. The Notmyfault executable can cause a crash only by loading a driver to perform an illegal operation for it in kernel mode.

Basic Crash Dump Analysis
The most straightforward Notmyfault crash to debug is the one caused by selecting the High IRQL Fault (Kernel-Mode) option and clicking the Crash button. This causes the driver to allocate a page of paged pool, free the pool, raise the IRQL to DPC/dispatch level, and then touch the page it has freed. (See Chapter 3 in Part 1 for more information on IRQLs.) If that doesn’t cause a crash, the process continues by reading memory past the end of the page until it causes a crash by accessing invalid pages. The driver performs several illegal operations as a result:

1. It references memory that doesn’t belong to it.
2. It references paged pool at an IRQL that’s DPC/dispatch level or higher, which is illegal because page faults are not permitted when the processor
IRQL is DPC/dispatch level or higher.

3. When it goes past the end of the memory that it had allocated, it tries to reference memory that is potentially invalid.

The reason the first page reference might not cause a crash is that it won’t generate a page fault if the page that the driver frees remains in the system working set. (See Chapter 10 for information on the system working set.)

When you load a crash generated with this bug into WinDbg, the tool’s analysis displays something like this:

```
Microsoft (R) Windows Debugger Version 6.12.0002.633 AMD64
Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

Loading Dump File [C:\Windows\MEMORY.DMP]
Kernel Complete Dump File: Full address space is available

Symbol search path is: srv*c:\symbols*http://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols
Executable search path is:
Windows 7 Kernel Version 7601 (Service Pack 1) MP (2 procs) Free x86 compatible
Product: WinNt, suite: TerminalServer SingleUserTS
Built by: 7601.17514.x86fre.win7sp1_rtm.101119-1850
Machine Name:
Kernel base = 0x82814000 PsLoadedModuleList = 0x8295e850
Debug session time: Wed Mar 21 08:12:50.194 2012 (UTC - 7:00)
System Uptime: 8 days 8:54:38.580
Loading Kernel Symbols

* ...............................................................
* Loading User Symbols
* Loading unloaded module list
* ...............................................................

* Bugcheck Analysis
* ...............................................................

Use !analyze -v to get detailed debugging information.

BugCheck D1, {946ae800, 2, 0, 91df15ab}

*** ERROR: Module load completed but symbols could not be loaded for myfault.sys
Probably caused by : myfault.sys ( myfault+5ab )

Followup: MachineOwner

---------

The first thing to note is that WinDbg reports errors trying to load symbols for Myfault.sys. This is expected because the symbol file for Myfault.sys is not stored in the symbol-file path (which is configured to point at the Microsoft symbol
server). You’ll see similar errors for third-party drivers that do not ship with the operating system.

The analysis text itself is terse, showing the numeric stop code and bug-check parameters followed by a “Probably caused by” line that shows the analysis engine’s best guess at the offending driver. In this case it’s on the mark and points directly at Myfault.sys, so there’s no need for manual analysis.

The “Followup” line is not generally useful except within Microsoft, where the debugger looks for the module name in the Triage.ini file that’s located within the Triage directory of the Debugging Tools for Windows installation directory. The Microsoft-internal version of that file lists the developer or group responsible for handling crashes in a specific driver, and the debugger displays the developer’s or group’s name in the Followup line when appropriate.

**Verbose Analysis**

Even though the basic analysis of the Notmyfault crash identifies the faulty driver, you should always have the debugger execute a verbose analysis by entering the command:

!analyze -v

The first obvious difference between the verbose and default analysis is the description of the stop code and its parameters. Following is the output of the command when executed on the same dump:

```
DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL (d1)
An attempt was made to access a pageable (or completely invalid) address at an interrupt request level (IRQL) that is too high. This is usually caused by drivers using improper addresses.
If kernel debugger is available get stack backtrace.
Arguments:
Arg1: 946ae800, memory referenced
Arg2: 00000002, IRQL
Arg3: 00000000, value 0 = read operation, 1 = write operation
Arg4: 91df15ab, address which referenced memory
```

This saves you the trouble of opening the help file to find the same information, and the text sometimes suggests troubleshooting steps, an example of which you’ll see in the next section on advanced crash dump analysis.

The other potentially useful information in a verbose analysis is the stack trace of the thread that was executing on the processor that crashed at the time of the crash.
Here’s what it looks like for the same complete dump:

STACK_TEXT:
93cdbb3c 91df1ab  badb0d00 84f3e380 946ad800 nt!KiTrap0E+0x2cf
WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.
93cddbb8 91df19db 86d77900 93cddbbc 91df1b26 myfault+0x5ab
93cddbc4 91df1b26 85e38488 00000001 00000000 myfault+0x9db
93cddbc8 8284b593 86c9a510 86d77900 86d77900 myfault+0x2b26
93cddbc8 8284b593 86d77900 86d77970 nt!IoCallDriver+0x63
93cddbc4 82a42b71 86c9a510 85e38488 00000000 nt!IopSynchronousServiceTail+0x1f8
93cddbc0 82a893f4 86c9a510 86d77900 00000000 nt!IopXxxControlFile+0x66a
93cddbd4 828521ea 000000c4 00000000 00000000 nt!NtDeviceIoControlFile+0x2a
93cddbd4 77af70b4 000000c4 00000000 00000000 nt!KiFastCallEntry+0x12a
0009f357 77af5864 75cb989d 000000c4 00000000 ntdll!KiFastSystemCallRet
0009f374 75cb989d 000000c4 00000000 00000000 ntdll!NtDeviceIoControlFile+0xc
0009f3d4 77a1a671 000000c4 83360018 00000000 KERNELBASE!DeviceIoControl+0xf6
0009f400 00c421f9 000000c4 83360018 00000000
kernel32!DeviceIoControlImplementation+0x80
0009f4a0 7749c4e7 000201ec 00000111 000003f9 NotMyfault+0x21f9

The preceding stack shows that the Notmyfault executable image, shown at the bottom, invoked the DeviceIoControlImplementation function in Kernel32.dll, which in turn invoked DeviceIoControl in Kernelbase.dll, and so on, until finally the system crashed with the execution of an instruction in the Myfault image. A stack trace like this can be useful because crashes sometimes occur as the result of one driver passing another one data that is improperly formatted or corrupt or contains illegal parameters. The driver that’s passed the invalid data might cause a crash and get the blame in an analysis, when the stack reveals that another driver was involved. In this sample trace, no driver other than Myfault is listed. (The module “nt” is Ntoskrnl.)

If the driver singled out by an analysis is unfamiliar to you, use the lm (list modules) command to look at the driver’s version information. Add the k (kernel modules) and v (verbose) options along with the m (match) option followed by the name of the driver:

0: kd> lm kv m myfault
start   end        module name
91df1000 91df2880  myfault    (no symbols)
Loaded symbol image file: myfault.sys
Image path: \\??\C:\Windows\system32\drivers\myfault.sys
Image name: myfault.sys
Timestamp: Sat Apr 07 09:34:40 2012 (4F806CA0)
Checksum:    00003871
ImageSize:    00001880
File version: 4.0.0.0
Product version: 4.0.0.0
File flags:    0 (Mask 3F)
File OS: 40004 NT Win32
File type: 3.7 Driver
Before you spend additional time and energy further analyzing crashes, you should ensure that your system’s kernel and drivers are the most recent available by using the services of Windows Update and third-party driver support sites.

In addition to using the description to identify the purpose of a driver, you can also use the file and product version numbers to see whether the version installed is the most up-to-date version available. If version information isn’t present (because it might have been paged out of physical memory at the time of the crash), look at the driver image file’s properties in Windows Explorer on the system that crashed.

To use Windows Update to check for a newer version of a driver, open Device Manager and locate the device that the driver is associated with. Right-click on the device, and select Update Driver Software. If Windows Update reports that no newer version of the driver is available for download, it may be worthwhile checking the website of the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) for the system. Finally, since both Windows Update and the OEM may not have the latest drivers, also check the website of the actual driver author for a newer version.
Using Crash Troubleshooting Tools

The crash generated in the preceding section with Notmyfault’s High IRQL Fault (Kernel-Mode) option poses no challenge for the debugger’s automated analysis. Unfortunately, most crashes are not so easy and sometimes are impossible to debug. There are several levels of increasing severity in terms of system performance degradation that might help turn system crashes that cannot be analyzed into ones that can be. If the crashes generated after you configure a level and reboot aren’t revealing the cause, try the next level.

1. If there are one or more drivers you consider likely sources of the crashes—because they were introduced into the system relatively recently, they were recently updated, or the circumstances of the crash implicate them—enable them for verification using Driver Verifier and check all the verification options except for low resources simulation. (See Chapter 8 for more information on Driver Verifier.)

2. If the computer is running a 32-bit version of Windows, enable the same level of verification as in level 1 on all unsigned drivers in the system. (All drivers on a 64-bit system must be signed unless this restriction is disabled manually at boot time by pressing F8 and choosing the advanced boot option Disable Driver Signature Enforcement.)

3. Enable the same verification as in level 1 on all drivers in the system. To maintain reasonable performance, you may want to divide the drivers into groups, enabling Driver Verifier on one group at a time between reboots.

NOTE

If your system becomes unbootable because Driver Verifier detects a driver error and crashes the system, start in safe mode (where verification is disabled), run Driver Verifier, and delete the verification settings.

The following sections demonstrate how Driver Verifier can make impossible-to-debug crashes into ones that you can solve.

Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool
One of the most common sources of crashes on Windows is pool corruption. Pool corruption usually occurs when a driver suffers from a buffer overrun or buffer underrun bug that causes it to overwrite data past either the end or start of a buffer it has allocated from paged or nonpaged pool. The Executive’s pool-tracking structures reside on either side of a pool buffer and separate buffers from each other. These bugs, therefore, cause corruption to the pool tracking structures, to buffers owned by other drivers, or to both. You can often catch the culprit of a pool overrun by using the !pool command to examine the surrounding pool tags. Find the address at which the corruption occurred, and use !pool address_of_corruption . This command will display all the pool allocations that are on the same page as the corruption. Looking in the left column, find the range of the corrupted address and then look at the allocation just previous to it and find its pool tag. This will likely be the culprit in a buffer overrun. You can use the Pooltag.txt file in the Triage folder of the Debugging Tools for Windows installation directory to find the driver that owns the pool tag, or use the Strings utility from Sysinternals.

Pool corruption can also occur when a driver writes to pool it had previously owned but subsequently freed. This is called a use after free bug and is usually caused by a race condition in a driver. These bugs are particularly hard to debug because the driver that corrupts memory no longer has any traceable ties to the memory, such as a neighboring pool tag as in a buffer overrun. Another fairly common cause of pool corruption is direct memory access (DMA). DMA occurs when hardware writes directly to RAM instead of going through a driver; however, the driver is still responsible for coordinating the whole process by allocating the memory that the hardware will write to and programming the hardware registers of the device with the details of the operation. If a driver has a bug that releases the memory it is using for DMA before the hardware writes to it, the memory can be given to another driver or even to a user-mode application, which will certainly not expect to have hardware writing to it.

The crashes caused by pool corruption are virtually impossible to debug because the system crashes when corrupted data is referenced, not when the corruption occurs. However, sometimes you can take steps to at least obtain a clue about what corrupted the memory. The first step is to try to determine the size of the corruption by looking at the corrupted data. If the corruption is a single bit, it was
likely caused by bad RAM or a faulty processor. If the corruption is fairly small, it could be caused by hardware or software, and finding a root cause will be nearly impossible. In the case of large corruptions, you can look for patterns in the corruption, like strings (for example, HTTP packet payloads, file contents of text-based files, and so on).

**NOTE**

To assist in catching pool corruptions, Windows checks the consistency of a buffer’s pool-tracking structures, and those of the buffer’s immediate neighbors, on every pool allocation and free operation. Thus, buffer overruns are likely to be detected shortly after the corruption and identified with a crash that has the BAD_POOL_HEADER (0x19) stop code.

You can generate a pool corruption crash by running Notmyfault and selecting the Buffer Overflow bug. This causes Myfault to allocate a buffer and then overwrite the 48 bytes following the buffer. There can be a significant delay between the time you click the Crash button and when a crash occurs, and you might even have to generate pool usage by exercising applications before a crash occurs, which highlights the distance between a corruption and its effect on system stability. An analysis of the resultant crash almost always reports Ntoskrnl or another driver as being the likely cause, which demonstrates the usefulness of a verbose analysis with its description of the stop code:

```
DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL (c5)
An attempt was made to access a pageable (or completely invalid) address at an interrupt request level (IRQL) that is too high. This is caused by drivers that have corrupted the system pool. Run the driver verifier against any new (or suspect) drivers, and if that doesn't turn up the culprit, then use gflags to enable special pool.
Arguments:
Arg1: 4f4f4f53, memory referenced
Arg2: 00000002, IRQL
Arg3: 00000000, value 0 = read operation, 1 = write operation
Arg4: 829234a7, address which referenced memory
```

The advice in the description is to run Driver Verifier against any new or suspect drivers or to use Gflags to enable special pool. Both accomplish the same thing: to have the system detect a potential corruption when it occurs and crash the system in a way that makes the automated analysis point at the driver causing the corruption.

If Driver Verifier’s special pool option is enabled, verified drivers use special pool, rather than paged or nonpaged pool, for any allocations they make for buffers
slightly less than a page in size. A buffer allocated from special pool is sandwiched between two invalid pages and by default is aligned against the top of the page. The special pool routines also fill the unused portions of the page in which the buffer resides with a random pattern (based on the system’s tick count). See Chapter 10 for more information on special pool.

The system detects any buffer overruns of under a page in size at the time of the overrun because they cause a page fault on the invalid page following the buffer. The signature serves to catch buffer underruns at the time the driver frees a buffer because the integrity of the pattern placed there at the time of allocation will have been compromised.

**EXPERIMENT: ENABLING SPECIAL POOL WITH DRIVER VERIFIER**

To see how the use of special pool causes a crash that the analysis engine easily diagnoses, run the Driver Verifier Manager to configure the special pool option. The Driver Verifier Manager provides the ability to activate most verification features without having to restart the system. The following steps show how to use the Driver Verifier Manager to enable the special pool feature, without requiring a restart:

1. From the Start menu, type `verifier`, and then press Enter to run the Driver Verifier Manager.
2. Select the option Display Information About The Currently Verified Drivers, and then click Next.
3. Click the Change button, select Special Pool, and click OK to enable the special pool option. (The Enabled? option will read No until you select a driver for verification.)
4. Next, click the Add button, type `myfault.sys` in the File Name field, and then click Open. (You do not have to find Myfault.sys in the dialog box; just enter its name.)
5. Click the Next button to progress to where the Driver Verifier Manager displays a list of global counters for any currently verified drivers. Clicking the Next button again shows you a list of counters specific to each verified driver. You should see Myfault.sys in the list.
6. Finally, click the Finish button to complete the wizard.

Drivers that are verified using the No Reboot feature of Driver Verifier are not monitored as thoroughly as drivers that are loaded after a reboot. Whenever possible, enable the driver for verification, and then restart the system. Running the following command from an elevated command prompt causes Driver Verifier to preserve verification settings across reboots:

```
C:\>verifier flags 0x1 driver myfault.sys
```

New verifier settings:

- Special pool: Enabled
- Pool tracking: Disabled
- Force IRQL checking: Disabled
- I/O verification: Disabled
- Deadlock detection: Disabled
- DMA checking: Disabled
- Security checks: Disabled
Force pending I/O requests: Disabled
Low resources simulation: Disabled
IRP Logging: Disabled
Miscellaneous checks: Disabled

Verified drivers:

myfault.sys

You must restart this computer for the changes to take effect.

When you run Notmyfault and cause a buffer overflow, the system will immediately crash and the analysis of the dump reports this:

Probably caused by : myfault.sys ( myfault+61d )

A verbose analysis describes the stop code like this:

DRIVER_PAGE_FAULT_BEYOND_END_OF_ALLOCATION (d6)
N bytes of memory was allocated and more than N bytes are being referenced.
This cannot be protected by try-except.
When possible, the guilty driver's name (Unicode string) is printed on the bugcheck screen and saved in KiBugCheckDriver.
Arguments:
Arg1: beb50000, memory referenced
Arg2: 00000001, value 0 = read operation, 1 = write operation
Arg3: 9201161d, if non-zero, the address which referenced memory.
Arg4: 00000000, (reserved)

Special pool made an elusive bug into one that instantly reveals itself and makes the analysis trivial.

**Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection**

A driver with a bug that causes corruption or misinterpretation of its own data structures can reference memory the driver doesn't own when it interprets corrupted data as a memory pointer value. The target of the pointer can be anything in the virtual address space, including data belonging to other drivers, invalid memory, or the code of other drivers or the kernel. As with buffer overruns, by the time that corruption is detected and the system crashes, it’s usually impossible to identify the driver that caused the corruption. Enabling special pool increases the chance of catching wild-pointer bugs, but it does not catch code corruption.

When you run Notmyfault and select the Code Overwrite option, the Myfault driver corrupts the entry point to the NtReadFile kernel function. One of two things will happen at this point: if your system has 2 GB or less of physical memory, you’ll get a crash for which an analysis points at Myfault.sys. The stop
code description that a verbose analysis displays tells you that Myfault attempted to write to readonly memory:

```
ATTEMPTED_WRITE_TO_READONLY_MEMORY (be)
An attempt was made to write to readonly memory. The guilty driver is on the stack trace (and is typically the current instruction pointer). When possible, the guilty driver's name (Unicode string) is printed on the bugcheck screen and saved in KiBugCheckDriver.
Arguments:
Arg1: 826a023c, Virtual address for the attempted write.
Arg2: 026a0121, PTE contents.
Arg3: 0f83b4c, (reserved)
Arg4: 0000000b, (reserved)
```

However, if you have more than 2 GB of memory, you'll get a different type of crash because the attempt to corrupt the memory isn't caught. Because NtReadFile is a commonly executed system service that is used by Windows, the system will almost immediately crash as a thread attempts to execute the corrupted code and generates an illegal instruction fault. The analysis of crashes generated with this bug is always wrong, but it might vary, with Win32k.sys and Ntoskrnl.exe commonly being the analyzer's best guess as to what's responsible. The bugcheck description for these crashes is:

```
KERNEL_MODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED (8e)
This is a very common bugcheck. Usually the exception address pinpoints the driver/function that caused the problem. Always note this address as well as the link date of the driver/image that contains this address. Some common problems are exception code 0x80000003. This means a hard coded breakpoint or assertion was hit, but this system was booted NODEBUG. This is not supposed to happen as developers should never have hardcoded breakpoints in retail code, but ...
If this happens, make sure a debugger gets connected, and the system is booted DEBUG. This will let us see why this breakpoint is happening.
Arguments:
Arg1: c0000005, The exception code that was not handled
Arg2: 826a0240, The address that the exception occurred at
Arg3: 978eb9c4, Trap Frame
Arg4: 00000000
```

The reason for the different behaviors on different configurations relates to a mechanism called system code write protection. If system code write protection is enabled, the memory manager maps Ntoskrnl.exe, the HAL, and boot drivers using standard physical pages (4 KB on x86 and x64, and 8 KB on IA64). Because the granularity of protection in an image is the standard page size, the memory manager can write-protect code pages so that an attempt to modify them generates an access fault (as seen in the first crash). However, when system code write protection is disabled on systems with more than 2 GB of RAM, the memory
manager uses large pages (4 MB on x86, and 16 MB on IA64 and x64) to map Ntoskrnl.exe and the HAL.

If system code write protection is off and crash analysis reports unlikely causes for a crash or you suspect code corruption, you should enable it. Verifying at least one driver with Driver Verifier is the easiest way to enable it. You can also enable it manually by adding a registry value under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management. You need to specify the amount of RAM at which the memory manager uses large pages instead of standard pages to map Ntoskrnl.exe as an effectively infinite value. You do this by creating a DWORD value called LargePageMinimum and setting it to 0xFFFFFFFF. You must reboot for the changes to take effect.
Advanced Crash Dump Analysis

The preceding section leverages Driver Verifier to create crashes that the debugger’s automated analysis engine can resolve. You might still encounter cases where you cannot get a system to produce easily analyzable crashes, and, if so, you will need to execute manual analysis to try to determine what the problem is. Here are some examples of basic commands that can provide clues during crash analysis. The Debugging Tools for Windows help file provides complete documentation on these and other commands as well as examples of how to use them during crash analysis:

- Use the !cpuinfo command to display a list of processors the system is configured to use.
- Use the processor ID with the k command to display the stack trace of each processor in the system—for example, 1k. Be sure you recognize each of the modules listed in the stack trace and that you have the most recent versions.
- Use the !thread command to display information about the current thread on each processor. The ~s command can be used with the processor ID to change the current processor (such as ~1s). Look for any pending I/O request packets (explained in the next section).
- Use the .time command to display information about the system time, including when the system crashed and for how long it had been running. A short uptime value can indicate frequent problems.
- Use the lm command with the k t option (the t flag specifies to display time stamp information—that is, when the file was compiled, not what appears on the file system, which might differ) to list the loaded kernel-mode drivers. Be sure you understand the purpose of any third-party drivers and that you have the most recent versions.
- Use the !vm command to see whether the system has exhausted virtual memory, paged pool, or nonpaged pool. If virtual memory is exhausted, the committed pages will be close to the commit limit, so try to identify a potential memory leak by examining the list of processes to see which one reports high commit usage. If nonpaged pool or paged pool is exhausted (that is, the usage is
close to the maximum), see the EXPERIMENT: Troubleshooting a Pool Leak experiment in Chapter 10.

- Use the !process 0 0 debugger command to look at the processes running, and be sure that you understand the purpose of each one. Try disabling or uninstalling unnecessary applications and services.

There are other debugging commands that can prove useful, but more advanced knowledge is required to apply them. The !irp command is one of them. The next section shows the use of this command to identify a suspect driver.

**Stack Trashes**

Stack overruns or stack trashing typically results from a buffer overrun or underrun or when a driver passes a buffer address located on the stack to a lower driver on the device stack, which then performs the work asynchronously.

In the case of a stack overrun or underrun, instead of residing in pool, as you saw with Notmyfault’s buffer overrun bug, the target buffer is on the stack of the thread that executes the bug. This type of bug is another one that’s difficult to debug because the stack is the foundation for any crash dump analysis.

In the case of passing buffers on the stack to lower drivers, if the lower driver returns to the caller immediately because it used a completion routine to perform the work, instead of returning synchronously, when the completion routine is called, it will use the stack address that was passed previously, which could now correspond to a different state on the caller’s stack and result in corruption.

When you run Notmyfault and select Stack Trash, the Myfault driver overruns a buffer it allocates on the kernel stack of the thread that executes it. When Myfault tries to return control to the Ntoskrnl function that was invoked, it reads the return address, which is the address at which it should continue executing, from the stack. The address was corrupted by the stack-buffer overrun, so the thread continues execution at some different address in memory—an address that might not even contain code. An illegal exception and crash occur when the thread executes an illegal CPU instruction or it references invalid memory.

The driver that the crash dump analysis of a stack overrun points the blame at will vary from crash to crash, but the stop code will almost always be
KERNEL_MODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED (0x8E) on a 32-bit system and KMODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED (0x1E) on a 64-bit one. If you execute a verbose analysis, the stack trace looks like this:

STACK_TEXT:
9569b6b4 82c108c 0000008e c0000005 00000000 nt!KeBugCheckEx+0x1e
9569badc 8284add6 9569ba8 00000000 9569bb4c nt!KiDispatchException+0x1ac
9569bb44 8284ad8a 00000000 00000000 badb0d00 nt!CommonDispatchException+0x4a
9569bbfc 82843593 853422b0 86b99278 86b99278 nt!Kei386EoiHelper+0x192
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 nt!IoCallDriver+0x63

Notice how the call to IofCallDriver leads immediately to Kei386EoiHelper and into an exception, instead of a driver’s IRP dispatch routine. This is consistent with the stack having been corrupted and the IRP dispatch routine causing an exception when attempting to return to its caller by referencing a corrupted return address. Unfortunately, mechanisms like special pool and system code write protection can’t catch this type of bug. Instead, you must take some manual analysis steps to determine indirectly which driver was operating at the time of the corruption. One way is to examine the IRPs that are in progress for the thread that was executing at the time of the stack trash. When a thread issues an I/O request, the I/O manager stores a pointer to the outstanding IRP on the IRP list of the ETHREAD structure for the thread. The !thread debugger command dumps the IRP list of the target thread. (If you don’t specify a thread object address, !thread dumps the processor’s current thread.) Then you can look at the IRP with the !irp command:

0: kd> !thread
THREAD 8527fa58 Cid 0d0c.0d10 Teb: 7ffdf000 Win32Thread: fe4ec4f8 RUNNING on processor 0
IRP List:
  86b99278: (0006,0094) Flags: 00060000 Mdl: 00000000
Not impersonating
...

0: kd> !irp 86b99278
Irp is active with 1 stacks 1 is current (= 0x86b992e8)
  No Mdl: No System Buffer: Thread 8527fa58: Irp stack trace.
  cmd flg cl Device File Completion-Context
>[ e, 0] 5 0 853422b0 85e3aed8 00000000-00000000 \Driver\MYFAULT
  Args: 00000000 00000000 83360010 00000000

The output shows that the IRP’s current and only stack location (designated with the “>” prefix) is owned by the Myfault driver. If this were a real crash, the next steps would be to ensure that the driver version installed is the most recent available, install the new version if it isn’t, and if it is, to enable Driver Verifier on
the driver (with all settings except low memory simulation).

**NOTE**

Most newer drivers built using the WDK are compiled by default to use the /GS (Buffer Security Check) compiler flag. When the Buffer Security Check option is enabled, the compiler reserves space before the return address on the stack, which, when the function executes, is filled with a security cookie. On function exit, the security cookie is verified. A mismatch indicates that a stack overwrite may have occurred, in which case, the compiler-generated code will call KeBugCheckEx, passing the DRIVER_OVERRAN_STACK_BUFFER (0xF7) stop code.

Manually analyzing the stack is often the most powerful technique when dealing with crashes such as these. Typically, this involves dumping the current stack pointer register (for example, esp and rsp on x86 and x64 processors, respectively). However, because the code responsible for crashing the system itself might modify the stack in ways that make analysis difficult, the processor responsible for crashing the system provides a backing store for the current data in the stack, called KiPreBugcheckStackSaveArea, which contains a copy of the stack before any code in KeBugCheckEx executes. By using the dps (dump pointer with symbols) command in the debugger, you can dump this area (instead of the CPU’s stack pointer register) and resolve symbols in an attempt to discover any potential stack traces. In this crash, here’s what dumping the stack area eventually revealed on a 32-bit system:

```
0: kd> dps KiPreBugcheckStackSaveArea KiPreBugcheckStackSaveArea+3000
81d7dd20  881fcc44
81d7dd24  98fcf406 myfault+0x406
81d7dd28  badb0d00
```

Although this data was located among many other different functions, it is of special interest because it mentions a function in the Myfault driver, which as we’ve seen was currently executing an IRP, that doesn’t show on the stack. For more information on manual stack analysis, see the Debugging Tools for Windows help file and the additional resources referenced later in this chapter.

**Hung or Unresponsive Systems**

If a system becomes unresponsive (that is, you are receiving no response to keyboard or mouse input), the mouse freezes, or you can move the mouse but the system doesn’t respond to clicks, the system is said to have hung. A number of
things can cause the system to hang:

- A device driver does not return from its interrupt service (ISR) routine or deferred procedure call (DPC) routine
- A high priority real-time thread preempts the windowing system driver’s input threads
- A deadlock (when two threads or processors hold resources each other wants and neither will yield what they have) occurs in kernel mode

You can check for deadlocks by using the Driver Verifier option called deadlock detection. Deadlock detection monitors the use of spinlocks, mutexes, and fast mutexes, looking for patterns that could result in a deadlock. (For more information on these and other synchronization primitives, see Chapter 3 in Part 1.) If one is found, Driver Verifier crashes the system with an indication of which driver causes the deadlock. The simplest form of deadlock occurs when two threads hold resources each other thread wants and neither will yield what they have or give up waiting for the one they want. The first step to troubleshooting hung systems is therefore to enable deadlock detection on suspect drivers, then unsigned drivers, and then all drivers, until you get a crash that pinpoints the driver causing the deadlock.

There are two ways to approach a hanging system so that you can apply the manual crash troubleshooting techniques described in this chapter to determine what driver or component is causing the hang: the first is to crash the hung system and hope that you get a dump that you can analyze, and the second is to break into the system with a kernel debugger and analyze the system’s activity. Both approaches require prior setup and a reboot. You use the same exploration of system state with both approaches to try to determine the cause of the hang.

To manually crash a hung system, you must first add the DWORD registry value HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\i8042prt\Parameters\CrashOnCtrlSc and set it to 1. After rebooting, the i8042 port driver, which is the port driver for PS/2 keyboard input, monitors keystrokes in its ISR (discussed further in Chapter 3 in Part 1) looking for two presses of the Scroll Lock key while the right Control key is depressed. When the driver sees that sequence, it calls KeBugCheckEx with the MANUALLY_INITIATED_CRASH (0xE2) stop code that indicates a
manually initiated crash. When the system reboots, open the crash dump file and apply the techniques mentioned earlier to try to determine why the system was hung (for example, determining what thread was running when the system hung, what the kernel stack indicates was happening, and so on). Note that this works for most hung system scenarios, but it won’t work if the i8042 port driver’s ISR doesn’t execute. (The i8042 port driver’s ISR won’t execute if all processors are hung as a result of their IRQL being higher than the ISR’s IRQL, or if corruption of system data structures extends to interrupt-related code or data.)

NOTE

Manually crashing a hung system by using the support provided in the i8042 port driver does not work with USB keyboards. It works with PS/2 keyboards only. See http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/hardware/ff545499.aspx for information about enabling USB keyboard support.

You can also trigger a crash if your hardware has a built-in “crash” button. (Some high-end servers have these embedded on their motherboards or exposed via remote management interfaces.) In this case, the crash is initiated by signaling the nonmaskable interrupt (NMI) pin of the system’s motherboard. To enable this, set the registry DWORD value HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\CrashControl\NMICrashDump to 1. Then, when you press the dump switch, an NMI is delivered to the system and the kernel's NMI interrupt handler calls KeBugCheckEx. This works in more cases than the i8042 port driver mechanism because the NMI IRQL is always higher than that of the i8042 port driver interrupt. See http://support.microsoft.com/kb/927069 for more information.

If you are unable to manually generate a crash dump, you can attempt to break into the hung system by first making the system boot into debugging mode. You do this in one of two ways. You can press the F8 key during the boot and select Debugging Mode, or you can create a debugging-mode boot option in the BCD by copying an existing boot entry and adding the debug option. When using the F8 approach, the system will use the default connection (serial port COM1 and 115200 baud), but you can use the F10 key to display the Edit Boot Options screen to edit debug-related boot options. With the debug option enabled, you must also configure the connection mechanism to be used between the host system
running the kernel debugger and the target system booting in debugging mode and then configure the transport parameters appropriately for the connection type. The three connection types are a null modem cable using a serial port, an IEEE 1394 (FireWire) cable using 1394 ports on each system, or a USB 2.0 host-to-host dongle using USB ports on each system. For details on configuring the host and target system for kernel debugging, see the Debugging Tools for Windows help file and the EXPERIMENT: Attaching a Kernel Debugger experiment later in the chapter.

When booting in debugging mode, the system loads the kernel debugger at boot time and makes it ready for a connection from a kernel debugger running on a different computer connected through a serial cable, IEEE 1394 cable, or USB 2.0 host-to-host dongle. Note that the kernel debugger’s presence does not affect performance. When the system hangs, run the WinDbg or Kd debugger on the connected system, establish a kernel debugging connection, and break into the hung system. This approach will not work if interrupts are disabled or the kernel debugger has become corrupted.

NOTE

Booting a system in debugging mode does not affect performance if it’s not connected to another system. Also, if a system booted in debugging mode is configured to automatically reboot after a crash, it will not wait for a connection from another system if a debugger isn’t already connected.

Instead of leaving the system in its halted state while you perform analysis, you can also use the debugger .dump command to create a crash dump file on the host debugger machine. Then you can reboot the hung system and analyze the crash dump offline (or submit it to Microsoft). Note that this can take a long time if you are connected using a serial null modem cable or USB 2.0 connection (versus a higher speed 1394 connection), so you might want to just capture a minidump using the .dump /m command. Alternatively, if the target machine is capable of writing a crash dump, you can force it to do so by issuing the .crash command from the debugger. This will cause the target machine to create a dump on its local hard drive that you can examine after the system reboots.

EXPERIMENT: DUMPING HYPER-V GUESTS USING LIVEKD

The LiveKd tool, in addition to allowing the use of the .dump command on a live system, also permits a
crash dump of a running Hyper-V guest to be created. To query the list of running guests on a Hyper-V host, the –hvl option can be specified. LiveKd will display both the name of the guest virtual machine and its partition GUID:

C:\Users\Administrator>livekd -hvl

LiveKd v5.2 - Execute kd/windbg on a live system
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com
Copyright (C) 2000-2012 Mark Russinovich and Ken Johnson

Partition GUID                         Name
7EB669F2-EB6E-405D-94EA-21CB2ABD0A52   Windows Server 2008
D57D7601-D154-473B-847D-C3C77413AD0B   Windows Server 2003

Once the name or the partition GUID of the target Hyper-V guest has been obtained, it can be passed to LiveKd using the –hv option, along with the –o switch, specifying where to write the crash dump file. LiveKd will write a complete dump, which requires enough free disk space on the destination volume equal to the amount of memory assigned to the virtual machine. Because the Hyper-V guest is still running, LiveKd might run into situations in which data structures are in the middle of being changed by the system and are inconsistent. To prevent such an event from occurring, LiveKd is able to pause the Hyper-V guest before writing the crash dump by specifying the –p option.

LiveKd takes the additional step of writing a comment to the header of the crash dump file, specifying that a live system view was taken—notifying the user performing analysis of any possible inconsistencies. After LiveKd finishes writing the crash dump file, the file can then be analyzed using any of the kernel debuggers and techniques described earlier in the chapter. If the Hyper-V guest was previously in the running state, LiveKd will automatically resume the target system.

You can cause a hang by running Notmyfault and selecting the Hang With DPC option. This causes the Myfault driver to queue a DPC on each processor of the system that executes an infinite loop. Because the IRQL of the processor while executing DPC functions is DPC/dispatch level, the keyboard ISR will respond to the special keyboard crashing sequence.

Once you’ve broken into a hung system or loaded a manually generated dump from
a hung system into a debugger, you should execute the `!analyze` command with the 
`–hang` option. This causes the debugger to examine the locks on the system and try
to determine whether there’s a deadlock and, if so, what driver or drivers are
involved. However, for a hang like the one that Notmyfault’s Hang With DPC
option generates, the `!analyze` analysis command will report nothing useful.

If the `!analyze` command doesn’t pinpoint the problem, execute `!thread` and
`!process` in each of the dump’s CPU contexts to see what each processor is doing.
(Switch CPU contexts with the `~s` command—for example, use `~1s` to switch to
processor 1’s context.) If a thread has hung the system by executing in an infinite
loop at an IRQL of DPC/dispatch level or higher, you’ll see the driver module in
which it has become stuck in the stack trace of the `!thread` command. The stack
trace of the crash dump you get when you crash a system experiencing the
Notmyfault hang bug looks like this:

```
STACK_TEXT:
8078ae30 8cb49160 000000e2 00000000 nt!KeBugCheckEx+0x1e
8078ae60 8cb49768 00527658 010001c6 00000000 i8042prt!I8xProcessCrashDump+0x251
8078aeac 8287c7ad 851c8780 855275a0 8078aed8
i8042prt!I8042KeyboardInterruptService+0x2ce
8078aeac 91d924ca 851c8780 855275a0 8078aed8 nt!KiInterruptDispatch+0x6d
WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frame may be wrong.
8078afa4 828a5218 82966d20 86659780 00000000 myfault+0x4ca
...
```

The top few lines of the stack trace reference the routines that execute when you
type the i8042 port driver’s crash key sequence. The presence of the Myfault driver
indicates that it might be responsible for the hang. Another command that might be
revealing is `!locks`, which dumps the status of all executive resource locks. By
default, the command lists only resources that are under contention, which means
that they are both owned and have at least one thread waiting to acquire them.
Examine the thread stacks of the owners with the `!thread` command to see what
driver they might be executing in. Sometimes you will find that the owner of one
of the locks is waiting for an IRP to complete (a list of IRPs related to a thread is
displayed in the `!thread` output). In these cases it is very hard to tell why an IRP is
not making forward progress. (IRPs are usually queued to privately managed driver
queues before they are completed). One thing you can do is examine the IRP with
the `!irp` command and find the driver that pended the IRP (it will have the word
“pending” displayed in its stack location from the `!irp` output). Once you have the
driver name, you can use the `!stacks` command to look for other threads that the
driver might be running on, which often provides clues about what the lock-owning driver is doing. Much of the time you will find the driver is deadlocked or waiting on some other resource that is blocked waiting for the driver.

**When There Is No Crash Dump**

In this section, we'll address how to troubleshoot systems that for some reason are not recording a crash dump. One reason why a crash dump might not be recorded is if no paging file is configured to hold the dump. This can easily be remedied by creating a paging file of the required size. A second reason why there might not be a crash dump recorded is because the kernel code and data structures needed to write the crash dump have been corrupted at the time of the crash. As described earlier, this data is captured when the system boots, and if the integrity verification check made at the time of the crash does not match, the system does not even attempt to save the crash dump (so as not to risk corrupting data on the disk). So in this case, you need to catch the system as it crashes and then try to determine the reason for the crash.

Another reason occurs when the disk subsystem for the system disk is not able to process disk write requests (a condition that might have triggered the system failure itself). One such condition would be a hardware failure in the disk controller or maybe a cabling issue near the hard disk.

Yet another possibility occurs when the system has drivers that have registered callbacks that are invoked before the crash dump is written. When the driver callbacks are called, they might incorrectly access data structures located in paged memory (for example), which will lead to a second crash. In the case of a crash inside of a secondary dump callback, the system should still have a valid crash dump file but any secondary crash dump data may be missing or incomplete.

One simple option is to turn off the Automatically Restart option in the Startup And Recovery settings so that if the system crashes, you can examine the blue screen on the console. However, only the most straightforward crashes can be solved from just the blue-screen text.

To perform more in-depth analysis, you need to use the kernel debugger to look at the system at the time of the crash. This can be done by booting the system in debugging mode, which is described in the previous section. When a system is
booted in debugging mode (with a debugger attached) and crashes, instead of painting the blue screen and attempting to record the dump, it will break into the host kernel debugger. In this way, you can see the reason for the crash and perhaps perform some basic analysis using the kernel debugger commands described earlier. As mentioned in the previous section, you can use the .dump command in the debugger to save a copy of the crashed system’s memory space for later debugging, thus allowing you to reboot the crashed system and debug the problem offline.

**EXPERIMENT: ATTACHING A KERNEL DEBUGGER**

Connecting a kernel debugger to a live, running system requires two computers—a target and a host. The target, the system being debugged, must be booted in debugging mode by pressing F8 during the boot process and selecting Debugging Mode or by modifying the boot configuration database from within an elevated command prompt using the BCDEdit tool:

```
bcdedit /debug on
```

The system will use the default settings of serial port COM1 and baud rate 115200 if no other settings are specified. On the host system—the computer running the debugger—the symbol path option needs to be set so that the debugger can locate the required symbol files. One option for configuring the symbol path is to use the systemwide environment variable NTSYMBOL_PATH. Setting the systemwide variable allows for other applications, such as Process Explorer and Process Monitor, to take advantage of the symbol path without requiring additional configuration. The symbol path can be set via an elevated command prompt by using the following command:

```
setx NTSYMBOL_PATH srv*c:\symbols*http://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols /m
```

The /m switch specifies that the variable should be set system wide. Without it, the default option is to set it only for the current user. One final step that’s required is to configure the transport layer. If two physical computers are being used, this is done by connecting the serial ports of the computers to each other by using a null modem cable.

In the following example, a Hyper-V guest has been selected as the target. Hyper-V (as is the case with other virtual-machine technologies) supports the option of configuring a virtual serial port to communicate with a physical computer through a named pipe. If you are using multiple named pipes, each pipe name should be unique to avoid a conflict.
Before restarting the target system, the debugger on the host needs to be configured to specify the named pipe that should be used as a transport. Both the resets=0 and reconnect options specified in the following command are required when connecting to Hyper-V guests. (For other virtual-machine technologies, refer to the Debugging Tools for Windows help file.) The command shown here will start a debugging session on a virtual machine, which is running on the same physical computer as the debugger:

```
windbg -k com:pipe,port=\\.\pipe\debugger,resets=0,reconnect
```

The WinDbg command window should appear with a prompt that the debugger is waiting to connect:

```
Microsoft (R) Windows Debugger Version 6.12.0002.633 AMD64
Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
Waiting for pipe \\.\pipe\debugger
Waiting to reconnect...
```

At this point, the target system should be restarted. After a brief period, the two systems should connect via the named pipe. The following output confirms that the host is now connected to the target system through the kernel debugger:

```
Connected to Windows 7 7601 x86 compatible target at
  (Mon Mar 12 19:34:01.295 2012 (UTC - 7:00)), ptr64 FALSE
Kernel Debugger connection established.
Symbol search path is: srv*c:\symbols*http://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols
Executable search path is:
Windows 7
Kernel Version 7601 (Service Pack 1) MP (1 procs) Free x86 compatible
Built by: 7601.17514.x86fre.win7sp1_rtm.101119-1850
Machine Name:
Kernel base = 0x82813000 PsLoadedModuleList = 0x8295d850
System Uptime: not available
```

To verify that the system will break into the debugger when a crash occurs, the /bugcheck option of Notmyfault can be used to crash the system. As is the case with other Notmyfault functions, a control code is sent to the Myfault.sys driver. The control code specifies that the KeBugCheckEx routine should be called, passing it a reference to the stop code. Here is an example of using a user-defined stop code:
When a debugger is connected to the system and a crash occurs, control is given to the debugger before painting the blue screen and any bugcheck callbacks have been called. This allows for further analysis to be performed or for breakpoints to be set:

*** Fatal System Error: 0xdeaddead
(0x00000000,0x00000000,0x00000000,0x00000000)

Break instruction exception - code 80000003 (first chance)

A fatal system error has occurred.
Debugger entered on first try; Bugcheck callbacks have not been invoked.

A fatal system error has occurred.

The operating system code and data structures that handle processor exceptions can become corrupted such that a series of recursive faults occur. One example of this would be if the operating system trap handler got corrupted and caused a page fault. This would invoke the page fault handler, which would fault again, and so on. If such a situation occurred, the system would be hopelessly stuck. To prevent such a situation from occurring, CPUs have a built-in recursive fault protection mechanism, which sets a hard limit on the depth of a recursive fault. On most x86 processors, a fault can nest to two levels deep. When the third recursive fault occurs, the processor resets itself and the machine reboots. This is called a triple fault. This can happen when there’s a faulty hardware component as well. Even a kernel debugger won’t be invoked in a triple fault situation. However, sometimes the mere fact that the kernel debugger doesn’t activate can confirm that there’s a problem with newly added hardware or drivers.

NOTE

You can use the kernel debugger to trigger a triple fault on a machine by setting a breakpoint on the kernel debugger dispatch routine KiDispatchException. This happens because the exception dispatcher now causes a breakpoint exception, which invokes the exception dispatcher, and so on.
Analysis of Common Stop Codes

The following sections provide a walkthrough of common stop codes reported to Microsoft’s Online Crash Analysis service. For each stop code presented, the analysis begins with the verbose output of the analysis engine’s !analyze –v command.

The reasons for each type of crash may vary, as well the commands and techniques used to analyze them. For more information on analyzing common stop codes, see the Debugging Tools for Windows help file and the additional resources referenced later in this chapter.

0xD1 - DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL

The DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL (0xD1) stop code is the result of a device driver attempting to access a pageable or invalid address at an interrupt request level that is too high. This stop code is usually the result of device drivers using improper addresses.

```
DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL (d1)
An attempt was made to access a pageable (or completely invalid) address at an interrupt request level (IRQL) that is too high. This is usually caused by drivers using improper addresses.
If kernel debugger is available get stack backtrace.
Arguments:
Arg1: a0a91660, memory referenced
Arg2: 00000002, IRQL
Arg3: 00000000, value 0 = read operation, 1 = write operation
Arg4: 85701579, address which referenced memory
```

In analyzing a stop DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL (0xD1), viewing the stack trace of the thread that was executing at the time of the crash will reveal the device driver that was referencing pageable or invalid memory:

```
STACK_TEXT:
8b94bb3c 85701579 badb0d00 84f40600 a0a4f660 nt!KiTrap0E+0x2cf
WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.
8b94bb88 85701849 86ffe5d8 8b94bbfc 857018ac myfault+0x579
8b94bbcc 857018ac 850d6890 00000001 00000000 myfault+0x849
8b94bbfc 8283e593 86efa998 86ffe5d8 86ffe5d8 myfault+0x8ac
8b94bc14 82a3299f 850d6890 86ffe5d8 86ffe648 nt!IoCallDriver+0x63
8b94bc34 82a35b71 86efa998 850d6890 00000000 nt!IopSynchronousServiceTail+0x1f8
8b94bcd0 82a3c49f 86efa998 850d6890 00000000 nt!IopXxxControlFile+0x6aa
8b94bd04 828451ea 00000000 00000000 00000000 nt!NtDeviceIoControlFile+0x2a
8b94bd04 776f70b4 00000000 00000000 00000000 nt!KlFastCallEntry+0x12a
0012f994 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 0x776f70b4
```
The debugger’s analysis engine is able to locate and display the trap frame that was created when the exception that caused the crash occurred. The trap frame contains the kernel thread’s machine state, which includes the register values of the CPU that the thread was executing on. The instruction pointer register (eip on an x86 processor and rip on an x64) contains the address of the instruction that, when executed, generated the trap. The lower line of the output from the .trap command in the debugger lists the address of the instruction that caused the crash, its binary code, assembly language mnemonic, and assembly language details:

```
TRAP_FRAME:  8b94bb3c -- (.trap 0xfffffffff8b94bb3c)
  ErrCode = 00000000
  eax=a0a91660 ebx=86ffe5f0 ecx=00200073 edx=84f40600 esi=a0a4f660 edi=00000000
  eip=85701579 esp=8b94bbb0 ebp=8b94bbb8 iopl=0    nv up ei ng nz na pe nc
  cs=0008  ss=0010  ds=0023  es=0023  fs=0030  gs=0000  efl=00010286
myfault+0x579:
  85701579 8b08            mov     ecx,dword ptr [eax]  ds:0023:
a0a91660
```

The first bugcheck parameter of a stop DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL (0xD1) points to the memory address that was being referenced by the device driver. If the debugger is unable to display an address (because it is invalid or not present in the dump file), a series of question marks is displayed. In the trap frame just shown, the debugger has been unable to resolve the address of the memory referenced by the device driver.

Viewing the output of the !pte command for the address that was referenced confirms that the valid bit for the page table entry is not set, which indicates that the address does not map to a page in physical memory:

```
0: kd> !pte a0a91660

  VA a0a91660
    PDE at C0602828
       contains 0000000010BE6863
       pfn 10be6  ---DA--KWEV
    PTE at C0505488
       contains 00007A1800000000
          not valid
    PageFile:  0
    Offset: 7a18
    Protect: 0
```

0x8E

**KERNEL_MODE_EXCEPTION_NOTHandled**

The KERNEL_MODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED (0x8E) stop message is caused by a kernel-mode thread generating an exception that was not handled. The first bugcheck parameter identifies the exception code for which a handler was not found. Common exception codes are STATUS_BREAKPOINT (0x80000003) and
STATUS_ACCESS_VIOLATION (0xC0000005).

KERNEL_MODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED (8e)
This is a very common bugcheck. Usually the exception address pinpoints the driver/function that caused the problem. Always note this address as well as the link date of the driver/image that contains this address. Some common problems are exception code 0x80000003. This means a hardcoded breakpoint or assertion was hit, but this system was booted NODBUG. This is not supposed to happen as developers should never have hardcoded breakpoints in retail code, but...
If this happens, make sure a debugger gets connected, and the system is booted DEBUG. This will let us see why this breakpoint is happening.
Arguments:
Arg1: 80000003, The exception code that was not handled
Arg2: 92c70a78, The address that the exception occurred at
Arg3: 9444fb4c, Trap Frame
Arg4: 00000000

Viewing the stack trace of the crashed thread can give an indication of the driver or function that caused the problem. If there’s nothing that looks suspicious, viewing the address where the exception occurred should provide more details. The stack trace from a crashed system looks like this:

STACK_TEXT:
9444fb64 82ba08c 0000000e 80000003 92c70a78 nt!KeBugCheckEx+0x1e
9444fadc 82843dd6 9444fa8 00000000 9444fb4c nt!KiDispatchException+0x1ac
9444fb44 82844678 9444fb4c 92c70a79 badb0d00 nt!CommonDispatchException+0x4a
9444fb44 92c70a79 9444fb4c 92c70a79 badb0d00 nt!KiTrap03+0x8
WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.
9444fbc4 92c70b1c 8730f980 00000001 00000000 myfault+0xa79
9444fbcf 8283c593 87314a08 87279950 87279950 myfault+0xb1c
9444fc14 82a3099f 8730f980 87279950 872799c0 nt!IofCallDriver+0x63
9444fc34 82a33b71 87314a08 8730f980 00000000 nt!IopSynchronousServiceTail+0x1f8
9444fcd0 82a7a3f4 87314a08 87279950 00000000 nt!IopXxxControlFile+0x6a
9444fd94 828431ea 000000c4 00000000 00000000 nt!NtDeviceIoControlFile+0x2a
9444fd94 772c70b4 00000000 00000000 00000000 nt!KiFastCallEntry+0x12a
0012f2ac 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 0x772c70b4

The second bugcheck parameter contains the location in memory that the exception occurred at. In the case of a STATUS_BREAKPOINT exception, unassembling the address will confirm the presence of a breakpoint instruction. The processor instruction INT 3 is called the trap to debugger instruction. An INT 3 instruction, when executed, causes the system to call the kernel’s debugger exception handler. If a debugger is attached to the computer, the system will break in.

0: kd> u 92c70a78
myfault+0xa78:
92c70a78 cc int 3
...

Breakpoints shouldn’t usually appear in retail versions of device drivers. Using the
lm command, it's sometimes possible to determine which environment a device driver was targeted for. When compiling a driver for release (and unless overridden by the developer), a flag is set indicating the release type. When viewing the File flags property, the presence of the word Debug indicates that the driver was built using a checked (or debug) environment:

```
0: kd> lm kv m myfault
start   end       module name
92c70000 92c71880   myfault   (no symbols)
Loaded symbol image file: myfault.sys
Image path: \\??\C:\Windows\system32\drivers\myfault.sys
Image name: myfault.sys
Timestamp: Sat Apr 07 09:34:40 2012 (4F806CA0)
CheckSum: 00004227
ImageSize: 00001880
FileVersion: 4.0.0.0
ProductVersion: 4.0.0.0
Fileflags: 1 (Mask 3F) Debug
File OS: 40004 NT Win32
```

A breakpoint in a debug version of a driver could also indicate the failure of an ASSERT macro. If a kernel debugger is attached to the system, a message would be displayed followed by a prompt asking the user what to do about the assertion failure.

**0x7F - UNEXPECTED_KERNEL_MODE_TRAP**

An UNEXPECTED_KERNEL_MODE_TRAP (0x7F) stop code indicates that the CPU generated a trap that the Windows kernel failed to handle. The trap could be the result of a bound trap (which the kernel is not permitted to catch) or a double fault (a fault that occurs while the kernel is processing an earlier fault). The first bugcheck parameter defines the type of trap.

```
UNEXPECTED_KERNEL_MODE_TRAP (7F)
This means a trap occurred in kernel mode, and it's a trap of a kind that the kernel isn't allowed to have/catch (bound trap) or that is always instant death (double fault). The first number in the bugcheck params is the number of the trap (8 = double fault, etc) Consult an Intel x86 family manual to learn more about what these traps are. Here is a portion of those codes:
If kv shows a taskGate
    use .tss on the part before the colon, then kv.
Else if kv shows a trapframe
    use .trap on that value
Else
    .trap on the appropriate frame will show where the trap was taken (on x86, this will be the ebp that goes with the procedure KiTrap)
Endif
kb will then show the corrected stack.
```
Most traps in this category are the result of faulty or failed hardware. If you recently added new hardware to the computer, try removing it to see whether the problem no longer occurs. Remove any existing hardware that may have failed and have it replaced. It’s also recommended to run any manufacturer-supplied hardware-diagnostic tools to determine which components may have failed.

There are, however, certain traps that are the result of software errors. Viewing the trap frame that was generated or the task gate (depending on the type of trap) displays the instruction that generated the trap:

```
TSS: 00000028 -- (.tss 0x28)
eax=8336001c ebx=86d57388 ecx=83360044 edx=00000000 esi=86d57388 edi=00000000
eip=96890918 esp=92985000
ebp=92987bc4 iopl=0         nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=0008  ss=0010  ds=0023  es=0023  fs=0030  gs=0000             efl=00010246
myfault+0x918:
96890918 e8f9ffffff      call    myfault+0x916 (96890916)
```

The type of trap described earlier, an EXCEPTION_DOUBLE_FAULT, is usually the result of one of two common causes—a kernel stack overflow or faulty hardware. A kernel stack overflow occurs when a kernel thread’s guard page is hit, as a result of having exhausted all of the current thread’s stack allocation. The kernel attempts to push a trap frame onto the stack—for which no more space exists—causing a double fault.

Using the !thread command to verify the stack limits of the thread that was executing confirms whether the double fault was caused by a kernel stack overflow:

```
0: kd> !thread
THREAD 850e3918 Cid 0fb8.0fbc Teb: 7ffde000 Win32Thread: fe4f0dd8 RUNNING on
processor 0
IRP List:
  86d57370: (0006,0094) Flags: 00060000 Mdl: 00000000
Not impersonating
DeviceMap                  8fa3b8e8
Owning Process            85100670       Image:         NotMyfault.exe
Attached Process          N/A            Image:         N/A
Wait Start TickCount      21664          Ticks: 0
Context Switch Count      461
UserTime                  00:00:00.000
KernelTime                00:00:00.046
Win32 Start Address 0x00fe27ff
Stack Init 92987fd0 Current 92987af8 Base 92988000 Limit 92985000 Call 0
```
The two values of interest are the stack base and the stack limit. Comparing the value of the stack limit with the value stored in the stack pointer register (esp in this case) of the task state segment shown earlier confirms that the lower limit of the stack has been reached. (Both locations contain the same value.)

To understand what component has used all of the kernel thread’s stack allocation requires the two values obtained earlier—the stack base and the stack limit. Using the dps command with both values displays the thread’s stack, using symbols to resolve any function names:

```
0: kd> dps 92985000 92988000
92985000 9689091d myfault+0x91d
92985004 9689091d myfault+0x91d
92985008 9689091d myfault+0x91d
```

In this output, a repeating address is shown for the Myfault.sys driver. This is consistent with a device driver that is recursively calling into itself. Each call to a function pushes the return address onto the stack—growing the stack and contributing to the thread’s overall stack limit. The return address is popped off the stack only when the function returns. In the case of a driver or function recursively calling itself, each function called never returns.

**0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL**

Diagnosing the cause of pool corruption can be difficult, if not virtually impossible, without the use of additional tools. The recommended course of action for troubleshooting any type of pool corruption issue is to enable the special pool option of Driver Verifier against any new or suspect drivers. Before you enable Driver Verifier, spending a few extra minutes analyzing the crash may yield some interesting results.
The cause of a DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL (0xC5) stop code is the result of an attempt to access a pageable or invalid address at an IRQL that is too high. The stop code originates from the kernel as a stop IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL (0xA). Inside the kernel’s KeBugCheck2 function (for which KeBugCheckEx is just a stub), the system checks the value of the stop code. If the stop code’s value is equal to IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL (0xA), the system queries the fourth bugcheck parameter, which is the address that referenced the memory that led to the crash. If the address lies between the regions of memory that contain the Windows executive’s pool functions, the system changes the stop code to DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL (0xC5). The reason for modifying the stop code is to highlight that it’s not the fault of the pool routines, but rather that one of the pool structures they manage has been corrupted.

**DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL (c5)**
An attempt was made to access a pageable (or completely invalid) address at an interrupt request level (IRQL) that is too high. This is caused by drivers that have corrupted the system pool. Run the driver verifier against any new (or suspect) drivers, and if that doesn’t turn up the culprit, then use gflags to enable special pool.

Arguments:
Arg1: 4f4f4f53, memory referenced
Arg2: 000000002, IRQL
Arg3: 00000000, value 0 = read operation, 1 = write operation
Arg4: 829234a7, address which referenced memory

In the case of pool corruption, a stack trace almost always points to Ntoskrnl or another device driver as being the likely cause of the crash. In the following example, the stack trace of the thread that was executing when the system crashed lists only Windows operating system functions:

```
STACK_TEXT:
8b8e3554 829234a7 badb0d00 00000000 91470d90 nt!KiTrap0E+0x2cf
8b8e3610 8288d2c6 00000000 00000280 76615358 nt!ExAllocatePoolWithTag+0x49d
8b8e3620 8288d19d 00000001 00000053 8b8e38a8 nt!KeAllocateXStateContext+0x25
8b8e3644 8288d6b5 00000003 00000000 8b8e37b4 nt!KeSaveExtendedProcessorState+0x104
8b8e3658 9139b443 8b8e37b4 fe7b8010 8288d038 nt!KeSaveFloatingPointState+0x14
8b8e3864 9139bfdb fe8af408 ffbdb540 00000000 win32k!EngAlphaBlend+0x230
8b8e38d0 9139c394 fe7b8010 fe989010 fe1c0010 win32k!SURFREFDC::vUnlock+0x1e5
8b8e3974 913a4a2f fe7b8010 00000000 win32k!SURFREFDC::vUnlock+0x59e
8b8e39d4 913a4981 fe7b8010 fe989010 00000000 win32k!EngNineGrid+0x6e
8b8e3a34 913a4b47 fe7b8010 fe989010 00000000 win32k!EngDrawStream+0x109
8b8e3aa8 913a13a3 8b8e3b4a 00000000 fe989000 win32k!GdiDrawStreamInternal+0x232
8b8e3b3d 913ae0e9 3a010231 00000000 0012f628 win32k!GdiDrawStream+0x557
8b8e3d20 828401ea 3a010231 00000006 0012f628 win32k!GdiDrawStream+0x8c
8b8e3d20 774570b4 3a010231 00000006 0012f628 nt!KiFastCallEntry+0x12a
0012f49c 75c973a5 75c973b8 3a010231 00000060 ntdll!KiFastSystemCallRet
0012f4a0 75c973b8 3a010231 00000060 0012f628 GDI32!GdiDrawStream+0xc
0012f5a4 74243efa 3a010231 00000060 0012f628 GDI32!GdiDrawStream+0x432
```
The trap frame that was generated when the attempt to access pageable or invalid memory was made displays the processor instruction that was executed and the register values of the CPU the thread was executing on. The debugger, with the assistance of the symbol file for the kernel image, is able to display the name of the function that crashed, using the instruction pointer as a reference:

```
TRAP_FRAME:  8b8e3554 -- (.trap 0xffffffff8b8e3554)
  eax=8b8e35f8  ebx=82939940  ecx=4f4f4f4f  edx=00000000  esi=82939da8  edi=82939944
  eip=829234a7  esp=8b8e3610  iopl=0
  cs=0008  ss=0010  ds=0023  es=0023  fs=0000  gs=0000
  efl=00010a83
  nt!ExAllocatePoolWithTag+0x49d:
    829234a7 8b4104           mov     eax,dword ptr [ecx+4]
```

As with previous examples, the series of question marks is used to represent invalid addresses that were unable to be displayed by the debugger. In the case of the preceding instruction, the processor read the address stored in the ecx register, added a value of four to it, and then attempted to reference the memory pointed to by that address (for storage into the eax register). The resulting address to be fetched was invalid, causing an exception to be raised by the processor.

To understand why the invalid value was stored in the ecx register, analyzing the set of instructions that executed prior to the crash may give an indication. The following output shows the results of unassembling the instruction stream of the crashed thread, backward from the current instruction pointer:

```
0: kd> ub 829234a7
  nt!ExAllocatePoolWithTag+0x479:
    ...
    829234a5 8b0e           mov     ecx,dword ptr [esi]
```

Analysis reveals that the address in the ecx register was written to by an instruction that read the value pointed to by the esi register. Using the `dc` command with the address stored in the esi register of the trap frame shows from where the value `4f4f4f4f` originated. What is of interest in the output of the command is that each of the addresses listed appears as a pair and that the first value—the one that contains the invalid address—doesn’t match the value adjacent to it:

```
0: kd> dc 82939da8
  82939da8 4f4f4f4f 85045810 82939db0 82939db0 0000.X...........
  82939db8 82939db8 82939db8 86f749f8 86f749f8 ........I...I..
  82939dc8 82939dc8 82939dc8 82939dd0 82939dd0 ................
  82939dd8 82939dd8 82939dd8 82939de0 82939de0 ................
  82939de8 82939de8 82939de8 82939df0 82939df0 ................
  ...
```

Following the suspicion that these values are address pairs and that the first value is
invalid, displaying the address next to the corrupted value leads toward determining the cause of the corruption. The value 4f4f4f4f is OOOO in ASCII, which is apparent in the output shown here:

```
0: kd> dc 85045810
85045810 4f4f4f4f 4f4f4f4f 4f4f4f4f 4f4f4f4f 4f4f4f4f 0000000000000000
85045820 4f4f4f4f 4f4f4f4f 4f4f4f4f 4f4f4f4f 4f4f4f4f 0000000000000000
85045830 46524556 00574f4c 00000000 00000000 VERFLOW...........
85045840 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 .................
85045850 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 .................
...
```

Checking the pool allocation with the !pool command confirms that the allocation, along with its pool headers, have been corrupted:

```
0: kd> !pool 85045810
Pool page 85045810 region is Nonpaged pool
85045000 size:  808 previous size:    0  (Allocated) None
85045808 is not a valid large pool allocation, checking large session pool...
85045808 is freed (or corrupt) pool
Bad previous allocation size @85045808, last size was 101
```

It’s important to note that although corruption has been identified, it may or may not have directly caused the crash currently being analyzed. Any pool corruption that has been discovered requires further investigation. Pool corruption left undiagnosed risks further crashes to the system or corruption of data stored on disk.

Of further interest in the output of the corrupted pool allocation is a reference to the string OVERFLOW. Using the !for_each_module command, it’s possible to search each loaded module for any occurrences of the suspect string. The following debugger command displays the name of any loaded drivers that contain a match for the search phrase:

```
0: kd> !for_each_module .foreach (address {s -[1]a @#Base @#End "OVERFLOW"}) {lm 1m a a address}
BTHUSB
CLASSPNP
CLASSPNP
rfcomm
rfcomm
rfcomm
...
myfault
```

Further analysis of a crash dump that appears at first to be virtually impossible to diagnose has narrowed down the list of suspect drivers. The next step would be to enable the special pool option of Driver Verifier with the device drivers listed.
Hardware Malfunctions

Another type of stop message is the hardware malfunction screen. This type of screen is displayed when the processor detects a hardware condition. Figure 14-10 shows a sample hardware malfunction screen. Depending on the type of condition that generated the hardware malfunction, the system might display additional information indicating the cause of the error. When displaying the hardware malfunction screen, the system ignores the AutoReboot value of the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\CrashControl registry key and will display the screen indefinitely.

![Figure 14-10. Example of a hardware malfunction screen](image.png)

As you should with any stop messages that are suspected to be caused by hardware failures, run any manufacturer-supplied hardware-diagnostic tools to determine which components, if any, may have failed. If you recently added new hardware to the computer, try removing it to see whether the problem no longer occurs. Remove any existing hardware that may have failed, and have it replaced.

Signaling the nonmaskable interrupt (NMI) pin of the system’s motherboard when the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\CrashControl\NMICrashDump registry value isn’t set will also generate a hardware malfunction screen. If the intention was to generate a manual crash dump using an NMI button for offline analysis, verify that the NMICrashDump value is configured correctly.

EXPERIMENT: THE BLUE SCREEN SCREEN SAVER

A great way to remind yourself of what a blue screen looks like or to fool your office workers and friends is to run the Sysinternals Blue Screen screen saver from Sysinternals. The screen saver simulates authentic looking blue screens that reflect the version of Windows on which you run it, generating all blue screen text using actual system information, such as the list of loaded drivers. It also mimics an automatic reboot, complete with the Windows startup splash screen. Note that unlike other screen savers, where a mouse movement dismisses them, the Blue Screen screen saver requires a key press.

By using the following syntax for the Psexec tool from Sysinternals, you can even run the screen saver on another system:
psexec \computernamex -c -f -i -d "SysInternalsBluescreen.scr" -s -accepteula

The command requires that you have administrative privilege on the remote system. (You can use the –u and –p Psexec switches to specify alternate credentials.) Make sure that your coworker has a sense of humor!
Conclusion

Although many crashes can be analyzed with some of the techniques described in this chapter, many require analysis that goes beyond the scope of this book. Here are some additional resources that may be useful if you want to learn more advanced crash analysis techniques and information:

- The Microsoft Platforms Global Escalation Services team blog, at http://blogs.msdn.com/ntdebugging, provides various tips and tricks and real-life scenarios encountered by the team.

- The website http://www.dumpanalysis.org provides hundreds of patterns and advanced analysis scenarios and hints.
Appendix A. Contents of Windows Internals, Sixth Edition, Part 1

Introduction

Chapter 1 Concepts and Tools
  Windows Operating System Versions
  Foundation Concepts and Terms
    Windows API
    Services, Functions, and Routines
    Processes, Threads, and Jobs
    Virtual Memory
    Kernel Mode vs. User Mode
    Terminal Services and Multiple Sessions
    Objects and Handles
    Security
    Registry
    Unicode
  Digging into Windows Internals
    Performance Monitor
    Kernel Debugging
    Windows Software Development Kit
    Windows Driver Kit
    Sysinternals Tools
  Conclusion

Chapter 2 System Architecture
  Requirements and Design Goals
  Operating System Model
  Architecture Overview
    Portability
    Symmetric Multiprocessing
    Scalability
Differences Between Client and Server Versions
Checked Build

Key System Components
Environment Subsystems and Subsystem DLLs
Ntdll.dll
Executive
Kernel
Hardware Abstraction Layer
Device Drivers
System Processes

Conclusion

Chapter 3 System Mechanisms
Trap Dispatching
Interrupt Dispatching
Timer Processing
Exception Dispatching
System Service Dispatching
Object Manager
Executive Objects
Object Structure

Synchronization
High-IRQL Synchronization
Low-IRQL Synchronization
System Worker Threads
Windows Global Flags

Advanced Local Procedure Call
Connection Model
Message Model
Asynchronous Operation
Views, Regions, and Sections
Attributes
Blobs, Handles, and Resources
Security
Performance
Debugging and Tracing
Kernel Event Tracing
Wow64
  Wow64 Process Address Space Layout
  System Calls
  Exception Dispatching
  User APC Dispatching
  Console Support
  User Callbacks
  File System Redirection
  Registry Redirection
  I/O Control Requests
  16-Bit Installer Applications
  Printing
  Restrictions
User-Mode Debugging
  Kernel Support
  Native Support
  Windows Subsystem Support
Image Loader
  Early Process Initialization
  DLL Name Resolution and Redirection
  Loaded Module Database
  Import Parsing
  Post-Import Process Initialization
  SwitchBack
  API Sets
Hypervisor (Hyper-V)
  Partitions
  Parent Partition
  Child Partitions
  Hardware Emulation and Support
Kernel Transaction Manager
Hotpatch Support
Kernel Patch Protection
Code Integrity
Conclusion

Chapter 4 Management Mechanisms

The Registry
- Viewing and Changing the Registry
- Registry Usage
- Registry Data Types
- Registry Logical Structure
- Transactional Registry (TxR)
- Monitoring Registry Activity
- Process Monitor Internals
- Registry Internals

Services
- Service Applications
- The Service Control Manager
- Service Startup
- Startup Errors
- Accepting the Boot and Last Known Good
- Service Failures
- Service Shutdown
- Shared Service Processes
- Service Tags

Unified Background Process Manager
- Initialization
- UBPM API
- Provider Registration
- Consumer Registration
- Task Host
- Service Control Programs

Windows Management Instrumentation
- Providers
- The Common Information Model and the Managed Object
- Format Language
Class Association
WMI Implementation
WMI Security
Windows Diagnostic Infrastructure
WDI Instrumentation
Diagnostic Policy Service
Diagnostic Functionality

Conclusion

Chapter 5 Processes, Threads, and Jobs

Process Internals
Data Structures
Protected Processes

Flow of CreateProcess
Stage 1: Converting and Validating Parameters and Flags
Stage 2: Opening the Image to Be Executed
Stage 3: Creating the Windows Executive Process Object (PspAllocateP
Stage 4: Creating the Initial Thread and Its Stack and Context
Stage 5: Performing Windows Subsystem–Specific Post-Initialization
Stage 6: Starting Execution of the Initial Thread
Stage 7: Performing Process Initialization in the Context of the New Pr

Thread Internals
Data Structures
Birth of a Thread

Examining Thread Activity
Limitations on Protected Process Threads

Worker Factories (Thread Pools)

Thread Scheduling
Overview of Windows Scheduling
Priority Levels
Thread States
Dispatcher Database
Quantum
Priority Boosts
Context Switching
Scheduling Scenarios
Idle Threads
Thread Selection
Multiprocessor Systems
Thread Selection on Multiprocessor Systems
Processor Selection
Processor Share-Based Scheduling
Distributed Fair Share Scheduling
CPU Rate Limits
Dynamic Processor Addition and Replacement
Job Objects
Job Limits
Job Sets
Conclusion

Chapter 6 Security
Security Ratings
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria
The Common Criteria
Security System Components
Protecting Objects
Access Checks
Security Identifiers
Virtual Service Accounts
Security Descriptors and Access Control
The AuthZ API
Account Rights and Privileges
Account Rights
Privileges
Super Privileges
Access Tokens of Processes and Threads
Security Auditing
Object Access Auditing
Global Audit Policy
Advanced Audit Policy Settings
Logon
    Winlogon Initialization
    User Logon Steps
    Assured Authentication
    Biometric Framework for User Authentication
User Account Control and Virtualization
    File System and Registry Virtualization
    Elevation
Application Identification (AppID)
AppLocker
Software Restriction Policies
Conclusion

Chapter 7 Networking
Windows Networking Architecture
    The OSI Reference Model
    Windows Networking Components
Networking APIs
    Windows Sockets
    Winsock Kernel
    Remote Procedure Call
    Web Access APIs
    Named Pipes and Mailslots
    NetBIOS
    Other Networking APIs
Multiple Redirector Support
    Multiple Provider Router
    Multiple UNC Provider
    Surrogate Providers
    Redirector
    Mini-Redirectors
    Server Message Block and Sub-Redirectors
Distributed File System Namespace
Distributed File System Replication
Offline Files
Caching Modes
Ghosts
Data Security
Cache Structure

BranchCache
Caching Modes
BranchCache Optimized Application Retrieval: SMB Sequence
BranchCache Optimized Application Retrieval: HTTP Sequence

Name Resolution
Domain Name System
Peer Name Resolution Protocol

Location and Topology
Network Location Awareness
Network Connectivity Status Indicator
Link-Layer Topology Discovery

Protocol Drivers
Windows Filtering Platform

NDIS Drivers
Variations on the NDIS Miniport
Connection-Oriented NDIS
Remote NDIS

QoS

Binding
Layered Network Services
Remote Access
Active Directory
Network Load Balancing
Network Access Protection
Direct Access

Conclusion
Index
Index

A NOTE ON THE DIGITAL INDEX

A link in an index entry is displayed as the section title in which that entry appears. Because some sections have multiple index markers, it is not unusual for an entry to have several links to the same section. Clicking on any link will take you directly to the place in the text in which the marker appears.

Symbols

!analyze command, Verbose Analysis, Verbose Analysis, Hung or Unresponsive Systems, Analysis of Common Stop Codes
!ca command, Section Objects
!cpuinfo command, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis
!dc command, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics
!dd command, Physical Address Extension (PAE)
!defwrites command, Write Throttling
!devnode command, Device Enumeration–Device Stacks, Device Stacks
!devobj command, Driver Objects and Device Objects, Shadow Copy Provider
!devstack command, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers
!dq command, Physical Address Extension (PAE)
!drvobj command, Driver Objects and Device Objects, Volume Mounting
!filecache command, Cache Working Set Size
!fileobj command, Per-File Cache Data Structures
!for_each_module command, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL
!handle command, Section Objects
!heap command, Heap Security Features, Heap Debugging Features
!Ir p command, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis
!Irpfnd command, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers
!loadermemorylist command, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems—Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
!locks command, Hung or Unresponsive Systems
!memusage command, Section Objects
!object command, Driver Objects and Device Objects
!PFN command, Page List Dynamics, PFN Data Structures
!pocaps command, Driver Power Operation
!pool command, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool
!poolused command, Monitoring Pool Usage
!popolicy command, Driver Power Operation
!ppm command, Utility Function
!ppmcheck command, Performance Check—Performance Check, Performance Check
!ppmpcrpfpolicy extension, Thresholds and Policy Settings
!ppmstate command, Utility Function
!process command, IRP Stack Locations, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination, Physical Address Extension (PAE), Crash Dump Files—Crash Dump Files, Crash Dump Files, Crash Dump Files, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis, Hung or Unresponsive Systems

DirBase field, Physical Address Extension (PAE)
listing processes, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis
minidump data, Crash Dump Files—Crash Dump Files, Crash Dump Files, Crash Dump Files
Notmyfault.exe, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination
outstanding IRPs, **IRP Stack Locations**

processor information, **Hung or Unresponsive Systems**

!pte command, **Page Directories, Physical Address Extension (PAE), 0xD1 - DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL**

!session command, **x86 Session Space**

!stacks command, **Hung or Unresponsive Systems**

!thread command, **IRP Stack Locations, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis**

!vad command, **Process VADs**

!verifier command, **Driver Verifier**

!vm command, **Examining Memory Usage, x86 Session Space, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis**

!vpb command, **Volume Mounting**

!wdfkd.wdfldr debugger, **Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver**

!wsle command, **Working Set Management–Balance Set Manager and Swapper, Balance Set Manager and Swapper**

1394 ports, **Hung or Unresponsive Systems**

16-bit applications, **Allocation Granularity, File Names**

16-bit real mode components, **BIOS Preboot**

16-bit Unicode characters, **Unicode-Based Names**

32-bit protected mode, **BIOS Preboot**

32-bit real mode components, **BIOS Preboot**

32-bit systems, **ASLR in Kernel Address Space, Physical Address Extension (PAE), User Stacks, Windows Client Memory Limits–32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, File Names, The UEFI Boot Process, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Using Crash Troubleshooting Tools, Using Crash Troubleshooting Tools**
driver verification, Using Crash Troubleshooting Tools

file names, File Names

kernel address space, ASLR in Kernel Address Space

numbers of threads, User Stacks

PAE support, Physical Address Extension (PAE)

physical memory support, Windows Client Memory Limits–32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits

troubleshooting, Using Crash Troubleshooting Tools

UEFI support, The UEFI Boot Process

VDM support, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

32-bit virtual addresses, x86 Virtual Address Translation–x86 Virtual Address Translation, x86 Virtual Address Translation, x86 Virtual Address Translation

32-bit Windows, Introduction to the Memory Manager, No Execute Page Protection, No Execute Page Protection, No Execute Page Protection, Address Windowing Extensions, x86 Address Space Layouts–x86 System Address Space Layout, x86 Address Space Layouts, x86 Address Space Layouts, x86 System Address Space Layout–x86 Session Space, x86 System Address Space Layout, x86 Session Space, x86 Session Space, System Page Table Entries–System Page Table Entries, System Page Table Entries, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management

address space layouts, x86 Address Space Layouts–x86 System Address Space Layout, x86 Address Space Layouts, x86 Address Space Layouts, x86 System Address Space Layout, x86 System Address Space Layout

AWE, Address Windowing Extensions

execution protection, No Execute Page Protection, No Execute Page Protection

no-execute page protection, No Execute Page Protection
process size, Introduction to the Memory Manager

system address space layouts, x86 System Address Space Layout–x86 Session Space, x86 Session Space, x86 Session Space

system PTEs, System Page Table Entries–System Page Table Entries, System Page Table Entries

virtual address spaces, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management

virtual allocator mechanism, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management

3DES algorithm, Encrypting File Data

512e emulation, Disk Sector Format

64-bit address space layouts, 64-Bit Address Space Layouts–64-Bit Address Space Layouts, 64-Bit Address Space Layouts, 64-Bit Address Space Layouts

64-bit protected mode, BIOS Preboot

64-bit systems, No Execute Page Protection, Windows x64 16-TB Limitation–System Virtual Address Space Quotas, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, System Virtual Address Space Management, System Virtual Address Space Management, ASLR in Kernel Address Space, User Stacks, Windows Client Memory Limits

client memory limitations, Windows Client Memory Limits

dynamic address spaces, Windows x64 16-TB Limitation–System Virtual Address Space Quotas, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, System Virtual Address Space Management, System Virtual Address Space Quotas

execution protection, No Execute Page Protection

kernel address space, ASLR in Kernel Address Space

numbers of threads and, User Stacks
virtual address allocation, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management

64-bit Windows, Introduction to the Memory Manager, System Page Table Entries, Windows x64 16-TB Limitation, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management

\Catroot directory, Driver Installation

\Device directory, Driver Objects and Device Objects, Driver Objects and Device Objects, Driver Objects and Device Objects, Explicit File I/O

\Global?? directory, Driver Objects and Device Objects, Opening Devices, Opening Devices, Disk Device Objects, Explicit File I/O, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

\Inf directory, Driver Installation

\Security directory, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

\Sessions directory, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

_NT_SYMBOL_PATH variable, When There Is No Crash Dump

“A disk read error occurred” error, Boot Sector Corruption

“away-mode” power requests, Power Availability Requests

“blue screen of death”, System File Corruption, Causes of Windows Crashes, Troubleshooting Crashes, Hung or Unresponsive Systems—When There Is No Crash Dump, When There Is No Crash Dump

system file corruption, System File Corruption

top 20 stop codes, Causes of Windows Crashes, Troubleshooting Crashes

troubleshooting without crash dumps, Hung or Unresponsive Systems—When There Is No Crash Dump, When There Is No Crash Dump

“BOOTMGR is compressed” error, Boot Sector Corruption

“BOOTMGR is missing” error, Boot Sector Corruption

“Check boot path and disk hardware” error, BCD Misconfiguration
“Could not read from selected boot disk” error, **BCD Misconfiguration**

“data read” errors, **NTFS Bad-Cluster Recovery**

“disk full” error, **Per-User Volume Quotas**

“Error loading operating system” error, **MBR Corruption**

“Invalid partition table” errors, **MBR Corruption**

“log file full” errors, **Log Record Types, Undo Pass**

“Missing operating system” error, **MBR Corruption**

“no cache” flag, **File System Interfaces**

“no write” log records, **Recoverable File System Support, Caching with the Mapping and Pinning Interfaces**

“STOP: 0xC000136” error, **System File Corruption**

“system running low on virtual memory” error, **Commit Charge and Page File Size**

“Windows could not start… ” error, **BCD Misconfiguration, System Hive Corruption**
abort records, **Logging Implementation**

absolute paths, **Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions**

abstraction (I/O system), **I/O System Components**

access bit tracking (Superfetch), **Tracing and Logging**

access fault trap handler, **Memory Manager Components**

access violations, **Fault Tolerant Heap, Page Fault Handling, Virtual Address Descriptors, Driver Verifier, Crash Dump Analysis**

  crashes, **Crash Dump Analysis**

  heap-related, **Fault Tolerant Heap**

  page faults, **Page Fault Handling**

  special pool, **Driver Verifier**

  VADs and, **Virtual Address Descriptors**

access-denied errors, **Process Monitor Troubleshooting Techniques**

Accessed bit (PTEs), **Page Tables and Page Table Entries, Physical Address Extension (PAE), Working Set Management**

ACLs (access control lists), **Opening Devices, Protecting Memory, UDF, System File Corruption**

  I/O process and, **Opening Devices**

  section objects, **Protecting Memory**

  UDF format, **UDF**

  Windows Resource Protection, **System File Corruption**

ACPI (Advanced Configuration and Power Interface), **Device Stack Driver Loading, The Power Manager, The Power Manager, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr**

Action Center, **Windows Error Reporting, Online Crash Analysis**
Active Directory, BitLocker Management, x86 Address Space Layouts, Safe Mode active pages, Prototype PTEs, PFN Data Structures, Components
Active PFN state, Page Frame Number Database, Page Frame Number Database Active Template Library (ATL), No Execute Page Protection active threads, The IoCompletion Object, Using Completion Ports active VACBs, Systemwide Cache Data Structures, Systemwide Cache Data Structures Add Recovery Agent Wizard, Encrypting a File for the First Time add-device routines, Structure of a Driver, Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver, Driver Support for Plug and Play, Driver Support for Plug and Play, Driver Installation AddiSNSSever command, iSCSI Drivers address space, Internal Synchronization, Internal Synchronization, Kernel-Mode Heaps (System Memory Pools), Virtual Address Space Layouts, x86 Address Space Layouts, x86 System Address Space Layout, x86 Session Space, x86 Session Space–System Page Table Entries, x86 Session Space, x86 Session Space, System Page Table Entries–System Page Table Entries, System Page Table Entries, System Page Table Entries, x64 Virtual Addressing Limitations–Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, Windows x64 16-TB Limitation, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, System Virtual Address Space Quotas–User Address Space Layout, User Address Space Layout, User Address Space Layout–Controlling Security Mitigations, User Address Space Layout, User Address Space Layout, Controlling Security Mitigations, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit–Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Process VADs, Cache Virtual Memory Management, Crash Dump Files

commit charge, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit–Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit
Commit Limit, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit

locks, Internal Synchronization

memory management, Internal Synchronization

paged and nonpaged pools, Kernel-Mode Heaps (System Memory Pools)

status, Process VADs

switching for processes, Crash Dump Files

system PTEs, System Page Table Entries–System Page Table Entries, System Page Table Entries

user layouts, User Address Space Layout–Controlling Security Mitigations, User Address Space Layout, Controlling Security Mitigations

views, Cache Virtual Memory Management

virtual address space quotas, System Virtual Address Space Quotas–User Address Space Layout, User Address Space Layout, User Address Space Layout

x64 virtual address limitations, x64 Virtual Addressing Limitations–Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, Windows x64 16-TB Limitation, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management

x86 layouts, Virtual Address Space Layouts, x86 Address Space Layouts, x86 System Address Space Layout, x86 Session Space

x86 session space, x86 Session Space–System Page Table Entries, x86 Session Space, System Page Table Entries

address translation, Large and Small Pages, x86 Virtual Address Translation–Translation Look-Aside Buffer, x86 Virtual Address Translation, x86 Virtual Address Translation, Page Directories, Page Directories, Page Tables and Page Table Entries, Page Tables and Page Table Entries, Byte Within Page, Translation Look-Aside Buffer–Physical Address Extension (PAE), Translation Look-Aside Buffer, Physical Address Extension (PAE)–Physical Address
Extension (PAE), Physical Address Extension (PAE), Physical Address Extension (PAE), x64 Virtual Address Translation–Page Fault Handling, x64 Virtual Address Translation, IA64 Virtual Address Translation–Page Fault Handling, Page Fault Handling, Page Fault Handling, Page Fault Handling

AS64 translation, x64 Virtual Address Translation–Page Fault Handling, Page Fault Handling

IA64 systems, IA64 Virtual Address Translation–Page Fault Handling, Page Fault Handling, Page Fault Handling, Page Fault Handling

PAE, Physical Address Extension (PAE)–Physical Address Extension (PAE), Physical Address Extension (PAE), Physical Address Extension (PAE), Physical Address Extension (PAE), Physical Address Extension (PAE), Physical Address Extension (PAE)

Page sizes and, Large and Small Pages

translation look-aside buffer, Translation Look-Aside Buffer–Physical Address Extension (PAE), Physical Address Extension (PAE)

x64 translation, x64 Virtual Address Translation

x86 translation, x86 Virtual Address Translation–Translation Look-Aside Buffer, x86 Virtual Address Translation, x86 Virtual Address Translation, Page Directories, Page Directories, Page Tables and Page Table Entries, Page Tables and Page Table Entries, Byte Within Page, Translation Look-Aside Buffer

Address Windowing Extensions (AWE), Address Windowing Extensions, Address Windowing Extensions, Address Windowing Extensions, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, PFN Data Structures

AddTarget command, iSCSI Drivers

AddTargetPortal command, iSCSI Drivers

AddUsersToEncryptedFile API, Encrypting File System Security

Adelson-Velskii and Landis (AVL), Process VADs

administrator privileges, Driver Installation
Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI), Device Enumeration, The Power Manager, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
advanced format (disks), Disk Sector Format, Disk Sector Format, Unified Caching
advanced local procedure calls (ALPC), User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF), Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
advancedoptions element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), Encryption Keys, Encryption Keys, BitLocker Key Recovery, BitLocker To Go–BitLocker To Go, BitLocker To Go, ReadyDrive, Encrypting File System Security
   AES-CCM keys, BitLocker Key Recovery
   AES128-CBC encryption, Encryption Keys
   AES256-CBC encryption, Encryption Keys
   BitLocker To Go, BitLocker To Go–BitLocker To Go, BitLocker To Go
   EFS usage, Encrypting File System Security
   ReadyBoost, ReadyDrive
affinitized cores, Performance Check
affinity counts, Algorithm Overrides
affinity history policies, Thresholds and Policy Settings
affinity manager, The Low Fragmentation Heap
aged pages, Working Set Management, Tracing and Logging
agents (Superfetch), Components
AGP ports, Rotate VADs
Algorithm for Recovery and Isolation Exploiting Semantics (ARIES), Marshalling
AllocateUserPhysicalPages function, Address Windowing Extensions
AllocateUserPhysicalPagesNuma function, Address Windowing Extensions
allocation, Monitoring Pool Usage, System Page Table Entries, Master File Table, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool

master file table entries, Master File Table

pool, Monitoring Pool Usage, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool

PTE failures, System Page Table Entries

allocation granularity, Allocation Granularity—Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, No Execute Page Protection, Heap Manager, Image Randomization—Image Randomization, Image Randomization, Image Randomization

defined, Allocation Granularity—Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files

in load offset number, Image Randomization—Image Randomization, Image Randomization, Image Randomization

no execute page protection, No Execute Page Protection

smaller blocks (heaps), Heap Manager

ALPC (advanced local procedure calls), User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF), Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

alternate data streams, UDF, Multiple Data Streams, Resource Managers, Copying Encrypted Files

ALUA (asymmetrical logical unit arrays), Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers

AlwaysOff or AlwaysOn mode, No Execute Page Protection

analysis pass (recovery), Analysis Pass–Undo Pass, Analysis Pass, Undo Pass

APCs (asynchronous procedure calls), Completing an I/O Request

APIC (Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controller), The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

APIs, Isolation–Resource Managers, Transactional APIs, Resource Managers, The
UEFI Boot Process, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
   EFI, The UEFI Boot Process
   transactions, Isolation–Resource Managers, Transactional APIs, Resource Managers
   Windows native, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
Apple Macintosh machines, The UEFI Boot Process
application launch agent, Page Priority and Rebalancing
application threads, The I/O Manager–Device Drivers, Device Drivers
Application Verifier, Driver Verifier
applications, The I/O Manager–Device Drivers, Typical I/O Processing, Device Drivers, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF), Driver and Application Control of Device Power, Shadow Copy Provider, Introduction to the Memory Manager, Services Provided by the Memory Manager, Large and Small Pages, Locking Memory, Types of Heaps, Components, Cache Coherency, Process Monitor Troubleshooting Techniques, Driver Loading in Safe Mode
   cache coherency, Cache Coherency
   calling functions, The I/O Manager–Device Drivers, Typical I/O Processing, Device Drivers
   default heap, Types of Heaps
   failed, traces, Process Monitor Troubleshooting Techniques
   large page sizes, Large and Small Pages
   large-address-space aware, Introduction to the Memory Manager
   locking pages in memory, Locking Memory
   memory management, Services Provided by the Memory Manager
   power management control, Driver and Application Control of Device Power
   safe mode boots, Driver Loading in Safe Mode
   shadow copies, Shadow Copy Provider
Superfetch agents, Components
UMDF interaction, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)
archival utilities, Multiple Data Streams
archived files, File Records
areal density (disk), Disk Sector Format–NAND-Type Flash Memory, NAND-Type Flash Memory
ARIES (Algorithm for Recovery and Isolation Exploiting Semantics), Marshalling
AS64 address translation, x64 Virtual Address Translation–Page Fault Handling, Page Fault Handling
heap randomization, Heap Randomization
kernel address space, ASLR in Kernel Address Space
load offset numbers, User Address Space Layout–Image Randomization, Image Randomization, Image Randomization
memory manager, Internal Synchronization
security mitigations, Controlling Security Mitigations
viewing processes, Controlling Security Mitigations
ASR (Automated System Recovery), Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)
assembly language, Structure of a Driver
ASSERT macros, 0x8E - KERNEL_MODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED
Assign API, KMDF Data Model
associated IRPs, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, Volume I/O Operations
asymmetric key pair certificate hashes, Encrypting a File for the First Time
asymmetrical logical unit arrays (ALUA), Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers

asynchronous callbacks, Container Notifications


APC calls, Completing an I/O Request
cancellation, User-Initiated I/O Cancellation, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination
completion, Completing an I/O Request
completion context, I/O Completion Port Operation

file object attributes, Opening Devices

layered drivers, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers–I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers

packet-based I/O, I/O System Components

scatter/gather I/O, Scatter/Gather I/O
testing status, Synchronous and Asynchronous I/O

write throttling, Write Throttling–Write Throttling, Write Throttling

asynchronous procedures calls (APCs), Completing an I/O Request, Completing an I/O Request, In-Paging I/O

asynchronous read or write, Fast I/O, Intelligent Read-Ahead

ATA (AT attachment), Prioritization Strategies

ATA-8, ReadyDrive

ATAPI-based IDE devices, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers

Atapi.sys driver, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers
Ataport.sys driver, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers
ATL (Active Template Library), No Execute Page Protection
ATL thunk emulation, No Execute Page Protection—Software Data Execution Prevention, No Execute Page Protection, Software Data Execution Prevention
atomic transactions, Recoverability—Data Redundancy and Fault Tolerance, Recoverability, Data Redundancy and Fault Tolerance
attaching memory to processes, Reserving and Committing Pages
Attachment Execution Service, Multiple Data Streams
attachments, web or mail, Multiple Data Streams
ATTEMPTED_EXECUTE_OF_NOEXECUTE_MEMORY code, No Execute Page Protection
attribute definition table (AttrDef), Master File Table
attribute streams, File Records
attributes, File Records—File Names, File Records, File Names, Resident and Nonresident Attributes—Data Compression and Sparse Files, Resident and Nonresident Attributes, Resident and Nonresident Attributes, Data Compression and Sparse Files
files, list, File Records—File Names, File Records, File Names
resident and nonresident, Resident and Nonresident Attributes—Data Compression and Sparse Files, Resident and Nonresident Attributes, Resident and Nonresident Attributes, Data Compression and Sparse Files
audio adapters, Windows Client Memory Limits
auditing, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
authentication schemes (BitLocker), Encryption Keys, BitLocker Management
authorization (NTFS security), Security
auto-recovery BCD element behavior, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
auto-start (2) value, The Start Value, Device Enumeration
auto-start device drivers, **BIOS Preboot**, **Smss, Csrss, and Wininit**

Autochk.exe, **Volume Mounting**

automated crash analysis, **Online Crash Analysis**

Automated System Recovery (ASR), **Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)**

automatic rebooting, **The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr**

Autoruns tool, **Images That Start Automatically**, **Images That Start Automatically**

auxiliary displays, **User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)**

available memory, **Examining Memory Usage**, **Examining Memory Usage**

available pages, **Modified Page Writer**, **PFN Data Structures**

average frequency (processors), **Utility Function**

AVL trees, **Process VADs**

avoid low memory element, **The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr**

AWE (Address Windowing Extensions), **Address Windowing Extensions**, **Address Windowing Extensions**, **Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit**, **PFN Data Structures**
B-trees, **Indexing**

background activity priority, **I/O Prioritization**

background application page priority, **Page Priority and Rebalancing**

background priority mode, **I/O Priority Booster and Bumps**

backing store, **Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit**, **Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit**, **Unified Caching**, **Stack Trashes**

backing up encrypted files, **Backing Up Encrypted Files**

Backup and Restore utility, **System File Corruption**


  - file system filter drivers, **Process Monitor–Process Monitor**, **Process Monitor**
  - shadow copies, **Uses in Windows**
  - shadow copy service and, **VSS Architecture**

backup components (VSS writers), **VSS Operation**

bad clusters, **Dynamic Bad-Cluster Remapping**, **NTFS Bad-Cluster Recovery**, **NTFS Bad-Cluster Recovery**, **NTFS Bad-Cluster Recovery**

bad pages, **PFN Data Structures**, **Memory Notification Events**, **The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr**

Bad PFN state, **Page Frame Number Database**, **Page Frame Number Database**

bad-cluster files (, **Master File Table**, **Master File Table**, **NTFS Bad-Cluster Recovery**

bad-sector remapping, **NTFS Bad-Cluster Recovery**

baddmemoryaccess element, **The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr**

badmemorylist element, **The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr**

BAD_POOL_CALLER stop code, **Causes of Windows Crashes**
BAD_POOL_HEADER stop code, Causes of Windows Crashes, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool


look-aside lists, Look-Aside Lists–Look-Aside Lists, Look-Aside Lists

page writer events, Modified Page Writer

trimming working sets, Working Set Management

working sets, Balance Set Manager and Swapper–System Working Sets, System Working Sets–Memory Notification Events, System Working Sets, Memory Notification Events

balanced trees, Indexing

bandwidth reservations, Opening Devices, Bandwidth Reservation (Scheduled File I/O)

Base Cryptographic Provider, Encrypting a File for the First Time

base file records, Master File Table, Master File Table

base LSNs, Logging Implementation

base-log files, Log Layout, Resource Managers

based sections, Section Objects

basic disks, Volume Management, MBR-Style Partitioning, GUID Partition Table Partitioning, GUID Partition Table Partitioning, GUID Partition Table Partitioning, GUID Partition Table Partitioning, Basic Disk Volume Manager, Basic Disk Volume Manager–Multipartition Volume Management, Multipartition Volume Management, The Mount Manager

GUID partition table partitioning, GUID Partition Table Partitioning, GUID Partition Table Partitioning

MBR-style partitioning, MBR-Style Partitioning

multipartition volumes on, Volume Management
registry information, The Mount Manager

storage management, GUID Partition Table Partitioning, Basic Disk Volume Manager–Multipartition Volume Management, Multipartition Volume Management

volume manager, Basic Disk Volume Manager

BAT files, Locking

batch oplocks, Locking–Locking, Locking, Locking

batching log records, Design

baud rates, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, When There Is No Crash Dump

baudrate element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

BCD (Boot Configuration Database), Winload, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, Encryption Keys, BitLocker Key Recovery, No Execute Page Protection, No Execute Page Protection, No Execute Page Protection, Address Windowing Extensions, Physical Address Extension (PAE), Physical Address Extension (PAE), BIOS Preboot, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr–The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr–The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr–The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

BitLocker encryption, Encryption Keys, BitLocker Key Recovery

BitLocker volumes, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning

boot application options, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr–The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
boot process, BIOS Preboot, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

boot volumes, Winload

Bootmgr options, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

corruption and startup issues, Boot Sector Corruption–System Hive Corruption, System Hive Corruption

debug option, Hung or Unresponsive Systems

increasing virtual memory, Address Windowing Extensions

loading non-PAE kernel, No Execute Page Protection

nolowmem option, Physical Address Extension (PAE)


nx values, No Execute Page Protection, No Execute Page Protection

pae options, Physical Address Extension (PAE)

safe mode options, Driver Loading in Safe Mode

Winload options, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr–The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

bcddevice element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

BCDEdit tool, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, BCD Misconfiguration, When There Is No Crash Dump

bcdfilepath element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

binary buddy systems, The Low Fragmentation Heap

BIOS, Basic Disks–GUID Partition Table Partitioning, GUID Partition Table Partitioning, BitLocker Drive Encryption, Boot Process, BIOS Preboot, BIOS Preboot–BIOS Preboot, BIOS Preboot, BIOS Preboot, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
BIOS vs. EFI, **Boot Process**

boot process components, **BIOS Preboot–BIOS Preboot, BIOS Preboot, BIOS Preboot**

emulation code, **Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems**

partitioning, **Basic Disks–GUID Partition Table Partitioning, GUID Partition Table Partitioning**

passwords, **BitLocker Drive Encryption**

preboot, **BIOS Preboot**

BIOS boot sector, **The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr–The UEFI Boot Process, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The UEFI Boot Process**

BIOS-detected disk drives, **The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr**

BitLocker, **LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, Attaching VHDs–BitLocker To Go, BitLocker Drive Encryption, BitLocker Drive Encryption, Trusted Platform Module (TPM)–BitLocker Boot Process, Trusted Platform Module (TPM)–BitLocker Boot Process, Trusted Platform Module (TPM), BitLocker Boot Process–BitLocker Key Recovery, BitLocker Boot Process, BitLocker Boot Process, BitLocker Boot Process, BitLocker Boot Process, BitLocker Boot Process, BitLocker Key Recovery, Full-Volume Encryption Driver–BitLocker Management, BitLocker Management–BitLocker To Go, BitLocker Management, BitLocker Management, BitLocker Management, BitLocker Management, BitLocker To Go–BitLocker To Go, BitLocker To Go, BitLocker To Go, BitLocker To Go, BitLocker To Go, BitLocker To Go, Encryption, Crash Dump Generation**

BitLocker To Go, **BitLocker To Go–BitLocker To Go, BitLocker To Go, BitLocker To Go**

boot process, **BitLocker Boot Process–BitLocker Key Recovery, BitLocker**
Key Recovery
Control Panel applet, BitLocker Boot Process, BitLocker To Go
Crashdump Filter driver, Crash Dump Generation
full-volume encryption driver, Full-Volume Encryption Driver–BitLocker Management, BitLocker Management, Encryption management, BitLocker Management–BitLocker To Go, BitLocker To Go overview, BitLocker Drive Encryption
storage management, Attaching VHDs–BitLocker To Go, BitLocker Drive Encryption, Trusted Platform Module (TPM)–BitLocker Boot Process, BitLocker Boot Process, BitLocker Management, BitLocker To Go suspending, BitLocker Boot Process
system volumes and, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning
Trusted Platform Module, Trusted Platform Module (TPM)–BitLocker Boot Process, Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Trusted Platform Module (TPM), BitLocker Boot Process
BitLocker To Go, BitLocker Drive Encryption, BitLocker To Go, BitLocker To Go bitmap attributes, Resident and Nonresident Attributes, Indexing
bitmap files, Spanned Volumes, Image Randomization, Master File Table, Master File Table
black screens, MBR Corruption
blanket boosting, I/O Priority Inversion Avoidance (I/O Priority Inheritance)
BLF (base-log file), Log Layout, Resource Managers
block metadata randomization, Heap Security Features
block offsets, Log Sequence Numbers
block size, Unified Caching
block-storage devices, iSCSI Drivers
blocking, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination, The IoCompletion Object

cancellation ports, The IoCompletion Object

thread, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination

blocks, Disk Sector Format, File Deletion and the Trim Command, Heap Manager Structure, Unified Caching, Booting from iSCSI

block-level access, Booting from iSCSI

core heap, Heap Manager Structure

logical, Disk Sector Format

store page size, Unified Caching

updating sectors, File Deletion and the Trim Command

Blu-ray drives, Storage Terminology, UDF

Bluetooth, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)

body (IRPs), IRP Stack Locations

boosting I/O priority, I/O Priority Boosts and Bumps–Bandwidth Reservation (Scheduled File I/O), I/O Priority Boosts and Bumps, I/O Priority Boosts and Bumps, Bandwidth Reservation (Scheduled File I/O)

boot applications, BCD and, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr–The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

boot code (MBR), BIOS Preboot

boot data, BitLocker Drive Encryption, ReadyDrive

boot device drivers, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

boot disks, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

boot drivers, Winload, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection
boot process, Winload
loading, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
loading failures, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
system code write protection, Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection

boot entropy values, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
boot files (, Master File Table
boot graphics library, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
boot logging, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Boot Logging in Safe Mode, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang

Boot Manager (Bootmgr), BitLocker Drive Encryption, BIOS Preboot, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

BCD options, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
BitLocker code in, BitLocker Drive Encryption
boot process tasks, BIOS Preboot
options editor, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

boot parameter block (BPB), Master File Table
boot partition paths, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

boot partitions, BIOS Preboot

boot preloaded hives, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr – The UEFI Boot Process, The UEFI Boot Process, The UEFI Boot Process, Booting from iSCSI, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, ReadyBoot – ReadyBoot, ReadyBoot, ReadyBoot, Troubleshooting Boot and Startup Problems – Safe-Mode-Aware User Programs, Troubleshooting Boot and Startup Problems, Troubleshooting Boot and Startup Problems – Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), Troubleshooting Boot and Startup Problems, Safe Mode, Driver Loading in Safe Mode, Driver Loading in Safe Mode, Driver Loading in Safe Mode, Driver Loading in Safe Mode, Driver Loading in Safe Mode, Driver Loading in Safe Mode, Safe-Mode-Aware User Programs, Safe-Mode-Aware User Programs, Boot Logging in Safe Mode, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)–MBR Corruption, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)–MBR Corruption, Solving Common Boot Problems – Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang, MBR Corruption, MBR Corruption, MBR Corruption, MBR Corruption, Boot Sector Corruption, System File Corruption, System Hive Corruption, Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang, Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang, BIOS boot sector and Bootmgr, BIOS Preboot–The UEFI Boot Process, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr.
BIOS preboot, **Boot Process–The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr**. BIOS Preboot, BIOS Preboot, BIOS Preboot, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

BitLocker, **Trusted Platform Module (TPM)–BitLocker Key Recovery**. BitLocker Boot Process, BitLocker Key Recovery, BitLocker Key Recovery

changes to encrypted components, **Trusted Platform Module (TPM)**

custom boot problems, **Solving Common Boot Problems–Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang**, Boot Sector Corruption, System File Corruption, System Hive Corruption, Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang, Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang

driver loading, **Troubleshooting Boot and Startup Problems–Safe-Mode-Aware User Programs**, Driver Loading in Safe Mode, Driver Loading in Safe Mode, Driver Loading in Safe Mode, Safe-Mode-Aware User Programs

iSCSI booting, **Booting from iSCSI**

kernel and executive subsystems, **Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems**, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

last known good (LKG), **Troubleshooting Boot and Startup Problems**

preboot process, **BitLocker Boot Process**

ReadyBoot, **ReadyBoot–ReadyBoot**, ReadyBoot, ReadyBoot

repairing installations, **Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)–MBR Corruption**, MBR Corruption

safe mode, **Troubleshooting Boot and Startup Problems–Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)**, Safe Mode, Driver Loading in Safe Mode, Driver Loading in Safe Mode, Boot Logging in Safe Mode, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)

safe-mode-aware programs, **Safe-Mode-Aware User Programs**
troubleshooting, Troubleshooting Boot and Startup Problems, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)


verification chain, encryption, Trusted Platform Module (TPM)–BitLocker Boot Process, BitLocker Boot Process, BitLocker Boot Process

Windows Recovery Environment, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)–MBR Corruption, MBR Corruption, MBR Corruption

boot sectors, Local FSDs, NTFS Bad-Cluster Recovery, BIOS Preboot
defined, BIOS Preboot
duplicated, NTFS Bad-Cluster Recovery

file system drivers and, Local FSDs

boot status files (bootstat.dat), Mirrored Volumes, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)

boot traces, Logical Prefetcher

boot video driver (Bootvid.dll), BIOS Preboot, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

boot volumes, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning–LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, Mirrored Volumes, BitLocker Drive Encryption, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr–The UEFI Boot Process, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The UEFI Boot Process

encrypting, BitLocker Drive Encryption

loading process, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr–The UEFI Boot Process, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The UEFI Boot Process

mirroring, Mirrored Volumes

partitioning, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning–LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning

boot-sector code, Encryption Keys, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
boot-selection menu, *The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr*

boot-start (0) value, *The Start Value, The Start Value*

boot-start drivers, *Device Enumeration, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)*

boot-time caching (ReadyBoot), *ReadyBoot–ReadyBoot, ReadyBoot, ReadyBoot*

bootable partitions, *MBR-Style Partitioning*

bootdebug element, *The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr*

bootems element, *The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr*

bootlog element, *The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr*

bootlog option, *Boot Logging in Safe Mode–Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)*

bootrec command, *MBR Corruption, Boot Sector Corruption, System Hive Corruption*

bootsequence element, *The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr*

bootstatuspolicy element, *The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr*

bootstrap data, *Master File Table, Master File Table*

bootux element, *The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr*

bottom dirty page threshold, *Write Throttling*

bound traps, *0x7F - UNEXPECTED_KERNEL_MODE_TRAP*

boundary operations, *Driver Verifier*

break on symbol load option, *Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems*

breaking into hung systems, *Hung or Unresponsive Systems–When There Is No Crash Dump, Hung or Unresponsive Systems, Hung or Unresponsive Systems, When There Is No Crash Dump*

breakpoints, *Copy-on-Write, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, 0x8E - KERNEL_MODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED*
copy-on-write process and, Copy-on-Write

drivers compiled in debug environment, 0x8E - \texttt{KERNEL\_MODE\_EXCEPTION\_NOT\_HANDLED}

HAL initialization, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

broken oplocks, Locking

BTG (BitLocker To Go), BitLocker To Go

bucket IDs (crash analysis), Online Crash Analysis

buckets, The Low Fragmentation Heap, The Low Fragmentation Heap

buffer overflows, Process Monitor Troubleshooting Techniques, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool

buffer overruns, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Stack Trashes, Stack Trashes

buffer underruns, Pageheap, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Stack Trashes, Stack Trashes

buffered I/O, IRP Stack Locations, IRP Buffer Management

buffers and buffer management, The I/O Manager, Scatter/Gather I/O, IRP Buffer Management–I/O Request to a Single-Layered Driver, I/O Request to a Single-Layered Driver, Look-Aside Lists, Unified Caching, Caching with the Direct Memory Access Interfaces, Caching with the Direct Memory Access Interfaces, Read-Ahead and Write-Behind, Explicit File I/O, Marshalling, Compression and Sparse Files, Compression and Sparse Files, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool

DMA and caching, Caching with the Direct Memory Access Interfaces

FILE\_FLAG\_NO\_BUFFERING flag, Read-Ahead and Write-Behind

I/O manager, The I/O Manager

invalid, Explicit File I/O

IRPs, IRP Buffer Management–I/O Request to a Single-Layered Driver, I/O
Request to a Single-Layered Driver
look-aside lists, Look-Aside Lists
mapping and pinning interfaces, Caching with the Direct Memory Access Interfaces
marshalling log records, Marshalling
pool-tracking structures, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool
scatter/gather I/O, Scatter/Gather I/O
sparse files, Compression and Sparse Files, Compression and Sparse Files
stores, Unified Caching
bugcheck callbacks, The Blue Screen
Bugcodes.h file, The Blue Screen
BUGCODE_USB_DRIVER stop code, Causes of Windows Crashes
bugs, No Execute Page Protection–Copy-on-Write, Copy-on-Write
bumps (I/O priority), I/O Priority Boosts and Bumps–Bandwidth Reservation (Scheduled File I/O), Bandwidth Reservation (Scheduled File I/O)
burnmemory boot option, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
KMDF IRP processing, KMDF Data Model
power states, Power Manager Operation
role in I/O, Layered Drivers
bus filter drivers, Fast I/O, Device Stacks
bus filters, WDM Drivers
busparams element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
busy thresholds (processors), Thresholds and Policy Settings, Thresholds and Policy Settings, Performance Check
byte offsets, Spanned Volumes, x86 Virtual Address Translation, Byte Within Page, Physical Address Extension (PAE)
C

C language, Structure of a Driver

C processor state, Power Availability Requests, Processor Power Management (PPM), Performance Check

C runtime (CRT), Heap Manager

C++ language, Structure of a Driver, No Execute Page Protection, Software Data Execution Prevention


address space, Cache Virtual Memory Management

cached address translations, Translation Look-Aside Buffer–Physical Address Extension (PAE), Translation Look-Aside Buffer, Physical Address Extension (PAE)

CLFS operations, Log Types

coherency, Remote FSDs

core parking and, Processor Power Management (PPM)

file caching, Mapped File I/O and File Caching–I/O Request Packets, Scatter/Gather I/O, I/O Request Packets
flushes, Flushing Mapped Files, Write Throttling, Design
forcing write-through, Forcing the Cache to Write Through to Disk
opened files, Explicit File I/O
oplocks, Locking–Locking, Locking
optimizing boot process, ReadyBoot–ReadyBoot, ReadyBoot, ReadyBoot
physical size, Cache Physical Size–Cache Data Structures, Cache Physical Size, Cache Data Structures
prefetch operations, Clustered Page Faults
ReadyBoost, ReadyBoost–Unified Caching, Unified Caching
reduction routines, Memory Manager Components
spatial locality, Cache Manager’s ReadAhead Thread
system space, Virtual Address Space Layouts
temporal locality, Cache Manager’s ReadAhead Thread
tunneling, File Names
virtual memory management, Cache Virtual Memory Management
virtual size, Cache Virtual Memory Management
working set size, Cache Working Set Size
write-through, Design
cache buffers, File System Interfaces
cache bytes, Examining Memory Usage
cache directory, System File Corruption
Cache disabled bit (PTEs), Page Tables and Page Table Entries
System Interfaces

fast dispatch routines, Structure of a Driver

fast I/O, Per-File Cache Data Structures–ReadAhead and WriteBehind, File System Interfaces, Fast I/O, Fast I/O–ReadAhead and WriteBehind, Fast I/O, ReadAhead and WriteBehind, ReadAhead and WriteBehind

file system drivers, File System Driver Architecture

file system interfaces, File System Interfaces–Fast I/O, File System Interfaces, Caching with the Mapping and Pinning Interfaces, Fast I/O

I/O prioritization strategies, Prioritization Strategies

intelligent read-ahead, Intelligent ReadAhead–Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing

lazy writing, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Disabling Lazy Writing for a File, Cache Manager’s Lazy Writer

look-aside lists, Look-Aside Lists

mapped file I/O, Mapped File I/O and File Caching, I/O Request Packets

memory manager operations, The Memory Manager

read-ahead and write-behind, ReadAhead and WriteBehind–Conclusion, Intelligent ReadAhead, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Conclusion

read-ahead thread, Cache Manager’s ReadAhead Thread–Process Monitor, Memory Manager’s Page Fault Handler, Process Monitor

recoverable file system support, Recoverable File System Support

section objects, Section Objects–Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier

sector size, Disk Sector Format

Superfetch, Cache Manager’s ReadAhead Thread–Process Monitor, Cache Manager’s ReadAhead Thread, Process Monitor
viewing operations, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing

write throttling, Write Throttling, Write Throttling, Write Throttling

write-back caching, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing–Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing

cache misses, NTFS File System Driver, Compressing Nonsparse Data

cached I/O, Opening Devices

cached read operations, File System Interfaces, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing

call stacks, Troubleshooting Crashes

callbacks, Structure of a Driver, Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver, KMDF Data Model, KMDF I/O Model

fast dispatch routines, Structure of a Driver

KMDF drivers, Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver, KMDF Data Model

KMDF queues, KMDF I/O Model

cameras, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)

cancel I/O routines, Structure of a Driver, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination

CancelIo function, User-Initiated I/O Cancellation

CancelSynchronousIo function, User-Initiated I/O Cancellation

canonical addresses, x64 Virtual Addressing Limitations

case-sensitive file names, POSIX Support

CAT files, I/O System Components, Driver Installation
catalog files, [Driver Installation, Driver Installation](#)
CcAdjustThrottle function, [Write Throttling](#)
CcCanIWrite function, [Write Throttling](#)
CcCopyRead interface, [File System Interfaces, Caching with the Mapping and Pinning Interfaces, Explicit File I/O](#)
CcCopyWrite interface, [File System Interfaces, Explicit File I/O](#)
CcDeferWrite function, [Write Throttling](#)
CcFastCopyRead interface, [File System Interfaces, Explicit File I/O](#)
CcFastCopyWrite interface, [Explicit File I/O](#)
CcInitializeCacheMap function, [File System Interfaces, Explicit File I/O](#)
CcNumberOfFreeVacbs variable, [Systemwide Cache Data Structures](#)
CcReadAheadIos variable, [Intelligent ReadAhead](#)
CcSetDirtyPageThreshold function, [Write Throttling](#)
CcTotalDirtyPages function, [Write Throttling](#)
CcVacArrays variable, [Systemwide Cache Data Structures](#)
CcWriteBehind variable, [System Threads](#)
CD-R/RW format, [UDF](#)
CD-ROM drives, [Storage Terminology, The Volume Namespace](#)
CDFS (CD-ROM file system), [I/O System Components, Windows File System Formats, Local FSDs, File Names, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr](#)
cell phones, [User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)](#)
Certificate Manager (Certmgr.msc), [Encrypting File System Security](#)
certificate stores, [Encrypting File System Security](#)
CfgMgr32.dll, [Driver Installation](#)
change journal files, [Compression and Sparse Files, Master File Table, The Change](#)
change logging, Change Logging
change records, Change Logging
channel element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
characters in file names, File Names, File Names
check phases (processor power), Thresholds and Policy Settings, Performance Check
checkpoint records, Log Record Types, Log Record Types, Recovery
checkpoints (virtual machines), Virtual Hard Disk Support
child devices, Device Enumeration
child list objects (KMDF), KMDF Data Model
child objects (KMDF), KMDF Data Model
child processes, Services Provided by the Memory Manager
chips (TPM), BitLocker Drive Encryption, Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
chipsets, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits
chkdsk command, System Hive Corruption
Chkdsk.exe (Check Disk), Volume Mounting, Recovery Implementation, NTFS
Bad-Cluster Recovery, NTFS Bad-Cluster Recovery–Self-Healing, NTFS Bad-
Cluster Recovery, Self-Healing, System File Corruption
  bad sectors, NTFS Bad-Cluster Recovery
  boot-time version, Volume Mounting
  NTFS usage vs. FAT, NTFS Bad-Cluster Recovery–Self-Healing, NTFS Bad-
  Cluster Recovery, Self-Healing
repairing after failures, Recovery Implementation
system file corruption, System File Corruption
CIFS (Common Internet File System), Remote FSDs

cipher block chaining, The Decryption Process

cipher command, Encrypting a File for the First Time

Cipher.exe, Encrypting File System Security

class drivers, Layered Drivers, Device Stacks, Disk Drivers, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers

class keys, Device Stack Driver Loading, Driver Installation

ClassGUID value, Device Stack Driver Loading, Device Stack Driver Loading

cleanup requests, KMDF I/O Model

clear keys, BitLocker Boot Process

CLFS (Common Log File System), Marshalling, Log Types–Log Types, Log Types, Log Types, Log Layout, Log Layout, Log Sequence Numbers, Log Sequence Numbers, Log Blocks, Translating Virtual LSNs to Physical LSNs–Translating Virtual LSNs to Physical LSNs, Translating Virtual LSNs to Physical LSNs, Translating Virtual LSNs to Physical LSNs, Management Policies, Management Policies

log blocks, Log Blocks

log file layout, Log Layout

log layout, Log Layout

log sequence numbers, Log Sequence Numbers, Log Sequence Numbers

log types, Log Types–Log Types, Log Types

management policies, Management Policies, Management Policies

marshalling, Marshalling

translating virtual LSNs to physical, Translating Virtual LSNs to Physical LSNs–Translating Virtual LSNs to Physical LSNs, Translating Virtual LSNs to Physical LSNs, Translating Virtual LSNs to Physical LSNs

ClfsMgmtPolicy policies, Management Policies
client applications, No Execute Page Protection
client systems, Crash Dump Files
client Windows editions, Windows Client Memory Limits
client-side remote FSDs, Remote FSDs–File System Operation, Remote FSDs, Locking, File System Operation
clock algorithm (LRU), Placement Policy
clock generator crystals, Processor Power Management (PPM)
clock sources, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
clone shadow copies, Clone Shadow Copies
cloning processes, Process Reflection–Process Reflection, Process Reflection, Process Reflection
close requests (KMDF), KMDF I/O Model
CloseEncryptedFileRaw function, Backing Up Encrypted Files
CloseHandle API, Transactional APIs
CLRs (compensating log records), Logging Implementation
cluster factor, Clusters–Master File Table, Clusters, Master File Table
clustered page faults, Clustered Page Faults, Page Files, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing
clustermodeaddressing element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
clusters, Solid State Disks, Partition Manager, Spanned Volumes, File Systems, File Systems–CDFS, File Systems, CDFS, CDFS, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, exFAT, Dynamic Bad-Cluster Remapping, Defragmentation, NTFS On-Disk Structure–NTFS Recovery Support, Clusters, Clusters–Master File Table, Clusters, Clusters, Master File Table, Resident and Nonresident Attributes, Compressing Sparse Data, Compressing Sparse Data, Compressing Nonsparse Data, NTFS


cluster factor, Clusters–Master File Table, Clusters, Master File Table

compressed files, Compressing Sparse Data, Compressing Nonsparse Data

disk attributes, Partition Manager

disk storage, Solid State Disks

FAT formats, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32

free and in-use, Defragmentation

noncompressed files, Compressing Sparse Data

NTFS on-disk structure, NTFS On-Disk Structure–NTFS Recovery Support, NTFS Recovery Support

offsets, translating from bytes, Spanned Volumes

remapping bad, Dynamic Bad-Cluster Remapping

runs, Resident and Nonresident Attributes

sectors and, File Systems–CDFS, File Systems, CDFS

size, File Systems, CDFS, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, exFAT, Clusters, Clusters

unused, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32

CMOS settings, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

CMPXCHG8B instruction, Windows x64 16-TB Limitation

CNG (Cryptography Next Generation), Encrypting File System Security, Encrypting File System Security

code integrity, Encryption Keys, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
code overwrites (crash dumps), Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection–Advanced Crash Dump Analysis, Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis

coherent caching schemes, Single, Centralized System Cache–Stream-Based Caching, Cache Coherence, Virtual Block Caching, Stream-Based Caching

collection objects (KMDF), KMDF Data Model

collided page faults, In-Paging I/O, Collided Page Faults

color (PFN entries), PFN Data Structures

COM components, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)

COM quota interfaces, Per-User Volume Quotas

COM TxF components, Transaction Support

COM+ applications, x86 Address Space Layouts

COM1 device name, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

Command Prompt, Safe Mode, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)

Command Server Thread, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems


defined, Allocation Granularity

memory notification events, Memory Notification Events–Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events

page fault handling, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Commit
Charge and the System Commit Limit, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Commit Charge and Page File Size, Commit Charge and Page File Size


virtual address space, Virtual Address Descriptors

commit limits, Examining Memory Usage, Commit Limit, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit

commit phase (VSS), VSS Operation

commit records, Logging Implementation

commitment, Commit Limit

committed bytes, Examining Memory Usage

committed memory, Shared Memory and Mapped Files–Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Heap Manager Structure

core heap and, Heap Manager Structure

section objects, Shared Memory and Mapped Files–Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files

committed pages, Large and Small Pages–Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Invalid PTEs, PFN Data Structures

memory manager, Large and Small Pages–Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages

page faults, Invalid PTEs

working set index field, PFN Data Structures
committed transactions, Transactional APIs, Log Record Types, Analysis Pass
Common Criteria profiles, Page List Dynamics
Common Internet File System (CIFS), Remote FSDs
common logs (CLFS), Log Types–Log Types, Log Types
CompactFlash cards, ReadyBoost
Compare and Exchange 8 Bytes (CMPXCHG8B), Windows x64 16-TB Limitation
Compatibility Administrator tool, No Execute Page Protection
compatible IDs (drivers), Driver Installation
compensating log records (CLRs), Logging Implementation
complete memory dumps, Crash Dump Files, Crash Dump Files, Crash Dump Files, Hung or Unresponsive Systems
Complete PC Restore (System Image Recover), Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)
completing IRPs, I/O Request to a Single-Layered Driver
completion packets, The IoCompletion Object, Using Completion Ports, I/O Completion Port Operation
completion routines, Structure of a Driver
CompletionContext field, I/O Completion Port Operation
CompletionKey parameter, I/O Completion Port Operation
compliance logging (CLFS), Common Log File System
component entries (LDM), The LDM Database–The LDM Database, The LDM Database, The LDM Database
compression units, Compressing Nonsparse Data
computers, lost or stolen, BitLocker Drive Encryption

concurrency (KMDF), KMDF I/O Model, KMDF I/O Model concurrency values, The IoCompletion Object, Using Completion Ports, I/O Completion Port Operation

configaccesspolicy element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

configflags element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

configuration changes, PnP, The Plug and Play (PnP) Manager

configuration manager, Driver Installation, Monitoring Pool Usage, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit, Shutdown

core registry hives, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

loading registry hives, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

memory allocations, Monitoring Pool Usage

PnP hardware installation, Driver Installation

shutting down, Shutdown

conserving energy, Driver and Application Control of Device Power

console applications, Shutdown

consolidated security, Indexing, Consolidated Security, Consolidated Security, Consolidated Security

container IDs, Device Stack Driver Loading–Device Stack Driver Loading, Device Stack Driver Loading, Device Stack Driver Loading

container indexes, Log Sequence Numbers

container notifications, Container Notifications

containers, Common Log File System, Management Policies

content indexing, I/O Priorities

contention, resources under, Hung or Unresponsive Systems

context agent (scenario manager), Components
context control blocks (CCBs), Log Types
CONTEXT structure, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
context switching, I/O Completion Ports, Page Directories
control areas (section objects), Section Objects, Section Objects, Section Objects, Section Objects, Section Objects, Driver Verifier
control backoff, Prioritization Strategies
control block data structures, I/O Completion Port Operation–I/O Completion Port Operation, I/O Completion Port Operation, I/O Completion Port Operation
control sets, Last Known Good, Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang
control vectors, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
controller objects, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
converting leases, Locking
cookies, Software Data Execution Prevention
copy APIs, Transactional APIs
copy method, File System Interfaces
copy protection mechanisms, No Execute Page Protection

cloned processes, Process Reflection
commit charge, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit
differential copies, Shadow Copy Provider–Uses in Windows, Shadow Copy Provider, Uses in Windows, Uses in Windows, Uses in Windows
files not copied, Shadow Copy Provider
memory manager, Memory Management
Previous Versions feature, Previous Versions and System Restore
Shadow Copy Provider, Shadow Copy Provider–Uses in Windows, Shadow Copy Provider, Uses in Windows
volume copies, Volume Shadow Copy Service, Shadow Copy Provider, Previous Versions and System Restore
Copy-on-write bit (PTEs), Page Tables and Page Table Entries
copying files, File System Interfaces, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Copying Encrypted Files
core heap, Heap Manager Structure, The Low Fragmentation Heap
increase/decrease actions, Increase/Decrease Actions–Thresholds and Policy Settings, Thresholds and Policy Settings, Thresholds and Policy Settings
policies, Core Parking Policies, Thresholds and Policy Settings
PPM parking and unparking, Performance Check
viewing, Performance Check–Performance Check, Performance Check
viewing processor history, Utility Function
CORE_PARKING_POLICY_CHANGE_IDEAL value, Increase/Decrease Actions
CORE_PARKING_POLICY_CHANGE_ROCKET value, Increase/Decrease Actions
CORE_PARKING_POLICY_CHANGE_STEP value, Increase/Decrease Actions
corruption, Synchronization, VSS Operation, The Low Fragmentation Heap–Heap
Debugging Features, Heap Debugging Features, Pageheap, Fault Tolerant Heap,
Windows Client Memory Limits, Recoverable File System Support, Self-
Security, Solving Common Boot Problems–Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang,
Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang, Using Crash Troubleshooting Tools–Buffer
Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory
Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special
Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns,
Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and
Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer
Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory
Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special
Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL,
0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL
boot problems, Solving Common Boot Problems–Post–Splash Screen Crash or
Hang, Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang
cache management, Recoverable File System Support
crash dump tools, Using Crash Troubleshooting Tools–Buffer Overruns,
Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption,
and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool,
Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns,
Memory Corruption, and Special Pool
driver synchronization, Synchronization
fault tolerant heap, Fault Tolerant Heap
heap manager, The Low Fragmentation Heap–Heap Debugging Features, Heap
Debugging Features
large physical addresses, Windows Client Memory Limits
pageheap, Pageheap
pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL


size of, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool

VSS shadow copies, VSS Operation

costs, computing for nodes, NUMA

cover files (BitLocker To Go), BitLocker To Go

CR-R format, UDF

CR3 register, Page Directories

crash buttons, Hung or Unresponsive Systems

crash command, Hung or Unresponsive Systems

.crash dump drivers, Crash Dump Files

Crash Troubleshooting Tools—Advanced Crash Dump Analysis, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis—When There Is No Crash Dump, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis, Stack Trashes, Stack Trashes, Hung or Unresponsive Systems—When There Is No Crash Dump, Hung or Unresponsive Systems, Hung or Unresponsive Systems, When There Is No Crash Dump, When There Is No Crash Dump—When There Is No Crash Dump, When There Is No Crash Dump, When There Is No Crash Dump, When There Is No Crash Dump, When There Is No Crash Dump, When There Is No Crash Dump, Analysis of Common Stop Codes—0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL, 0xD1 - DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL, Hardware Malfunctions

advanced analysis, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis—When There Is No Crash Dump, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis, Stack Trashes, Stack Trashes, Hung or Unresponsive Systems, Hung or Unresponsive Systems, When There Is No Crash Dump, When There Is No Crash Dump

basic analysis, Basic Crash Dump Analysis—Verbose Analysis, Basic Crash Dump Analysis, Basic Crash Dump Analysis, Verbose Analysis, Verbose Analysis

blue screen crashes, The Blue Screen—Troubleshooting Crashes, The Blue Screen—Troubleshooting Crashes, Troubleshooting Crashes, Troubleshooting Crashes

capturing data in dump files, Crash Dump Files, Crash Dump Files, Crash Dump Files, Crash Dump Files, Crash Dump Generation, Crash Dump Generation, Crash Dump
Generation

displaying VACBs, **Systemwide Cache Data Structures**
drivers, **Crash Dump Generation**
generating files, **Crash Dump Generation**
hardware malfunctions, **Hardware Malfunctions**
hung/unresponsive systems, **Hung or Unresponsive Systems—When There Is No Crash Dump**, **When There Is No Crash Dump**, **When There Is No Crash Dump**
memory corruption, **Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool**, **Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool**, **Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool**, **Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool**
memory information, **Examining Memory Usage**
no dump file available, **When There Is No Crash Dump—When There Is No Crash Dump**, **When There Is No Crash Dump**, **When There Is No Crash Dump**
online analysis, **Online Crash Analysis—Notmyfault**, **Basic Crash Dump Analysis**, **Notmyfault**
reasons for crashes, **Why Does Windows Crash?—The Blue Screen**, **The Blue Screen**
sending to Microsoft, **Windows Error Reporting—Windows Error Reporting**, **Windows Error Reporting**, **Windows Error Reporting**
special pool, **Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool**, **Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool**, **Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool**, **Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool**—**Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool**, **Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool**, **Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool**
stop code analysis, **Analysis of Common Stop Codes—0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL**, **0xD1 -**
DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL

system code write protection, Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection

top 20 stop codes, Causes of Windows Crashes, Troubleshooting Crashes

troubleshooting crashes, Troubleshooting Crashes–Crash Dump Files, Crash Dump Files

troubleshooting tools, Using Crash Troubleshooting Tools–Advanced Crash Dump Analysis, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis

troubleshooting without files, When There Is No Crash Dump

verbose analysis, Verbose Analysis–Verbose Analysis, Verbose Analysis

viewing, Crash Dump Files–Crash Dump Generation, Crash Dump Generation

CrashControl registry key, Troubleshooting Crashes

Crashdump.sys driver, Crash Dump Generation

crashes, NTFS Recovery Support, Solving Common Boot Problems–Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang, Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang, Causes of Windows Crashes, Troubleshooting Crashes, Troubleshooting Crashes–Crash Dump Files, Crash Dump Files, Crash Dump Files, Notmyfault–Basic Crash Dump Analysis, Basic Crash Dump Analysis, Hardware Malfunctions

boot problems, Solving Common Boot Problems–Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang, Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang

hardware malfunctions, Hardware Malfunctions

manual system crashes, Crash Dump Files

Notmyfault manual crashes, Notmyfault–Basic Crash Dump Analysis, Basic Crash Dump Analysis

recovery and, NTFS Recovery Support

top 20 stop codes, Causes of Windows Crashes, Troubleshooting Crashes
troubleshooting, [Troubleshooting Crashes–Crash Dump Files](#), [Crash Dump Files](#)

CRC (cyclic redundancy checksums), [GUID Partition Table Partitioning](#)

create APIs, [Transactional APIs](#)

create operations, [User-Initiated I/O Cancellation](#), [KMDF I/O Model](#)

CreateFile function, [Opening Devices](#), [I/O Processing](#), [Disk Device Objects](#), [Cache Virtual Memory Management](#), [Intelligent ReadAhead](#), [Forcing the Cache to Write Through to Disk](#), [File System Operation](#)

active files, [Cache Virtual Memory Management](#)

asynchronous I/O, [I/O Processing](#)

opening disks, [Disk Device Objects](#)

opening file objects, [Opening Devices](#), [File System Operation](#)

sequential file access, [Intelligent ReadAhead](#)

write-through, [Forcing the Cache to Write Through to Disk](#)

CreateFileMapping function, [Mapped File I/O and File Caching](#), [Shared Memory and Mapped Files](#), [Transactional APIs](#)

CreateFileMappingNuma function, [Services Provided by the Memory Manager](#), [Shared Memory and Mapped Files](#)

CreateHardLink function, [Hard Links](#)

CreateIoCompletionPort function, [Using Completion Ports](#)

CreateMemoryResourceNotification function, [Memory Notification Events](#)

CreateRemoteThread function, [Reserving and Committing Pages](#)

CreateThread function, [Reserving and Committing Pages](#)

credential providers, [Smss, Csrss, and Wininit](#)

Critical I/O priority, [I/O Priorities](#), [Prioritization Strategies](#), [Prioritization Strategies](#)
critical object crashes, Causes of Windows Crashes–Troubleshooting Crashes, Causes of Windows Crashes, Troubleshooting Crashes

critical processes, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

critical threads, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

CRITICAL_OBJECT_TERMINATION stop code, Causes of Windows Crashes–Troubleshooting Crashes, Causes of Windows Crashes, Troubleshooting Crashes

cross-process memory access, Reserving and Committing Pages, Virtual Address Space Layouts

C CRTM (Core Root of Trust of Measurement), Trusted Platform Module (TPM)

Cryptography Next Generation (CNG), Encrypting File System Security


boot process, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

initialization tasks, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

paged pool area, Virtual Address Space Layouts

shutdown functions, Shutdown–Shutdown, Shutdown, Shutdown

CTRL_LOGOFF_EVENT event, Shutdown

CTRL_SHUTDOWN_EVENT event, Shutdown

current byte offsets, Opening Devices, Opening Devices

current threads, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis

customactions element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

cyclic redundancy checksums (CRC), GUID Partition Table Partitioning
D

D0 (fully on) power state, The Power Manager, Power Manager Operation

D1 device power state, The Power Manager, Power Manager Operation

D2 device power state, The Power Manager, Power Manager Operation

D3 (fully off) power state, The Power Manager, Power Manager Operation

data decryption field (DDF), Encrypting a File for the First Time, Encrypting a File for the First Time, Encrypting File Data

Data Recovery Agent (DRA), BitLocker Management

data recovery field (DRF), Encrypting a File for the First Time, Encrypting a File for the First Time, Encrypting File Data

data redundancy, Multipartition Volume Management, Data Redundancy and Fault Tolerance

data structures, Physical Memory Limits, Per-File Cache Data Structures
  caching, Per-File Cache Data Structures
  physical memory support, Physical Memory Limits

data transfers, Structure of a Driver

database records (LDM), The LDM Database

DbgLoadImageSymbols function, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

dbgtransport element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

dc command, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL

DC2WMI parser tool, Driver Verifier

dd command, I/O Priority Boosts and Bumps

DDF (data decryption field), Encrypting a File for the First Time, Encrypting a File for the First Time, Encrypting File Data

deadlock detection, Hung or Unresponsive Systems
detection, Hung or Unresponsive Systems
modified page writer, Modified Page Writer–Modified Page Writer, Modified Page Writer
process reflection, Process Reflection–Process Reflection, Process Reflection
debug BCD option, Hung or Unresponsive Systems
debug command, BitLocker Key Recovery
debug element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
debug environments, 0x8E - KERNEL_MODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED
debugaddress element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
debugger, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, Crash Dump Files, Crash Dump Files, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis–Stack Trashes, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis, Stack Trashes
Debugger Extension APIs, Crash Dump Files
debugging mode, Hung or Unresponsive Systems–When There Is No Crash Dump, Hung or Unresponsive Systems, When There Is No Crash Dump, When There Is No Crash Dump
Debugging Tools for Windows, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis–Stack Trashes, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis, Stack Trashes
debugport element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
debugstart element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
debugtype element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
DecodeSystemPointer API, Software Data Execution Prevention
decommitting memory, Heap Manager Structure
decommitting pages, Reserving and Committing Pages
decompressing files, Compressing Nonsparse Data
decreasing thresholds (processors), Thresholds and Policy Settings
DecryptFile function, Encryption
decryption, The Decryption Process
dedicated logs, Log Types, Owner Pages
Default BCD element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
default core parking, Core Parking Policies
default process heaps, Types of Heaps
default resource manager (, Master File Table, Resource Managers, Resource Managers, On-Disk Implementation
DefineDosDevice function, Opening Devices
Defrag.exe, Defragmentation
defragmentation, I/O Priorities, NAND-Type Flash Memory, Page Files, Logical Prefetcher, POSIX Support–Defragmentation, Defragmentation, Defragmentation
  NTFS design goals, POSIX Support–Defragmentation, Defragmentation, Defragmentation
  page files, Page Files
  prefetch operations, Logical Prefetcher
  priorities, I/O Priorities
  SSDs, NAND-Type Flash Memory
defragmentation APIs, Defragmentation
delayed file deleting, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
delayed file renaming, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
delete APIs, Transactional APIs
delete operations, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
deleted files, File Deletion and the Trim Command, Resource Managers
deleted partitions, Basic Disk Volume Manager
demand paging, Virtual Address Descriptors, Demand Paging
demand-start (3) value, The Start Value
demand-zero pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Page Fault Handling,
Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Page List Dynamics–Page List Dynamics,
Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics

in commit charge, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit

page faults and, Page Fault Handling

page list dynamics, Page List Dynamics–Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics,
Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics

private committed pages, Reserving and Committing Pages
demotion (performance states), Thresholds and Policy Settings
DependOnGroup value, The Start Value
deprioritization (robust performance), Robust Performance
desktops, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit, Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang

initializing objects, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

post-splash-screen hangs or crashes, Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang

DESX encryption, Encrypting File Data
detecthal element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
detection component (FTH), Fault Tolerant Heap
device drivers, Typical I/O Processing–Layered Drivers, Types of Device Drivers,
Types of Device Drivers, Types of Device Drivers, Layered Drivers–Layered Drivers,
Layered Drivers, Layered Drivers, Layered Drivers, Layered Drivers, Structure of a Driver,
Structure of a Driver, Structure of a Driver–Opening Devices, Structure of a Driver,
Driver Objects and Device Objects, Driver Objects and Device Objects,
Driver Objects and Device Objects, Driver Objects and Device Objects, Driver Objects and Device Objects,
Opening Devices–Opening Devices, Opening

access violations, Causes of Windows Crashes

associated IRPs, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers–I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, blue screen information, The Blue Screen

boot process, Startup and Shutdown

breakpoints in, 0x8E - KERNEL_MODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED

corruption and startup issues, System File Corruption, System Hive Corruption
deadlock detection, Hung or Unresponsive Systems
deciphering names, Troubleshooting Crashes
disk drivers, Disk Drivers, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Disk Device Objects, Partition Manager
driver and device objects, Structure of a Driver–Opening Devices, Driver Objects and Device Objects, Driver Objects and Device Objects, Driver Objects and Device Objects, Driver Objects and Device Objects, Driver Objects and Device Objects, Driver Objects and Device Objects, Opening Devices
high IRQL faults, 0xD1 - DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL
IRP processing, I/O Request Packets–IRP Stack Locations, IRP Stack Locations, IRP Stack Locations, I/O Request to a Single-Layered Driver, I/O Request to a Single-Layered Driver, Servicing an Interrupt, Completing an I/O Request, Completing an I/O Request
kernel-mode, Types of Device Drivers, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)
look-aside lists, Look-Aside Lists
new, crashing, Troubleshooting Crashes–Troubleshooting Crashes, Troubleshooting Crashes, Troubleshooting Crashes
opening devices, Opening Devices–Opening Devices, Opening Devices, Opening Devices
physical memory support and, Physical Memory Limits
pool tags, Monitoring Pool Usage–Monitoring Pool Usage, Monitoring Pool Usage, Monitoring Pool Usage
routines, Structure of a Driver, Structure of a Driver, Structure of a Driver
Environment (WinRE), Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)

section objects and, Shared Memory and Mapped Files

servicing interrupts, Servicing an Interrupt, Servicing an Interrupt, Completing an I/O Request

troubleshooting, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)
types of, Typical I/O Processing–Layered Drivers, Types of Device Drivers, Layered Drivers

user mode, Types of Device Drivers, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF), The Plug and Play (PnP) Manager

version information, Verbose Analysis

viewing loaded drivers list, Layered Drivers–Layered Drivers, Layered Drivers, Layered Drivers

virtual address and, x86 Virtual Address Translation
device IDs, Device Stacks, Device Stack Driver Loading, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
device instance IDs (DIIDs), Device Stack Driver Loading, Device Stack Driver Loading
device interrupt request level (DIRQL), Structure of a Driver, Servicing an Interrupt
device IRQL (DIRQL), Structure of a Driver, Servicing an Interrupt

Device Manager (Devmgmt.msc), Device Enumeration–Device Enumeration, Device Enumeration, Device Enumeration, Device Stack Driver Loading, Driver Power Operation, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits–32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang–Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang, Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang, Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang, Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang, Verbose Analysis
devnode information, Device Stack Driver Loading
disabling drivers, Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang, Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang, Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang, Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang

driver power mappings, Driver Power Operation

listing devices, Device Enumeration–Device Enumeration, Device Enumeration, Device Enumeration

updating drivers, Verbose Analysis

viewing memory regions, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits–32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits


in I/O process, Structure of a Driver–Opening Devices, Driver Objects and Device Objects, Driver Objects and Device Objects, Driver Objects and Device Objects, Driver Objects and Device Objects, Driver Objects and Device Objects, Opening Devices

volume’s, Local FSDs, Explicit File I/O

device stacks, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF), User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF), Device Stacks, Device Stacks

device stacks (DevStack), Attaching VHDS

device trees, Device Enumeration, Device Enumeration, Device Enumeration

device-specific modules (DSMs), Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers

DeviceIoControl function, IRP Buffer Management, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions, Notmyfault

driver power control, Driver and Application Control of Device Power

I/O cancellation, I/O Cancellation

KMDF objects, KMDF Data Model

listing for crash analysis, Online Crash Analysis

name mappings, Opening Devices

names, Opening Devices

PnP manager, The Plug and Play (PnP) Manager


power states, The Power Manager

synchronizing access, Opening Devices

DEVICE_OBJECT structure, KMDF Data Model

devnodes, Device Enumeration, Device Enumeration, Device Stack Driver Loading–Device Stack Driver Loading, Device Stack Driver Loading, Device Stack Driver Loading
difference data, Shadow Copy Provider

differences area, Copy-on-Write Shadow Copies

differencing (virtual hard disks), Virtual Hard Disk Support

diffuser (encryption), Encryption Keys, Encryption Keys, Full-Volume Encryption Driver

digital signatures, I/O System Components, Driver Installation

dir command, Multiple Data Streams, File Names

direct I/O, IRP Buffer Management


as virtual files, The I/O Manager

compression, Compression and Sparse Files, Data Compression and Sparse Files—The Change Journal File, Data Compression and Sparse Files, Compressing Nonsparse Data, Compressing Nonsparse Data, The Change Journal File


indexing, Indexing

missing, Troubleshooting File System Problems

new, The Change Journal File

symbolic links, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions

transaction resource managers, Transactional APIs—Resource Managers,
Resource Managers, Resource Managers

Windows Resource Protection, System File Corruption
directory junctions, Opening Devices, Hard Links, Symbolic (Soft) Links andJunctions, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions
Directory Services Restore, Safe Mode, Driver Loading in Safe Mode
DirectX drivers, Layered Drivers
dirty bits, Page Tables and Page Table Entries, Hardware vs. Software Write Bits inPage Table Entries, Page Fault Handling, Fast I/O
dirty page table recovery, Recovery, Analysis Pass
dirty page threshold, Write Throttling, Write Throttling
dirty pages, Memory Manager Components, Cache Physical Size–Cache DataStructures, Cache Data Structures, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing,Disabling Lazy Writing for a File, Flushing Mapped Files, Cache Manager's LazyWriter

  lazy writer, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Disabling Lazy Writing for a File, Cache Manager’s Lazy Writer

modified page writer, Memory Manager Components
multiple process mapped files, Flushing Mapped Files
standby and modified lists, Cache Physical Size–Cache Data Structures, CacheData Structures
discovery mechanisms, iSCSI Drivers–Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, iSCSI Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers
discovery volumes, BitLocker To Go, BitLocker To Go
disk allocations, Compressing Nonsparse Data
Disk Defragment utility (Dfrgul.exe), Defragmentation
disk device objects, Disk Device Objects, Disk Device Objects, Partition Manager
disk devices, Disk Devices, Disk Sector Format, Disk Sector Format, NAND-Type
Flash Memory, File Deletion and the Trim Command, File Deletion and the Trim Command, Partition Manager
disk drivers, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, Winload, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers–Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers–Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers–Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers–Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers–Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers, iSCSI Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Virtual Disk Service, Virtual Disk Service
disk class, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers–Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Disk Device Objects
disk I/O operations, Volume I/O Operations–Virtual Disk Service, Virtual Disk Service
file system drivers, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers
miniport, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers–Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers
partition manager, Partition Manager
port, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers–Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers
WINLOAD, Winload
disk entries (LDM), The LDM Database–The LDM Database, The LDM Database, The LDM Database, The LDM Database
disk groups, The LDM Database
Disk Management MMC snap-in, Dynamic Disk Volume Manager, Multipartition Volume Management, Mirrored Volumes, Mount Points, Virtual Disk Service,
FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, Volumes, Clusters–Master File Table, Clusters, Master File Table

cluster size, Clusters–Master File Table, Clusters, Master File Table

creating mirrored volumes, Mirrored Volumes

creating volumes, Volumes

formatting FAT volumes, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32

mount points, Mount Points

VDS APIs, Virtual Disk Service

volume manager, Dynamic Disk Volume Manager, Multipartition Volume Management

disk miniport drivers, Winload, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Crash Dump Generation

disk offsets, Multipartition Volume Management, The Mount Manager

disk port drivers, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers--iSCSI Drivers, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers, iSCSI Drivers

disk scheduling algorithms, Winload

disk sector formats, Disk Sector Format–NAND-Type Flash Memory, Disk Sector Format, Disk Sector Format, NAND-Type Flash Memory

disk signatures, The Mount Manager, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

Disk.sys driver, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers

Disk2VHD utility, Virtual Hard Disk Support

Diskmon utility, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers

diskpart command, Volumes

DiskPart utility, Volume Mounting, Virtual Hard Disk Support

disks, Storage Management, Rotating Magnetic Disks, Disk Sector Format, Solid State Disks, NAND-Type Flash Memory, File Deletion and the Trim Command,
File Deletion and the Trim Command, Virtual Disk Service
dismount operations, Local FSDs
dispatch entry points, IRP Stack Locations
dispatch functions, Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver
dispatch levels, Synchronization, Causes of Windows Crashes
dispatch methods (KMDF queues), KMDF I/O Model
dispatch routines, Structure of a Driver, IRP Stack Locations, IRP Stack Locations, KMDF I/O Model, Driver Support for Plug and Play
dispatcher data structures, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
DISPATCH_LEVEL IRQL, Completing an I/O Request, Synchronization
Dispdiag.exe (display diagnostic dump utility), x86 Address Space Layouts
display diagnostic dump utility (Dispdiag.exe), x86 Address Space Layouts
display drivers, Causes of Windows Crashes
displaybootmenu element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
displaybootorder element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
distributed link-tracking, Link Tracking
Distributed Transaction Coordinator, Resource Managers
dl command, Power Availability Requests
Dllhost (Dllhost.exe), Logical Prefetcher
Dllhst3g.exe, x86 Address Space Layouts
DLLs (dynamic link libraries), User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF), Virtual Disk Service, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, User Address Space Layout, User Address Space Layout
  address space, User Address Space Layout, User Address Space Layout
  sharing, Shared Memory and Mapped Files
UMDF drivers, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)
VDS hardware providers, Virtual Disk Service

DMA (direct memory access), I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, Driver Verifier, KMDF Data Model, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF), Caching with the Direct Memory Access Interfaces, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool

caching processes, Caching with the Direct Memory Access Interfaces

IRP processing, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers

KMDF objects, KMDF Data Model

pool corruption, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool

UMDF, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)

verifying functions and buffers, Driver Verifier

DMA Checking option, Driver Verifier

DMA common buffer objects, KMDF Data Model

DMA enabler objects, KMDF Data Model

DMA transaction objects, KMDF Data Model

DMA-aware devices, IRP Buffer Management

DMDiskManager, Dynamic Disk Volume Manager–Multipartition Volume Management, Multipartition Volume Management

double errors, NTFS Bad-Cluster Recovery

double faults, 0x7F - UNEXPECTED KERNEL_MODE_TRAP, 0x7F - UNEXPECTED KERNEL_MODE_TRAP

double-freeing memory, Driver Verifier

DO_PRIORITY_CALLBACK_ENABLED flag, I/O Priority Inversion Avoidance (I/O Priority Inheritance)

DPC routines, Structure of a Driver

DPC stacks, Stacks, DPC Stack, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
DPC/dispatch levels, Driver Verifier, Causes of Windows Crashes, Basic Crash Dump Analysis, Hung or Unresponsive Systems

DPCs (deferred procedure calls), Structure of a Driver, Structure of a Driver, Servicing an Interrupt—Completing an I/O Request, Completing an I/O Request, Completing an I/O Request, Completing an I/O Request, KMDF Data Model, Performance Check, Stacks, Kernel Stacks, Driver Verifier, Hung or Unresponsive Systems

hung systems, Hung or Unresponsive Systems

in I/O process, Structure of a Driver

interrupt processing, Servicing an Interrupt—Completing an I/O Request, Completing an I/O Request, Completing an I/O Request

KMDF objects, KMDF Data Model

pool quotas and, Driver Verifier

power domain masters, Performance Check

routines, Structure of a Driver

stacks, Stacks, Kernel Stacks

thread context, Completing an I/O Request

dps command, Stack Trashes

DRA (Data Recovery Agent), BitLocker Management

DRF (data recovery field), Encrypting a File for the First Time, Encrypting a File for the First Time, Encrypting File Data

drive letters, Basic Disk Volume Manager, The LDM Database, Explicit File I/O

dynamic disks, The LDM Database

symbolic links, Explicit File I/O

volume manager, Basic Disk Volume Manager

driver callbacks, When There Is No Crash Dump
driver entry points, Driver Objects and Device Objects

driver groups, Driver Loading in Safe Mode, Using Crash Troubleshooting Tools

driver host processes, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)

driver images, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management

driver manager, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)—User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF), User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF), User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)

Driver Verifier, Kernel-Mode Driver Framework (KMDF), Large and Small Pages, Monitoring Pool Usage, Driver Verifier–Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Using Crash Troubleshooting Tools, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool—Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL

    disabling large pages, Large and Small Pages

driver errors, Using Crash Troubleshooting Tools

enabling special pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool—Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool

IRQL checking, Driver Verifier

low resources simulation, Driver Verifier

memory manager, Driver Verifier–Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier

miscellaneous checks, Driver Verifier

No Reboot option, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool
overview, Kernel-Mode Driver Framework (KMDF)
pool tracking, Monitoring Pool Usage, Driver Verifier
special pool verification, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL
Driver Verifier Manager, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool
driver-signing policies, Driver Installation, Driver Installation, Driver Installation
DriverEntry routine, Structure of a Driver
driverloadfailurepolicy element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
buffer management, IRP Buffer Management—I/O Request to a Single-Layered Driver, IRP Buffer Management, I/O Request to a Single-Layered Driver

callbacks, When There Is No Crash Dump
calling other drivers, The I/O Manager
deadlock detection, Hung or Unresponsive Systems
disk drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers
dispatch routines, IRP Stack Locations
groups, Driver Loading in Safe Mode
I/O system and, I/O System
images, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management
IRPs, The I/O Manager
KMDF objects, KMDF Data Model
layered, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, NTFS File System Driver

loading in safe mode, Driver Loading in Safe Mode, Driver Loading in Safe Mode, Driver Loading in Safe Mode

lower order, Stack Trashes
major function codes, **IRP Stack Locations**

matching for minidumps, **Crash Dump Files**

memory manager, **Internal Synchronization**

non-Plug and Play, **Level of Plug and Play Support**


PnP support, **Level of Plug and Play Support–The Start Value**, **Driver Support for Plug and Play**, **The Start Value**

pool tags, **Monitoring Pool Usage–Monitoring Pool Usage**, **Monitoring Pool Usage**, **Monitoring Pool Usage**

power mappings, **Power Manager Operation–Driver Power Operation**, **Driver Power Operation**

protected driver lists, **Driver Installation**

registry keys, **Driver Loading, Initialization, and Installation–The Start Value**, **The Start Value**, **The Start Value**

signed and unsigned, **Driver Installation**, **Driver Installation**
synchronizing data and hardware access, Synchronization–Synchronization, Synchronization, Synchronization

version information, Verbose Analysis

DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL stop code, Causes of Windows Crashes, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL

DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL stop code, Causes of Windows Crashes, 0xD1 - DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL, 0xD1 - DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL

DRIVER_OVERRAN_STACK_BUFFER stop code, Stack Trashes

DRIVER_POWER_STATE_FAILURE stop code, Causes of Windows Crashes

Drvinst.exe process, Driver Installation

DSM (device-specific modules), Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers
dt command, Thresholds and Policy Settings, Performance Check, x86 Session Space, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
dual-boot environments, Mount Points
dummy pages, Clustered Page Faults–Page Files, Clustered Page Faults, Page Files
.dtype command, Crash Dump Files, Hung or Unresponsive Systems
dump counts (BLF), Log Layout

DUMP files, Crash Dump Files
dump pointer with symbols command, Stack Trashes

Dumpanalysis.org website, Conclusion

Dumpbin utility, x86 Address Space Layouts

dumpdebug command, Crash Dump Files

Dumpfve.sys driver, Crash Dump Generation
duplicate data in memory, Section Objects–Section Objects, Section Objects, Section Objects
DuplicateHandle function, Opening Devices, Shared Memory and Mapped Files
DVD drives, Storage Terminology
DVD formats, UDF
Dxgport/Videoprt driver, Layered Drivers
dynamic address space, x86 System Address Space Layout, x86 Session Space, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management

dynamic bad-cluster remapping, Dynamic Bad-Cluster Remapping, NTFS Bad-Cluster Recovery
dynamic disks, Volume Management, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, Dynamic Disk Volume Manager, Dynamic Disk Volume Manager, Multipartition Volume Management, Multipartition Volume Management–RAID-5 Volumes, RAID-5 Volumes

    multipartition disk support, Volume Management

    partitioning, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning

    storage management, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, Dynamic Disk Volume Manager, Multipartition Volume Management–RAID-5 Volumes, RAID-5 Volumes

    volume manager, Dynamic Disk Volume Manager, Multipartition Volume Management
dynamic interrupt redirection, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers
dynamic loading and unloading, I/O System Components
dynamic page sizes, Large and Small Pages
dynamic partitioning, Dynamic Partitioning
dynamic physical NVRAM cache, Unified Caching
dynamic system virtual address space management, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management–System Virtual Address Space Quotas, Dynamic
System Virtual Address Space Management, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, System Virtual Address Space Quotas, System Virtual Address Space Quotas

dynamic virtual hard disks, Virtual Hard Disk Support
E

ECC (error correcting code), Disk Sector Format, NAND-Type Flash Memory, PFN Data Structures

echo command, Multiple Data Streams

ECP (extended create parameters), Opening Devices

EFI (Extensible Firmware Interface), Winload, Basic Disks–GUID Partition Table Partitioning, GUID Partition Table Partitioning, GUID Partition Table Partitioning, Startup and Shutdown, Boot Process, The UEFI Boot Process, The UEFI Boot Process

APIs, The UEFI Boot Process

BCD in, Winload

boot process, Startup and Shutdown

file extensions, The UEFI Boot Process

partitioning and, Basic Disks–GUID Partition Table Partitioning, GUID Partition Table Partitioning, GUID Partition Table Partitioning

Unified EFI (EFI 2.0), Boot Process

EFI Boot Manager, The UEFI Boot Process

EFI system partition, The UEFI Boot Process


EFSDump utility, Backing Up Encrypted Files

EISA devices, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

eject events, Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver

EKU (enhanced key usage), Encrypting File Data
El Torito CDFS, *The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr*

Elephant diffuser, *Encryption Keys, Full-Volume Encryption Driver*

embedded links (OLE), *Link Tracking*

embedded spaces (file names), *File Names*

emd (External Memory Device), *ReadyBoost*

emergency hibernation files, *The Power Manager*

Emergency Management Services (EMS), *The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems*

EMET (Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit), *Controlling Security Mitigations*

empty pages, *Shared Memory and Mapped Files*

EMS (Emergency Management Services), *The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr*

ems element, *The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr*

esmsbaudrate element, *The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr*

emsport element, *The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr*

emulation (advanced format disks), *Disk Sector Format*

EncodeSystemPointer API, *Software Data Execution Prevention*

Encrypted Data Recovery Agents policy, *Encrypting a File for the First Time*

EncryptFile function, *Encryption*


encryption, *BitLocker Drive Encryption–BitLocker To Go, BitLocker Drive Encryption, BitLocker Drive Encryption, BitLocker Drive Encryption, Encryption Keys–Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Encryption Keys, Encryption Keys, Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Trusted*

backing up files, Backing Up Encrypted Files

BitLocker Drive Encryption, BitLocker Drive Encryption–BitLocker To Go, BitLocker Drive Encryption, BitLocker Drive Encryption, Encryption Keys, Encryption Keys, Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Trusted Platform Module (TPM), BitLocker Boot Process, BitLocker Key Recovery, Full-Volume Encryption Driver, BitLocker Management, BitLocker To Go, BitLocker To Go

BitLocker To Go, BitLocker To Go–BitLocker To Go, BitLocker To Go

c change journal and, The Change Journal File
decryption, The Decryption Process


file attributes, File Records

file system filter drivers and, Process Monitor

keys, Encryption Keys–Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Trusted Platform Module (TPM)

NTFS design goals, Link Tracking–Defragmentation, Defragmentation

device interfaces, **Driver Objects and Device Objects**
device keys, **Device Stack Driver Loading**, **Driver Installation** enumeration-based loading, **Driver Loading, Initialization, and Installation**
heap entries and regions, **Heap Manager**, **Heap Synchronization**
indexing interactions, **Indexing**
nonenumerable devices, **Device Enumeration**

PnP loading and initialization process, **Device Enumeration–Device Enumeration**, **Device Enumeration**, **Device Enumeration**
registry keys, Device Enumeration, Device Stack Driver Loading
reparse points, Reparse Points
shadow copy writers, VSS Operation
volume manager, Basic Disk Volume Manager
enumeration keys, device, Device Stack Driver Loading, Driver Installation
enumeration-based loading, Driver Loading, Initialization, and Installation
.enumtag command, Crash Dump Files
environment subsystems, The I/O Manager
environment variables, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
EPROCESS structure, Crash Dump Files
ERESOURCE structure, I/O Priority Inversion Avoidance (I/O Priority Inheritance), Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier
errata manager, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
error correcting code (ECC), Disk Sector Format, PFN Data Structures
error messages (boot problems), MBR Corruption–Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang, Boot Sector Corruption, System File Corruption, Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang
error-logging routines, Structure of a Driver
Esentutl.exe (Active Directory Database Utility tool), x86 Address Space Layouts
Ethernet, Booting from iSCSI
ETHREAD structure, I/O Priority Inversion Avoidance (I/O Priority Inheritance), Crash Dump Files
ETW (Event Tracing for Windows), Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
event dispatcher objects, Page List Dynamics
Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Initializing the
Kernel and Executive Subsystems

Event Viewer, Fault Tolerant Heap

events, Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver, Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver, In-Paging I/O–Collided Page Faults, Collided Page Faults, Memory Notification Events–Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events, Common Log File System, Common Log File System, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

CLFS, Common Log File System

in-paging I/O, In-Paging I/O–Collided Page Faults, Collided Page Faults

KDMF drivers, Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver

KDMF runtime states, Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver

logging, Common Log File System

memory notification events, Memory Notification Events–Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events

object types, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

evstore element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

EvtDeviceFileCreate event, KMDF I/O Model

EvtDriverDeviceAdd callback, Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver

EvtDriverDeviceAdd event, Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver

EvtFileCleanup callback, KMDF I/O Model

EvtFileClose callback, KMDF I/O Model

EvtIo routines, Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver

EvtIoDefault callback, KMDF I/O Model

Ex functions, Services Provided by the Memory Manager

ExAdjustLookasideDepth function, Look-Aside Lists

ExAllocatePool functions, Driver Verifier
ExAllocatePoolWithTag function, Driver Verifier

exception codes, Software Data Execution Prevention, Causes of Windows Crashes, Causes of Windows Crashes

exception handlers, Software Data Execution Prevention

exceptions, Memory Manager Components, Why Does Windows Crash?, When There Is No Crash Dump

EXCEPTION_DOUBLE_FAULT exception, 0x7F - UNEXPECTED_KERNEL_MODE_TRAP

exclusive access locks, Locking–Locking, Locking, Locking

exclusive leases, Locking

ExDeleteResource function, Driver Verifier

Executable Dispatch Mitigation, Software Data Execution Prevention

executables, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Protecting Memory–Protecting Memory, Protecting Memory, Protecting Memory, No Execute Page Protection, User Address Space Layout, User Address Space Layout

address space, User Address Space Layout, User Address Space Layout

execute-only, Shared Memory and Mapped Files

execution protection, No Execute Page Protection

PAGE attributes and, Protecting Memory–Protecting Memory, Protecting Memory, Protecting Memory

execution protection, No Execute Page Protection

executive components, Look-Aside Lists, Section Objects, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Shutdown

executive objects, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

executive resource locks, Hung or Unresponsive Systems

executive subsystems, Memory Manager Components, BIOS Preboot, Initializing
the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Shutdown

executive worker threads, System Threads

exFAT file system, exFAT–NTFS, exFAT, NTFS

Exfat.sys, Local FSDs

ExFreePool function, Driver Verifier

ExInitializeNPageSizeLookasideList function, Look-Aside Lists

ExInitializePagedListLookasideList function, Look-Aside Lists

ExitWindowsEx function, Shutdown

expanding, Balance Set Manager and Swapper–System Working Sets, System Working Sets, System Working Sets

working sets, Balance Set Manager and Swapper–System Working Sets, System Working Sets, System Working Sets


ASLR protection, Controlling Security Mitigations

cache flushing, Forcing the Cache to Write Through to Disk–Write Throttling, Write Throttling, Write Throttling

cache manager operations, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing–Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing

catalog files, Driver Installation


core parking policies, Thresholds and Policy Settings–Thresholds and Policy Settings, Thresholds and Policy Settings, Thresholds and Policy Settings

DEP protection, No Execute Page Protection

device handles, Opening Devices–Opening Devices, Opening Devices, Opening Devices

device name mappings, Opening Devices

device objects, Driver Objects and Device Objects, Driver Objects and Device Objects

devnode information, Device Stack Driver Loading
driver dispatch routines, IRP Stack Locations

driver objects, Driver Objects and Device Objects

dump file analysis, Crash Dump Files–Crash Dump Generation, Crash Dump Files, Crash Dump Generation

EFS encryption, Backing Up Encrypted Files

fast I/O routines, Fast I/O

free and zero page lists, Page List Dynamics–Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics

hard links, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions

history, processor utility and frequency, Utility Function

hung program timeouts, Shutdown

I/O priorities, I/O Priority Boosts and Bumps–Bandwidth Reservation (Scheduled File I/O), I/O Priority Boosts and Bumps, Bandwidth Reservation (Scheduled File I/O), Bandwidth Reservation (Scheduled File I/O)

idle system activity, Process Monitor Basic vs. Advanced Modes

INF files, Driver Installation

IRPs, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers–I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers

kernel debugging, When There Is No Crash Dump–When There Is No Crash Dump, When There Is No Crash Dump, When There Is No Crash Dump

kernel stack usage, Kernel Stacks

KMDF drivers, Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver–KMDF Data Model, KMDF Data Model, KMDF Data Model

large address aware applications, x86 Address Space Layouts

LDM database, The LDM Database, The LDM Database, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning
loaded driver lists, Layered Drivers–Layered Drivers, Layered Drivers, Layered Drivers
mapping volume shadow device objects, Previous Versions and System Restore–Conclusion, Conclusion
maximum number of threads, User Stacks
memory mapped files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files
mirrored volume I/O, Mirrored Volumes–Mirrored Volumes, Mirrored Volumes, Mirrored Volumes
NTFS volume information, Master File Table
PAE and addresses, Physical Address Extension (PAE)–Physical Address Extension (PAE), Physical Address Extension (PAE), Physical Address Extension (PAE)
page directories and PDEs, Page Directories
page files, Page Files
PFN database, Page Frame Number Database
PFN entries, PFN Data Structures
physical disk I/O, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers
pool leaks, Monitoring Pool Usage–Look-Aside Lists, Monitoring Pool Usage, Look-Aside Lists
power availability requests, Power Availability Requests
PPM check information, Performance Check–Performance Check, Performance Check
prefetch files, Logical Prefetcher, Logical Prefetcher
prioritized standby lists, Page Priority, Page Priority, Page Priority
Process Monitor’s filter driver, Process Monitor
process reflection, Process Reflection–Process Reflection, Process Reflection
process working sets, Working Set Management

processor utility and frequency, Utility Function–Utility Function, Utility Function

reserved and committed pages, Reserving and Committing Pages–Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages

resource manager information, Resource Managers–On-Disk Implementation, Resource Managers, On-Disk Implementation

restore points and previous versions, Previous Versions and System Restore

session space utilization, x86 Session Space

sessions, x86 Session Space–System Page Table Entries, x86 Session Space, System Page Table Entries

shadow copy device objects, Shadow Copy Provider

shadow volume device objects, Backup

shared and private cache maps, Per-File Cache Data Structures–File System Interfaces, Per-File Cache Data Structures, File System Interfaces

special pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool

streams, Multiple Data Streams

symbolic links, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions

system look-aside lists, Look-Aside Lists

system memory information, Examining Memory Usage–Examining Memory Usage, Examining Memory Usage, Examining Memory Usage

system power and policies, Driver Power Operation–Driver Power Operation, Driver Power Operation, Driver Power Operation

system PTEs, System Page Table Entries–System Page Table Entries, System Page Table Entries
system virtual address usage, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management

thread IRPs, IRP Stack Locations

transactions, Isolation–Transactional APIs, Isolation, Transactional APIs

tunneling, File Names

user virtual address space, User Address Space Layout–User Address Space Layout, User Address Space Layout

VACBs, Systemwide Cache Data Structures

viewing registered file systems, Locking–Locking, Locking

virtual address descriptors, Process VADs

virtual address limits, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management

VPBs, Volume Mounting–Volume Mounting, Volume Mounting

working set lists, Working Set Management–Balance Set Manager and Swapper, Working Set Management, Balance Set Manager and Swapper


write throttling, Write Throttling

explicit device driver loading, The Start Value


explicit memory allocation, Driver Verifier

exportascd element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

exporting control sets, Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang

express queues (cache), System Threads

extended attributes, File Records, The Change Journal File
extended console input, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
extended create parameters (ECP), Opening Devices
Extended File Allocation Table file system (exFat), exFAT–NTFS, NTFS, NTFS
extended partitions, MBR-Style Partitioning, BIOS Preboot
extended input element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
extending data, Sparse Files
extensibility, I/O System Components
extents (runs), Resident and Nonresident Attributes
external disk storage management, Storage Management
External Memory Device (emd), ReadyBoost
F

F10 key, Hung or Unresponsive Systems

F8 key, Last Known Good, Troubleshooting Crashes, Hung or Unresponsive Systems

fail fast policy, Why Does Windows Crash?

failed control sets, Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang

fake symbolic records, Software Data Execution Prevention

faked crash screen saver, Conclusion

fast dispatch routines, Structure of a Driver


  bypassing file system, Virtual Block Caching

  caching methods, Cache Manager

  entry points, Fast I/O—Mapped File I/O and File Caching, Fast I/O, Mapped File I/O and File Caching

  file system drivers, Explicit File I/O—Cache Manager’s Read-Ahead Thread, Cache Manager’s Read-Ahead Thread, Cache Manager’s Read-Ahead Thread

  operations, Fast I/O

fast lookups, Driver Objects and Device Objects

fast mutexes, Driver Verifier, Hung or Unresponsive Systems

fast references, Windows x64 16-TB Limitation

fast teardown queues, System Threads

fast user switching, Components, Scenarios

Fastfat.sys driver, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, Local FSDs
FAT volumes, **FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, Volumes**

FAT12, FAT16, FAT32 file systems, **I/O System Components, Spanned Volumes, BitLocker To Go, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32−FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, Volumes, File Names, NTFS Bad-Cluster Recovery, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The UEFI Boot Process**

bad sectors, **NTFS Bad-Cluster Recovery**

BitLocker To Go, **BitLocker To Go**

Bootmgr support, **The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr**

EFI system partitions, **The UEFI Boot Process**

extending volumes, **Spanned Volumes**

FAT directory entries, **FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32−FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32**

I/O system and, **I/O System Components**

short file names, **File Names**

volumes, **FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, Volumes**

FAT64 file system (exFAT), **exFAT–NTFS, NTFS, NTFS**

fault handler (pager), **x86 Virtual Address Translation**

fault injection, **Driver Verifier**

fault tolerance, **RAID-5 Volumes, Data Redundancy and Fault Tolerance**

fault tolerant heap (FTH), **Fault Tolerant Heap**

feedback handler, **Utility Function, Utility Function**

FEK (File Encryption Key), **Encrypting File System Security, Encrypting File System Security, Encrypting File Data, Encrypting File Data**

fiber-local storage, **Process Reflection**

Fibre Channel devices, **Prioritization Strategies, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport**
Drivers

FiDOs (filter device objects), Device Stacks, Device Stacks

FIFO (first in, first out), Placement Policy

file caching, Mapped File I/O and File Caching

File classes, Transactional APIs

file control blocks (FCBs), Locking, Log Types, Owner Pages, NTFS File System Driver, On-Disk Implementation

file drivers, Scatter/Gather I/O–IRP Stack Locations, IRP Stack Locations, IRP Stack Locations

File Encryption Key (FEK), Encrypting File System Security, Encrypting File System Security, Encrypting File Data

file I/O, File System Interfaces, File System Interfaces, File System Operation

file name indexes, Indexing

file names, Opening Devices, Opening Devices, User Address Space Layout, Logical Prefetcher, Tracing and Logging, Cache Coherency, UDF, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, Hard Links–Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions, File Records, File Names–Resident and Nonresident Attributes, File Names, File Names, File Names, File Names, File Names, File Names, File Names, File Names, Resident and Nonresident Attributes, Resident and Nonresident Attributes, Resident and Nonresident Attributes, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

as attributes, File Records

associated with streams, Tracing and Logging

cache processes, Cache Coherency

device objects in, Opening Devices

FAT volumes, File Names

file object attributes, Opening Devices

hard links, Hard Links–Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions, Symbolic (Soft)
Links and Junctions, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions

kernel image, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

long, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, File Names, File Names

mapped files, User Address Space Layout

multiple, File Names

NTFS on-disk structure, File Names–Resident and Nonresident Attributes, File Names, File Names, Resident and Nonresident Attributes

prefetched data, Logical Prefetcher

short, File Names

tunneling, File Names

UDF format, UDF

file namespaces, File Names–File Names, File Names, File Names

file object extensions, Opening Devices

file object pointers, Per-File Cache Data Structures, Explicit File I/O


attributes, Opening Devices

completion ports and, I/O Completion Port Operation

extension fields, Opening Devices


I/O functions, Driver Objects and Device Objects–Opening Devices, Opening
Devices, Opening Devices, Opening Devices

pointers, Per-File Cache Data Structures
section object pointers, Section Objects
security descriptors, Security
viewing handles, Opening Devices–Opening Devices, Opening Devices, Opening Devices

file record numbers, Hard Links, Object IDs, Resource Managers, On-Disk Implementation

file records, Master File Table, File Records, File Records, File Records, File Names, Resident and Nonresident Attributes, Resident and Nonresident Attributes, Resident and Nonresident Attributes

file sizes, File Systems, UDF, Indexing

file system cache, x86 System Address Space Layout, File System Interfaces, File System Interfaces, Caching with the Mapping and Pinning Interfaces

file system filter drivers, Mount Points, File System Filter Drivers, Process Monitor

file system formats, Volume Mounting, Volume Mounting, File Systems

file system metadata, Single, Centralized System Cache, Recoverable File System Support, Systemwide Cache Data Structures, Caching with the Mapping and Pinning Interfaces, Caching with the Mapping and Pinning Interfaces

file system minifilters, Memory Manager's Modified and Mapped Page Writer

File System Recognizer, Volume Mounting

file systems, File Deletion and the Trim Command–File Deletion and the Trim Command, Volume Mounting, Attaching VHDs, Cache Manager, File Systems–CDFS, Windows File System Formats–Local FSDs, CDFS, CDFS, UDF, UDF, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32–exFAT, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, exFAT–NTFS, exFAT, exFAT, exFAT–Local FSDs, exFAT, NTFS, NTFS, NTFS, NTFS, File System Driver Architecture–Process Monitor, Local FSDs–Local FSDs, Local FSDs, Local FSDs,
cache manager and, **Cache Manager**

CDFS, **CDFS**

CLFS, **Common Log File System, Log Types, Log Layout, Log Blocks, Owner Pages, Translating Virtual LSNs to Physical LSNs, Management Policies**

deleting files, **File Deletion and the Trim Command–File Deletion and the Trim Command**


exFAT, **exFAT–NTFS, exFAT, NTFS**

FAT12, FAT16, FAT32, **FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32–exFAT, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, exFAT**


filter drivers, **File System Filter Drivers–Process Monitor, Process Monitor**

instances, mounting, **Volume Mounting**

local FSDs, **Local FSDs–Local FSDs, Local FSDs, Local FSDs**

nested, **Attaching VHDs**

NTFS, **exFAT–Local FSDs, NTFS, Local FSDs**

NTFS advanced features, **Multiple Data Streams–NTFS File System Driver**, **General Indexing Facility, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions, Compression and Sparse Files, Compression and Sparse Files, Per-User Volume Quotas, Link Tracking, Defragmentation, Defragmentation, Dynamic Partitioning, NTFS File System Driver, NTFS File System Driver**
NTFS high-end file system requirements, **NTFS Design Goals and Features**—Data Redundancy and Fault Tolerance, Recoverability, Data Redundancy and Fault Tolerance


operations, **File System Operation**—Process Monitor, Cache Manager’s Read-Ahead Thread, Process Monitor

overview, **File Systems**—CDFS, CDFS

recoverable, **Design**—Log File Service, Log File Service

registered, viewing, **Locking**—Locking, Locking

troubleshooting, **Troubleshooting File System Problems**—Common Log File System, Process Monitor Troubleshooting Techniques, Common Log File System

UDF, **UDF**

Windows file systems, **Windows File System Formats**—Local FSDs, UDF, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, exFAT, NTFS, Local FSDs
file-allocation chains, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32–FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32

file-to-offset pairs, Tracing and Logging

FileCompletionInformation class, I/O Completion Port Operation

FileEncryptionStatus function, Encryption

FileInfo driver (Fileinfo.sys), Components, Tracing and Logging


attributes, Multiple Data Streams–Multiple Data Streams, Multiple Data Streams

attributes list, File Records–File Names, File Records, File Names

change notifications, Process Monitor Basic vs. Advanced Modes
compression, Compression and Sparse Files, Data Compression and Sparse Files–The Change Journal File, Data Compression and Sparse Files, Compressing Nonsparse Data, Compressing Nonsparse Data, The Change Journal File

copying encrypted, Backing Up Encrypted Files–Conclusion, Conclusion

deleted, File Deletion and the Trim Command–File Deletion and the Trim Command


hard links, Hard Links–Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions

indexing, General Indexing Facility

KMDF objects, KMDF Data Model

locking, Remote FSDs–File System Operation, Locking, File System Operation

mapped file I/O, Mapped File I/O and File Caching

missing, Troubleshooting File System Problems

multiple names, File Names

new, The Change Journal File

open instances of, Opening Devices

read-ahead and write-behind, Read-Ahead and Write-Behind–Conclusion, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Conclusion

resident and nonresident attributes, Resident and Nonresident Attributes–Data Compression and Sparse Files, Resident and Nonresident Attributes, Resident and Nonresident Attributes, Data Compression and Sparse Files

security descriptors, Opening Devices

setting up for cache access, File System Interfaces–Fast I/O, File System Interfaces, Fast I/O
sparse files, Compression and Sparse Files, Compression and Sparse Files
streams, Stream-Based Caching
temporary, Disabling Lazy Writing for a File
usage patterns, Cache Manager’s Read-Ahead Thread
viewing device handles, Opening Devices–Opening Devices, Opening Devices, Opening Devices
virtual, Typical I/O Processing
FILE_ATTRIBUTE_COMPRESSED flag, Compression and Sparse Files
FILE_ATTRIBUTE_ENCRYPTED flag, Encryption
FILE_ATTRIBUTE_REPARSE_POINT flag, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions
FILE_ATTRIBUTE_TEMPORARY flag, Disabling Lazy Writing for a File
FILE_FLAG_NO_BUFFERING flag, Read-Ahead and Write-Behind, Explicit File I/O
FILE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED flag, Synchronous and Asynchronous I/O
FILE_FLAG_RANDOM_ACCESS flag, Cache Virtual Memory Management, Fast I/O, Intelligent Read-Ahead
FILE_FLAG_SEQUENTIAL_SCAN flag, Cache Virtual Memory Management, Intelligent Read-Ahead
FILE_FLAG_WRITE THROUGH flag, Forcing the Cache to Write Through to Disk
FILE_SUPPORTS_TRANSACTIONS value, Transactional APIs
FILE_SYSTEM_RECOGNITION_STRUCTURE type, Local FSDs
filter device objects (FiDOs), Device Stacks, Device Stacks, Basic Disk Volume Manager
filter drivers, Opening Devices, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF), Level of Plug and Play Support, Driver Support for
Plug and Play, BitLocker Drive Encryption, Full-Volume Encryption

BitLocker, BitLocker Drive Encryption

file associations, Opening Devices

file system drivers and, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers

FVE drivers, Full-Volume Encryption Driver–BitLocker Management, BitLocker Management

PnP manager, Level of Plug and Play Support, Driver Support for Plug and Play


UMDF reflectors, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)

Filter Manager (Fltmc.exe), I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, Process Monitor, Process Monitor

filter miniport drivers, Process Monitor

filters, IRPs and, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers

find APIs, Transactional APIs

FindFirstChangeNotification function, Process Monitor Basic vs. Advanced Modes, Change Logging

FindNextChangeNotification function, Process Monitor Basic vs. Advanced Modes

FindNextFile API, Transactional APIs

FireWire cables, Hung or Unresponsive Systems

first in, first out (FIFO), Placement Policy

firstmegabytepolicy element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

fixed disks, Volume Management, Virtual Hard Disk Support

flash disks, Prioritization Strategies, BitLocker Drive Encryption, BitLocker To
Go, ReadyBoost–Unified Caching, ReadyDrive, Unified Caching

BitLocker encryption, BitLocker Drive Encryption

BitLocker To Go, BitLocker To Go

I/O prioritization strategy, Prioritization Strategies

ReadyBoost, ReadyBoost–Unified Caching, ReadyDrive, Unified Caching

flash drivers, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)

flash memory, Solid State Disks, NAND-Type Flash Memory, NAND-Type Flash Memory, ReadyBoost

floppy disk drive letters, The Mount Manager

floppy disks, Storage Management

Ftmc.exe (Filter Manager), Process Monitor

flush queues (CLFS), Log Types–Log Types, Log Types

FlushFileBuffers function, Forcing the Cache to Write Through to Disk

flushing caches, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Forcing the Cache to Write Through to Disk, Design, Log File Service, Recovery, Analysis Pass, Shutdown

in recovery passes, Recovery, Analysis Pass

lazy write systems, Design

LFS operations, Log File Service

shutdown process, Shutdown

threads explicitly flushing, Forcing the Cache to Write Through to Disk

write operations, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing

write-behind operations, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing

flushing mapped files, Flushing Mapped Files–Write Throttling, Write Throttling

flushing modified pages, Modified Page Writer, Modified Page Writer
FlushViewOfFile function, Reserving and Committing Pages
fontpath element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
fopen function, Opening Devices
Force Pending I/O Requests option, Driver Verifier
forced affinitization, Algorithm Overrides, Performance Check
forcing IRQL checks, Driver Verifier
foreground processes, Components
foreign volume recovery keys, BitLocker Key Recovery
format command, UDF, Volumes, Clusters
Format utility, NTFS Bad-Cluster Recovery
format, disk, Disk Sector Format–NAND-Type Flash Memory, Disk Sector Format, Disk Sector Format, NAND-Type Flash Memory
FORANDOMACCESS flag, Fast I/O
fragmentation, Heap Manager Structure, The Low Fragmentation Heap, Clusters, Compressing Nonsparse Data
free blocks, Heap Manager, Heap Security Features, Pageheap, Fault Tolerant Heap
free function, Types of Heaps
free lists, Memory Manager Components, Examining Memory Usage, NUMA, Page List Dynamics, Balance Set Manager and Swapper
free page lists, Modified Page Writer
    page writer, Modified Page Writer
free pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Modified Page Writer, PFN Data Structures
Free PFN state, Page Frame Number Database, Page Frame Number Database
free pool tag, Monitoring Pool Usage
free space, Management Policies
freed buffers, Look-Aside Lists
freed memory, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Memory Notification Events
freed object referencing, Driver Verifier
freed pool, Basic Crash Dump Analysis, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool
freezes, VSS writers and, VSS Architecture, VSS Architecture
frequency (processors), Utility Function, Utility Function, Increase/Decrease Actions, Performance Check
front-end heap, Heap Manager Structure, The Low Fragmentation Heap
FSCTL control codes, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions, Compression and Sparse Files, Compression and Sparse Files, Defragmentation, Data Compression and Sparse Files, Compressing Nonsparsely Data, Resource Managers, Logging Implementation, Encrypting File System Security
   cluster usage, Defragmentation
   compression, Compression and Sparse Files, Data Compression and Sparse Files, Compressing Nonsparsely Data
repairing volumes, Encrypting File System Security
reparse points, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions
sparse files, Compression and Sparse Files
TxF recovery process, Logging Implementation
TxF resource managers, Resource Managers
FSCTL_QUERY_FILE_SYSTEM_RECOGNITION code, Local FSDs
Fsdepends.sys driver, Nested File Systems
FSDs (file system drivers), Fast I/O, IRP Stack Locations, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers–I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, Mount Points,

associated IRPs, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers–I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers

cache manager, File System Driver Architecture

cached files, File System Interfaces


disk I/O operations, Virtual Disk Service

fast I/O, Fast I/O, Explicit File I/O, Explicit File I/O

file I/O operations, Per-File Cache Data Structures–Caching with the Mapping and Pinning Interfaces, File System Interfaces, Caching with the Mapping and Pinning Interfaces


functions, IRP Stack Locations
lazy writer, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing
local FSDs, Local FSDs–Local FSDs, Local FSDs, Local FSDs
locking, Remote FSDs–File System Operation, Locking, File System Operation
mapping and pinning interfaces, Caching with the Mapping and Pinning Interfaces–Fast I/O, Caching with the Direct Memory Access Interfaces, Fast I/O
memory manager, File System Driver Architecture
registering, Local FSDs
reparse points, Mount Points
shrinking partitions, Dynamic Partitioning
volume manager and disk drivers, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers
FsRtlXxx functions, Locking
fsutil command, Hard Links, Self-Healing
Fsutil.exe utility, Master File Table, The Change Journal File, Isolation, Resource Managers, On-Disk Implementation
Fs_rec.sys driver, Volume Mounting
FTH (fault tolerant heap), Fault Tolerant Heap
Fthsvc.dll, Fault Tolerant Heap
full-volume encryption (FVE), Full-Volume Encryption Driver–BitLocker Management, BitLocker Management
full-volume encryption key (FVEK), Encryption Keys–Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
fully provisioned virtual hard disks, Virtual Hard Disk Support
fully reentrant functionality, Internal Synchronization
function codes (IRP stack locations), IRP Stack Locations
function drivers, Level of Plug and Play Support, Driver Support for Plug and Play,
Driver Support for Plug and Play–The Start Value, Driver Loading, Initialization, and Installation, The Start Value, Device Stacks, Device Stack Driver Loading, Driver Installation

class/port drivers, Device Stacks

order of loading, Device Stack Driver Loading

PnP driver installation, Driver Installation

PnP manager, Level of Plug and Play Support, Driver Support for Plug and Play

PnP state transitions, Driver Support for Plug and Play–The Start Value, Driver Loading, Initialization, and Installation, The Start Value

function filters, WDM Drivers

functional device objects (FDOs), Device Stacks–Device Stack Driver Loading, Device Stacks, Device Stack Driver Loading

functions (user-mode applications), The I/O Manager–Device Drivers, Typical I/O Processing, Device Drivers

FVE (full-volume encryption), Full-Volume Encryption Driver–BitLocker Management, BitLocker Management

FVEK (full-volume encryption keys), Encryption Keys–Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Trusted Platform Module (TPM)

Fvevol.sys driver, BitLocker Drive Encryption, Full-Volume Encryption Driver
gaming system memory limits, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits
gate objects, Page List Dynamics, Modified Page Writer
GDI (Graphics Device Interface), Types of Heaps
generic extensions (file objects), Opening Devices
generic KMDF objects, KMDF Data Model
generic utility measurement (processors), Utility Function, Performance Check, Performance Check
Get API, KMDF Data Model
GetCompressedFileSize function, Data Compression and Sparse Files
GetFileAttributes function, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions
GetFileSizes API, Transactional APIs
GetInformationByHandle API, Transactional APIs
GetNativeSystem function, Locking Memory
GetProcessDEPPolicy function, No Execute Page Protection
GetProcessHeap function, Types of Heaps
GetQueuedCompletionStatus(Ex) functions, Synchronous and Asynchronous I/O
GetSystemDEPPolicy function, No Execute Page Protection
GetSystemInfo function, Allocation Granularity
GetSystemMetrics function, Safe-Mode-Aware User Programs
GetTickCount function, Crash Dump Files
GetVolumeInformation function, Data Compression and Sparse Files
Gflags tool, Heap Debugging Features
Gigabit Ethernet, iSCSI Drivers
Global bit (PTEs), Page Tables and Page Table Entries
global file system driver data structures, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

global I/O queue, Prioritization Strategies

global look-aside lists, I/O Request Packets, System Threads

global memory manager, Cache Working Set Size—Cache Working Set Size, Cache Working Set Size

global replacement policies, Placement Policy

GlobalDosDevicesDirectory field, Explicit File I/O

Global.xxx functions, Services Provided by the Memory Manager

GPT (GUID Partition Table), MBR-Style Partitioning, GUID Partition Table Partitioning, GUID Partition Table Partitioning, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning—LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, The UEFI Boot Process

headers, GUID Partition Table Partitioning

LDM partitioning, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning—LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning

partitioning, MBR-Style Partitioning, GUID Partition Table Partitioning

UEFI systems, The UEFI Boot Process

graphical interface, BIOS Preboot, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

graphical shell, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

Graphics Device Interface (GDI), Heap Manager

graphics mode (BCD), The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

graphics systems, Kernel Stacks, Rotate VADs

graphicsmode-disabled element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

graphicsresolution element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
Group Policy, BitLocker Drive Encryption–BitLocker Drive Encryption, BitLocker Drive Encryption, BitLocker Drive Encryption, Full-Volume Encryption Driver, BitLocker To Go, BitLocker To Go, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

BitLocker, Full-Volume Encryption Driver, BitLocker To Go

BitLocker To Go, BitLocker To Go

encryption, BitLocker Drive Encryption–BitLocker Drive Encryption, BitLocker Drive Encryption, BitLocker Drive Encryption

logon tasks, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
group seeds (BCD), The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

Group value (driver loading), The Start Value
groupaware element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
groups (drivers), Driver Loading in Safe Mode, Using Crash Troubleshooting Tools
groupsize element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

/GS flag, Stack Trashes

GsDriverEntry routine, Structure of a Driver

guard pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Protecting Memory, Page Fault Handling, User Stacks, Kernel Stacks
guard PTEs, Kernel Stacks
guests, running, Hung or Unresponsive Systems–Hung or Unresponsive Systems, Hung or Unresponsive Systems, Hung or Unresponsive Systems

GUIDs (globally unique identifiers), MBR-Style Partitioning–GUID Partition Table Partitioning, GUID Partition Table Partitioning, GUID Partition Table Partitioning, The Mount Manager

Mount Manager assigned, The Mount Manager

UEFI partitioning, MBR-Style Partitioning–GUID Partition Table Partitioning, GUID Partition Table Partitioning, GUID Partition Table Partitioning
GUID_PROCESSOR… policies, Thresholds and Policy Settings, Thresholds and Policy Settings
H

H-HDDs (hybrid hard disk drives), ReadyDrive

HAL (hardware abstraction layer), The I/O Manager–Device Drivers, Typical I/O Processing, Device Drivers, Driver Verifier–Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver, Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver, The Start Value, Virtual Address Space Layouts, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection

BCD elements, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

BIOS emulation code, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier–Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver, Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver

I/O processing, The I/O Manager–Device Drivers, Typical I/O Processing, Device Drivers

initializing, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

Root driver, The Start Value

system code write protection, Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection

system memory reserved for, Virtual Address Space Layouts

virtual addresses, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management

HalAllProcessorsStarted function, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

halbreakpoint element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

HalInitializeBIOS function, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

HalInitializeProcessor function, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

HalInitSystem function, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

HalQueryRealTimeClock function, Initializing the Kernel and Executive

APCs, Completing an I/O Request
c change journal, The Change Journal File
c child and parent processes, Opening Devices
c completion ports, I/O Completion Port Operation
duplication, Shared Memory and Mapped Files
file objects, Opening Devices, Per-File Cache Data Structures, NTFS File System Driver
files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files
I/O cancellation, User-Initiated I/O Cancellation
I/O process, Opening Devices
inheritance, Shared Memory and Mapped Files
KMDF objects, KMDF Data Model–KMDF I/O Model, KMDF I/O Model
multiple, File System Operation
obtaining for devices, Driver Objects and Device Objects
page files, Page Files
removing devices, Driver Support for Plug and Play
transacted operations, Transactional APIs–Resource Managers, Transactional APIs
APIs, Resource Managers


failures, Causes of Windows Crashes

ReadyBoost and, ReadyBoost, ReadyDrive

rotating magnetic, Rotating Magnetic Disks–NAND-Type Flash Memory, NAND-Type Flash Memory

sector size, File Systems

solid state, Solid State Disks–File Deletion and the Trim Command, File Deletion and the Trim Command

hard faults, Logical Prefetcher, Components, Scenarios


hard partitions, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning

hard working set limits, Working Set Management

hardware, I/O System Components, The Power Manager, Utility Function, Clone Shadow Copies, Protecting Memory, The UEFI Boot Process, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Causes of Windows Crashes, 0x7F - UNEXPECTED_KERNEL_MODE_TRAP, Hardware Malfunctions

bound traps or double faults, 0x7F - UNEXPECTED_KERNEL_MODE_TRAP

crash stop codes, Causes of Windows Crashes
detection, The UEFI Boot Process
device drivers, I/O System Components

feedback, Utility Function

latency, The Power Manager
malfunctions, Hardware Malfunctions
memory protection, Protecting Memory
mirroring, Clone Shadow Copies
virtualization, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
hardware attacks, Encryption Keys
hardware DEP, No Execute Page Protection
HARDWARE hive, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
hardware IDs, Driver Installation
Hardware Installation Wizard, Driver Installation
hardware providers, Virtual Disk Service
hardware PTE accessed bit, Working Set Management
hardware PTEs, Page Tables and Page Table Entries, Translation Look-Aside Buffer, Physical Address Extension (PAE), x64 Virtual Address Translation
hardware tree, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
hardware Write bits, Hardware vs. Software Write Bits in Page Table Entries
hardware-detected memory exceptions, Memory Manager Components
hash entries (working sets),PFN Data Structures
hashes, Driver Installation, Consolidated Security–Consolidated Security, Consolidated Security, Consolidated Security
HasOverlappedIoCompleted macro, Synchronous and Asynchronous I/O
HBAs (Host Bus Adapters), iSCSI Drivers, iSCSI Drivers
head seeks, Intelligent Read-Ahead
headers, Resident and Nonresident Attributes
HeadlessInit function, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
heads (hard disks), Disk Devices

heap and heap manager, Services Provided by the Memory Manager, Kernel-Mode Heaps (System Memory Pools)–Look-Aside Lists, Look-Aside Lists, Heap Manager, Heap Manager, Types of Heaps–Heap Manager Structure, Types of Heaps, Types of Heaps, Types of Heaps, Heap Manager Structure, Heap Manager Structure, Heap Synchronization, The Low Fragmentation Heap, Heap Security Features–Heap Debugging Features, Heap Debugging Features–Pageheap, Heap Debugging Features, Heap Debugging Features, Pageheap, Pageheap, Pageheap, Fault Tolerant Heap, User Address Space Layout, User Address Space Layout, User Address Space Layout, Heap Randomization

address space, User Address Space Layout, User Address Space Layout

APIs, Heap Manager

blocks, Types of Heaps

core, Heap Manager Structure

debugging features, Heap Debugging Features–Pageheap, Heap Debugging Features, Pageheap

fault tolerant, Fault Tolerant Heap

functions (Heapxxx), Services Provided by the Memory Manager, Heap Manager

IDs, User Address Space Layout

kernel-mode, Kernel-Mode Heaps (System Memory Pools)–Look-Aside Lists, Look-Aside Lists

pageheap, Pageheap

pointers for processes, Types of Heaps

randomization, Heap Randomization

scalability, The Low Fragmentation Heap

security features, Heap Security Features–Heap Debugging Features, Heap
Debugging Features, Heap Debugging Features
structure, Heap Manager Structure
synchronization, Heap Synchronization
types of, Types of Heaps–Heap Manager Structure, Heap Manager Structure
user-mode, Types of Heaps
heap blocks, Heap Manager
Heap functions, Services Provided by the Memory Manager, Heap Manager
heap IDs, User Address Space Layout
Heap interfaces, Heap Manager
HEAP linker flag, Types of Heaps
heap storage, Synchronization
HeapCompatibilityInformation class, The Low Fragmentation Heap
HeapCreate function, Heap Manager
HeapDestroy function, Heap Manager
HeapEnableTerminationOnCorruption class, Heap Security Features
HeapFree function, Fault Tolerant Heap
HeapSetInformation API, The Low Fragmentation Heap
HeapWalk function, Heap Synchronization
HEAP_NO_SERIALIZE flag, Heap Synchronization
help files (stop codes), The Blue Screen
Hiberfil.sys (hibernation files), The Power Manager, BIOS Preboot

BCD information, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
boot status file information, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)

MPIO, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers

non-Plug and Play drivers, Level of Plug and Play Support

resuming from, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

S4 power state, The Power Manager, The Power Manager

volume encryption, BitLocker Drive Encryption

hibernation files (Hiberfil.sys), The Power Manager, Nested File Systems, Shadow Copy Provider, ReadyDrive, BIOS Preboot

hibernation scenario (Superfetch), Scenarios

hierarchy chains (KMDF), KMDF Data Model

hierarchy prioritization strategy, Prioritization Strategies, Prioritization Strategies

high bits (address spaces), x86 Address Space Layouts

High I/O priority, I/O Priorities, Prioritization Strategies

high IRQL faults, Basic Crash Dump Analysis, Verbose Analysis, Hung or Unresponsive Systems, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL

high memory allocation addresses, x86 Address Space Layouts

high memory conditions, Memory Notification Events–Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events

high priority mapping VACBs, Systemwide Cache Data Structures

high-level drivers, I/O System Components

HighCommitCondition event, Memory Notification Events

highly utilized processor cores, Performance Check

HighMemoryCondition event, Memory Notification Events

HighNonPagedPoolCondition event, Memory Notification Events
HighPagedPoolCondition event, Memory Notification Events

hists, Key Features of the Cache Manager

history tracking, Utility Function, Thresholds and Policy Settings, Thresholds and Policy Settings, Components

hive files, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

host bus adapters (HBAs), iSCSI Drivers, Booting from iSCSI

host computers (debugging), When There Is No Crash Dump—When There Is No Crash Dump, When There Is No Crash Dump

host processes, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)—User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF), User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF), User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)

hot memory, PFN Data Structures

hotfixes, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

hotpatching technology, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

hung or unresponsive systems, Solving Common Boot Problems—Post—Splash Screen Crash or Hang, Post—Splash Screen Crash or Hang, Stack Trashes—When There Is No Crash Dump, Hung or Unresponsive Systems, Hung or Unresponsive Systems, Hung or Unresponsive Systems, When There Is No Crash Dump, When There Is No Crash Dump

boot problems, Solving Common Boot Problems—Post—Splash Screen Crash or Hang, Post—Splash Screen Crash or Hang

crash dump analysis, Stack Trashes—When There Is No Crash Dump, Hung or Unresponsive Systems, Hung or Unresponsive Systems, Hung or Unresponsive Systems, Hung or Unresponsive Systems, When There Is No Crash Dump, When There Is No Crash Dump

hung program screens, Shutdown

HvInitSystem function, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

hybrid hard disk drives, ReadyDrive, Unified Caching

hybrid sleep states, The Power Manager
Hyper-Threading feature, Core Parking Policies

Hyper-V, Partition Manager, Virtual Hard Disk Support, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, Crash Dump Files, Hung or Unresponsive Systems, When There Is No Crash Dump–When There Is No Crash Dump, When There Is No Crash Dump, When There Is No Crash Dump, When There Is No Crash Dump

booting from VHDs, Virtual Hard Disk Support

disk attributes used by, Partition Manager

dumping memory, Crash Dump Files, Hung or Unresponsive Systems

kernel debugger, When There Is No Crash Dump–When There Is No Crash Dump, When There Is No Crash Dump, When There Is No Crash Dump, When There Is No Crash Dump

loading hypervisor, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

hyperspace, Virtual Address Space Layouts

hypervisor, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

hypervisor binaries, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

hypervisor baudrate element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

hypervisor channel element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

hypervisor debug element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

hypervisor debug port element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

hypervisor debug type element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

hypervisor disable slat element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

hypervisor launch type element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

hypervisor path element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

hypervisor use large vtlb element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
I/O cancellation, KMDF I/O Model


associated IRPs, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers

completion context, Opening Devices

completion ports, I/O Completion Ports–I/O Priorities, The IoCompletion Object, Using Completion Ports, I/O Completion Port Operation, I/O Completion Port Operation, I/O Completion Port Operation, I/O Completion Port Operation, I/O Priorities

file attributes, Opening Devices


layered drivers, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers

port operation, I/O Completion Port Operation–I/O Priorities, I/O Completion Port Operation, I/O Completion Port Operation, I/O Completion Port Operation, I/O Priorities

process, Completing an I/O Request

I/O completion ports, Opening Devices, Synchronous and Asynchronous I/O, Completing an I/O Request, User-Initiated I/O Cancellation, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination, The IoCompletion Object, Using Completion Ports, I/O Completion Port Operation, I/O Completion Port Operation, I/O Completion Port Operation

completion process, Completing an I/O Request, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination, The IoCompletion Object, Using Completion Ports, I/O
Completion Port Operation, I/O Completion Port Operation, I/O Completion Port Operation

cfile object attributes, Opening Devices

I/O cancellation, User-Initiated I/O Cancellation

testing asynchronous I/O, Synchronous and Asynchronous I/O

I/O concurrency, KMDF I/O Model

I/O control codes, IRP Buffer Management

I/O errors, PFN Data Structures, PFN Data Structures

atomic transactions, Recoverability–Data Redundancy and Fault Tolerance,
Data Redundancy and Fault Tolerance


cache manager, The Memory Manager

canceling IRPs, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination–I/O Completion Ports, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination, I/O Completion Ports
copy engine, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing
device drivers, Opening Devices, Opening Devices, Opening Devices, Opening Devices
driver and device objects, Driver Objects and Device Objects
driver initialization, The Start Value
Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier
half-completed I/O, Recoverable File System Support
in-paging I/O, In-Paging I/O–Collided Page Faults, Collided Page Faults
IRPs, I/O Request Packets
Kernel-Mode Driver Framework (KMDF), Kernel-Mode Driver Framework (KMDF)–KMDF I/O Model, Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver, KMDF Data Model, KMDF Data Model, KMDF I/O Model, KMDF I/O Model, KMDF I/O Model, KMDF I/O Model
KMDF model, KMDF I/O Model–KMDF I/O Model, KMDF I/O Model, KMDF I/O Model, KMDF I/O Model
KMDF queues, KMDF I/O Model
layered driver processing, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers–I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, NTFS File System Driver, NTFS File System Driver
loading drivers, Driver Loading in Safe Mode
local file system drivers, Local FSDs–Local FSDs, Local FSDs, Local FSDs
look-aside lists, Look-Aside Lists
mapped file I/O and caching, Mapped File I/O and File Caching–I/O Request Packets, I/O Request Packets, I/O Request Packets
mounting process, Volume Mounting
not shown in Process Monitor, Process Monitor Basic vs. Advanced Modes
prioritization, I/O Prioritization–Bandwidth Reservation (Scheduled File I/O), Prioritization Strategies, Prioritization Strategies, I/O Priority Inversion Avoidance (I/O Priority Inheritance), I/O Priority Boosts and Bumps, Bandwidth Reservation (Scheduled File I/O), Bandwidth Reservation (Scheduled File I/O)
reparse points, Mount Points
request processing, The I/O Manager–Device Drivers, Typical I/O Processing, Device Drivers
Buffer Management, I/O Request to a Single-Layered Driver, I/O Request to a Single-Layered Driver

robust performance, Robust Performance–Robust Performance, Robust Performance

scatter/gather I/O, Scatter/Gather I/O

shutting down, Shutdown

Superfetch rebalancer, Page Priority and Rebalancing

synchronization, KMDF I/O Model

volume operations, Volume I/O Operations–Virtual Disk Service, Virtual Disk Service, Virtual Disk Service

writing crash dumps, Crash Dump Generation

I/O port drivers, Layered Drivers

I/O prioritization, Opening Devices, Prioritization Strategies–I/O Priority Inversion Avoidance (I/O Priority Inheritance), Prioritization Strategies, I/O Priority Inversion Avoidance (I/O Priority Inheritance), I/O Priority Inversion Avoidance (I/O Priority Inheritance), I/O Priority Inversion Avoidance (I/O Priority Inheritance), I/O Priority Boosts and Bumps–Bandwidth Reservation (Scheduled File I/O), Bandwidth Reservation (Scheduled File I/O)

boosts and bumps, I/O Priority Boosts and Bumps–Bandwidth Reservation (Scheduled File I/O), Bandwidth Reservation (Scheduled File I/O)

file object attributes, Opening Devices

inheritance, I/O Priority Inversion Avoidance (I/O Priority Inheritance)

strategies, Prioritization Strategies–I/O Priority Inversion Avoidance (I/O Priority Inheritance), Prioritization Strategies, I/O Priority Inversion Avoidance (I/O Priority Inheritance), I/O Priority Inversion Avoidance (I/O Priority Inheritance)

I/O priority inheritance, I/O Priority Inversion Avoidance (I/O Priority Inheritance)
I/O priority inversion avoidance, I/O Priority Inversion Avoidance (I/O Priority Inheritance)

I/O queues, KMDF Data Model


asynchronous, I/O Processing–Synchronous and Asynchronous I/O, Synchronous and Asynchronous I/O


completing, Completing an I/O Request–Synchronization, Completing an I/O Request, Completing an I/O Request, Completing an I/O Request, Synchronization

control flow, Fast I/O

fast I/O, Fast I/O, Fast I/O

I/O manager, The I/O Manager, The I/O Manager

interrupts, Servicing an Interrupt–Completing an I/O Request, Servicing an
Interrupt, Completing an I/O Request
KMDF objects, KMDF Data Model
large pages, Large and Small Pages
layered drivers, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers
multiple, Synchronous and Asynchronous I/O–Synchronous and Asynchronous I/O, Synchronous and Asynchronous I/O
processing, I/O Processing
scatter/gather I/O, Scatter/Gather I/O
synchronization, Synchronization–Synchronization, Synchronization, Synchronization
synchronous, I/O Processing–Synchronous and Asynchronous I/O, Synchronous and Asynchronous I/O
I/O status block ranges, Opening Devices
I/O status blocks, Completing an I/O Request
I/O targets, KMDF Data Model
I/O Verification option, Driver Verifier
i8042 port driver, Hung or Unresponsive Systems–Hung or Unresponsive Systems, Hung or Unresponsive Systems, Hung or Unresponsive Systems
IA64 systems, Introduction to the Memory Manager, Address Windowing Extensions, IA64 Virtual Address Translation–Page Fault Handling, Page Fault Handling, Working Set Management, Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection
address translation, IA64 Virtual Address Translation–Page Fault Handling, Page Fault Handling
AWE functions, Address Windowing Extensions
process virtual address space, Introduction to the Memory Manager
system code write protection, Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection
working set limits, Working Set Management
iBFT (iSCSI Boot Firmware Table), Booting from iSCSI
IDE devices, Prioritization Strategies, Bandwidth Reservation (Scheduled File I/O), Winload
ideal model (PPM), Increase/Decrease Actions, Performance Check
ideal node (NUMA), NUMA
idempotent operations, Log Record Types
idle devices, Driver and Application Control of Device Power
idle I/Os, Prioritization Strategies
idle prioritization strategy, Prioritization Strategies, Prioritization Strategies, I/O Priority Boosts and Bumps
Idle process, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
idle processor states (C processor states), Processor Power Management (PPM), Processor Power Management (PPM), Performance Check
idle scaling (processors), Performance Check
idle state management policies, Thresholds and Policy Settings
idle systems, Components
IEEE 1394 (FireWire) cables, Hung or Unresponsive Systems
   basic disks, Volume Management–Dynamic Disks, Dynamic Disks
debugging devices, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
drivers, Types of Device Drivers
hypervisor debugging, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
KMDF support, Kernel-Mode Driver Framework (KMDF)
UMDF support, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)
illegal instruction faults, Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection
illegal operations, Driver Verifier
image activation, Mapped File I/O and File Caching
image autoruns, Images That Start Automatically–Images That Start Automatically, Images That Start Automatically
image bias, Image Randomization
Image Dispatch Mitigation, Software Data Execution Prevention
image loader, Shared Memory and Mapped Files
image randomization, Image Randomization, Image Randomization
images, Crash Dump Files
ImageX, Virtual Hard Disk Support
IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_NX_COMPAT flag, No Execute Page Protection–Software Data Execution Prevention, No Execute Page Protection, Software Data Execution Prevention
IMAGE_DLL_CHARACTERISTICS_DYNAMIC_BASE flag, User Address Space Layout, Controlling Security Mitigations
IMAGE_FILE_LARGE_ADDRESS_AWARE flag, x86 Address Space Layouts
implicit memory allocation, Driver Verifier
In POSIX function, Hard Links
in-page error PFN flag, PFN Data Structures
in-paging I/O, In-Paging I/O–Collided Page Faults, In-Paging I/O, Collided Page Faults
InbvDriverInitialize function, *Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems*

InbvEnableBootDriver function, *Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems*

increaseuserva configuration, *User Stacks, Crash Dump Files*

increaseuserva element, *The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr*

increasing thresholds (processors), *Thresholds and Policy Settings*

index allocations, *File Records, Resident and Nonresident Attributes, Indexing*

index buffers, *Indexing*

index root attributes, *Resident and Nonresident Attributes, Resident and Nonresident Attributes, Indexing*


Inetinfo.exe (Internet Information Server), *x86 Address Space Layouts*

INF database, *Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems*

INF files, *Device Stack Driver Loading, Driver Installation*

device keys, *Device Stack Driver Loading*

function driver files, *Driver Installation*

infinite loops, *Hung or Unresponsive Systems*

InitBootProcessor function, *Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems*

initialconsoleinput element, *The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr*

initialization, *Structure of a Driver, Kernel-Mode Driver Framework (KMDF), Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver, Device Enumeration–Device Enumeration, Device Enumeration*

KMDF routines, *Kernel-Mode Driver Framework (KMDF), Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver*

order of, *Device Enumeration–Device Enumeration, Device Enumeration*

routines, *Structure of a Driver*
Initiator service, iSCSI Drivers
InitSafeBoot function, Driver Loading in Safe Mode
InitSafeBootMode function, Driver Loading in Safe Mode
injected threads, Process Reflection
input buffers, IRP Buffer Management–I/O Request to a Single-Layered Driver, IRP Buffer Management, I/O Request to a Single-Layered Driver
input device drivers, Types of Device Drivers
installation, The Plug and Play (PnP) Manager, Driver Installation, Driver Installation, Driver Installation, Driver Installation, Driver Installation, Driver Installation, Driver Installation, Boot Process–BIOS Preboot, BIOS Preboot, BIOS Preboot, BIOS Preboot, BCD Misconfiguration
  PnP manager’s handling, The Plug and Play (PnP) Manager, Driver Installation, Driver Installation, Driver Installation, Driver Installation, Driver Installation
  Windows boot preparations, Boot Process–BIOS Preboot, BIOS Preboot, BIOS Preboot
  Windows Update, BCD Misconfiguration
instance IDs, Device Stack Driver Loading
instances, Opening Devices, KMDF Data Model, Monitoring Pool Usage
  open files, Opening Devices
  pool tags, Monitoring Pool Usage
  WMI, KMDF Data Model
instruction pointer register, 0xD1 - DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL
inswapping stacks, Memory Manager Components
INT 3 instruction, 0x8E - KERNEL_MODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED
integrity check mechanisms, Heap Security Features, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, When There Is No Crash Dump
integrityservices element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
Intel Macintosh machines, The UEFI Boot Process
intelligent read-ahead (caching), Virtual Block Caching, Per-File Cache Data Structures, Intelligent Read-Ahead, Intelligent Read-Ahead
Interactive Services Detection service (UIODetect.exe), Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
internal synchronization, Internal Synchronization
Internet attachments, Multiple Data Streams
Internet Information Server (Inetinfo.exe), x86 Address Space Layouts
Internet SCSI (iSCSI), Prioritization Strategies, Disk Devices, iSCSI Drivers, Booting from iSCSI
Internet Storage Name Service (iSNS), iSCSI Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers
interrupt controller, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
interrupt dispatch table, Servicing an Interrupt
interrupt-driven devices, Structure of a Driver
interrupt-serving DPC routines, Structure of a Driver
KMDF objects, KMDF Data Model
servicing, Servicing an Interrupt
UMDF, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)
interval clock timer interrupts, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
invalid addresses, 0xD1 - DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL
invalid IRQL, Driver Verifier
invalid pages, Driver Verifier
invalid PFN states, Page Frame Number Database
invalid PTEs, Page Fault Handling, Prototype PTEs, Prototype PTEs, Prototype PTEs
INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE value, Shared Memory and Mapped Files
IoAdjustStackStizeForRedirection API, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers
IoAsynchronousPageWrite function, Memory Manager’s Modified and Mapped Page Writer
IoBoostCount function, I/O Priority Inversion Avoidance (I/O Priority Inheritance)
IoCallDriver function, I/O Request to a Single-Layered Driver, Explicit File I/O
IoCompleteRequest function, I/O Request to a Single-Layered Driver
IoCompletion executive object, The IoCompletion Object, I/O Completion Port Operation
IoCreateDevice function, Driver Objects and Device Objects
IoCreateDeviceSecure function, Driver Objects and Device Objects
IoCreateFile function, Opening Devices
IoCreateFileEx function, Opening Devices
IoCreateFileSpecifyDeviceObjectHint function, Opening Devices
IOCTL requests, KMDF I/O Model, Disk Sector Format, File Deletion and the Trim Command
KMDF, KMDF I/O Model
querying sector size, Disk Sector Format
trim command and, File Deletion and the Trim Command
IofCallDriver function, Stack Trashes
IoGetTransactionParameterBlock function, Opening Devices
IoPageRead function, Explicit File I/O
IopBootLog function, Boot Logging in Safe Mode
IopCancelAlertedRequest function, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination
IopCopyBootLogRegistryToFile function, Boot Logging in Safe Mode
IopInvalidDeviceRequest function, IRP Stack Locations
IopLoadDriver function, Driver Loading in Safe Mode
IopParseDevice function, Explicit File I/O
IopPriority.exe, I/O Priority Boosts and Bumps–Bandwidth Reservation (Scheduled File I/O), Bandwidth Reservation (Scheduled File I/O)
IopSafeBootDriverLoad function, Driver Loading in Safe Mode
IopSynchronousServiceTail function, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination
IoReadPartitionTableEx function, Partition Manager
IoRegisterContainerNotification function, Container Notifications
IoRegisterDeviceInterface function, Driver Objects and Device Objects
IoRegisterFileSystem function, Volume Mounting
IoRegisterPriorityCallback function, I/O Priority Inversion Avoidance (I/O Priority Inheritance)
IoRemoveIoCompletion function, I/O Completion Port Operation
IoSessionStateNotification class, Container Notifications
IoSetCompletionRoutineEx function, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier
IoSetDeviceInterfaceState function, Driver Objects and Device Objects
IoSetIoPriorityHint function, Prioritization Strategies
IP networks, iSCSI Drivers
IRP credits, Balance Set Manager and Swapper
IRP dispatches, Stack Trashes
IRP Logging option, Driver Verifier
IRP look-aside lists, I/O Request Packets, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers
IRP stack locations, I/O Request to a Single-Layered Driver, Servicing an Interrupt, Completing an I/O Request, Completing an I/O Request, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers
associated groups, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers
cache interactions, Single, Centralized System Cache
cancellation, I/O Cancellation–I/O Completion Ports, User-Initiated I/O
Cancellation, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination, I/O Completion Ports

completion, Completing an I/O Request, Completing an I/O Request, Completing an I/O Request

creating, The I/O Manager

defined, I/O Request Packets

device tree flow, Device Enumeration

examining, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers—I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers

file object interaction, Explicit File I/O

KMDF handling, KMDF I/O Model—KMDF I/O Model, KMDF I/O Model, KMDF I/O Model

layered driver processing, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers

lists, Opening Devices

look-aside lists, I/O Request Packets

priority strategies, Prioritization Strategies, Prioritization Strategies

Process Manager and, Process Monitor

processing, The I/O Manager

recording usage, Driver Verifier

reuse, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers

stack locations, IRP Stack Locations, IRP Stack Locations, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers

IRP_MJ_CREATE IRPs, Explicit File I/O

IRP_MJ_PNP IRPs, Driver Objects and Device Objects
IRP_MJ_READ IRPs, Explicit File I/O
IRP_MJ_WRITE IRPs, Explicit File I/O, Memory Manager’s Modified and Mapped Page Writer
IRP_MN_START_DEVICE IRPs, Driver Objects and Device Objects
IRP_MU_CREATE command, File System Filter Drivers
IRQLs (interrupt request levels), Completing an I/O Request–Synchronization, Synchronization, Synchronization, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, The Blue Screen
   APCs and, Completing an I/O Request–Synchronization, Synchronization
   crashes, The Blue Screen
drivers executing at elevated, Driver Verifier
   preempting driver execution, Synchronization
   special pool allocations and, Driver Verifier
IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL stop code, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL
ISA buses, Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
iSCSI Boot Firmware Table (iBFT), Booting from iSCSI
iSCSI Control Panel applet, iSCSI Drivers
iSCSI devices, Prioritization Strategies, Storage Management, Disk Devices, iSCSI Drivers, iSCSI Drivers, Booting from iSCSI
iSCSI Host Bus Adapter (HBA), Booting from iSCSI
iSCSI Initiator, iSCSI Drivers, iSCSI Drivers, Booting from iSCSI
Iscsicli.exe utility, iSCSI Drivers, iSCSI Drivers
iSNS (Internet Storage Name Service), iSCSI Drivers
ISO images, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
ISO-13346 format, **UDF**
ISO-9660 format, **CDFS**

isolating transaction operations, **Isolation–Transactional APIs**, **Isolation**, **Isolation**, **Transactional APIs**

ISRs (interrupt service routines), **Hung or Unresponsive Systems**, **Hung or Unresponsive Systems**–**Hung or Unresponsive Systems**, **Hung or Unresponsive Systems**

hung systems, **Hung or Unresponsive Systems**

monitoring keystrokes, **Hung or Unresponsive Systems**–**Hung or Unresponsive Systems**, **Hung or Unresponsive Systems**

Itanium firmware, **LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning**, **Large and Small Pages**, **The UEFI Boot Process**
J

Joliet disk format, CDFS
journaled file systems, Common Log File System
jumping stacks, Kernel Stacks
junctons, directory, Opening Devices, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions
k command, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis

Kd debugger (Kd.exe), The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, Basic Crash Dump Analysis, Hung or Unresponsive Systems, Hung or Unresponsive Systems, Hung or Unresponsive Systems, When There Is No Crash Dump

KdDebuggerInitialize1 routine, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

KeAcquireInterruptSpinLock routine, Synchronization

KeBalanceSetManager routine, Memory Manager Components

KeBugCheck2 function, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL

KeBugCheckEx function, The Blue Screen

KeExpandKernelStackAndCallout function, Kernel Stacks

Kei386EoiHelper function, Stack Trashes

KeInitializeQueue function, I/O Completion Port Operation

KeInsertByKeyDeviceQueue function, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers

KeInsertQueue function, I/O Completion Port Operation

KeLoaderBlock variable, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

KeRegisterBugCheckCallback function, The Blue Screen

KeRegisterBugCheckReasonCallback function, The Blue Screen, Crash Dump Files

KeRemoveByKeyDeviceQueue function, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers

KeRemoveQueueEx function, I/O Completion Port Operation

kernel (Ntoskrnl.exe, Ntkrnlpa.exe), Layered Drivers, Opening Devices, Synchronization, I/O Completion Port Operation, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF), Winload, Memory Manager Components–Internal Synchronization, Internal Synchronization, Internal Synchronization, Heap Manager, Page Fault Handling, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel
and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit, Driver Loading in Safe Mode, Why Does Windows Crash?, Verbose Analysis, Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection

boot process, Winload

DLLs, Layered Drivers

file objects, Opening Devices

heap manager, Heap Manager

initializing, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

listing modules, Verbose Analysis

memory manager components, Memory Manager Components–Internal Synchronization, Internal Synchronization, Internal Synchronization

phase 1 initialization, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

queues, I/O Completion Port Operation

safe mode switch scanning, Driver Loading in Safe Mode

stack trace database, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

subsystem crashes, Why Does Windows Crash?

synchronization routines, Synchronization

system code write protection, Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection

trap handler, Page Fault Handling

UMDF interaction, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)

kernel address space, x64 Virtual Addressing Limitations, ASLR in Kernel Address Space, IA64 Virtual Address Translation
kernel bumps, I/O Priority Boosts and Bumps–Bandwidth Reservation (Scheduled File I/O), I/O Priority Boosts and Bumps, Bandwidth Reservation (Scheduled File I/O)
kernl code, Large and Small Pages, IA64 Virtual Address Translation

kernel debugger, Opening Devices–Opening Devices, Opening Devices, Opening Devices, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, Hung or Unresponsive Systems, When There Is No Crash Dump–When There Is No Crash Dump, When There Is No Crash Dump, When There Is No Crash Dump

attaching, When There Is No Crash Dump–When There Is No Crash Dump, When There Is No Crash Dump

BCD elements, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

breaking into systems, Hung or Unresponsive Systems

transports, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

troubleshooting without crash dumps, When There Is No Crash Dump

viewing file objects, Opening Devices–Opening Devices, Opening Devices, Opening Devices

kernel driver stack, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)

kernel element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

kernel extensions, Types of Device Drivers

kernel image file name, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

kernel memory, Driver Verifier, Internal Synchronization, Examining Memory Usage, No Execute Page Protection, No Execute Page Protection, Driver Verifier

displaying information, Examining Memory Usage

low resources simulation, Driver Verifier

memory manager, Internal Synchronization

paged pool execution protection, No Execute Page Protection
pool functions, **Driver Verifier**

session pool execution protection, **No Execute Page Protection**

kernel memory dumps, **Crash Dump Files, Crash Dump Files, Crash Dump Files**

kernel mode, **Types of Device Drivers, Layered Drivers, Layered Drivers, Services Provided by the Memory Manager, Kernel-Mode Heaps (System Memory Pools)–Look-Aside Lists, Look-Aside Lists, x86 Virtual Address Translation, Page Fault Handling, Memory Notification Events, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, The Blue Screen, Causes of Windows Crashes**

access violations, **Causes of Windows Crashes**

DLLs, **Layered Drivers**

drivers, **Types of Device Drivers, Layered Drivers, Memory Notification Events, The Blue Screen**

heaps, **Kernel-Mode Heaps (System Memory Pools)–Look-Aside Lists, Look-Aside Lists**

memory manager services in, **Services Provided by the Memory Manager**

page faults and, **Page Fault Handling**

paging, **Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems**

virtual addresses, **x86 Virtual Address Translation**

Kernel Mode Code Signing (KMCS), **Driver Installation, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr**

kernel process block (KPROCESS), **Page Directories**

kernel queues, **I/O Completion Port Operation**

kernel stack, **Kernel Stack–Virtual Address Descriptors, Kernel Stacks, Kernel Stacks, Virtual Address Descriptors, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems**

memory management, **Kernel Stack–Virtual Address Descriptors, Kernel Stacks, Virtual Address Descriptors**
stack trace database, **Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems**
usage, **Kernel Stacks**


kernel-mode drivers, **Types of Device Drivers**, **Layered Drivers**, **Layered Drivers**, **User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)**, **Memory Notification Events**, **Why Does Windows Crash?**, **The Blue Screen**

kernel-mode heaps (system memory pools), **Kernel-Mode Heaps (System Memory Pools)—Look-Aside Lists**, **Look-Aside Lists**

kernel-mode pages, **Crash Dump Files**

kernel-mode thread exceptions, **0x8E - KERNEL_MODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED—0x7F - UNEXPECTED_KERNEL_MODE_TRAP**, **0x8E - KERNEL_MODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED, 0x7F - UNEXPECTED_KERNEL_MODE_TRAP**

**KERNEL_DATA_INPAGE_ERROR** stop code, **Causes of Windows Crashes**

**KERNEL_MODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED** stop code, **Stack Trashes**, **0x8E - KERNEL_MODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED, 0x7F - UNEXPECTED_KERNEL_MODE_TRAP**

**KERNEL_MODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED** with P1… stop code, **Causes of Windows Crashes**

KeStartAllProcessors routine, **Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems**

KeSwapProcessOrStack routine, **Memory Manager Components**

KeSynchronizeExecution routine, **Synchronization**

KEVENT structure, **Driver Verifier**

key entries (encryption), **Encrypting a File for the First Time**

key escrow services, **BitLocker Management**

key number generation, **Trusted Platform Module (TPM)**
key recovery mode (TPM), Trusted Platform Module (TPM)

key rings, Encrypting a File for the First Time, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

keyboard buffers, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

keyboard drivers, Hung or Unresponsive Systems–Hung or Unresponsive Systems,
Hung or Unresponsive Systems, Hung or Unresponsive Systems

keyboard ISRs, Hung or Unresponsive Systems

keyboard sequences, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

keyringaddress element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

KiActivateWaiterQueue function, I/O Completion Port Operation

KiDispatchException function, When There Is No Crash Dump

KiInitializeKernel function, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

KiPreBugcheckStackSaveArea function, Stack Trashes

KiSystemStartup function, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

KiUnwaitThread function, I/O Completion Port Operation


data model, KMDF Data Model–KMDF I/O Model, KMDF Data Model, KMDF Data Model, KMDF Data Model, KMDF Data Model, KMDF Data Model
Model
driver structure and operation, Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver–KMDF Data Model, Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver, KMDF Data Model
I/O model and processes, KMDF I/O Model–KMDF I/O Model, KMDF I/O Model, KMDF I/O Model
KMDF objects, KMDF Data Model, KMDF Data Model, KMDF Data Model, KMDF I/O Model
object attributes, KMDF Data Model–KMDF I/O Model, KMDF Data Model, KMDF I/O Model
object context, KMDF Data Model
object hierarchy, KMDF Data Model
object types, KMDF Data Model–KMDF Data Model, KMDF Data Model, KMDF Data Model
viewing drivers, Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver–KMDF Data Model, KMDF Data Model, KMDF Data Model
KMODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED stop code, Causes of Windows Crashes, Stack Trashes
KMUTEX structure, Driver Verifier
Knowledge Base, The Blue Screen
KPRCB structure, Utility Function, Utility Function, Performance Check
KPROCESS block, Page Directories
KSEG0 mapping, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
Kseg3 and 4 addresses, IA64 Virtual Address Translation
KSEMAPHORE structure, Driver Verifier
KSPIN_LOCK structure, Driver Verifier
KTHREAD structure, I/O Completion Port Operation
KTIMER structure, Driver Verifier

KTM (Kernel Transaction Manager), Resource Managers, Logging Implementation, Logging Implementation

KtmLog stream, Resource Managers, Recovery Implementation

Ktmutil.exe utility, Isolation

KUSER_SHARED_DATA structure, Software Data Execution Prevention
LANMan Redirector, Remote FSDs
LANMan Server, Remote FSDs
laptop encryption, Encryption
large file sizes, Per-File Cache Data Structures
Large page bit (PTEs), Page Tables and Page Table Entries
large pages, Large and Small Pages, Large and Small Pages, Large and Small Pages, Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection
large scale corruption causes, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool
large-address-space-aware applications, Introduction to the Memory Manager, x86 Address Space Layouts, 64-Bit Address Space Layouts
large-IRP look-aside lists, I/O Request Packets
last known good (LKG), The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit–Smss, Csrss, and Wininit, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit, Troubleshooting Crashes
booting LKG configuration, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
configuration, troubleshooting with, Troubleshooting Crashes
lastknowngood element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
latency, Servicing an Interrupt, Striped Volumes
NTFS File System Driver

data redundancy, Data Redundancy and Fault Tolerance


I/O system, I/O System, Layered Drivers, Layered Drivers, Layered Drivers, Layered Drivers

layered device objects, Driver Objects and Device Objects

lazy closes, System Threads

lazy commit algorithm, Undo Pass

lazy evaluation algorithms, Copy-on-Write

lazy writer, Recoverable File System Support, Fast I/O, Disabling Lazy Writing for a File, Write Throttling–Write Throttling, Write Throttling, NTFS File System Driver

cache interaction, Recoverable File System Support

disabling, Disabling Lazy Writing for a File

fast I/O, Fast I/O

flushing cache contents, NTFS File System Driver

write throttling, Write Throttling–Write Throttling, Write Throttling

LCNs (logical cluster numbers), Clusters, Master File Table, Master File Table, Master File Table, Master File Table, Resident and Nonresident Attributes, Indexing

in runs, Master File Table

index mapping, Indexing

physical locations, Clusters

VCN-to-LCN mapping, Master File Table, Master File Table, Resident and Nonresident Attributes
LDM (Logical Disk Manager), Dynamic Disks–LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, The LDM Database, The LDM Database, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning

LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning

LDMDump utility, The LDM Database

leaking memory, Monitoring Pool Usage–Look-Aside Lists, Monitoring Pool Usage, Look-Aside Lists, System Page Table Entries–System Page Table Entries, System Page Table Entries, Commit Charge and Page File Size

paged pool, Commit Charge and Page File Size

pool, Monitoring Pool Usage–Look-Aside Lists, Monitoring Pool Usage, Look-Aside Lists

system PTEs, System Page Table Entries–System Page Table Entries, System Page Table Entries

leaks, pool, Monitoring Pool Usage–Look-Aside Lists, Monitoring Pool Usage, Look-Aside Lists

lease keys, Locking

leases, Locking–File System Operation, File System Operation

least recently used (LRU), Systemwide Cache Data Structures

VACBs, Systemwide Cache Data Structures

legacy APIs, Heap Manager

legacy applications, System File Corruption

legacy BIOS interrupts, Booting from iSCSI

legacy devices, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

legacy disk management utilities, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning

legacy drivers, Level of Plug and Play Support, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers

legacy file formats, CDFS
legacy mode, **Physical Address Extension (PAE)**

legacy naming conventions, **Disk Device Objects**

legacy operating systems, **Disk Sector Format**

legacy port drivers, **Prioritization Strategies, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers**

legacy reparse points (junctions), **Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions–Compression and Sparse Files, Compression and Sparse Files**

levels, oplocks, **Locking–Locking, Locking, Locking**

LFH (Low Fragmentation Heap), **Heap Manager Structure, The Low Fragmentation Heap, The Low Fragmentation Heap**

LFS (log file service), **NTFS File System Driver, Log File Service, Log File Service, Log Record Types**

library calls, KMDF and, **Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver**

licensing, **Physical Memory Limits, File System Filter Drivers, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems**

link tracking, **Link Tracking, Link Tracking, File Records**

linked lists, **Windows x64 16-TB Limitation, Page Frame Number Database, Page Frame Number Database, Page List Dynamics**

links, OLE, **Link Tracking–Encryption, Link Tracking, Encryption**

list modules command option, **Verbose Analysis**

list shadows command, **Previous Versions and System Restore**

listing, **Driver Objects and Device Objects**

    device objects, **Driver Objects and Device Objects**

LiveKd, **Crash Dump Files, Hung or Unresponsive Systems–Hung or Unresponsive Systems, Hung or Unresponsive Systems, Hung or Unresponsive Systems**

Im command, **Verbose Analysis**
load-balancing policies, **Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers**

loaded drivers, **Layered Drivers–Layered Drivers, Layered Drivers, Internal Synchronization**

memory manager and, **Internal Synchronization**

viewing list, **Layered Drivers–Layered Drivers, Layered Drivers**

loaded image address space, **User Address Space Layout**

loader parameter blocks, **Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems**


loadoptions element, **The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr**

local FSDs, **File System Driver Architecture–Local FSDs, Local FSDs, Local FSDs**

Local Group Policy Editor, **BitLocker Management–BitLocker To Go, BitLocker To Go, BitLocker To Go**

local pool tag files, **Monitoring Pool Usage**

local replacement policies, **Placement Policy**

Local Security Policy MMC snap-in, **Encrypting a File for the First Time**

local session manager (LSM), **BIOS Preboot, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit**

local-to-local or -remote links, **Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions**

locale element, **The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr**

Localtag.txt file, **Monitoring Pool Usage**

Localxxx functions, **Services Provided by the Memory Manager**
lock contention, The Low Fragmentation Heap
LOCK prefix, Windows x64 16-TB Limitation
locked bytes, Fast I/O
locked memory page tracking, Driver Verifier
LockFile function, Opening Devices
locking, Opening Devices, Memory Manager Components, Internal Synchronization, Commit Limit, Heap Synchronization, Multiple Data Streams
address space, Memory Manager Components
byte ranges, Multiple Data Streams
heap, Heap Synchronization
memory, Commit Limit
portions of files, Opening Devices
working set locks, Internal Synchronization
log block signature arrays, Owner Pages
log blocks, Log Blocks
log container files, Master File Table
log file service (LFS), NTFS File System Driver, Log File Service, Log File Service, Log Record Types
CLFS, Log Types, Log Layout
defragmentation and, Defragmentation
NTFS, Master File Table
recovery, Design, Metadata Logging–Recovery, Log File Service, Log Record Types, Log Record Types, Log Record Types, Recovery
recovery passes, Undo Pass, Undo Pass
safe mode, Boot Logging in Safe Mode–Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)
size, Log Record Types–Recovery, Recovery
Superfetch service, Proactive Memory Management (Superfetch)
TxF, Resource Managers
marshalling, Marshalling
metadata logging, Log Record Types–Recovery, Recovery
recovery mechanisms, Log Record Types–Recovery, Log Record Types, Log Record Types, Recovery
size, Management Policies
types, Log Record Types–Recovery, Recovery
log start LSNs, Log Sequence Numbers
log tails, Management Policies
log-end LSNs, Owner Pages
logged utility streams, File Records
metadata, Metadata Logging—Recovery, Log File Service, Recovery

NTFS transaction support, On-Disk Implementation—NTFS Recovery Support, NTFS Recovery Support, NTFS Recovery Support

overhead, Design

proactive memory management, Tracing and Logging

recovery, Design

sequence numbers, Log Sequence Numbers

Superfetch service, Tracing and Logging

transactions, Logging Implementation

update records, Log Record Types

logging areas (LFS), Metadata Logging—Log File Service, Log File Service, Log File Service

logical block numbers, Disk Sector Format

logical block offsets, Key Features of the Cache Manager

logical blocks, Disk Sector Format

logical container identifiers, Log Layout

logical descriptors (TxF), Log Record Types

logical disk manager (LDM), Dynamic Disks—LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, The LDM Database, The LDM Database, The LDM Database, The LDM Database, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning

logical drives, MBR-Style Partitioning

logical ports, Layered Drivers

logical prefetcher, NUMA, Demand Paging, Logical Prefetcher, Logical Prefetcher, Logical Prefetcher, ReadyBoot

logical processors, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
logo animation, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
logoff notifications, Container Notifications
logon manager (Winlogon.exe), Virtual Address Space Layouts, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit, ReadyBoot, Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang, Shutdown
long file names, File Names, File Names
look-aside lists, KMDF Data Model, NUMA, PFN Data Structures
  kernel stack PFNs, PFN Data Structures
  KMDF objects, KMDF Data Model
  NUMA nodes, NUMA
Low Fragmentation Heap (LFH), Heap Manager Structure, The Low Fragmentation Heap
Low I/O priority, I/O Priorities, Prioritization Strategies
low memory conditions, Memory Notification Events–Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events
low priority mapping VACBs, Systemwide Cache Data Structures
low-priority page lists, Page List Dynamics
LowCommitCondition event, Memory Notification Events
lower-level filter drivers, Device Stacks, Device Stack Driver Loading
lowercase characters, Master File Table
LowMemoryCondition event, Memory Notification Events
LowNonPagedPoolCondition event, Memory Notification Events
LowPagedPoolCondition event, Memory Notification Events
LPT1 device name, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
LRU VACBs, Systemwide Cache Data Structures
LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem), \textit{x86 Address Space Layouts}, \textit{Encryption}, \textit{Encrypting a File for the First Time}

EFS, \textit{Encryption}

encryption services, \textit{Encrypting a File for the First Time}

large address space aware, \textit{x86 Address Space Layouts}

LSM (local session manager), \textit{Smss, Csrss, and Wininit}


CLFS operations, \textit{Log Layout–Log Blocks}, \textit{Log Blocks}, \textit{Log Blocks}

resource managers and, \textit{Resource Managers}

translating virtual to physical, \textit{Owner Pages–Translating Virtual LSNs to Physical LSNs}, \textit{Translating Virtual LSNs to Physical LSNs}, \textit{Management Policies}

LZNT1 compression, \textit{Data Compression and Sparse Files}
machine checks, Causes of Windows Crashes
magneto-optical storage media, UDF
mailslots, Typical I/O Processing
major function codes (IRP stack locations), IRP Stack Locations
malloc function, Heap Manager
malware, No Execute Page Protection–Copy-on-Write, Software Data Execution Prevention, Copy-on-Write
Manage-bde.exe, BitLocker Management
manual crash dumps, Hung or Unresponsive Systems, Hung or Unresponsive Systems, Hardware Malfunctions
manual I/Os, KMDF I/O Model
manual restore points, Previous Versions and System Restore
manually configured targets (iSCSI), iSCSI Drivers
manually crashing systems, Hung or Unresponsive Systems
MANUALLY_INITIATED_CRASH stop code, Hung or Unresponsive Systems
mapped file functions, Services Provided by the Memory Manager, Local FSDs, Memory Manager’s Page Fault Handler
mapped files, Fast I/O, Scatter/Gather I/O, Reserving and Committing Pages, Allocation Granularity–Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Types of Heaps, User Address Space Layout, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Section Objects, Section Objects, Modified Page Writer–Modified Page Writer, Modified Page Writer–Modified Page Writer, Modified Page Writer, Modified Page Writer, Modified Page Writer, The Memory Manager, Cache Coherency, Cache Coherency, Read-Ahead and Write-Behind
address space, User Address Space Layout
cache coherency, Cache Coherency, Cache Coherency
copy-on-write mapped memory, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit
I/O, Fast I/O, Scatter/Gather I/O, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Section Objects
memory manager, Allocation Granularity—Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files
modified page writer, Modified Page Writer—Modified Page Writer, Modified Page Writer, Modified Page Writer
objects, Types of Heaps
pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Modified Page Writer—Modified Page Writer, Modified Page Writer
read-ahead and write-behind, Read-Ahead and Write-Behind
section objects, Section Objects
viewing, Shared Memory and Mapped Files
virtual address space, The Memory Manager
mapped page writer, Recoverable File System Support, Caching with the Mapping and Pinning Interfaces, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing
  cache operations, Caching with the Mapping and Pinning Interfaces
  recovery process, Recoverable File System Support
  write-behind operations, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing
mapped pages, Address Windowing Extensions
mapped views, Prototype PTEs, Cache Virtual Memory Management—Cache Working Set Size, Cache Working Set Size, Per-File Cache Data Structures, Transactional APIs
cache manager, *Cache Virtual Memory Management–Cache Working Set Size, Cache Working Set Size*

TxF transactions, *Transactional APIs*

VACBs, *Per-File Cache Data Structures*

valid and invalid pages, *Prototype PTEs*

mapped writer threads, *Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing*

mapping, *Previous Versions and System Restore–Conclusion, Conclusion, Memory Management*

virtual memory into physical, *Memory Management*

volume shadow device objects, *Previous Versions and System Restore–Conclusion, Conclusion*

mapping interface, *Caching with the Mapping and Pinning Interfaces–Fast I/O, Caching with the Mapping and Pinning Interfaces, Fast I/O*

mapping methods, *File System Interfaces*

MapUserPhysicalPages functions, *Address Windowing Extensions*

MapViewOfFile function, *Mapped File I/O and File Caching–I/O Request Packets, I/O Request Packets, Services Provided by the Memory Manager, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Cache Coherency*

cache coherency issues, *Cache Coherency*

committed storage, *Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit*

creating virtual address space, *Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit*


memory mapped file functions, *Services Provided by the Memory Manager*

section views, *Shared Memory and Mapped Files*

MapViewOfFileEx function, *Services Provided by the Memory Manager*
Allocation Granularity, Shared Memory and Mapped Files

MapViewOfFileExNuma function, Shared Memory and Mapped Files

Markov chain models, Page Priority and Rebalancing

marshalling, Marshalling

marshalling areas, Marshalling

mass storage devices, Types of Device Drivers, Prioritization Strategies, Bandwidth Reservation (Scheduled File I/O)

master file table backup (, Dynamic Partitioning

maxgroup element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

maximum pool sizes, Pool Sizes–Pool Sizes, Pool Sizes, Pool Sizes, Pool Sizes

maximum section size, Section Objects

maximum utility (processors), Utility Function

Maxim CommitCondition event, Memory Notification Events

maxproc element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

MBRs (master boot records), MBR-Style Partitioning, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning–LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, Mirrored Volumes, MBR Corruption

    corruption and startup issues, MBR Corruption

    LDM partitioning, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning–LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning

    multipartition volumes, Mirrored Volumes

    partitioning style, MBR-Style Partitioning

MCA (Micro Channel Architecture), The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

MD5 hashes, Encrypting a File for the First Time

MDLs (memory descriptor lists), IRP Buffer Management, Clustered Page Faults, Caching with the Direct Memory Access Interfaces
media player applications, Power Availability Requests—Processor Power Management (PPM), Power Availability Requests, Power Availability Requests, Processor Power Management (PPM)

Meminfo tool, Page Frame Number Database, Page Priority, Page Priority, Page Priority, PFN Data Structures, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits

MemLimit utility, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management memory, KMDF Data Model, KMDF Data Model, Processor Power Management (PPM), Solid State Disks, NAND-Type Flash Memory—File Deletion and the Trim Command, File Deletion and the Trim Command, Memory Management, Memory Manager Components, Examining Memory Usage, Examining Memory Usage—Examining Memory Usage, Examining Memory Usage, Examining Memory Usage, Examining Memory Usage, Large and Small Pages, Monitoring Pool Usage, Look-Aside Lists, Look-Aside Lists, Driver Verifier, Page Priority, System Working Sets—Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events—Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events, Robust Performance—Robust Performance, Robust Performance, Robust Performance, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection access violations, Large and Small Pages
core parking, Processor Power Management (PPM)
corruption, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool
counter objects, Examining Memory Usage, Monitoring Pool Usage
diagnostic tools, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)
KMDF objects, KMDF Data Model, KMDF Data Model
look-aside lists, Look-Aside Lists, Look-Aside Lists
low resources simulation, Driver Verifier
NAND-type, NAND-Type Flash Memory—File Deletion and the Trim Command, File Deletion and the Trim Command
not owned by drivers, Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection notification events, Memory Notification Events—Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events
physical, maximums, Memory Management
priority, Page Priority
RAM vs. flash, Solid State Disks
removing from use, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
third-party optimization software, Robust Performance—Robust Performance, Robust Performance, Robust Performance
usage, Examining Memory Usage—Examining Memory Usage, Examining Memory Usage, Examining Memory Usage
working sets, System Working Sets—Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events
zeroing, Memory Manager Components
memory cards, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32
memory description lists (MDLs), IRP Buffer Management, Clustered Page Faults, Clustered Page Faults, Driver Verifier, Caching with the Mapping and Pinning Interfaces
Memory Leak Diagnoser, Process Reflection
memory management unit (MMU), x86 Virtual Address Translation, Page Tables and Page Table Entries, Physical Address Extension (PAE)
memory manager, Mapped File I/O and File Caching, Mapped File I/O and File Caching–I/O Request Packets, Mapped File I/O and File Caching, I/O Request Packets, I/O Priorities, Driver Verifier, Introduction to the Memory Manager,
Memory Manager Components–Internal Synchronization, Memory Manager Components, Memory Manager Components, Internal Synchronization, Internal Synchronization, Internal Synchronization, Examining Memory Usage–Examining Memory Usage, Examining Memory Usage, Examining Memory Usage, Examining Memory Usage, Large and Small Pages–Reserving and Committing Pages, Large and Small Pages, Large and Small Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Commit Limit, Allocation Granularity, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files–Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, No Execute Page Protection, No Execute Page Protection, No Execute Page Protection, Software Data Execution Prevention, Copy-on-Write–Copy-on-Write, Copy-on-Write, Copy-on-Write, Heap Manager, Heap Manager, Heap Manager Structure, Heap Synchronization, The Low Fragmentation Heap, Heap Debugging Features, Pageheap, Virtual Address Space Layouts–Controlling Security Mitigations, Virtual Address Space Layouts, x86 Address Space Layouts, x86 Address Space Layouts, x86 Address Space Layouts, x86 Address Space Layouts, x86 Address Space Layouts, x86 System Address Space Layout–System Page Table Entries, x86 System Address Space Layout–System Page Table Entries, x86 System Address Space Layout–System Page Table Entries, x86 Session Space, x86 Session Space, System Page Table Entries, System Page Table Entries, System Page Table Entries, System Page Table Entries, System Page Table Entries, System Page Table Entries, 64-Bit Address Space Layouts–64-Bit Address Space Layouts, 64-Bit Address Space Layouts, 64-Bit Address Space Layouts, 64-Bit Address Space Layouts, x64 Virtual Addressing Limitations–Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, x64 Virtual Addressing Limitations, Windows x64 16-TB Limitation, Windows x64 16-TB Limitation, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, System Virtual Address Space Quotas, System Virtual Address Space Quotas–Controlling Security Mitigations, User Address Space Layout, User Address Space Layout, User Address Space Layout, Image Randomization, Image Randomization, Stack Randomization, ASLR in Kernel Address Space, ASLR in Kernel Address Space,

64-bit virtual layouts, 64-Bit Address Space Layouts—64-Bit Address Space Layouts, 64-Bit Address Space Layouts

address translation, Address Translation—Translation Look-Aside Buffer, x86 Virtual Address Translation, x86 Virtual Address Translation, Translation Look-Aside Buffer, Translation Look-Aside Buffer, Physical Address Extension (PAE), Physical Address Extension (PAE), IA64 Virtual Address Translation

allocation granularity, Allocation Granularity

balance set manager and swapper, Balance Set Manager and Swapper—System Working Sets, System Working Sets

cache manager, Cache Manager

caching, Mapped File I/O and File Caching—I/O Request Packets, Mapped File I/O and File Caching, I/O Request Packets

collided page faults, Collided Page Faults

commit charge, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit—Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit
Charge and the System Commit Limit, Commit Charge and Page File Size–Commit Charge and Page File Size, Commit Charge and Page File Size components, Memory Manager Components–Internal Synchronization, Memory Manager Components, Internal Synchronization
copy-on-write, Copy-on-Write–Copy-on-Write, Copy-on-Write, Copy-on-Write Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier–Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier file system drivers, File System Driver Architecture
heap manager, Heap Manager, Heap Manager, Heap Manager Structure, Heap Synchronization, The Low Fragmentation Heap, Heap Debugging Features, Pageheap
I/O priorities, I/O Priorities
in-paging I/O, In-Paging I/O–Collided Page Faults, Collided Page Faults
internal synchronization, Internal Synchronization
invalid PTEs, Page Fault Handling–Invalid PTEs, Invalid PTEs
large and small pages, Large and Small Pages–Reserving and Committing Pages, Large and Small Pages, Large and Small Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages
locking memory, Commit Limit
logical prefetcher, Logical Prefetcher
management, Introduction to the Memory Manager, Memory Manager Components, Working Set Management–Balance Set Manager and Swapper, Balance Set Manager and Swapper
mapped file views, Cache Manager's Read-Ahead Thread
mapped files, Mapped File I/O and File Caching, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files
mapped page writer, Memory Manager’s Modified and Mapped Page Writer
modified page writer, Modified Page Writer–Modified Page Writer, Modified
Page Writer, Modified Page Writer, Memory Manager’s Modified and Mapped Page Writer

no execute page protection, No Execute Page Protection, No Execute Page Protection, Software Data Execution Prevention

notification events, Memory Notification Events–Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events

NUMA, NUMA

PAE translation, Physical Address Extension (PAE)–Physical Address Extension (PAE), Physical Address Extension (PAE), Physical Address Extension (PAE), Physical Address Extension (PAE)

page fault handling, Page Fault Handling–Commit Charge and Page File Size, Invalid PTEs–In-Paging I/O, Invalid PTEs, Prototype PTEs, In-Paging I/O, In-Paging I/O, In-Paging I/O, Clustered Page Faults, Page Files, Commit Charge and Page File Size


page files, Page Files–Page Files, Page Files, Page Files

page list dynamics, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics

PFN database, Page Frame Number Database–PFN Data Structures, Page Frame Number Database, Page Frame Number Database, Page Frame Number Database, Page Frame Number Database

proactive memory management (Superfetch), Proactive Memory Management (Superfetch)–Unified Caching, Components, Tracing and Logging, Scenarios, Page Priority and Rebalancing, Page Priority and Rebalancing, Robust
Performance, Robust Performance, ReadyBoost, ReadyDrive, Unified Caching, Unified Caching

prototype PTEs, Prototype PTEs–In-Paging I/O, Prototype PTEs, In-Paging I/O

section objects, Section Objects, Section Objects

session space, x86 System Address Space Layout–System Page Table Entries, x86 System Address Space Layout–System Page Table Entries, System Page Table Entries, System Page Table Entries

shared memory, Shared Memory and Mapped Files–Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files

shutting down, Shutdown

stacks, Stacks, Kernel Stacks, Kernel Stacks

standby and modified lists, Cache Physical Size

system PTEs, System Page Table Entries

system working sets, System Working Sets–Memory Notification Events, System Working Sets, Memory Notification Events

systemwide resources, Internal Synchronization

translation look-aside buffer, Translation Look-Aside Buffer–Physical Address Extension (PAE), Physical Address Extension (PAE)

usage, Examining Memory Usage–Examining Memory Usage, Examining Memory Usage, Examining Memory Usage

user space virtual layouts, System Virtual Address Space Quotas–Controlling Security Mitigations, User Address Space Layout, ASLR in Kernel Address Space, Controlling Security Mitigations, Address Translation

virtual address descriptors, Virtual Address Descriptors–Process VADs, Virtual Address Descriptors, Process VADs, Process VADs

virtual address randomization, Image Randomization, Stack Randomization
virtual address space layouts, Virtual Address Space Layouts–Controlling Security Mitigations, Virtual Address Space Layouts, x86 Address Space Layouts, x86 Address Space Layout–System Page Table Entries, x86 Session Space, System Page Table Entries, System Page Table Entries, 64-Bit Address Space Layouts, 64-Bit Address Space Layouts, x64 Virtual Addressing Limitations, Windows x64 16-TB Limitation, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, System Virtual Address Space Quotas, User Address Space Layout, User Address Space Layout, Image Randomization, ASLR in Kernel Address Space, Controlling Security Mitigations, Address Translation

working sets, Working Sets–Memory Notification Events, Logical Prefetcher, Placement Policy, Placement Policy, Working Set Management, Balance Set Manager and Swapper, System Working Sets, Memory Notification Events

x64 virtual limitations, x64 Virtual Addressing Limitations–Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, Windows x64 16-TB Limitation, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management

x86 virtual layouts, x86 Address Space Layouts, x86 Address Space Layouts, x86 Address Space Layouts, x86 Session Space, System Page Table Entries

memory mirroring APIs, Crash Dump Files

Memory Test (Memtest.exe), BIOS Preboot

memory-mapped files, Introduction to the Memory Manager, Services Provided by the Memory Manager, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit, Causes of Windows Crashes

Memory.dmp file, Crash Dump Files

MemoryErrors event, Memory Notification Events

MEMORY_MANAGEMENT stop code, Causes of Windows Crashes

MEM_DOS_LIM flag, Allocation Granularity

MEM_TOP_DOWN flag, x86 Address Space Layouts
message queues, Common Log File System
message signaled interrupts, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
metadata, File Deletion and the Trim Command, Heap Security Features, File Systems, Log Layout, Master File Table–Master File Table, Master File Table, Master File Table, Master File Table, Master File Table, Metadata Logging–Recovery, Log File Service, Recovery

CLFS logs, Log Layout
disk availability, File Deletion and the Trim Command
file system metadata, File Systems
file system structure, Master File Table–Master File Table, Master File Table, Master File Table
LFH blocks, Heap Security Features
logging, Metadata Logging–Recovery, Log File Service, Recovery
NTFS extensions directory, Master File Table
metadata transaction log (, Dynamic Partitioning

MFT records, Master File Table, Master File Table, File Record Numbers, File Records, File Records, Resident and Nonresident Attributes, Indexing

MFTs (master file tables), Logical Prefetcher, Defragmentation, Master File Table, File Records, File Names, Resident and Nonresident Attributes–Data Compression and Sparse Files, Resident and Nonresident Attributes, Data Compression and Sparse Files, Indexing, NTFS Bad-Cluster Recovery

contiguous disk space, Defragmentation
directories, Resident and Nonresident Attributes
duplicated, NTFS Bad-Cluster Recovery
file entries, File Records
file names, File Names
file records, Master File Table, Indexing
resident attributes, Resident and Nonresident Attributes–Data Compression and Sparse Files, Data Compression and Sparse Files

traces, Logical Prefetcher

mice, legacy, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

MiComputeNumaCosts function, NUMA

Micro Channel Architecture (MCA), The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

Microsoft symbol server, Crash Dump Files

Microsoft Windows Hardware Quality Labs (WHQL), Driver Verifier, Driver Installation


MiCurrentMappedPageBucket routine, Modified Page Writer

MiDereferenceSegmentThread routine, Memory Manager Components

MiDispatchFault routine, Explicit File I/O

MiImageBias routine, Image Randomization

MiImageBitmap routine, Image Randomization

MiInitializeRelocations routine, Image Randomization

MiInsertPage routines, Modified Page Writer, Modified Page Writer

MiIssueHardFault routine, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing

MiMappedPageListHeadEvent event, Modified Page Writer

MiMappedPageWriter routine, Memory Manager Components

MiMaximumWorkingSet variable, Working Set Management

MiModifiedPageWriter routine, Memory Manager Components

miniclass drivers, Layered Drivers

minidumps, Crash Dump Files, Crash Dump Files

minifilter drivers, Process Monitor
Minimal subkey, Safe Mode, Driver Loading in Safe Mode, Driver Loading in Safe Mode

MiniNT/WinPE registry keys, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

miniport drivers, Layered Drivers, Device Stacks, Disk Drivers, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Volume I/O Operations

minor function codes (IRP stack locations), IRP Stack Locations

MIPS support, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

MiReclaimSystemVA function, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management

MiRescanPageFilesEvent event, Modified Page Writer

mirrored partitions, Basic Disk Volume Manager, The LDM Database, Data Redundancy and Fault Tolerance

mirrored volumes (RAID-1), Mirrored Volumes, Volume I/O Operations–Virtual Disk Service, Virtual Disk Service, Data Redundancy and Fault Tolerance, NTFS Bad-Cluster Recovery

bad sector handling, NTFS Bad-Cluster Recovery

data redundancy, Data Redundancy and Fault Tolerance

I/O operations, Mirrored Volumes, Volume I/O Operations–Virtual Disk Service, Virtual Disk Service

mirroring, Volume Shadow Copy Service–Conclusion, Conclusion

Volume Shadow Copy Service, Volume Shadow Copy Service–Conclusion, Conclusion

MiSystemPteInfo variable, System Page Table Entries–System Page Table Entries, System Page Table Entries, System Page Table Entries

MiSystemVaType arrays, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management

MiSystemVaTypeCount arrays, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management
mitigation component (FTH), Fault Tolerant Heap
MiTrimAllSystemPagableMemory function, Driver Verifier
MiVa regions, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management
MiWriteGapCounter variable, Modified Page Writer
MiZeroInParallel function, Memory Manager Components
Mklink.exe utility, Previous Versions and System Restore
MLC (multilevel cell memory), NAND-Type Flash Memory–NAND-Type Flash Memory, NAND-Type Flash Memory, NAND-Type Flash Memory
mlink utility, Hard Links
Mm functions, Services Provided by the Memory Manager
MmAccessFault handler, Page Fault Handling, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Explicit File I/O
MmAllocate functions, NUMA
MmAvailablePages variable, Modified Page Writer,PFN Data Structures
MmFlushAllFilesystemPages function, Modified Page Writer
MmFlushAllPages function, Modified Page Writer
MmFlushSection function, Cache Manager’s Lazy Writer
MmInitializeProcessAddressSpace function, Process Reflection
MmLock functions, Locking Memory
MmMapIoSpace function, Large and Small Pages
MmMapLockedPages function, Driver Verifier
MmMappedPageWriterEvent event, Modified Page Writer
MmMapViewInSystemCache function, Explicit File I/O
MmMaximumNonPagedPoolInBytes variable, Pool Sizes
MmModifiedPageWriterGate object, Modified Page Writer
MmNumberOfPhysicalPages variable, **PFN Data Structures**

MmPagedPoolWs variables, **Pool Sizes, System Working Sets**

MmPagingFileHeader event, **Modified Page Writer**

MmPrefetchPages function, **Logical Prefetcher**

MmProbeAndLockPages function, **Locking Memory, Driver Verifier**

MmProbeAndLockProcessPages function, **Driver Verifier**

MmResidentAvailablePages variable, **PFN Data Structures**

MmSizeOfNonPagedPoolInBytes variable, **Pool Sizes**

MmSizeOfPagedPoolInBytes variable, **Pool Sizes**

MmSystemCacheWs variables, **System Working Sets, System Working Sets**

MmSystemDriverPage variable, **System Working Sets**

MmSystemPtesWs variable, **System Working Sets**

MMU (memory management unit), **Page Tables and Page Table Entries, Physical Address Extension (PAE)**

MmUnlockPages function, **Driver Verifier**

MmUnmapLockedPages function, **Driver Verifier**

MmWorkingSetManager function, **Memory Manager Components, Modified Page Writer**

MmZeroPageThread routine, **Memory Manager Components**

MM_SESSION_SPACE structure, **x86 Session Space**

model-specific registers (MSRs), **DPC Stack**

cache manager write operations, Intelligent Read-Ahead

cache physical size, Cache Physical Size–Cache Data Structures, Cache Data Structures

mapped page writer, Memory Manager Components

page writer, Modified Page Writer

redistributing memory, Tracing and Logging

system cache, Cache Size, Cache Physical Size, Cache Physical Size


Modified no-write PFN state, Page Frame Number Database

modified page lists, Reserving and Committing Pages

modified page writer, Modified Page Writer

PFN database, Modified Page Writer

modified pages,PFN Data Structures, Memory Manager’s Modified and Mapped Page Writer

Modified PFN state, Page Frame Number Database

modified PFN state flag, PFN Data Structures

modified-no-write lists, Invalid PTEs, Prototype PTEs

modified-no-write pages, PFN Data Structures

more command, Multiple Data Streams

motherboard devices, Device Enumeration, Hung or Unresponsive Systems

motherboard driver, BIOS Preboot

Mount Manager, Mount Points

Mount Manager driver, The Mount Manager–Mount Points, The Mount Manager, Mount Points

mount operations, Basic Disk Volume Manager
mount points, Opening Devices, Mount Points, Mount Points, Reparse Points
mount requests, Volume Mounting
Mountvol.exe tool, Mount Points
move APIs, Transactional APIs
MoveFileEx API, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
moving files, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
Mpclaim.exe, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers
Mpdev.sys driver, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers
MPIO (Multipath I/O), Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Partition Manager
Mpio.sys driver, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers
MS-DOS, File Records–Resident and Nonresident Attributes, File Names, Resident and Nonresident Attributes
   file names, File Records–Resident and Nonresident Attributes, Resident and Nonresident Attributes
   generating file names, File Names
MS-DOS applications, Allocation Granularity, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
Msconfig utility, Images That Start Automatically
Msdsms.sys module, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers
msi element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
MsInfo32.exe utility, Layered Drivers, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits
Msiscsi.sys driver, iSCSI Drivers
MUI files, BitLocker To Go
multiboot systems, **FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32**

multifunction device container IDs, **Device Stack Driver Loading–Device Stack Driver Loading, Device Stack Driver Loading, Device Stack Driver Loading**

multilevel cell memory (MLC), **NAND-Type Flash Memory–NAND-Type Flash Memory, NAND-Type Flash Memory, NAND-Type Flash Memory**

multilevel VACB arrays, **Per-File Cache Data Structures**


  basic disks, **Volume Management**

  dynamic disks, **Volume Management, Dynamic Disks–Multipartition Volume Management, Multipartition Volume Management**

  I/O operations, **Volume I/O Operations**

  management, **Multipartition Volume Management–RAID-5 Volumes, Spanned Volumes, Striped Volumes, Mirrored Volumes, RAID-5 Volumes**

  mirrored, **Striped Volumes–Mirrored Volumes, Mirrored Volumes, Mirrored Volumes, Mirrored Volumes, Mirrored Volumes, RAID-5 Volumes**

  RAID-5, **RAID-5 Volumes**

  spanned, **Spanned Volumes**

  storage management, **Spanned Volumes, Striped Volumes, Mirrored Volumes**

  striped, **Striped Volumes, Striped Volumes**

Multipath Bus Driver (Mpio.sys), **Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers**

multipath I/O (MPIO) drivers, **Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O**
(MPIO) Drivers, Partition Manager

multipathing solutions, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers

multiple data streams, Advanced Features of NTFS–Multiple Data Streams, Multiple Data Streams, Multiple Data Streams, Multiple Data Streams

Multiple Provider Router, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

Multiple Universal Naming Convention (UNC) Provider (MUP) driver, The Start Value

multiplexed logs, Log Types, Translating Virtual LSNs to Physical LSNs

multiprocessor systems, Synchronization, Internal Synchronization, Look-Aside Lists, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

   driver synchronizing, Synchronization

   look-aside lists, Look-Aside Lists

   memory manager, Internal Synchronization

   numbers of CPUs, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

multithreaded applications, Heap Synchronization

mutexes, Driver Verifier, Hung or Unresponsive Systems

mutual exclusion (heap blocks), Heap Manager

Myfault.sys driver, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination, Notmyfault, Basic Crash Dump Analysis, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool
N

name logging traces, Tracing and Logging
name resolution, Explicit File I/O
named data attributes, File Records
Named Pipe File System (Npfs) driver, IRP Stack Locations
named pipe file system drivers, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
named pipes, Using Completion Ports, When There Is No Crash Dump, When There Is No Crash Dump
named streams, UDF, Multiple Data Streams, NTFS File System Driver
namespace subdirectories, Disk Device Objects

shell, Link Tracking–Encryption, Link Tracking, Encryption

naming, I/O System, Disk Device Objects, Shared Memory and Mapped Files
disk class drivers, Disk Device Objects
I/O system, I/O System
section objects, Shared Memory and Mapped Files
NAND-type flash memory, Solid State Disks–File Deletion and the Trim Command, NAND-Type Flash Memory, File Deletion and the Trim Command, File Deletion and the Trim Command
NAS (network-attached storage), Booting from iSCSI
National Language System (NLS) files, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
native applications, BIOS Preboot, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
NDIS (Network Driver Interface Specification), Layered Drivers
neither I/O, IRP Buffer Management, IRP Buffer Management
nested file systems, Nested File Systems
nested partitions, GUID Partition Table Partitioning
nesting VHDs, Virtual Hard Disk Support
.NET Framework, Resource Managers
network adapters, Types of Device Drivers, The Start Value, 32-Bit Client
Effective Memory Limits
network API drivers, Types of Device Drivers
network devices, Types of Device Drivers, The Plug and Play (PnP) Manager,
Caching with the Direct Memory Access Interfaces
Network Driver Interface Specification (NDIS), Layered Drivers
network endpoints, Using Completion Ports
network file system drivers, User-Initiated I/O Cancellation, NTFS File System
Driver
network interface controller ROM, Booting from iSCSI
network protocol drivers, Fast I/O
network providers, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
network redirectors, Cache Coherency, Write Throttling
network storage management, Storage Management
Network subkey, Driver Loading in Safe Mode, Driver Loading in Safe Mode
network-attached storage (NAS), Booting from iSCSI
new operator, Heap Manager
New Simple Volume wizard, Mirrored Volumes
NLS files, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, Initializing the Kernel and
Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems,
Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

NLS object directory, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

NMI (nonmaskable interrupt), Causes of Windows Crashes, Hung or Unresponsive Systems, Hardware Malfunctions

NMICrashDump file, Hardware Malfunctions

no execute page protection (DEP), Protecting Memory–Copy-on-Write, No Execute Page Protection, No Execute Page Protection, Software Data Execution Prevention–Copy-on-Write, Software Data Execution Prevention, Copy-on-Write, Copy-on-Write, Copy-on-Write, User Address Space Layout, Heap Randomization, Physical Address Extension (PAE)

address space allocation, User Address Space Layout

ASLR, Heap Randomization

memory manager, Protecting Memory–Copy-on-Write, No Execute Page Protection, No Execute Page Protection, Copy-on-Write, Copy-on-Write

PAE, No Execute Page Protection, Physical Address Extension (PAE)

software data execution prevention, Software Data Execution Prevention–Copy-on-Write, Copy-on-Write

stack cookies and pointer encoding, Software Data Execution Prevention

No Reboot (Driver Verifier), Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool

no-execute memory, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

nocrashautoreboot element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

nodes (NUMA), NUMA

noerrordisplay element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

nointegritychecks element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

nolowmem element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

nolowmen BCD option, Physical Address Extension (PAE), Windows Client
Memory Limits

Non Uniform Memory Architecture (NUMA), **NUMA**
non-fault-tolerant volumes, **NTFS Bad-Cluster Recovery**
non-PAE kernel, **No Execute Page Protection**
non-PAE systems, **x86 Virtual Address Translation**, **x86 Virtual Address Translation**, **Page Directories**, **Page Tables and Page Table Entries**, **Hardware vs. Software Write Bits in Page Table Entries**
non-Plug and Play drivers, **Driver Objects and Device Objects**, **Kernel-Mode Driver Framework (KMDF)**, **Level of Plug and Play Support**
creating device objects, **Driver Objects and Device Objects**
KMDF initialization routines, **Kernel-Mode Driver Framework (KMDF)**
PnP levels of support, **Level of Plug and Play Support**
nonbased sections, **Section Objects**
noncached I/O, **Opening Devices**, **Scatter/Gather I/O**, **File System Interfaces**, **Explicit File I/O**, **Memory Manager’s Modified and Mapped Page Writer**, **Cache Manager’s Lazy Writer**
file object attributes, **Opening Devices**
file objects, **Explicit File I/O**
IRPs, **Memory Manager’s Modified and Mapped Page Writer**
memory manager and, **File System Interfaces**
page writers, **Cache Manager’s Lazy Writer**
scatter/gather I/O and, **Scatter/Gather I/O**
noncached memory mapping, **Protecting Memory**
noncached read operations, **File System Interfaces**, **Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing**
noncommitted transactions, **Analysis Pass**, **Undo Pass**
nonencoded pointers, Software Data Execution Prevention

nonmaskable interrupt (NMI), Causes of Windows Crashes, Hung or Unresponsive Systems, Hardware Malfunctions

non pageable memory, Large and Small Pages

nonpaged look aside lists, Look-Aside Lists


address space, 64-Bit Address Space Layouts

commit charge, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit

debugging information, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis–Stack Trashes, Stack Trashes

expanding, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management

memory quotas, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management–User Address Space Layout, System Virtual Address Space Quotas, User Address Space Layout

NUMA nodes, NUMA

performance counters, Monitoring Pool Usage–Look-Aside Lists, Monitoring Pool Usage, Look-Aside Lists

reclaiming virtual addresses, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management

sizes, Pool Sizes–Pool Sizes, Pool Sizes

system space, Virtual Address Space Layouts
VADs, Virtual Address Descriptors

nonpaged pool buffers, IRP Buffer Management, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)

nonpaged pool session memory, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier

nonpaged system memory, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers

nonpower-managed queues, KMDF I/O Model

nonprototype PFNs, Page Frame Number Database–Page Frame Number Database

nonresident attributes (NTFS), Resident and Nonresident Attributes–Data Compression and Sparse Files, Resident and Nonresident Attributes, Resident and Nonresident Attributes, Resident and Nonresident Attributes, Data Compression and Sparse Files

nonsparse data, Compressing Nonsparse Data, Compressing Nonsparse Data, Sparse Files, Sparse Files

nontransacted writers and readers, Isolation, Isolation, Resource Managers

nonvolatile data, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing

nonvolatile memory, Solid State Disks

nonvolatile RAM (NVRAM), ReadyDrive, Unified Caching, The UEFI Boot Process

NOR-type flash memory, Solid State Disks

Normal I/O priority, I/O Priorities, Prioritization Strategies, I/O Priority Boosts and Bumps, I/O Priority Boosts and Bumps, I/O Priority Boosts and Bumps

Notmyfault.exe, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination, Monitoring Pool Usage, Notmyfault

noumex element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

novesa element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

Npfs (Named Pipe File System) driver, IRP Stack Locations
Nt5.cat file, Driver Installation
Nt5ph.cat file, Driver Installation
Ntbtlog.txt file, Boot Logging in Safe Mode
NtCreateFile function, Opening Devices, Explicit File I/O
NtCreateIoCompletion system service, I/O Completion Port Operation
NtCreatePagingFile service, Page Files
Ntdll.dll, Opening Devices, Heap Manager, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

alternate data streams, NTFS
clusters, NTFS, NTFS On-Disk Structure
compression, NTFS, Compression and Sparse Files, Data Compression and Sparse Files, Data Compression and Sparse Files, Compressing Nonsparse Data, Compressing Nonsparse Data

crash codes, Troubleshooting Crashes
data redundancy, Data Redundancy and Fault Tolerance
data structures, NTFS File System Driver
defragmentation, Defragmentation
encryption, NTFS, Encryption–Defragmentation, Encryption, Defragmentation
file names, File Records, File Names
file system driver, File System Driver Architecture
flash memory, File Deletion and the Trim Command
hard links, NTFS, Hard Links–Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions

high-end requirements, High-End File System Requirements–Data Redundancy and Fault Tolerance, Data Redundancy and Fault Tolerance

I/O system, I/O System Components
indexing, General Indexing Facility
isolation, Isolation–Transactional APIs, Isolation, Transactional APIs
master file tables, Master File Table, Master File Table, Master File Table
metadata logging, Metadata Logging–Recovery, Log File Service, Recovery
mount points, Mount Points–Volume Mounting, Mount Points, Volume Mounting
multiple data streams, Multiple Data Streams–Hard Links, Unicode-Based Names, Hard Links
object attributes, Multiple Data Streams
object IDs, Object IDs
per-user volume quotas, exFAT, Per-User Volume Quotas, Per-User Volume Quotas
POSIX support, POSIX Support
reparse points, Reparse Points
resource managers, Resource Managers–On-Disk Implementation, On-Disk Implementation
security, NTFS, Security
self-healing, Self-Healing
spanned volumes, Spanned Volumes
sparse files, Compressing Nonsparse Data, Sparse Files, Sparse Files
symbolic links and junctions, NTFS, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions
transaction logging, On-Disk Implementation–NTFS Recovery Support, Recovery Implementation, NTFS Recovery Support
Unicode-based names, **Unicode-Based Names**, **General Indexing Facility**

volumes, **Volumes**

NTFS file system driver (Ntfs.sys), **NTFS**, **NTFS File System Driver**, **NTFS File System Driver**

NtfsCopyReadA routine, **Fast I/O**

NTFS_FILE_SYSTEM stop code, **Causes of Windows Crashes**

NtInitializeRegistry function, **Smss, Csrss, and Wininit**

Ntkrnlpa.exe kernel, **Physical Address Extension (PAE)**

NtQuerySystemInformation API, **I/O Priority Boosts and Bumps**, **Logical Prefetcher**

NtReadFile function, **Synchronous and Asynchronous I/O**, **IRP Buffer Management**, **Explicit File I/O**, **Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection**

NtRemoverIoCompletion system service, **I/O Completion Port Operation**

NtSetInformationFile system service, **I/O Completion Port Operation**

NtSetIoCompletion system service, **I/O Completion Port Operation**

NtSetSystemInformation API, **Scenarios**

NtShutdownSystem function, **Shutdown**

NtWriteFile function, **IRP Buffer Management**, **I/O Request to a Single-Layered Driver**, **Explicit File I/O**

null modem cables, **Hung or Unresponsive Systems**, **When There Is No Crash Dump**

NUMA (Non Uniform Memory Architecture), **Kernel-Mode Heaps (System Memory Pools)**, **NUMA**

NUMA I/O, **Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers**

NUMA nodes, **Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers**, **PFN Data Structures**, **The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr**
numproc element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

NVRAM (nonvolatile RAM), ReadyDrive, Unified Caching, The UEFI Boot Process

nx element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
O index, **Object IDs**

object context areas, **KMDF Data Model, KMDF Data Model**

object contexts, **KMDF Data Model–KMDF Data Model, KMDF Data Model, KMDF Data Model**

object handle tracing, **Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems**

object headers, **Section Objects**

object identifier files (, **Master File Table**

object IDs, **File Records, Object IDs**

attributes, **File Records, Object IDs**

object linking and embedding (OLE), **Link Tracking**

object manager, **Mount Points, Look-Aside Lists, Section Objects, Section Objects, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems**

    directory, **Section Objects**

initialization, **Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems**

look-aside lists and, **Look-Aside Lists**

namespace directories, **Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems**

reparse points, **Mount Points**

section objects, **Section Objects**

object manager directory, **Section Objects**

Object Viewer (Winobj.exe), **Driver Objects and Device Objects, Opening Devices, Backup, Section Objects, Memory Notification Events, Locking**

    device names, **Driver Objects and Device Objects**

memory resource notifications, **Memory Notification Events**
registered file systems, Locking
section objects, Section Objects
shadow volumes, Backup
symbolic links, Opening Devices
ObjId metadata file, Object IDs
ObOpenObjectByName function, Explicit File I/O
OCA (Online Crash Analysis), Online Crash Analysis, Basic Crash Dump Analysis
OEM fonts, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
OEMs (original equipment manufacturers), Images That Start Automatically
offline storage, Multiple Data Streams
OLE (object linking and embedding), Link Tracking
onecpu element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
online crash analysis (OCA), Online Crash Analysis, Online Crash Analysis,
Analysis of Common Stop Codes
opaque objects (KMDF), KMDF Data Model
open devices, Opening Devices–Opening Devices, Opening Devices, Opening Devices, Opening Devices, Opening Devices, Opening Devices, Opening Devices
open files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Explicit File I/O
open mode flags, Opening Devices
open operations, User-Initiated I/O Cancellation
OpenEncryptedFileRaw function, Backing Up Encrypted Files
OpenFileMapping function, Shared Memory and Mapped Files
operating system errors, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)
operating system files, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
operating system images, Virtual Address Space Layouts
operating system versions, Online Crash Analysis
oplock (opportunistic locking), Remote FSDs–Locking, Locking, Locking, Locking
optical media, Storage Management, UDF
Optical Storage Technology Association (OSTA), UDF
optimization software, Robust Performance, Robust Performance
Optin and Optout modes, No Execute Page Protection
optionsedit element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), Images That Start Automatically, Verbose Analysis
original volumes, Clone Shadow Copies
OS/2 applications, File Records
osdevice element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
OSTA (Optical Storage Technology Association), UDF
output buffers, IRP Buffer Management–I/O Request to a Single-Layered Driver, IRP Buffer Management, I/O Request to a Single-Layered Driver
outswapping stacks, Memory Manager Components
overcommitted resources, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit
overlapped flags, Synchronous and Asynchronous I/O
overlocking, Locking Memory
overrun detection, Driver Verifier–Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier
overutilized cores, Algorithm Overrides, Thresholds and Policy Settings, Performance Check
overwriting data, The Change Journal File
overwriting flash memory, Solid State Disks
Owner bit (PTEs), Page Tables and Page Table Entries
owner pages, Log Types, Owner Pages, Owner Pages, Translating Virtual LSNs to Physical LSNs
P

P processor state, Processor Power Management (PPM), Processor Power Management (PPM), Performance Check

padding files, BitLocker To Go

PAE (Physical Address Extension), Physical Address Extension (PAE), Page Files, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

  address translation, Physical Address Extension (PAE)

  loading kernel, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

  page file size, Page Files

pae element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

page access traces, Tracing and Logging

PAGE attributes, Protecting Memory–Protecting Memory, Protecting Memory, Protecting Memory

page directories, x86 Virtual Address Translation, Page Directories, Physical Address Extension (PAE), Physical Address Extension (PAE), Physical Address Extension (PAE)

page directory entries (PDEs), x86 Virtual Address Translation, Page Directories, Physical Address Extension (PAE)

page directory indexes, x86 Virtual Address Translation, x86 Virtual Address Translation

page directory pointer indexes, Physical Address Extension (PAE)

page directory pointer structures, x64 Virtual Address Translation

page directory pointer tables (PDPTs), Physical Address Extension (PAE), Physical Address Extension (PAE), Physical Address Extension (PAE)

page faults and fault handling, IRP Stack Locations, Kernel-Mode Heaps (System Memory Pools)–Pool Sizes, Kernel-Mode Heaps (System Memory Pools), Pool Sizes, x86 Virtual Address Translation, Page Fault Handling–Invalid PTEs, Invalid

adjusting working sets, Balance Set Manager and Swapper

clustered faults, Collided Page Faults–Page Files, Page Files

collided faults, In-Paging I/O, Collided Page Faults


copy operations, Explicit File I/O

crashes, The Blue Screen

I/O optimization, IRP Stack Locations

in-paging I/O, In-Paging I/O–Collided Page Faults, Collided Page Faults

invalid PTEs, Page Fault Handling–Invalid PTEs, Invalid PTEs

modified page writer, Modified Page Writer

nonpaged pools, Kernel-Mode Heaps (System Memory Pools)–Pool Sizes, Kernel-Mode Heaps (System Memory Pools), Pool Sizes

number per seconds, Working Set Management

page file size, Commit Charge and Page File Size–Commit Charge and Page
File Size, Commit Charge and Page File Size

page files, Page Files–Page Files, Page Files, Page Files

prefetching pages, Demand Paging

prototype PTEs, Prototype PTEs–In-Paging I/O, Prototype PTEs, In-Paging I/O

standby or modified lists, PFN Data Structures

valid virtual addresses, x86 Virtual Address Translation

page file headers, Modified Page Writer

page file offsets, Invalid PTEs, Invalid PTEs

page frame numbers (PFNs), x86 Virtual Address Translation, Page Directories, Physical Address Extension (PAE), Modified Page Writer, PFN Data Structures, PFN Data Structures, PFN Data Structures

page frame transitions, Page List Dynamics–Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics

page health, NAND-Type Flash Memory

page lists, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics, Modified Page Writer, Modified Page Writer

page mappings, Translation Look-Aside Buffer

page priority, Page List Dynamics, Page Priority, Page Priority, Page Priority, Scenarios, Page Priority and Rebalancing

page protection, Copy-on-Write, Copy-on-Write, Section Objects

page table indexes, x86 Virtual Address Translation, x86 Virtual Address Translation, Page Directories

page tables, Large and Small Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Virtual Address Space Layouts, Page Directories–Page Tables and Page Table Entries, Page Directories, Page Directories, Page Tables and Page Table Entries, In-Paging I/O–Collided Page Faults, Collided Page Faults, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Page Frame Number Database–Page Frame Number Database,
Page Frame Number Database, PFN Data Structures, PFN Data Structures, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

commit charge, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit

creating, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

in-paging I/O, In-Paging I/O–Collided Page Faults, Collided Page Faults

page directories, Page Directories–Page Tables and Page Table Entries, Page Tables and Page Table Entries

PFN database, Page Frame Number Database–Page Frame Number Database, Page Frame Number Database, PFN Data Structures

process address space, Reserving and Committing Pages

processes, Virtual Address Space Layouts, Page Directories

session space, Page Directories

TLB entries, Large and Small Pages

viewing, PFN Data Structures


balance set manager/swapper events, Modified Page Writer

dirty pages, Memory Manager Components

mapped files, Modified Page Writer–Modified Page Writer, Modified Page Writer

memory manager, Modified Page Writer, Memory Manager’s Modified and Mapped Page Writer

modified page writer, Memory Manager Components

pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Modified Page Writer, Modified Page
Writer

paging files, Modified Page Writer–Modified Page Writer, Modified Page Writer, Modified Page Writer

PFN database, Modified Page Writer

write-behind operations, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing

page-aligned buffers, Scatter/Gather I/O

page-file-backed mapped memory, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Unified Caching

page-file-backed sections, Large and Small Pages, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Prototype PTEs, Page List Dynamics

paged pool, Pool Sizes–Pool Sizes, Pool Sizes, Virtual Address Space Layouts, 64-Bit Address Space Layouts, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit

address space, 64-Bit Address Space Layouts

commit charge, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit

expanding, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management

session-specific, Virtual Address Space Layouts

sizes, Pool Sizes–Pool Sizes, Pool Sizes

paged pool working sets, Virtual Address Space Layouts, System Working Sets

Pagedefrag tool, Page Files

pageheap, Pageheap

pager, Invalid PTEs, In-Paging I/O, In-Paging I/O

Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Locking Memory, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Protecting Memory, Prototype PTEs, Clustered Page Faults, User Stacks, NUMA, Modified Page Writer, Modified Page Writer, PFN Data Structures, Logical Prefetcher–Placement Policy, Logical Prefetcher, Logical Prefetcher, Logical Prefetcher, Placement Policy, Working Set Management, Components, Tracing and Logging, Robust Performance, Unified Caching, Cache Virtual Memory Management, Flushing Mapped Files, Cache Manager’s Read-Ahead Thread, Log Types, Owner Pages–Translating Virtual LSNs to Physical LSNs, Owner Pages, Translating Virtual LSNs to Physical LSNs

aging, Tracing and Logging

buffer management, IRP Buffer Management

committed, Reserving and Committing Pages–Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages

dummy, Clustered Page Faults

free, Reserving and Committing Pages

guard, Protecting Memory, User Stacks

locking in memory, Locking Memory

modified by multiple processes, Flushing Mapped Files

modified page writer, Reserving and Committing Pages, Modified Page Writer, Modified Page Writer

owner, Log Types, Owner Pages–Translating Virtual LSNs to Physical LSNs, Owner Pages, Translating Virtual LSNs to Physical LSNs

prefetching, Logical Prefetcher–Placement Policy, Logical Prefetcher, Logical Prefetcher, Logical Prefetcher, Placement Policy

protection, Large and Small Pages

removing from working sets, Working Set Management
reserved, Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages
robusted, Robust Performance
shareable, Reserving and Committing Pages, Prototype PTEs
shared memory, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files
store, Unified Caching
Superfetch agents, Components
types,PFN Data Structures
usage information, Cache Manager’s Read-Ahead Thread
views of opened files, Cache Virtual Memory Management
zero-initialized, Reserving and Committing Pages
zeroing out, Memory Manager Components, NUMA
PAGE_EXECUTE flags, No Execute Page Protection, Copy-on-Write
PAGE_FAULT_IN_NONPAGED_AREA stop code, Causes of Windows Crashes
paging boosts, I/O Priority Inversion Avoidance (I/O Priority Inheritance)
paging bumps, I/O Priority Boosts and Bumps
commit limit, Commit Limit
containing crash dumps, Crash Dump Generation
Control Panel applet, Introduction to the Memory Manager
copy-on-write avoidance, Shadow Copy Provider
Crashes, The Blue Screen
creating, Page Files, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
defragmentation, Page Files, Defragmentation
file system driver operations, Cache Manager’s Lazy Writer
I/O not in Process Monitor, Process Monitor Basic vs. Advanced Modes
memory manager, Internal Synchronization
modified page writer, Modified Page Writer, Modified Page Writer
routines, Memory Manager Components
section objects, Section Objects
shadow copies, VSS Operation
shutdown process, Shutdown
Commit Charge and Page File Size–Commit Charge and Page File Size,
Commit Charge and Page File Size, Commit Charge and Page File Size
viewing, Page Files
viewing usage, Commit Charge and Page File Size–Commit Charge and Page File Size,
Commit Charge and Page File Size, Commit Charge and Page File Size
Windows use of, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit
paging I/O IRPs, IRP Stack Locations, Explicit File I/O, Memory Manager’s Modified and Mapped Page Writer
paging lists, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics, Page Priority and Rebalancing
paging memory to disk, Introduction to the Memory Manager
paging system (memory manager), Mapped File I/O and File Caching—I/O Request Packets, Mapped File I/O and File Caching, I/O Request Packets
parallel I/Os, KMDF I/O Model, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers
parallel ports, Disk Device Objects, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
parameters, Heap Security Features, Crash Dump Files–Crash Dump Generation, Crash Dump Generation, Crash Dump Generation, Crash Dump Generation, Crash Dump Generation, Crash Dump Generation
heap checking, Heap Security Features
verbose analysis, Verbose Analysis–Verbose Analysis, Verbose Analysis
viewing dump files, Crash Dump Files–Crash Dump Generation, Crash Dump Generation, Crash Dump Generation
parent objects (KMDF), KMDF Data Model, KMDF Data Model
parent virtual hard disks, Virtual Hard Disk Support
parity bytes, RAID-5 Volumes
parity errors, Page Frame Number Database, PFN Data Structures
parity information, Data Redundancy and Fault Tolerance
parked cores, Increase/Decrease Actions–Thresholds and Policy Settings, Thresholds and Policy Settings, Performance Check, Performance Check–Performance Check, Performance Check
frequency settings, Performance Check
increase/decrease actions, Increase/Decrease Actions–Thresholds and Policy Settings, Thresholds and Policy Settings
viewing, Performance Check–Performance Check, Performance Check
parse functions, Explicit File I/O
partial MDLs, Driver Verifier
partition device objects, Disk Device Objects
partition entries (LDM), The LDM Database–The LDM Database, The LDM Database
partition manager, Partition Manager, Basic Disk Volume Manager
partition tables, Storage Terminology, MBR-Style Partitioning, BIOS Preboot, BIOS Preboot
partitions, Opening Devices, Disk Sector Format, Partition Manager, Volume Management–Dynamic Disks, MBR-Style Partitioning, MBR-Style Partitioning, MBR-Style Partitioning, GUID Partition Table Partitioning, GUID Partition Table Partitioning, Basic Disk Volume Manager, Dynamic Disks, The LDM Database, The LDM Database–LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, The LDM Database, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning–LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning

basic disks, Volume Management–Dynamic Disks, Dynamic Disks
boot processes, BIOS Preboot
bootable, BIOS Preboot
extended, MBR-Style Partitioning
file object pointers, Opening Devices
GUID Partition Table style, GUID Partition Table Partitioning, GUID Partition Table Partitioning
LDM database, The LDM Database, The LDM Database–LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, The LDM Database, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning
LDM partitioning, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning–LDM and GPT
or MBR-Style Partitioning, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning

MBR style, MBR-Style Partitioning

multipartition volumes, Multipartition Volume Management—RAID-5 Volumes, Mirrored Volumes, RAID-5 Volumes


partition manager, Partition Manager, Basic Disk Volume Manager

physical sectors, Disk Sector Format

primary, MBR-Style Partitioning

recovery, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)

Partmgr.sys (partition manager), Partition Manager, Basic Disk Volume Manager


passive IRQL (0), Synchronization

PASSIVE_LEVEL IRQL, Synchronization

Patchguard DPC, Windows x64 16-TB Limitation

path names, Mount Points, Explicit File I/O, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions

paths, Opening Devices, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers—Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Hard Links, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

hard links, Hard Links, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions

multipath drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers—Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers

operating systems, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

symbolic links, Opening Devices

PC/AT keyboard buffer, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
PCI buses, Types of Device Drivers, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

device memory, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits

drivers, Types of Device Drivers

dynamic IRQ resources, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

workarounds, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

PCI Express buses, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

cpciexpress element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

Pciide.sys driver, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers

Pciidex.sys driver, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers

PCMCIA buses, WDM Drivers, Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver

PCRs (platform configuration registers), Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Trusted Platform Module (TPM)

PDAs (personal digital assistants), User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)

PDEs (page directory entries), Page Directories

PDPT (page directory pointer table), Physical Address Extension (PAE), Physical Address Extension (PAE)

PDRIVE_LAYOUT_INFORMATION_EX structure, Partition Manager

PE headers, User Address Space Layout–Image Randomization, Image Randomization, Image Randomization

peak commit charge, Commit Charge and Page File Size, Commit Charge and Page File Size

peak paging file usage, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit

peak working set size, Working Set Management

pending file rename operations, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

Pendmoves utility, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
per-file cache data structures, Per-File Cache Data Structures—File System Interfaces, Per-File Cache Data Structures, Per-File Cache Data Structures, Per-File Cache Data Structures, Per-File Cache Data Structures, File System Interfaces, File System Interfaces

per-handle caching information, Opening Devices

per-process private code and data, Virtual Address Space Layouts

per-processor look-aside lists, System Threads

per-user quotas, System Virtual Address Space Quotas, Per-User Volume Quotas, Per-User Volume Quotas

perfmem element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

performance, Pageheap, Commit Charge and Page File Size, Proactive Memory Management (Superfetch)

page files, Commit Charge and Page File Size

pageheap, Pageheap

standby lists, Proactive Memory Management (Superfetch)

performance check intervals (processors), Thresholds and Policy Settings, Thresholds and Policy Settings

performance checks, Performance Check, Performance Check, Performance Check, Performance Check, Performance Check

performance counters, System Working Sets

cache faults, System Working Sets

performance data logging buffers, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

Performance Monitor, Mirrored Volumes, Mirrored Volumes, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Working Set Management, Flushing Mapped Files, Write Throttling

performance states, Increase/Decrease Actions, Thresholds and Policy Settings, Thresholds and Policy Settings, Thresholds and Policy Settings, Performance Check, Performance Check
PERFSTATE_POLICY_CHANGE_IDEAL state, Increase/Decrease Actions
PERFSTATE_POLICY_CHANGE_ROCKET state, Increase/Decrease Actions
PERFSTATE_POLICY_CHANGE_STEP state, Increase/Decrease Actions
periods (.), File Names
permissions, No Execute Page Protection, Link Tracking
  file, Link Tracking
  no execute page protection, No Execute Page Protection
PF files, Logical Prefetcher
Pf routines, Robust Performance
PFAST_IO_DISPATCH pointers, Fast I/O–Mapped File I/O and File Caching,
Mapped File I/O and File Caching
PFN data structures, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management,
Collided Page Faults, Modified Page Writer, PFN Data Structures, PFN Data Structures,
PFN Data Structures
  collided page faults and, Collided Page Faults
  creating, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management
  PFN database, Modified Page Writer, PFN Data Structures, PFN Data Structures,
PFN Data Structures, PFN Data Structures, PFN Data Structures,
PFN Data Structures, PFN Data Structures, PFN Data Structures,
PFN Data Structures, Components
  memory manager, Internal Synchronization
  modified page writer, Modified Page Writer, Modified Page Writer
PFN data structures, PFN Data Structures, PFN Data Structures, PFN Data Structures,
PFN Data Structures, PFN Data Structures, PFN Data Structures,
Superfetch rebalancer, Components
viewing, Page Frame Number Database
viewing entries, PFN Data Structures
PFN image verified flag, PFN Data Structures
PFN of PTE numbers, PFN Data Structures
PFN (page frame numbers), x86 Virtual Address Translation, Physical Address Extension (PAE), PFN Data Structures, PFN Data Structures
PFN_LIST_CORRUPT stop code, Causes of Windows Crashes
.phase 0 initialization, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
.phase 1 initialization, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
Phase 1 Initialization routine, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
physical addresses, Page List Dynamics, Per-File Cache Data Structures, Caching with the Direct Memory Access Interfaces
  DMA interface, Caching with the Direct Memory Access Interfaces
  reading/writing data to buffers, Per-File Cache Data Structures
  sorting pages, Page List Dynamics
physical byte offsets, Clusters
physical client CLFS logs, Log Types
physical container identifiers, Log Layout
physical descriptions, Log Record Types
physical device objects (PDOs), Device Stacks, Device Stacks, Attaching VHDs
physical disk objects, Disk Device Objects
physical LSNs, Translating Virtual LSNs to Physical LSNs–Translating Virtual
LSNs to Physical LSNs, Translating Virtual LSNs to Physical LSNs, Translating Virtual LSNs to Physical LSNs

physical memory, Internal Synchronization, Examining Memory Usage–Examining Memory Usage, Examining Memory Usage, Examining Memory Usage, PFN Data Structures, Physical Memory Limits–32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, Windows Client Memory Limits–32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, Windows Client Memory Limits, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, Memory Notification Events–Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events, Cache Manager, The Memory Manager, Cache Working Set Size, Cache Physical Size, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

cache flushing operations, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing

cache manager, Cache Manager, The Memory Manager

cache physical size, Cache Physical Size

client memory limits, Windows Client Memory Limits–32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits

displaying information, Examining Memory Usage–Examining Memory Usage, Examining Memory Usage, Examining Memory Usage, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

dumping information about, Cache Working Set Size

limits, Physical Memory Limits–32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, Windows Client Memory Limits, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits

lists, Internal Synchronization

notification events, Memory Notification Events–Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events

system variables, PFN Data Structures
physical memory access method, File System Interfaces

physical memory limits, Physical Memory Limits–32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, Windows Client Memory Limits, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits

physical NVRAM stores, Unified Caching

physical page allocations, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics, Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection

physical page numbers (PFNs), x86 Virtual Address Translation, x86 Virtual Address Translation, Physical Address Extension (PAE), Modified Page Writer, PFN Data Structures, PFN Data Structures, PFN Data Structures, PFN Data Structures

physical pages, PFN Data Structures, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

physical storage devices, Storage Terminology

PIN numbers, Encryption Keys

pinning, Systemwide Cache Data Structures, File System Interfaces, Caching with the Mapping and Pinning Interfaces–Fast I/O, Caching with the Mapping and Pinning Interfaces, Fast I/O

PIN_HIGH_PRIORITY flag, Systemwide Cache Data Structures

PipCallDriverAddDevice function, Driver Loading in Safe Mode

pipes, Typical I/O Processing

PKI (public key infrastructure), Encrypting File Data

plaintext attacks, Full-Volume Encryption Driver

platform configuration registers (PCRs), Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Trusted Platform Module (TPM), BitLocker Management

Platform Validation Profile (TPM), Trusted Platform Module (TPM)–BitLocker Boot Process, Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Trusted Platform Module (TPM), BitLocker Boot Process
Plug and Play (PnP), I/O System, Types of Device Drivers, WDM Drivers–Layered Drivers, Layered Drivers, Layered Drivers, Structure of a Driver, Driver Objects and Device Objects, IRP Stack Locations, Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver

commands, IRP Stack Locations

drivers, Types of Device Drivers, Structure of a Driver, Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver

exposing interfaces, Driver Objects and Device Objects

I/O system and, I/O System

WDM drivers, WDM Drivers–Layered Drivers, Layered Drivers, Layered Drivers

Plug and Play BIOS, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

Plug and Play drivers, Types of Device Drivers, Driver Objects and Device Objects, Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver


device enumeration, The Start Value–Device Stacks, Device Enumeration, Device Enumeration, Device Enumeration, Device
Stacks
device stack driver loading, Device Stack Driver Loading–Driver Installation, Device Stack Driver Loading, Device Stack Driver Loading, Device Stack Driver Loading, Device Stack Driver Loading, Driver Installation
driver loading, The Start Value, Device Enumeration, Device Enumeration, Device Enumeration
initialization, Driver Loading, Initialization, and Installation, The Start Value, Device Enumeration, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
processing routines, Driver Support for Plug and Play
replacing CMOS, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
shutting down, Shutdown
volume manager, Basic Disk Volume Manager
PnP drivers, Types of Device Drivers, Driver Objects and Device Objects, Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver
Poavltst.exe utility, Power Availability Requests
PoClearPowerRequest API, Power Availability Requests
PoCreatePowerRequest API, Power Availability Requests
PoDeletePowerRequest1 API, Power Availability Requests
PoEndDeviceBusy API, Driver and Application Control of Device Power
pointer encoding, Software Data Execution Prevention
pointer values, Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection
polling behavior, Process Monitor Basic vs. Advanced Modes
No Execute Page Protection, Address Windowing Extensions–Look-Aside Lists, Kernel-Mode Heaps (System Memory Pools), Kernel-Mode Heaps (System Memory Pools), Kernel-Mode Heaps (System Memory Pools), Kernel-Mode Heaps (System Memory Pools), Kernel-Mode Heaps (System Memory Pools), Pool Sizes–Pool Sizes, Pool Sizes, Pool Sizes, Pool Sizes, Monitoring Pool Usage, Monitoring Pool Usage, Monitoring Pool Usage, Monitoring Pool Usage, Look-Aside Lists, Look-Aside Lists, Look-Aside Lists, Look-Aside Lists, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, NUMA, Driver Verifier, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL–0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL.

allocation, Look-Aside Lists, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL

compared to look-aside lists, Look-Aside Lists

corruption, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL–0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL

execution protection, No Execute Page Protection

expanding, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management

look-aside pointers, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

monitoring usage, Monitoring Pool Usage, Monitoring Pool Usage

nonpaged pools, Kernel-Mode Heaps (System Memory Pools)
NUMA nodes, **NUMA**

paged pool, **Kernel-Mode Heaps (System Memory Pools)**

Poolmon tags, **Monitoring Pool Usage**

session space, **Kernel-Mode Heaps (System Memory Pools)**

sizes, **Pool Sizes–Pool Sizes, Pool Sizes**

special, **Kernel-Mode Heaps (System Memory Pools)**

system memory (kernel-mode heaps), **Address Windowing Extensions–Look-Aside Lists, Kernel-Mode Heaps (System Memory Pools), Pool Sizes, Pool Sizes, Monitoring Pool Usage, Monitoring Pool Usage, Monitoring Pool Usage, Look-Aside Lists, Look-Aside Lists**

tracking, **Monitoring Pool Usage, Driver Verifier**

verification, **Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems**

pool freelists, **NUMA**

pool manager, **Causes of WindowsCrashes**

pool nonpaged bytes, **Examining Memory Usage**

pool paged bytes, **Examining Memory Usage**

pool quotas, **Driver Verifier**

pool tags, **Buffer Overruns, MemoryCorruption, and Special Pool**

pool tracking, **Monitoring Pool Usage, Driver Verifier**

Poolmon utility, **Monitoring Pool Usage–Look-Aside Lists, Monitoring Pool Usage, Monitoring Pool Usage, Look-Aside Lists**

Poohtag.txt file, **Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool–Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool**

pop operations, **Windows x64 16-TB Limitation**
PoRegisterDeviceForIdleDetection function, **Driver and Application Control of Device Power**

PoRequestPowerIrp function, **Driver Power Operation**

port drivers, **Bandwidth Reservation (Scheduled File I/O), Device Stacks, Winload, Winload–Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, iSCSI Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers**, bandwidth reservation, **Bandwidth Reservation (Scheduled File I/O)**

function drivers, **Device Stacks**

operating system specific, **Winload**

storage management, **Winload–Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, iSCSI Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers**, port notifications, **I/O Completion Port Operation–I/O Priorities, I/O Completion Port Operation, I/O Priorities**

portable music players, **User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)**

porting drivers, **I/O System**

PoSetDeviceBusy function, **Driver and Application Control of Device Power**

PoSetDeviceBusyEx function, **Driver and Application Control of Device Power**

PoSetPowerRequest function, **Power Availability Requests**

PoSetSystemPower function, **Shutdown**

POSIX subsystems, **The I/O Manager, Typical I/O Processing, POSIX Support, File Names**

POST (power-on self test), **MBR Corruption**

post tick queue, **System Threads**

PoStartDeviceBusy API, **Driver and Application Control of Device Power**

PostQueuedCompletionStatus function, **Using Completion Ports**
potential page file usage, **Commit Charge and Page File Size**


ACPI power states, **The Power Manager–Power Manager Operation**, **The Power Manager**, **The Power Manager**, **Power Manager Operation**

commands, **IRP Stack Locations**

crashes, **The Blue Screen**

driver and application control, **Driver and Application Control of Device Power**

driver power management, **Driver Power Operation–Driver Power Operation**, **Driver Power Operation**, **Driver Power Operation**

I/O system, **I/O System Components**

KMDF queues, **KMDF I/O Model**

MPIO, **Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers**

PnP dispatch routines, **Level of Plug and Play Support**

policies, **Thresholds and Policy Settings**

power availability requests, **Power Availability Requests**

shutting down, **Shutdown**

states, **Processor Power Management (PPM)**, **Processor Power Management (PPM)**, **Performance Check**

WDM drivers, **WDM Drivers–Layered Drivers**, **Layered Drivers**

power availability requests, **Power Availability Requests**, **Power Availability**
 Requests, Power Availability Requests, Power Availability Requests
power dispatch routines, Driver Power Operation
power domains, Processor Power Management (PPM), Performance Check
power policies, The Power Manager, Driver Power Operation, Driver Power Operation, Thresholds and Policy Settings, Thresholds and Policy Settings
power request objects, Power Availability Requests–Processor Power Management (PPM), Power Availability Requests, Power Availability Requests, Processor Power Management (PPM)
power states, Driver Power Operation, Driver Power Operation, Driver Power Operation, Power Availability Requests, Processor Power Management (PPM), Performance Check, Causes of Windows Crashes
power-on self test (POST), MBR Corruption
Powercfg utility, Power Availability Requests
PowerClearRequest API, Power Availability Requests
PowerCreateRequest API, Power Availability Requests
PowerSetRequest API, Power Availability Requests
algorithm overrides, Algorithm Overrides
core parking policies, Processor Power Management (PPM)–Utility Function, Utility Function, Utility Function
increase/decrease actions, Increase/Decrease Actions–Thresholds and Policy Settings, Thresholds and Policy Settings
utility function, Utility Function–Increase/Decrease Actions, Utility Function,
Utility Function, Utility Function, Increase/Decrease Actions
viewing check information, Performance Check–Performance Check, Performance Check
PpmCheckPhaseInitiate phase, Performance Check
PpmCheckRecordAllUtility process, Performance Check
PpmCheckRun process, Performance Check
PpmCheckStart callbacks, Performance Check
PpmPerfApplyDomainState function, Performance Check
PpmPerfApplyProcessorState routine, Performance Check
PpmPerfChooseCoresToUnpark function, Performance Check
PpmPerfRecordUtility function, Performance Check
PpmPerfSelectDomainState function, Performance Check
PpmPerfSelectDomainStates function, Performance Check
PpmPerfSelectProcessorState function, Performance Check
PpmPerfSelectProcessorStates function, Performance Check
PpmScaleIdleStateValues function, Performance Check
preboot process, BitLocker Boot Process, Boot Process, BIOS Preboot, BIOS Preboot
prefetch operations, NUMA, Logical Prefetcher, Logical Prefetcher, Cache Manager’s Read-Ahead Thread–Process Monitor, Process Monitor
defragmentation, Logical Prefetcher
files, Cache Manager’s Read-Ahead Thread–Process Monitor, Process Monitor
ideal NUMA node, NUMA
logical prefetcher, Logical Prefetcher
prefetched shared pages, Reserving and Committing Pages
prefetcher, Logical Prefetcher, Logical Prefetcher, Logical Prefetcher, Initializing
the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

Preflect utility, Process Reflection–Process Reflection, Process Reflection

prepare records, Logging Implementation

prereading blocks of data, Intelligent Read-Ahead

pretransaction data, Isolation

Previous Versions data, Previous Versions and System Restore–Previous Versions and System Restore, Previous Versions and System Restore, Previous Versions and System Restore

primary buses, Device Enumeration

primary partitions, Partition Manager, MBR-Style Partitioning

primitives in memory manager, Shared Memory and Mapped Files–Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files

Print Spooler, Power Availability Requests

printer drivers, Types of Device Drivers

printer mappings, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

priorities, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics, Page Priority, Page Priority, PFN Data Structures, Scenarios, Page Priority and Rebalancing

memory, Page Priority

page, Page List Dynamics, Page Priority, Scenarios, Page Priority and Rebalancing

PFN entries, PFN Data Structures

priority boosts, Page List Dynamics

zero page thread, Page List Dynamics

prioritized standby lists, Components

Priority 1-7 pages, Page Priority and Rebalancing
private address space, Virtual Address Space Layouts, User Address Space Layout
private byte offsets, Opening Devices
private cache maps, Opening Devices, Cache Physical Size, Per-File Cache Data Structures, Intelligent Read-Ahead, Explicit File I/O
cache data structures, Cache Physical Size
file object attributes, Opening Devices
file object pointers, Per-File Cache Data Structures
file objects, Explicit File I/O
read requests, Intelligent Read-Ahead
private data (physical memory), Physical Address Extension (PAE)
Private Header (LDM), The LDM Database
private heaps, Types of Heaps
private memory, Large and Small Pages, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Page List Dynamics
private page tables, Flushing Mapped Files
PrivateCacheMap field, Explicit File I/O
ProbeForRead function, IRP Buffer Management
ProbeForWrite function, IRP Buffer Management
Procdump utility, Process Reflection
process buffers, File System Interfaces, Fast I/O
Process counter objects, Examining Memory Usage—Examining Memory Usage, Examining Memory Usage, Examining Memory Usage, Examining Memory Usage
process environment blocks (PEBs), System Virtual Address Space Quotas, Process Reflection

Process Explorer, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF), Examining Memory Usage, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, No Execute Page Protection, Controlling Security Mitigations, Section Objects, Page Priority

ASLR protection, Controlling Security Mitigations

DEP protection, No Execute Page Protection
displaying memory information, Examining Memory Usage
mapped files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Section Objects
prioritized standby lists, Page Priority
threads, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers
UMDF interactions, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)

process heaps, User Address Space Layout, User Address Space Layout

process manager, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination, Process Monitor, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems


process objects, Protecting Memory

process page file quotas, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Virtual Address Descriptors

process reflection, Process Reflection–Process Reflection, Process Reflection,
Process Reflection, Process Reflection

process VADs, Process VADs–Process VADs, Process VADs, Process VADs

process working set list, PFN Data Structures

process working sets, Working Sets, Working Set Management

process/stack swapper, Memory Manager Components

processes, I/O Cancellation, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination–I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination, Introduction to the Memory Manager, Services Provided by the Memory Manager, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Protecting Memory, No Execute Page Protection, No Execute Page Protection, Copy-on-Write–Copy-on-Write, Copy-on-Write, Copy-on-Write, Heap Manager–Heap Manager Structure, Types of Heaps, Heap Manager Structure, Virtual Address Space Layouts, Virtual Address Space Layouts, Virtual Address Space Layouts–x86 Address Space Layouts, x86 Address Space Layouts, x86 Address Space Layouts, x86 Address Space Layouts, x86 Session Space–System Page Table Entries, x86 Session Space, System Page Table Entries, 64-Bit Address Space Layouts, Page Directories, Prototype PTEs–In-Paging I/O, Prototype PTEs, In-Paging I/O, Section Objects, Page List Dynamics–Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics, Page Priority, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, Working Sets–Working Set Management, Placement Policy, Working Set Management, Page Priority and Rebalancing, Process Reflection, Process Reflection–Process Reflection, Process Reflection, Process Reflection, Process Reflection, Cache Coherency, Flushing Mapped Files, Troubleshooting File System Problems, Process Monitor Troubleshooting Techniques, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions, Shutdown, Crash Dump Files, Crash Dump Files, Crash Dump Files, Crash Dump Files, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis

address space, 64-Bit Address Space Layouts

cache coherency, Cache Coherency

child, Services Provided by the Memory Manager

copy-on-write, Copy-on-Write–Copy-on-Write, Copy-on-Write, Copy-on-Write
current, Crash Dump Files
DEP protection, No Execute Page Protection
emptying working sets, Page List Dynamics–Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics
execution protection, No Execute Page Protection
heap types, Heap Manager–Heap Manager Structure, Types of Heaps, Heap Manager Structure
hung, Process Reflection
increasing address space, Virtual Address Space Layouts–x86 Address Space Layouts, x86 Address Space Layouts, x86 Address Space Layouts
IRP cancellation, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination–I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination
lists of running, Crash Dump Files, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis
mapped private code and data, Virtual Address Space Layouts
memory limits, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits
page tables, Page Directories
pages modified by, Flushing Mapped Files
priorities, Page Priority, Page Priority and Rebalancing
private address spaces, Protecting Memory, Virtual Address Space Layouts
process reflection, Process Reflection–Process Reflection, Process Reflection, Process Reflection
prototype PTEs, Prototype PTEs–In-Paging I/O, Prototype PTEs, In-Paging I/O
reparse points, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions
section objects, Section Objects
sessions, \textit{x86 Session Space–System Page Table Entries}, \textit{x86 Session Space–System Page Table Entries}.

shared memory, \textit{Shared Memory and Mapped Files}, \textit{Shared Memory and Mapped Files}.

shutdown levels, \textit{Shutdown}.

switching address space, \textit{Crash Dump Files}.

termination, \textit{I/O Cancellation}.


virtual size, \textit{Introduction to the Memory Manager}.


processor control blocks (PRCBs), \textit{Performance Check}.


increase/decrease actions, \textit{Increase/Decrease Actions–Thresholds and Policy Settings}, \textit{Thresholds and Policy Settings}.


16-TB Limitation, Windows x64 16-TB Limitation, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis, Hung or Unresponsive Systems

concurrency value, Using Completion Ports
configuration flags, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
deadlocks, Hung or Unresponsive Systems
environment variables, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
groups, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
initializing, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
maximum number, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
no execute page protection, No Execute Page Protection
page sizes, Allocation Granularity
performance checking, Performance Check–Performance Check, Performance Check
preparing registers, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
processor power management (PPM), Processor Power Management (PPM)–Performance Check, Processor Power Management (PPM), Utility Function, Utility Function, Utility Function, Thresholds and Policy Settings, Thresholds and Policy Settings, Performance Check, Performance Check, Performance Check, Performance Check
server threading models, I/O Completion Ports
stack traces, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis
states, Performance Check
TPM, Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
utility and frequency, Utility Function–Utility Function, Utility Function
x64 system virtual address limitations, x64 Virtual Addressing Limitations—Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, Windows x64 16-TB Limitation, Windows x64 16-TB Limitation, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management

PROCESS_VM_READ or WRITE rights, Reserving and Committing Pages

Procmon.exe (Process Monitor), Process Monitor

product IDs (PIDs), Device Stack Driver Loading

progress bars, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

promotion (performance states), Thresholds and Policy Settings

protected boot mode, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

protected driver list, Driver Installation

protected mode with paging (processors), BIOS Preboot, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

protected prefixes, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

protected processes, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

protecting memory, Protecting Memory—Protecting Memory, Protecting Memory, Protecting Memory

protection, Services Provided by the Memory Manager—Reserving and Committing Pages, Large and Small Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Copy-on-Write—Copy-on-Write, Copy-on-Write, Copy-on-Write, Copy-on-Write, Copy-on-Write, Section Objects

... copy-on-write, Copy-on-Write—Copy-on-Write, Copy-on-Write, Copy-on-Write

... pages, Services Provided by the Memory Manager—Reserving and Committing Pages, Large and Small Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Clustered Page Faults, Section Objects

protective MBR, GUID Partition Table Partitioning

protocol device classes, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)
protocol drivers, Types of Device Drivers

Prototype bit (PTEs), Page Tables and Page Table Entries

prototype PFNs, Page Frame Number Database–Page Frame Number Database, Page Frame Number Database

prototype PTEs, Prototype PTEs, Prototype PTEs, Prototype PTEs, In-Paging I/O, Section Objects, Page List Dynamics, PFN Data Structures

PS/2 keyboards, Hung or Unresponsive Systems

PsBoostThreadIo API, I/O Priority Inversion Avoidance (I/O Priority Inheritance)

Psexec tool, Hardware Malfunctions

PspAllocateProcess function, Process Reflection

PTEs (page table entries), No Execute Page Protection, Virtual Address Space Layouts, x86 Session Space–System Page Table Entries, x86 Session Space–System Page Table Entries, x86 Session Space, System Page Table Entries, System Page Table Entries, System Page Table Entries, System Page Table Entries, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, Page Tables and Page Table Entries–Page Tables and Page Table Entries, Page Tables and Page Table Entries, Page Tables and Page Table Entries, Page Tables and Page Table Entries, Hardware vs. Software Write Bits in Page Table Entries, IA64 Virtual Address Translation–Page Fault Handling, Page Fault Handling–Invalid PTEs, Page Fault Handling, Page Fault Handling, Page Fault Handling, Invalid PTEs, Invalid PTEs, Prototype PTEs, Prototype PTEs, Prototype PTEs, In-Paging I/O–Collided Page Faults, Collided Page Faults, Virtual Address Descriptors, Page Frame Number Database, Modified Page Writer, PFN Data Structures, PFN Data Structures, Tracing and Logging, 0xD1 - DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL

access bits, Tracing and Logging

addresses, PFN Data Structures

expanding, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management

hardware or software Write bits, Hardware vs. Software Write Bits in Page Table Entries
IA64 address translation, IA64 Virtual Address Translation–Page Fault Handling, Page Fault Handling, Page Fault Handling

in-paging I/O, In-Paging I/O–Collided Page Faults, Collided Page Faults

invalid, Page Fault Handling–Invalid PTEs, Page Fault Handling, Invalid PTEs

nonexecutable pages, No Execute Page Protection

original, PFN Data Structures

page files, Invalid PTEs

page writer, Modified Page Writer

PFN database, Page Frame Number Database

prototype, Prototype PTEs, Prototype PTEs, Prototype PTEs

system, x86 Session Space–System Page Table Entries, System Page Table Entries, System Page Table Entries

system space, Virtual Address Space Layouts

system, viewing, x86 Session Space–System Page Table Entries, System Page Table Entries, System Page Table Entries

VADs, Virtual Address Descriptors

valid fields, Page Tables and Page Table Entries–Page Tables and Page Table Entries, Page Tables and Page Table Entries, Page Tables and Page Table Entries

viewing, x86 Session Space, 0xD1 - DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL


public key infrastructure (PKI), Encrypting File Data

push operations, Windows x64 16-TB Limitation

pushlocks, Internal Synchronization, Windows x64 16-TB Limitation
PXE, Booting from iSCSI
quadwords, Physical Address Extension (PAE)
quantum expiration, Synchronization
query APIs, Transactional APIs
query remove notification, Driver Support for Plug and Play–The Start Value, Driver Support for Plug and Play, The Start Value
query-stop command, Driver Support for Plug and Play–The Start Value, Driver Support for Plug and Play, The Start Value
QueryDosDevice function, Opening Devices
QueryMemoryResourceNotification function, Memory Notification Events
QueryUsersOnEncryptedFile function, Backing Up Encrypted Files
queue objects, I/O Completion Port Operation
queue pointers, I/O Completion Port Operation
queues, KMDF I/O Model, KMDF I/O Model
quietboot element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
quietboot option, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
quota control entries, Quota Tracking–Consolidated Security, Quota Tracking, Consolidated Security
Quota Entries tool, Per-User Volume Quotas
quota files (, Master File Table, Quota Tracking, Quota Tracking
quota tracking, Indexing, Quota Tracking, Quota Tracking
quotas, Compression and Sparse Files–Link Tracking, Per-User Volume Quotas, Link Tracking
   NTFS per-user, Compression and Sparse Files–Link Tracking, Per-User Volume Quotas, Link Tracking
QUOTA_LIMITS_HARDWS_MIN_ENABLE flag, Working Set Management
R handles, Locking

race conditions, Hardware vs. Software Write Bits in Page Table Entries, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool

RADAR (Windows Resource Exhaustion Detection and Resolution), Process Reflection, Process Reflection

RAID-5 volumes, Dynamic Disks, Data Redundancy and Fault Tolerance, NTFS Bad-Cluster Recovery


commit charge, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit

corruption, Why Does Windows Crash?

DMA errors, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool

I/O priorities, I/O Priorities

page files, Page Files, Commit Charge and Page File Size, Commit Charge and Page File Size

usage, Examining Memory Usage

viewing working sets, Working Set Management

vs. flash memory, Solid State Disks

ramdiskimagelength element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

ramdiskimageoffset element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
ramdiskspath element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
ramdiskftpblocksize element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
ramdiskftpclientport element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
ramdiskftpwindowsize element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
RAMMap utility, Examining Memory Usage, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics
random I/O, Opening Devices, ReadyBoost
random number generation, Trusted Platform Module (TPM), The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
randomization (block metadata), Heap Security Features
RAW disks, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
RAW file system driver, Volume Mounting, Local FSDs
raw traces and logs, Tracing and Logging
RDBSS (Redirected Drive Buffering Subsystem), Remote FSDs
Rdyboost.sys (ReadyBoost), ReadyBoost
buffered I/O, IRP Buffer Management
cached and noncached versions, File System Interfaces
copies of files in memory, Section Objects
crashes, Crash Dump Analysis
fast I/O, Fast I/O, Fast I/O
file attributes, File Record Numbers
file handles, Transactional APIs
in-paging I/O, In-Paging I/O
KMDF, KMDF I/O Model
LFS log files, Log File Service
mirrored volumes, Mirrored Volumes–Mirrored Volumes, Mirrored Volumes
paging files, I/O Priority Boosts and Bumps
prefetched pages, Clustered Page Faults–Page Files, Clustered Page Faults, Page Files
ReadyBoost, Unified Caching
shadow copies, VSS Operation
read-ahead operations, Fast I/O, Intelligent Read-Ahead, Locking–Locking, Locking, Cache Manager’s Lazy Writer, Memory Manager’s Page Fault Handler, Compressing Nonsparse Data
  asynchronous with history, Intelligent Read-Ahead
  cache manager work requests, Cache Manager’s Lazy Writer, Memory Manager’s Page Fault Handler
  compressed files, Compressing Nonsparse Data
  fast I/O, Fast I/O
  oplocks, Locking–Locking, Locking
read-commited isolation, Isolation–Isolation, Isolation, Isolation
read-in-progress bits, Collided Page Faults
read-in-progress PFN flag, PFN Data Structures
read-isolation rules, Transactional APIs
read-modify-write operations, Disk Sector Format
read-only file attributes, File Records
read-only memory, Page Frame Number Database, Why Does Windows Crash?, Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection

read-only status, Large and Small Pages, Address Windowing Extensions, Page Tables and Page Table Entries, Physical Address Extension (PAE), Page Fault Handling

read/write access, Large and Small Pages, Address Windowing Extensions

ReadDirectoryChanges API, Transactional APIs

ReadDirectoryChangesW function, Process Monitor Basic vs. Advanced Modes

ReadEncryptedFileRaw function, Backing Up Encrypted Files

ReadFile function, Explicit File I/O, Transactional APIs

ReadFileEx function, Completing an I/O Request

ReadFileScatter function, Scatter/Gather I/O

ReadProcessMemory function, Reserving and Committing Pages

ReadyBoost, ReadyBoost, ReadyBoost, ReadyBoost, exFAT, ReadyBoot, ReadyBoot

ReadyBoot, ReadyBoot–ReadyBoot, ReadyBoot, ReadyBoot

ReadyDrive, ReadyBoost–Unified Caching, Unified Caching

real boot mode, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

reason callbacks, The Blue Screen

rebalancer, Components, Tracing and Logging, Page Priority and Rebalancing, Page Priority and Rebalancing

reciprocals, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

recognizing volumes, File System Driver Architecture

record offsets (LSNs), Log Sequence Numbers

recording utility values, Performance Check
records, NTFS file, File Record Numbers–File Names, File Records, File Records, File Names

recoverable file systems, Key Features of the Cache Manager, Recoverable File System Support, Design


implementation, Recovery Implementation


log files (!, Recoverable File System Support, Master File Table


RAID-5 recoverability, RAID-5 Volumes

redo pass, Redo Pass

self-healing, Self-Healing
striped volumes, Striped Volumes

TxF process, Logging Implementation

undo pass, Undo Pass–NTFS Bad-Cluster Recovery, NTFS Bad-Cluster Recovery

recovery agents, Encrypting a File for the First Time, Encrypting a File for the First Time, Encrypting File Data

recovery keys, Trusted Platform Module (TPM), BitLocker Key Recovery, BitLocker To Go

recovery partitions, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)

recovery sequence (BCD), The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

recovery-enabled element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

recovery-sequence element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

recursive callouts, Kernel Stacks

recursive faults, When There Is No Crash Dump

redirectors, Remote FSDs, NTFS File System Driver

redo entries, Log Record Types, Log Record Types

redo pass, Recovery Implementation, Log File Service, Analysis Pass

redo records, Logging Implementation

redundant volumes, NTFS Bad-Cluster Recovery

reference counts, Modified Page Writer, PFN Data Structures, PFN Data Structures

referenced directory traces, Logical Prefetcher

referenced file traces, Logical Prefetcher

Regedit utility, Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang

regions, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, Log Blocks

CLFS, Log Blocks
FAT, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32

registered device driver bugcheck callbacks, When There Is No Crash Dump

registered drivers, Layered Drivers, Layered Drivers, Volume Mounting, Local FSDs, Locking

registers, Synchronization


boot process, Winload

cache virtual size, Cache Virtual Size

complete crash dump enabling, Crash Dump Files

deciphering driver names, Troubleshooting Crashes

device driver identification and loading, Device Stacks, Device Stack Driver Loading, Device Stack Driver Loading, Device Stack Driver Loading, Device Stack Driver Loading, Device Stack Driver Loading, Last Known Good, Driver Loading in Safe Mode, Driver Loading in Safe Mode

Driver Verifier values, Driver Verifier

enumeration keys, Device Enumeration, Device Stack Driver Loading
forcing high memory addresses, x86 Address Space Layouts
high and low memory values, Memory Notification Events
I/O system, I/O System Components
initializing, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
KMDF object keys, KMDF Data Model
large page size key, Large and Small Pages
last known good settings, Last Known Good
lists of page files, Page Files–Page Files, Page Files, Page Files
loading drivers and services, Driver Loading, Initialization, and Installation–The Start Value, The Start Value, The Start Value
Memory.dmp file options, Crash Dump Files
mounted device letters, The Mount Manager
partitions, Partition Manager
per-user quotas, System Virtual Address Space Quotas
prefetch settings, Logical Prefetcher
self-healing entries, Self-Healing
service configuration keys, Driver Loading in Safe Mode
system code write protection, Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection
tracking PTEs, System Page Table Entries
troubleshooting issues, Troubleshooting File System Problems
VDS information, Virtual Disk Service
registry hive files, BitLocker Drive Encryption–BitLocker To Go, BitLocker To
Go, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit, System Hive Corruption

encryption, BitLocker Drive Encryption–BitLocker To Go, BitLocker To Go

loading user set, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

SYSTEM hive, System Hive Corruption

regular queues (cache management), System Threads

relative paths, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions

releasing address space, Reserving and Committing Pages

relocating physical element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

remapping bad sectors, NTFS Bad-Cluster Recovery

remote boot debugging, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

remote disks, booting from, Booting from iSCSI

remote file replication services, File System Filter Drivers

remote FSDs, Remote FSDs–File System Operation, Remote FSDs, File System Operation

removable devices, The Mount Manager, Volume Mounting

removal requested PFN flag, PFN Data Structures

remove command, Driver Support for Plug and Play–The Start Value, The Start Value

remove/eject device utility, Driver Support for Plug and Play

removememory element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

RemoveUsersFromEncryptedFile function, Backing Up Encrypted Files

rename APIs, Transactional APIs

renaming files, Sparse Files, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

repair installations, System File Corruption

repairing, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)–MBR Corruption, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), MBR Corruption
installation, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)–MBR Corruption, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), MBR Corruption

reparse data, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions

reparse point files, Master File Table, Reparse Points

reparse points, Mount Points, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions, File Records, The Change Journal File, Reparse Points

reparse tags, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions, Reparse Points

replacement policies, Placement Policy–Working Set Management, Placement Policy, Working Set Management

replication agents, Common Log File System

reporting errors, Windows Error Reporting, Windows Error Reporting

repurpose counts, Page Priority

reserve cache, Examining Memory Usage

reserved pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Allocation Granularity, Allocation Granularity, Pageheap

reserving and committing pages, Reserving and Committing Pages–Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages

resident pages, faults, Page Fault Handling

resident shared pages, Reserving and Committing Pages

resident size of paged pool, Pool Sizes

resolution (BCD elements), The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

resolution settings (video), Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

resource allocation (PnP), The Plug and Play (PnP) Manager

resource arbitration (PnP), The Plug and Play (PnP) Manager, Driver Support for Plug and Play
resource lists (KMDF), **KMDF Data Model**

resource manager objects, **Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems**


resource range lists (KMDF), **KMDF Data Model**

resource requirements lists (KMDF), **KMDF Data Model**

restart area (LFS), **Log File Service**, **Log File Service**

restart LSNs, **Log Sequence Numbers**, **Recovery Implementation**

restart records, **Logging Implementation**

restore points, **Previous Versions and System Restore**, **Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)**, **System File Corruption**, **System File Corruption**, **Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang**

restoring previous versions, **Previous Versions and System Restore–Previous Versions and System Restore**, **Previous Versions and System Restore**, **Previous Versions and System Restore**, **Previous Versions and System Restore**

restrictapiccluster element, **The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr**

resumeobject element, **The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr**, **The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr**

Retrieve API, **KMDF Data Model**

RH (Read-Handle) handles, **Locking**

Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), **Encrypting File System Security**

RMs (resource managers), **Resource Managers**

robust performance, **Robust Performance–Robust Performance**, **Robust Performance**, **Robust Performance**

robusted pages, **Robust Performance–Robust Performance**, **Robust Performance**, **Robust Performance**

rocket model (PPM), **Increase/Decrease Actions**, **Performance Check**
rollback operations, Recoverability
Rom PFN flag, PFN Data Structures
Rom PFN state, Page Frame Number Database
Root bus driver, Device Enumeration
root directories, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, Encryption, Master File Table
rotate VADs, Rotate VADs
rotating magnetic disks, Disk Devices–NAND-Type Flash Memory, Solid State Disks, NAND-Type Flash Memory
rotational latency, ReadyBoost
RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman), Encrypting File Data
Rtl interfaces, Heap Manager
RtlCloneUserProcess function, Process Reflection
RtlCreateProcessReflection function, Process Reflection
RtlGenerate8dot3Name function, File Names
Run DLL Component (Rundll32.exe), Driver Installation, Logical Prefetcher
run-time environments, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF), User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)
runs, Master File Table, Master File Table, Resident and Nonresident Attributes, Resident and Nonresident Attributes, Resident and Nonresident Attributes, Compressing Sparse Data, Compressing Sparse Data, Compressing Nonsparse Data
RW (Read-Write) handles, Locking
RWH handles, Locking
S

S0 (fully on) power state, The Power Manager, The Power Manager, Power Manager Operation

S1 (sleeping) power state, The Power Manager, The Power Manager, Power Manager Operation

S2 (sleeping) power state, The Power Manager, Power Manager Operation

S3 (sleeping) power state, The Power Manager, The Power Manager, Power Manager Operation, Power Availability Requests

S4 (hibernating) power state, The Power Manager, The Power Manager, Power Manager Operation

S5 (fully off) power state, The Power Manager, Power Manager Operation

safe mode, Driver Verifier, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Troubleshooting Boot and Startup Problems, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)–MBR Corruption, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), MBR Corruption

  boot options, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

Driver Verifier settings, Driver Verifier

registry entries, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

troubleshooting startup, Troubleshooting Boot and Startup Problems

Windows RE alternative, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)–MBR Corruption, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), MBR Corruption

Safe Mode With Command Prompt, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, Safe Mode

Safe Mode With Networking, Safe Mode

safe save programming, File Names
safe structured exception handling, Software Data Execution Prevention
safeboot element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
SAFEBOOT variable, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
safebootalternateshell element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
safemode BCD option, Driver Loading in Safe Mode
salt (encryption keys), BitLocker Key Recovery
SANs (storage area networks), Storage Management, iSCSI Drivers
SAS (Serial Attached SCSI), Disk Devices, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers
SATA devices, Prioritization Strategies, Bandwidth Reservation (Scheduled File I/O), Disk Devices, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers
saved system states, The Power Manager
scalability, I/O System, The Low Fragmentation Heap
    heap functions, The Low Fragmentation Heap
    I/O system, I/O System
scaling (performance states), Thresholds and Policy Settings, Performance Check
scatter/gather I/O, Scatter/Gather I/O
SCB (stream control block), NTFS File System Driver, Resource Managers
scenario manager, Components
scenarios, Scenarios
scheduled file I/O, Bandwidth Reservation (Scheduled File I/O)
scheduled file I/O extension, Opening Devices
scheduled tasks, I/O Priorities
scheduler, Algorithm Overrides, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
SCM (service control manager), IRP Stack Locations
    SCM process, IRP Stack Locations
screen savers, blue screen, **Hardware Malfunctions**

scripting (BitLocker), **BitLocker Drive Encryption**

scripts, user, **Smss, Csrss, and Wininit**

scrubbing pages, **PFN Data Structures**

Scsiport.sys driver, **Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers**, **Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers**

SD cards, **ReadyBoost**

SD Client buses, **Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver**

SD/MMC support, **Disk Devices**

SDI ramdisks, **The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr**

search indexing priorities, **I/O Prioritization**

Second Layer Address Translation (SLAT), **The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr**

secondary dump data, **Crash Dump Files**


SeCreateSymbolicLink privilege, **Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions**

section object pointers, **Opening Devices**, **Section Objects**, **Section Objects**, **Per-File Cache Data Structures**

section objects (control areas), **Introduction to the Memory Manager**, **Services Provided by the Memory Manager**, **Allocation Granularity**, **Shared Memory and Mapped Files—Shared Memory and Mapped Files**, **Shared Memory and Mapped Files**, **Shared Memory and Mapped Files**, **Prototype PTEs—Prototype PTEs**, **Prototype PTEs**, **Prototype PTEs**, **Section Objects**, **Section Objects**, **Section Objects**, **Section Objects**, **Section Objects**, **Section Objects**, **The Memory Manager**, **Smss, Csrss, and Wininit**, **Causes of Windows Crashes**

control areas, **Section Objects**

creating, **Smss, Csrss, and Wininit**
file mapping objects, The Memory Manager
memory manager, Allocation Granularity, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Section Objects, Section Objects, Section Objects, Section Objects
memory mapped files, Introduction to the Memory Manager, Services Provided by the Memory Manager, Causes of Windows Crashes
prototype PTEs, Prototype PTEs–Prototype PTEs, Prototype PTEs, Prototype PTEs
section objects, Shared Memory and Mapped Files–Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files
viewing, Section Objects
sections, Reserving and Committing Pages, Invalid PTEs
sector signatures, Log Blocks
sector size, Unified Caching
sector to client mapping, Translating Virtual LSNs to Physical LSNs
sector-level disk I/O, Partition Manager
sectors, Disk Devices, File Deletion and the Trim Command, File Deletion and the Trim Command, GUID Partition Table Partitioning, The LDM Database, Full-Volume Encryption Driver–BitLocker Management, BitLocker Management, Unified Caching, Log Blocks, Dynamic Bad-Cluster Remapping, Clusters
blocks, Disk Devices
encrypting, Full-Volume Encryption Driver–BitLocker Management, BitLocker Management
GPT bits, GUID Partition Table Partitioning
larger sizes, Clusters
LDM database, The LDM Database
remapping bad clusters, Dynamic Bad-Cluster Remapping
signatures, Log Blocks
size, Unified Caching
trim command, File Deletion and the Trim Command
upating, File Deletion and the Trim Command
Secure Digital cards, ReadyBoost
AWE memory, Address Windowing Extensions
BitLocker, BitLocker Drive Encryption–BitLocker To Go, BitLocker Drive Encryption, Encryption Keys, Encryption Keys, Encryption Keys, Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Trusted Platform Module (TPM), BitLocker Boot Process, BitLocker Key Recovery, Full-Volume Encryption Driver, Full-Volume Encryption Driver, BitLocker To Go, BitLocker To Go
encryption recovery agents, Encrypting a File for the First Time
heap manager, The Low Fragmentation Heap, Heap Debugging Features
I/O system, I/O System
NTFS design goals, Recoverability
page files, Page Files
zero-initialized pages, Page List Dynamics
security contexts, Explicit File I/O
security cookies, Stack Trashes
security descriptor database, Master File Table
Security Descriptor Hash (, Consolidated Security, Consolidated Security
file attributes, File Records
files, Opening Devices
indexing features, General Indexing Facility
section objects, Shared Memory and Mapped Files
sharing descriptors, Consolidated Security
security files (, Security, Master File Table, Consolidated Security, Consolidated Security, Consolidated Security, Consolidated Security
Security ID Index (, Consolidated Security, Consolidated Security
security IDs (SIDs), Per-User Volume Quotas, Quota Tracking, Consolidated Security, Consolidated Security, Encrypting File System Security
security mitigations, Controlling Security Mitigations
security reference monitor, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
SeDebugPrivilege rights, Reserving and Committing Pages, Protecting Memory
seek times, Logical Prefetcher, ReadyBoost
segment dereference thread, Memory Manager Components
segment structures, Section Objects
segments, Heap Manager Structure
SEH handler, Software Data Execution Prevention
SEHOP (Structured Exception Handler Overwrite Protection), Software Data Execution Prevention
semaphore object, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
SendTarget portals, iSCSI Drivers
sequential I/O, Opening Devices, Robust Performance
sequential read-ahead, Intelligent Read-Ahead
sequentially reading files, Cache Virtual Memory Management
Serial Advanced Technology Attachment (SATA), Disk Devices, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers
serial devices, debugging, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
serial hypervisor debugging, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
serial ports, Disk Device Objects, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, When There Is No Crash Dump
device objects, Disk Device Objects
hypervisor debugging, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
kernel debugger, When There Is No Crash Dump
serializing IRPs, Structure of a Driver
server applications, No Execute Page Protection, NTFS File System Driver
cache manager, NTFS File System Driver
execution protection, No Execute Page Protection
server farms (crash analysis), Online Crash Analysis
Server Message Block (SMB) protocol, Remote FSDs, Remote FSDs, Locking
server-side remote FSDs, Remote FSDs–File System Operation, Remote FSDs, File System Operation
servers, VSS Operation, Crash Dump Files
   Memory.dmp files, Crash Dump Files
   shadow copies, VSS Operation
Service Hosting Process (Svchost.exe), Driver Installation, Logical Prefetcher
service loading, The Start Value–The Start Value, The Start Value
service packs, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
Services for Unix Applications, Process Reflection
Services registry key, Troubleshooting Crashes
services, shutting down, Shutdown
Services.exe, IRP Stack Locations
Session 0 window hook, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
   boot logging in safe mode, Boot Logging in Safe Mode
   boot logs, Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang
DLL order, Image Randomization
initialization tasks, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems–Smss, Csrss, and Wininit, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
initializing, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
page file setup, Page Files–Page Files, Page Files, Page Files
process, Virtual Address Space Layouts
running Chkdsk, Volume Mounting
session manager process, Virtual Address Space Layouts
session namespaces, Explicit File I/O
session space, Kernel-Mode Heaps (System Memory Pools), Virtual Address Space Layouts, x86 Session Space–System Page Table Entries, x86 Session Space, System Page Table Entries, 64-Bit Address Space Layouts–64-Bit Address Space Layouts, 64-Bit Address Space Layouts, Page Directories
64-bit layouts, 64-Bit Address Space Layouts–64-Bit Address Space Layouts,
64-Bit Address Space Layouts
defined, Virtual Address Space Layouts
page tables, Page Directories
pool, Kernel-Mode Heaps (System Memory Pools)
utilization, x86 Session Space
x86 systems, x86 Session Space–System Page Table Entries, System Page Table Entries
session-private object manager namespace, Virtual Address Space Layouts
SESSION5_INITIALIZATION_FAILED code, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
sessions, Virtual Address Space Layouts, Virtual Address Space Layouts, Working Sets
defined, Virtual Address Space Layouts
sessionwide code and data, Virtual Address Space Layouts
working sets, Working Sets
Set APIs, KMDF Data Model, Transactional APIs
SetEndOfFile API, **Transactional APIs**
SetFileBandwidthReservation API, **Opening Devices**
SetFileCompletionNotificationModes API, **I/O Completion Port Operation**
SetFileInformationByHandle function, **Prioritization Strategies, Transactional APIs**
SetFileIoOverlappedRange API, **Opening Devices**
SetFileShortName API, **Transactional APIs**
SetFileTime API, **Transactional APIs**
SetPriorityClass function, **Prioritization Strategies**
SetProcessDEPPolicy function, **No Execute Page Protection**
SetProcessShutdownParameters function, **Shutdown**
SetProcessWorkingSetSize function, **Working Set Management**
SetProcessWorkingSetSizeEx function, **Locking Memory**
SetThreadExecutionState API, **Power Availability Requests**
SetThreadPriority function, **Prioritization Strategies**
Setupapi.dll, **Driver Installation**
Setupcl.exe, **Smss, Csrss, and Wininit**
SetupDiEnumDeviceInterfaces function, **Driver Objects and Device Objects**
SetupDiGetDeviceInterfaceDetail function, **Driver Objects and Device Objects**
SET_REPAIR flags, **Self-Healing**
SE_LOCK_MEMORY privilege, **Thread Agnostic I/O**
shadow copies, **Volume Shadow Copy Service–Conclusion, VSS Architecture, VSS Operation–Uses in Windows, Shadow Copy Provider, Shadow Copy Provider, Shadow Copy Provider, Shadow Copy Provider, Uses in Windows–Previous Versions and System Restore, Uses in Windows, Backup, Backup, Previous Versions and System Restore, Previous Versions and System Restore, Previous Versions and**
System Restore, Previous Versions and System Restore, Conclusion

backup operations, Uses in Windows–Previous Versions and System Restore, Backup, Previous Versions and System Restore

operations, VSS Operation–Uses in Windows, Shadow Copy Provider, Shadow Copy Provider, Uses in Windows

set IDs, Previous Versions and System Restore

Volume Shadow Copy Service, Volume Shadow Copy Service–Conclusion, VSS Architecture, Shadow Copy Provider, Shadow Copy Provider, Shadow Copy Provider, Backup, Previous Versions and System Restore, Previous Versions and System Restore, Previous Versions and System Restore, Conclusion

Shadow Copies for Shared Folders, Previous Versions and System Restore

shadow copy device objects, Previous Versions and System Restore

Shadow Copy Provider, Shadow Copy Provider–Uses in Windows, Shadow Copy Provider, Shadow Copy Provider, Uses in Windows

shadow copy volumes, Previous Versions and System Restore

share counts, Modified Page Writer, PFN Data Structures, PFN Data Structures, PFN Data Structures

share modes (file objects), Opening Devices

share-access checks, Opening Devices

shareable address space, User Address Space Layout

shareable pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages

shared access leases, Locking

shared access locks, Locking

shared cache maps, Per-File Cache Data Structures, Per-File Cache Data Structures, Per-File Cache Data Structures, Explicit File I/O
shared encrypted files, Encrypting File System Security
shared heaps, read-only, Types of Heaps
shared memory, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Protecting Memory, Virtual Address Space Layouts
shared pages, Address Windowing Extensions, Prototype PTEs, Prototype PTEs, Prototype PTEs
shell, Link Tracking, Link Tracking, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit, Online Crash Analysis
shell namespace, Link Tracking–Encryption, Link Tracking, Encryption
shim mechanisms, Fault Tolerant Heap
short names, File Records, File Names, File Names, File Names
ShrinkAbort request, Dynamic Partitioning
ShrinkCommit request, Dynamic Partitioning
shrinking engine (partitions), Dynamic Partitioning
ShrinkPrepare request, Dynamic Partitioning
shutdown, Driver Verifier, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), Shutdown, Shutdown, Shutdown, Shutdown
SideShow-compatible devices, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)
SIDs (security IDs), Per-User Volume Quotas, Quota Tracking, Consolidated Security
signatures, Driver Installation, Driver Installation, Driver Installation, Driver Installation, Driver Installation, Heap Security Features
driver signing, Driver Installation, Driver Installation, Driver Installation, Driver Installation
heap tail checking, Heap Security Features
verification, Driver Installation
simple volumes, Storage Terminology, Mirrored Volumes

single bit corruption, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool

single-layered drivers, I/O Request to a Single-Layered Driver–Synchronization, Completing an I/O Request, Synchronization, Synchronization, Synchronization

single-level cell (SLC) memory, NAND-Type Flash Memory

single-page granularity, Allocation Granularity

singly linked lists, Windows x64 16-TB Limitation

sleep states, Level of Plug and Play Support, The Power Manager, Power Manager Operation, Power Manager Operation, Driver and Application Control of Device Power, Power Availability Requests, Processor Power Management (PPM)

SLIST_HEADER data structure, Windows x64 16-TB Limitation, Windows x64 16-TB Limitation

small memory dumps (minidumps), Process Reflection, Crash Dump Files, Crash Dump Files, Crash Dump Files, Hung or Unresponsive Systems

small pages, Large and Small Pages, Large and Small Pages, Large and Small Pages

small-IRP look-aside lists, I/O Request Packets

SMB Server Message Block (SMB) protocol, Remote FSDs, Remote FSDs, Locking

SMP system processors, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

SmpCheckForCrashDump function, Causes of Windows Crashes

SmpConfigureSharedSessionData function, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

SmpCreateDynamicEnvironmentVariables function, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

SmpCreateInitialSession function, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

SmpCreatePagingFiles function, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

SmpExecuteCommand function, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

SmpInit function, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
SmpInitializeDosDevices function, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
SmpInitializeKnownDlls function, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
SmpLoadDataFromRegistry function, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
SmpProcessFileRenames function, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
SmpStartCsr function, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
SMT cores, Core Parking Policies, Utility Function
snapshot devices, VSS Operation
snapshots, Volume Shadow Copy Service–Conclusion, Previous Versions and System Restore, Conclusion
soft faults, Logical Prefetcher
soft links, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions–Compression and Sparse Files, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions, Compression and Sparse Files
soft page faults, NUMA
soft partitions, The LDM Database, The LDM Database, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning
software attacks, Encryption Keys
software data execution prevention, Software Data Execution Prevention–Copy-on-Write, Software Data Execution Prevention, Copy-on-Write
software DEP, Software Data Execution Prevention–Copy-on-Write, Software Data Execution Prevention, Copy-on-Write
software mirroring, Clone Shadow Copies
software PTEs, Invalid PTEs–Invalid PTEs, Invalid PTEs, Prototype PTEs
software resumption from power states, The Power Manager
software Write bits, Hardware vs. Software Write Bits in Page Table Entries
sos element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
space quotas, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management—User Address Space Layout, User Address Space Layout, User Address Space Layout

spaces (file names), File Names

spanned volumes, Spanned Volumes

spare bits, NAND-Type Flash Memory

sparse files, UDF, Compression and Sparse Files, Compression and Sparse Files, Data Compression and Sparse Files, Data Compression and Sparse Files, Compressing Sparse Data

sparse matrix, Compressing Sparse Data

sparse multilevel VACB arrays, Per-File Cache Data Structures

spatial locality (cache), Cache Manager’s Read-Ahead Thread

special agents (prefetch), Page Priority and Rebalancing

special pool, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, Driver Verifier–Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool–Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool

Driver Verifier option, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL

enabling, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool–Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool

expanding, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management

registry settings, Driver Verifier

verification, Driver Verifier–Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier

speed, cluster size and, Clusters
spinlocks, Synchronization, KMDF Data Model, KMDF Data Model, Look-Aside Lists, Windows x64 16-TB Limitation

accessing directly, Synchronization context areas, KMDF Data Model

eliminating need for, Windows x64 16-TB Limitation KMDF objects, KMDF Data Model pools and, Look-Aside Lists

splash screens, hangs and, Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang

split log blocks, Owner Pages

split mirrors (clone shadow copies), Clone Shadow Copies

Spoolsvc.exe, Power Availability Requests

SRTM (Static Root of Trust Measurement), Trusted Platform Module (TPM)

SSDs (solid state disks), NAND-Type Flash Memory, NAND-Type Flash Memory, NAND-Type Flash Memory–File Deletion and the Trim Command, File Deletion and the Trim Command–File Deletion and the Trim Command, File Deletion and the Trim Command, File Deletion and the Trim Command, Disk Drivers, ReadyBoost, Unified Caching

file deletion and trim, File Deletion and the Trim Command–File Deletion and the Trim Command, File Deletion and the Trim Command, File Deletion and the Trim Command, Disk Drivers

ReadyBoost, ReadyBoost, Unified Caching

slowing down, NAND-Type Flash Memory

wear-leveling, NAND-Type Flash Memory–File Deletion and the Trim Command, File Deletion and the Trim Command, File Deletion and the Trim Command, File Deletion and the Trim Command

wearing out, NAND-Type Flash Memory

stack bases, 0x7F - UNEXPECTED_KERNEL_MODE_TRAP

stack cookies, Software Data Execution Prevention
stack limits, 0x7F - UNEXPECTED KERNEL_MODE_TRAP

stack locations, I/O Request Packets, IRP Stack Locations–IRP Stack Locations, IRP Stack Locations, IRP Stack Locations, IRP Stack Locations, Completing an I/O Request–Synchronization, Completing an I/O Request, Completing an I/O Request, Synchronization, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers

I/O request packets (IRPs), IRP Stack Locations–IRP Stack Locations, IRP Stack Locations, IRP Stack Locations, IRP Stack Locations

IRP reuse and, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers

large-IRP look-aside list, I/O Request Packets

request completion, Completing an I/O Request–Synchronization, Completing an I/O Request, Completing an I/O Request, Synchronization

stack overruns (stack trashes), Stack Trashes–Hung or Unresponsive Systems, Stack Trashes, Stack Trashes, Hung or Unresponsive Systems

stack pointer register, Stack Trashes, Stack Trashes, 0x7F - UNEXPECTED_KERNEL_MODE_TRAP

stack randomization, Stack Randomization, Stack Randomization

stack traces, Heap Debugging Features, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Verbose Analysis–Verbose Analysis, Verbose Analysis, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis, 0xD1 - DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL–0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL

displaying device driver, 0xD1 - DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL

heap debugging, Heap Debugging Features

pool corruption, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL–0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL

processors, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis

read-ahead operations, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing
verbose analysis, Verbose Analysis—Verbose Analysis, Verbose Analysis
write-behind operations, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing
stack trashes, Stack Trashes—Hung or Unresponsive Systems, Hung or Unresponsive Systems
StackRandomizationDisabled, Stack Randomization
stacks, Software Data Execution Prevention, User Address Space Layout, Stack Randomization—ASLR in Kernel Address Space, Heap Randomization, ASLR in Kernel Address Space, Stacks–Virtual Address Descriptors, Stacks, Stacks, Kernel Stacks–Virtual Address Descriptors, Kernel Stacks, Kernel Stacks, DPC Stack, Virtual Address Descriptors–Process VADs, Virtual Address Descriptors, Virtual Address Descriptors, Process VADs, Stack Trashes–Hung or Unresponsive Systems, Stack Trashes, Stack Trashes–Hung or Unresponsive Systems, Stack Trashes, Hung or Unresponsive Systems, Hung or Unresponsive Systems
address space, User Address Space Layout
analyzing, Stack Trashes–Hung or Unresponsive Systems, Hung or Unresponsive Systems
crash dump analysis, Stack Trashes–Hung or Unresponsive Systems, Stack Trashes, Hung or Unresponsive Systems
DEP stack cookies, Software Data Execution Prevention
DPC, DPC Stack
kernel, Stacks, Kernel Stacks–Virtual Address Descriptors, Kernel Stacks, Virtual Address Descriptors
memory manager, Stacks–Virtual Address Descriptors, Stacks, Kernel Stacks, Virtual Address Descriptors–Process VADs, Virtual Address Descriptors, Process VADs
pointer register, Stack Trashes
randomization, Stack Randomization–ASLR in Kernel Address Space, Heap Randomization, ASLR in Kernel Address Space
stammdisks element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
standard BitLocker operation, BitLocker Drive Encryption
standby cache, Examining Memory Usage
standby lists, Clustered Page Faults, Page Priority, Page Priority, Components, Components, Cache Size, Cache Physical Size
  prefetched pages, Clustered Page Faults
  prioritized, Page Priority, Page Priority
  rebalancer, Components
  Superfetch service, Components
  system cache, Cache Size, Cache Physical Size
standby mode, Driver Power Operation, Components
standby page lists, Examining Memory Usage, Page Fault Handling
standby pages,PFN Data Structures
StandbyPFN state, Page Frame Number Database, Page Frame Number Database
standby scenario, Scenarios
start I/O routines, Structure of a Driver
Start values, The Start Value, The Start Value, Device Enumeration
start-device command, Driver Support for Plug and Play
start-device IRPs, Driver Objects and Device Objects
Startup Repair tool, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)
Startup.com, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
state-transition table, Driver Support for Plug and Play–The Start Value, The Start Value
static physical NVRAM cache, Unified Caching
Static Root of Trust Measurement (SRTM), Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
STATUS_ACCESS_VIOLATION exception, No Execute Page Protection, 0x8E -
KERNEL_MODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED

STATUS_BREAKPOINT exception, 0x8E -
KERNEL_MODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED–0x7F -
UNEXPECTED KERNEL MODE TRAP, 0x8E -
KERNEL_MODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED, 0x7F -
UNEXPECTED KERNEL MODE TRAP, 0x7F -
UNEXPECTED KERNEL MODE TRAP

STATUS_INVALID_DEVICE_REQUEST exception, KMDF I/O Model

STATUS_REPARSE code, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions

step model (PPM), Increase/Decrease Actions, Performance Check

stolen USB keys, Encryption Keys

stop code analysis, Causes of Windows Crashes, Verbose Analysis–Verbose
Analysis, Verbose Analysis, 0xD1 -
DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL–0x8E -
KERNEL_MODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED, 0x8E -
KERNEL_MODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED–0x7F -
UNEXPECTED KERNEL MODE TRAP, 0x8E -
KERNEL_MODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED, 0x7F -
UNEXPECTED KERNEL MODE TRAP–0xC5 -
DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL, 0x7F -
UNEXPECTED KERNEL MODE TRAP, 0xC5 -
DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL–0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL,
0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL, 0xC5 -
DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL

DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL, 0xC5 -
DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL–0xC5 -
DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL, 0xC5 -
DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL

DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL, 0xD1 -
DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL–0x8E -
KERNEL_MODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED, 0x8E - KERNEL_MODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED

IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL, Causes of Windows Crashes

KERNEL_MODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED, 0x8E - KERNEL_MODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED - 0x7F - UNEXPECTED_KERNEL_MODE_TRAP, 0x7F - UNEXPECTED_KERNEL_MODE_TRAP

UNEXPECTED_KERNEL_MODE_TRAP, 0x7F - UNEXPECTED_KERNEL_MODE_TRAP - 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL

verbose analysis, Verbose Analysis - Verbose Analysis, Verbose Analysis

stop codes (bugchecks), Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, The Blue Screen, Basic Crash Dump Analysis, Basic Crash Dump Analysis, Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection - Advanced Crash Dump Analysis, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis, 0xD1 - DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL

bugcheck parameters, Basic Crash Dump Analysis, 0xD1 - DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL

bugcheck screens, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

illegal instruction fault crashes, Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection - Advanced Crash Dump Analysis, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis

manual crashes, Basic Crash Dump Analysis

numeric identifiers, The Blue Screen

storage area networks (SANs), Storage Management, iSCSI Drivers

storage device states, The Plug and Play (PnP) Manager

storage devices, ReadyBoost, Unified Caching, Unified Caching, Booting from iSCSI
storage drivers, Prioritization Strategies, Storage Management, Winload–Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, iSCSI Drivers, iSCSI Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Local FSDs, Local FSDs

device drivers, Storage Management, Local FSDs, Local FSDs

management, Winload–Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, iSCSI Drivers, iSCSI Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers

port drivers, Prioritization Strategies


basic disks, Volume Management, GUID Partition Table Partitioning, Basic Disk Volume Manager

BitLocker, BitLocker Drive Encryption–BitLocker To Go, BitLocker Drive
Encryption, Encryption Keys, Encryption Keys, Encryption Keys, Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Trusted Platform Module (TPM), BitLocker Boot Process, BitLocker Key Recovery, Full-Volume Encryption Driver, Full-Volume Encryption Driver, BitLocker To Go, BitLocker To Go

BitLocker To Go, BitLocker To Go

disk drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers
dynamic disks, Dynamic Disks, The LDM Database, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, Dynamic Disk Volume Manager–Multipartition Volume Management, Multipartition Volume Management

full-volume encryption driver, Full-Volume Encryption Driver

multipartition volume management, Multipartition Volume Management–RAID-5 Volumes, Spanned Volumes, Striped Volumes, Mirrored Volumes, Mirrored Volumes, RAID-5 Volumes, RAID-5 Volumes
terminology, Storage Terminology–Disk Sector Format, Disk Sector Format

virtual hard disk support, Virtual Hard Disk Support–BitLocker Drive Encryption, BitLocker Drive Encryption

volume I/O operations, Volume I/O Operations–Virtual Disk Service, Virtual Disk Service, Virtual Disk Service


Volume Shadow Copy Service, Volume Shadow Copy Service

storage stacks, Prioritization Strategies, I/O Priority Inversion Avoidance (I/O Priority Inheritance), Disk Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers

store keys, Unified Caching
Store Manager (unified caching), **Unified Caching**, **Unified Caching**, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

store pages, **Unified Caching**

Storport minidriver, **Attaching VHDs**

Storport.sys driver, **Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers**, **Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers**

stream names, **Stream-Based Caching**

stream-based caching, **Stream-Based Caching**

stream-controlled block (SCB), **NTFS File System Driver**

streaming playback, **I/O Prioritization**

streams, **Tracing and Logging**, **Stream-Based Caching**, **Common Log File System**, **Multiple Data Streams**, **Multiple Data Streams**–**Multiple Data Streams**, **Multiple Data Streams**, **Multiple Data Streams**, **Multiple Data Streams**, **The Change Journal File**, **The Change Journal File**, **Resource Managers**

  associated with file names, **Tracing and Logging**

  attributes, **Multiple Data Streams**

  caching, **Stream-Based Caching**

  change journal, **The Change Journal File**, **The Change Journal File**

  CLFS, **Common Log File System**

  multiple, NTFS design goals, **Multiple Data Streams**–**Multiple Data Streams**, **Multiple Data Streams**, **Multiple Data Streams**, **Multiple Data Streams**

  TxF, **Resource Managers**

strings, **Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool**

Strings utility, **Monitoring Pool Usage**, **Logical Prefetcher**, **Buffer Overruns**, **Memory Corruption, and Special Pool**

striped arrays, **Dynamic Disks**
striped volumes, The LDM Database, Volume I/O Operations, Data Redundancy and Fault Tolerance

data redundancy, Data Redundancy and Fault Tolerance

I/O operations, Volume I/O Operations

LDM partition entries, The LDM Database

Structured Exception Handler Overwrite Protection (SEHOP), Software Data Execution Prevention

subkeys, Device Enumeration

subst command, Opening Devices

Subst.exe utility, Previous Versions and System Restore

subsystem DLLs, I/O Request to a Single-Layered Driver, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

success codes, I/O Completion Port Operation, KMDF I/O Model

successful boots, Troubleshooting Crashes


components, Components–Components, Components, Components

I/O priorities, I/O Priorities

idle I/O, I/O Priority Boosts and Bumps

logical prefetcher, Logical Prefetcher

organizing files, Logical Prefetcher

page priority, Page Priority and Rebalancing–Robust Performance, Robust
Performance

process reflection, Process Reflection, Process Reflection

ReadyBoost, ReadyBoost, Unified Caching

ReadyDrive, ReadyDrive

rebalancing, Page Priority and Rebalancing—Robust Performance, Page Priority and Rebalancing, Robust Performance

robust performance, Robust Performance

scenarios, Scenarios

tracing and logging, Tracing and Logging

unified caching, Unified Caching–Unified Caching, Unified Caching, Unified Caching

surprise-remove command, Driver Support for Plug and Play

suspending, BitLocker Boot Process

BitLocker, BitLocker Boot Process

Svchost.exe (Service Hosting Process), Logical Prefetcher

swapper thread, Balance Set Manager and Swapper

switching CPU contexts, Hung or Unresponsive Systems

Swprov.dll (shadow copy provider), Shadow Copy Provider—Uses in Windows, Uses in Windows

symbol files, Basic Crash Dump Analysis, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL

symbol server, Crash Dump Files

symbol-file paths, Basic Crash Dump Analysis

symbolic exception registration records, Software Data Execution Prevention

symbolic links, Driver Objects and Device Objects, Opening Devices, Opening Devices, Opening Devices, Opening Devices, Disk Device Objects, The Mount Manager, Mount
Points, Previous Versions and System Restore, Explicit File I/O, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions—Compression and Sparse Files, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions, Compression and Sparse Files, The Change Journal File, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

cchange journal, The Change Journal File
device names, Opening Devices
device objects, Driver Objects and Device Objects
file object extensions, Opening Devices
MS-DOS devices, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
naming conventions, Disk Device Objects
NTFS design goals, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions—Compression and Sparse Files, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions, Compression and Sparse Files, Compression and Sparse Files
reparse points, Mount Points
shadow copies, Previous Versions and System Restore
viewing, Opening Devices
volumes, The Mount Manager, Explicit File I/O
symbols, kernel, Pool Sizes
SymLinkEvaluation option, Symbolic (Soft) Links and Junctions
symmetric encryption, Encrypting File System Security
synchronization, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers, KMDF I/O Model, KMDF I/O Model, Internal Synchronization, Types of Heaps, Heap Synchronization

heap manager, Heap Synchronization
I/O requests, I/O Requests to Layered Drivers
internal memory, Internal Synchronization
KMDF callbacks, KMDF I/O Model
KMDF queues, KMDF I/O Model
not supported by heap functions, Types of Heaps
synchroization objects, Synchronous and Asynchronous I/O, In-Paging I/O, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier
synchroization scope object attribute, KMDF I/O Model
synchronous I/O, Opening Devices, Completing an I/O Request, User-Initiated I/O Cancellation, Fast I/O, Fast I/O
cancellation, User-Initiated I/O Cancellation
completion, Completing an I/O Request
fast I/O, Fast I/O, Fast I/O
file object attributes, Opening Devices
Synchronous Paging I/O, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing
SYSCALL instruction, DPC Stack
SYSENDER instruction, DPC Stack
systpes command, System Page Table Entries–System Page Table Entries, System Page Table Entries, System Page Table Entries
system address space, Virtual Address Space Layouts, Virtual Address Space Layouts, 64-Bit Address Space Layouts, Kernel Stacks
system cache, 64-Bit Address Space Layouts, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, Clustered Page Faults
address space, 64-Bit Address Space Layouts
expanding, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management
prefetching pages, Clustered Page Faults
system cache working sets, Virtual Address Space Layouts, System Working Sets, Cache Size, Cache Working Set Size
system code write protection, Code Overwrite and System Code Write
Protection—Advanced Crash Dump Analysis, Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis

system code, in system space, Virtual Address Space Layouts—x86 Address Space Layouts, Virtual Address Space Layouts, x86 Address Space Layouts

system commit limit, Commit Limit, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit

System Deployment Image (SDI), The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

system environment variables, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

system failures, Recoverable File System Support

System File Checker (Sfc.exe), System File Corruption

system files, Boot Sector Corruption—System Hive Corruption, System File Corruption, System File Corruption, System Hive Corruption

backup copies, System File Corruption

repairing corruption, Boot Sector Corruption—System Hive Corruption, System File Corruption, System Hive Corruption

SYSTEM hive, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, System Hive Corruption

system identifiers (TPM), Encryption Keys

System Image Recover (Windows RE), Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)

System Image Recovery images, System File Corruption

system images, x86 Address Space Layouts, x86 Address Space Layouts, Boot Logging in Safe Mode, System File Corruption

System Information tool, Troubleshooting Crashes

system integrity checks (TPM), Trusted Platform Module (TPM)

system mapped views, Virtual Address Space Layouts, x86 System Address Space Layout, x86 System Address Space Layout
system memory pools (kernel-mode heaps), Kernel-Mode Heaps (System Memory Pools)—Look-Aside Lists, Kernel-Mode Heaps (System Memory Pools), Pool Sizes, Pool Sizes, Monitoring Pool Usage, Monitoring Pool Usage, Monitoring Pool Usage, Look-Aside Lists, Look-Aside Lists

system partitions, BIOS Preboot, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

system paths, Booting from iSCSI

system power policies, Power Manager Operation, Driver Power Operation, Driver Power Operation

system power requests, Power Availability Requests

System process, Memory Manager Components, Internal Synchronization, Process Monitor Basic vs. Advanced Modes

system process shutdowns, Shutdown—Shutdown, Shutdown, Shutdown

System Properties tool, Crash Dump Files

system PTE working sets, Virtual Address Space Layouts, Balance Set Manager and Swapper

system PTEs, Virtual Address Space Layouts, x86 Address Space Layouts, System Page Table Entries, System Page Table Entries, 64-Bit Address Space Layouts, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management

System Recovery Options dialog box, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)

system resources, releasing, Structure of a Driver–Driver Objects and Device Objects, Structure of a Driver, Driver Objects and Device Objects

System Restore, VSS Architecture, Previous Versions and System Restore, Previous Versions and System Restore, Previous Versions and System Restore, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), System Hive Corruption, Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang

System Restore Wizard, Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang

system root paths, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

system service dispatch tables, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
system shutdown notification routines, *Structure of a Driver*

system start (1) value, *Driver Support for Plug and Play, The Start Value*

system start device drivers, *Causes of Windows Crashes*

system storage class device drivers, *Prioritization Strategies*

system threads, *Modified Page Writer, Modified Page Writer*

system time, *Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis*

system variables, *PFN Data Structures*

system virtual address spaces, *Internal Synchronization, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, System Virtual Address Space Quotas, The Memory Manager*

system virtual memory limits, *Physical Memory Limits—32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, Windows Client Memory Limits, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits*

System Volume Information directory, *Shadow Copy Provider*

system volumes, *LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, Mirrored Volumes, BIOS Preboot, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit*

system worker threads, *System Threads, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems*

system working set lists, *PFN Data Structures*

system working sets, *Driver Verifier, System Working Sets*

  forcing code out of, *Driver Verifier*

  working sets, *System Working Sets*

system-managed paging files, *Page Files*

system-managed shared resources, *Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit*

system-start values, *Device Enumeration*
SystemLowPriorityIoInformation class, *I/O Priority Boosts and Bumps*

systemroot element, *The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr*

SystemSuperFetchInformation class, *Scenarios*

systemwide code and data, *Virtual Address Space Layouts*

systemwide environment variables, *When There Is No Crash Dump*

SYSTEM_SERVICE_EXCEPTION stop code, *Causes of Windows Crashes*

SYSTEM_THREAD_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED stop code, *Causes of Windows Crashes*
T

T states (processors), Thresholds and Policy Settings, Performance Check
T10 SPC4 specification, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers
table of contents area (LDM), The LDM Database
Tag value, The Start Value
tags, The Start Value, Monitoring Pool Usage, Heap Debugging Features
    heap debugging, Heap Debugging Features
    pool allocation, Monitoring Pool Usage
    precedence, The Start Value
tail checking, Heap Debugging Features, Pageheap
tamper-resistant processors, Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
target computers, When There Is No Crash Dump–When There Is No Crash Dump, When There Is No Crash Dump
    target portals (iSCSI), iSCSI Drivers
targetname element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
task gates, 0x7F - UNEXPECTED_KERNEL_MODE_TRAP
    cache values, Cache Physical Size
    memory information, Examining Memory Usage–Examining Memory Usage, Examining Memory Usage
Task Scheduler, I/O Priorities
TBS (TPM Base Services), Trusted Platform Module (TPM), BitLocker Management

Tbssvc.dll, BitLocker Drive Encryption

TCG (Trusted Computing Group), Trusted Platform Module (TPM)

TCP/IP, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF), iSCSI Drivers

TEB allocations, Allocation Granularity, User Address Space Layout
temporal locality (cache), Cache Manager’s Read-Ahead Thread
temporary files, Disabling Lazy Writing for a File, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
temporary page states, Page Frame Number Database

Terminal Services notifications, Container Notifications
termination, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination–I/O Completion Ports, I/O Completion Ports, I/O Completion Ports
termination, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination–I/O Completion Ports, I/O Completion Ports, I/O Completion Ports
testsigning mode, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

TestLimit utility, Reserving and Committing Pages–Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, x86 Address Space Layouts, 64-Bit Address Space Layouts, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, Stacks, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics, Page Priority

creating handles, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management

leaking memory, x86 Address Space Layouts, Page Priority

private pages, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics

reserved or committed pages, Reserving and Committing Pages–Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages

reserving address space, 64-Bit Address Space Layouts

thread creation, Stacks
TestLimit64.exe utility, User Stacks
testsing element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
TFAT (Transaction-Safe FAT), exFAT
TFTP (Trivial FTP), The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
thaws, VSS writers and, Volume Shadow Copy Service, VSS Architecture
thinly provisioned virtual hard disks, Virtual Hard Disk Support
third-party drivers, Monitoring Pool Usage, Crash Dump Files
third-party RAM optimization software, Robust Performance–Robust Performance, Robust Performance, Robust Performance
thread environment block (TEB) allocations, User Address Space Layout
thread stacks, No Execute Page Protection, User Address Space Layout, User Address Space Layout, Stack Randomization
thread thrashing, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination
thread-agnostic I/O, Opening Devices, IRP Stack Locations, Thread Agnostic I/O, Using Completion Ports
thread-scheduling core, Memory Manager Components
threaded boosts, I/O Priority Inversion Avoidance (I/O Priority Inheritance)
Unresponsive Systems, Hung or Unresponsive Systems

asynchronous and synchronous I/O, I/O Processing–Synchronous and Asynchronous I/O, Synchronous and Asynchronous I/O

completion ports, The IoCompletion Object, I/O Completion Port Operation

concurrency value, Using Completion Ports

current, Crash Dump Files, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis

deadlocks, Hung or Unresponsive Systems

heap synchronization, Heap Synchronization

higher-priority, Synchronization

I/O completion, Completing an I/O Request

I/O requests, The I/O Manager

IDs, User Address Space Layout

inactive, I/O Completion Port Operation

maximum number, User Stacks

outstanding IRPs, IRP Stack Locations

preempting windowing system driver, Hung or Unresponsive Systems

priorities, I/O Priority Boosts and Bumps, I/O Priority Boosts and Bumps, Page Priority and Rebalancing

read-ahead, Cache Manager’s Read-Ahead Thread–Process Monitor, Process Monitor

shutdown process, Shutdown, Shutdown

stack trace analysis, Verbose Analysis–Verbose Analysis, Verbose Analysis, Verbose Analysis

stacks, No Execute Page Protection, User Address Space Layout, Stacks, Kernel Stacks, Kernel Stacks

synchronizing access to shareable resources, Opening Devices
termination, I/O Cancellation, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination

virtual files, Typical I/O Processing

thresholds, Thresholds and Policy Settings–Thresholds and Policy Settings, Thresholds and Policy Settings

throttle states (processors), Thresholds and Policy Settings, Performance Check

throttling (write throttling), Write Throttling–Write Throttling, Write Throttling, Write Throttling

throughput, I/O Priority Boosts and Bumps–Bandwidth Reservation (Scheduled File I/O), Bandwidth Reservation (Scheduled File I/O), Bandwidth Reservation (Scheduled File I/O)

time (BIOS information), The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

time command, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis

time segments (Superfetch), Page Priority and Rebalancing

time stamps, POSIX Support, File Records, The Change Journal File

change journal, The Change Journal File

file attributes, File Records

POSIX standard, POSIX Support

time-check intervals (processors), Thresholds and Policy Settings

time-slice expiration, Synchronization

Timeout element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

timeouts, The I/O Manager, Driver Power Operation

I/O manager, The I/O Manager

power options, Driver Power Operation

timers, KMDF Data Model, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
expiration, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
KMDF objects, KMDF Data Model
object types, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems
timing requirements (UMDF), User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)
TLB (translation look-aside buffer), Large and Small Pages, Translation Look-Aside Buffer, Translation Look-Aside Buffer, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
toolsdisplayorder element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
top dirty page threshold, Write Throttling
torn writes, Owner Pages
total memory, displaying, Examining Memory Usage
total process working sets, Working Set Management
total virtual address space, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit
TPM (Trusted Platform Module), BitLocker Drive Encryption, BitLocker Drive Encryption, Encryption Keys, Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Trusted Platform Module (TPM), The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
   BitLocker, BitLocker Drive Encryption
   Boot Entropy policy, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
   encrypting volume master keys, Encryption Keys
   MMC snap-in, BitLocker Drive Encryption, Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
   Windows support, Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
TPM Base Services (TBS), BitLocker Drive Encryption, Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Trusted Platform Module (TPM), BitLocker Management
TPM chips, Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Trusted Platform Module (TPM), BitLocker Management
TPM MMC snap-in, BitLocker Drive Encryption, Trusted Platform Module
(TPM), Trusted Platform Module (TPM)

Tpm.sys driver, BitLocker Drive Encryption
tpmbootentropy element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

trace collector and processor, Components
trace file names, Logical Prefetcher, Logical Prefetcher

trace information (ReadyBoot), ReadyBoot

tracer mechanism (Superfetch), Components

traces, Tracing and Logging, Page Priority and Rebalancing, Process Monitor Troubleshooting Techniques

  prebuilt traces, Page Priority and Rebalancing

  Process Monitor, Process Monitor Troubleshooting Techniques

  Superfetch service, Tracing and Logging

traditionalksegmappings element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

training Superfetch, Page Priority and Rebalancing

Transactdemo.exe tool, Isolation–Transactional APIs, Isolation, Transactional APIs

transacted APIs, Transaction Support

transaction isolation directory (, Master File Table

transaction log (, Master File Table, Resource Managers

transaction log (CLFS), Marshalling

transaction log (LDM), The LDM Database, The LDM Database, The LDM Database

transaction log records, Recoverable File System Support, Log File Service

transaction manager, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

transaction parameter blocks, Opening Devices

transaction parameters, Opening Devices
transaction repair directory, Master File Table
transaction semantics, NTFS, Common Log File System
transaction tables, Recovery Implementation, Log Record Types, Recovery
Transaction-Safe FAT (TFAT), exFAT
transactional APIs, Transactional APIs–Resource Managers, Resource Managers
transactional NTFS library, Transaction Support
after system failures, NTFS Recovery Support
APIs, Transactional APIs–Resource Managers, Resource Managers, Resource Managers
atomic, Recoverability, Recoverability
committed, Log Record Types
isolation, Isolation–Transactional APIs, Isolation, Transactional APIs
logged information, Log Record Types
logging implementation, Logging Implementation–NTFS Recovery Support, Recovery Implementation, NTFS Recovery Support
on-disk implementation, On-Disk Implementation–Logging Implementation, Logging Implementation, Logging Implementation
recovery implementation, Recovery Implementation
recovery process, Recovery Implementation
resource managers, Resource Managers–On-Disk Implementation, On-Disk Implementation
transition pages, PFN Data Structures
Transition PFN state, Page Frame Number Database, Page Frame Number Database
transition PTEs, PFN Data Structures
transition, pages in, Invalid PTEs, Prototype PTEs
translation, Protecting Memory, Management Policies
translation look-aside buffer (TLB), Large and Small Pages, Hardware vs. Software
Write Bits in Page Table Entries, Translation Look-Aside Buffer, Translation Look-Aside Buffer
translation-not-valid handler, Memory Manager Components
transport layer, When There Is No Crash Dump
transport parameters, Hung or Unresponsive Systems
transportable shadow copies, VSS Operation
trap command, 0xD1 - DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL—0x8E - KERNEL_MODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED, 0xD1 - DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL, 0x8E - KERNEL_MODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED
trap frames, 0xD1 - DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL, 0x7F - unexpected_kernel_mode_trap, 0x7F - unexpected_kernel_mode_trap, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL
trap handler, Servicing an Interrupt
trap to debugger instruction, 0x8E - KERNEL_MODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED
traps, Causes of Windows Crashes, 0x7F - unexpected_kernel_mode_trap—0xC5 -
**DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL**

traversal permissions, **POSIX Support**

triage dumps (minidumps), **Crash Dump Files, Crash Dump Files**

Triage.ini file, **Basic Crash Dump Analysis–Verbose Analysis, Verbose Analysis, Verbose Analysis**

trim command, **File Deletion and the Trim Command–File Deletion and the Trim Command**

trimmed private data, **Physical Address Extension (PAE)**

trimmed working sets, **Modified Page Writer, PFN Data Structures**

trimming, **Page Files, Driver Verifier, Working Set Management, Balance Set Manager and Swapper, System Working Sets, Page Priority and Rebalancing**

page files, **Page Files**

pretraining Superfetch, **Page Priority and Rebalancing**

system working set, **Driver Verifier**

working sets, **Working Set Management, Balance Set Manager and Swapper, System Working Sets**

triple faults, **When There Is No Crash Dump**

Trivial FTP (TFTP), **The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr**

When There Is No Crash Dump

Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier

heap, Heap Security Features—Pageheap, Heap Debugging Features, Pageheap

large page allocation failures, Large and Small Pages


processes, Process Reflection—Process Reflection, Process Reflection

safe mode, Troubleshooting Boot and Startup Problems—Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), Safe Mode, Driver Loading in Safe Mode, Driver Loading in Safe Mode, Boot Logging in Safe Mode, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)

SSDs, NAND-Type Flash Memory

stop code help files, The Blue Screen

Windows Recovery Environment, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)—MBR Corruption, MBR Corruption, MBR Corruption

without crash dumps, When There Is No Crash Dump

troubleshooting user menus, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

truncatememory element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

truncating data, The Change Journal File

trusted applications, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

Trusted Computing Group (TCG), Trusted Platform Module (TPM)

try/except blocks, IRP Buffer Management, Explicit File I/O

tunneling cache, File Names

TxT (transactional NTFS), Shadow Copy Provider, Master File Table, Master File Table, File Records, The Change Journal File, Transaction Support, Transactional

backward compatibility, Transaction Support

base log file, Master File Table

change journal, The Change Journal File

file attributes, File Records

log files, Resource Managers

log records, Logging Implementation–NTFS Recovery Support, Recovery Implementation, NTFS Recovery Support

log stream, Master File Table

recovery, Design

resource managers, Resource Managers–On-Disk Implementation, On-Disk Implementation

snapshot device operations, Shadow Copy Provider

TxF file ID (TxID), On-Disk Implementation–Logging Implementation, On-Disk Implementation, Logging Implementation

TxF log files, Master File Table, Transaction Support, Resource Managers

TxF old page stream, Master File Table

TxfLog stream, Master File Table, Resource Managers

Txfw32.dll library, Transaction Support

TxID (TxF file ID), On-Disk Implementation–Logging Implementation, On-Disk Implementation, Logging Implementation
UDF (Universal Disk Format), I/O System Components, Windows File System Formats, UDF

UDFS (user defined file system), The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

Udfs.sys (UDF driver), UDF, Local FSDs

UEFI systems, MBR-Style Partitioning, GUID Partition Table Partitioning, Boot Process, The UEFI Boot Process, The UEFI Boot Process

UI0Detect.exe (Interactive Services Detection service), Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

UMDF (User-Mode Driver Framework), Types of Device Drivers, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF), User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF), User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)

Umpnpmgr.dll, Driver Installation

underrun detection, Driver Verifier

UNDI (Universal Network Device Interface), Booting from iSCSI

undo entries, Log Record Types, Log Record Types

undo pass, Logging Implementation, Log File Service, Undo Pass, Undo Pass, Undo Pass

undo records, Logging Implementation

undo/redo histories, Common Log File System

undocking, Level of Plug and Play Support

UNEXPECTED_KERNEL_MODE_TRAP stop code, Causes of Windows Crashes, 0xF - UNEXPECTED_KERNEL_MODE_TRAP, 0xC5 - DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL

Unicode, CDFS, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, Unicode-Based Names, Unicode-Based Names, File Records, File Names—File Names, File Names, File Names

unified caching (Store Manager), Unified Caching, Unified Caching, Unified Caching
Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI), GUID Partition Table Partitioning, GUID Partition Table Partitioning, Boot Process, The UEFI Boot Process

unique IDs (partition manager), Partition Manager

Universal Disk Format (UDF), I/O System Components, CDFS, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32

Universal Network Device Interface (UNDI), Booting from iSCSI

unkillable processes, I/O Cancellation, I/O Cancellation, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination

unknown page fault errors, Invalid PTEs

unload routines, Structure of a Driver–Driver Objects and Device Objects, Structure of a Driver, Driver Objects and Device Objects

unloading drivers, I/O System Components

unmapped pages, Page Files

unnamed data attributes, File Records, File Records

unnamed file streams, Cache Working Set Size, Multiple Data Streams

unparked cores, Thresholds and Policy Settings, Performance Check

unpinning pages, Caching with the Mapping and Pinning Interfaces

unsigned drivers, Driver Installation, Driver Installation, Using Crash Troubleshooting Tools, Hung or Unresponsive Systems

untrusted locations, Multiple Data Streams

unwinding, Kernel Stacks

update records, Log Record Types, Log Record Types, Recovery, Redo Pass

update sequence numbers (USNs), Change Logging, The Change Journal File, On-Disk Implementation

updating, Solid State Disks, File Deletion and the Trim Command, Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang, Verbose Analysis

device drivers, Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang
flash memory, Solid State Disks
kernel, Verbose Analysis
sectors, File Deletion and the Trim Command
upper-level filter drivers, Device Stacks, Device Stack Driver Loading
uppercase characters, Master File Table
uppercase file (, Master File Table
uptime, listing, Advanced Crash Dump Analysis
USB (universal serial bus), Types of Device Drivers, Bandwidth Reservation
(Scheduled File I/O), KMDF Data Model, Volume Management, The BIOS Boot
Sector and Bootmgr
  bandwidth reservation, Bandwidth Reservation (Scheduled File I/O)
  basic disks, Volume Management
drivers, Types of Device Drivers
  KMDF objects, KMDF Data Model
  ports, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
USB debugger, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and
Bootmgr
USB dongles, Hung or Unresponsive Systems
USB flash devices, KMDF Data Model, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF),
BitLocker Drive Encryption, Encryption Keys, BitLocker To Go, ReadyBoost,
Unified Caching, Unified Caching
  BitLocker, Encryption Keys
  BitLocker To Go, BitLocker To Go
KMDF objects, KMDF Data Model
ReadyBoost, ReadyBoost, Unified Caching
startup disks, BitLocker Drive Encryption
stores, Unified Caching
UMDF display, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)
USB keyboards, Hung or Unresponsive Systems
use after free bugs, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool
usefirmwarepcisettings element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
uselegacyapicmode element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
usephysicaldestination element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
useplatformclock element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
user address space, Virtual Address Space Layouts–x86 Address Space Layouts,
x86 Address Space Layouts, User Address Space Layout–User Address Space Layout, User Address Space Layout, User Address Space Layout, Controlling Security Mitigations
layout overview, User Address Space Layout–User Address Space Layout, User Address Space Layout
security mitigations, Controlling Security Mitigations
virtual address space layouts, Virtual Address Space Layouts–x86 Address Space Layouts, x86 Address Space Layouts
user buffers, Thread Agnostic I/O
user code address translation, IA64 Virtual Address Translation
user data stream caching, Single, Centralized System Cache
user defined file system (UDFS), The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
user IDs, Quota Tracking–Consolidated Security, Quota Tracking, Consolidated Security
User objects, Types of Heaps
user process address space, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
user scripts, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
user space layouts, System Virtual Address Space Quotas–Controlling Security Mitigations, User Address Space Layout, Image Randomization, Heap Randomization, Controlling Security Mitigations, Address Translation

user stacks, Stacks, User Stacks

user-initiated I/O cancellation, User-Initiated I/O Cancellation–User-Initiated I/O Cancellation, User-Initiated I/O Cancellation, I/O Cancellation for Thread Termination

user-mode accessible bit, Physical Address Extension (PAE)

user-mode applications, Typical I/O Processing–Device Drivers, Device Drivers

user-mode buffers, Opening Devices

user-mode code, Page Tables and Page Table Entries

user-mode debugging framework, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems


user-mode drivers, Types of Device Drivers, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF), User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF), User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF), The Plug and Play (PnP) Manager

user-mode exceptions, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

user-mode heaps, Heap Manager Structure

user-mode page faults, Page Fault Handling

user-mode pages, No Execute Page Protection

user-mode processes, Memory Notification Events–Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events, Memory Notification Events

user-mode stack, Reserving and Committing Pages–Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages

user-mode virtual address space, x64 Virtual Addressing Limitations
Userinit.exe, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit, Safe-Mode-Aware User Programs
users, Scenarios
fast-user switching, Scenarios
Usndump.exe utility, The Change Journal File
USN_REASON identifiers, The Change Journal File–The Change Journal File,
UTF-16 characters, Unicode-Based Names
utility, processor, Utility Function, Utility Function, Utility Function, Utility Function,
Utility Function, Thresholds and Policy Settings, Thresholds and Policy Settings,
Performance Check, Performance Check, Performance Check
Uuidgen utility, Driver Objects and Device Objects
V

VACB arrays, Systemwide Cache Data Structures

VACB index arrays, Per-File Cache Data Structures, Per-File Cache Data Structures, Per-File Cache Data Structures

VACBs (virtual address control blocks), Cache Virtual Memory Management–Cache Working Set Size, Cache Working Set Size, Cache Working Set Size, Cache Physical Size, Cache Data Structures, Systemwide Cache Data Structures

  cache data structures, Cache Data Structures

  cache manager, Cache Virtual Memory Management–Cache Working Set Size, Cache Working Set Size, Cache Working Set Size

  cache slots, Cache Physical Size

  structure, Systemwide Cache Data Structures

VAD trees, Invalid PTEs

VADs (virtual address descriptors), Reserving and Committing Pages, Allocation Granularity, Page Directories, Virtual Address Descriptors, Virtual Address Descriptors, Virtual Address Descriptors–Process VADs, Process VADs, Process VADs, Process VADs, Process VADs, Rotate VADs, Rotate VADs, Rotate VADs, Rotate VADs, Explicit File I/O

  granular allocation, Allocation Granularity

  memory manager, Virtual Address Descriptors, Virtual Address Descriptors, Virtual Address Descriptors, Virtual Address Descriptors–Process VADs, Process VADs

  page faults, Explicit File I/O

  page table creation, Page Directories

  process, Virtual Address Descriptors–Process VADs, Process VADs, Process VADs, Process VADs

  process address space, Reserving and Committing Pages

  rotate, Rotate VADs
viewing, Process VADs

Valid (Active) PFN state, Page Frame Number Database, Page Frame Number Database

Valid bit (PTEs), Page Tables and Page Table Entries

valid pages, Prototype PTEs, PFN Data Structures

valid PTE bits, Physical Address Extension (PAE)

valid PTE fields, Page Tables and Page Table Entries—Page Tables and Page Table Entries, Page Tables and Page Table Entries, Page Tables and Page Table Entries

valid PTEs, PFN Data Structures

valid shared pages, Prototype PTEs

validation (heap debugging), Heap Debugging Features

VBO (virtual byte offset), Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing

VCNs (virtual cluster numbers), Master File Table, Resident and Nonresident Attributes, Compressing Nonsparse Data

compressed files, Compressing Nonsparse Data

VCN-to-LCN mapping, Master File Table, Resident and Nonresident Attributes

VDM (Virtual DOS Machine), Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

Vdrvroot driver, Attaching VHDs

VDS (Virtual Disk Service), Dynamic Disks, Virtual Disk Service, Virtual Disk Service, Virtual Disk Service

VDS Basic Provider, Virtual Disk Service

VDS Dynamic Provider, Virtual Disk Service

vendor IDs (VIDs), Device Stack Driver Loading

verbose analysis, Verbose Analysis, Verbose Analysis, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection, Stack Trashes
verification, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool—Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool

Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier, Driver Verifier

enabling special pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool—Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool, Buffer Overruns, Memory Corruption, and Special Pool

Verify Image Signatures option, Images That Start Automatically

version numbers, displaying, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

versioning information, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

Very Low I/O priority, I/O Priorities, I/O Priority Boosts and Bumps, I/O Priority Boosts and Bumps

VESA display modes, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

Vf* functions, Driver Verifier

VfLoadDriver function, Driver Verifier

VGA display drivers, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, Driver Loading in Safe Mode

VGA display, crashes and, The Blue Screen

vga element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

VGA font files, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

vgaoem.fon file, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

Vhdmp miniport driver, Attaching VHDs

VHDs (virtual hard disks), Storage Management, Virtual Hard Disk Support, Virtual Hard Disk Support

video adapters, Types of Device Drivers, Windows Client Memory Limits, 32-Bit
Client Effective Memory Limits, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

video drivers, Rotate VADs, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

video port drivers, Layered Drivers

VIDEO_TDR_FAILURE stop code, Causes of Windows Crashes

view indexes, Indexing

views (virtual address space), Reserving and Committing Pages, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Copy-on-Write–Copy-on-Write, Copy-on-Write, Copy-on-Write, Prototype PTEs, Cache Virtual Memory Management, Systemwide Cache Data Structures, Per-File Cache Data Structures

cache virtual memory management, Cache Virtual Memory Management

copy-on-write, Copy-on-Write–Copy-on-Write, Copy-on-Write, Copy-on-Write

mapped into cache, Per-File Cache Data Structures

preallocated for VACBs, Systemwide Cache Data Structures

prototype PTEs, Prototype PTEs

section objects, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Shared Memory and Mapped Files

shared page mapping, Reserving and Committing Pages

virtual address space, Completing an I/O Request, Memory Management, Introduction to the Memory Manager, Introduction to the Memory Manager, Services Provided by the Memory Manager, Large and Small Pages, Large and Small Pages, Large and Small Pages–Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Virtual Address Descriptors, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics, The Memory Manager

fast allocation, Virtual Address Descriptors

I/O completion, Completing an I/O Request

mapping files into, The Memory Manager

mapping into physical memory, Introduction to the Memory Manager
memory manager, Memory Management

pages, Services Provided by the Memory Manager, Large and Small Pages, Large and Small Pages

reserving/committing pages, Large and Small Pages–Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages

viewing allocations, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics

vs. physical memory, Introduction to the Memory Manager

virtual address space layouts, x86 System Address Space Layout, x86 Session Space, System Page Table Entries, System Page Table Entries, Windows x64 16-TB Limitation–Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management–System Virtual Address Space Quotas, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, System Virtual Address Space Quotas, System Virtual Address Space Quotas, System Virtual Address Space Quotas, User Address Space Layout, Image Randomization

dynamic management, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management–System Virtual Address Space Quotas, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, System Virtual Address Space Quotas, System Virtual Address Space Quotas

memory manager, x86 Session Space, System Page Table Entries, System Virtual Address Space Quotas, User Address Space Layout, Image Randomization

session space, x86 System Address Space Layout

system PTEs, System Page Table Entries

x64 limitations, Windows x64 16-TB Limitation–Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management

virtual addresses, Windows x64 16-TB Limitation, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space

virtual allocator, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management

virtual block caching, Key Features of the Cache Manager, Virtual Block Caching

virtual bus drivers, Device Enumeration

virtual byte offset (VBO), Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing

virtual bytes, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit

virtual clients, Log Types

virtual devices, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)

Virtual Disk Service (VDS), Dynamic Disks, Virtual Disk Service, Virtual Disk Service, Virtual Hard Disk Support

Virtual DOS Machine (VDM), Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

virtual FCBs, Log Types

virtual files, Typical I/O Processing

virtual hard disks (VHDs), Storage Management, Virtual Hard Disk Support, Virtual Hard Disk Support

virtual log LSNs, Owner Pages

virtual LSNs, Translating Virtual LSNs to Physical LSNs—Translating Virtual LSNs to Physical LSNs, Translating Virtual LSNs to Physical LSNs, Translating Virtual LSNs to Physical LSNs

Virtual Machine Extensions (VME), Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

virtual machines (VMs), Virtual Hard Disk Support, When There Is No Crash Dump, When There Is No Crash Dump

virtual memory, Mapped File I/O and File Caching, Introduction to the Memory Manager, Services Provided by the Memory Manager, Reserving and Committing Pages, Physical Memory Limits–32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, Windows
Client Memory Limits, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, Cache Virtual Memory Management, Cache Working Set Size, Fast I/O, Fast I/O cache manager, Cache Virtual Memory Management, Cache Working Set Size Control Panel applet, Introduction to the Memory Manager fast I/O, Fast I/O, Fast I/O functions, Services Provided by the Memory Manager limits, Physical Memory Limits–32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, Windows Client Memory Limits, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits mapped file I/O, Mapped File I/O and File Caching releasing or decommitting pages, Reserving and Committing Pages virtual NVRAM stores, Unified Caching virtual page numbers, x86 Virtual Address Translation, x86 Virtual Address Translation virtual pages, Memory Manager Components, Placement Policy, Working Set Management Virtual PC, Virtual Hard Disk Support virtual size, Pool Sizes paged pool, Pool Sizes virtual storage (SANs), Storage Management, Disk Class, Port, and Miniport Drivers virtual TLB entries, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr virtual-address-to-working-set pairs, Tracing and Logging virtual-to-physical memory translation, Protecting Memory VirtualAlloc functions, Large and Small Pages, Reserving and Committing Pages, Address Windowing Extensions, Types of Heaps, x86 Address Space Layouts, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit–Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Commit Charge
and the System Commit Limit, Virtual Address Descriptors

backing stores, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit
committed storage, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit–Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit

growth in allocations, x86 Address Space Layouts

large memory regions, Types of Heaps, Virtual Address Descriptors

large pages, Large and Small Pages

mapping views, Address Windowing Extensions

private pages, Reserving and Committing Pages

VirtualFree functions, Reserving and Committing Pages

VirtualLock function, Locking Memory

VirtualProtect functions, Protecting Memory–Protecting Memory, Protecting Memory

VirtualQuery functions, Protecting Memory–Protecting Memory, Protecting Memory

Virtualxxx functions, Services Provided by the Memory Manager

virus scanning, I/O Prioritization, File System Filter Drivers

VMMMap utility, Examining Memory Usage, User Address Space Layout, User Address Space Layout, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics

vnodes, Opening Devices

volatile data, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing

volatile physical NVRAM cache, Unified Caching

VolMgr driver, Basic Disk Volume Manager, Dynamic Disk Volume Manager, Multipartition Volume Management

VolMgr-Internal GUID, The Mount Manager
VolMgrX driver, **Dynamic Disk Volume Manager**, **Multipartition Volume Management**

Volsnap.sys driver, **Shadow Copy Provider—Uses in Windows**, **Shadow Copy Provider**, **Uses in Windows**

volume book records (VBRs), **Volume Mounting**, **Master File Table**, **BIOS Preboot**, **BIOS Preboot**

volume device objects, **Basic Disk Volume Manager**, **Volume Mounting**, **Volume Mounting**

volume entries (LDM), **The LDM Database—The LDM Database**, **The LDM Database**

volume file (, **NTFS On-Disk Structure**, **Master File Table**, **Master File Table**

volume label file (, **Dynamic Partitioning**, **NTFS Bad-Cluster Recovery**


  associated IRPs, **I/O Requests to Layered Drivers—I/O Requests to Layered Drivers**, **I/O Requests to Layered Drivers**, **I/O Requests to Layered Drivers**

  basic disks, **Basic Disk Volume Manager**

  disk offset management, **Multipartition Volume Management**

  dynamic disks, **Dynamic Disk Volume Manager**

  layering drivers, **Layered Drivers**

  recovery, **NTFS Bad-Cluster Recovery**

  symbolic links, **Disk Device Objects**


volume namespace mechanism, **The Volume Namespace—Volume Mounting**, **The**


volume objects, Volume I/O Operations, Explicit File I/O

volume quotas, Per-User Volume Quotas, Per-User Volume Quotas

volume sets (spanned volumes), Spanned Volumes

Volume Shadow Copy Driver, Shadow Copy Provider–Uses in Windows, Shadow Copy Provider, Shadow Copy Provider, Uses in Windows

volume-recognition process, Volume Mounting


basic disk partitions, GUID Partition Table Partitioning

basic disks, Volume Management, GUID Partition Table Partitioning, Basic Disk Volume Manager
clone and original volumes, Shadow Copies

compression, Data Compression and Sparse Files, Data Compression and Sparse Files, Compressing Nonsparse Data, Compressing Nonsparse Data
defragmentation, Defragmentation
dependent, Nested File Systems
dynamic, Dynamic Disks–Multipartition Volume Management, The LDM Database, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, Multipartition Volume Management
encryption, BitLocker Drive Encryption, BitLocker Drive Encryption, Trusted Platform Module (TPM), BitLocker Boot Process, Full-Volume Encryption Driver, BitLocker To Go
FAT cluster sizes, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32–FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32, FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32
foreign, BitLocker Key Recovery
I/O operations, Volume I/O Operations
indexing, General Indexing Facility

multipartition, Storage Terminology, Multipartition Volume Management–RAID-5 Volumes, Mirrored Volumes, RAID-5 Volumes

NTFS on-disk structure, NTFS On-Disk Structure
recovery, Design
redundant, NTFS Bad-Cluster Recovery
self-healing, Self-Healing
simple, Storage Terminology
snapshots, Nested File Systems
version and labels, File Records
VOLUME_NAME attribute, File Records
VPBs (volume parameter blocks), Volume Mounting, Volume Mounting, Local FSDs, Explicit File I/O
device objects, Explicit File I/O
file system drivers, Volume Mounting
I/O manager, Local FSDs
mount operations, Volume Mounting
architecture, VSS Architecture, VSS Operation
operation, VSS Operation–Uses in Windows, Shadow Copy Provider, Shadow Copy Provider, Uses in Windows
shrinking volumes, Dynamic Partitioning–NTFS File System Driver, Dynamic Partitioning, NTFS File System Driver
storage management, Shadow Copy Provider, Shadow Copy Provider
VSS providers, VSS Architecture, VSS Operation, VSS Operation, Uses in Windows
VSS requestors, VSS Architecture, VSS Operation
Windows backup/restore, Shadow Copy Provider–Conclusion, Backup, Previous Versions and System Restore, Previous Versions and System Restore, Previous Versions and System Restore, Conclusion
Vssadmin utility, Previous Versions and System Restore–Conclusion, Conclusion
wait functions, Memory Notification Events
wait locks, KMDF Data Model
wait states, Completing an I/O Request
WaitForMultipleObjects function, The IoCompletion Object
waking power state, The Power Manager, The Power Manager
watermarked desktops, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
WDF (Windows Driver Foundation), Kernel-Mode Driver Framework (KMDF)–KMDF I/O Model, Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver, KMDF Data Model, KMDF I/O Model
WdfDeviceCreate function, KMDF Data Model
WDFDRIVER structure, KMDF Data Model
Wdfkd.dll extension, Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver
WDFQUEUE processing, KMDF I/O Model
WDFREQUEST objects, KMDF I/O Model
WDF_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES structure, KMDF Data Model–KMDF I/O Model, KMDF I/O Model
WDI (Windows Diagnostic Infrastructure), Process Reflection
WDK (Windows Driver Kit), File System Driver Architecture, The Blue Screen, Stack Trashes
WDM (Windows Driver Model), I/O System Components, WDM Drivers, WDM Drivers, Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver, KMDF I/O Model, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)
wear-leveling, NAND-Type Flash Memory, File Deletion and the Trim Command
webcams, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)
weighting (affinity history), Thresholds and Policy Settings
WER (Windows Error Reporting), \textit{Windows Error Reporting}, \textit{Online Crash Analysis}

WerFault.exe, \textit{Windows Error Reporting}, \textit{Online Crash Analysis}

WHEA\textunderscore UNCORRECTABLE\textunderscore ERROR stop code, \textit{Causes of Windows Crashes}

WHQL (Windows Hardware Quality Labs), \textit{Driver Verifier}, \textit{Driver Installation}

wild-pointer bugs, \textit{Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection}

WIM (Windows Installation Media), \textit{The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr}, \textit{The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr}

Win32 GUI driver, \textit{Types of Heaps}

Win32k.sys (windowing system driver), \textit{x86 System Address Space Layout}, \textit{Kernel Stacks}, \textit{Driver Verifier}

\hspace{1em} Driver Verifier and, \textit{Driver Verifier}

\hspace{1em} graphic system calls, \textit{Kernel Stacks}

\hspace{1em} session space, \textit{x86 System Address Space Layout}

Win32\textunderscore EncryptableVolume interface, \textit{BitLocker Management}

Win32\textunderscore Tpm interface, \textit{BitLocker Management}

WinDbg.exe, \textit{Crash Dump Files}, \textit{Basic Crash Dump Analysis}, \textit{Basic Crash Dump Analysis}, \textit{When There Is No Crash Dump}

\hspace{1em} basic crash analysis, \textit{Basic Crash Dump Analysis}

\hspace{1em} connecting to host computer, \textit{When There Is No Crash Dump}

\hspace{1em} extracting minidumps, \textit{Crash Dump Files}

\hspace{1em} loading symbols, \textit{Basic Crash Dump Analysis}

Windiff utility, \textit{Post--Splash Screen Crash or Hang}

I/O manager, The I/O Manager
native API, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit
object model, Security
security, Security
splash screen hangs or crashes, Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang–Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang
Windows 7, BitLocker To Go, Volumes, Causes of Windows Crashes, Causes of Windows Crashes
Windows Application Compatibility Toolkit, No Execute Page Protection
Windows Backup and Restore, System File Corruption
Windows Cryptography Next Generation (CNG), Encrypting File System Security
Windows Defender, I/O Priorities
Windows Diagnostic Infrastructure (WDI), Process Reflection
Windows directory, Encryption
Windows Driver Foundation (WDF), Kernel-Mode Driver Framework (KMDF)—KMDF I/O Model, Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver, KMDF Data Model, KMDF Data Model, KMDF Data Model, KMDF Data Model, KMDF I/O Model, KMDF I/O Model, KMDF I/O Model
Windows Driver Kit (WDK), Structure of a Driver, File System Driver Architecture, The Blue Screen, Stack Trashes
Windows Driver Model (WDM), I/O System Components, WDM Drivers, WDM Drivers, Structure and Operation of a KMDF Driver, KMDF Data Model, User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)
Windows Embedded CE, exFAT
Windows Enterprise, Virtual Hard Disk Support, BitLocker To Go, Physical Memory Limits, Windows Client Memory Limits
Windows Error Reporting (WER), Fault Tolerant Heap, Troubleshooting Crashes,
Troubleshooting Crashes, Windows Error Reporting, Windows Error Reporting, Online Crash Analysis

Windows file systems, CDFS, UDF, exFAT–NTFS, exFAT, NTFS
- CDFS, CDFS
- exFAT, exFAT–NTFS, exFAT, NTFS
- UDF, UDF

Windows Home Basic, Physical Memory Limits

Windows Home Premium, Physical Memory Limits

Windows Installation Media (WIM), The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

Windows logo animation, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

Windows Media Player Network Sharing Service, Power Availability Requests

Windows Memory Diagnostic Tool, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)

Windows Modules Installer service, Boot Sector Corruption

Windows NT, Disk Device Objects

Windows PE, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

Windows Portable Device (WPD), User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)

Windows Professional, Physical Memory Limits, Windows Client Memory Limits

Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)–Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), Solving Common Boot Problems, Boot Sector Corruption, System File Corruption, System Hive Corruption, Post–Splash Screen Crash or Hang, Shutdown

Windows Resource Exhaustion Detection and Resolution (RADAR), Process Reflection, Process Reflection


2008 R2, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers, BitLocker To Go, Volumes

BitLocker To Go, BitLocker To Go


for Itanium, Physical Memory Limits

Foundation, Physical Memory Limits

FTH, Fault Tolerant Heap

HPC Edition, Physical Memory Limits

MPIO support, Multipath I/O (MPIO) Drivers

NTFS v. 3.1, NTFS On-Disk Structure

Standard Edition, Physical Memory Limits

Windows Setup, BIOS Preboot, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), System File Corruption

Windows Sockets 2 (Winsock2), Using Completion Ports

Windows software trace preprocessor (WPP), Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems


Windows subsystems, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

Windows Task Scheduler, I/O Prioritization

Windows Ultimate, Virtual Hard Disk Support, BitLocker To Go, Physical Memory Limits
Windows Update, Driver Installation, Driver Installation, System File Corruption, Verbose Analysis

Windows Web Server, Physical Memory Limits

Wininit.exe (Windows initialization process), BIOS Preboot, Smss, Csrss, and Wininit

Winload.efi, The UEFI Boot Process

Winload.exe, Winload, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning, Mirrored Volumes, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The UEFI Boot Process, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The UEFI Boot Process

BCD options, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The UEFI Boot Process

boot volume loading, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The UEFI Boot Process, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The UEFI Boot Process

device and configuration information, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

LDM invisible, LDM and GPT or MBR-Style Partitioning

multipartition volumes and, Mirrored Volumes

storage management, Winload

virtual addresses, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management

Winlogon.exe, Virtual Address Space Layouts

winpe element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

WinRE (Windows Recovery Environment), Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)
Winresume.exe, BIOS Preboot, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
Winsock 2 (Windows Sockets 2), The IoCompletion Object
Winver utility, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits
WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation), I/O System Components, WDM Drivers–Layered Drivers, Layered Drivers, Driver Verifier, KMDF Data Model, KMDF I/O Model, Full-Volume Encryption Driver
    BitLocker interface, Full-Volume Encryption Driver
    IRP handling, KMDF I/O Model
    IRP stress tests, Driver Verifier
    KMDF objects, KMDF Data Model
    WDM drivers, WDM Drivers–Layered Drivers, Layered Drivers
    WDM WMI, I/O System Components
WMI providers, KMDF Data Model, BitLocker Drive Encryption, Crash Dump Files
Wmic.exe, Crash Dump Files
Wmpntwk.exe, Power Availability Requests
WM_QUERYENDSESSION message, Shutdown, Shutdown
work items (KMDF objects), KMDF Data Model
work requests (cache manager), System Threads
worker threads, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems, Shutdown
working set manager, Memory Manager Components, Modified Page Writer, Working Set Management, Balance Set Manager and Swapper
working sets, Memory Manager Components, Internal Synchronization, Internal Synchronization, Reserving and Committing Pages, Hardware vs. Software Write Bits in Page Table Entries, Physical Address Extension (PAE), Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit, Page Frame Number Database, Page List Dynamics, Modified Page Writer, Modified Page Writer,PFN Data Structures, PFN Data

active pages in, Page Frame Number Database

aging, Tracing and Logging

balance set manager/swapper, Balance Set Manager and Swapper–System Working Sets, Balance Set Manager and Swapper, System Working Sets

commit charge, Commit Charge and the System Commit Limit

hash trees, PFN Data Structures

index field, PFN Data Structures

limits, Working Set Management

locks, Internal Synchronization

logical pref, Logical Prefetcher

management, Working Set Management

memory manager, Internal Synchronization, Demand Paging, Logical Prefetcher, Logical Prefetcher, Placement Policy, Placement Policy, Working Set Management, Working Set Management, Balance Set Manager and Swapper, Balance Set Manager and Swapper, Memory Notification Events

moving pages out of, Reserving and Committing Pages
page writer, Modified Page Writer
paged pool working set, System Working Sets
pages trimmed from, Page List Dynamics
physical memory, Physical Address Extension (PAE)
session working sets, Working Sets
size, Cache Size–Cache Working Set Size, Cache Working Set Size, Cache Working Set Size
software and hardware Write bits, Hardware vs. Software Write Bits in Page Table Entries
system cache working sets, System Working Sets
system PTEs working sets, System Working Sets–Memory Notification Events, System Working Sets, Memory Notification Events
system working sets, Working Sets, System Working Sets
trimming, Working Set Management
types, Working Sets
viewing, Working Set Management
viewing set lists, Working Set Management–Balance Set Manager and Swapper, Balance Set Manager and Swapper, Balance Set Manager and Swapper
working set manager, Memory Manager Components, Modified Page Writer, Working Set Management, Balance Set Manager and Swapper

WorkingSetSize variable, Pool Sizes

Wow64 environment, 64-Bit Address Space Layouts, User Stacks
writable pages, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Hardware vs. Software Write Bits in Page Table Entries

Write bit (PTEs), Page Tables and Page Table Entries
write in progress PFN flag, PFN Data Structures
write operations, IRP Buffer Management, KMDF I/O Model, Mirrored Volumes–Mirrored Volumes, Mirrored Volumes, Large and Small Pages, Fast I/O, Fast I/O, Write Throttling, Write Throttling, Locking, Crash Dump Analysis, When There Is No Crash Dump
  buffered I/O, IRP Buffer Management
  crashes, Crash Dump Analysis, When There Is No Crash Dump
  fast I/O, Fast I/O, Fast I/O
  KMDF, KMDF I/O Model
  large page bugs, Large and Small Pages
  mirrored volumes, Mirrored Volumes–Mirrored Volumes, Mirrored Volumes
  oplocks, Locking
  write throttling, Write Throttling, Write Throttling
write protection, Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection
write throttling, Write Throttling–Write Throttling, Write Throttling, Write Throttling
Write through bit (PTEs), Page Tables and Page Table Entries
write-behind operations, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing–Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Disabling Lazy Writing for a File, Write Throttling, Write Throttling
  disabling lazy writing, Disabling Lazy Writing for a File
  lazy writer, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing
  write throttling, Write Throttling, Write Throttling
write-back caching, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing–Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing
write-combined memory access, Page Tables and Page Table Entries
write-through operations, **Fast I/O, Forcing the Cache to Write Through to Disk, Design**

WriteEncryptionFileRaw function, **Backing Up Encrypted Files**

WriteFile function, **Synchronous and Asynchronous I/O, Write-Back Caching and Lazy Writing, Explicit File I/O, Transactional APIs**

WriteFileEx function, **Completing an I/O Request**

WriteFileGather function, **Scatter/Gather I/O**

WriteProcessMemory function, **Reserving and Committing Pages**

WRP (Windows Resource Protection), **System File Corruption**

WUDFHost.exe, **User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)**

WUDFPlatform.dll, **User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)**

WUDFx.dll, **User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF)**
X.509 version 3 certificates, Encrypting File Data, Encrypting File Data x2apicpolicy element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

x64 systems, MBR-Style Partitioning, Introduction to the Memory Manager, x64 Virtual Addressing Limitations–Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, Physical Address Extension (PAE), IA64 Virtual Address Translation, Page Files, Page Priority, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits, Working Set Management, Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection

address translation, IA64 Virtual Address Translation
device memory support, 32-Bit Client Effective Memory Limits
limitations, x64 Virtual Addressing Limitations–Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management, Dynamic System Virtual Address Space Management

MBR, MBR-Style Partitioning
PAE, Physical Address Extension (PAE)
page file size, Page Files
prioritized standby lists, Page Priority
process virtual address space, Introduction to the Memory Manager
system code write protection, Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection

working set limits, Working Set Management

x86 systems, MBR-Style Partitioning, x86 System Address Space Layout, x86 Session Space, x86 Virtual Address Translation, x86 Virtual Address Translation, Page Directories, Translation Look-Aside Buffer, Physical Address Extension (PAE)–Physical Address Extension (PAE), Physical Address Extension (PAE), Physical Address Extension (PAE), Physical Address Extension (PAE), Page Files, Page List Dynamics, Working Set Management, The BIOS Boot Sector and
Bootmgr–The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection

address translation, x86 Virtual Address Translation, x86 Virtual Address Translation, Translation Look-Aside Buffer

layouts and session space, x86 Session Space

MBR, MBR-Style Partitioning

PAE systems, Physical Address Extension (PAE)–Physical Address Extension (PAE), Physical Address Extension (PAE), Physical Address Extension (PAE), Physical Address Extension (PAE)

page files, Page Files

page tables, Page Directories

real mode, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr–The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

session space, x86 System Address Space Layout

system code write protection, Code Overwrite and System Code Write Protection

viewing page allocations, Page List Dynamics

working set limits, Working Set Management

XOR operation, RAID-5 Volumes

XSAVE instruction, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

XSAVE Policy Resource Driver (Hwpolicy.sys), The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

xsaveaddfeature0-7 element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

xsavedisable element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr

xsavepolicy element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
xsavemask element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
xsaveremovefeature element, The BIOS Boot Sector and Bootmgr
zero page lists, Examining Memory Usage, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics, Page List Dynamics, Modified Page Writer, Tracing and Logging, Robust Performance

zero page threads, Memory Manager Components, Page List Dynamics, Initializing the Kernel and Executive Subsystems

zero-filled pages, Shared Memory and Mapped Files, Page Fault Handling

zero-length buffers, KMDF I/O Model

zero-size memory allocations, Driver Verifier

zeroed pages, Memory Manager Components, Large and Small Pages, PFN Data Structures

Zeroed PFN state, Page Frame Number Database, Page Frame Number Database, Page List Dynamics

Zw functions, Shared Memory and Mapped Files
About the Authors

Mark Russinovich is a Technical Fellow in the Windows Azure™ group at Microsoft. He is coauthor of Windows SysInternals Administrator’s Reference, co-creator of the Sysinternals tools available from Microsoft TechNet, and coauthor of the Windows Internals book series.

David A. Solomon is coauthor of the Windows Internals book series and has taught his Windows internals class to thousands of developers and IT professionals worldwide, including Microsoft staff. He is a regular speaker at Microsoft conferences, including TechNet and PDC.

Alex Ionescu is a chief software architect and consultant expert in low-level system software, kernel development, security training, and reverse engineering. He teaches Windows internals course with David Solomon, and is active in the security research community.